Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo, petitioner Vs.

The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, respondent

Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, Rep. Rodolfo B. Albano, Jr., Rep. Simeon A. Datumanong, and Rep. Orlando B. Fua, Sr.,
petitioners
Vs.
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., and Department of Budget and Management Secretary Florencio B. Abad,
repondents

Facts:

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then
Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this
noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo)
in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative
power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive
Order No. 1;

2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and

5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Ruling:

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The Court finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention
of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental
and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the
guidance of all. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe
the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to
settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society.

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has
the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating
team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry.

Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cariño
v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation,"
"investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded
conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa
Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ
have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are
not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for
violations of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that
it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous
administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded
with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous
to that of former President Arroyo.

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover
all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions
of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
"concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only. The intent to single
out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions
of the questioned executive order.

The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the
executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the
protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers?
Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for
it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nation’s
thrust to progress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of
Executive Order No. 1.

Remman Enterprises, Inc v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service

FACTS:

• In 2009, RA 9646 (Real Estate Service Act) was signed into law by PGMA. Said Act aims to
professionalize the real estate service industry by requiring a licensure examination for
practitioners in said field.
• In 2010, the PRC, pursuant to RA 9646, promulgated the IRR implementing the Act. It required
any person engaged in the real estate service to comply with the requirements, with a certain
exemption (per Sec. 28):
o “Any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform by himself/herself the acts
mentioned in Section 3 hereof with reference to his/her or its own property, except real
estate developers”
• Petitioners now appeal by way of certiorari to the SC, contending the following, inter alia,
infirmities of said law:
o Sec. 28, and relevant provisions, are violative of substantive due process
▪ Petitioners aver that this is “unduly oppressive,” for it burdens them to employ
first licensed practitioners before they can dispose of their properties; that it
interferes with their right to handle their property as they see fit.
o Sec. 28, and relevant provisions, are violative of the equal protection clause
▪ Petitioners aver that the exemption of other persons from the law unduly
discriminates towards their own class.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not Sec. 28, inter alia, violates constitutional due process
• Whether or not Sec. 28, inter alia, violates the equal protection clause

RULING:

• NO. There is no deprivation of their property rights. Regulatory laws are a valid use of police
power.
o The burden imposed upon petitioners is a consequence of the lawful subject, i.e. the
professionalization and regulation of the real estate service; That said subject is in
furtherance of public welfare, to prevent unscrupulous practices.
• NO. The Equal Protection Clause allows for valid classification, so long as there is a substantive
purpose therefor. In this case, the classification is valid because real estate developers sell
property not solely as an exercise of their patrimonial rights, but as a business. Thus, to curtail
certain evils in the practice thereof, such classification is indeed necessary.

People of the Philippines vs Cayat

“Equal Protection” – Requisites of a Valid Classification – Bar from Drinking Gin
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of
their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act.
He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt
but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal
protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or “mark them as
inferior or less capable race and less entitled” will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and
classify native non-Christians from Christians.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasized
that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The
classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or parentage.” The law, then, does not seek to mark the
non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or less capable race.” On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the
promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the
enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the
law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise
their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing
them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

Philippine Judges Association vs Prado

FACTS:

The main target of this petition is **Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from
the SC, CA, RTC, MTC and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges
will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 (see ISSUE
for the grounds stated by the petitioners).

ISSUE:

WON RA No.7354 is unconstitutional based on the following grounds:

1) its *title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes;

(2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were
not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the
independence of the Judiciary.

HELD:

1. The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or
to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates
the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature
or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. In the case at bar, the repealing
clause which includes the withdrawal of franking privileges is merely the effect and not the subject of the statute; and
it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title.

2. This argument is unacceptable. While a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences
between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. It may propose an entirely new
provision. The court also added that said the bill in question was duly approved by the Senate and the House of
Representatives. It was enrolled with its certification by Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives.
It was then presented to and approved by President the President. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court
may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. An enrolled
bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary. The court therefore declined to look into the petitioners' charges. Both the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted. The court is bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government.

3. Yes, the clause denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly
situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real
differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege (Pres, VP, Senators etc.). If the problem
of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it
altogether from all agencies of government. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it
from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need
it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it.

Therefore, Sec 35 of RA 7345 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

-----------------------

* "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for
Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."

** Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth Act
No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege
under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions
as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ

101 PHIL 155

Facts: The Congress of the Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes the retail trade business, Republic Act No.
1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business,” prohibiting aliens in general to engage in retail trade in our
country.

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the provisions of RA No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether Congress in enacting R.A. No. 1180 violated the UN Charter, the UN Declaration of Human Rights and
the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of Amity.

Held: The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects, and
the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China guarantees equality of
treatment to the Chinese nationals “upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country. But the nationals of
China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who
are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade.
But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or
amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the
State.

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado

[GR 105371, 11 November 1993]
En Banc, Cruz (J): 12 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: The Philippine Judges Association (duly represented by its President, Bernardo P. Abesamis, Vice-President for
Legal Affairs Mariano M. Umali, Director for Pasig, Makati and Pasay, Metro Manila Alfredo C.Flores, and Chairman of
the Committee on Legal Aid, Jesus G. Bersamira, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City
and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively); the National Confederation of the Judges
Association of the Philippines (composed of the Metropolitan Trial Court Judges Association represented by its
President, Reinato Quilala of the Municipal Trial Circuit Court, Manila); and the Municipal Judges League of the
Philippines (represented by its President, Tomas G. Talavera); by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the
Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, filed the
petition assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act 7354 (An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining
its Power, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected
Therewith), as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular 92-28, on the grounds that: (1)
its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings
in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members
before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary; contending that
their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the withdrawal of franking privilege. The National Land
Registration Authority (NLRA) has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as the sending of
requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.

Issue: Whether the withdrawal of the franking privilege of the Judiciary violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause
in Article III Sec. 1, of the Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or
hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But
if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is
the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal protection
clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. What the
clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant
the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars. The withdrawal of franking privilege from the Judiciary would further deepen the problem in the delay in
the administration of justice. The Court are dependent on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and
litigants as part of the judicial process. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they
have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions, considering that
the Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive
Departments (.84% of P309 billion budgeted for 1993). The repealing clause is a discriminatory provision that denied
the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction
made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the
Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege (The President of the Philippines; the Vice President of the
Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives; the Commission on Elections; former Presidents
of the Philippines; widows of former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the
general public in the filing of complaints against public offices or officers). In lumping the Judiciary with the other
offices (the Office of Adult Education; the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan
or the Office of Special Prosecutor; the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial
and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.) from which the franking privilege
has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there
is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

PASEI [Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc] v. Drilon

[GR L-81958, 30 June 1988]
En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 12 concur, 2 on leave

Facts: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) is a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement." It challenged the Constitutional validity of DOLE’s
Department Order 1 (series of 1988), in the character of "Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of
Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers," in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The measure is
assailed (1) for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" (2) for being violative of the right to travel, and (3) for being an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. PASEI also
invoked Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law as Department Order No. 1, as contended, was
passed in the absence
of prior consultations. It also claimed that it violated the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great
and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced. On 25 May 1988, the Solicitor
General, on behalf of the Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the POEA, filed a Comment informing the Court that
on 8 March 1988, the Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong,
United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the
Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.

Issue: Whether Department Order 1 unduly discriminates against women.

Held: Department Order 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. ‘Equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity
of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4)
they apply equally to all members of the same class. The classification made — the preference for female workers —
rests on substantial distinctions. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and
various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent
Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of
exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. There is no evidence that, except
perhaps for isolated instances, Filipino men abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament. Discrimination
in this case is justified. Further, the impugned guidelines are applicable to all female domestic overseas workers, not
all Filipina workers. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and
arbitrary, due to the fact that not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling
out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or
resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. Where the classification is based on such
distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule is
to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable
treatment.

International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) vs. Quisumbing

[GR 128845, 1 June 2000]
First Division, Kapunan (J): 2 concur, 1 on official leave, 1 on leave

Facts: The International School, Inc., pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution
established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the
School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the
same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally
or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and
regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of
employees. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the
same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty
member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire, i.e. (a) What is one's domicile? (b) Where is one's home
economy? (c) To which country does one owe economic allegiance? (d) Was the individual hired abroad specifically to
work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines? The School grants
foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes,
and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires. The School
justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the
"dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to
remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent
professionals in the field of international education. The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown
to apply to all, regardless of race. There are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino
local hires. When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, the International
School Alliance of Educators (ISAE), "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty
members" of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well
as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a
deadlock between the parties. On 7 September 1995, ISAE filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board
to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume
jurisdiction over the dispute. On 10 June 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order
resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing
subsequently denied ISAE's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated 19 March 1997. ISAE sought relief from the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the School unduly discriminated against the local-hires.

Held: That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect
the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to
"give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person,
"in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes
discrimination. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention
(No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 16 — all embody the general principle
against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has
incorporated this principle as part of its national laws. In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor
are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible. If
an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal
work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest,
it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult
to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee
is treated unfairly. Herein, the International School has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that
foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and
responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. The School cannot invoke the need to entice
foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal
work for equal pay. The point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the
salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local- hires. The
practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy.