Pub Corp Case Digests 06 Word

LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp
Provisions for Elective and Appointive Local Officials

Elective Local Officials
Practice of Profession
1) Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the NPC vs Atty. Rambuyong

G.R. No. 167810, October 04, 2010
FACTS: Alfred Chu filed a case for collection of a sum of money and/ or damages against the
National Power Corporation which was raffled to the RTC of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Appearing
for Chu is Atty. Richard Rambuyong who was the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay, NPC filed a Motion for Inhibition of Atty. Rambuyong arguing that under Sec. 90(b) RA
7160 (LGC), sanggunian members are prohibited to appear as counsel before any court wherein
any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party. NPC argued that being
a GOCC, it is embraced within the term instrumentality.
The RTC favoured Rambuyong. The CA upheld the decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition
ISSUE: Whether NPC is an instrumentality of government such Atty. Rambuyong, as a sanggunian

member, should not appear as counsel against it.
HELD: Yes, NPC is government instrumentality thus, Atty. Rambuyong should not appear as
counsel against it.
Reason: Based on jurisprudence, Maceda vs Macaraig, Jr., 1997 197 SCRA 771 (1991), the Court
stated that NPC is a government instrumentality with the enormous task of undertaking
development of hydroelectric generation of power and production of electricity from other sources,
as well as transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis, to improve the quality of life
pursuant to the State policy embodied in Section 9, Article 2 of 1987 Constitution. With this, the
LGC prohibits a sanggunian member (Atty. Rambuyong) to appear as counsel of a party adverse
to the NPC.
2) CATU VS. RELLOSA

A.C. NO. 5738 02/19/2008
FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were
occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said
complaint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
Manila where respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for
conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the
respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Petitioner, thus, filed a
complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where
respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed
the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on the ground that he committed an act
of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants
despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong
barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task
without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for free as she was
financially distressed. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to them,
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respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official,
the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the violation of the latter
prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for the violation of the latter
prohibition, respondent was then recommended suspension from the practice of law for one month
with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as
the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were proper.
HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 the Code of
Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in
connection to former government lawyers who are prohibited from accepting employment in
connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar,
respondent was an incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of
the said provision.
Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which governs the practice
of profession of elective local government officials. While RA 6713 generally applies to all public
officials and employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713
.Moreover, while under RA 7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial
board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to
practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong
barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice
their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his profession.
Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. The failure
of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes
a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first
securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the
legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces
the dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be
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disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Prohibition against Appointment
1) FLORES V DRILON
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993
FACTS: Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs
the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for
the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as
the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”
ISSUES
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation
of elective officials to other government posts.
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City
and thus an excepted circumstance.
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double
compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another
post.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments
which he may have received pursuant to his appointment.
HELD
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject
proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits.
It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an
executive position in government, and thus neglect his constitutents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the
Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably
shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor
of Olongapo City.
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(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-
President for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the
compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of
SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is
the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to
appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot
at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such enactment effectively
eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction
on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications
of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo
City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one,
and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all
throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post
to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for
appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however
remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void;
he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such
benefits.
Qualifications/Disqualifications
1) Jalosjos v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012
FACTS: Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia
in 1981 when he was eight years old and there acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22,
2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
hence, he was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of
Immigration. On September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn
renunciation of the same in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225. From the time of his return,
Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same village where he lived. He applied for
registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent Erasmo, the Barangay Captain,
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opposed the said act. Election Registration Board approved it and included Jalosjos’ name in the
COMELEC voters list. Erasmo filed before the MTC a petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name
from the official voters list. MTC denied Erasmo’s petition. He appealed to RTC but RTC ruled same
as MTC’s. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor
of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to deny
due course or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC on the ground that Jalosjos made material misrepresentation
in the same since he failed to comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year
residency requirement of the Local Government Code. COMELEC ruled against Jalosjos, because
it failed to comply with the 1-year residency ruequirement. Jalosjos won the elections
ISSUE: w/n Jalosjos failed to comply with the 1-year residency requirement
HELD: Yes. It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of
his birth. His domicile was changed from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the
age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became
his domicile by operation of law and by choice. But, when he came to the Philippines in November
2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to
change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced
his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited
his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
2) Jalosjos v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 205033 : June 18, 2013
FACTS: On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision convicting petitioner by final
judgment. Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code. On April 30,
2007, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued an order commuting his prison term to
sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days.
On April 26, 2012,petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of
his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election
Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of
Voters before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City. Pending resolution of the same,
he filed a CoCon October 5, 2012, seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming
local elections scheduled on May 13, 2013. In his CoC, petitioner stated,inter alia,that he is eligible
for the said office and that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.
On October 18, 2012,the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual
absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such denial
was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court in its Order which, pursuant to Section 138 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code" (OEC), was
immediately final and executory.
The COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 on January 15, 2013, resolving
"to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as
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Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to his perpetual
absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement.
ISSUES:
(a)Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio
Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner's right to due process;
(b)Whether or not petitioner's perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office had
already been removed by Section 40 (a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991" (LGC).
HELD: Decision of the appellate court is affirmed.
POLITICAL LAW: cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy
The COMELECEn Bancdid not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No.
9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve any election case before
it or any of its divisions.Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws
in cancelling petitioner's CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which
had already been established by his final conviction.In this regard, the COMELECEn Bancwas
exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of
a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in
quasi-judicial proceedings.
The denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one's CoC generally necessitates the exercise
of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition based on either Sections
12 or 78of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive
on account of final and executory judgments as when a candidate's disqualification to run for public
office is based on a final conviction.
There is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELECEn Banc would be acting
in a purely administrative manner.
POLITICAL LAW: right to run for elective office
The petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for
elective office. As discussed, Section 40 (a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal
provision such as Article 41 in this case directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running
for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner's service of his
commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
It is well to note that the use of the word "perpetual" in the aforementioned accessory penalty
connotes a lifetime restriction and in this respect, does not depend on the length of the prison term,
which is imposed as its principal penalty. Instructive on this point is the Court's ruling in Lacuna v.
Abes,where the Court explained the meaning of the term "perpetual" as applied to the penalty of
disqualification to run for public office.
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The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualified the convict for public office
and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article
27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired
on 13 October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage.This accessory penalty deprives the convict
of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from
temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence.
Petition for review on certiorari is DISMISSED.
3) EFREN ARATEA v. COMELEC AND ESTELA ANTIPOLO

G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012, Carpio, J.
FACTS: Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid S.
Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify
Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground
that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4)
consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections.
Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy
when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section
8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code both prohibit
a local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the
same position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolutionon 18 February 2010 cancelling

Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy.
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during
the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number
of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of
Olongapo. On the same date, Aratea wrote the DILG and requested for an opinion on whether, as
Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s
disqualification.
DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal conviction, and
as a consequence, his office was deemed permanently vacant, and thus, Aratea should assume
the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution of
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration.
In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take the oath of
office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo
allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the COMELEC.
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On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from
running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on
two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three
consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final
judgment of 10 counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for
each count of falsification to imprisonment of 4 years and 1 day of prisión correccional as minimum,
to 8 years and 1 day of prisión mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23
October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People, before Lonzanida filed his
certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.
The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanida’s removal. Whether Lonzanida was disqualified
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material representation under
Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio,
is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales.
HELD: Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes
for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the
highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 681 of the Omnibus Election Code are
specifically enumerated.
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts
and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." All the offenses mentioned
in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations
of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify
including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of
falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under
Section 68.
On the other hand, Section 782 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy
may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the
certificate of candidacy:
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of candidacy:
1 Sec. 68. Disqualifications. ‒ Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision by
a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this
Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing
as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant
to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in
the election laws.
2 Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. ‒ A verified petition seeking to deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.
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Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒ The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office x x x
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies him
perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This
perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory
penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under
Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of
"deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such
office.” The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal
penalty of prisión mayor.
On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of his disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public
office.
A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and
commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is
eligible to so run.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much
less to valid votes.
As the Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution: Since Lonzanida was never a candidate
for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered
stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the
mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly
elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run
for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is
immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the
very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified
candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the highest
number of votes. Petition dismissed.
4) MANUEL B. JAPZON v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S. TY

G.R. No. 180088 January 19, 2009
Facts:
Ø Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were
candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the
local elections held on 14 May 2007.
Ø Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition[5] to disqualify and/or
cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred
in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in
what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).
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Ø Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty
had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on
28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent
resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
Ø While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually
resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year
immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
Ø Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the
USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.
Ø Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport
himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his
foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.
Ø Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running
for public office and the cancellation of the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
Ø Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently
became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of
Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28
March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act No.
9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate
General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles,
California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his
residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar. Ty's application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine
passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his Community Tax Certificate
(CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he stated that his address was at
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was
registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar;
(6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay
6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a
duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
Ø He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he
had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one
year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon's Petition in
SPA No. 07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.[7]
Ø The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5
of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the
purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person
owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory
thereof.
Ø Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul
of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and
executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.]
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9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying public office nor is in active service as
commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of which he was
naturalized citizen
Ø Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he
was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year
before the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that: Although Ty has lost his domicile in [the]
Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held on
14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.
Ø The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing to obtain a favorable
resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition for Certiorari, that the
COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of discretion for dismissing the
petition.
Ø Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28
September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a new
resolution denying due course to or canceling Ty's Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon
as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ø Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already found
sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very
same pieces of evidence without violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the
COMELEC are binding on the Court.
Ø The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to meet
the one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the
14 May 2007 local elections.The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.
Ø . On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a
notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively
renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.
Ø The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals
and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the
ground that respondent's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of
his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he
was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of
his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be
disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions.
RULING:
Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective position.
Ø It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born
Filipino may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship,
and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute
would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking
advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
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reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-
born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is
only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
Ø There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has
previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually
present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of
the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is
not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only
consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ø Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency
requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v.
COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he
could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he
has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. As this
Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had
established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May
2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate
for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.
Ø To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is
ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant Petition for Certiorari is dismiss.
5) TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M.

BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN,Respondents
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8,
1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage
to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known
as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved and
the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia,
which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an
Australian citizen.6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in
her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position
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of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning
candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8
(private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo
warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the
petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen
and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased
to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that
her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon disqualified and ineligible to hold office
of vice mayor of Caba La union and nullified her proclamation as the winning candidate.
After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but the appeal was dismissed y the second
division and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006,
she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of
candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does
not apply to her.
Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to renounce her
Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225
Ruling:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens
who have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil
and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in
Section 5.
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a
renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was
not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship was invalid due to it was
not oath before any public officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of Condon void.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated
September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE).
6) Cordora v COMELEC
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FACTS: Cordora filed a complaint affidavit before Comelec law department against Tambunting
asserting that Gustavo Tambunting made false assertion in his certificate of candidacy by claiming
that Natural Born Filipino and resident before the election in 2001 and 2004. Cordora alleged that
Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required
citizenship and residency requirements. Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon
arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June
2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American
citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000.
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his
certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino,
Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino
mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American
citizen.
The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting’s father petitioned
him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which
he acquired at birth. Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not mean that
Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November
2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003.
The Comelec law department recommended the dismissal of complaint because it failed to
substantiate the charges. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the
COMELEC Law Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to support
his accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence. Commissioner Sarmiento
wrote a separate opinion which concurred with the findings of the En Banc Resolution.
Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen.
Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship when he filed his certificates
of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office. Petitioner filed a MR but was denied, hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tambunting is natural born Filipino.
HELD: Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father.
Neither does he deny that he underwent
the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his father’s citizenship.
Tambunting claims that because of his parents’ differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and
American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American
citizen. We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses dual
citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting
to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS
Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth.
The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed nine other
trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship
prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting
had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office.
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Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who
seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained
therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individual’s active participation
in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a
naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an
implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign citizenship.
Manner and Date of Election
7) Kida v Senate
G.R. No. 196271, : October 18, 2011
FACTS:
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted
through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional
officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM under R.A. 6734.
Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9333 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the
2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734
and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held onAugust 8,
2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.But onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country.With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its
preparations for the ARMM elections.
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from different parties arose as a
consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity of said
laws.
OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue
to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term on September
30, 2011.
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws
amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become
effective.
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The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to
comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.Also cited
as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the
failure to adhere to the "elective and representative" character of the executive and legislative
departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power
to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected
under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that
the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete
violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections
Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates the provisions of the 1987 Constitution
HELD:
Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in toto. The Court
agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position that the Constitution
mandates synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the
1987 Constitution. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the
Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others
through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is
to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every three
years.This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve synchronization, Congressnecessarilyhas to reconcile the
schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on
RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to
be held in May 2013).
In Osme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of
Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-
President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of
synchronizationis used synonymously as the phraseholding simultaneouslysince this is the precise
intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the sameday or occasion.This common termination date
will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials
(under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice
President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x xrecords of the proceedings in
the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
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Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to
be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly
representatives fall within the classification of "local" elections, since they pertain to the elected
officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM. From the perspective of the Constitution,
autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article
Xof the Constitution entitled "Local Government."Autonomous regions are established and
discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government.
Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate.
Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked
reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress,
therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty nor
is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local
elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as
the other.If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization
operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly
carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements
and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner
that does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms.Under these
limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were elected in executive and
legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have
chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. In the case of the terms
of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an
interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three
(3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM(RA No. 9054) sets
outs in terms of structure of governance.What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to"appoint officers-
in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until
the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office."This
power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on
the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. It must be therefore
emphasized that the law must be interpreted as an interim measure to synchronize elections and
must not be interpreted otherwise.
Motion for reconsideration, 2012

G.R. No. 196271 : February 28, 2012
FACTS: These cases are motions for reconsideration assailing the SCs Decision dated October
18, 2011, where it upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second
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Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the Presidents power
to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of
the terms of the elected officials.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and
local elections?
2. Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements?
3. Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
4. Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?
5. Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative
nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?
6. Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President's supervisory powers
over autonomous regions?
HELD: The constitutionality of RA No. 10153 is upheld.
POLITICAL LAW: synchronization of ARMM
1. The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly there was
to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials from the President down to the municipal
officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of
elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional
mandate. That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of
the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not
covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. The ARMM had not yet been officially
organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that
a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure
through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a
constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern
not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles
embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution
must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be
progressive and not static.
2. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM
elections; it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for
the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA
No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date
of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely
filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, it is well-settled that the
supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is unconstitutional
for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.
Similarly, the petitioners contention that the plebiscite requirement applies to all amendments of RA
No. 9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the
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Constitution is incorrect. Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that the creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. This means that only amendments to, or revisions of,
the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects
specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act
require ratification through a plebiscite.
3. The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No.
9054, which allows the regional officials to remain in their positions in a holdover capacity. The
petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials should be allowed to remain in their
respective positions until the May 2013 elections since there is no specific provision in the
Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials from performing their duties in a holdover
capacity.
The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of
the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials
can occupy their offices. Since elective ARMM officials are also local officials, they are, thus, bound
by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the
Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short
of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by
inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should
stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.
4.The Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election.Although the legislature, under the Omnibus
Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to
postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and circumstances
provided for in the law. Both Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances where elections
have already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended because of
unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous
circumstances. In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the
constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously, this does not
fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.
5. The President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it
falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the second sentence of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the Presidents appointment power thus rests on clear
constitutional basis.
6. There is no incompatibility between the President's power of supervision over local governments
and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of
RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs. The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior
officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law. This is
distinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for the latter.
The petitioners apprehension regarding the President's alleged power of control over the OICs is
rooted in their belief that the President's appointment power includes the power to remove these
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officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the
President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the people. This is incorrect. Once
the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are
replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints
that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners
fears in this regard are more apparent than real.
MR DENIED.
Term of Office
1) MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., v. COMELEC, ET. AL. - Read FULL TEXT!
G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013
Political Law; The three-term limit rule for elective local officials; Elements. To constitute a
disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and
statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms;
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different factual milieus
has its complicated side.
In the instant case, the Court revisited and analyzed the various holdings and relevant
pronouncements of the Court on the matter.
The Supreme Court further held that there has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive
terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does
not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that
a “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.”
This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the
three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary
interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain
events or causes.
2) Borja v COMELEC
G.R. No. 133495 September 3, 1998
Facts: Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the
death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two
more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for
Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a
candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already
served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve
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for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec
en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was
subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.
Issue: Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and
serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose
of the three-term limit.
Held: No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the
office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither
had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the
deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is
more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in
the application of any term limit.
The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A
consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members
of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice
of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In discussing term
limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were
serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore
ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict
the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. (Borja vs Comelec, G.R. No.
133495, September 3, 1998)
3) Aldovino VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms:
1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the
Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a
criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed
the performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was
sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three
consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.
ISSUE: WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?
RULING: NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA
7160).
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections
was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-
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2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the
petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s
disqualification.
“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a
term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted
that preventive suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary renunciation that
the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely
requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed.
4) Adormeo vs Comelec
Facts: Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998.
During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-
2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the
unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was
challenged on the ground that he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms in
violation of the three term-limit rule. Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga
filed a motion for reconsideration which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.
Issue: Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two full
terms and he won in the 2000 recall elections.
Held: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as
well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by
his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second term and the recall election is
sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as contemplated in the
disqualifications in the LGC.
Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was defeated in the
1998 elections. His election during the 2000 recall election is not a continuation of his two previous
terms which could constitute his third term thereby barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory
in the 2000 recall election is not the “voluntary renunciation” contemplated by the law. (Adormeo vs
Comelec, G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002)
5) Socrates vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002
Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of
Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election.
Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the
disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the
ground that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected
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and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998
immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.
COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC
declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run
for mayor in the recall election.
Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which states:
“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.”
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code, which provides:
“Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.”
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule.
The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt
the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of
time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from
being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a
fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following
the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer
covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no
longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is an
immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution,
however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is
not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term
following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after
the third term.
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Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in any
other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a
consecutive fourth term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an
immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The
immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular
elections in 2001.
6) Latasa vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 154829 Dec 10, 2003)

A mayor for 3 consecutive term of a municipality which became a city in the said mayor’s last term
is barred from running in the next preceding election if the said new city has the same territorial
jurisdiction when it was still a municipality.
FACTS: Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the
elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioner’s third term, the Municipality of Digos was
became a component city. On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city
mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise
disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of
Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor. On March 1, 2001, private
respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the
COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For
Disqualification against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged therein that petitioner falsely
represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City since
petitioner had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to
2001. On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his Answer, arguing that he did not make any false
representation in his certificate of candidacy since he fully disclosed therein that he had served as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. Moreover, he argued that this fact
does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 2001 elections since this will
be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
Issue: WON Latasa is barred from running as mayor of the newly created city of Digos being the
mayor of Digos for 3 consecutive term when it was still a municipality.
Held: Yes, Latasa is barred from running. An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from
running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and
2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the present case, petitioner argued that a
city and a municipality have separate and distinct personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a
single entity and must be accorded different treatment consistent with specific provisions of the
Local Government Code. He does not deny the fact that he has already served for three
consecutive terms as municipal mayor. However, he asserts that when Digos was converted from
a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same local
government post. True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from
that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject
Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants
of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of
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voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These
are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for
nine years. The delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by
an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos. The framers of the
Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will
govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner
Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a
municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this
exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos,
petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario
sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
7) FRANCIS G. ONG, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, Respondents. G.R. No. 163295 January 23, 2006
FACTS: Alegre and Ong were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed the petition to disqualify Ong which was predicated on the three-
consecutive term rule. Francis ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have
assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms
corresponding to those elections.
The May 1998 elections, both Alegre and Ong ran for the office of mayor, with Ong was proclaimed winner.
Alegre filed an election protest. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998
mayoralty contest, but the decision came out only when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty
term and starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect.
Acting on Alegre’s petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis’ certificate of candidacy for the May 10, 2004
elections, the First Division of the COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution5 dismissing the said
petition of Alegre.
Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC en banc issued, a resolution6 reversing the
resolution of the COMELEC’s First Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis "as disqualified to run for mayor
in the May 10, 2004"; (b) ordering the deletion of Francis’ name from the official list of candidates; and (c)
directing the concerned board of election inspectors not to count the votes cast in his favor.
The following day, May 8 at about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is past the deadline for
filing a certificate of candidacy, Rommel Ong filed his own certificate of candidacy for the position
of mayor, as substitute candidate for his brother Francis. However, it is recommended that the
substitute certificate of candidacy of Rommel Ong should be denied due course and the election
officer be directed to delete his name from the list of candidates.
ISSUE:
a) whether or not petitioner Francis’s assumption of office for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be
considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
b) whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in declaring petitioner Francis as disqualified to run
c) whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due course to
Rommel’s certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother
Francis.
HELD:
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a) Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. The three-term limit rule for elective local
officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. For the three-term limit for elective local
government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that
he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
The disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for
mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in
the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions
thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation
of the three-term rule.
b) The ascription of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it disqualified
Francis from running in the May 10, 2004 elections for the mayoralty post cannot be sustained.
c) A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way
as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination,
be a candidate at all.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the assailed en banc Resolution dated May 7, 2004
of the COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-048 AFFIRMED.
8) Mendoza vs Comelec
GR 188308, October 15, 2009
Facts: Petitioner Mendoza asserts that the COMELEC, exercising judicial power, conducted proceedings in
the election contest within SET premises for the gubernatorial position of the Province of Bulacan, between
him and the respondent Pagdanganan, without due regard to his fundamental due process rights of notice
and participation.
The COMELEC, claims that its decision-making deliberations are internal, confidential and do not require
notice to and the participation of the contending parties.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has judicial power.
Held: No. Judicial power in our country is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
The COMELECs adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional body, other than a court,
vested with authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, to hold
hearings and exercise discretion of a judicial nature; it receives evidence, ascertain the facts from these
submissions, determine the law and the legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on
the merits of the case and renders judgment. Despite the exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in
character, particularly with respect to election contests, COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial branch
of government and is not a court exercising judicial power in the constitutional sense; hence, its adjudicative
function, exercised as it is in the course of administration and enforcement, is quasi-judicial.
Under these terms, the COMELEC under our governmental structure is a constitutional administrative
agency and its powers are essentially executive in nature (i.e., to enforce and administer election laws),
quasi-judicial (to exercise original jurisdiction over election contests of regional, provincial and city officials
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and appellate jurisdiction over election contests of other lower ranking officials), and quasi-legislative
(rulemaking on all questions affecting elections and the promulgation of its rules of procedure).
9) Rivera v COMELEC
G.R. No. 167591 May 9, 2007
FACTS: The case is a resolution of two consolidated petitions – one filed by Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera III and
Atty. Normandick de Guzman against Marino “Boking Morales, and the other one filed by Anthony D. Dee,
the candidate who obtained the second highest vote after Morales.
In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as
candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007.
Petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel respondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They
alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.
Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1,
1995 to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the second
term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since his
proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was also preventively
suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January to July 1999.
ISSUE: Whether or not Morales violated the three-‐term limit rule when he ran for re-‐election as mayor in
the 2004 elections.
HELD: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites
must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He
served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of
the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Respondent
Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break
since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve
(12) continuous years. His assumption of office for the second term constituted “service for the full term”
and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the
constitutional and statutory provisions barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for
more than three consecutive terms for the same position.
The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against
the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent
Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a
candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes. (Rivera
vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 167591. May 9, 2007)
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10) Dizon v COMELEC
G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009
FACTS: Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the COMELEC
to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter was
elected and had fully served three previous consecutive terms in violation of Section 43 of the Local
Government Code. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus,
Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same
position and same municipality.
Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor of Mabalacat
because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He averred that the COMELEC en
banc affirmed the decision of the RTC declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in
the 1998 elections. Thus, he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His term should be
reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for his second term.
COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took judicial notice of SC’s
ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor
of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that
the then proclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the three-term
limit under Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a candidate in the 2004 elections,
and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again for the same position
in 2007 elections.
Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. COMELEC En Banc: affirmed. The
three-term limit is not applicable here for: 1) Morales was not the duly-elected mayor of Mabalacat for the
July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 term primordially because he was not even considered a candidate thereat;
and 2) Morales has failed to serve the entire duration of the term of office because he has already
relinquished the disputed office on May 16, 2007 which is more than a month prior to the end of his
supposed term.
ISSUES:
1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he was ousted from his office as
Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term
2. WON the 2007-2010 term of Morales is his 5th term
HELD:
1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his fourth term. We
cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from
being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.
Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code state that the
term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
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There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms: 1
July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 30
June 2007. We disqualified Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term
limit. Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales’ proclamation for the 1998-2001 term was void,
there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales’ service with respect to the 1998-2001 term because
the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004-
2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9
May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our
decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The
assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon,
interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004
to 30 June 2007. (4th term)
2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office. NO. Morales occupied the position
of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:
1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998

1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001
1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and
1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007.
However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term.
Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed
to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration
of the term. Morales’ occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007
cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17
May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July
2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
● Dizon alleges that Morales "was able to serve his fourth term as mayor through lengthy litigations. In
other words, he was violating the rule on three-term limit with impunity by the sheer length of litigation
and profit from it even more by raising the technicalities arising therefrom." To this, we quote our ruling in
Lonzanida v. COMELEC:
“The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then
opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the petitioner’s incumbency
in an office to which he was not lawfully elected. We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the
petitioner. There is neither specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering
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on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to move
for the early resolution of the election protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file
a motion for the execution of the regional trial court’s decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and
ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay
which is not here shown to have been intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office
cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his chosen local government post in the
succeeding mayoral election.” (Dizon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009)
11) Bolos v. Comelec

G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009
Facts: Petitioner Bolos was elected as the Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol for 3
consecutive terms (1994,1997, 2002).
In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He assumed office
on July 1, 2004 leaving his post as Punong Barangay.
After serving his term as a councilor he filed his candidacy for the position of Punong Barangay in the
October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. Cinconiegue, then incumbent Punong
Barangay and also a candidate for the same office, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that
Bolos Jr. has already served the maximum limit of three term hence no longer eligible to run and hold the
position in accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991.
Cinconiegue contended that Bolos’ relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay in July 2004 was
voluntary on his part, as it could be presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal councilor
in the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections. He added that petitioner knew that if he won and assumed
the position, there would be a voluntary renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay.
In his Answer, petitioner argued that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left
his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, it must be considered as an involuntary interruption
in the continuity of his last term of service.
Pending the resolution of the case before the COMELEC, Bolos Jr. won in the election.
The COMELEC resolved the petition in favor of Cinconiegue ruling that Bolos Jr. has already served the
maximum three consecutive term for an office and thus disqualified to run for the same office. It further
ordered that the proclamation of Bolos Jr. be annulled and that the office will be succeeded based on Sec.
44 of the Local Government Code.
Issue: Whether or not there was a voluntary renunciation of the office of Punong Barangay by Bolos Jr. when
he assumed the post of Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have served for three consecutive
terms.
Held: YES. The three-term limit for elective official is contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
30 of 32
“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”
The Local Government Code provides for the term of office of Barangay Officials:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. – x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
(c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for five (5) years, which
shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1997: Provided,
that the sangguniang kabataan members who were elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve until the
next regular election of barangay officials.
Socrates v. Comelec held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, has two parts: x x x The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for
more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the
three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time
does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for
any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption
from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term.
The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec, the Court stated that the second part of the rule on the three-term limit shows the
clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected
official full service of a term. The Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification
must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms,
satisfying the first condition for disqualification.
What is to be determined is whether petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his position as
Punong Barangay during his third term when he ran for and won as Sangguniang Bayan member and
assumed said office.
The Court agrees with the COMELEC that petitioner’s relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of
Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption to office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis,
Bohol, on July 1, 2004, is a voluntary renunciation.
31 of 32
When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan, he was not deemed
resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his election as municipal councilor point out to
an intent and readiness to give up his post as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office,
for it was very unlikely that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan
post, campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then after being elected
and proclaimed, return to his former position. He knew that his election as municipal councilor would entail
abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is
voluntary.
Petitioner erroneously argues that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left
his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, he did not fully serve his third term as Punong
Barangay.
The term "operation of law" is defined by the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as "a term describing the fact
that rights may be acquired or lost by the effect of a legal rule without any act of the person affected."
Black's Law Dictionary also defines it as a term that "expresses the manner in which rights, and sometimes
liabilities, devolve upon a person by the mere application to the particular transaction of the established
rules of law, without the act or cooperation of the party himself.
An interruption in the service of a term of office, by operation of law, is exemplified in Montebon v. Comelec
and Borja vs. Comelec. In this case, petitioner did not fill or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He
instead relinquished his office as Punong Barangay during his third term when he won and assumed office
as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of
Punong Barangay. (Bolos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009)
12) COMELEC v CRUZ - Full Text!
Hence, while it is settled that in elections, the first consideration of every democratic polity is to give effect
to the expressed will of the majority, there are limitations to being elected to a public office. Our Constitution
and statutes are explicit anent the existence of term limits, the nature of public office, and the guarantee
from the State that citizens shall have equal access to public service. Section 8, Article X of our Constitution,
on term limits, is significantly reiterated by Section 43(b) of the LGC. Moreover, the Court has time and again
declared that a public office is a public trust and not a vested property right. (COMELEC v. Cruz, G.R. No.
186616, November 20, 2009, 605 SCRA 167)
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LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp

Provisions for Elective and Appointive Local Officials

Provisions for Elective and Appointive Local Officials

1) Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the NPC vs Atty. Rambuyong

ISSUE: Whether NPC is an instrumentality of government such Atty. Rambuyong, as a sanggunian

2) CATU VS. RELLOSA

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional

Prohibition against Appointment

Elective Local Officials

HELD: Decision of the appellate court is affirmed.

POLITICAL LAW: cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy

POLITICAL LAW: right to run for elective office

Petition for review on certiorari is DISMISSED.

3) EFREN ARATEA v. COMELEC AND ESTELA ANTIPOLO

The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolutionon 18 February 2010 cancelling

Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

4) MANUEL B. JAPZON v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S. TY

5) TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tambunting is natural born Filipino.

Manner and Date of Election

In Osme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:

Motion for reconsideration, 2012

HELD: The constitutionality of RA No. 10153 is upheld.

POLITICAL LAW: synchronization of ARMM

“Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

6) Latasa vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 154829 Dec 10, 2003)

7) FRANCIS G. ONG, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has judicial power.

1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998

11) Bolos v. Comelec

12) COMELEC v CRUZ - Full Text!

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