G.R. No.
171855 October 15, 2012 On February 9, 2005, the provincial prosecutor issued a
FE V. RAPSING, TITA C. VILLANUEVA and ANNIE F.
APAREJADO, represented by EDGAR AP
AREJADO,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, of RTC-Branch 47,
Masbate City; SSGT. EDISON RURAL, CAA JOSE MATU,
CAA MORIE FLORES, CAA GUILLEN TOPAS, CAA DANDY
FLORES, CAA LEONARDO CALIMUTAN and CAA RENE
ROM, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners Fe
Rapsing, Tita C. Villanueva and Annie Aparejado, · as
represented by Edgar Aparejado, seeking to set aside the
Orders dated December 6, 20051 and January 11,
2006,2 respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Masbate City, Branch 47, in Criminal Case No. 11846.
The antecedents are as follows:
Respondents SSgt. Edison Rural, CAA Jose Matu, CAA Morie
Flores, CAA Guillien Topas, CAA Dandy Flores, CAA Leonardo
Calimutan and CAA Rene Rom are members of the Alpha
Company, 22nd Infantry Battalion, 9th Division of the Philippine
Army based at Cabangcalan Detachment, Aroroy, Masbate.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are the widows of Teogenes
Rapsing, Teofilo Villanueva and Edwin Aparejado, who were
allegedly killed in cold blood by the respondents.
Respondents alleged that on May 3, 2004, around 1 o'clock in
the afternoon, they received information about the presence of
armed elements reputed to be New People’s Army (NPA)
partisans in Sitio Gaway-gaway, Barangay Lagta, Baleno,
Masbate. Acting on the information, they coordinated with the
Philippine National Police and proceeded to the place. Thereat,
they encountered armed elements which resulted in an intense
firefight. When the battle ceased, seven (7) persons, namely:
Teogenes Rapsing y Manlapaz, Teofilo Villanueva y Prisado,
Marianito Villanueva y Oliva, Edwin Aparejado y Valdemoro,
Isidro Espino y Arevalo, Roque Tome y Morgado and Norberto
Aranilla y Cordova were found sprawled on the ground lifeless.
The post-incident report of the Philippine Army states that a
legitimate military operation was conducted and in the course
of which, the victims, armed with high-powered firearms,
engaged in a shoot-out with the military.
On the other hand, petitioners complained that there was no
encounter that ensued and that the victims were summarily
executed in cold blood by respondents. Hence, they requested
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the
case. After investigation, the NBI recommended to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate City that a preliminary
investigation be conducted against respondents for the crime
of multiple murder. In reaching its recommendation, the NBI
relied on the statements of witnesses who claim that the
military massacred helpless and unarmed civilians.
Resolution3 recommending the filing of an Information for
Multiple Murder. Consequently, respondents were charged with
multiple murder in an Information4 dated February 15, 2005,
which reads:
The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses
SSGT Edison Rural, CAA Jose Matu. CAA Morie Flores, CAA
Guillen Topas, CAA Dandy Flores, CAA Leonardo Calimutan
and CAA Rene Rom, stationed at Alpha Company, 22nd
Infantry Battalion, 9th Division, Philippine Army, Cabangcalan
Detachment, Aroroy, Masbate, committed as follows:
That on May 9, 2004, at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon
thereof, at Barangay Lagta, Municipality of Baleno, Province of
Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping with one another, taking
advantage of their superior strength as elements of the
Philippine Army, armed with their government issued firearms,
with intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot Teogenes Rapsing y
Manlapaz, Teofilo Villanueva y Prisado, Marianito Villanueva y
Oliva, Edwin Aparejado y Valdemoro, Isidro Espino y Arevalo,
Roque Tome y Morgado and Norberto Aranilla y Cordova,
hitting them on different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting
upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their
deaths.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Masbate City, February 15, 2005.
On July 28, 2005, a warrant5 for the arrest of respondents was
issued by the RTC of Masbate City, Branch 47, but before
respondents could be arrested, the Judge Advocate General's
Office (JAGO) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
filed an Omnibus Motion6 dated July 20, 2005, with the trial
court seeking the cases against respondents be transferred to
the jurisdiction of the military tribunal.7 Initially, the trial court
denied the motion filed by the JAGO on the ground that
respondents have not been arrested. The JAGO filed a Motion
for Reconsideration,8and in an Order9 dated December 6,
2005, the trial court granted the Omnibus Motion and the entire
records of the case were turned over to the Commanding
General of the 9th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, for
appropriate action.
Petitioners sought reconsideration10 of the Order, but was
denied by the trial court in an Order11 dated January 11, 2006.
Hence, the present petition with the following arguments:
I
HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO ABLES GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO TRANSFER THE INSTANT
CRIMINAL CASE OF MULTIPLE MURDER TO THE
JURISDICTION OF THE MILITARY COURT MARTIAL, AS
THE SAID TRIBUNAL, BASED ON FACTS AND IN LAW, HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT MURDER CASE.
II
IT IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
EXCESS IN JURISDICTION IF NOT GROSS IGNORANCE
OF THE LAW ON THE PART OF HONORABLE JUDGE
MAXIMINO ABLES TO HOLD THAT HIS ORDER DATED
DECEMBER 6, 2005 COULD ONLY BE REVIEWED
THROUGH AN APPEAL, AS THERE IS NO TRIAL ON THE
MERIT YET ON THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.12
Petitioners alleged that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it
transferred the criminal case filed against the respondents to
the jurisdiction of the military tribunal, as jurisdiction over the
same is conferred upon the civil courts by Republic Act No.
7055 (RA 7055).13 On the other hand, the respondents and the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) alleged that the acts
complained of are service connected and falls within the
jurisdiction of the military court.
The petition is meritorious. The trial court gravely abused its
discretion in not taking cognizance of the case, which actually
falls within its jurisdiction.
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein.14 As a necessary consequence,
the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss,
for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely
depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction
of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing
from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters
to be consulted.15
In the case at bar, the information states that respondents,
"conspiring together and mutually helping with one another,
taking advantage of their superior strength, as elements of the
Philippine Army, armed with their government-issued firearms
with intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot the [victims], hitting them
on different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting upon them
multiple gunshot wounds which caused their deaths." 16 Murder
is a crime punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended, and is within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.17 Hence, irrespective of whether the killing was actually
justified or not, jurisdiction to try the crime charged against the
respondents has been vested upon the RTC by law.
Respondents, however, contend that the military tribunal has
jurisdiction over the case at bar because the crime charged
was a service-connected offense allegedly committed by
members of the AFP. To support their position, respondents
cite the senate deliberations on R.A. 7055.
Respondents stress in particular the proposal made by Senator
Leticia Ramos Shahani to define a service-connected offense
as those committed by military personnel pursuant to the lawful
order of their superior officer or within the context of a valid
military exercise or mission.18 Respondents maintain that the
foregoing definition is deemed part of the statute.1âwphi1
However, a careful reading of R.A. 7055 indicate that the
proposed definition was not included as part of the statute. The
proposed definition made by Senator Shahani was not adopted
due to the amendment made by Senator Wigberto E. Tañada,
to wit:
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. I would just want to
propose to the Sponsor of this amendment to consider,
perhaps, defining what this service-related offenses would be
under the Articles of War. And so, I would submit for her
consideration the following amendment to her amendment
which would read as follows: AS USED IN THIS SECTION,
SERVICE-CONNECTED CRIMES OR OFFENSES SHALL BE
LIMITED TO THOSE DEFINED IN ARTICLES 54 TO 70,
ARTICLES 72 TO 75, ARTICLES 76 TO 83 AND ARTICLES
84 TO 92, AND ARTICLES 95 TO 97, COMMONWEALTH
ACT NO. 408 AS AMENDED.
This would identify, I mean, specifically, what these service-
related or connected offenses or crimes would be. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The President. What will happen to the definition of "service-
connected offense" already put forward by Senator Shahani?
Senator Tañada. I believe that would be incorporated in the
specification of the Article I have mentioned in the Articles of
War.
SUSPENSION OF THE SESSION
The President. Will the Gentleman kindly try to work it out
between the two of you? I will suspend the session for a
minute, if there is no objection. There was none.
It was 5:02 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF THE SESSION
At 5:06 p.m., the session was resumed.
The President. The session is resumed.
Senator Tañada. Mr. President, Senator Shahani has
graciously accepted my amendment to her amendment,
subject to refinement and style.
The President. Is there any objection? Silence There being
none, the amendment is approved.19
In the same session, Senator Tañada emphasized:
Senator Tañada. Section 1, already provides that crimes of
offenses committed by persons subject to military law ... will be
tried by the civil courts, except, those which are service-related
or connected. And we specified which would be considered
service-related or connected under the Articles of War,
Commonwealth Act No. 408.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
The said amendment was later on reflected in the final version
of the statute as Paragraph 2 of Section 1. Section 1 of R.A.
7055 reads in full:
Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
and other persons subject to military law, including members of
the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit Articles 72 to 92
crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code,
other special penal laws, or local government ordinances,
regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons,
shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-
connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court- Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in
the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before
arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
proper civil courts.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses
shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended. (Emphasis supplied)
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.

The second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. 7055 explicitly

Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
specifies what are considered "service-connected crimes or
offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408 (CA 408), as
amended,21 to wit: Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.

Articles 54 to 70: Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.

Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment. Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.

Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment. Art. 83. Spies.

Art. 56. False Muster. Art. 84. Military Property. – Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage
or Wrongful Disposition.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property
Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.

Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.

Art. 59. Desertion.

Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.

Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.

Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.

Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.

Art. 88-A. Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court.

Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.

Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.

Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,
Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National Defense.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned
Officer. Articles 95 to 97:

Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition. Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.

Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition. Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.

Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders. Art. 97 General Article.

In view of the provisions of R.A. 7055, the military tribunals
cannot exercise jurisdiction over respondents' case since the
offense for which they were charged is not included in the
enumeration of "service-connected offenses or crimes" as
provided for under Section 1 thereof. The said law is very clear
that the jurisdiction to try members of the AFP who commit
crimes or offenses covered by the RPC, and which are not
service-connected, lies with the civil courts. Where the law is
clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what
it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its
mandate is obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but
only application.22 Hence, the RTC cannot divest itself of its
jurisdiction over the alleged crime of multiple murder.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court

of Masbate City, Branch 47, dated December 6, 2005 and
January 11, 2006, respectively, in Criminal Case No. 11846
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 47, Masbate City, is DIRECTED to reinstate Criminal
Case No. 11846 to its docket and conduct further proceedings
thereon with utmost dispatch in light of the foregoing
disquisition.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-
ROBERTO A. ABAD
DE CASTRO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of tile Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO
SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU
BRANCH) bonding company and defendant-appellant.
F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-appellees.
Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino Sibonghanoy and
Lucia Baguio.
Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office, Pages and Soberano
for defendant-appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company,
Inc.
DIZON, J.:
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 —
the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced
Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia
Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until
the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the
complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against
defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon
the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the
Surety, on the 31st of the same month.
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed
their answer in which, after making some admissions and
denials of the material averments of the complaint, they
interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by
the plaintiffs.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had
become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the
Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The
writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for
the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond
(Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a
written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1)
Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the
Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment.
Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to
deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond but also
the following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein bonding
company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question" (Id.
p. 54) The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that
no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand
was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the
judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution
against the counterbond. On the date set for the hearing
thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel,
granted the latter a period of five days within which to answer
the motion. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court
granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ
was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the
ground that the same was issued without the required
summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the
Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety
appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and
from the one denying its motion for reconsideration (Id. p. 97).
Its record on appeal was then printed as required by the Rules,
and in due time it filed its brief raising therein no other question
but the ones covered by the following assignment of errors:
I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its order
dated November 2, 1957, by holding the incident as submitted
for resolution, without a summary hearing and compliance with
the other mandatory requirements provided for in Section 17,
Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the
issuance of execution against the herein bonding company-
appellant.
III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the motion
to quash the writ of execution filed by the herein bonding
company-appellant as well as its subsequent motion for
reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or setting aside the writ
of execution.
Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises
the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.
Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of
Appeals, on December 11, 1962, decided the case affirming
the orders appealed from.
On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received
notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for extension of
time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court
of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of
the same year. Two days later the Surety filed a pleading
entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that
appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only;
that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become
effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the
value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does
not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the
Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and
decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion
prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to
dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court
of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to
dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the
same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to
certify the case to Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution
read as follows:
It would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar,
which is a suit for collection of money in the sum of exactly
P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was originally instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. But about a
month prior to the filing of the complaint, more specifically on
June 17, 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving
the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in
which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than
P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.)
We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellant's
motion is an important one which merits serious consideration.
As stated, the complaint was filed on July 19, 1948. This case
therefore has been pending now for almost 15 years, and
throughout the entire proceeding appellant never raised the
question of jurisdiction until after receipt of this Court's adverse
decision.
There are three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme
Court which may be worthy of consideration in connection with
this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compañia de
Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-10096, March 23, 1956; Pindangan
Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-
14591, September 26, 1962; and Alfredo Montelibano, et al.
vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-15092,
September 29, 1962, wherein the Honorable Supreme Court
frowned upon the 'undesirable practice' of appellants
submitting their case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction
when adverse.
Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the
"exclusive" appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the
jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue" (See. 1, Par. 3[3],
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended), we have no choice but to
certify, as we hereby do certify, this case to the Supreme
Court.1äwphï1.ñët
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of
1948 as amended, let the record of this case be forwarded to
the Supreme Court.
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by
appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of
P1,908.00 only — an amount within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions
of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a
month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True
also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of
it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of
the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, considering the facts and
circumstances of the present case — which shall forthwith be
set forth — We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred
by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the
purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case
with its active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almostfifteen
years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January
12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first
time.
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was
exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety
became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed
a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment
issued by the court of origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19).
Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific
obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance
with sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs.
Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. 170).
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the
counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition
thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an
additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its liability
under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in
support of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the court a
quo not being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution
against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through
counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or
opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of
such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to
dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the
statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting
a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R.
79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was
further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was
not important in such cases because the party is barred from
such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is
valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that
such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of
public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on
the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction
or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S.
273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride,
141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16
Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases
mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20,
1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well
as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September
26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court
of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965,
and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety
became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised
the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by
reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the
law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction
of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of
the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication
on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct
on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced
on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up
their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is
not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the
entire record, We have become persuaded that We can do
nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962 as
follows:
In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
which was a suit for collection of a sum of money, a writ of
attachment was issued against defendants' properties. The
attachment, however, was subsequently discharged under
Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the filing by defendants of a bond
subscribed by Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.
The writ of execution against defendants having been returned
totally unsatisfied, plaintiffs moved, under Section 17 of Rule
59, for issuance of writ of execution against Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the obligation of the bond. But the
motion was, upon the surety's opposition, denied on the
ground that there was "no showing that a demand had been
made, by the plaintiffs to the bonding company for payment of
the amount due under the judgment" (Record on Appeal, p.
60).
Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety
for satisfaction of the judgment, and upon the latter's failure to
pay the amount due, plaintiffs again filed a motion dated
October 31, 1957, for issuance of writ of execution against the
surety, with notice of hearing on November 2, 1957. On
October 31, 1957, the surety received copy of said motion and
notice of hearing.
It appears that when the motion was called on November 2,
1957, the surety's counsel asked that he be given time within
which to answer the motion, and so an order was issued in
open court, as follows:1äwphï1.ñët
As prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr., counsel for the
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., Cebu Branch, is given until
Wednesday, November 6, 1957, to file his answer to the
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution dated October
30, 1957 of the plaintiffs, after which this incident shall be
deemed submitted for resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open court, this 2nd day of November, 1957, at Cebu
City, Philippines.
(Sgd.) JOSE M. MENDOZA
Judge
(Record on Appeal, pp.
64-65, emphasis ours)
Since the surety's counsel failed to file any answer or objection
within the period given him, the court, on December 7, 1957,
issued an order granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against
the surety; and on December 12, 1957, the corresponding writ
of execution was issued.
On December 24, 1957, the surety filed a motion to quash the
writ of execution on the ground that the same was "issued
without the requirements of Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of
Court having been complied with," more specifically, that the
same was issued without the required "summary hearing". This
motion was denied by order of February 10, 1958.
On February 25, 1958, the surety filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above-stated order of denial; which
motion was likewise denied by order of March 26, 1958.
From the above-stated orders of February 10, 1958 and March
26, 1958 — denying the surety's motion to quash the writ of
execution and motion for reconsideration, respectively — the
surety has interposed the appeal on hand.
The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its
motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was
issued without the summary hearing required by Section 17 of
Rule 59, which reads;
"Sec. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had
upon bond. — If the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole
or in part, the surety or sureties on any bond given pursuant to
the provisions of this role to secure the payment of the
judgment shall become finally charged on such bond, and
bound to pay to the plaintiff upon demand the amount due
under the judgment, which amount may be recovered from
such surety or sureties after notice and summary hearing in the
same action." (Emphasis ours)
Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the
formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83
C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is
resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in
preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings"
(Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified
or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear
what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after
which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties" (Ibid.,
pp. 793-794); and as to the extent and latitude of the hearing,
the same will naturally lie upon the discretion of the court,
depending upon the attending circumstances and the nature of
the incident up for consideration.

In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs'
motion for execution and of the date when the same would be
submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was
present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon
his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days
within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to
lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot
now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.

It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an answer to

the motion "for the simple reason that all its defenses can be
set up during the hearing of the motion even if the same are
not reduced to writing" (Appellant's brief, p. 4). There is
obviously no merit in this pretense because, as stated above,
the record will show that when the motion was called, what the
surety's counsel did was to ask that he be allowed and given
time to file an answer. Moreover, it was stated in the order
given in open court upon request of the surety's counsel that
after the four-day period within which to file an answer, "the
incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution"; and
counsel apparently agreed, as the order was issued upon his
instance and he interposed no objection thereto.

It is also urged that although according to Section 17 of Rule

59, supra, there is no need for a separate action, there must,
however, be a separate judgment against the surety in order to
hold it liable on the bond (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). Not so, in
our opinion. A bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per
Section 12 of Rule 59, "to secure the payment to the plaintiff of
any judgment he may recover in the action," and stands "in
place of the property so released". Hence, after the judgment
for the plaintiff has become executory and the execution is
"returned unsatisfied" (Sec. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the
liability of the bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the
surety to satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite
demand therefor, writ of execution may issue against the
surety to enforce the obligation of the bond.

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are

hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila Surety
and Fidelity Company, Inc.

Reyes, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,

Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 158121 December 12, 2007
HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, SR. NAMELY:
TERESITA CONCHA-PARAN, VALERIANO P. CONCHA,
JR., RAMON P. CONCHA, EDUARDO P. CONCHA,
REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL GUARDIAN, REYNALDO P.
CONCHA, ALBERTO P. CONCHA, BERNARDO P. CONCHA
and GLORIA, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO1 and BIENVENIDA
GUYA, CRISTITA J. LUMOCSO VDA. DE DAAN, AND
SPOUSES JACINTO J. LUMOCSO and BALBINA T.
LUMOCSO,2 respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the decision3 and resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 59499, annulling the resolutions 5 and
order6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City,
Branch 9, in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434 which
denied the separate motions to dismiss and Joint Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the respondents.
The relevant facts are undisputed.
Petitioners, heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha,
Sr., claim to be the rightful owners of Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case
No. 5188), a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A (Civil Case
No. 5433), and a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and
7529-A (Civil Case No. 5434), all situated in Cogon, Dipolog
City, under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A.
No. 141), otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Respondent
siblings Gregorio Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5188), Cristita
Lumocso Vda. de Daan (Civil Case No. 5433) and Jacinto
Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5434), are the patent holders and
registered owners of the subject lots.
The records show that on August 6, 1997, Valeriano Sr. 7
and
his children, petitioners Valeriano Jr., Ramon, Eduardo,
Alberto, Bernardo, Teresita, Reynaldo, and Gloria, all
surnamed Concha, filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or
Annulment of Title with Damages against "Spouses Gregorio
Lomocso and Bienvenida Guya." They sought to annul Free
Patent No. (IX-8)985 and the corresponding Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. P-22556 issued in the name of "Gregorio
Lumocso" covering Lot No. 6195. The case was raffled to the
RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, and docketed as Civil Case No.
5188. In their Amended Complaint, petitioners prayed that
judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and Original Certificate
of Title No. 22556 issued to defendants as null and void ab
initio;
2. Declaring Lot No. 6195 or 1.19122-hectare as private
property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141
otherwise known as the Public Land Act as amended by RA
1942;
3. Ordering the defendant Lomocsos to reconvey the
properties (sic) in question Lot No. 6195 or the 1.19122
hectares in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality
of the decision in this case and if they refuse, ordering the
Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of
reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by the
defendant[s] themselves;
4. Ordering defendant Lomocsos to pay P60,000.00 for the 21
forest trees illegally cut; P50,000.00 for moral
damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees; P20,000.00 for
litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings;
5. Declaring the confiscated three (sic) flitches kept in the area
of the plaintiffs at Dampalan San Jose, Dipolog with a total
volume of 2000 board feet a[s] property of the plaintiff [they]
being cut, collected and taken from the land possessed,
preserved, and owned by the plaintiffs;
6. The plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies
which this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the
premises.8
On September 3, 1999, two separate complaints for
Reconveyance with Damages were filed by petitioners, 9 this
time against "Cristita Lomocso Vda. de Daan" for a one-
hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and "Spouses Jacinto
Lomocso and Balbina T. Lomocso" for a one-hectare portion of
Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A. The two complaints were also
raffled to Branch 9 of the RTC of Dipolog City and docketed as
Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434, respectively. In Civil Case No.
5433, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 6196-A titled under OCT
(P23527) 4888 equivalent to one hectare located at the
western portion of Lot 4888 as private property of the plaintiffs
under Sec. 48(B) CA 141 otherwise known as Public Land
OCT (sic) as amended by RA No. 1942;
2. Ordering the defendant to reconvey the equivalent of one (1)
hectare forested portion of her property in question in favor of
the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in
this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P23527) 4888,
located at its Western portion and if she refuse (sic), ordering
the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed
of reconveyance with like force and effect, as if executed by
the defenda[n]t herself;
3. Ordering defendant to pay P30,000.00 for the 22 forest trees
illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for
Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay
the cost of the proceedings.10
In Civil Case No. 5434, petitioners prayed that judgment be
rendered:
1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 7529-A under OCT (P-23207)
12870 and Lot 6196-B OCT (P-20845) 4889 equivalent to one
hectare located as (sic) the western portion of said lots as
private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A. No.]
141 otherwise know[n] as the [P]ublic [L]and [A]ct as amended
by RA 1942;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey the equivalent of one
(1) hectare forested portion of their properties in question in
favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the
decision in this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P-
23207) 12870 and OCT (T-20845)-4889 all of defendants,
located at its Western portion and if they refuse, ordering the
Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of
reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by the
defendants themselves[;]
3. Ordering defendants to pay P20,000.00 for the six (6) forest
trees illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00
for Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to
pay the cost of the proceedings.11
The three complaints12 commonly alleged: a) that on May 21,
1958, petitioners' parents (spouses Valeriano Sr. and Dorotea
Concha) acquired by homestead a 24-hectare parcel of land
situated in Cogon, Dipolog City; b) that since 1931, spouses
Concha "painstakingly preserved" the forest in the 24-hectare
land, including the excess four (4) hectares "untitled forest
land" located at its eastern portion; c) that they possessed this
excess 4 hectares of land (which consisted of Lot No. 6195,
one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and one-hectare portion
of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A) "continuously, publicly,
notoriously, adversely, peacefully, in good faith and in concept
of the (sic) owner since 1931;" d) that they continued
possession and occupation of the 4-hectare land after the
death of Dorotea Concha on December 23, 1992 and
Valeriano Sr. on May 12, 1999; e) that the Concha spouses
"have preserved the forest trees standing in [the subject lots] to
the exclusion of the defendants (respondents) or other persons
from 1931" up to November 12, 1996 (for Civil Case No. 5188)
or January 1997 (for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434) when
respondents, "by force, intimidation, [and] stealth forcibly
entered the premises, illegally cut, collected, [and] disposed" of
21 trees (for Civil Case No. 5188), 22 trees (for Civil Case No.
5433) or 6 trees (for Civil Case No. 5434); f) that "the land is
private land or that even assuming it was part of the public
domain, plaintiffs had already acquired imperfect title thereto"
under Sec. 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 1942; g) that respondents allegedly cut into flitches
the trees felled in Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No. 5188) while the
logs taken from the subject lots in Civil Case Nos. 5433 and
5434 were sold to a timber dealer in Katipunan, Zamboanga
del Norte; h) that respondents "surreptitiously" filed free patent
applications over the lots despite their full knowledge that
petitioners owned the lots; i) that the geodetic engineers who
conducted the original survey over the lots never informed
them of the survey to give them an opportunity to oppose
respondents' applications; j) that respondents' free patents and
the corresponding OCTs were issued "on account of fraud,
deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation"; and k) that the lots in
question have not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.
On separate occasions, respondents moved for the dismissal
of the respective cases against them on the same grounds of:
(a) lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of
the complaints; (b) failure to state causes of action for
reconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d) waiver, abandonment,
laches and estoppel.13 On the issue of jurisdiction, respondents
contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints
pursuant to Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129,
as amended by R.A. No. 7691, as in each case, the assessed
values of the subject lots are less than P20,000.00.
Petitioners opposed,14 contending that the instant cases
involve actions the subject matters of which are incapable of
pecuniary estimation which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129,
as amended by R.A. 7691, fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTCs. They also contended that they have
two main causes of action: for reconveyance and for recovery
of the value of the trees felled by respondents. Hence, the
totality of the claims must be considered which, if computed,
allegedly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
RTC.
The trial court denied the respective motions to dismiss of
respondents.15 The respondents filed a Joint Motion for
Reconsideration,16 to no avail.17
Dissatisfied, respondents jointly filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Issuance
of Restraining Order Ex Parte18 with the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 59499. In its Decision,19 the CA reversed the
resolutions and order of the trial court. It held that even
assuming that the complaints state a cause of action, the same
have been barred by the statute of limitations. The CA ruled
that an action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in
ten (10) years, hence, the instant complaints must be
dismissed as they involve titles issued for at least twenty-two
(22) years prior to the filing of the complaints. The CA found it
unnecessary to resolve the other issues.
Hence, this appeal in which petitioners raise the following
issues, viz:
FIRST - WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN
REVERSING THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO
DENYING THE MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, CONSIDERING
THE DISMISSAL OF A PARTY COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE
AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED TO
THRESH OUT EVIDENTIARY MATTERS.
SECOND - WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS' COMPLAINTS ON [THE]
GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION.
THIRD - WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS NO DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO SHOW THAT PETITIONERS
OWN THE SUBJECT FOREST PORTION OF THE
PROPERTIES ERRONEOUSLY INCLUDED IN THE TITLES
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
FOURTH - WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION OF HEREIN
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FILED WITH THE RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) SHOULD
HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OUTRIGHTLY FOR PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS' THEREIN FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1 RULE 65
OF THE RULES OF COURT TO SUBMIT CERTIFIED TRUE
COPIES OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE TRIAL
COURT WHICH RENDERED THEIR PETITION (CA G.R.
59499) DEFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE CITING THE
CASE OF CATUIRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS (172 SCRA
136).20
In their memorandum,21 respondents reiterated their arguments
in the courts below that: a) the complaints of the petitioners in
the trial court do not state causes of action for reconveyance;
b) assuming the complaints state causes of action for
reconveyance, the same have already been barred by
prescription; c) the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the instant cases; d) the claims for
reconveyance in the complaints are barred by waiver,
abandonment, or otherwise extinguished by laches and
estoppel; and e) there is no special reason warranting a review
by this Court.
Since the issue of jurisdiction is determinative of the resolution
of the instant case yet the CA skirted the question, we resolved
to require the parties to submit their respective Supplemental
Memoranda on the issue of jurisdiction.22
In their Supplemental Memorandum,23 petitioners contend that
the nature of their complaints, as denominated therein and as
borne by their allegations, are suits for reconveyance, or
annulment or cancellation of OCTs and damages. The cases
allegedly involve more than just the issue of title and
possession since the nullity of the OCTs issued to respondents
and the reconveyance of the subject properties were also
raised as issues. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction under Section
19(1) of B.P. 129, which provides that the RTC has jurisdiction
"[i]n all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation." Petitioners cited:
a) Raymundo v. CA24which set the criteria for determining
whether an action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation;
b) Swan v. CA25where it was held that an action for annulment
of title is under the jurisdiction of the RTC; c) Santos v.
CA26 where it was similarly held that an action for annulment of
title, reversion and damages was within the jurisdiction of the
RTC; and d) Commodities Storage and ICE Plant
Corporation v. CA27 where it was held that "[w]here the action
affects title to the property, it should be filed in the RTC where
the property is located." Petitioners also contend that while it
may be argued that the assessed values of the subject
properties are within the original jurisdiction of the municipal
trial court (MTC), they have included in their prayers "any
interest included therein" consisting of 49 felled natural grown
trees illegally cut by respondents. Combining the assessed
values of the properties as shown by their respective tax
declarations and the estimated value of the trees cut, the total
amount prayed by petitioners exceeds twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00). Hence, they contend that the RTC has
jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings
in question belong.28 It is conferred by law and an objection
based on this ground cannot be waived by the parties. 29 To
determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case, it is important to determine the nature of the
cause of action and of the relief sought.30
The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve
actions for reconveyance.31 An action for reconveyance
respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but
seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful
and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better
right.32 There is no special ground for an action for
reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal
claim on the property superior to that of the registered
owner33 and that the property has not yet passed to the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value.34
The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify
an action for reconveyance. The following are also the
common allegations in the three complaints that are sufficient
to constitute causes of action for reconveyance, viz:
(a) That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together with his
spouse Dorotea Concha have painstakingly preserve[d] the
forest standing in the area [of their 24-hectare homestead]
including the four hectares untitled forest land located at the
eastern portion of the forest from 1931 when they were newly
married, the date they acquired this property by occupation or
possession;35
(b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and Dorotea P.
Concha have preserved the forest trees standing in [these
parcels] of land to the exclusion of the defendants Lomocsos or
other persons from 1931 up to November 12, 1996 [for Civil
Case No. 5188] and January 1997 [for Civil Case Nos. 5433
and 5434] when defendants[,] by force, intimidation, [and]
stealth[,] forcibly entered the premises, illegal[ly] cut, collected,
disposed a total of [twenty-one (21) trees for Civil Case No.
5188, twenty-two (22) trees for Civil Case No. 5433 and six (6)
trees for Civil Case No. 5434] of various sizes;36
(c) That this claim is an assertion that the land is private land or
that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiff
had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Sec. 48(b) of
[C.A.] No. 141[,] otherwise known as the Public Land Act[,] as
amended by [R.A.] No. [7691];37
(d) That [respondents and their predecessors-in-interest knew
when they] surreptitiously filed38 [their respective patent
applications and were issued their respective] free patents and
original certificates of title [that the subject lots belonged to the
petitioners];39
(e) [That respondents' free patents and the corresponding
original certificates of titles were issued] on account of fraud,
deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation;40 and
(f) The land in question has not been transferred to an innocent
purchaser.41
These cases may also be considered as actions to remove
cloud on one's title as they are intended to procure the
cancellation of an instrument constituting a claim on petitioners'
alleged title which was used to injure or vex them in the
enjoyment of their alleged title.42
Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to
remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine
which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, viz:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts;
x x x.
In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are
situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are
less than P20,000.00, to wit:
Civil Case No. Lot No. Assessed Value
5188 6195 P1,030.00
5433 6196-A 4,500.00
5434 6196-B 4,340.00
7529-A 1,880.00.43
Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.
Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for
reconveyance44 of or for cancellation of title45 to or to quiet
title46 over real property are actions that fall under the
classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein."
The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its
forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,47 as amended, gave the
RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original
jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to,
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts
under R.A. 296, as amended)." Thus, under the old law, there
was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one,
the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary
estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving
title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between
the two classes became crucial with the amendment
introduced by R.A. No. 769148 in 1994 which expanded the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include
"all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original
jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves
"title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein"
under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and
second level courts, with the assessed value of the real
property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was
introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs
which would result in the speedier administration of justice." 49
The cases of Raymundo v. CA50 and Commodities Storage
and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA,51 relied upon by the
petitioners, are inapplicable to the cases at
bar. Raymundo involved a complaint for mandatory injunction,
not one for reconveyance or annulment of title. The bone of
contention was whether the case was incapable of pecuniary
estimation considering petitioner's contention that the
pecuniary claim of the complaint was only attorney's fees
of P10,000, hence, the MTC had jurisdiction. The Court defined
the criterion for determining whether an action is one that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and held that the issue of
whether petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed
and Declaration of Restriction of the Corporation is one that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The claim for attorney's fees
was merely incidental to the principal action, hence, said
amount was not determinative of the court's jurisdiction. Nor
can Commodities Storage and ICE Plant
Corporation provide any comfort to petitioners for the issue
resolved by the Court in said case was venue and not
jurisdiction. The action therein was for damages, accounting
and fixing of redemption period which was filed on October 28,
1994, before the passage of R.A. No. 7691. In resolving the
issue of venue, the Court held that "[w]here the action affects
title to property, it should be instituted in the [RTC] where the
property is situated. The Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage is
located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The venue in Civil Case No. 94-
727076 was therefore improperly laid."
Worse, the cases of Swan v. CA52 and Santos v. CA53 cited
by the petitioners, contradict their own position that the nature
of the instant cases falls under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129. The
complaints in Swan and Santos were filed prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 7691. In Swan, the Court held that the
action being one for annulment of title, the RTC had original
jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. In Santos, the
Court similarly held that the complaint for cancellation of title,
reversion and damages is also one that involves title to and
possession of real property under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.
Thus, while the Court held that the RTC had jurisdiction, the
Court classified actions for "annulment of title" and
"cancellation of title, reversion and damages" as civil actions
that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.
Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the
subject properties constitutes "any interest therein (in the
subject properties)" that should be computed in addition to the
respective assessed values of the subject properties is
unavailing. Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No.
7691, is clear that the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil
actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)." It
is true that the recovery of the value of the trees cut from the
subject properties may be included in the term "any interest
therein." However, the law is emphatic that in determining
which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the
realty involved that should be computed.54 In this case, there is
no dispute that the assessed values of the subject properties
 17
as shown by their tax declarations are less than P20,000.00. Order dated May 10, 2000; id. at 305-306.
Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant cases belongs not to the
RTC but to the MTC. 18 Id. at 307-334.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals is 19 Dated November 29, 2002; id. at 7-14.
hereby AFFIRMED that the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, has
no jurisdiction in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434. 20 Id. at 36-37.
SO ORDERED. 21 Id. at 568-641.
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, 22
JJ., concur. Id. at 703-710.

23 Id. at 722-733.

24
Footnotes G.R. No. 97805, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 457.

25
1 Also referred to as "Lomocso" or "Lumucso" in the records. G.R. No. 97319, August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 114.

2 The Court of Appeals was removed as public respondent
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and our
ruling in Serg's Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.,
G.R. No. 137705, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 499, 504.
3 Promulgated on November 29, 2002; Rollo, pp. 7-14.
4 Promulgated on April 10, 2003; id. at 16.
5 Annexes "M," "N" and "O" of the Petition; id. at 281-295.
26
G.R. No. 61218, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 162.
27 G.R. No. 125008, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 439.
28Allied Domecq Phil., Inc. v. Villon, G.R. No. 156264,
September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 667, 672, citing Reyes v.
Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 486 (1941).
29Republic v. Sangalang, L-58822, April 8, 1988, 159 SCRA
515.

30
6 Annex "R" of the Petition; id. at 305-306. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, et al. v. Padilla,
et al., 106 Phil. 591 (1959), citing Perkins v. Roxas, 72 Phil.
7
514 (1941).
Died on May 12, 1999.
31
8
Rollo, pp. 283, 288, 293.
Rollo, pp. 98-99.
32
9
Hi-Tone Marketing Corp. v. Baikal Realty Corp., G.R. No.
Id. at 119-125, 143-149. 149992, August 20, 2004, 437 SCRA 121, 143, citing Walstrom
v. Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 38387, January 29, 1990, 181 SCRA
10
Id. at 124. 431, 442.

11 33
Id. at 148-149. Ponce, D.R. Florencio, The Philippine Torrens System
(1965), p. 213.
12Id. at 93-106 (Civil Case No. 5188), 119-132 (Civil Case No.
34
5433), 143-158 (Civil Case No. 5434). Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Fernandez, G.R. No.
138971, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 489, 499, citing Lucena v.
13Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Affirmative Defenses for CA, G.R. No. 77468, August 25, 1999, 313 SCRA 47.
the Dismissal of the Complaint and the Instant Case (Civil
35
Case No. 5188), id. at 169-189; Motion to Dismiss (Civil Case Rollo, pp. 94, 120, 144.
No. 5434), id. at 191-210; Motion to Dismiss (Civil Case No.
5433), id. at 212-231. 36 Id. at 95, 121, 145.
14Opposition to Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint (Civil 37 Ibid
Case No. 5188), id. at 233-248; Opposition to Motion [to]
Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5433), id. at 249-264; Opposition to 38
Motion [to] Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5434), id. at 265-280. Id. at 95-96, 121-122, 145-146.

39
15In its separate Resolutions all dated December 9, Id. at 96, 122, 146.
1999; id. at 281-285, 286-290, 291-295.
40 Ibid.
16 Id. at 296-301.
41 Id. at 97, 123, 147.

42See Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence

on the Civil Code of the Philippines Vol. II (1992), pp. 148-149.

43 Rollo, pp. 105, 132, 157, 158.

44Abrin v. Campos, G.R. No. 52740, November 12, 1991, 203

SCRA 420, 421; Estate of the late Mercedes Jacob v. CA, G.R.
No. 120435, December 22, 1997, 283 SCRA 474.

45Santos v. CA, G.R. No. 61218, September 23, 1992, 214

SCRA 162, 163; Swan v. CA, G.R. No. 97319, August 4, 1992,
212 SCRA 114, 121; Heirs of Susana De Guzman Tuazon v.
CA, G.R. No. 125758, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 219.

46Mendoza v. Teh, G.R. No. 122646, March 14, 1997, 269

SCRA 764, 768; Heirs of Susana De Guzman Tuazon v. CA,
supra.

47Also known as "The Judiciary Act of 1948," as amended,

which provides that:

SECTION 44. Original jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance

shall have original jurisdiction: x x x

(b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of

real property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax,
impost or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into and
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is
conferred by this Act upon city and municipal courts; x x x.

48An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial

Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,"
approved on March 25, 1994.

49Sponsorship Speech of Senator Biazon, Record of the

Senate dated October 6, 1993.

50 Supra Note 24.

51 Supra Note 27.

52 Supra Note 25.

53 Supra Note 26.

54Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457

SCRA 815, 826; See also Aquino, H.L., Remedial Law,
Doctrines Enunciated in Ponencias on Jurisdiction, Procedure
and Evidence Including Useful Outlines (2002), p. 218.
G.R. No. L-27033 October 31, 1969
POLYTRADE CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICTORIANO BLANCO, defendant-appellant.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for plaintiff-appellee.
Isidro T. Almeda and Mario T. Banzuela for defendant-
appellant.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Suit before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on four
causes of action to recover the purchase price of rawhide
delivered by plaintiff to defendant.1 Plaintiff corporation has its
principal office and place of business in Makati, Rizal.
Defendant is a resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Defendant
moved to dismiss upon the ground of improper venue. He
claims that by contract suit may only be lodged in the courts of
Manila. The Bulacan court overruled him. He did not answer
the complaint. In consequence, a default judgment was
rendered against him on September 21, 1966, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
and against defendant ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the
following amounts:
First Cause of Action — P60,845.67, with interest
thereon at 1% a month from May 9, 1965 until the full amount
is paid.
Second Cause of Action — P51,952.55, with interest
thereon at 1% a month from March 30, 1965 until the full
amount is paid.
Third Cause of Action — P53,973.07, with interest
thereon at 1% a month from July 3, 1965 until the full amount is
paid.
Fourth Cause of Action — P41,075.22, with interest
thereon at 1% a month2 until the full amount is paid.
In addition, defendant shall pay plaintiff attorney's fees
amounting to 25% of the principal amount due in each cause of
action, and the costs of the suit. The amount of P400.00 shall
be deducted from the total amount due plaintiff in accordance
with this judgment.
Defendant appealed.
1. The forefront question is whether or not venue was properly
laid in the province of Bulacan where defendant is a resident.
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of
personal actions triable by courts of first instance — and this is
one — provides that such "actions may be commenced and
tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs
resides, at the election of the plaintiff." Qualifying this provision
in Section 3 of the same Rule which states that venue may be
stipulated by written agreement — "By written agreement of
the parties the venue of an action may be changed or
transferred from one province to another."
Defendant places his case upon Section 3 of Rule 4 just
quoted. According to defendant, plaintiff and defendant, by
written contracts covering the four causes of action, stipulated
that: "The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of
Manila." This agreement is valid.3 Defendant says that because
of such covenant he can only be sued in the courts of Manila.
We are thus called upon to shake meaning from the terms of
the agreement just quoted.
But first to the facts. No such stipulation appears in the
contracts covering the first two causes of action. The general
rule set forth in Section 2 (b), Rule 4, governs, and as to said
two causes of action, venue was properly laid in Bulacan, the
province of defendant's residence.
The stipulation adverted to is only found in the agreements
covering the third and fourth causes of action. An accurate
reading, however, of the stipulation, "The parties agree to sue
and be sued in the Courts of Manila," does not preclude the
filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain
meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued in
Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that
Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent
therefrom. We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and
defendant bound themselves to file suits with respect to the
last two transactions in question only or exclusively in Manila.
For, that agreement did not change or transfer venue. It simply
is permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of
Manila as tribunals to which they may resort. They did not
waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically
mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non
praesumitur.
Illuminating on this point is Engel vs. Shubert Theatrical Co.,
151 N.Y.S. 593, 594. And this, became there the stipulation as
to venue is along lines similar to the present. Said stipulation
reads: "In case of dispute, both contracting parties agree to
submit to the jurisdiction of the Vienna courts." And the ruling
is: "By the clause in question the parties do not agree to submit
their disputes to the jurisdiction of the Viennese court, and to
those courts only. There is nothing exclusive in the language
used. They do agree to submit to the Viennese jurisdiction, but
they say not a word in restriction of the jurisdiction of courts
elsewhere; and whatever may be said on the subject of the
legality of contracts to submit controversies to courts of certain
jurisdictions exclusively, it is entirely plain that such
agreements should be strictly construed, and should not be
extended by implication."
Venue here was properly laid.
2. Defendant next challenges the lower court's grant to plaintiff
of interest at the rate of one per centum per month. Defendant
says that no such stipulation as to right of interest appears in
the sales confirmation orders which provided: "TERMS — 60
days after delivery with interest accruing on postdated cheques
beyond 30 days." The flaw in this argument lies in that the
interest and the rate thereof are expressly covenanted in the
covering trust receipts executed by defendant in favor of
plaintiff, as follows: "All obligations of the undersigned under
this agreement of trust shall bear interest at the rate of one per
centum (1%) per month from the date due until paid."
On this score, we find no error. Footnotes

1
3. Defendant protests the award of attorneys' fees which totals Civil Case 224-V, entitled "Polytrade Corporation,
P51,961.63, i.e., 25% of the total principal indebtedness of Plaintiff, versus Victoriano Blanco, Defendant."
P207,846.51 (exclusive of interest). Defendant's thesis is that
the foregoing sum is "exorbitant and unconscionable." 2Interest should start from March 24, 1965. See:
Decision, R.A., pp. 38- 39.
To be borne in mind is that the attorneys' fees here provided is
not, strictly speaking, the attorneys' fees recoverable as 3Navarro vs. Aguila, 66 Phil. 604, 608; Borreros vs.
between attorney and client spoken of and regulated by the Philippine Engineering Corporation, L-6500,
Rules of Court. Rather, the attorneys' fees here are in the September 16, 1954; Bautista vs. De Borja (1966), 18
nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is SCRA 474, 480, citing Central Azucarera de Tarlac
aptly called a penal clause.4 It has been said that so long as vs. De Leon, 56 Phil. 169.
such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public
order, it is strictly binding upon defendant.5 The attorneys' fees 4
so provided are awarded in favor of the litigant, not his counsel. Luneta Motor Company vs. Limgenco, 73 Phil. 80,
It is the litigant, not counsel, who is the judgment creditor 81.
entitled to enforce the judgment by execution.6
5 Government vs. Lim, 61 Phil. 737, 739.
The governing law then is Article 2227 of the Civil Code, viz.:
"Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a 6Gan Tion vs. Court of Appeals (1969), 28 SCRA
penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or 235, 237.
unconscionable." For this reason, we do not really have to
strictly view the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees in the
light of such factors as the amount and character of the
services rendered, the nature and importance of the litigation,
and the professional character and the social standing of the
attorney. We do concede, however, that these factors may be
an aid in the determination of the iniquity or
unconscionableness of attorneys' fees as liquidated damages.

May the attorneys' fees (P51,961.63) here granted be tagged

as iniquitous or unconscionable? Upon the circumstances, our
answer is in the negative. Plaintiff's lawyers concededly are of
high standing. More important is that this case should not have
gone to court. It could have been easily avoided had defendant
been faithful in complying with his obligations. It is not denied
that the rawhide was converted into leather and sold by
defendant. He raises no defense. In fact, he did not even
answer the complaint in the lower court, and was thus declared
in default. Nor does he deny the principal liability. Add to all
these the fact that the writ of attachment issued below upon
defendant's properties yielded no more than P400 and the
picture is complete. The continued maintenance by defendant
of the suit is plainly intended for delay. The attorneys' fees
awarded cannot be called iniquitous or unconscionable.

In the very recent case of Universal Motors Corporation vs. Dy

Hian Tat (1969), 28 SCRA 161, 170, we allowed attorneys'
fees in the form of liquidated damages at the rate of 25% of the
total amount of the indebtedness. Here, the trial court has
already reduced the attorneys' fees from the stipulated 25% "of
the total amount involved, principal and interest, then unpaid"
to only 25% of the principal amount due. There is no reason
why such judgment should be disturbed.

FOR THE REASON GIVEN, the appealed judgment is hereby

affirmed, except that interest granted, in reference to the fourth
cause of action, should start from March 24, 1965.

Costs against defendant-appellant. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,

Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. L-27897-98 October 29, 1971
LORENZO IGNACIO and MAGDALENA DELA
CRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
BULACAN and FELIZARDO LIPANA, respondents.
Romerico P. Flores for petitioners.
Restituto M. David for respondent F. Lipana.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition in forma
pauperis questioning the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of
Plaridel, Bulacan, in an ejectment case against petitioners,
which case was subsequently appealed to the Court of First
Instance, where it was shown that another case had been filed
ahead in the Court of Agrarian Relations wherein petitioners
asked that they be declared the lawful tenants of the disputed
landholding. Upon motion of petitioners, alleging that private
respondent had moved in the Court of First Instance for the
execution of its decision affirming an order of the Municipal
Court which found them guilty of contempt of court and
ordering them to vacate the landholding in question, We
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon
the filing of a bond in the sum of P200.00.
The said landholding consists of two hectares, more or less,
included in a larger tract owned by Felizardo Lipana and
tenanted by Alipio Marcelo until his death on December 3,
1962. Two cases involving the land were pending in the Court
of Agrarian Relations at the time of death, namely: CAR Case
No. 750-Bulacan '62, "Alipio Marcelo vs. Felizardo Lipana;" and
CAR Case 827-Bulacan '62, entitled "Felizardo Lipana vs.
Alipio Marcelo."1 In both cases the deceased was subsequently
substituted by Maximo Marcelo and Emilia Tabor Vda. de
Marcelo, surviving son and wife, respectively. A third case —
CAR Case No. 895 — was filed on December 20, 1962 by
Maximo Marcelo against Felizardo Lipana and Magdalena dela
Cruz (the latter having been the alleged common-law wife of
Alipio Marcelo), praying that he, Maximo be declared as
entitled to succeed to the tenancy and status of the deceased.
One of the allegations of Lipana in his answer to the complaint
was that he "signified his intention to recognize as his tenant
Magdalena dela Cruz who is the widow of Alipio Marcelo." This
is an admission that as far as Lipana was concerned it was
Magdalena who had the right to succeed the deceased Alipio
as tenant.
On July 23, 1963, acting on a motion of Maximo Marcelo to
enjoin Magdalena dela Cruz from interfering with his peaceful
cultivation of the landholding, as well as an urgent motion of
Felizardo Lipana for leave to cultivate the same land, the CAR
issued the following order:
For this Court to be able to resolve the above prayer a motion
intelligently and judiciously, there is necessity for formal
hearing to determine the following questions of fact:
(1) Since the demise of the former tenant, Alipio Marcelo who
has been and is in actual possession and cultivation of the
holding in question?
(2) Did the deceased voluntarily surrender the holding to
respondent in November 1962?
(3) Is Maximo Marcelo the natural son of the late Alipio
Marcelo?
It appears, however, that these are the factual issues directly
involved in CAR Case No. 895-Bulacan '62 where petitioner
therein has already presented three (3) witnesses and several
exhibits. Respondents have not yet presented any evidence.
The cause of action indicated, therefore, is for this Court to
withhold action on Maximo Marcelo's prayer for interlocutory
order and Felizardo Lipana's urgent motion for leave to
cultivate the holding.
In the meanwhile, to forestall any untoward incidents and in
order not to disturb the productivity of the land, this Court shall
undertake the cultivation thereof by administration through an
impartial third-party. All the parties in the above-entitled cases
shall be restricted from doing any act of cultivation or planting
on the land and reaping harvesting or threshing of crops
thereon.
WHEREFORE, Maximo Marcelo, Emilia Tabol de Marcelo,
Magdalena dela Cruz, Felizardo Lipana and/or their agents are
directed to desist from performing any act of cultivation or
planting on the landholding formerly tenanted by Alipio Marcelo
at Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, with a seedling capacity of 30
gantas of palay, or from reaping harvesting or threshing any
crops thereon until further orders from this court.
Pursuant to: Section 9, Rep. Act No. 1267, as amended, Mr.
Severino Madronio, Agricultural Extension Officer, Bureau of
Agricultural Extension, Bulacan, is hereby directed to repair to
the landholding in question, take possession of the same and
undertake the cultivation thereof and/or planting thereon
according to his best judgment and to proven farm practices. If
the hiring of laborers for the purpose of complying with this
Order is called for, the afore-named Agricultural Extension
Officer shall give preference of employment to Maximo Marcelo
and Magdalena dela Cruz at the prevailing wage for
agricultural laborers in the locality but in no case shall the wage
be less than P2.50 per day, with no allowance for board and
lodging.
Thereafter, a compromise agreement in the three CAR cases
was entered into by Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana,
wherein the former surrendered all his rights over the
landholding in favor of the latter. A judgment in accordance
with the terms and conditions of said compromise was
thereupon rendered by the trial Judge on November 5, 1964,
declaring that CAR Cases Nos. 750, 895 and 827 were
deemed closed and terminated as between Maximo Marcelo
and Felizardo Lipana.
On January 27, 1965 the CAR ordered the issuance of writ of
execution in the three cases. On the same day another order
was issued, discharging the administration of the landholding
by the Agricultural Extension Officer. On February 5, 1965 the
corresponding writ of execution was issued, commanding the
provincial sheriff of Bulacan to place Felizardo Lipana in
possession; and on the following February 25 the provincial
sheriff submitted to the court his return of service.
On July 15, 1965 Magdalena dela Cruz filed a complaint
against Lipana (Case No. 1221), asking the CAR to declare her
the lawful tenant of the landholding, to fix the annual, rentals
thereof during the past three years and to award damages in
her favor by way of attorney's fees and consequential
expenses. In her complaint she alleged the Alipio Marcelo, the
former tenant, surrendered the landholding to Lipana on
November 21, 1962, where upon she succeeded as such
tenant upon agreement with the latter that on November 13,
1964 the CAR issued an order stating that the dismissal of
CAR Case No. 895 was without prejudice to her right to file an
independent action to assert her claim against Lipana, her co-
defendant therein; the together with her husband2 she
continued to work on the land during the agricultural year 1964-
65, but that after they had plowed the land in preparation for
the agriculture natural year 1965-66 defendant's henchmen
created some disturbance at the place for the purpose of
ejecting her for forcibly therefrom. Plaintiff was allowed to
litigate as pauper, and notice of the filing of the complaint was
served up Lipana on July 31, 1965.
On July 29, 1965 Lipana in turn went to the Municipal Court of
Plaridel, Bulacan on an action for "Ejectment and Forcible
Entry" (Civil Case No. 235), with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction against Magdalena dela Cruz and
her husband Lorenzo Ignacio, alleging that he, Lipana, had
been placed in possession of the landholding by the provincial
sheriff of Bulacan by virtue of the order of the CAR dated
January 27, 1965 in CAR Cases Nos. 750, 827 and 895.
Defendants filed their answer with counterclaim on August 11,
1965, denying the substantial averments of the complaint and
alleging as affirmative defense the pendency of CAR Case No.
1221. In their counterclaim for damages, defendants alleged
that Magdalena dela Cruz was the tenant of Felizardo Lipana
but that the latter wanted to eject her because she married her
co-defendant Lorenzo Ignacio, who was a member of a
farmers' organization in the locality.
On August 2, 1965 the Municipal Court of Plaridel ordered
defendants, pending the hearing of the case on the merits, to
desist from plowing, harrowing, and/or planting the land in
question upon the filing by plaintiff of a bond of P2,000.00.
On October 7, 1965 plaintiff filed a motion to declare
defendants in contempt of court for having plowed, narrowed
and planted the land in question in spite of the existence of the
injunctive order. In their opposition dated October 18, 1965
defendants pointed out that they did so as tenants of the land
subject of CAR Case No. 1221 and that if they observed the
injunctive order of the Municipal Court they would in effect be
violating their rights and obligations in said CAR case.
On November 25, 1965 the Municipal Court found defendants
guilty of contempt and sentenced them to pay a fine of P50.00
each or suffer imprisonment for ten days. This order was
appealed by defendants, in forma pauperis to the Court of First
Instance, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No.
3280-M.
On May 31, 1966 a decision in Civil Case No. 235 was
rendered by the Municipal Court, ordering defendants to vacate
the land and to remove their house therefrom. This decision
was likewise appealed to the Court of First Instance, where the
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3363-M. Again,
defendants were allowed to appeal as paupers.
In due time the trial in CAR Case No. 1221 was terminated and
the trial Judge, in an order dated September 13, 1966, gave
both parties fifteen days from notice that the stenographic
notes had been transcribed within which to submit their
memoranda, after which period the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. The CAR, however, held its decision in
abeyance for the reason the "it is powerless to modify or set
aside the decision rendered by the Municipal Court in Civil
Case No. 235, now on appeal with the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan."
In Civil Cases Nos. 3280-M and 3363-M before the Court of
First Instance, defendants (petitioners herein), in motion dated
April 28, 1967, asked for the postponement of the hearing
scheduled on May 2, 1967. The court denied the motion on
May 2, 1967 and allowed plaintiff to present his evidence ex
parte before the Deputy Clerk of Court.
On May 16, 1967 defendants filed a motion for reconsideration,
pleading that the evidence presented by plaintiff be
disregarded and the hearing of the case reset for another date.
This motion was also denied.
On July 27, 1967 the Court of First Instance rendered judgment
in Civil Cases Nos. 3280-M and 3363-M, which reads as
follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. With respect to Civil Case No. 3280, finding the defendants
guilty of contempt of court and sentencing them each pay a
fine in the sum of P50.00 or to suffer an imprisonment 10 days;
2. With respect to Civil Case No. 3363, ordering the defendants
and/or anybody acting under them, to vacate the premise in
question and remove their house therefrom within 30 days from
notice hereof.
The facts show clearly that these cases proceed from and
involve essentially a tenancy dispute. Before Civil Case No.
235 was filed in the Municipal Court of Plaridel three cases
involving the same landholding had already been filed with the
Court of Agrarian Relations. The issue as to who had been in
actual possession of the land since the death of the tenant
Alipio Marcelo was before the CAR in Case No. 895, a suit
brought by Maximo Marcelo against Lipana and Magdalena
dela Cruz, wherein he sought to be declared as the tenant by
right of succession to Alipio Marcelo. The case, however, was
dismissed together with CAR Cases Nos. 725 and 827
originally brought by Alipio Marcelo, without the issue of actual
possession having been resolved, by virtue of the compromise
agreement entered into between Maximo and Lipana.
Magdalena dela Cruz thereafter filed her complaint — CAR
Case No. 1221 — to have herself declared the lawful tenant of
the landholding.
While it is true that the jurisdiction of the court in a suit for 3 See Evangelista vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, L-13875,
ejectment or forcible entry is determined by the allegations in October 31, 1960; Basilio vs. David, L-8702, April 28, 1956.
the complaint, yet where tenancy is averred as a defense and,
upon hearing, is shown to be the real issue, the court should
dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. 3 The decision of the
CAR, it should be remembered, was rendered upon a
compromise agreement between Maximo Marcelo and
Felizardo Lipana. The right of Magdalena dela Cruz, who was
a co-defendant in CAR Case No. 895, was not touched upon in
said agreement. There the decision simply stated that CAR
Cases Nos. 750, 827 and 895 were "deemed closed and
terminated as between Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana;"
and the writ of execution was limited to "placing Mr. Felizardo
Lipana immediately in possession of the landholding formerly
cultivated by Maximo Marcelo or any person, agent, and/or
representative acting in behalf of Maximo Marcelo."

It was therefore incorrect for respondent court to conclude from

the decision and writ of execution in the CAR cases that Lipana
had actual possession, as against Magdalena dela Cruz, over
the landholding prior to the alleged unlawful detainer and/or
forcible entry. While both Maximo and Magdalena asserted the
right to succeed to tenancy of the same landholding after the
death of Alipio Marcelo, the CAR did not adjudicate that right to
either of them nor did it resolve the question as to who had
actual possession of the landholding after the death of Alipio.
What it did, in order to prevent further trouble between Maximo
and Magdalena was to place the landing under the
administration of the Agricultural Extension Officer, with
instruction that Maximo and Magdalena should be given
preference in working on the land as laborers. The allegations
in the complaint in CAR Case No. 1221 reveal that they worked
on different portion of the land in accordance with the CAR's
order. This was how things stood when Maximo entered into a
compromising agreement with Lipana surrendering his rights
over landholding in favor of the latter. For all intents purposes,
therefore, the decision and writ of execution effected only the
claim of Maximo Marcelo as tenant and actual possession of
the portion of the land on which he was working by virtue of the
provisional arrangement ordered by the CAR. Since the
tenancy dispute remained unresolved with respect to
Magdalena dela Cruz and was actually the subject of litigation
in CAR Case No. 1221, the filing of the ejectment case was an
intrusion upon the jurisdiction of said court.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and decision of

respondent court in Civil Cases Nos. 3280-M and 3363-M is
set aside. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,

Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, concur.

Footnotes

1 (a) CAR Case 750 was a claim of Alipio Marcelo change of

tenancy relationship from sharing to leasehold; reliquidation of
the previous harvests against Felizardo Lipana;

(b) CAR Case 827 was a claim of Felizardo Lipana again Alipio
Marcelo for accounting of the produce of auxiliary crops.

2 Magdalena dela Cruz had married Lorenzo Ignacio on June

30, 1964.