III.

THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE

• ART. III, SEC. 10

Sec. 10, Art. Ill: “No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.”

It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition does not prohibit every change
in existing laws. To fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the
existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial. Moreover, the law must effect a change in
the rights of the parties with reference to each other, and not with respect to nonparties [Philippine
Rural Electric Cooperatives Association v. Secretary, DUG, G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003].
Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. There is substantial
impairment when the law changes the terms of a legal contact between the parties, either in the time
or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or
authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms [Clements v.
Nolting, 42 Phil 702]

WHEN IS THERE IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT?

ANS – In the case of Victoriano vs. Elizalde, According to Black, any statute which introduce
changes in to the express terms of the contract, or its legal construction, or its validity, or its
discharge, or the remedy for its enforcement, impair its contract.
ANS - When a right is taken or when a person is deprived of the means for enforcing such
right, there is impairment. (Government vs Visayan Surety Insurance Co.)

IS THE EXTENT OF A DEGREE OF CHANGE, IRRELEVANT?

ANS - The extent of the change is not material. It is not a question of degree or manner or
cause, but of encroaching in any respect or its obligation or dispensing with any part of its force.
However, not all impairment are prohibited. Only those unreasonable are prohibited.
ANS - The degree is immaterial. The real test of impairment is the diminution of the value of a
contract.

WHAT IMPAIRMENTS MAY BE VALIDLY INTRODUCED INTO EXISTING CONTRACTS BY

LEGISLATION?

ANS – in the exercise of inherent powers, laws and reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power are read into contracts agreed upon by the parties.
In every contract, there are two (2) implied elements aside from the stipulation of the parties that:
1. A future date or a future time, a state may exercise its inherent powers that may validly
change the terms of their contract.
2. All existing laws are deemed included in the contract.

ARE MORATORIUM VALID IMPAIRMENT OF A CONTRACT?

ANS - Generally, YES, it is valid.

WHAT IS A MORATORIUM LAW?

ANS - postponement of fulfillment of obligation decreed by the state through the medium of
legislation; the essence of which is the application of the sovereign power.
 WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF MORATORIUM?

ANS – definite as to the period of suspension; reasonable period. It should be reasonable to

both parties.

IS THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT ABSOLUTE?

ANS - No, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the
police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State,
but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time as the general well-being of the
community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the
necessity. And under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the
State because they are not ordinary contracts but are impressed with public interest.
• PURPOSE

The basic purposes are:

1. To implement the freedom of contracts

2. To protect property rights (Philam life v. Auditor General)
3. To safeguard the integrity of contracts against unwarranted interference by the State.

What are the limitations on the non-impairment of contract clause?

ANS - The limitations are:

1. the police power of the State
2. power of eminent domain; and
3. the reserved power of the State to impair, for even if it is not expressly made, it can still be
exercised.

(1) PRYCE v. CBC and BPI

Non-Impairment of Contract is limited by police power

FACTS: The present case originated from a petition for corporate rehabilitation filed by petitioner
Pryce Corporation on July 9, 2004 with the Regional Trial Court. On September 13, 2004, the
rehabilitation court gave due course to the petition and directed the rehabilitation receiver to evaluate
and give recommendations on petitioner Pryce Corporation’s proposed rehabilitation plan attached to
its petition. Respondent China Banking Corporation and BPI contended that the rehabilitation plan’s
approval impaired the obligations of contracts. It argued that neither the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 902–A nor the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim Rules)
empowered commercial courts “to render without force and effect valid contractual stipulations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court of commerce can issue a rehabilitation order that will impair the
contract of CBC and BPI with the respondent Pryce without violating the non-impairment clause and
the mutuality of contracts?

HELD: Respondent China Banking Corporation mainly argues the violation of the constitutional
proscription against impairment of contractual obligations in that neither the provisions of Pres. Dec.
No. 902–A as amended nor the Interim Rules empower commercial courts “to render without force
and effect valid contractual stipulations.
 The non–impairment clause first appeared in the United States Constitution as a safeguard
against the issuance of worthless paper money that disturbed economic stability after the American
Revolution. This constitutional provision was designed to promote commercial stability. At its core is
“a prohibition of state interference with debtor–creditor relationships.”
This clause first became operative in the Philippines through the Philippine Bill of 1902, the
fifth paragraph of Section 5 which states “[t]hat no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
enacted.” It was consistently adopted in subsequent Philippine fundamental laws, namely, the Jones
Law of 1916, the 1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, and the present Constitution.
Nevertheless, this court has brushed aside invocations of the non–impairment clause to give
way to a valid exercise of police power and afford protection to labor.
In Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation v. Puerto Azul Land, Inc. which similarly
involved corporate rehabilitation, this court found no merit in Pacific Wide’s invocation of the non–
impairment clause, explaining as follows: We also find no merit in PWRDC’s contention that there is a
violation of the impairment clause. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution mandates that no law
impairing the obligations of contract shall be passed. This case does not involve a law or an executive
issuance declaring the modification of the contract among debtor PALI, its creditors and its
accommodation mortgagors. Thus, the non–impairment clause may not be invoked. Furthermore, as
held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. even assuming that the same may be invoked, the non–impairment
clause must yield to the police power of the State. Property rights and contractual rights are not
absolute. The constitutional guaranty of non–impairment of obligations is limited by the exercise of
the police power of the State for the common good of the general public.
Successful rehabilitation of a distressed corporation will benefit its debtors, creditors,
employees, and the economy in general.
Corporate rehabilitation is one of many statutorily provided remedies for businesses that
experience a downturn. Rather than leave the various creditors unprotected, legislation now provides
for an orderly procedure of equitably and fairly addressing their concerns. Corporate rehabilitation
allows a court–supervised process to rejuvenate a corporation.

• EMERGENCY POWERS

(2) ROYAL L. RUTTER v. PLACIDO J. ESTEBAN

G.R. No. L-3708, May 18, 1953

MORATORIUM LAWS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.

Statutes declaring a moratorium on the enforcement of monetary obligations are not of recent
enactment. These moratorium laws are not new. "For some 1,400 years western civilization has
made use of extraordinary devices for saving the credit structure, devices generally known as
moratoria. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through
the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of the sovereign power" (58
C.J. S., p. 1208 footnote 87).
In the United States, many state legislatures have adopted moratorium laws "during times of
financial distress, especially when incident to, or caused by, a war" (41 C.J., p.213). Thus, such laws
"were passed by many state legislatures at the time of the civil war suspending the rights of creditors
for a definite and reasonable time, . . . whether they suspend the right of action or make dilatory the
remedy" (12 C.J., p 1078). The laws were declared constitutional.
However, some courts have also declared that "such statutes are void as to contracts made
before their passage where the suspension of remedied prescribed is indefinite or unreasonable in
duration" (12C.J., 1078). The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of the moratorium statute lies
in the determination of the period of a suspension of the remedy. It is required that such suspension
be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution.
 One of the arguments advanced against the validity of the moratorium law is the fact that it
impairs the obligation of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution. This argument, however
does not now hold water. While this may be conceded, it is however justified as a valid exercise by
the State of its police power.
The leading case on the matter is Home Building and Loan Association vs. Blaisdell, 290 U. S.,
398, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 8, 1934. Here appellant
contested the validity of charter 339 of the laws of Minnesota of 1933, approved April 13, 1933, called
the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, as being repugnant to the contract clause of the Federal
Constitution. The statute was sustained by the Supreme Court of Minnesota as an emergency
measure. "Although conceding that the obligations of the mortgage contract was impaired, the court
decided that what it thus described as an impairment was, notwithstanding the contract clause of the
Federal Constitution, within the police power of the State as that power was called into exercise by
the public economic emergency which the legislative had found to exist". This theory was up-held by
the Supreme Court. Speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, the court made the following
pronouncements:
Not only is the constitutional provision qualified by the measure of control which the State
retains over remedial processes, but the State also continues to possess authority to safeguard the
vital interest of its people. It does not matter that legislation appropriate to that end "has the result of
modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect." . . . . Not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes
of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of
protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of
which contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains adequate authority to secure
the peace and good order of society. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with
the necessary residuum of state power has had progressive recognition in the decision of this Court.

FACTS: On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the Manila for
P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on
or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7
percent per annum. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has been
constituted in favor of the plaintiff.
Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that had
accrued, and so in 1949, Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due, the interest due and
the attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in
accordance with law. Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation contracted and that he is a war
sufferer, having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he had
suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under section 2 of RA 342 (Moratorium Law),
payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years from the settlement of
his claim by the Philippine War Damage Commission, and this period has not yet expired.
Section 2 of RA 342 provides that all debts and other monetary obligations contracted before
December 8, 1941, any provision in the contract creating the same or any subsequent agreement
affecting such obligation to the contrary notwithstanding, shall not due and demandable for a period
of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor by the Philippine
War Damage Commission.
The court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint holding that the obligation which
plaintiff seeks to enforce is not yet demandable under the moratorium law. Plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration wherein he raised for the first time the constitutionality of the moratorium law, but the
motion was denied. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether RA 342 is unconstitutional being violative of the constitutional provision forbidding
the impairment of the obligation of contracts
RULING: Republic Act No. 342 is unreasonable and oppressive, and therefore, the same should be
declared null and void and without effect.
The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the
medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of the sovereign power, most
especially during times of financial distress, especially when incident to, or caused by, a war. The true
test of the constitutionality of the moratorium statute lies in the determination of the period of a
suspension of the remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite and reasonable, otherwise it
would be violative of the constitution.
RA 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations who suffered from the ravages of
the last war and who filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is
therein provided that said obligation shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years
from and after settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the
law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a
reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being victimized by
their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation conditions have gradually returned
to normal, this is not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and so it was
therein declared as a policy that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force.
However, these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of
Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 (debt moratorium) and at present their enforcement is still inhibited
because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during
the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least
twelve (12) years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941.
The court declares that the period is unreasonable and oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is
plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are
practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote,
more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor
is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief.
Furthermore, the emergency caused by the war that earlier had justified the moratorium was
no longer existing. The Court in its observation and based on the official pronouncements made by
our Chief Executive (President Quirino) on the general state of the nation, declares that the main the
financial condition of the country and people, individually and collectively, has practically returned to
normal notwithstanding occasional reverses caused by local dissidence and the sporadic disturbance
of peace and order in our midst.
In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with the belief to be as the only
course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, the court declared that the continued operation
and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive,
therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect. And what we say here with
respect to said Act also holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, perhaps with greater
force and reason as to the latter, considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in
point of time as regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.
And there is need to make this pronouncement in view of the revival clause embodied in said Act if
and when it is declared unconstitutional or invalid.
Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P4,800 with
interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent annum from August 27, 1942, until its full payment, plus 12
per cent as attorney's fees. Failure to pay this judgment as stated, the properties mortgaged will be
sold at public auction and the proceeds applied to its payment in accordance with law.

• ZONING AND REGULATORY ORDINANCES

(3) VILLANUEVA v. CASTANEDA

[154 SCRA 142 (1987)
FACTS: The municipal of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing 24 members of the
Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association (petitioners) to have a right to remain in and
conduct business in an area known as talipapa in the public market. They also argue that the
disputed area is under lease to them by virtue of contracts they had entered into with the municipal
government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal
constructions on public property. They argue that the area was a public in nature and was beyond the
commerce of man, therefore could not be subject of private occupancy.
While protests were going on regarding that, another resolution was passed which declared
the subject areas as parking place and public plaza thereby impliedly revoking the earlier resolution.

ISSUE: Whether the vendors had the right to occupy and make use of the property.

RULING: There is no question that the place they occupied is a public plaza. A public plaza is beyond
the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking.
Communal things cannot be sold because they are by their very nature outside of commerce are
those for public use, such as the plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, fountains, etc."
Due to their occupancy of the area, it has deteriorated increasingly to the great prejudice of the
community in general. It was converted into a veritable fire trap, obstructs access to and from the
public market, aggravated health and sanitation problems, they have also spilled into the street and
obstruct the flow of traffic.
The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by the
police power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause. 29 This authorizes the
municipal council "to enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may
be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and
such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."
The respondent mayor was justified in ordering the area cleared on the strength alone of its
status as a public plaza as declared by the judicial and legislative authorities.
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively
terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained
away through the medium of a contract.

(4) SANGALANG v. IAC

[168 SCRA 634 (1988)]

LIMITATIONS TO NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE – POLICE POWER

The Supreme Court said that a municipal zoning ordinance is a police measure and prevails over a
restriction contained in the title to property.

FACTS: The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of several
streets to the general public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter St.
was voluntarily opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the municipal officials force-
opened the gates of said street for public use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for
damages was brought against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to
maintain the purely residential status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed their respective
cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said dismissals.

ISSUE: Whether there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation violated in opening
the Jupiter street for public use.
HELD: No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.
Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to build a
hence along Jupiter street with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayala’s alleged continuing
obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a
contract violated, it was still overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a
legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold otherwise
other than for the supposed “non-impairment” guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the
more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or
arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.
All contracts are subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater number
as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. The Court guarantees sanctity
of contract and is said to be the "law between the contracting parties," but while it is so, it cannot
contravene "law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy." Above all, it cannot be raised
as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the
common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. Police power is the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the
power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee. Police power is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions;
it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must
follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life. Public welfare, when clashing with the individual
right to property, should be made to prevail through the state's exercise of its police power. Herein,
the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power, as the ordinance is neither
capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable; but that it is based on compelling interests of general welfare.
The restrictive easements are similar to any other contract, and should not deter the valid exercise of
police power. The MMC has reclassified Jupiter Street into a “high density commercial zone, pursuant
to Ordinance 81-01. Sangalang, BAVA, et. al., thus have no cause of action on the strength alone of
said “deed restrictions.”

(5) ORTIGAS & CO. vs. CA

[G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000]
400 Phil. 615

ORTIGAS & CO. LTD., PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ISMAEL G. MATHAY III,
RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: On August 25, 1976, Ortigas & Co. (Ortigas) sold to Emilia Hermoso (Hermoso) a parcel of
land, with the condition that only a single-family residential building shall be erected on the
same and such restrictions shall run unti December 31, 2025. These and the other conditions were
duly annotated on the certificate of title issued to Emilia.
A few years later, the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) issued a zoning ordinance,
MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital
Region, which effectively reclassified the land bought by Hermoso from “residential” to “commercial.”
Hermoso leased the land to Ismael Mathay III (Mathay). Mathay constructed a single-
storey commercial building on the land. Ortigas sued Hermoso for breach of contract and prayed
for the demolition of the building. Complainant prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit petitioner from constructing the
commercial building and/or engaging in commercial activity on the lot. Mathay was
subsequently impleaded as a respondent.
 The lower court ruled in favor of Ortigas. Mathay moved for reconsideration, but he was
rebuffed. He filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), ascribing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court judge. The CA ruled in his favor, hence this review
on certiorari filed by Ortigas.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the zoning ordinance should be read into the contract between Ortigas and Hermoso;
and
2. Whether Mathay is a real party-in-interest considering that he is a mere lessee and there is no
privity of contract between him and Ortigas.

RULING:
1. YES. In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having only prospective
operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the
execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are
specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any
manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself
and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against
impairment of contracts.
But the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law
enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could
be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power
legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non-
impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate
exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power
must be read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we
already upheld MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 as a legitimate police power measure. Ordinance No. 81-
01 retroactively affected the operation of the zoning ordinance in Greenhills by reclassifying certain
locations therein as commercial.
Following our ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 (1979), the
contractual stipulations annotated on the Torrens Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield to the
ordinance. When that stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was
reclassified as a commercial zone by the Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981, the
restrictions in the contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all construction on
the disputed lot to single-family residential buildings, were deemed extinguished by the
retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced. While our legal
system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law between the contracting
parties, nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene "law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy. "Otherwise such stipulations would be deemed null and void.

2. YES, Mathay is a real party-in-interest.

First, Mathay is a possessor in the concept of a “holder of the thing” under Art. 525, CC;
therefore, he has an interest in the property.
A real party in interest is defined as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means
material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest.
 Second, what Ortigas prayed for is the demolition of the building erected by Mathay on the
property. As the owner of the building, he has a material interest in it, and he obviously stands
either to be benefited or injured after the case is decided.
Lastly, Ortigas impleaded Mathay as a respondent; as such, it can no longer question his
standing by virtue of estoppel.

• ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS

(6) TIRO v. HONTANOSAS

[125 SCRA 697 (1983)]
G.R. No. L-32312, November 25, 1983

LIMITATIONS TO NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE – POLICE POWER

In Tiro v. Hontanosas, 125 SCRA 697, an administrative order discontinuing the assignment
of salaries of public-school teachers to their creditors was declared not violative of the guarantee, as
the latter could still collect its loans after the salaries had been received by the teachers themselves.

AURELIO TIRO, AS CITY SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU CITY, PETITIONER-

APPELLANT, VS. HONORABLE AGAPITO HONTANOSAS, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF CEBU, BRANCH XI, ZAFRA FINANCING ENTERPRISE AND MARCELINO ZAFRA,
RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

FACTS: In Civil Case No. 11616 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu, Zafra Financing
Enterprise sued Aurelio Tiro in his official capacity as Superintendent of Schools in Cebu City. It
appears that Zafra had extended loans to public school teachers in Cebu City and the teachers
concerned executed promissory notes and special powers of attorney in favor of Zafra to take and
collect their salary checks from the Division Office in Cebu City of the Bureau of Public Schools.
However, Tiro forbade the collection of the checks on the basis of Circular No. 21 "PROHIBITING
PAYMENT OF SALARY TO PERSONS OTHER THAN THE EMPLOYEE CONCERNED, series 1969,
dated December 5, 1969, of the Director of Public Schools which prohibits payment of salary of any
person other than the employees concerned, except when the persons so designated and authorized
is an immediate member of the family of the employee concerned, and in all other cases, except upon
proper authorization of the Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal and Administrative Matters, with the
recommendation of the Financial Assistant.
Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special powers of attorney; to declare Circular No. 21
to be illegal; and to make Tiro pay attorney's fees and damages. The trial court granted the prayer of
Zafra but the claim for money was disallowed on the ground that he acted in good faith in implementing
Circular No. 21.
Tiro now seeks in this petition for review a reversal of the trial court's decision.
The petition is highly impressed with merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Circular No. 21 is valid and enforceable.

RULING: YES. The petition is granted; the judgment of the court a quo is hereby set aside; costs
against the private respondent.
The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong to him
before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the Government. Accor-
dingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it
without the consent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands on firm legal footing.
The Circular in question is authorized by relevant statutes extant when it was issued such as the
following:
 "SEC. 79 (b). Power to regulate - The Department Head shall have power to promulgate,
whoever he may see fit to do so, all rules, regulations, orders, circular, memorandums, not
contrary to law, necessary to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient
administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and for the
strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of
said Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties. All rules, regulations,
orders or instructions of a general and permanent character promulgated in conformity with this
section shall be numbered by each Department consecutively each year, and shall be duly
published.
Chiefs of Bureaus or offices may, however, be authorized to promulgate circulars of
information or instructions for the government of the officers and employees in the interior
administration of the business of each Bureau or office, and in such case said circulars shall not
be required to be published." (Revised Administration Code.)
"SEC. 21. Deductions Prohibited. - No person shall make any deduction whatsoever from
the salaries of teachers except under specific authority of law authorizing such deductions:
Provided, however, that upon written authority executed by the teacher concerned, (1) lawful
dues and fees owing to the Philippine Public School Teachers Association, and (2) premiums
properly due on insurance policies, shall be deductible." (Magna Carta For Teachers, R.A. No.
4670.)
Zafra's claim that the Circular impairs the obligation of contracts with the teachers is baseless.
For the Circular does not prevent Zafra from collecting the loans. The Circular merely makes the
Government a non-participant in their collection which is within its competence to do.

• RENTAL LAWS

(7) CALEON v. AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORP.

[207 SCRA 748 (1992)]

LIMITATIONS TO NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE – POLICE POWER

In Canleon v. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748, BP 25, regulating the
rentals of dwelling units, was held as a constitutional exercise of the police power, and an exception
to the non-impairment clause.

FACTS: Agus Development Corporation leased to Rita Caleon its lot for P180.00/month. Caleon built
a 4-door apartment and sub-leased it at P350.00/door/month without Agus’ consent. Agus’ filed an
ejectment suit under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 25 after Caleon refused to vacate the lot. Caleon
argued that B.P. Blg. 25 cannot be applied because there is a perfected contract of lease without any
express prohibition on subleasing. The MTC ruled in favor of Agus. It was appealed to the RTC but
was dismissed outright. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE:
1. Whether B.P. Blg. 25 is unconstitutional for being violative of “non-impairment clause” on the
ground that it impaired the lease contract.
2. Whether legislation, appropriate to safeguard vital interests of the people, may modify or
abrogate contracts already in effect.

HELD:
1. No. B.P. Blg. 25 is valid and constitutional. The lease contract is subordinate to the police
power of the state. Petition is denied.
B.P. Blg. 25 is derived from P.D. No. 20 which has been declared by the Supreme Court as
police power legislation so that the applicability thereof to existing contracts cannot be denied. The
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the
exercise of police power of the state in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general
welfare. In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard
the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interest may modify or
abrogate contracts already in effect.
2.The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and
subject to the exercise of police power of the State in the interest of public health, safety, morals and
general welfare. In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to
safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interest may
modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. Every contract affecting public interest suffers a
congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the
existing legal order. This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract,
or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not
militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.
Batas Pambansa 25, "An Act Regulating Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which Another's
Dwelling is Located and For Other Purposes" shows that the subject matter is the regulation of rentals
and is intended only for dwelling units with specified monthly rentals constructed before the law
became effective. BP 25 is derived from PD 20 which has been declared by the Court as a police
power legislation, applicable to leases entered into prior to 14 July 1971 (effectivity date of RA 6539),
so that the applicability thereof to existing contracts cannot be denied.

• TAX EXEMPTIONS

(8) MERALCO v. PROVINCE OF LAGUNA

[306 SCRA 750 (1999)]

FACTS: Certain municipalities of the Province of Laguna issued resolutions through their respective
municipal councils granting franchise in favor of petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) for
the supply of electric light, heat and power within their concerned areas.
In connection with R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code), respondent province enacted Laguna
Provincial Ordinance which imposed tax on businesses enjoying a franchise at a rate of 50% of 1% of
the gross annual receipts.
Respondent provincial treasurer then sent a demand letter to MERALCO for the tax payment
which was then paid by the latter. MERALCO filed a formal claim for refund contending that the
ordinance contravened with the provisions of Section 1 of P.D. 551 which imposes a franchise tax of
2% of their gross receipts.

ISSUE: Whether the imposition of franchise tax under the provincial ordinance is violative of the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution and of P.D. 551.

RULING: The petition lacks merit.

While the Court has, not too infrequently, referred to tax exemptions contained in special
franchises as being in the nature of contracts and a part of the inducement for carrying on the
franchise, these exemptions, nevertheless, are far from being strictly contractual in
nature. Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense of the term and where the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution can rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the
taxing authority in contracts, such as those contained in government bonds or debentures,
lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in which the government, acting in its
private capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its governmental immunity.
Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without impairing the obligations of
contracts. These contractual tax exemptions, however, are not to be confused with tax exemptions
granted under franchises. A franchise partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
The Local Government Code has also already effectively withdrawn under Section 193 thereof,
tax exemptions or incentives theretofore enjoyed by certain entities.

• FREEDOM OF RELIGION

• ART. III, SEC. 5

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

• ART. II, SEC. 6 (SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND THE STATE)

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Two guarantees contained in ART. III, Sec. 5:

(a) Non-establishment Clause; and

(b) Freedom of religious profession and worship.

Non-establishment clause. This reinforces Sec. 6, Art. II, on the separation of Church and
State. Recall other constitutional provisions which support the non-establishment clause, namely:
Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-C [a religious sect or denomination cannot be registered as a political party];
Sec. 5(2), Art. VI [no sectoral representative from the religious sector]; and Sec. 29 (2), Art.VI
[prohibition against the use of public money or property for the benefit of any religion, or of any priest,
minister, or ecclesiastic]. See Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil 201; Garces v. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510.

EXCEPTIONS:
(i) Sec. 28 (3), Art. VI [exemption from taxation of properties actually, directly and exclusively
used for religious purposes]; see Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, 51 Phil 352;
(ii) Sec. 4 (2), Art.XIV [citizenship requirement of ownership of educational institutions, except
those established by religious groups and mission boards];
(iii) Sec. 3 (3), Art. XIV [optional religious instruction in public elementary and high schools: at
the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religious instruction taught within regular
class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which
the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government];
(iv) Sec. 29 (2), Art. VI [appropriation allowed where the minister or ecclesiastic is employed in
the armed forces, in a penal institution, or in a government-owned orphanage or leprosarium].

(9) RENE RONULO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014

FACTS: Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003
at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the
wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon
learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then
dressed in barong tagalog, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors
and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan
Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter
agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.
Ronulo was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal
marriage ceremony. Florida, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the
ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife. Mary Anne, the cord sponsor in the
wedding, testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle and the couple exchange their wedding
rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.
Ronulo contend that he was merely blessing the couple and his act of blessing does not
tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC. It held that the
petitioner's act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official church
recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling. The
CA observed that although there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of
marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has
been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing
officer; and (2) they should declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
at least two witnesses of legal age.

ISSUES: Whether petitioner conducted a “blessing” and not a marriage ceremony

RULING: Article 6 of the Family Code provides that "no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties
to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.
The law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: First, there should
be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their
declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and
wife.
The Court do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State
precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the
petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it
provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. This
pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital
rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
The Court emphasizes at this point that Article 15 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as
an inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount
interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of
marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery
of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may
view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a
marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by Article
3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioner's knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his
defense of good faith.

• NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

USE OF RELIGION TO JUSTIFY AN ACTION

(10) ANG LADLAD v. COMELEC

FACTS: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Ang Ladlad first applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground
that the organization had no substantial membership base. Petitioner argued that the LGBT
community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because
of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination,
and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual
orientation.
COMELEC argued using verses in the bible and Koran that petitioner tolerates immorality
which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote: For this cause God gave them up
into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature:
And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward
another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense
of their error which was meet.
In the Koran: For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a
people transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone):
Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord!
Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30). The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates
sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition's par. 6F: 'Consensual partnerships or relationships by
gays and lesbians who are already of age'

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC can use religion to justify their denial for party list representation of the
LADLAD?

HELD: Petition is granted in favor of LadLad. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that
"[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious
matters." Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC
to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent
of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil
public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms."
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the
resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious
programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom.
Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse
that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not
support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or
even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in
criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this
conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of
one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a
compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered
a moral disapprobation punishable by law.

• OPERATION OF SECTARIAN SCHOOLS

• ART. XIV, SEC. 4(2)

2. Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission
boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however,
require increased Filipino equity participation in all educational institutions. The control and
administration of educational institutions shall be vested in citizens of the Philippines.
No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no group of aliens
shall comprise more than one-third of the enrollment in any school. The provisions of this sub section
shall not apply to schools established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and,
unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary residents.

• RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

• ART. XIV, SEC. 3(3)

3. All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually,
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the
dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed
of in the manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be
entitled to such exemptions, subject to the limitations provided by law, including restrictions on
dividends and provisions for reinvestment.

• CIVIL CODE, ART. 359(1)

Art. 359. The government promotes the full growth of the faculties of every child. For this purpose,
the government will establish, whenever possible:
(1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional religious instruction
shall be taught as part of the curriculum at the option of the parent or guardian;

• ANTI-EVOLUTION LAWS

(11) EPPERSON v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

33 U.S. 27 (1968)

FACTS: An Arkansas law barred the teaching of evolution in public schools violated the First
Amendment’s establishment clause, which generally prohibits the government from establishing,
advancing, or giving favour to any one religion.
Arkansas enacted a statute that made it illegal for teachers in state-supported schools or
universities “to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order
of animals” or “to adopt or use…a textbook that teaches” such a theory. Those who violated the
statute could be charged with a misdemeanour and dismissed. Until 1965 the science textbooks used
in the school system of Little Rock, Arkansas, did not contain a section on evolution. For the 1965–66
academic year, however, school administrators adopted a textbook that included information on the
theory. Susan Epperson, a biology teacher, was confronted with the task of teaching from the new
textbook. With a fear that she might be dismissed, Epperson sought a declaration that the Arkansas
statute was void. She also sought to enjoin the state and school officials from dismissing her for
violating the statute.

ISSUE: Whether the teaching of evolution in public schools violated the First
Amendment’s establishment clause, which generally prohibits the government from establishing,
advancing, or giving favour to any one religion

RULING: The court held that the law was unconstitutional because the government “must be neutral
in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice” and must be neutral between religions and
between religion and non-religion. The government should not “aid, foster, or promote one religion or
religious theory against another.” Thus, the court ruled that the Arkansas statute violated the
First Amendment’s establishment clause, which was protected on the state level by the Fourteenth
Amendment.

• PRAYER AND BIBLE READING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

(12) ENGEL v. VITALE

370 US 421

SCOPE: In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S, 421, known as the “School Prayer Case”, the recitation
by the students in public schools in New York of a prayer composed by the Board of Regents was
held unconstitutional.

FACTS: The respondent Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 9, New Hyde Park,
New York, acting in its official capacity under state law, directed the School District's principal to
cause the following prayer to be said aloud by each class in the presence of a teacher at the
beginning of each school day. This daily procedure was adopted on the recommendation of the State
Board of Regents, a governmental agency created by the State Constitution to which the New York
Legislature has granted broad supervisory, executive, and legislative powers over the State's public
school system.
Shortly after the practice of reciting the Regents' prayer was adopted by the School District, the
parents of ten pupils brought this action in a New York State Court insisting that use of this official
prayer in the public schools was contrary to the beliefs, religions, or religious practices of both
themselves and their children and they challenged the constitutionality of both the state law
authorizing the School District to direct the use of prayer in public schools and the School District's
regulation ordering the recitation of this particular prayer on the ground that these actions of official
governmental agencies violate that part of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution which
commands that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion" -- a command
which was "made applicable to the State of New York by the Fourteenth Amendment of the said
Constitution."
The New York Court of Appeals, over the dissents of Judges Dye and Fuld, sustained an order
of the lower state courts which had upheld the power of New York to use the Regents' prayer as a
part of the daily procedures of its public schools so long as the schools did not compel any pupil to
join in the prayer over his or his parents' objection.

ISSUE: Whether or not the recitation by the students in public schools in New York of a prayer
composed by the Board of Regents is unconstitutional
RULING: YES. Since we think that the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an
establishment of religion must at least mean that, in this country, it is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a
religious program carried on by government. It is a matter of history that this very practice of
establishing governmentally composed prayers for religious services was one of the reasons which
caused many of our early colonists to leave England and seek religious freedom in America.
By the time of the adoption of the Constitution, our history shows that there was a widespread
awareness among many Americans of the dangers of a union of Church and State. One of the
greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way lay in the Government's
placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one particular form of
religious services. The Constitution was intended to avert a part of this danger by leaving the
government of this country in the hands of the people, rather than in the hands of any monarch.The
people's religions must not be subjected to the pressures of government for change each time a new
political administration is elected to office.
Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its
observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the
Establishment Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause. Although these two clauses may, in
certain instances, overlap, they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon
religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend
upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which
establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals
or not.The Establishment Clause thus stands as an expression of principle on the part of the
Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its
"unhallowed perversion" by a civil magistrate.
Indeed, the governmental endorsement of that prayer seems relatively insignificant when
compared to the governmental encroachments upon religion which were commonplace 200 years
ago. To those who may subscribe to the view that, because the Regents' official prayer is so brief and
general there can be no danger to religious freedom in its governmental establishment, however, it
may be appropriate to say in the words of James Madison, the author of the First Amendment:
"[I]t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. . . . Who does not see
that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may
establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?
That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property
for the support of any one establishment may force him to conform to any other establishment
in all cases whatsoever?

(13) ABINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SCHEMPP

374 U.S. 2013 (1973)

As pointed out by Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion in Abington School District v.
Schempp] strict neutrality could lead to “a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and
a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious” which is prohibited by the Constitution.

FACTS: Edward Schempp, a Unitarian Universalist and a resident of Abington Township,

Pennsylvania, filed suit against the Abington School District in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania to prohibit the enforcement of a Pennsylvania state law that required
his children, specifically Ellery Schempp, to hear and sometimes read portions of the Bible as part of
their public school education. That law required that "[a]t least ten verses from the Holy Bible [be] read,
without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day." Schempp specifically
contended that the statute violated his and his family's rights to religious freedom as protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pennsylvania law, like that of four other states, included a statute
compelling school districts to perform Bible readings in the mornings before classes. Twenty-five states
had laws allowing "optional" Bible reading, with the remainder having no laws supporting or rejecting
Bible reading. In eleven of those states with laws supportive of Bible reading or state-sponsored prayer,
the state courts had declared them unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether the said law violates the religious freedom?

RULING: The US Supreme Court held that the law violated religious freedom.
The Constitution forbids any establishment of religion, that prayer is a form of religion, and that hence
state-sponsored or mandated Bible reading in public schools cannot be allowed. Public schools cannot
sponsor Bible readings and recitations of the Lord’s Prayer under the First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause. Moreover, it was ‘‘no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any
group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government.’’

(14) STONE v. GRAHAM

449 US 39 (1980)

FACTS: A Kentucky statute requires the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments, purchased with
private contributions, on the wall of each public-school classroom in the State.
To show an “avowed” secular purpose, the state legislature required the notation in small print
at the bottom of each display that "[t]he secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen
in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United
States."
The state trial court upheld the statute, finding that its "avowed purpose" was "secular and not
religious," and that the statute would "neither advance nor inhibit any religion or religious group" nor
involve the State excessively in religious matters.

ISSUE: Whether the statute is a violation of the Non-Establishment clause of the Constitution.

RULING: Yes. The Kentucky's statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school
rooms has no secular legislative purpose, and is therefore unconstitutional.
This Court has announced a three-part test for determining whether a challenged state statute
is permissible under the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . .; finally the statute must not foster
`an excessive government entanglement with religion.'"
The pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly
religious in nature. This is not a case in which the Ten Commandments are integrated into the school
curriculum, where the Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history,
civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like. Posting of religious texts on the wall serves no
such educational function.

• TAX EXEMPTION

• ART. VI, SEC. 28 (3)

Section 28.
1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive
system of taxation.
2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
 3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of the Congress.

• PUBLIC AID TO RELIGION

• ART. VI, SEC. 29 (2)

Section 29.
1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.
2. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
3. All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund
and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been
fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the
Government.

(15) RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT THE HALL
OF JUSTICE BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017

FACTS: Valenciano wrote several letters to former Chief Justice Renato S. Puno, complaining about
the holding of masses during lunch break at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice. He
claimed that the religious icons placed there, the electric organ and other items related to the
celebration of masses therein violated the separation of the constitutional provision on the separation
of the Church and State. He also claimed, among others, that the choir rehearsals disturbed the other
employees and that the other employees could no longer attend to their personal necessities as they
cannot go to the lavatories which are located near the basement.

ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of the constitutional provision on the separation of the Church
and State with the holding of masses during lunch break at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of
Justice as well as the constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public money or property for
the benefit of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution or system of religion.

RULING: The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does not amount to the union of
Church and State. The 1987 constitution provides that the separation of Church and the State shall
be inviolable; it further provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Allowing religion to flourish is
not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and state. In fact, these two principles are in
perfect harmony with each other. The Roman Catholic express their worship through the holy mass
and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to the free exercise of their religion.
It is also the view of the Supreme Court that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of
the Quezon City Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment but merely accommodation wherein the
government recognize the reality that some measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the
population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can
be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to
regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.
No appropriation of Public money or property for the benefit of any Church. The constitution
provides that “No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or any priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or any
penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the
furtherance of a particular church. The aforecited constitutional provision “does not inhibit the use of
public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to
a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general. Thus, the basement of the
Quezon City Hall of Justice has remained to be a public property devoted for public use because the
holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of its primary purpose.
(The present controversy did not involve a national or local law in conflict with the Free
Exercise Clause. Valenciano was merely questioning the propriety of holding religious masses at the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice.
By allowing the holding of masses, the Court could not be said to have established Roman
Catholicism as an official religion or to have endorsed the same. It also allowed other religious
denominations to practice their religion within the courthouses.
Thus, the holding of religious rituals at the Halls of Justice does not amount to a union of
Church and State. While the Church and State are separate, the latter still recognizes the inherent
right of the people to have some form of belief system. Such is enshrined in our Constitution.
Besides, allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and
State.
In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of
accommodation - a recognition of the reality that some governmental measures may not be imposed
on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious
beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare,
the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.
There is in this case, merely an accommodation.
First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly
mandating that judicial employees attend the mass.
Second, when judiciary employees attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own
initiative and on their own free will.
Third, no government funds are being spent because the lighting and air conditioning continue
to be operational even if there are no religious rituals being observed.
Fourth, the basement has neither been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel not has it
been permanently appropriated for the exclusive use of the faithful.
Fifth, the allowance of religious masses has not prejudiced other religions.)

(16) AGLIPAY v. RUIZ

[64 Phil. 201 (1937)]

Q— The Philippine Postal Office printed stamps commemorating the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress in the Philippines. It was challenged on the ground that it was violative
of the separation of the Church and State and that the non-establishment clause has been
violated. Is the contention correct? Why?

ANS: No, because it merely advertised the Philippines as the site of the Eucharistic Congress to
attract more tourists. (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201).
 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.

It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere
religious toleration. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of
profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And,
in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and
highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid
of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and
develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they
thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who
guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere.
In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to
religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec.
Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par [c], Adm. Code) sectarian aid is not
prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned
to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3 Art. VI,
Constitution of the Philippines).
Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5,
Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Ad. Code). Thursday and Friday of
Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm.
Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral results. The
law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship
are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised
Penal Code).

Q: WHAT IS BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY?

ANS – exemptions are granted to allow individuals to exercise their religion.

Q: DOES ACCOMODATION ONLY EXEMPTS ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY?

ANS – No, it also extends to criminal liability

FACTS: Pet., Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks
the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic
Congress under the provision of Act No. 4052. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY
NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF
POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made
immediately available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for
the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses
incident thereto.
The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day,
remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.
ISSUE: Whether the actions of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection
3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:

No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or

indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian,
institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or
leprosarium.

HELD: There has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 contemplates no
religious purpose in view of Art. VI, Sec. 23, subsection 3, of the Constitution. What it gives the
Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage
stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the
Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the
appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a
particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in
question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not
inspired by any sectarian denomination.
The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were
money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the
latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint,
that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract
more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered
of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people". It is significant to note
that the stamps as actually designed and printed, instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as
originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an
inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is
emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the
seat of that congress.
It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by
the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion
that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results,
more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate
to mere incidental results not contemplated.

(17) MUELLER v. ALLEN

FACTS: A Minnesota statute that provides a tax deduction for parents of school aged children for
school related expenses is alleged to be unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment of the Constitution as it applies not just to public schools, but to private schools as well.
The appeals court ruled that statute did not violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution and
the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) affirmed.
The Supreme Court stated that it rejects the argument that any government program that in
some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation violates the Establishment Clause. The
Supreme Court instead stated the rule in Lemon, whether the statute has the primary effect of
advancing the sectarian aim of the non-public schools was the more appropriate test.
The Supreme Court found the Minnesota statute in question did not have a primary effect of
advancing sectarian aims, as the deduction is available for educational expenses incurred by all
parents, applying to those whose children that attend pubic schools and those who attend
nonsectarian private schools and those who attend sectarian private schools. The Supreme Court
also stated that there was not excessive government entanglement in religion under the third inquiry
of the Lemon test.

ISSUE: Whether a Minnesota income tax deduction available for expenses incurred in sending
children to public as well as non-public schools violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.

HELD: Section 290.09, subd. 22, does not violate the Establishment Clause, but satisfies all
elements of the "three-part" test laid down in Lemon v. Kurtzman, that must be met for such a statute
to be upheld under the Clause.
(a) The tax deduction in question has the secular purpose of ensuring that the State's citizenry
is well educated, as well as of assuring the continued financial health of private schools, both
sectarian and nonsectarian.
(b) The deduction does not have the primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of
nonpublic schools. It is only one of many deductions -- such as those for medical expenses and
charitable contributions -- available under the Minnesota tax laws; is available for educational
expenses incurred by all parents, whether their children attend public schools or private sectarian or
nonsectarian private schools, Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, distinguished; and provides
aid to parochial schools only as a result of decisions of individual parents, rather than directly from the
State to the schools themselves.
The Establishment Clause's historic purposes do not encompass the sort of attenuated
financial benefit that eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally available tax benefit at
issue.
The fact that, notwithstanding § 290.09, subd. 22's facial neutrality, a particular annual
statistical analysis shows that the statute's application primarily benefits religious institutions does not
provide the certainty needed to determine the statute's constitutionality. Moreover, private schools,
and parents paying for their children to attend these schools, make special contributions to the areas
in which the schools operate.
(c) Section 290.09, subd. 22, does not "excessively entangle" the State in religion. The fact
that state officials must determine whether particular textbooks qualify for the tax deduction and must
disallow deductions for textbooks used in teaching religious doctrines is an insufficient basis for
finding such entanglement.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE,
POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined post.

(18) LEMON v. KURTZMAN

FACTS: Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for
aspects of non-secular, non-public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and
provided funding for non-public elementary and secondary school teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Island’s statute was passed in 1969 and provided
state financial support for non-public elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15% of
teachers’ annual salaries.
The appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers in Pennsylvania
who believed that the statute violated the separation of church and state described in the First
Amendment. Appellant Lemon also had a child in Pennsylvania public school. The district court
granted the state officials’ motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees were
citizens and tax payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in question declared
unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The
district court found in favor of the appellees and held that the statute violated the First Amendment.
ISSUE: Do statutes that provide state funding for non-public, non-secular schools violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

RULING: YES. The Court held that a statute must pass a three-pronged test in order to avoid
violating the Establishment Clause. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither promotes nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster
“excessive government entanglement with religion.” The Court held that both the state statutes in
question had secular legislative purposes because they reflected the desire of the states to ensure
minimum secular education requirements were being met in the non-public schools.
The Court did not reach a holding regarding the second prong of the test, but it did find that the
statutes constituted an excessive government entanglement with religion. In the Rhode Island
program, the amount of oversight of teachers and curricula required to ensure that there is no
unnecessary injection of religion into secular topics would require the government to become
excessively involved in the nuances of religious education.
The same danger holds true for the Pennsylvania statute, which additionally provides state
funding directly to a church-related organization. Government financial involvement in such
institutions inevitably leads to “an intimate and continuing relationship” between church and state. The
Court also noted the potential political implications of public funding, as there is a risk of religious
issues becoming politically divisive.

(19) WALLACE v. JAFFREE

472 US 38 (1985)

FACTS: Appellees challenged the constitutionality of, inter alia, a 1981 Alabama Statute (§ 16-1-
20.1) authorizing a 1-minute period of silence in all public schools "for meditation or voluntary prayer."
Although finding that § 16-1-20.1 was an effort to encourage a religious activity, the District Court
ultimately held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does not prohibit a State from
establishing a religion. The Court of Appeals reversed.

ISSUES: Whether the 1-minute period of silence under Alabama Statute (16-1-20.1) is constitutional

HELD: Section 16-1-20.1 is a law respecting the establishment of religion, and thus violates the First
Amendment.
The proposition that the several States have no greater power to restrain the individual
freedoms protected by the First Amendment than does Congress is firmly embedded in constitutional
jurisprudence. The First Amendment was adopted to curtail Congress' power to interfere with the
individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of
his own conscience, and the Fourteenth Amendment imposed the same substantive limitations on the
States' power to legislate. The individual's freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his
right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority. Moreover, the individual freedom
of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or
none at all.
One of the well-established criteria for determining the constitutionality of a statute under the
Establishment Clause is that the statute must have a secular legislative purpose.
The record here not only establishes that § 16-1-20.1's purpose was to endorse religion, it also
reveals that the enactment of the statute was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose. The
legislation was solely an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to the public schools. Moreover, such
unrebutted evidence of legislative intent is confirmed by a consideration of the relationship between §
16-1-20.1 and two other Alabama statutes -- one of which, enacted in 1982 as a sequel to § 16-1-
20.1, authorized teachers to lead "willing students" in a prescribed prayer, and the other of which,
enacted in 1978 as § 16-1-20. l's predecessor, authorized a period of silence "for meditation" only.
The State's endorsement, by enactment of § 16-1-20.1, of prayer activities at the beginning of each
schooldays is not consistent with the established principle that the government must pursue a course
of complete neutrality toward religion.

(20) ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
[G.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003]

Q— Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) is a non-governmental organization

licensed under the DSWD. It extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially the
Muslim communities. It is a member of a federation of Islamic organizations and an active
member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Da’wah Council of
Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The
RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal certifications in the Philippines. On October 26,
2001, the Office of the Executive Secretary issued E.O. No. 46 creating the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme and designating the Office of the Muslim Affairs to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and
perform other regulatory activities. OMA sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to
secure halal certification only from OMA lest they violate E.O. No. 46 and R.A. No. 4109. As a
result, petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from
it, hence, it filed a petition for prohibition. It contended that the EO violated the constitutional
provision on the separation of church and state. It is unconstitutional for the government to
formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because it is a function
only religious organizations, entities or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the
Muslims. A food product becomes a halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual
and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A
government agency cannot perform religious functions like certifying qualified food product
as halal. Rule on the contention and explain.

ANS: The contention is correct.

Classifying a food as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from
the Qur’an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal,
E.O. No. 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like petitioner to interpret
for Muslim Filipinos what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. By arrogating to itself the task
of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of
Qur’an and Sunnab on halal food. (Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines Inc. vs. Office of
the Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003).

EXCEPTION TO NON – ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:

In Islamic Da’wah. Council of the Philippines v. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
153888, July 9, 2003, the Supreme Court declared that freedom of religion is accorded preferred status
by the framers of the fundamental law, well aware that it is “designed to protect the broadest possible
liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and
to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good”.
Without doubt, classifying food products as halal is a religious function because the standards used are
drawn from the Qur’an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) the exclusive
power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. Also by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has, in effect,
forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah on halal food.

FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-governmental organization
that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among the
functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue
halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of
the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and
designating respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. Under the EO,
respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related
regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the
separation of Church and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies
and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious
organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.

ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of religion

RULING: Petition is granted. EO 46 is declared NULL and VOID. OMA deals with the societal, legal,
political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not
as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State,
the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-
establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the
1987 Constitution.
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And
this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good." Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function
because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs.
By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the
religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what
food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal
certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and
Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare
of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom.
If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable. There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the
premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right
to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged
with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled
and safe.
Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. With these
regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and safety of food
products, the perceived danger against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally
avoided. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the
official religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim consumption.

• INTRAMURAL RELIGIOUS DISPUTES

(21) SANTIAGO A. FONACIER v. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABELO DE LOS REYES, Jr.
G.R. No. L-5917

…all who unite themselves to an ecclesiastical body do so with an implied consent to submit to
the Church government and they are bound to submit to it.
 In the leading case of Fonacier v Court of Appeals, we enunciated the doctrine that in
disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one area which the Court should not
touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences.

FACTS: This case was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente, represented by its Supreme Bishop Gerardo M. Bayaca, against Bishop Santiago A.
Fonacier seeking to require the latter to render an accounting of his administration of all the temporal
properties he has in his possession belonging to said church and to recover the same from him on
the ground that he had ceased to be the Supreme Bishop of said religious organization.
Mons.
Fonacier claims as a defense that he has not been properly removed as Supreme Bishop; that
his legal successor was Juan Jamias who had been elected in accordance with the constitution of the
church; that he had already rendered an accounting of his administration to Bishop Jamias and
turned over all the properties to the latter; that Bishop Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. formally joined the
Protestant Episcopal Church of America and for this reason he has ceased to be a member of the
Iglesia Filipina Independiente; and that Bishops De los Reyes and Bayaca having abandoned the
faith, fundamental doctrines and practices of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, they ceased to be
members thereof and consequently, have no personality to maintain the present action.

ISSUE: Whether the ouster of Bishops Manuel Aguilar and Alejandro Remollino legal and valid.

RULING: The claim that the ouster in question was legal and valid because petitioner, as Supreme
Bishop, could act alone pursuant to the constitution of the church wherein it is provided that the
Supreme Bishop is the supreme head of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente and as such shall have full
powers to impose the penalties of dismissal, confinement in the seminary, suspension, fine, transfer,
etc. which, without contravening the penal laws of the constituted government, can be imposed upon
the bishops, and that said power can be exercised even without the intervention of the Supreme
Council, cannot be entertained in the light of the very provisions of the constitution of the church, it
appearing that the alleged power of the Supreme Bishop under the constitution is not all-embracing
but limited and, in any event, the final action shall be taken by the Supreme Council.
To finally dispose of the property issue, the Court, citing Watson v. Jones,368 declared that the
rule in property controversies within religious congregations strictly independent of any other superior
ecclesiastical association (such as the Philippine Independent Church) is that the rules for resolving
such controversies should be those of any voluntary association. If the congregation adopts the
majority rule then the majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence to duly constituted authorities
within the congregation, then that should be followed.
We have already stated that while the civil courts will ordinarily leave ecclesiastical matters to
church authorities, they may however intervene when it is shown, as in this case, that they have
acted outside the scope of their authority or in a manner contrary to their organic law and rules.

• FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

(22) IMBONG v. OCHOA

DOCTRINE: The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was
to prevent the legislature from passing a law that would allow abortion.

FACTS: The consolidated petitions assail as unconstitutional Republic Act No. 10354 also known as
Reproductive Health (RH) Law for violating the following:
1. Right to life of the unborn – insofar as it authorizes the purchase of abortives in violation of
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception.
 2. Right to health – insofar as it provides access to contraceptives which have hazardous
health effects
3. Right to religious freedom- insofar as (a) it mandates the State-sponsored procurement of
contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of petitioners (b) it compels medical health
practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other
institutions despite their conscientious objections; (c) it requires would-be spouses, as a condition for
the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding
and infant nutrition, and (d) it provides for mandatory sex education in schools.
Petitioners argue that the RH law does not satisfy the “clear and present danger” test and
“compelling state interest test” to justify the regulation of the free exercise of religion and free speech.
4. Prohibition against involuntary servitude- insofar as it compels medical practitioners, under
pain of criminal punishment, to render 48 hours of pro bono service to indigent women, to be
accredited under the Philhealth program
5. Equal protection – insofar as it makes the poor the primary target of the legislation that
promotes contraceptive that will effectively reduce the number of the poor.
6. Due process clause- as the RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” since it punishes “any violation”
of the law yet does not define the type of conduct to be treated as violation. Moreover, it infringes on
the right of the people to manage their own affairs.
7. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)- insofar as it gives absolute authority to the
person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, it impedes the right of spouses to mutually
decide on matter affecting the family.
8. Non-delegation of legislative authority – insofar is it delegates to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) the authority to determine if product is a non-abortifacient and to be included in
the Essential Drugs List (EDL)
9. Local Autonomy – insofar as it imposes duties on the local government.

ISSUES AND HELD:

Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee
of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on
one's belief. The first part is absolute. The second part however, is limited and subject to the
awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others.
The RH law contains a provision mandating a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately
refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare
provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government
legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Doctrine of Benevolent
Neutrality finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would
warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular
objective.
The obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. The Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free
exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Accordingly, a conscientious
objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be
compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of
non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health
care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the
right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother
in grave danger.
Furthermore, the provision in the RH-IRR that “skilled health professional ….who by virtue of
their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and
these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors” is void not only because no such
exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is discriminatory and violative of the equal
protection clause in the Constitution. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should
equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or
private sector.

Equal Protection

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed
The equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article
XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the
people
Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH
Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the
children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to
substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial
distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions,
particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education.

ALTERNATIVE DIGEST:
IMBONG V. OCHOA
G.R. NO.204819, APRIL 8, 2014

FACTS: 14 petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention were filed in Court assailing the constitutionality of
R.A. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012,
or the RH Law, for short.

ISSUE: Whether the law violates the right of an unborn child as guaranteed under Sec. 12, Art. II, of
the Constitution.

HELD: NO. The framers of the Constitution intended for: “conception” to refer to the moment of
“fertilization”; the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization.
They did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible. Nachura
 The RH Law actually prohibits abortion.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning
of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacient only those that “primarily
induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb”, Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR would
pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Sec. 12, Art. II, of the Constitution. For the same reason, the
definition of contraceptives under Sec. 3.01(j) of the IRR, which also uses the term “primarily” must be
struck down.
Sec. 7 of the RH Law which excludes parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a
procedure is already a parent or has had miscarriage is anti-family and violates Sec.12, Art.II (1987
Constitution). In addition, the portion of Sec.23(a)(ii) which reads: “in the case of minors, the written
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or
next-f-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid, as it denies the right of
parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures”.

The SC recognized 2 exceptions:

1. A minor may receive information, as opposed to procedures, about family planning services.
Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and
may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject information received.
2. In life-threatening procedures. The life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage
and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply because of the lack of consent. Ibid.

Sec.12, Art.II, places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children, with theuse of the term “primary”. The right of parents in the upbringing of the youth is
superior to that of the State. Ibid

(23) ALEJANDRO ESTRADA v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR

A.M. NO. P-02-1651, JUNE 22,2006

Q— In a sworn letter-complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote
Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas
City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court
interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of
eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner
and is a resident of Las Piñas but of Bacoor, Cavite. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against
Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the
court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the
court condones her act. Consequently, respondent was charged with committing “disgraceful
and immoral conduct” under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised
Administrative Code. Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in
1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has
been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that
they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with
their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991
a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.”
For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the congregation who
have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus
makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except
in countries where divorce is allowed. As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the Jehovah’s
congregation requires that at the time the declarations are executed, the couple cannot secure
the civil authorities’ approval of the marital relationship because of legal impediments. Only
couple who have been baptized and in good standing may execute the Declarations, which
requires the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter of practice, the marital
status of the declarants and their respective spouses’ commission of adultery are investigated
before the declarations are executed. Escritor and Quiliapio’s declaration were executed in the
usual and approved form prescribed by the Jehovah’s Witnesses, approved by elders of the
congregation where the declaration were executed, and recorded in the Watch Tower Central
Office.
Moreover, the Jehovah’s congregation believes that once all legal impediments for the
couple are lifted, the validity of the declarations ceases, and the couple should legalize their
union. In Escritor’s case, although she was widowed in 1998, thereby lifting the legal
impediment to marry on her part, her mate was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus, their
declarations remained valid. Insofar as the congregation is concerned there is nothing
immoral about the conjugal arrangement between them and they remained members of good
standing in the congregation.
The Court remanded the case to the OCA for the task subjecting the case to the
application of the compelling state interest test, i.e., determining whether respondent is
entitled to exemption from the administrative case and instead, invoke her freedom of religion.
At the hearing, the OSG presented a letter of Bro. Ramong Leach, Legal Representative of the
Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society that efforts were exerted to examine the sincerity and
centrality of her claim to religious belief and practice and a certification duly notarized to
substantiate the sincerity and centrality of the claimed religious practice and belief and to
prove that the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness being purely internal arrangement within
the congregation cannot be a source of any legal protection to the respondent.
On the basis of the evidence of the OSG contended that there was a compelling interest
to override the claimed religious belief and practice in order to protect marriage and the family
as basic social institution. It was contended that marriage and the family are so crucial to the
stability and peace of the nation that the conjugal arrangement embraced in the Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness should not be recognized or given effect as it is utterly destructive of
the avowed institutions of marriage and the family for it reduces to mockery these legally
exalted and socially significant institutions which in their purity demand respect and dignity.
In short, there is a compelling state interest to preserve the marriage and the family as basic
social institutions which is ultimately the public policy underlying the criminal sanctions
against bigamy and concubinage. Is the contention of the OSG correct? Why?

ANS: No. There is no question that the State has an interest in protecting the institution of marriage
and the family or even in the sound administration of justice.
Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the
hierarchy of rights- “the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights,” in the words of Jefferson.
Hence, it is not enough to contend that the State’s interest is important, because our Constitution
itself holds the right to religious freed sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms of the State
interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule
otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.
Thus, it is not the State’s broad interest in “protecting the institution of marriage and the
family,” or even “in the sound administration of justice” that must be weighed against respondent’s
claim, but the State’s narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which
respondent’s faith finds moral. In other words, the government must do more than assert the
objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those
objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. This, the Solicitor General failed to do.
(Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P--, June 22, 2006).
FACTS: Soledad Escritor was already a widow when she joined the judiciary in 1999 as court
interpreter of RTC. At that time, she was legally free to marry Feliciano D. Qualipio who has been her
family ever since her husband Joselito V. De Torres, deceased, abandoned her for another woman in
1979. Unfortunately, it is Feliciano who remains incapacitated to exchange vows with Soledad since
his wife from whom he had been separated de facto even before he and Soledad fell in love with
each other, is still alive and their marriage still subsisting in law.
Soledad and her de facto husband belong to Jehovah´s Witnesses. The informal conjugal
partnership between them has been characterized by faithfulness and devotion to each other with the
proper inspiration and guidance of their spiritual leaders. Soledad and Feliciano voluntarily executed
a document called "Declaration Pledging Faithfulness," conformably with their religious practice and
with the sanction of their respected elders in who acted willingly as their witnesses.
Soledad was charged with the administrative offense of "Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct," a
grave offense under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulation, by a total stranger in her life
and place of work.

ISSUE: Whether Soledad is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct.

RULING: No disgraceful conduct may be inferred from the actuations of respondent since even her
church or religion sanctifies her relationship; complainant himself admits that Escritor is a decent
woman; no question has been raised on her efficiency in the service; and community standards have
been changing as shown by the Solo Parent's Welfare Act of 2000 and the attitude of people who
shaped public opinion.
No immoral conduct may be inferred since Sec. 3, Art. XV, of the Constitution which provides,
"The State shall defend the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demand of responsible parenthood" This rule is broad enough to include de facto
family relations since it would be absurd to deny the free exercise of religious convictions by virtue of
the existence or non-existence of marriage. Besides, such "atypical" family organization is not
immoral per se considering the leeway granted to Moros in Sulu Islamic Association of Masjid
Lambayong v. malik, and in PD 1083, for surely if the arrangement is itself heinous no law could be
validly enacted to endorse it.

• FLAG SALUTE

(24) WEST VIRGINIA BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BARNETTE

As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943):
. . . To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and
spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal
of our institutions to free minds.

FACTS: In 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public schools to include salutes to
the flag by teachers and students as a mandatory part of school activities. The children in a family of
Jehovah's Witnesses refused to perform the salute and were sent home from school for non-
compliance. They were also threatened with reform schools used for criminally active children, and
their parents faced prosecutions for causing juvenile delinquency.

ISSUE: Did the compulsory flag-salute for public schoolchildren violate the First Amendment?
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
RULING: The Court held that it was unconstitutional for public schools to compel students to salute
the flag. It overruled its decision in a previous case, finding that the flag salute was "a form of
utterance" and "a primitive but effective means of communicating ideas". The Court wrote that any
"compulsory unification of opinion" was doomed to failure and was antithetical to the values set forth
in the First Amendment. The Court stated:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.

(25) EBRALINAG v. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT

G.R No. 95770, Mach 01, 1993

Q— WHAT ARE THE TWO (2) ASPECTS IN THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION CLAUSE?

ANS: They are:

(1) The non-establishment clause; and
(2) The free exercise clause. (Ebralinag, et al., vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of
Cebu, supra).

Q— IS THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE ABSOLUTE?

ANS: NO, because it is subject to the police power of the State. In fact, in German vs. Barangan,
March 27, 1985, it was said that the freedom of religion must be exercised in good faith. This was a
situation where the Supreme Court said that when people, who claimed to be holding mass near
Malacañang Palace, were instead chanting words against the government, they can be prevented as
it was actually a demonstration. People come and go to Malacañang, the lives of the members of the
First Family and the security of the people going in and out were the concerns of the State. When
they wer prevented, there was no deprivation of the freedom of religion. What was at issue was the
manner of the exercise. A person may believe, and there is no limit to it, but the manner of doing it is
subject to regulation. (See also Ebralinag, et al., vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu,
G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993).

Q— IS THE FREEDOM TO BELIEVE ABSOLUTE?

ANS: YES, the freedom to believe is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of
thought. Ebralinag, et al., vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, March 1, 1993).

Q— MAY SCHOOL CHILDREN WHO ARE MEMBERS OF A RELIGIOUS SECT KNOWN AS

JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES HE EXPELLED FROM SCHOOL (BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE) FOR
REFUSING, ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR RELIGIOUS BELIEF, TO TAKE PART IN THE FLAG
CEREMONY WHICH INCLUDES PLAYING (BY A BAND) OR SINGING THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL ANTHEM, SALUTING THE PHILIPPINE FLAG, AND RECITING THE PATRIOTIC
PLEDGE?

ANS: NO, because that is part of the exercise of their religious freedom. Religious freedom is a
fundamental right which is entitled to highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights
for it involves the relationship of man and his Creator. (See German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514;
Ebralinag vs..Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, supra).

Q— GIVE EXAMPLES OF SITUATIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION WHERE THE BENEVOLENT

NEUTRALITY-ACCOMMODATION HAS BEEN ADOPTED.
ANS: (1) In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA
256, the Court granted to plaintiff exemption from a law of general application based on the Free
Exercise Clause. In this case, plaintiff was required by an ordinance to secure a mayor’s permit and a
municipal license as ordinarily required of those engaged in the business of general merchandise
under the city’s ordinances. Plaintiff argued that this amounted to “religious censorship and restrained
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession, to wit: the distribution and sale of bibles and
other religious literature to the people of the Philippines.” Although the Court categorically held that
the questioned ordinances were not applicable to plaintiff as it was not engaged in the business or
occupation of selling said “merchandise” for profit, it also ruled that applying the ordinance to plaintiff
and requiring it to secure a license and pay a license fee or tax would impair its free exercise religious
profession and worship and its right of dissemination of religious beliefs “as the power to tax the
exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment.” The decision states in part,
viz:
“The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can
only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.”

(2) Another case involving mandatory accommodation is Ebralinag v. The Division

Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, G.R. No. 95770,March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 256. The case
involved several Jehovah’s Witnesses who were expelled from school for refusing to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, in violation of the Administrative Code of
1987. In resolving the religious freedom issue, a unanimous Court overturned an earlier ruling
denying such exemption, using the “grave and imminent danger” test, viz:
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom (according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting
opinion in German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and
present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State
has a right (and duty) to prevent. Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of
the petitioners from the schools is not justified.
In these two cases, the Court itself carved out an exemption from a law of general application,
on the strength directly of the Free Exercise Clause.

(3) There is also jurisprudence that supports permissive accommodation. The case of
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, G.R. No. 25246, September 12, 1974; See also Basa
vs. FederacionObrera, G.R. No.L-27113, November 19,1974, 61 SCRA 93; Gonzales vs. Central
Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union, G.R. No. L-38178, October 3, 1985, 139 SCRA 30, is an
example of the application of Mr. Justice Carpio’s theory of permissive accommodation, where
religious exemption is granted by a legislative act. In Victoriano, the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 3350 was questioned. The said R.A. exempt employees from the application and coverage of a
closed shop agreement— mandated in another law— based on religious objections. A unanimous
Court upheld the constitutionality of the law, holding that “government is not precluded from pursuing
valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or
sect.” Interestingly, the secular purpose of the challenged law which the Court upheld was the
advancement of “the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.”

Q- WHAT CAUSED THE SUPREME COURT IN EBRALINAG TO UPHOLD THE EXEMPTION OF

THE JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES FROM SALUTING THE FLAG?

ANS - It was the conviction that by exempting them from saluting the flag, singing the national
anthem, and reciting the patriotic pledge, this small group which admittedly compromises a small
portion of the school population will not shake up this part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation
untaught and inculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love of country, or
admiration for national heroes. After all, what they were merely asking was exemption from flag
ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the
democratic way of life and of government and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and
culture, but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of patriotism,
respect for human rights, appreciation o national heroes, rights and duties of citizenship, moral and
spiritual values. (Ebralinag vs Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256
(1993).
Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation
that the SC feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to
participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of
country or respect for duly constituted authorities.

DOCTRINE: Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Cebu [G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993]

SINGING OF NATIONAL ANTHEM AND SALUTING THE FLAG MAY NOT BE IMPOSSED
AGAINST CITIZENS WHOSE RELIGIOUS BELIEF PROHIBIT THE SAME. It is somewhat ironic
however, that after the Gerona ruling had received legislative cachet by its incorporation in the
Administrative Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time has come to reexamine it. The
idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic
pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from
school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill
of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech ** and the free exercise of religious profession
and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution; Article IV, Section 8, 1973 Constitution;
Article III, Section 1[7], 1935 Constitution).
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the
amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator (Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-
531).
"The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe
and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the
realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts
that affect the public welfare" (J. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 176-177).
Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony,
they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to
participate in the solemn proceedings (Annex F, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887, p. 50 and Rollo of G.R.
No. 95770, p. 48). Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their
expulsion.
"The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom
(according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs.
Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both
grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to
public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.
We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to
the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those
beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not
give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in
Non. vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the
exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to
discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities,
both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave
and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent" (German vs. Barangan, 135
SCRA 514, 517).

FACTS: All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge
as required by Republic Act No. 1265 and DECS Department Order No. 8 which stipulated compulsory
flag ceremonies in all educational institutions. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not
to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those
are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or
anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They allege
that the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution
protects against official control. Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu
Division of DECS and her Assistant issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989,
directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions to
remove from service, after due process, teachers and school employees, and to deprive the students
and pupils from the benefit of public education, if they do not participate in daily flag ceremony and
doesn’t obey flag salute rule. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary
of Education. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state and
the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The freedom
of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not mean exception from non-discriminatory
laws like the saluting of flag and singing national anthem. This exemption disrupts school discipline and
demoralizes the teachings of civic consciousness and duties of citizenship.

ISSUE: May the school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses
be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to
take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national
anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge?

RULING: NO. The petition is granted. The expulsion orders issued by the public respondents against
the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2-fold aspect of right to
religious worship is:
1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought.
2.) Freedom to act on one’s belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation
to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and
interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from the school is not
justified.
The expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled
will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for
it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education x x x and
to make such education accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag,
singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly
comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly
produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism,
love of country and admiration for national heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24).
After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the
public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of
government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also re¬ceive
training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights,
appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values
(Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Nevertheless, their right not to
participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.
Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the
highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be
taken to mean that school authori¬ties are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit
breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other
persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and
teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patri¬otic pledge, we do not see how
such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil
to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a
right (and duty) to prevent" (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).
Although the Court upholds in this decision the petitioners' right under our Constitution to
refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs, we hope, nevertheless, that
another foreign invasion of our country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to
appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.

• FREEDOM TO PROPAGATE RELIGIOUS DOCTRINES

(26) AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY v. CITY OF MANILA

[181 Phil. 386 (1957)]

To illustrate, in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, the Court granted to plaintiff
exemption from a law of general application based on the Free Exercise Clause. In this case,
plaintiff was required by an ordinance to secure a mayor’s permit and a municipal license as ordinarily
required of those engaged in the business of general merchandise under the city’s ordinances.
Plaintiff argued that this amounted to “religious censorship and restrained the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession, to wit: the distribution and sale of bibles and other religious
literature to the people of the Philippines.” Although the Court categorically held that the questioned
ordinances were not applicable to plaintiff as it was not engaged in the business or occupation of
selling said “merchandise” for profit, it also ruled that applying the ordinance to plaintiff and requiring it
to secure a license and pay a license fee or tax would impair its free exercise of religious profession
and worship and its right of dissemination of religious beliefs “as the power to tax the exercise of a
privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment.” The decision states in part,
viz:
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such
right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that
there is a clear and present danger of any substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent.
At this point, we must emphasize that the adoption of the benevolent neutrality-
accommodation approach does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time
a free exercise claim comes before it. This is an erroneous reading of the framework which the
dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio seems to entertain. Although benevolent neutrality is the lens with
which the Court ought to view religion clause cases, the interest of the state should also be
afforded utmost protection. This is precisely the purpose of the test — to draw the line
between mandatory, permissible and forbidden religious exercise.
xxx While the Court cannot adopt a doctrinal formulation that can eliminate the difficult questions of
judgment in determining the degree of burden on religious practice or importance of the state interest
or the sufficiency of the means adopted by the state to pursue its interest, the Court can set a
doctrine on the ideal towards which religious clause jurisprudence should be directed.
We here lay down the doctrine that in Philippine jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent
neutrality approach not only because of its merits as discussed above, but more importantly,
because our constitutional history and interpretation indubitably show that benevolent
neutrality is the launching pad from which the Court should take off in interpreting religion
clause cases. The ideal towards which this approach is directed is the protection of religious liberty
“not only for a minority, however small- not only for a majority, however large but for each of
us” to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.

In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil 386, the Supreme Court recognized
the “right to proselytize’’ as part of religious freedom, and invalidated the application of a City
Ordinance imposing license fees on the sale of merchandise to the sale of religious tracts. Citing this
case, the Supreme Court said in Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, supra.,that the constitutional
guarantee of free exercise of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information, and any restraint of such right can be justified only on the ground that there is a
clear and present danger of an evil which the State has the right to prevent.

FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly

registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila.
Plaintiff agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof throughout the
Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. City Treasurer of the City of Manila
informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise without providing itself
with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as
amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three
days, the corresponding permit and license fees the total sum of P5,821.45
Ordinance No. 3000 provides:
SEC. 1. PERMITS NECESSARY. — It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to conduct or
engage in any of the businesses, trades, or occupations enumerated in Section 3 of this Ordinance or
other businesses, trades, or occupations for which a permit is required for the proper supervision and
enforcement of existing laws and ordinances governing the sanitation, security, and welfare of the
public and the health of the employees engaged in the business specified in said section 3
hereof, WITHOUT FIRST HAVING OBTAINED A PERMIT THEREFOR FROM THE MAYOR AND THE
NECESSARY LICENSE FROM THE CITY TREASURER.
To avoid the closing of its business as well as further fines and penalties in the premise’s plaintiff
paid to the permit and license fees. At the same time plaintiff filed a complaint before the court to
question the legality of the ordinances.
Defendant answered the complaint, maintaining in turn that said ordinances were enacted by
the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by virtue of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
During the hearing plaintiff proved that it has been in existence in the Philippines since 1899,
and that its parent society is in New York, United States of America; that it is are exempt from real
estate taxes; and that it was never required to pay any municipal license fee or tax before the war, nor
does the American Bible Society in the United States pay any license fee or sales tax for the sale of
bible therein. Plaintiff further tried to establish that it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles
but was untenable.
Court dismissed complaint. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the ordinances restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession
and worship of appellant.
RULING: YES, Ordinance No. 3000 restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious
profession and worship of appellant.
Article III, section 1, clause (7) of the Constitution of the Philippines, guarantees the freedom of
religious profession and worship. "Religion has been spoken of as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to its Creator" (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil., 201).It has reference to
one's views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being
and character, and obedience to His Will (Davis vs. Beason, 133 U.S., 342). The constitutional guaranty
of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. Any restraints of such right can only be justified like other restraints
of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent". (Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of the
Philippines, Vol. 1, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon
appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature.
In the case of Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, it was held that an ordinance requiring that a license
be obtained before a person could canvass or solicit orders for goods, paintings, pictures, wares or
merchandise cannot be made to apply to members of Jehovah's Witnesses who went about from door
to door distributing literature and soliciting people to "purchase" certain religious books and pamphlets,
all published by the Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society. The "price" of the books was twenty-five cents
each, the "price" of the pamphlets five cents each. It was shown that in making the solicitations there
was a request for additional "contribution" of twenty-five cents each for the books and five cents each
for the pamphlets. Lesser sum were accepted, however, and books were even donated in case
interested persons were without funds.
On the above facts the Supreme Court held that it could not be said that petitioners were
engaged in commercial rather than a religious venture. Their activities could not be described as
embraced in the occupation of selling books and pamphlets. Then the Court continued: "We do not
mean to say that religious groups and the press are free from all financial burdens of government.”
The power to tax the exercise of a privilege in this case freedom of religion is the power to control
or suppress its enjoyment. "When we balance the constitutional rights of owners of property against
those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the
fact that the latter occupy a preferred position. . . . In our view the circumstance that the property rights
to the premises where the deprivation of property here involved, took place, were held by others than
the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of
citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the
application of a State statute." (Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 4th
ed., p. 304-306).
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets
was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that
appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this
reason We believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be
applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be applied to plaintiff because, it would impair plaintiff's right to the
free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination
of religious beliefs.
Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal Revenue Code,
Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or
educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the income of whatever kind and character from
any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the
disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Code shall not be taxed

(27) SWAGGART MINISTRIES v. CAL BD. OF EQUALIZATION

493 U.S. 378 January 17, 1990
 As the US Supreme Court held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, the
free exercise clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale
of religious materials by a religious organization

FACTS: California law required retailers to pay a 6% sales tax on in-state sales of tangible personal
property and residents to pay a 6%use tax on such property if purchased out of state. Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries, incorporated in Louisiana, sold religious materials to California residents through
several direct and mail-order "evangelistic crusades." After auditing his ministry, the California Board
of Equalization ("Board") told Swaggart that under California law he had to register his ministry as a
seller so the Board could collect the appropriate sales and use taxes. After paying the taxes,
Swaggart petitioned the Board for a refund. When his petition was rejected, Swaggart challenged the
Board in state court. Following two unfavorable rulings, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Swaggart's
petition for certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether California's imposition of a sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials
violate the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment (America)

RULING: NO. California's impositions of sales and use tax liability on appellant’s sales of religious
materials DOES NOT contravene the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
Basing its unanimous decision on the fact that California's sales and use tax was not a flat tax,
affected only a small portion of retail sales, and was neutrally applied, the Court found the taxes
constitutional. Moreover, since the taxes were not imposed as a precondition to spreading any given
message and were due regardless of registration, the Court rejected Swaggart's claim that
California's no-fee registration requirement acted as a prior restraint on his religious organization.
Finally, the Court held that any administrative burdens associated with the payment of taxes did not
give rise to an establishment conflict since they did not cause excessive entanglement between the
government and Swaggart's organization.

• EXEMPTION FROM UNION SHOP

(28) VICTORIANO v. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS UNION

[59 SCRA 54 (1974)]

In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that ". . . it is only where it is
unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent
necessary to avoid the danger."

Q— TO JUSTIFY E.O. NO. 46’S INTRUSION INTO THE SUBJECT RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL ARGUED THAT THE FREEDOM OG RELIGION IS SUBSERVIENT TO
THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE. BY DELEGATING TO THE OMA THE AUTHORITY TO
ISSUE HALAL CERTIFICATIONS, THE GOVERNMENT SOUGHT TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE
THE MUSLIM FILIPINOS’ RIGHT TO HEALTH, AND TO INSTILL HEALTH CONSCIOUSNESS IN
THEM. IS THE CONTENTION CORRECT? WHY?

ANS: NO. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. (Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union, 59 SCRA 54).
 In Victoriano, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350 was questioned. The said R.A.
exempt employees from the application and coverage of a closed shop agreement— mandated in
another law— based on religious objections. A unanimous Court upheld the constitutionality of the
law, holding that “government is not precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character
even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect.” Interestingly, the secular purpose
of the challenged law which the Court upheld was the advancement of “the constitutional right to the
free exercise of religion.”

In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54, the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of R.A. 3350, exempting members of a religious sect from being compelled to join a labor
union.

FACTS: Petitioner Victoriano is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo and was an employee of Elizalde
Rope Factory and was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. Membership with the Union
was mandatory as provided for under a CBA: "Membership in the Union shall be required as a
condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement."
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic
Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization
to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted,
introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as
follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
Being a member of the INC, a religion that prohibits affiliation with labor organizations, the
Petitioner wrote a letter informing the Union of his resignation. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal
letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that
he was resigning from the Union as a member.
The CFI ruled in favor of Petitioner and enjoined the company from dismissing him.
In its appeal, the Union claimed that R.A. no. 3350 was unconstitutional on the ground that
1) prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect
prohibits affiliations of their members thereto; and, consequently, deprives said members of their
constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
and thus becomes obnoxious [to the] Constitution;
2) Impairs the obligation of contracts;
3) discriminates in favor of certain religious sects and affords no protection to labor unions;
4) violates the constitutional provision that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of
a civil right;
5) violates the equal protection clause; and
6) the act violates the constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social justice.

ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 3350 violates the Constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers
and to promote their welfare notwithstanding the fact that it allows some workers, by virtue of their
religious beliefs, to opt out of Union security agreements.

RULING: NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be pointed out that the free
exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter
must, therefore, yield to the former.
The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets
or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any
creed or the practice of any form of worship, but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form
of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the
Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man
to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or
purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. But if the
stage regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and
effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden.
In Aglipay v. Ruiz , this Court had occasion to state that the government should not be
precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would be
favorable to a religion or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in order to withstand the
strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot
be said to violate the constitutional inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the
Constitution.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or
religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or
be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a
modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens to find
gainful employment whereby they can make a living to support themselves and their families is a valid
objective of the state. In fact, the state is enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to
labor, and regulate the relations between labor and capital and industry. More so now in the 1973
Constitution where it is mandated that "the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers.
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of
religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of
said employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving
certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic
insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the
people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption
from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any
particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that
prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely
incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct
whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions. The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious
exercise be preferentially aided.

• DISQUALIFICATION FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

(29) PAMIL v. TELERON

G.R. NO. L-34854 NOVEMBER 20, 1978

In Pamil v. Teleron, 86 SCRA 413, a divided Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Sec. 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code disqualifying ecclesiastics from holding elective or
appointive municipal offices.

FACTS: In 1971, Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was elected and duly proclaimed
as mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. Petitioner filed a suit for quo warranto, to disqualify respondent
based on Section 2175 of the Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or
appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastic, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality."
The suit did not prosper, with the lower court held that the ineligibility was impliedly repealed
by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner. It is his
contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full force and effect. Thus, was the
specific question raised.

ISSUE: Whether an ecclesiastic was eligible to an elective municipal position

RULING: NO. The attack on the continuing effectivity of Section 2175 having failed, it must be, as
noted at the outset, given full force and application. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code,
as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The presumption of validity calls for
its application. Under the circumstances, certiorari lies.
The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible
ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom
guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test. Here being an
ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office. There is
thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied upon by petitioner and an
express constitutional mandate.
Respondent Gonzaga is hereby ordered immediately to vacate the mayoralty of the
municipality of Albuquerque, Bohol, there being a failure to elect.

• RELIGIOUS TEST

(30) TORCASO v. WATKINS

367 U.S. 488

FACTS: Appellant was appointed by the Governor of Maryland to the office of Notary Public.
However, he was denied a commission because he would not declare his belief in God, a
requirement to hold "any office of profit or trust in this State" by the Maryland Constitution.
Article 37 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution provides: "No religious test
ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State, other than a
declaration of belief in the existence of God. . . ."
Claiming that this requirement violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
he sued in a state court to compel issuance of his commission, but relief was denied. The State Court
of Appeals affirmed, holding that the state constitutional provision is self-executing, without need for
implementing legislation, and requires declaration of a belief in God as a qualification for office.
The Court of Appeals justified its decision thus: “The petitioner is not compelled to believe or
disbelieve, under threat of punishment or other compulsion. True, unless he makes the declaration of
belief, he cannot hold public office in Maryland, but he is not compelled to hold office.”
Torcaso took the matter to the United States Supreme Court, where it was heard on April 24,
1961.

ISSUE: Whether appellant’s constitutional rights to freedom of religious expression had been
infringed

HELD: This Maryland test for public office cannot be enforced against appellant, because it
unconstitutionally invades his freedom of belief and religion guaranteed by the First Amendment and
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by the States.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court said:
"The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the
legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. . . . Thus, the Amendment
embraces two concepts -- freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot be."
Later, on Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court said that:
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: neither a
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to
or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of
separation between church and State.'"
The Court repeats that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a
person “to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion”. Neither can constitutionally pass laws or
impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers, and neither can aid those
religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different
beliefs.
In upholding the State's religious test for public office, the highest court of Maryland said: "The
petitioner is not compelled to believe or disbelieve, under threat of punishment or other compulsion.
True, unless he makes the declaration of belief, he cannot hold public office in Maryland, but he is not
compelled to hold office."
The fact, however, that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot possibly be an
excuse for barring him from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the Constitution.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is accordingly reversed, and the cause is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

• LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

• ART. III, SEC. 6

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law.

Q: WHAT IS LIBERTY OF ABODE?

ANS – Right to change one’s place. it is the right of a person to have his home in whatever place
chosen by him and thereafter to change it at will.

Q: IS IT SAME AS THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL?

ANS - No, However, they are distinct constitutional right

Q: IS THIS AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT?

ANS – liberty of abode cannot be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. The lawful order of
the court is one of the limitations of Section 6.
Q: IF NO LAWFUL ORDER OF THE COURT?

ANS - NO, otherwise, the freedom of the person to choose his own residence is abridged and the
purpose of the constitutional right or the right to be protected is rendered inutile. In addition, this goes
against not only the Constitution but as well as internationally accepted principles, which the
Constitution also respects and recognizes.

LIMITATION ON LIBERTY OF ABODE: LAWFUL ORDER OF THE COURT

a) Art. 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Art. 12 of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights provide that everyone has the right of freedom of movement and residence within
the border of each State.

(31) SALONGA v. HERMOSO

GR NO 53622, April 25,1980

FACTS: During the Martial Law, Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga filed a case for mandamus against
Rolando Hermoso as the Captain of the Travel Processing Center to compel the latter to issue a
certificate of travel in favor of Salonga.
(This is not the first-time petitioner Jovito Salonga came to the tribunal by way of a mandamus
proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to travel. In the first case,
Salonga v Madella, Salonga always travel to the US for operations for several illnesses. However, it
was alleged that the main reason of his constant travel was to meet the alleged subversives of the
government. In the totality of the case no prima facie evidence was presented hence the declare of
the case being moot and academic.)

ISSUE: Whether the RIGHT TO TRAVEL may be prohibited during the Martial Law.

HELD: NO, the issuance of the certificate to travel was in pursuant to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights on the Right to Travel. While the Philippines is under Martial Law, it shall not facilitate
the erosion of Human Rights. The Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid
the impression by the citizens that their right to travel is subject to inconvenience or annoyance. It
goes with the saying that the petition for such certificate of eligibility to travel be filed at the earliest
opportunity to facilitate the granting thereof and preclude any disclaimer as to the persons to travel
being in any way responsible for any delay. This is to avoid such similar cases the court has to face
which needlessly expire the court’s effort and time.
Since it was established that Salonga was in fact issued a certificate to travel. The case is
hereby declared moot and academic.

(32) CAUNCA v. SALAZAR

82 Phil. 851 (1949)

FACTS: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin
Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar,
respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment
agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which
was disallowed by the employment agency. Further, she was detained and her liberty was restrained.
The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation
expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.
ISSUE: Whether an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning
the advance payment it gave.

RULING: None. An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective
employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no
physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make it less real
the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another,
freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor
to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental
faculty of choice of the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell
is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice
as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.

(33) MANOTOC v. CA
[142 SCRA 149 (1986)]

FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Following the "run" on
stock brokerages caused by a stock broker’s flight from this jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the
United States, came home, and together with his co-stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities
and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a management committee for the two companies.
Pending disposition of the Case the Securities and Exchange Commission requested the then
Commissioner of Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure.
When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was supected to be
a fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner and one Raul Leveriza,
Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course,
corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal. In all cases, petitioner
has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Insurance Corporation as
surety.
Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave
the country", stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business
transactions and opportunities. The motion was denied thus the petitioner appealed to CA contending
that he si being deprived o his right to travel.

ISSUE: Whether a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an
unrestricted right to travel?

HELD: NO. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond as provided under Rule 114,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever
the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. If the accused
were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of
the courts. Further, petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his
surety has agreed to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had
posted cash indemnities.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states:
"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or
when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health."
 To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order
as contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.

(34) MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS

177 SCRA 668; 1989

DOCTRINE: MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS

The right to return to one’s country is NOT among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel. Nonetheless, it is the Court’s
well-considered view that the right to return may be reckoned as a generally accepted principle of
international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land.
• The right to return is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys different
protection under the
• International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being arbitrarily deprived
thereof.
• The President did not act arbitrarily in determining that the return of former President Marcos
and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare.
• The power involved is the President’s residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
• This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The power
is NOT limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or
leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence.

FACTS: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and
the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to
bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the
Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres.
Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so
within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino)
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

HELD: YES.
DIFFERENCE OF RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE’S COUNTRY
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally
connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct
right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the
country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration
speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the
other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be
restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate
rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be
therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one’s country in the same
context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view
that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and,
under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is
distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights [Art. 12 (4).]

THE PRESIDENT HAS THE POWER TO BAR THE MARCOSES FROM RETURNING TO THE
PHILIPPINES AS SHE DEEMED IT NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE GENERAL WELFARE OF
THE PEOPLE (RESIDUAL POWERS)

The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right
to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even
remotely similar to the present one.
It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in
that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether
it must be granted or denied.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the
return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos
regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return
to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

(35) SILVERIO v. CA
G.R. No. 94284 (April 8, 1991)

In Silverio v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 760, the Court said that Art. Ill, Sec. 6, should be
interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without court order, the
appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to
impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of “national security, public safety or
public health” and “as may be provided by law”, a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973
text, xxx Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered a valid restriction on his right to travel, so that he
may be dealt with in accordance with law.

DOCTRINE: SILVERIO v. CA

A condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the
Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel. A person facing
criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to
return. An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he
attempts to depart from the Philippines prior permission of the Court where the case is pending.
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of
travel may be impaired even without court order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative
authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits ONLY
on the basis of “national security, public safety, or public health” and “as may be provided by law”. It
should NOT be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary
to carry orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by all, jurisdiction is conferred
on a Court or Judicial officer, all auxiliary powers, writs, process and other means necessary to carry
it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer.

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal
Case of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.
More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines
filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against
accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court
approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order directing the Department of
Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner’s passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission
on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the
Trial Court’s finding that since the filing of the Information, “the accused has not yet been arraigned
because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is
evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without
the knowledge and permission of this Court”. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction
of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving
the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that “An accused released on bail may be
re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior
permission of the Court where the case is pending.
Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of
the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable
impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public
health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
The submission is not well taken.
HENCE, holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that
he may be dealt with in accordance with law.

(36) ANGEL LORENZO v. THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH

G.R. No. 27484, September 01, 1927

FACTS: The purpose of this appeal is to induce the court to set aside the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Manila sustaining the law authorizing the segregation of lepers, and denying the
petition for habeas corpus, by requiring the trial court to receive evidence to determine if leprosy is or
is not a contagious disease.
The petition for the writ of habeas corpus was in the usual form. Therein it was admitted that
the applicant was a leper. It was, however, alleged that his confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital in
the City of Manila was in violation of his constitutional rights. The further allegation was made that
leprosy is not an infectious disease. The return of the writ stated that the leper was confined in the
San Lazaro Hospital in conformity with the provisions of section 1058 of the Administrative Code. But
to this was appended, for some unknown reason, the averment that each and every fact of the
petition not otherwise admitted by the return was denied.
In its simplest aspects, therefore, we have this situation presented: A leper confined in the San
Lazaro Hospital by the health authorities in conformity with law, but with counsel for the leper
contending that the said law is unconstitutional, and advancing as the basis for that contention the
theory to be substantiated by proof that human beings are not inoculable with leprosy, and that the
disease may not be communicated by contact.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s right to travel violated.

RULING: NO. The Philippine law pertaining to the segregation of lepers is found in article XV of
chapter 37 of the Administrative Code. Codal section 1058 empowers the Director of Health and his
authorized agents "to cause to be apprehended, and detained, isolated, or confined, all leprous
persons in the Philippine Islands." In amplification of this portion of the law are found provisions
relating to arrest of suspected lepers, medical inspection and diagnostic procedure, confirmation of
diagnosis by bacteriological methods, establishment of hospitals, detention camps, and a leper
colony, etc.
Section 1058 of the Administrative Code was enacted by the legislative body in the legitimate
exercise of the police power which extends to the preservation of the public health. It was placed on
the statute books in recognition of leprosy as a grave health problem. The methods provided for the
control of leprosy plainly constitute due process of law. The assumption must be that if evidence was
required to establish the necessity for the law, that it was before the Legislature when the act was
passed. In the case of a statute purporting to have been enacted in the interest of the public health,
all questions relating to the determination of matters of fact are for the Legislature. If there is a
probable basis for sustaining the conclusion reached, its findings are not subject to judicial review.
Debatable questions are for the Legislature to decide. The courts do not sit to resolve the merits of
conflicting theories.
Judicial notice will be taken of the fact that leprosy is commonly believed to be an infectious
disease tending to cause one afflicted with it to foe shunned and excluded from society, and that
compulsory segregation of lepers as a means of preventing the spread of the disease is supported by
high scientific authority.
Upon this view, laws for the segregation of lepers have been provided the world over.
Similarly, the local Legislature has regarded leprosy as a contagious disease and has authorized
measures to control the dread scourge. To that forum must the petitioner go to reopen the question.
We are frank to say that it would require a much stronger case than the one at bar for us to sanction
admitting the testimony of expert or other witnesses to show that a law of this character may possibly
violate some constitutional provision.