CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
authority.
The different meanings and concepts of “Local
Government”
 Distribution of powers to Local Government as
limitation to political authority
 The idea of distributing governmental powers is
one of the basic and minimum characteristics of
the concept of the rule of law. Horizontal and
vertical distribution prevents over-centration of
powers on one branch or agency of the
government and is another way of limiting
political authority.
 By horizontal distribution of government
powers, the powers of government are
distributed among the three (3) branches of
national government, namely: legislative,
executive, and judicial. In the US and the
Philippines, there is complete separation of
powers between the three branches.
 By vertical distribution of government powers,
the powers of government are distributed
among two (2) levels of government. At the
upper level is the national government and the
lower level are the local governments.
 Local governments as political and territorial
subdivisions of the State
 In MMDA vs Bel-air Village, local government
is defined as a “political subdivision of a nation
or state which is constituted by law and has a
substantial control of local affairs.”
 Local Government Unit is also defined in
Section 15 of the Local Government Code of
1991 as “body politic and corporate endowed
with powers to be exercised by it in conformity
with law.”
 Local government are subordinate entities,
having no inherent powers and moust look up to
the higher governmental level for delegation of
 Concept of local gov. Does not only connote
higher authority but also territorial boundary of
governance . The International Union of Local
Authorities refer to it as “GEOGRAPHIC
SUBDIVISIONS” (higher authority + territorial
boundary).
Divisions:
Politically and
terrestrially subdivided
to:
State different provinces or
cities (independent and
highly urbanized.
province Municipalities and/or
component cities
Independent and highly barangays
urbanized cities
Municipalities and barangays
component cities
-a cluster of brgys. Compose a municipality/city
-a cluster of municipalities/ component cites =
province
 section 1, article X “provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays are political and
territorial subdivision of the Republic of the Phil.
The Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras are
considered autonomous regions.
 Local governments as municipal corporations
a) Local governments are essentially municipal
corporations. As such, it is a body politic and
corporate constituted by the incorporation of the
inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of
local government thereof.
b) Municipal corporations are established by law as
agent of the state to assist in the civil government
of the country and chiefly to regulate and
administer the local internal affairs of the city,
town, or district incorporated.
c) As a result of this concept of local governments as
municipal corporations, the “corporation” is
 therefore legally considered distinct from its
members.
Local Gov. System
1. HISTORY
I. Pre-Spanish
 Datu- exercised all 3 gov. Function: Executive,
legis. And judiciary often upon
CONSULTATION with the Elders.
◦ Organized the Balangay (barangay) BUT
these Balangays are not yet perceived as
local governments but it has a status of
CITY STATES (independent, not
subordinate of higher gov.)
2. Spanish Period
 Centralization-main tool in colonizing and
controlling the country.
 Encomiendas (parcels of lands)- given to
privileged and favored persons who assisted
them in the pacification of the islands.
 They created: .. in ascending hierarchy
◦ Cabildos -cities
◦ Pueblos- municipalities
◦ Provincias- provinces
◦ Barangays- reduced to Barrios (it became
the lowest rung in ascending power of gov.
power)
 Datus demoted to Cabezas de
Barangay(FUNCTION: assist higher gov. Only
in collecting tributes)
3. American Period
 Continued the convenient system of the
Spaniards
 Why? Phil. Is so regionalized, centralization is
needed to wholly govern the Phil. For
themselves
4. Later peiods
 1935 consti only one sec. In art. 7, sec 10 “pres.
Shall exercise gen. Supervision over local gov.
As provided by law”
 1972 Pres. And congress determined
relationship of national and local gov. Statutes
and Eos
 1972 martial law- strengthened Pres. Power
over LGUs despite the provision in the 1973
consti and creation of dep. Of local gv and
community dev.. Marcos created and abolised
offices changing the relationship between the
national and local gov.
 AFTER PEOPLE POWER- 1987 consti. Provided
for the special forms of LGU in response to ethnic
peculiarities in Muslim Mindanao and Cordilleras
◦ LGU code of 1991 was passed – devolution of
powers and services.
Structures and System of Philippine Local Government
 Creation
 Although the LGC of 1991 provides for a
devolution of powers, the Philippines remains a
unitary state. The national government, by law,
creates, merges, or abolishes local government
units, endows them with powers within their
jurisdiction, and determines national-local
relations.
 Tiers of Local Government
 In the Philippines, there are several levels of local
authority. The province is the intermediate unit,
providing supervision to the municipalities and
component cities under it, and performing services
for national government.
 The Unitary System of Government
1) In a Unitary System of Government, municipal
governments are only agents of the national
government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred upon them
by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
 Since ours is still a unitary form of government,
not a federal state, any for form of autonomy
granted to local governements will necessarily be
limited and confined within the extent allowed by
the central authority
 SEE the other file for chapters
2 and 3
Chapter 4: Local Governments and Unions
or Federations of Local Governments in the
Philippines
Local Units and Autonomous Regions:
1. Local govt. units should be created by law.
The constitution does not create local
government units but merely ensures that no
law can abolish barangays.
2) Barangay – the basic political unit. It is
the primary and implementing unit of
government policies, plans, forums. It
is where the views of the people may
be expressed and considered. It is also
where disputes may be amicably
settled.
3) Municipality – consists of a group of
barangays. Its purpose is the
consideration and delivery of basic,
regular, and direct services / effective
governance.
4) City – consists of more urbanized and
developed barangays. Its purpose is the
coordination and delivery of basic,
regular, and direct services / effective
governance.
5) Province – composed of a cluster of
municipalities and component cities. It
serves as a dynamic mechanism for
developmental processes. It governs
the LGUs under its jurisdiction.
Regular LGUs: provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays.
Autonomous Regions: Muslim Mindanao
and the cordilleras.
Classification of Cities:
6) Highly Urbanized – they have an
income of at least 50 million pesos
7) Independent Component Cities – their
charter prohibits the city’s inhabitants
from voting for provincial elective
officials / to be voted as provincial
elective officials
8) Component Cities – all other cities
Special Metropolitan Political Subdivisions:
9) Can be created by congress through law
subject to plebiscite
10) Component cities / municipalities regain
basic autonomy and are entitled to their
own local executives and legislative
assemblies.
11) Their jurisdiction only includes basic
services. They cannot exercise local
political powers.
Loose Federations:
12) These are formed when LGUs group
themselves and coordinate their efforts,
services, and resources for purposes
beneficial to them
13) May be created through ordinances
enacted by the LGUs
14) Not considered a new corporate body
Regional Development Councils:
15) Composed of local government officials,
regional heads of departments and govt.
offices. Includes NGO representatives to
strengthen autonomy of the LGU and
accelerate economic growth.
16) Established by president, no need for
authorization from congress.
CASES:
 Abella vs. COMELEC
Facts:
17) Silvestre Dela Cruz filed a petition with
the COMELEC to disqualify Larrazabal
from running as governor of Leyte
18) Dela Cruz claimed that Larrazabal
wasn’t truthful regarding her residence,
and that she lied in her Certificate of
Candidacy. He also claimed that she
was a resident of Ormoc.
19) The petition was granted but
Larrazabal was already governor.
Issue:
20) WON or not the person with the 2nd
highest votes can become governor if
the current governor ends up
disqualified
Held:
21) No. They cannot. Larrazabal was
presumed to be a bonafide candidate
at the time of the election and the
people voted for her. The person with
the second highest votes still lost the
election.
 Metro Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) vs. Bel-Air Village:
Facts:
22) MMDA, a government agency tasked
with delivering basic services in Manila,
sent Bel-Air a notice requesting that
the latter open Neptune Street to
public vehicles
23) Bel-Air refused and filed an injunction.
However, Bel-Air lost.
24) However, on appeal the court ruled
that MMDA had no authority to order
the opening of the street (which was
inside a private subdivision)
Issue:
25) WON MMDA had the authority to open
up Neptune Street
Held:
26) No. The MMDA only has the following
powers: formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installation of a system and
administration. They do not have
legislative powers. The powers granted in
their charter are limited, and their
primary function is merely to help
organize the transportation system.
Chapter 5: The Local Government Code of
1991
Constitutional Mandate:
 The 1987 constitution mandates congress
to enact a local government code that
shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable LGU structure through
decentralization.
 This paradigm shift results from the
realization that genuine development
comes from strengthening local
autonomy.
Scope:
 All provinces, cities, municipalities,
barangays, political subdivisions. Officials,
offices and agencies of the local
government.
 Applies to autonomous regions until they
come up with their own local government
code.
 Existing tax ordinances remain in force
 All general and special laws, acts, charters,
decrees, and executive orders that were
inconsistent with the code were repealed
or modified accordingly.
Rules of Interpretation:
 Provisions on the powers of LGUs should
be interpreted liberally in the LGU’s favor.
 In case of doubts, it should be resolved
in favor of the devolution of powers
 Tax ordinances or revenue measures
should be interpreted strictly against
the LGU. It should favor the tax payer.
HOWEVER when it comes to tax
exemptions, it should be interpreted
against the person claiming it.
 General welfare provisions should be
interpreted in favor of the LGU.
 Rights and obligations arising from
contracts should be governed by the
original terms.
 If no legal provisions or jurisprudence
is available, the controversy shall be
governed by the customs and
traditions of the place.
CHAPTER 6: CREATION, CONVERSION,
DIVISION, MERGER, SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE
OF BOUNDARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS AND ABOLITION
Political Subdivisions
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
“No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.”
Creation and Conversion
 General Requirements
 LAW
-by law enacted by Congress in the case of a
provonce, city, municipality, or any other
politiical subdivision
-by ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod in the
case of a barangay located within its territorial
jursidiction
 PLEBISCITE
-The constitution specifically requires that a
plebiscite should be held in order to lawfully
create a municipal corporation (sec 10, art X)
 COMPLIANCE with CRITERIA on INCOME,
LAND AREA and POPULATION
Income- it must be sufficient to provide for all
essential government facilties, services and
special functions commensurate with the size of
population.
Population- it shall be determined as the total
number of inhabitatants within the territorial
jurisdiction.
Land Area- it must be contiguos, unless
comprises 2 or more islands; properly indentified
by metes and sufficient to provide for basic
services.
NOTES:
 Sec. 7, LGC: compliance with the
following shall be attested by Dept. Of
Finance (DOF), National statistics office
(NSO) and Land Management Bureau
(LMB) of the DENR
 Compliance with the criteria is a question
of fact answered by DOF, NSO and DENR.
Such is binding unless there is grave
 abuse of discretion amounting to City case of
excess of jurisdiction or clear error of conversion
of a
facts. municipality
 INCOME (dept. Of finance order no. or a cluster
35-93)- all revenues and receipts of barangays
collected or received forming the gross into a city
per R.A 9009
accretions of funds of the LGU from
(6/30/’01)
REGULAR sources of local general Highly P50M latest 200,000 Not anymore
funds including internal revenue Urbanized annual stated in law
allotment (IRA). City income
 internal revenue allotment (IRA)- Province P20M ave. 250,000 2,000sq.km
annual (contiguous)
items of income
income
◦ form part of gross accretion of LGU
funds Merger and Division
◦ regularly and automatically accrue - The division and merger of existing LGU’s shall
to local treasury without need for
comply with the same requirements prescribed
further actions on the part of the
for their creation provided that such division
LGU
shall not reduce the income, population, or land
◦ constitute income
area of the LGU’s to less than the minimum
 Converting municipality to city or requirements.
cluster of brgy to component city -Sec 8, LGC- income classification of LGU shall be
(because of RA (9009 ammending sec updated within 6 months upon effectivity of this
450 of LGC-increase income from 20M code
to 100M(-IRAs no longer included in - When two or more municipal corporations are
the computation of annual income for consolidated under one government, the old
complying with income requirement corporations become extinct in most instances.
 INHABITANTS- needed otherwise no - new ones entitled to:
muncorp at all 1. all assets and immunities
 TERRITORY- boundaries must be 2. severally liable for all its then subsisting debts
definite, fixed or certain otherwise void. 3. vested power to raise revenue to pay them by
(sec 7, LGC) levying taxes on property transferred and people
 living there
4. annexed territory dissolved and become part
of annexing corp.
 Specific Requirements 5. officers and agents terminate their relations
with offices
LGU Income Population Land Area
Barangay none 2,000- none
6. title to properties passed without
5,000 compensation
Municipality P2.5M ave. 25,000 50 sq.kmm. 7. its debts and obli assumed by annexing corp.
For 2 Except if an Unless otherwise provided by law
consecutive island
preceding Substantial Change of Boundaries
years
Component P100M in the 150,000 100 sq.km.
- No substantial alteration of boundaries shall
take effect unless approved by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose in the political unit or units directly
affected.
CASES:
 League of Cities of the Philippines vs.
COMELEC
Facts:
 During the 11th Congress, 57 bills
seeking the conversion of
municipalities into component cities
were filed before the House of
Representatives.
 However, Congress acted only on 33
bills. During the 12th Congress, R.A. No.
9009 became effective revising Section
450 of the Local Government Code. It
increased the income requirement to
qualify for conversion into a city from
P20 million annual income to P100
million locally-generated income.
 In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24
municipalities filed, through their
respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills.
 Each of the cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting the
particular municipality from the 100
million income requirement imposed
by R.A. No. 9009.
Issue:
 Are the cityhood laws converting 16
municipalities into cities constitutional?
Held:
 The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly
intended that the local government units
covered by the Cityhood Laws be
exempted from the coverage of RA 9009.
The Court reiterated that while RA 9009
was being deliberated upon, the Congress
was well aware of the pendency of
conversion bills of several municipalities,
including those covered by the Cityhood
Laws.
Province of North Cotabato vs Government of
the Republic of the Philippines
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of
public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the
complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to
prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and
the holding of public consultation thereon. They
also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO
enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
ISSUES:
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the
people's right to information on matters of public
concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991)
Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave
violation of the Constitution involved in the
matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a
state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (Art 2,
Sec 28) including public consultation under RA
7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not
recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate,
among other things, that the Parties aimed to
vest in the BJE the status of an associated state
or, at any rate, a status closely approximating
it.
The concept of association is not recognized
under the present Constitution (sec. 1, art X
consti)
No province, city, or municipality, not even the
ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an “associative” relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies
powers that go beyond anything ever granted
by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of
the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part
of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the
autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and
existing laws to conform to the MOA;
MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the
MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing
legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon
effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework,” implying an amendment of the
Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This
stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the
amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has
authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to
preserve and defend the Constitution. Such
presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but
simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision.
Creation and Conversion
1.law
Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General
FACTS:
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the
President of the Philippines issued executive
orders to create thirty-three municipalities
pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Public funds thereby
stood to be disbursed in the implementation of
said executive orders.
Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice
President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction
against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain
from the respondent or any person acting in his
behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of the executive
orders aforementioned.
ISSUE:
Whether the executive orders are null and void,
upon the ground that the President does not have
the authority to create municipalities as this
power has been vested in the legislative
department.
RULING:
Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental
law ordains:
“The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
The power of control under this provision
implies the right of the President to interfere
in the exercise of such discretion as may be
vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers. This power is denied by the
Constitution to the Executive, insofar as
local governments are concerned. Such
control does not include the authority to
either abolish an executive department or
bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code does not
merely fail to comply with the constitutional
mandate above quoted, it also gives the
President more power than what was vested in
him by the Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby
declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from
passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said Executive
Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities referred to.
2. plebiscite
 Miranda vs Aguirre
Facts:
 1994, RA No. 7720 effected the
conversion of the municipality of
Santiago, Isabela, into an independent
component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720
was approved by the people of Santiago
in a plebiscite.
 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it
amended RA No. 7720 that practically
downgraded the City of Santiago from an
independent component city to a
component city.
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to
submit the law for the approval of the
people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
Held:
 When an amendment of the law involves
creation, merger, division, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of
local government units, a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected is
mandatory.
Requires participation of residents of orig. LGU
not just those residing in LGU sought to be
created:
Padilla vs COMELEC
Facts: Republic Act No. 7155 created the new
municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of
Camarines Norte and pursuant to this law, the
COMELEC (D) conducted a plebiscite for its
approval. In its resolution for the conduct of the
plebiscite, the COMELEC (D) included all the
voters of the Municipality of Labo—the parent
unit of the new municipality.
The result of the plebiscite showed that the
majority rejected the creation of the new
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. The governor,
Hon. Roy Padilla, Jr. (P), petitioned the court to
set aside the result arguing that the phrase
"political units directly affected" in Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution does not
include the parent political unit—the
Municipality of Labo.
Issues: Is the result of the plebiscite valid?
Ruling: Yes. When the law states that the
plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political
units directly affected," it means that residents
of the political entity who would be
economically dislocated by the separation
thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite.
What is contemplated by the phrase "political
units directly affected," is the plurality of
political units which would participate in the
plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in
such political areas are the inhabitants of the
proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as
well as those living in the the parent
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.
HOWEVER in Abbas vs COMELEC, merger of
administrative regions which pertains to
executive branch will not require plebiscite.
 Navarro vs. Executive Secretary Ermita
Facts:
 The President of the Republic approved
into law (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act
Creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands).
 Then the COMELEC conducted the
mandatory plebiscite for the
ratification of the creation of the
province under the (LGC).
 November 10, 2006, petitioners filed
before this Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition challenging
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355.
The Court dismissed the petition on
technical grounds. Their motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
Held:
 The Congress, recognizing the capacity
and viability of Dinagat to become a full-
fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355,
following the exemption from the land
area requirement, which, with respect to
the creation of provinces, can be found as
an express provision in the LGC-IRR.
CHAPTER 7: DE JURE and DE FACTO
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
De Jure
-If its creation perfectly complies with all the
requirements of an incorporation, a municipal
corporation is considered de jure.
De Facto
-Not all requirements are complied with
provided certain elements are present:
1. Valid law authorizing incorporation;
2. Attempt in good faith to organize it;
3. Colorable compliance with law; and
4. Assumption of corporate powers.
CASES:
 Pelaez vs. Auditor General
- the Supreme Court denied the President the
power to create local government units because
the creation of LGU’s is essentially legislative.
Pelaez vs Auditor General
undue delegation of legislative power
Facts:
The President of the Philippines, purporting to
act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders
Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating
thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in
the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice
President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
instituted the present special civil action, for a
writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction,
against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as
well as his representatives and agents, from
passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said executive
orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders
are null and void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by
Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1,
1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power. The third paragraph of
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
“Barrios shall not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed
except under the provisions of this Act or by
Act of Congress.”
Issues:
Whether or not Section 68 of Revised
Administrative Code constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.
Discussions:
Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental
law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision
implies the right of the President to interfere
in the exercise of such discretion as may be
vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers. This power is denied by the Constitution
to the Executive, insofar as local governments
are concerned. With respect to the latter, the
fundamental law permits him to wield no more
authority than that of checking whether said
local governments or the officers thereof
perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments. Hence, the President cannot
interfere with local governments, so long as the
same or its officers act within the scope of their
authority.
Rulings:
Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of
legislative powers. The alleged power of the
President to create municipal corporations
would necessarily connote the exercise by him of
an authority even greater than that of control
which he has over the executive departments,
bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code does not merely
fail to comply with the constitutional mandate.
Instead of giving the President less power over
local governments than that vested in him over
the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it
reverses the process and does the exact opposite,
by conferring upon him more power over
municipal corporations than that which he has
over said executive departments, bureaus or
offices.
 Sultan Osop Camid vs. Office of the
Pres.
-the Supreme Court confirmed that municipal
corporations may exist by prescription where its
is shown that the community has claimed and
exercised corporate functions, with the
knowledge of the legislature and without
interruption and objection.
CAMID VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
(ARTICLE X Section 10: Creation, Abolition,
Change of boundaries)
FACTS: This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the
existence of Municipality of Andong in Lanao Del
Sur. This decision have noted the earlier decision of
Pelaez where the Executive orders of Former
President Macapagal creating 33 Municipalities of
Lanao Del Sur was considered null and void due to
undue delegation of legislative powers. Among the
annulled executive orders is EO107 creating
Andong.The petitioner herein represents himself as
resident of Andong (asa private citizen and taxpayer).
Camid contends/argues the following:
(1) Municipality of Andong evolved into a full-blown
municipality (since there is a complete set of officials
appointed to handle essential tasks and services, it has
its own highschool, Bureau of Post, DECS office, etc.
(2)17 barangays with chairman;
(3) he noted agencies and private groups recognizing
Andong and also the CENRO and DENR
Certification of land area and population of Andong.
In the Certification of DILG, thereis an enumeration
of existing municipalities including 18 0f the 33
Municipalities invalidated in Pelaez Case. Camid
finds this as an abuse of discretion and unequal
treatment for Andong. Likewise, Camid insists the
continuing of EO 107, arguing that in Municipality of
San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, the Court affirmed in
making San Andres a de facto municipal corporation.
San Andres was created through anexecutive order.
Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:Whether or not theMunicipality ofAndong
berecognized as ade facto municipal corporation
HELD:SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except
in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Municipal corporations may exist by prescription
where it is shown that the community has claimed and
exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge
and acquiescence of the legislature,and without
interruption or objection for periodlong enough
toaffordtitle by prescription. The Certification has no
power or it does not bear any authority to create or
revalidate a municipality. Should the case of Andong be
treated same as the case of San Andres? No, for the
following reasons:
(A) There are facts found in the San Andres case that are
not present in the case at bar:
(1)The Executive Order creating San Andres was not
invalidated inPelaezCase,
(2) The municipality existed for 30 years before it was
questioned and
(3) The municipality was classified as a fifth class
municipality and was included in the legislative district
in the House of Representatives apportionment.
(B) Andong did not meet the requisites set by Local
Government Code of1991Sec.42par. d regarding
municipalities created by executive orders. It says:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of
this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.
Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective set of elective municipal officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of this
Codeshall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities.
(C) The failure to appropriatefundsfor Andong and
theabsence ofelections inthe municipality are eloquent
indicia (indicators) that the State does not recognize the
existence of the municipality.
(D) The Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution
(which apportioned seats for the House
ofRepresentatives tothe different legislative districts
inthe Philippines, enumeratesthe various municipalities
encompassed inthe various districts) did notinclude
Andong.
Mun of San Narciso, Quezon vs Mendez Sr.
G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994
FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued,
pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353
creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by
segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same
province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban,
Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
EO No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the
President and coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon,
of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon
By virtue of EO No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by
President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San
Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status
of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by
operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. 2 The
executive order added that “(t)he conversion of this municipal
district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No.
4864 was approved by the House of Representatives.”
Petitioner Municipality of San Narciso: filed a petition for quo
warranto with RTC which petition sought the declaration of
nullity of EO No. 353 Invoking the ruling of this Court in
Pelaez v. Auditor General.
Respondent San Andres: San Narciso is estopped from
questioning the creation of the new municipality and that the
case had become moot and academic with the enactment of
Republic Act No. 7160 (Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. —
. . .(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity
of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.)
Petitioner: The above provision of law was inapplicable to the
Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to
legally existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of
creation had been void ab initio.
ISSUE: W/N Municipality of San Andres is a de jure or de
facto municipal corporation.
HELD: Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district
of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only
after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the
municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the
legality of the executive order.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity
for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in
this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider
the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a
status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in
fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal
corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be
otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No.
353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for
more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v.
Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have
sounded the call for a similar declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not
to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all
pointed to the State’s recognition of the continued existence of
the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years
as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the
Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after
having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act
No. 1515.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the
municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on
15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of
Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the
Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the
twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the
province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the
Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts
“organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”
All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San
Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded.
Here SC considered the following factors which
validated the creation:
see p71
 Municipality of Jimenez Case
-Sincaban was considered to ahve attained de
facto status at the time of 1987 Constitution
took effect and was not subject to plebiscite
requirement. This requirement applies only to
new municipalities created for the first time
under the Constitution.
MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ vs. BAZ
Facts: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created
by EO 258 of then Pres. Quirino pursuant to Sec.
68 of the Revised Admin. Code.Sinacaban laid
claim to several barrios based on the technical
description in EO 258. The Municipality of
Jimenez asserted jurisdiction based on an
agreement with Sinacaban which was approved
by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental
which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban
and Jimenez. The Provincial Board declared the
disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held
that the earlier resolution approving the
agreement between the municipalities was void
since the Board had no power to alter the
boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258.
Jimenez argued that the power to create
municipalities is essentially legislative (as held
in Pelaez v Auditor General), then Sinacaban,
which was created thru and EO, had no legal
personality and no right to assert a territorial
claim.
Issue: Whether or not Sinacaban has juridical
personality. YES
Held: Where a municipality created as such by
EO is later impliedly recognized and its acts are
accorded legal validity, its creation can no
longer be questioned. In the case of
Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, the SC
laid the factors to consider in validating the
creation of a municipal corporation:
1. The fact that for 30 years, the validity of the
corporation has not been challenged;
2. The fact that no quo warranto suit was filed
to question the validity of the EO creating the
municipality; and
3. The fact that the municipality was later
classified as a 5th class municipality, organized
as part of a municipal circuit court and
considered part of a legislative district in the
Constitution apportioning the seats in the
House. In this case, the following factors are
present:
1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years
when Pelaez was decided in 1965 and yet the
validity of EO 258 creating it had never been
questioned. 2. It was only 40 years later that
its existence was questioned. 3. Rule 66, Sec.
16 of the Rules of COurt provides that a quo
warranto suit against a corporation for
forfeiture of its charter must be commenced
within 5 years from the time the act
complaned of was done or committed. 4. The
State and even Jimenez recognized
Sinacaban’s corporate existence by entering
into an agreement with it regarding the
boundary. Ex.: AO 33, Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, etc. 5. Sinacaban is constituted as
part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the
establishment of MTCs in the country. Moreover,
the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that
“municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of elective
officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.” Sinacaban
has attained de jure status by virtue of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution,
apportioning legislative districts throughout the
country, which considered Sinacaban as part of
the 2nd District of Misamis Occidental. II.
Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the
time the 1987 Constitution took effect. It is not
subject to the plebiscite requirement. It applies
only to new municipalities created for the first
time under the Constitution. The requirement of
plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI,
Section 3 of the previous Constitution. It cannot
be applied to municipal corporations created
before, such as Sinacaban.
CHAPTER 8: POWER RELATIONS WITH
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, SUPREME COURT,
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS; INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND
HIERARCHICAL RELATIONS AMONG LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS
LGUs and National Government in General:
LGUs are agents of the State
 Municipal governments are only agents
of the national government
 Local councils exercise only delegated
legislative powers conferred to them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body
Magtajas vs Pryce Properties
  PAGCOR expanded its operations to
CDO. It was met with various protests
and demonstrations by civic
organizations and religious elements.
 Petitioners contended that PAGCOR’s
operations is violative of City
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use
of buildings for the operation of a
casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casinos.
 Respondents invoke PD 1869 which
created PAGCOR to help regulate all
games of chance, including casinos on
land and sea within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines.
 ISSUE: WON the City Ordinances are
valid
 HELD: No. Cagayan de Oro, like other
political subdivisions, is empowered to
enact ordinances as expressed in Sec
16 of LGC. However, there is a
requirement that an ordinance should
not contravene with a statute.
Municipal govts are only agents of the
national government. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of
the latter.
 Casino gambling is authorized by PD
1869. This decree has the status of a
statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance.
LGUs and the Supreme Court: LGUs’ acts are
subject to Judicial Review
Acts of LGUs are within the scope of judicial
review, under Art 8 Sec 4(2), 1987 Constitution,
 The SC has jurisdiction over all cases
involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be
heard by the Supreme Court en banc,
and all other cases which under the
Rules of Court are required to be heard
en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations
LGUs and the President: President exercises
General Supervision
 President shall exercise general
supervision over local governments, to
ensure that their acts are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
 National agencies and offices with project
implementation functions shall
coordinate with one another and with
the LGUs concerned in the discharge of
these functions
Drilon v Lim
 Then Secretary of Justice Drilon declared
Ordinance No 7794 null and void for non-
compliance with the procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinance and for
containing certain provisions contrary to
law and public policy.
 This power to revoke is provided in Sec
287 of the LGC which authorizes the
Secretary of Justice to review the
constitutionality or legality of the tax
ordinance, and of warranted, to revoke it
on either or both of these grounds.
 ISSUE: WON Sec 187 of the LGC is
constitutional
 HELD: Yes. When a Sec of Justice alters or
modifies or sets a tax ordinance, he is not
also permitted to substitute his own
judgement for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure.
Sec Drilon did set aside the ordinance,
but he did not replace it with his own
version of what the code should be. He
did not exercise an act of control but only
supervision.

Does the President’s power of general
supervision extend to the liga ng mga
barangay, which is not a local government
unit?
-Yes. The liga ng mga barangay is an
association, federation, league or union
created by law or by authority of law, whose
members are either appointed or elected
government officials.
 The Liga is an aggroupment of
barangays which are in turn
represented by their punong barangays.
 of Component LGU:
LGUs and Congress: LGUs derive their
existence and powers from Congress
 No province, city, municipality or
barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government
Code and subject to approval by a
majority of votes cast ina plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.
Mother LGU and Component LGU: Mother
LGU reviews acts of component LGU
d) In general
 The President of the Philippines shall
exercise general supervision over local
governments.
 This is to ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope
of their prescribed powers and
functions
e) Provincial relations with Component
Cities and Municipalities
 The province, through the governor,
shall ensure that every component city
and municipality within its territorial
jurisdiction acts within the scope of its
prescribed powers and functions.
 Highly urbanized cities and independent
component cities shall be independent of
the province
f) City and Municipal relations with
Component Barangays
 The city or municipality, through the city
or municipal Mayor concerned, shall
exercise general supervision over
component barangays to ensure that said
barangays act within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions
Two types of reviews by a Mother LGU of acts
 Executive: Local Chief Executive (LCE) of
Mother LGU reviews Executive Orders
(Eos) of LCE of Component LGU
 The governor shall review all executive
orders promulgated by the component
city or municipal Mayor within his
jurisdiction (shall be forwarded to the
governor 3 days after issuance)
 The LCE concerned shall ensure that such
executive orders are within the powers
granted by law and in conformity with
provincial, city or municipal ordinances.
 If there is inaction on the part of the
governor or the city or municipal mayor,
the EO shall be deemed valid.
 Legislative: Sanggunian of Mother LGU
reviews Ordinances of Sanggunian and
EOs of LCE of Component LGU
2.1 Component City and Municipal
Ordinances and Resolutions
 Within 3 days after approval, the
secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod
or sangguniang bayan shall forward to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review,
copies of approved ordinances and
resolutions made by the local
development councils.
 Within 30 days after receipt of copies, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine
 the documents or transmit them to the
provincial attorney, or if there is none,
to the provincial atty for prompt
execution
 The provincial atty shall inform the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of his
comments and recommendations
 If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds
that such an ordinance or resolution is
beyond the power conferred upon the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it can
declare such ordinance as invalid
 Inaction by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan within 30 days from
submission = ordinance presumed valid
◦ Barangay Ordinances
 Within 10 days from its enactment, the
sangguniang barangay shall furnish
copies of all barangay ordinances to
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned for
review as to whether the ordinance is
consistent with law and city or
municipal ordinance
 Inaction by Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang bayan within 30 days
from submission = ordinance deemed
valid
 If Sangguniang Panlungsod or Bayan
finds the barangay ordinances
inconsistent with law, it shall return
the same with its comments and
recommendations to the sangguniang
barangay concerned for adjustment,
amendment or modification
LGUs and National Agencies and Offices (with
project implementation functions): Prior
consultation and approval before
implementation
 No project or program shall be
implemented by government
authorities unless the consultations
mentioned in Sections 2(c) and 26 of LGC
are complied with, and prior approval of
the sanggunian concerned is obtained,
provided that occupants in areas where
such projects are to be implemented shall
not be evicted unless appropriate
relocation sites have been provided, in
accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
 The requirement of prior consultations
found in Sec 2(c) and 27 of the LGC apply
only to national programs and/or projects
that are to be implemented to a
particular or local community
 Since Lotto is neither a program nor a
project of the national government, but
of a charitable institution, the PCSO, the
provision on prior consultation will not
apply. (Lino vs Pano)
Lino vs Pano
FACTS:On December 29, 1995,
respondent Tony Calvento was appointed
agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install
Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto.
He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor
of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s
permit to open the lotto outlet. This was
denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter
dated February 19, 1996. The ground for
said denial was an ordinance passed by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna
entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.
1995which was issued on September 18,
1995.As a result of this resolution of
denial, respondent Calvento filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order. In the said
complaint, respondent Calvento asked
the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro
Laguna, Branch 93, for the following
reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order, ordering
the defendants to refrain from
implementing or enforcing
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an
order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor
Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business
permit for the operation of a lotto
outlet; and (3) an order annulling or
declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the
respondent judge, Francisco Dizon
Paño, promulgated his decision
enjoining the petitioners from
implementing or enforcing resolution
or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.
1995 is valid
HELD: As a policy statement expressing
the local government’s objection to the
lotto, such resolution is valid. This is
part of the local government’s
autonomy to air its views which may be
contrary to that of the national
government’s. However, this freedom
to exercise contrary views does not
mean that local governments may
actually enact ordinances that go
against laws duly enacted by Congress.
Given this premise, the assailed
resolution in this case could not and
should not be interpreted as a measure
or ordinance prohibiting the operation
of lotto.n our system of government,
the power of local government units to
legislate and enact ordinances and
resolutions is merely a delegated
power coming from Congress. As held
in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not
contravene an existing statute enacted
by Congress. The reasons for this is
obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v.
Pryce Properties Corp
LGUs and National Agencies, offices and GOCCs
(with field units in the LGU): Monthly
Reportorial Requirement for Information and
Guidance
 National agencies and offices including
GOCCs with field units or branches in a
province, city, or municipality shall
furnish the local chief executive
concerned, for his information and
guidance, monthly reports including duly
certified budgetary allocations and
expenditures.
LGUs and National Agencies, offices and
GOCCs(with environmental programs):
Consultation
 It shall be the duty of every national
agency or GOCC authorizing or involved
in the planning and implementation of
any project or program that may cause
pollution, climatic change, depletion of
non-renewable resources, loss of crop
land, rangeland or forest cover, and
extinction of plant or animal species, to
consult with the LGUs, NGOs and other
sectors concerned and to explain the
goals and objectives of the program, its
impact upon the people and the
measures that will be undertaken to
prevent or minimize the adverse effects
thereof (Sec 26 of LGC)
LGUs and the PNP, Fire Protection Unit and Jail
Management Personnel: Operational
Supervision and Control by LGU
Andaya vs RTC
 There was a vacancy in the position of
chief of police in Cebu. The regional
 director of the Cebu police Andaya
submitted a list of 5 eligible appointed
to the position to the Mayor of Cebu
 However, the mayor refused to appoint
one because he wanted a certain
Sarmiento, who was not on the list due
to being disqualified.
 ISSUE: WON the mayor can require the
Regional Director to include the
mayor’s protégé in the list?
 HELD: No. The mayor has only the
power to choose from the list. It is the
prerogative of the regional director of
the police to choose the eligible person
who should be included in the list
without intervention from local
executives (Sec 51 of R.A 6975)
LGUs and NGOs: LGUs shall support, and may
give assistance to, NGOs
LGUs shall promote the establishment amd
operation of people’s and NGOs to become
active partners in the pursuit of local
autonomy
CHAPTER 9: LOCAL TAXATION AND
RELATED POWERS AND PRIVILEGES
Power to Create Sources of Revenues and to
Levy Taxes, Fees and Charges
 Local Taxation Power
Under the sec 5 art X, 1987 Constitution, each
LGU has the power to create its own sources
of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and
charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provode,
consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Shall accrue to LGU
 This is only a general power to tax.
Their special power to tax is subject to
the guidelines and limitations as Congress
may provide
 The delegation to tax is not absolute and
unconditional; the legislature must see to
it that:
 The taxpayer will not be overburdened or
saddled with multiple and unreasonable
impositions
 Each LGU will have its fair share of
available resources
 The resources of the national
government will not be unduly disturbed
 Local taxation will be fair, uniform and
just
Basco v PAGCOR (decided before the LGU code)
 P.D 1869, which exempts PAGCOR from
“paying any tax of any kind or form,
income or otherwise , as well as fees,
charges or levies of whatever nature,
whether National or Local” was
questioned by the Manila City
government and it allegedly waives the
latter’s right to impose taxes and license
fees, violating its constitutionally
enshrined principle of local autonomy
(Sec 5, Art X 1987 Constitution)
 ISSUE: Does the Local Government of
Manila have the power to impose taxes
on PAGCOR?
 HELD: The power of an LGU to impose
taxes and fees is always subject to
limitations which Congress may provide
by law
 Municipal corporations have no inherent
power to tax and their power to tax must
always yield to a legislative act for they
are mere creatures of Congress wherein
the latter has the power to create and
abolish municipal corporation due to its
general powers
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) v Marcos
 The SC took a different path compared
to the previous case (Basco v PAGCOR)
on the same issue
 MCIAA was created by virtue of R.A
6958, mandated to principally
undertake the economical, efficient,
and effective control, management,
and supervision of the MIA and Lahug
Airport
 Since its time of creation, MCIAA
enjoyed the privilege of tax exemption
of realty taxes in accordance with Sec
14 of its charter.
 However, The Office of the Treasurer
of the City of Cebu, demanded
payment from realty taxes from MCIAA.
 MCIAA objected to the demand and
asserted that it is an instrumentality of
the government performing
governmental functions, citing Sec 133
of the LGC.
 ISSUE: WON MCIAA is a taxable person
 HELD: Taxation is the rule and
exemption is the exception. MCIAA’s
exemption from payment of taxes is
withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193
and 234 of the LGC. Statutes granting
tax exemptions shall be strictly
construed against the taxpayer and
liberally construed in favor of the
taxing authority.
 MCIAA cannot claim that it was never a
“taxable person” under its Charter. It
was only exempted from payment of
realty taxes.
 practicable on the taxpayer’s ability
Manila International Airport Authority v CA
 SC reverted to the Basco doctrine
 The MIAA operates the NAIA Complex
in Parañaque City under EO 903.
 On March 1997, the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel issued
Opinion No. 061 to the effect that the
LGC withdrew the exemption from real
estate tax granted to MIAA under Sec 21
of its Charter. Thus, MIAA paid real estate
taxes already due.
 OGCC clarified that the LGC requires
persons exempt from real estate tax to
show proof that MIAA is exempt from
real estate tax.
 MIAA then pointed out that it is exempt
from real estate tax
 ISSUE: WON airport lands and buildings
of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax?
 HELD: Yes. Because:
(1) MIAA is not a GOCC but an
instrumentality of the National
Government and thus exempt from local
taxation, and
(2) second, the real properties of MIAA
are owned by the Republic of the
Philippines and thus exempt from real
estate tax.
 Construction of Local Taxation
 Local tax measures, being in derogation
of property rights must also be construed
strictly against the local government unit
enacting it and liberally in favor of the
taxpayer in case of doubt
 The principle of “Taxation is the rule and
exemption is the exception” still applies
 Fundamental Principle in Local Taxation
 Taxation shall be uniform in each LGU
 Taxes, fees charges and other impositions
shall:
◦ Be equitable and based as far as
to pay
◦ Be levied and collected only for public
purposes
◦ Not be unjust, excessive, oppressive,
or confiscatory
 ◦ Not be contrary to law, public
policy, national economic policy, or
in restraint of trade;
 The collection of local taxes, fees and
charges and other impositions shall in
no case be left to any private person
 The revenue collected pursuant to the
provisions of the Code shall inure solely
to the benefit of and be subject to
disposition by, the LGU levying the tax,
fee or other imposition unless
otherwise specified
 Each LGU shall, as far as practicable,
evolve a progressive system of taxation
 Taxing Authority
The power to impose a tax, fee, or charge to
generate revenue under the Code shall be
exercised by the sanggunian of the LGU
concerned through an appropriate ordinance.
Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers:
Unless otherwise provided in the code, the
exercise of the taxing powers of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not
extend to the levy of the following.
 Income tax, except when levied on
banks and other financial institutions
 Documentary stamp tax
 Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts,
legacies, and other acquisitions in
mortis causa, except as otherwise
provided by the code.
 Custom duties, registration fees of
vessel and wharfage on wharves,
tonnage dues, and all other kinds of
customs fees, charges and dues except
when wharfage on wharves
constructed and maintained by the
LGU concerned
 Taxes, fees and charges and other
impositions upon goods carried into or
out of, or passing through the territorial
jurisdiction of the LGU in the guise of
charges for wharfage, tolls for bridges or
otherwise, or other taxes, fees, or
charges in any form whatsoever upon
such goods or chandies.
 Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and
aquatic products when sold by marginal
farmers or fishermen
 Taxes on business enterprises certified by
the Board of Investments as pioneer or
non-pioneer for a period of 6 and 4 years
from the date of registration
 Excise taxes on articles enumerated
under the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or
charges on petroleum products
 Percentages or VAT on sales, barters or
exchanges or similar transactions on
goods or services except as otherwise
provided
 Taxes on gross receipts of transportation
contractors and persons engaged in the
transportation of passengers or freight by
hire and common carriers by air, land, or
water.
 Taxes on premiums paid by way of
reinsurance or retrocession
 Taxes, fees or charges for the registration
of motor vehicles and for the issuance of
all kinds of licenses or permits for the
driving thereof
 Taxes and fees or other charges on
Philippine products actually exported,
except as otherwise provided in the code

 Taxes, fees or other charges on the
countryside and barangay business
enterprises and cooperatives duly
registered under R.A. No. 6810 and R.A.
No. 6938.
 Taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on
the National Government, its agencies
and instrumentalities, and local
government units
The taxing powers of LGUs shall not extend to
the levy of any kind of tax on the national
government, its agencies, or its
instrumentalities.
Section 133 states that the common
limitations on taxing powers prevails over
section 193 which grants the LGU’s with taxing
powers, so the limitations prevail.
Procedural Matters Affecting Tax Ordinances
and Measures:
A) Public Hearing – a mandatory
requirement
B) Questions on Constitutionality or
Legality of the Tax Ordinance – may be
raised on appeal 30 days from the
effectivity thereof. The Secretary of
Justice shall then render a decision 60
days from the date of receipt. The
appeal shall not have the effect of
suspending the effectivity
C) Publication and Public Dissemination –
Within 10 days of the approval,
certified true copies of tax ordinances
must be published in full for three
consecutive days in a newspaper of
local circulation, or be posted for 2
days in a conspicuous and publicly
accessible place
D) Enforcement of Void or Suspended Tax
Measure – sufficient ground for
disciplinary action against the local
officials responsible for it
E) Tax Rate Adjustment – LGUs can adjust
them but not more than once every 5
years
F) Tax Exemption Privileges – may be
granted by LGUs through ordinances that
were approved. HOWEVER, under the
code unless otherwise provided, tax
exemptions – except those for local water
districts, cooperatives registered under
R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit
hospitals and educational institutions –
were withdrawn upon the code’s
effectivity
Despite this, congress may enact a law
restoring such exemptions or privileges.
Just Share in the National Taxes:
G) LGUs have a just share to national taxes.
Their share is determined by law and
shall be automatically released to them.
The LGUs’ shares shall be released to
them on a quarterly basis.
H) The national government cannot
withhold part of this share for any
purpose.
Amount of Shares:
I) Under the code, the LGU shall have a
share based on the collection of the third
fiscal year proceeding the current fiscal
year as follows:
 30% on the first year
 35% on the second year
 40% on the third year
 In case of an unmanageable deficit, the
president is authorized upon
recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance to adjust the allotments.
HOWEVER, it cannot fall below 30% of
the taxes collected during the third
fiscal year.
J) Before the president may interfere in
local matters there must be:
 Unmanaged public sector deficit
Equitable Share in the Proceeds of the
 Consultations with the officers of the
Utilization and Development of the National
senate and house of reps / the
Wealth Within their Respective Areas:
presidents of various local leagues
 The corresponding recommendation of
the secretaries of the department of
finance, interior and local govt, and
budges and management
Allocation of Shares:
K) Provinces – 23 %
L) Cities – 23 %
M) Municipalities – 34 %
N) Barangays - 20 %
The share of each province, city, and
municipality shall be determined by this
formula.
O) Population – 50 %
P) Land Area – 25 %
Q) Equal Sharing – 25 %
Share of each barangay with a population
not less than 100 shall not be less than
80,000 pesos per annum chargeable
against the 20% share of the barangay
from the internal revenue allotment, and
the balance to be allocated. This is the
formula:
R) On the first year:
Population – 40 %
Equal sharing – 60 %
S) On the second year:
a. Population – 50%
b. Equal Sharing – 50%
T) On the third year and thereafter
a. Population – 60%
b. Equal Sharing – 40%
To ensure that the shares benefit the
local community, each LGU shall
appropriate AT LEAST 20% of their annual
budget to developmental projects.
U) Before the code PNOC didn’t have to give
the LGUs anything, now they pay millions
of pesos to the LGUs.
V) LGUs are entitled to 40% of the gross
collection derived by the national
government from the preceding fiscal
year from mining taxes, royalties, forestry
and fishery charges and etc.
W) LGUs have a share from government
agencies or government cooperatives
engaged in the development of national
wealth.
X) The proceeds from the shares of LGUs
from the utilization and development of
national wealth shall be appropriated by
their respective sanggunian to finance
local development, but 80% derived from
the utilization of hydrothermal,
geothermal, and other sources of energy
shall be applied to lower the cost of
electricity in the LGU
Y) LGUs are empowered to create their own
sources of revenue and they also have
the authority to dispose of real or
personal property held by them in their
proprietary capacity to apply their
 resources and assets for productive,
Chapter 10 - LOCAL POLICE POWER
Police Power
1) It is the inherent power of the State to
regulate conduct for the promotion of
general welfare. It has been described
as the least limitable of the inherent
powers of the State.
27) Based on the ancient doctrine - salus
populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the
people is the supreme law.
28) In Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
(39 Phil. 660), the SC stated that: “The police
power of the State is a power co-extensive
with self protection, and is not inaptly termed
the ‘law overruling necessity.’
29) Invariably described as “the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers”
and “in a sense , the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government”
30) The exercise of police power may be
judicially inquired into and corrected only if it
is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been denial of
due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guarantee.
31) Thus, the state in order to promote
general welfare, may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations.
Police Power in Municipal Corporations
 Police power is essentially legislative in
character and is inherently vested in
Congress of the Philippines.
 It is inherent in the State, but not in
municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there
must be a valid delegation of power by the
Legislature which may be through express
delegation or inferred by the mere fact of
creation of the municipal corporation.
Delegation through Local Government Code
 In matters that are deemed within the
competence of local governments to handle,
developmental, or welfare purposes.
Congress delegates this power to local
governments under the Local Government
Code, through Section 16 thereof, the General
Welfare Clause.
 This clause provides that “every local
government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of general
welfare….” (See Sec. 16 of LGC)
 It is general rule that the ordinances
passed by virtue of the implied power found in
the general welfare clause must be
reasonable, consonant with the general
powers and purposes of the corporation, and
not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the
State.
 Being Legislative in character, local
police power is exercised by the Sanggunian
of the local government through the
enactment of the appropriate ordinances.
Requisites for Valid Exercise of Local Police
Power
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the
municipality to enact but must also be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law,
and must be in consonance with certain well
established and basic principles of a
substantive nature.
These principles require that a municipal
ordinance:
 Must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute,
 Must not be unfair or oppressive
 Must not be partial or discriminatory
 Must be general and consistent with
public policy
 Must not be unreasonable

As with the State, the local government
may be considered as having properly
exercised its police power only if the following
requisites are met:
 The interests of public generally, as
distinguished from those of particular class,
require the interference of the State, and
 There must be concurrence of a lawful
subject and lawful method.
In Lim vs Pacquing, the national government
contended that Manila Ordinance No. 7065
which purported to grant Associated
Development Corporation (ADC), a franchise to
conduct jai alai operations is void and ultra vires.
The SC upheld national government’s
contention stating that jai alai is not a mere
economic activity which the law seeks to
regulate but is essentially gambling so that
whether it should be permitted and, if so, under
what conditions primarily for the lawmaking
authority to determine, taking into account
national and local interests. SC added that
police power of the State (not of local
government) is paramount.
In Balacuit vs CFI of Agusan de Norte, SC
agreed with the petitioners(theater owners) that
Ordinance No. 640 of Butuan City is ultra vires
and an invalid exercise of police power. The
said ordinance penalized any person engaged
in the business of selling admission tickets to
any movie or other public exhibitions, games,
contests, or other performances who would
require children between 7 and 12 yrs of age to
pay full payment for admission tickets intended
for adults (they should only charge one-half of
the value of the said tickets). The Court can see
that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not
unduly oppressive upon the business of
petitioners.
In De la Cruz vs. Paras, the Supreme Court
ruled that municipal corporations cannot prohibit
the operation of night clubs. They may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on
their business.
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations
Association Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila, SC
affirmed the validity of a mere regulatory
ordinance that required the owner, manager,
keeper, or duly authorized representative of a
hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer
without his filling up the prescribed form in the
lobby open to public view at all times in his
presence.
In White Light Corporation vs City of Manila,
SC nullified the Manila City Ordinance as
“overbreadth” prohibiting hotels, motels,
pension houses, and similar establishments
from offering a short-time admission, as well as
pro-rated or “wash up” rates to minimize or
eliminate the use of covered establishments for
illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
Interpretation of the General Welfare Clause
Section 5 (c) of the LGC explicitly
mandates that the general welfare provisions of
the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give
more powers to the local government units in
accelerating economic development and
upgrading the quality of life for the people of the
community.
In Zoomzat, Inc. vs People, the SC court ruled
that under the general welfare clause, the LGU
can regulate operation of cable television but
only when it
encroaches on public properties, such as the
use of public streets, rights of ways, the
founding structures and the parceling of large
regions. Beyond these parameters, its acts such
as the grand of the franchise to Spacelink,
would be ultra vires.
In Tan vs Perena, the SC acknowledged the
ability of the national government to implement
police power measures that affect the subjects
of municipal government, especially if the
subjects of the regulation is a condition of
universal character irrespective of territorial
jurisdictions. Cockfighting is one of such
conditions.
Territorial Limitations
It has been held that the municipality may
Chapter 11 - LOCAL EMINENT DOMAIN
POWER
Eminent Domain
1. The right or power of a sovereign state
to appropriate private property to
particular uses to promote public
welfare. It is an indispensable attribute
of sovereignty; a power grounded in the
primary duty of government to serve the
common need and advance the general
welfare.
2. This power is essentially legislative in
nature. It is firmly settled but may be
validly delegated to local government
units, other public entities and public
utilities, although the scope of this
delegated legislative power is
necessarily narrower than that of the
delegating authority and may only be
exercised in strict compliance with the
terms of the delegating law.
3. However, the right of expropriation is
not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can be
exercised, some law must exist
conferring the power upon it.
When the courts come to determine the
question, they must not only find
(a) that a law or authority exists for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain, but
(b) also the right or authority is being
exercised in accordance with the law.
Specific requirements for local eminent
domain (Sec 19 of LGC)
 It is exercised through its chief executive
exercise police power in the protection of the
territory to insure cleanliness, and prevent any
business and conduct likely to corrupt the
fountain of water supply for the city.
and acting pursuant to an ordinance;
 It is for public use, or purpose, or welfare for
the benefit of the poor and the landless;
 Payments of just compensation, pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws; and
 A valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such
offer was not accepted.
 Exercised through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance
In Municipality of Paranaque vs V.M. Realty
Corporation, the SC ruled that the LGC of
1991, which was the law already applicable,
specifically requires “ordinance,” such that a
mere “resolution” will not suffice. The court said
that there is a difference between an ordinance
and a resolution in that the former has the
force and effect of laws while the latter is merely
an expression of the sentiment of the local
legislative body.
2. For public use, or purpose, or welfare for
the benefit of the poor and the landless
This concept of “public use,” was limited to the
uses that are readily available to any member of
the community like in the case of a public road,
bridge, or public plaza. However, this concept
had been expanded to mean “promotion of
general welfare.”
The following shall be considered as public
use, purpose or welfare (Implementing Rules
of the Local Government Code):
 Socialized housing;
 Construction or extension of roads, streets,
sidewalks, viaducts, bridges, ferries, levees,
wharves, or piers;
 Construction or improvement of public
buildings;
 Establishment of parks, playgrounds, or
 plazas;
 Establishment of market places;
 Construction of artesian wells or water
supply systems;
 Establishment of cemeteries or crematories;
 Establishment of drainage systems,
cesspools, or sewerage systems;
 Construction of irrigation canals or dams;
 Establishment of nurseries, health centers,
or hospitals;
 Establishment of abattoirs; and
 Building of research, breeding, or dispersal
centers for animals
In Lourdes de la Paz Masikip vs. City of
Pasig, where the taking by the State of private
property is done for the benefit of a small
community which seeks to have its own sports
and recreational facility, not withstanding that
there is such a recreational facility only a short
distance away, cannot be considered to be for
public use.
3. Payments of just compensation (Sec 9
Art II of the 1987 Constitution)
“Just Compensation” is described as a full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from the
private owner by the expropriator. This is to
indemnify the owner for the loss he has
sustained as a result of the expropriation.
 Where only a portion of the private
property is expropriated, the owner is entitled
to a just compensation on the basis of the
fair market value of the property plus
consequential benefits.
The concept of “fair market value” also
presupposes that it shall be paid within a
reasonable time or it is no fair market value at
all.
 The SC interpreted the requirement that
payment of just compensation should be
made within a reasonable time means that
the expropriator must pay the property owner
just compensation within five (5) years from
the finality of the judgement in the
expropriation case.
In Republic vs. Lim, the SC mandated that “the
landowner is entitled to recover possession of
the property expropriated if the government fails
to fully pay just compensation to the owner
within a periof of five (5) years from the finality
of the judgement in expropriation proceeding.
4. A valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such
offer was not accepted.
 As required, the Local Government must
first make an offer (must be in writing) to buy
the private property before it can legally
initiate an expropriation proceeding so that if
the owner of the property agrees to sell it, the
local govt need not expropriate the property.
 It shall specify the property sought to be
acquired, the reasons for acquisition and the
price offered.
 If the owner/owners accept the offer in
its entirety, a contract of sale shall be
executed and payment forthwith made.
 If the owner/owners are willing to sell
their property but at a price higher that that
offered to them, the local chief executed shall
call them to the conference for the purpose of
reaching an agreement on the selling price.
 If the LGU fails to acquire a private property
for public use, purpose, or welfare through
purchase, LGU may expropriate property
through a resolution of the Sanggunian
authorizing its chief executive to initiate
expropriation proceedings.
 The Local chief executive shall cause the
provincial, city, or municipal attorney
concerned or, in his absence, the provincial
or city prosecutor, to file expropriation
proceedings in the proper court in
accordance with the Rules of Court and other
pertinent laws.
 The LGU may immediately take position of
the property upon the filing of expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with
the proper court of at least 15% of the fair
market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration of the property to the
expropriated.

For expropriation of for purposes of urban land
reform and housing (RA 7279 Urban
Development Housing Act of 1992), read Sec.
9 and 10.
CHAPTER 12 – POWER TO RECLASSIFY
LANDS
A city or municipality may, through an
ordinance passed by the sanggunian after
conducting public hearing for that purpose,
authorize the reclassification of agricultural
lands and provide for the manner of their
utilization or disposition--
1) when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes as determined by
the Department of Agriculture, or
2) where the land shall have substantially
greater economic value for residential,
commercial, or industrial purposes, as
determined by the sanggunian
concerned.
However, such reclassification shall be limited
to the following percentage of the total
agricultural land area at the time of the
passage of the ordinance:
1) For highly urbanized and independent
component cities, fifteen percent;
2) For component cities and first to third
class municipalities, ten percent;
3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities,
five percent.
The President may, when public interest so
requires and upon the recommendation of the
National Economic and Development Authority,
authorize a city or municipality to reclassify
lands in excess of the limits set forth above.
Nicolas Laynesa v. Uy
 The SC ruled that despite the
reclassification of an agricultural land to
non-agricultural land by a local
government unit, the DARAB still retains
jurisdiction over a complaint filed by a
tenant of the land in question for
threatened ejectment and redemption.
 The local government units need not
obtain the approval of the DAR to
convert or reclassify lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use.
CHAPTER 13 – CLOSURE OF ROAD, ALLEY,
PARK OR SQUARE
A local government unit may, pursuant to an
ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or
open any local or national road, alley, park, or
square falling within its jurisdiction. However, it
is submitted that such power shall be deemed
implied in the General Welfare power of every
local government unit.
Permanent Closure
 The ordinance authorizing it must be
approved by at least 2/3 of all the
members of the sanggunian concerned,
and when necessary, an adequate
substitute for the public facility that is
subject to closure is provided.
 No such way or place or any part thereof
shall be permanently closed without
making provisions for the maintenance
of public safety therein.
 No park shall be closed permanently
without provision for its transfer or
relocation to a new site.
 No permanent closure of any local road,
street, alley, park, or square shall be
affected unless there exists a compelling
reason or sufficient justification thereof
such as, but not limited to:
 change in land use
 establishment of infrastructure
facilities
  projects
 or such other justifiable reasons as
public welfare may require.
  In case of fiesta celebration, the closure
Macasiano v. Diokno
 aside from the requirement of due
process which should be complied with
before closing a road, street or park,
the closure should be for the sole
purpose of withdrawing the road or
other public property from public use
when circumstances show that such
property is no longer intended or
necessary for public use or public
service.
Cebu Oxygen and Acetelyne Co. v. Berciles
 The City Council of Cebu through a
resolution declared a terminal road as
an abandoned road and authorized its
sale through a public bidding.
 The SC held that the City of Cebu is
empowered to close a city street and to
vacate or withdraw the same from
public use.
LGC of 1991: “a property thus permanently
withdrawn from public use may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which other real
property belonging to the locla government
unit concerned may be lawfully used or
conveyed.”
Temporary Closure
 Any national or local road, alley, park,
or square may be temporarily closed
during:
 an actual emergency or fiesta
celebrations
 public rallies or agricultural and
industrial fairs
 undertaking of public works and
highways, telecommunications, and
waterworks projects
 The duration of which shall be specified
by the local chief executive concerned in
a written order.
should not exceed 9 days.
 No national or local road, alley, park, or
square shall be temporarily closed for
athletic, cultural, or civic activities not
officially sponsored, recognized, or
approved by the local government unit
concerned.
 Any city, municipality, or barangay may,
by a duly enacted ordinance,
temporarily close or regulate the use of
any local street, road, thoroughfare, or
any public place where shopping malls,
Sunday flea or night markets or
shopping areas may be established and
where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs,
commodities, or articles of commerce
may be sold and dispensed to the
general public.
No Just Compensation in general
 The closure of a road, alley, park or
square presupposes an exercise of
police power. Hence, for any loss or
inconvenience caused to a property
owner is a “damnum absque injuria”
(damage without injury) thus, no
compensation.
Sangalang v. IAC
 When any property is condemned or
seized by competent authority in the
interest of health, safety or security, the
owner thereof shall not be entitled to
compensation.
Power to close road, etc., discretionary to LGU
 The local legislative body has the
competence to determine whether or
not a certain property is still necessary
for public use.
  Such discretion will not be ordinarily be corporation, nor affect its rights,
controlled or interfered with by the privileges or liabilities.
courts.  It is prohibited to use the names of living
persons except for justifiable reasons.
Pilapil v. CA  The term “corporate” signifies that a
 The establishment, closure or local government unit has “distinct and
abandonment of the camino vecinal separate personality.”
 Local government units may only be
was found to be the sole prerogative of
held liable for acts of its officers only
the Municipality.
when they acted “by authority” annd “in
conformity with the requirements of the
CHAPTER 14 – CORPORATE POWERS law”. Otherwise, the officers will be held
personally liable.
The Local Government Code mandates that
every local government unit, as a corporation,
2. To sue and be sued
shall have the following powers: (Section 22,
 While it is not an inherent power of
LGC).
municipal corporations, this power is
1. To have continuous succession in its
vested in the local government units not
corporate name;
only by the LGC of 1991, but also in the
2. To sue and be sued;
charters creating them.
3. To have and use a corporate seal;
 This explicit grant of the power to sue
4. To acquire and convey real or personal
and be sued is one form of an express
property;
consent on the part of the State to be
5. To enter into contracts; and
sued.
6. To exercise such other powers as are
 Suability vs. Liability
granted to corporations, subject to the
 Suability depends on the consent of
limitations provided in this Code and
the state to be sued, liability on the
other laws.
applicable law, and the established
facts. The fact that the state is suable
1. To have continuous succession in its
does not mean that it is liable. It can
corporate name
never be held liable if it does not first
 In order to be able to act as a juridical
consent to be sued.
entity and exercise such corporate
powers granted to a local government, it  Liability is not conceded by the
mere fact that the state has allowed
must first have a corporate name.
itself to be sued. When the state does
 Under the Code, the Sangguniang
waive its sovereign immunity, it is
Panlalawigan may, in consulation with
only giving the plaintiff the chance to
the Philippine Historical Institute,
prove, if it can, that the defendants is
change the name of component cities
liable.
and municipalities, upon the
 As a rule, the local government unit sues
recommendation of the Sanggunian
through its local chief executive and as
concerned, provided that the same shall
authorized by the Sanggunian.
be effective only upon ratification in a
plebiscite conducted for the purpose in
the political unit directly affected. City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon
 The City of Cebu sued through its
 A change of name will not dissolve nor
councilors in a “representative suit” and
destroy the identity of the municipal
as “taxpayers”, in order to declare null
 and void a contract which was executed
by defendant city mayor purportedly in
behalf of the city without valid authority
and which had been expressly declared
by the Auditor-General to be null and
void ab initio.
 This case is considered peculiar because
the local chief executive, the Mayor of
Cebu City, could not have represented
the local government unit as he was in
fact the defendant in that case.
FACTS:
Respondents Mayor Cuizon and Tropical
Commercial Co. entered into a contract
involving the purchase of road construction
equipment for $520,912.00 cash from Tropical.
The City Council of Cebu filed with the CFI a
complaint to nullify said contract as having
been executed without prior authority from it.
Complaint was dismissed for lack of legal
capacity.
The lower court held that there is no provision
of law authorizing the city council to sue in
behalf of the city and that the authorized
representative under the LGC is the city mayor
for that purpose.
Hence the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the city councilors have
the legal capacity to question the validity of the
contract entered into by the mayor.
RULING:
Yes. Generally, suit is commenced by the local
executive, i.e. the mayor, upon authority of the
sanggunian, except where the city councilors
themselves and as representatives in behalf of
the city, bring the action to prevent unlawful
disbursement of public funds.
Here where the defendant city mayor’s acts and
contracts purportedly entered into on behalf of
the city are precisely questioned as unlawful,
the city mayor would be the last person to file
such a suit on behalf of the city, since he
precisely maintains the contrary position that
his acts have been lawful and thus duly bind the
city.
To adhere to the lower court’s interpretation
would mean that no action against a city
mayor’s acts and contracts in the name and on
behalf of the city could ever be questioned and
subjected to judicial action for a declaration of
nullity and invalidity, since no city mayor would
file such an action on to question, much less
nullify, contracts executed by him on behalf of
the city and which he naturally believes to be
valid and within his authority.
Hence, the order appealed from is set aside and
the lower court is ordered to proceed with the
trial and disposition of the case.
Ramos v. Court of Appeals
 Under the Revised Administrative Code,
only provincial fiscal and the municipal
attorney can represent a province or
municipality in their lawsuits. It is only
when the government lawyer is clearly
disqualified to handle the case that the
local government unit may hire private
lawyers.
Bugnay Construction v. Laron Digest
G.R. No. 79983 August 10, 1989
Ponente: Regalado, J.:
Facts:
1. A lease contract between the City of Dagupan
and P & M Agro was executed for the use of a
city lot called the Magsaysay Market Area.
Subsequently, the City filed a case to rescind the
contract due to the failure of P&M to comply
with the lease contract conditions.
2. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution
granting the lease of said lot to the petitioner
Bugnay COnstruction for the establishment of a
Magsaysay Market building. As a result,
respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit
against the City assailing the validity of the
lease contract between the petitioner and the city.
Ravanzo was the counsel of P&M Agro in the  Local government units hold properties
earlier case. in their:
a. government capacity as for properties
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is the real for public use; and
party in interest b. propriety capacity as for properties
deemed patrimonial.
NO.  Property for public use in the provinces,
cities, and municipalities:(art. 424, NCC)
1. The Court held that the respondent has no  provincial roads
standing to file the case. There was no  city streets
disbursement of public funds involved in this  municipal streets
case since it is the petitioner, a private party  the squares
which will fund the planned construction of the  fountains
market building.  public waters
 promenades
 public works for public services
Alinsug v. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City,
 All other property possessed by any of
Negros Occidental
them is patrimonial and shall be
 The law allows a private counsel to be
governed by the New Civil Code,
hired by a municipality only when the
without prejudice to the provisions of
municipality is an adverse party in a
special laws.
case involving the provincial
 If the property is owned by the
government or another municipality or
municipality in its public and
city within the province.
governmental capacity, the property is
public and Congress has absolute control
3. To have and use a corporate seal
over it. But if the property is owned in its
 Local government units may continue
private or proprietary capacity, then it is
using. Modifying, or changing their
patrimonial and Congress has no
existing corporate seal. It should be
absolute control.
registered with the Department of
 The manner by which it was acquired
Interior and Local Government (DILG).
and the kind of fund used in acquiring
the property may serve as guide to
4. To acquire and convey real or personal
identify whether the property is public or
property
matrimonial.
 The corporate personality of the local
government unit allows it to acquire and
Knowing whether the property of the local
convey real and personal properties.
government unit is held in its governmental or
 A municipal corporation may acquire
proprietary capacity is important in the
property in its public or government
following areas of concern:
powers and private or propriety capacity.
g) Property for public use is under the
control of Congress because the lgu in
4.1 Public and Patrimonial Properties
this instance is merely a political agent
 The property of provinces, cities, and
of the State/Natioanal Government.
municipalities is divided into property
h) Property for public use cannot be the
for public use and patrimonial
subject of a contract as it is beyond the
property.(Art. 423, NCC)
commerce of man.
 i) Public property cannot be acquired by
prescription against the state.
j) Public property cannot be the subject of
attachment and execution.
k) Public property cannot be burdened by
any voluntary easement.
Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs City of
Zamboanga (conflict between special law and
NCC, former prevails)
properties of a municipal
corporation, of which a province is one. The
principle itself is simple: If the property is
owned by the municipality (meaning municipal
corporation) in its public and governmental
capacity, the property is
public and Congress has absolute control over it.
But if the property is owned in its private or
proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and
Congress has no absolute control. The
municipality cannot be deprived of it without
due process and payment of just compensation
Art. 424 NCC: ...All other property possessed
by any of them is
patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,
without prejudice to the provisions of special
laws. Law of Municipal Corporations
can be considered as “special laws”. Hence, the
classification of municipal property devoted for
distinctly governmental purposes as public
should prevail over the Civil Code
classification in this particular case
Rabuco v. Villegas
Facts:
The constitutionality of RA No. 3120 was
assailed by the city officials of the City of
Manila contending that the conversion of the
lots in Malate area into disposable and alienable
lands of the state and placing its administration
and disposal to the LTA to be subdivided into
lots and selling it to bona fide occupants thereof
in installments constitutes a deprivation of the
City of Manila of its property by providing for
its sale without the payment of just
compensation.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties in dispute may be
disposed without paying just compensation to
the City of Manila?
Held:
The court held that the assailed RA 3120 is
constitutional. The lots in question are owned by
the City of Manila in its public and
governmental capacity and are therefore public
property over which Congress has absolute
control as distinguished from patrimonial
property owned by it which cannot be deprived
from the City without just compensation and
without due process. RA 3120 expressly
provides that the properties are reserved for the
purpose of communal property and ordered its
conversion into disposable and alienable lands
of the state to be sold to its bona fide occupants.
It has been an established doctrine that the state
reserves its rights to classify its property under
its legislative prerogative and the court cannot
interfere on such power of the state.
Villanueva v. Castaneda (Very important case
guys)
Facts:
municipal council of San Fernando adopted
Resolution No. 218 authorizing 24 members of
Fernandino United Merchants and Traders
Association to construct permanent stalls and
sell in the subject property within the vicinity of
the public market. CFI issued writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent the
construction of stalls.
While the case was pending, the municipal
council adopted Resolution No. 29 which
declared the subject area as a parking place and
as the public plaza of the municipality. CFI
decided Civil Case No. 2040 and held that the
subject land was public in nature and was
beyond the commerce of man. The preliminary
injunction was made permanent.
Petitioners argued that they had right to occupy
the area by virtue of lease contracts entered into
with the municipal government, and later, by
virtue of space allocations made in their favor
for which they paid daily fees. The municipality
denied that they entered into said agreements. It
argued that even if the leases were valid, the
same could be terminated at will because rent
was collected daily.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the vendors had the right to
occupy and make use of the property.
HELD:
No. A public plaza is beyond the commerce of
man and so cannot be the subject of lease or
any other contractual undertaking. The town
plaza cannot be used for the construction of
market stalls, specially of residences, and that
such structures constitute a nuisance subject to
abatement according to law. Town plazas are
properties of public dominion, to be devoted to
public use and to be made available to the
public in general. They are outside the common
of man and cannot be disposed of or even
leased by the municipality to private parties.
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in
dispute, the resolution could have effectively
terminated the agreement for it is settled that
the police power cannot be surrendered or
bargained away through the medium of a
contract.
Dacanay v. Asistio
ISSUE
May public streets be leased or licensed to
market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance
or resolution of Metropolitan Manila
Commission?
HELD: NO
1. A public street is property for public use
hence outside the commerce of man. Being
outside the commerce of man, it may not be the
subject of lease or other contract
2. The vested right of the public to use city
streets for the purpose they were intended to
serve such as for traveling
3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot
change the nature of the public street because it
is going to be contrary to the general law
Viuda de tantoco v. Municipal Council of
Iloilo(very important too)
 NOTE: properties for public use held
in municipal corps. Are not subject to
levy and execution
FACTSThe widow of Tan Toco sued the
municipal council of Iloilo for the two strips of
land which the municipality of Iloilo had
appropriated for widening said street. On
account of lack of funds the municipality of
Iloilo was unable to pay the said judgment,
wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution issue
against the property of the said municipality, by
virtue of which the sheriff attached two auto
trucks, one police patrol automobile, the police
stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and
Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the
corresponding lots.
ISSUE
Whether the Municipal properties can be
executed in lieu of the unsatisfied obligation?
HELD
No, property for public use of the State is not
within the commerce of man and, consequently,
is unalienable and not subject to prescription.
Likewise, property for public use of the
municipality is not within the commerce of man
so long as it is used by the public and,
consequently, said property is also inalienable.
The rule is that property held for public uses,
such as public buildings, streets, squares, parks,
promenades, wharves landing places, fire
engines, hose and hose carriages, engine houses,
public markets, hospitals, cemeteries, and
generally everything held for governmental
purposes, is not subject to levy and sale under
execution against such corporation.
Municipality of Paoay vs Manaois
Issue:
May the fishery or municipal waters of the
town of Paoay or its usufruct may be levied
upon and subject to execution? How about the
revenue or income derived from the renting of
these fishery lots?
 Exception: after being reclaimed, in
accordance with the law, they cease to be
public properties and may be disposed as
patrimonial properties.
 QUESTION:Who may acquire such
lands after being reclaimed?

Held: Chavez vs PEA and Amari Coastal Bay dev.

No, properties for public use held by municipal Corp. (Amari case)- important case
corporation are not subject to levy and (take note of the comparison of this case to the
execution. The reason= held in trust for the Ponce case (Ponce et. al. Vs City of Cebu et. al)
people. HOWEVER, revenue or income Amari case Ponce Case
coming from the renting of these fishery lots is
ISSUE: WON private Admit that submerged lands
certainly subject to execution. These are
corp. (Amari) can still belong to the national
profitable, it is a sort of sideline, so that even lawfully acquire gov. And inalienable except
without it the municipality may still continue submerged and reclaimed agricultural lands (sec 2, art.
functioning and perform its essential duties as submerged lands in XII constitution)
such municipal corporations. Manila bay? --Cebu city ordinance merely
HELD: granted Essel Inc. An
City of Angeles vs CA Submerged lands, like “irrevocable option to
ISSUE waters (sea or bay) above purchase the forshore lands
Whether a subdivision owner/developer is them are inalienable. This AFTER reclamation, it did
legally bound under Presidential Decree No. is also true to not actually sell the still to be
1216 to donate to the city or municipality the FORESHORE lands. Any reclaimed foreshore lands.
sale of submerged or --Option to purchase referred
“open space” allocated exclusively for parks,
forshore lands is void to RECLAIMED lands, not
playground and recreational use being contrary to the foreshore lands which are
HELD: constitution. inalienable.
YES. it is no longer optional on the part --Here, the bulk of lands --Reclaimed lands are no
of the subdivision owner/developer to donate subject of the ammended longer foreshore or
the open space for parks and playgrounds; joint venture agreement submereged and may qualify
rather there is now a legal obligation to donate (JVA) are STILL as alienable public
the same. SUBMERGED lands, agricultural lands.
These are non-alienable public lands, therefore unalienable.
and non-buildable. No portion of the parks --According to the JVA,
andplay grounds donated thereafter shall be PEA conveyed to Amari
converted to any other purpose or purposes. the submerged lands even
before their actual
PD 1216: open space- an area reserved reclamation.
exclusively for parks,playgrounds, recreational
uses, schools, roads, places of worship,
hospitals, health centers, barangay centers and Illegal- There is an legal-ONLY an irrevocable
immediate transfer to the option to purchase of
other similar facilities and amenities
joint venture. foreshore lands once actually
Amari’s right to own the reclaimed
4. 2. Submerged Lands, foreshore lands, and submerged land is
reclaimed lands IMMEDIATELY
 Generally: they belong to the state’s effective upon approval
inalienable natural resources. of the ammended JVA,
not merely an option to be
exercised in the future if
reclamation is actually
realized.
Same Amari case: Court reiterated the need for
PUBLIC BIDDING (sec. 379, LGC 1991)
 Who will reclassify the land? DENR
Constitutional Ban on acquisition of
alienable pub. Lands and pub. Corp; End-
user government agency doctrine
 LGU is a pub. Corp. And is qualified
under the constitution to hold alienable
or even inalienable lands of public
domain.
PHILIPPINE FISHERIES
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs CA
- The Iloilo Fishing [P]ort [Complex/IFPC]
constructed by the State for public use and/or
public service falls within the term “port” in the
aforecited provision which can’t be subject for
execution/sale. Whether there are
improvements in the fishing port complex that
should not be construed to be embraced within
the term ‘port’. Any doubt on whether the
entire IFPC may be levied upon to satisfy the
tax delinquency should be resolved against the
City of Iloilo.
The NFPC cannot be sold at public auction in
satisfaction of the tax delinquency. The land on
which the NFPC property sits is a reclaimed
land, which belongs to the State. In Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority, the Court declared
that reclaimed lands are lands of the public
domain and cannot, without Congressional fiat,
be subject of a sale, public or private.
5. To enter into contracts
 can enter into contracts
 must be respected by congress thus any
obligations arising out of municipal
contracts CANNOT be impaired by
congress.
 HOW? Local chief executive +
sangunian’s approval + posting
◦ SECTION 22, LGC
▪ unless otherwise provided by this
code, NO contract may be
entered into by the local chief
executive in behalf of LGU
without prior authorization of the
SANGGUNIAN concerned.
▪ Legible copy of such must be
posted at a conspicuous place in
the provincial capitol, city of
brgy. Hall.
5.1 Requisites for valid LGU contract
-conditions for a local chief executive may enter
into a contract in behalf of LGU: PSPACFPG
(Papa is SuPer ACtive For the
President’sGovernor)
A) LGU must have the POWER to enter
into the particular contract (note: LGU’s
cannot enter into contracts on extracting
natural resources, it is the national
government);
B) Prior authorization by the
SANGGUNIAN concerned and legible
copy of such must be POSTED at a
conspicuous place in the provincial
capitol, city of brgy. Hall.(sec. 22c, LGC);
C) If contract involves expenditure of public
funds there should be ACTUAL
APPROPRIATION and
CERTIFICATE OF AVAILABILITY
OF FUNDS by the treasurer of LGU
(Secs. 46 and 47, chapter subtitle B, Book V,
1987 admin, code);
D) Conform with FORMAL requisites of
written contracts prescribed by law;
E) If province is a party conveying real
property, it must be approved by the
PRESIDENT (sec 2068 revised admin code).
If a municipality is a party conveying
real property or any interest or creating
lien, must be approved by GOVERNOR
(sec 2196 revised admin code).
Note: statutes requiring pub. Bidding apply to contracts
already executed in compliance with law if such
amendments ALTER orig cont.
5.2 Prior authorization by Sanggunian
QUISUMBING, et al. vs GARCIA, et al.
(very important case)
Facts: COA conducted a financial audit on the
Province of Cebu and found out that several
contracts were not supported with a Sangguniang
Panlalawigan resolution authorizing the Provincial
Governor to enter into a contract, as required under
Section 221 of R.A. No. 7160. Gov Garcia sought
reconsideration of this findings. However, without
waiting for its resolution, filed an action for
declaratory relief with the RTC. Gov claimed that the
no prior authorization is required because the
expenditures incurred are already authorized by the
appropriation ordinances of the previous year which
are deemed re-enacted. RTC ruled that no prior
authorization is required.
HELD:
1. Reenacted- ONLY for salary and wages
2. Not reenacted- appropriation ordinance
describing new projects in generic terms such as
infrastructure, inter municipal water works,
drainage etc. It NEEDS sanggunian’s approval.
5.3 EFFECTS OF COMPLIANCE of the Requisites
Question (note: this might come out sa exam) :
 Distinguish Ratification from
Authorization.
Ratification (after) presumes that there is
already an authorization (before).
 Effects: (refer to 5.1 Requisites for valid
LGU contract)
Entered without Effect/Ratification
compliance
with:
A and C -Ultra Vires (acting or done beyond
requisites one's legal power or authority) and null
and void.
-Cannot be ratified.
B and D -Defective BUT can be ratified
requisites expressly or impliedly
-DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL will not apply to void
contracts when LGU already received benefits
because it will only validate the void contract.
-DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED MUNICIPAL LIABILITY apply to
transactions without contracts BUT could have been
valid had one been entered to to the extent of the
benefit received.
Vergara vs Ombudsman: (important case)
FACTS:
The City Government of Calamba (Calamba City),
through Mayor Lajara, entered into the following
agreements: MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage and Deed of Assignment of Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA).
The above documents were subsequently endorsed
to the City Council. Petitioner, however, alleged that
all these documents were not ratified by the City
Council, a fact duly noted by the Commission on
Audit.
Respondents justified the absence of ratification by
the City Council of the MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of
Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment. They cited
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) which
spoke of prior authority and not ratification.
Respondents pointed out that petitioner did not
deny the fact that Mayor Lajara was given prior
authority to negotiate and sign the subject contracts.
In fact, it was petitioner who made the motion to
enact Resolution No. 280.
ISSUE: Whether all the documents pertaining to
the purchase of the lots should bear the ratification
by the City Council of Calamba.
HELD:
Clearly, when the local chief executive enters into
contracts, the law speaks of prior authorization or
authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod and not
ratification. It cannot be denied that the City Council
issued Resolution No. 280 authorizing Mayor Lajara
to purchase the subject lots.
ratification by the City Council is not a condition
sine qua non for Mayor Lajara to enter into
contracts. With the resolution issued by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, it cannot be said that
there was evident bad faith in purchasing the
subject lots.
Power to Negotiate and Secure Grants
SECTION 23, LCG
GENERAL RULE:
Local executive may, upon AUTHORITY of
sanggunian negotiate and secure financial grants
and donations in kind, in support of services and
facilities given in sec. 17, LGC from local and foreign
assistance agencies WITHOUT necessity of securing
clearance or approval from any department, agency,
or office of the national government or from any
higher LGU.
EXCEPTION:
projects finance by such grants or assistance with
national security implications shall be approved by
the national agency concerned PROVIDED that
when national agency FAILS to act on request for
approval within 30 days from receipt, it is deemed
approved.
Local chief executive, within 30 days upon signing of
such grant agreement of deed of donation, report
the nature, amount, and terms of such assistance
to both houses of congress and the President.
CHAPTER 15: LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES
Liability for Defective public works
 Article 2189, NCC “Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for
damages for death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of
the defective condition of the roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings and
other public works under their control
and supervision.
◦ requires only CONTROL and
SUPERVISION for liability to arise
regardless of ownership.
◦ Specific on defects on road...etc.
 Art. 471, rules and Regulations
Implementing LGC “ extent of liability
shall be governed by the provisions of
the civil code on quasi delict”.
Cases (okay, here comes the manholes :)
Jimenez vs City of Manila
A victim fell in an uncovered opening in a public
market managed by Asiatic Integrated corp.
Respondent City of Manila maintains that it
cannot be held liable for the injuries sustained
by the petitioner because under the
Management and Operating Contract, Asiatic
Integrated Corporation assumed all
responsibility for damages which may be
suffered by third persons for... any cause attri-
butable to it.
However Article 2189 of the Civil Code which
governs liability due to "defective streets,...
public buildings and other public works"
requires only that the province, city or
municipality has either "control or supervision"
over the public building in question. There is no
question that the Sta. Ana Public Market,
despite the Management and Operating
Contract between respondent City and Asiatic
Integrated Corporation remained under the
control of the former. In fact it employed a
market master to take direct supervision and
control to check the safety of the place.
Guilatco vs City of Dagupan
Facts: Florentina Guilatco was about to board a
tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a
national road) when she accidentally fell into an
open manhole resulting in her hospitalization
and continuing difficulty in locomotion. City of
Dagupan denied liability on the ground that
the manhole was located on a national road,
which was not under the control or supervision
of the City of Dagupan.
ISSUE:
Whether the City of Dagupan is liable to Guilatco.
HELD:
Yes, the City of Dagupan is liable. For Article 2189
to apply, it is not necessary for the defective road
or street to belong to the province, city or
municipality. The article only requires that either
control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street.
Here, control or supervision is provided for in the
charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the
City Engineer, whose duties include the care and
custody of the public system of waterworks and
sewers.
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila Vs. CA
Municipal liability for injuries caused by failure to
regulate drilling and excavation attaches weather it
be in a national or municipal road so long as it is
within the latter’s jurisdiction.
LIABILITY for Torts
If LGU is engaged in governmental functions, it is
not liable for such damages but if it is engaged in
proprietary functions, it is liable.
Cases:
Municipality of San Fernando La Union vs Firme -
this case was decided on Feb. 1989 when LGC was
not yet effective (take note of the difference of this
case to the case of Sps. Jayme vs Apostol)
The test of liability of the municipality depends on
whether or not the driver acting in behalf of the
municipality is performing governmental or
proprietary functions. Municipal corporations are
suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they
are generally not liable for torts committed by
them in the discharge of governmental functions
and can be held answerable only if it can be shown
that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In
permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely
gives the claimant the right to show that the
defendant was not acting in its governmental
capacity when the injury was committed or that the
case comes under the exceptions recognized by law.
Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
NOTE HOWEVER that under section 24, LGC, LGU
and their official are liable are NOT EXEMPT from
liability for death or injury to persons or damage to
property
Sps. Jayme vs Apostol
Liability of LGU under art. 2180 of the NCC is clear
that the obligation imposed in 2176 is demandable
not only for ones acts and omissions but also for
those whom he is responsible.
Torio vs Funtanilla
Municipal council of Malasiqui ordered the
construction of wooden stage for the town fiesta
however it collapsed causing serious physical
injuries to the participants.
Held: Municipality is liable for holding a fiesta is a
proprietary function not for general welfare. The
councilors were however absolved for they can be
likened to members of the board of directors in
private corp. having a distinct personality since
celebration of fiesta is not a government function.
They are not liable for damages for negligence of an
agent and the employees of government unless
there is a showing of bad faith or gross negligence.
City of Manila vs IAC
in the absence of special law, North cemetery is a
patrimonial property of the city of Manila. The
administration and government of the cemetery
were under the city health officer and the order and
police of the cemetery, opening graves etc. were
under the superintendent of the cemetery. City is
therefore liable for the tortuous acts of its
employees under the principle of respondeat
superior.
Liability for Contracts:
 LGU’s 2 fold power:
 1. public, governmental or political-
▪ administering power of the
state and promoting public
welfare
▪ including: legislative, judicial,
public and political functions.
2. corporate, private and proprietary-
▪ for special benefit and
advantage of the community.
▪ Including: ministerial, private
and corporate
1. Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability
 municipality may be obligated upon an
implied contract to pay the reasonable
value of benefits accepted or appropriated
by it as to which it has general power to
contract.
 Apply to all cases where money and
property is receive under general law
 principles rests on the theory that the
obligation implied by law to pay does not
originate in unlawful contract but arises
from considerations outside it.
Province of Cebu vs IAC
by reaping benefits out of the contract, city of Cebu
is estopped from questioning its validity
2. Doctrine of Estoppel, not applicable to VOID
contracts
limitation of no. 1. It cannot be applied to mun.
corp. to validate a contract which corp. has no
power to make or which it is not authorized to do
so.
-Otherwise, it will allow the Mun. to do acts
indirectly what it cannot do directly. (San Diego vs
Mun. of Naujan)
Liability for Illegal Dismissal of Employees
-an illegally dismissed employee who is later
reinstated is entitled to back wages and other
monetary benefits at the time of dismissal to
reinstatement.
BUT who will be liable? The LGU or the officer who
effected it?
1. Municipal liability
Municipality of Jasaan vs Gentallan
permanent appointee to the position, Gentallan is
entitled to security of tenure and benefits. So who
should be liable for damages? Since no finding of
malice or bad faith which attended illegal dismissal
and refusal to reinstate Gentallan by her superior
officers, latter can’t be accountable for back salaries
so municipal government was ordered to disburse
funds to answer to such.
HOWEVER, if the LGU approved or permitted the
illegal act of the officials in removing its employees,
it may be held jointly and severally with the pub.
Official (Laganapan vs Asedillo).
2. Enforcement of Monetary Judgment
2.1. remedy- levy on patrimonial property of the
government (Municipality of Paoay vs Manaois)
2.2. But is the LGU do not have patrimonial
properties- Remedy file petition for mandamus to
compel it to pay to satisfy judgment (Mun of Makati
vs CA)
2.3. file money claim with Comm. Of Audit (COA)
--- HOWEVER, the money of LGU in the bank
CANNOT be GARNISHED if it came from PUBLIC
FUNDS. Such is exempted (Mun. of Makati vs CA)
3. Personal Liability of Officials
General rule: they can be held liable for acts claimed
to be in connection to their official duty where they
acted ultra vires or there is bad faith (Chavez vs SB)
Rama vs CA
gov, v-gov, members of sanggunian, prov. Auditor,
treasurer and engineer- solidarily liable for damages
to some 200 employees of prov. Of Cebu who were
eased out because of party affiliations.
Correa vs CFI Bulacan
Gen: LGU is liable for the acts of its officers acting
within the scope of their authority
Exception: a pub. Officer who commits tort or act in
excess of beyond his scope of duty is not protected
by his office and is like to a private individual.
In JONES vs LOVING- However, legislative officers
are not personally liable for the adoption of
ordinances. They are exempt for passing such
within their authority, nor their motives be inquired.
Chapter 16: Elective Officials
I. Qualifications
a. For LGU Officials (sec. 39, LGC)
1.) Citizen of the Philippines
 Need not be a natural
born citizen at the time
of the election
 Naturalized officials are
allowed to run provided
they surrender their
other citizenship
2. Registered Voter in the barangay,
municipality, city or province (For a
member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, panlunsod or bayan- the
District where he intends to be elected)
3.) Resident therein for at least 1 year
immediately preceeding the day of the
election
4.) Able to Read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect
b. For Gov, VG/Member of the s.
panlalawigan/Mayor or VM for s. panlungod
5.) At least 23 years of age on election
day
c. For M or VM of independent component
cities/municipalities
6.) At least 21 years of age on ED
d. For members of the s. panlungsod/s.bayan
7.) At least 18 years on ED
e. For Punong Barangay/ member of s.
barangay
8.) At least 18 years on ED
f. For S. Kabataan
9.) at least 15 y/o but not more than 21
(or 24) on ED
Frivaldo v COMELEC
“Philippines citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public
office, and the purpose of such qualification is
none other than to ensure that no alien shall
govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof.”
 Definition for “at the time of election” =
on the day of the proclamation
 It is immaterial WON you were not a
Filipino during the filing of the candidacy,
but what matters is that you are a
Filipino at the time of election
 Therefore, Frivaldo is not considered as
a Filipino citizen because although he
did lose his naturalized American
citizenship, such forfeiture did not have
the effect of automatically restoring his
citizenship in the PH that he had
renounced. Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and
must be posessesd not only at the time
of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the
officer’s entire tenure.
Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC
Residence- one’s permanent or temporary
place of abode
Domicile- the fixed place of abode where one
has an intention on returning
 A person can only have a single domicile,
unless for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in
favor of another domicile of choice
 Rationale for the requirement: To give
the candidates the opportunity to be
familiar with the needs, difficulties,
aspirations, potentials for growth and all
matters vital to the welfare of their
constituents

Ruling: Therefore, Imelda was qualified to
run for the reason that Leyte is her
domicile even tho she claims to have more
than 1 residence
Torayno v COMELEC
3 Classifications of Domicile (BLC)
1. Domicile by Birth
2. Domicile by Law
3. Domicile by Choice
Ruling: residence is required because electives
are needed to be familiar with the issues
surrounding that specific place. Thus, Emano
was allowed to run, satisfying the 1 year
requirement for having an ancestral home in
CDO.
II. Disqualifications
LGC. Sec. 40
1. Those sentenced by Final Judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by 1 year or more of
imprisonment
 Moral Turpitude- everything which is
done contrary to justice, modesty or
good morals.
 Moreno v COMELEC
When an officer is under probation (for
the commission of a crime), it does not
mean that he is disqualified from office
because probation suspends his
sentence. Furthermore, probation will
restore all civil rights lost because of
conviction
 Therefore, Moreno’s probation
granted him the right to run for
public office because Probation
law provides that the final
discharge of the probationer
shall operate to restore to him
all civil rights lost or suspended
as a result of his convuction and
to fully discharge his liability for
any fine imposed as to the
offense
2. Those removed from office as a result for an
Administrative case
3. Those convicted by final judgment for
violating the Oath of allegiance to the republic
4. Those with Dual citizenship
 Rule: Dual Citizenship is not a ground for
disqualification, HOWEVER, dual
allegiance is.
 Mercado v Manzano
Dual Citizenship- a person is considered
to be a national of a country because of
an involuntary decision
Dual Allegiance- it is the voluntary
decision to be a national of a country
5. Fugitives from justice in a criminal or non-
political case here or abroad
 Marquez v COMELEC
“Fugitive from justice” refers to:
- a person fleeing from conviction to
avoid punishment, or;
- a person, who after being charged,
flees to avoid prosecution
6. Permanent residents in a foreign country of
those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right
 Acquistion of residence abroad = positive
act of abandonment
 Caasi v COMELEC
Rule: any person who is not a permanent
resident or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office UNLESS the person has
waived his status as a permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country.
 Although the LGC does not mention
the word “immigrant”, it is
understood to mean a permanent
resident in foreign country or those
who have acquired the right to
reside abroad
  Rationale: the law reserves the
privilege for its citizens who have
cast their loyalty to the republic
without mental reservation
7. The Insane of feeble-minded
Chp. 17: Disciplinary Actions of Public
Officials
I. Sources
1. Local Government Code of 1991
2. RA 3019
3. Code of Ethics
4. Revised Penal Code
5. 1987 Constitution
6. The Ombudsman Law
7. The Sandiganbayan Law
8. Plunder Law
II. Grounds for Disciplinary Action
(DOA-DOA-CU)
1. Disloyalty to the Republic of the PH
2. Comission of an Offense involving moral
turpitude or of an offense punishable by at
least prision mayor
3. Abuse of authority
4. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office,
gross negligence or dereliction of duty
5. Other grounds provided by law
6. Application for, or acquisition of, foreign
citizenship or resident or immigrant status
7. Culpable violation of the constitution
8. Unauthorized absence for 15 consective
working days, EXCEPT in the case of members
of the sangguniang
Ombudsman v Rodriguez
Ruling: Elective officials can only be removed
by the courts because the court, being an
unelected entity, is free from any political
intervention. The Local Government Code is
the basis, and the Ombudsman has the
jurisdiction
Pablico v Villapardo
Ruling: the sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction
to prosecute erring local elective officers
III. Preventive Suspension
Objective: (PA)
1. To Prevent the accused from hampering the
normal course of the investigation with his
influence and authority over possible witnesses
or to keep him off the records and other
evidence
2. To Assist prosecutors in firming up a case
against erring local officials.
Imposed by: (PGM)
 The President- if the respondent
is an elective of a province,
highly urbanized or an
independent component city
 The Governor- if respondent is
an elective official of a
component city or municipality
 The Mayor- if the respondent is
an elective offial of the barangay
Requisites of Preventive Suspension:
Joson III v CA
 After the issues are joined (when
the complaint has been
answered and there are no
longer any substantial
preliminary issues)
 When the evidence of guilt is
strong
 Great probability that the
continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the
witness or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the
records and other evidences
Rule: PS shall not extend beyond 60 days
Rule: PS shall not extend beyond 90 days within
a single year on the same ground if several
administrative cases are filed against an erring
local official
Rule: The respondent official preventively
suspended from office shall receive no salary or
compensation during such suspension
Except: he shall be paid full salary or
compensation upon exoneration and
reinstatement
IV. Penalty: Effects
1. The investigation of the case shall be
terminated within 90 days from the start
thereof. Within 30 days after the end of the
investigation, the Office of the President or the
sangguniang concerned shall render a decision
in writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts
and the reasons for such decision. Copies of
said decision shall immediately be furnished to
the respondent and all interested parties.
2. The penalty of suspension shall not eceed
the unexpired term of the respondent or a
period of 6 months for every administrative
offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the
candidacy of the respondent so suspended as
long as he meets the qualification required for
the office.
A public official cannot be removed for
administrative conduct committed during a
prior term.
Rationale: a candidate’s re-election signifies a
condonation of the offenses committed during
his prior term because the public now knows of
his character and life, hence the reason why
they elected him.
Carpio-Morales v CA & Binay
Overturned the Aguinaldo Doctrine for the
reason that the same has no legal basis;
election is not a mode of condoming
administrative offenses. The decision was based
from the Pascual Doctrine (US Jurisprudence)
VII. Removal of Local Elective
The office of the President is without any power to
remove elected officials, since such power is
exclusively vested in the proper courts.

3. The penalty of removal from office as a

result of an administrative investigation shall
be considered a bar to the candidacy of the
respondent for any elective position.
V. Administrative Appeals
Decisions in administrative cases may, within
30 days from receipt thereof, be appealed to
the ff:
1. The S. Panlalawigan- of decisions
from the S. Panlulungod of component
cities and S. Bayan

2. Office of the Pres- of decisions from

the S. Panlalawigan and Panlungod of
highly urbanized cities and independent
component cities. Decisions from the
Office of the President shall be final and
executory

Rule: an appeal shall not prevent a decision

from becoming final and executory.
VI. The Aguinaldo Doctrine