46. Republic V. Rambuyong composed of the municipal vice mayor as the presiding officer.

As such,
Rambuyong cannot represent himself as counsel for Chu when NPC is an
A Sanggunian Member cannot engage in his legal profession if the adverse party is an adverse party, pursuant to the above-mentioned laws.
instrumentality of the Government.

Facts:
Alfredo Chu filed a case for collection against the National Power Corporation
(NPC). Appearing as counsel for Chu is Atty. Richard Rambuyong who was
then the incumbent Vice-Mayor. NPC then filed a motion for inhibition of
Rambuyong arguing that he is prohibited under Section 90 (b)(1) of the Local
Government Code.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Rambuyong where it argued that
government-owned or controlled corporations are not included in the
prohibition. Should the framers intended so, it must have explicitly stated
therein. In appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not Rambuyong can represent NPC as counsel despite being a Vice
Mayor.
Held:
The Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner.
Section 90 (b)(1) of the Local Government Code provides that Sanggunian
Members may practice their profession or engage in any occupation or teach
in schools except during session hours, provided when the Member is also a
member of the Bar, he shall not appear as counsel before any court in any civil
case where the local government unit or any office, agency or instrumentality
of the government is the adverse party. Then, the Court quoted Section 2 (10)
of the Revised Administrative Code which defined “instrumentality” shall
include regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or
controlled corporations.
With the foregoing provisions, it is clear without any ambiguity that NPC is a
government instrumentality tasked in undertaking development hydroelectric
generation of power and production of electricity from other sources. Further,
being the Vice-Mayor, Rambuyong is deemed a Sanggunian Member because
Section 446 of the LGC provided that the sangguniang bayan shall be

1
 47. Catu v Rellosa
Facts:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected
thereon located in Manila. His mother and brother contested the possession of
Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building.
The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint
was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay.
Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation
meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement,
respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the
(subsequent ejectment) case. Complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a
lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants
despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his
task without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case
for free as she was financially distressed.
The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.
According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and, as an elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b)
(2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition,
respondent committed a breach of Canon 1.
Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent was then
recommended suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern
warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent was liable for violating his oath as a lawyer
Held:
Yes, but in their decision, the Court ruled that Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Ethics is not applicable because the Respondent was an
incumbent Barangay Captain and not one who has already left government
service. In addition, it should have been Section 90 of RA 7160 and not Section
7(b)(2) of RA 6713 that was applied. The Latter is the general law which
applies to all public officials and employees while the former applies to
elective local government officials.
In RA 7160, the elective local government officials totally prohibited to
practice their profession are governors, city mayors and municipal mayors,
while partial prohibition is given to members of the Provincial Council, City
Council and Municipal Council. There was no prohibition given to
Barangay Captains and members of the Barangay Council therefore it
should be understood that they are allowed to practice their profession without
prohibition. However, the Barangay Captain should still procure permission
or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil
service regulations
It is in this requirement that the Respondent have failed to comply with. This
non-compliance has made him liable for breaking his oath as a lawyer, to obey
the laws and exact ethical standards of the legal profession. The importance of
this oath has been enshrined respectively as the first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the seventh canon of upholding the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession.
The act of the respondent meted a guilty verdict from the Supreme Court and
was suspended for 6 months and is sternly warned that any repetition of similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
2
 48. Flores v Drilon
Facts:
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act
of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations,
the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the
chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”
Issue:
1. Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government
posts.
2. Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of
Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance.
3. Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official
to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no
elective official may be appointed to another post.
4. Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of
the President.
5. Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and
other emoluments which he may have received pursuant to his
appointment.
Held:
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official
shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to
appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the
Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective
official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government,
and thus neglect his constituents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as
automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without need of
appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent
to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of
Mayor of Olongapo City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In
any case, the Vice-President for example, an elective official who may be
appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the
cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to
appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the
Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to
appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint.
Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an
officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one
candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the
appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the
power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the
qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e.,
he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of
congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no
other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment
remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however
resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached
disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment.
Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains
ineligible for appointment to another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment
to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment
thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City,
and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled
to such benefits.
3
 49. Jalosjos v COMELEC
Doctrine: Proof required to establish domicile of a reinstated Filipino citizen
running for governor of a province
Facts:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He migrated to
Australia when he was eight years old and acquired Australian citizenship. In
2008, he returned to the Philippines and lived in Zamboanga, he took an oath
of allegiance to the Philippines and was issued a certificate of reacquisition of
citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration and he renounced his Australian
citizenship
Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, but
Private Respondent Erasmo, the barangay captain, opposed the registration.
COMELEC approved the application and included Jalosjos in the voter's list.
This decision was affirmed at the MCTC and at the RTC.
Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for Governor of
Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to cancel
the COC on the ground of failure to comply with the one-year residency
requirement of the Local Government Code (LGC).
COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide
intention to establish a domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that when
he first moved back to the Philippines, he was merely a guest or transient at
his brother's house in Ipil, and for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his
domicile. Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the elections.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that petitioner did not
present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish domicile at Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.
Held:
NO. The COMELEC is incorrect. Jalosjos has successfully proven by his
acts of renouncing his Australian citizenship and by living in Ipil, that he has
changed his domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay.
The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a resident of the province
for at least one year before the elections. For the purposes of election laws,
the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile: i.e. he must
have an intention to reside in a particular place, but must also have
personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. To determine compliance
with the residency/domicile requirement, jurisprudence has laid down the
following guidelines:
1. every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;
2. where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new
one; and
3. a person can have but one domicile at a time.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his
domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and
renounced his allegiance to that country and reacquired his old citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippines. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited
his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile
there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos did not come to settle his
domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother's house. A
candidate is not required to have a house in order to establish his
residence or domicile in that place. It is enough that he should live there
even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. What
matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil
and an intention of making it his domicile.
Addt’t
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or
declared ineligible22 should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the
time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that
took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the
person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such
non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the
elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing
jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes.23 If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled
one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of
candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation
of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat
one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.
4
 50. Jalosjos v COMELEC
Facts:
In 2001, petitioner Jalosjos was convicted by final judgment of two (2) counts
of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness. He was sentenced
to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
for each count, respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
In 2007, his sentence was commuted by President Gloria.
In 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. Because
of his previous conviction, his application was denied, prompting him to file a
petition for inclusion in the permanent list of voters. Pending the resolution of
his petition, he filed a CoC seeking to run as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the
2013 elections. In his CoC, petitioner stated that he is a registered voter of
Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.
The MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual
absolute disqualification which in effect deprived him of the right to vote in
any election. Which was affirmed by the RTC.
Five (5) petitions were lodged before the COMELEC seeking the denial and/or
cancellation of petitioner’s CoC due to his perpetual absolute disqualification
as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement. The
COMELEC granted the petition. Hence, this petition.
this should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes a penalty,
either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the
convict to run for elective office.
Article 30 provides that the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification has
the effect of depriving the convict of the privilege to run for elective office.
This is based on the presumption that one who is rendered infamous by
conviction of a felony or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is
unfit to hold public office, as the same partakes of the nature of a privilege
which the State grants only to such classes of persons which are most likely to
exercise it for the common good.
The use of the word "perpetual" in the aforementioned accessory penalty
connotes a lifetime restriction and, in this respect, does not depend on the
length of the prison term, which is imposed as its principal penalty.
Section 40(a) of the LGC should be considered a law of general application
and therefore must yield to the more definitive RPC provisions in line with the
principle that general legislation must give way to special legislation on the
same subject. Article 41 of the RPC also expressly states that the accessory
penalty of disqualification remains even though one is pardoned as to the
principal penalty unless the accessory penalty shall have been so expressly
remitted in the pardon. In this case, the accessory penalty had not been
expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any subsequent pardon
and, as such, petitioner’s disqualification to run for elective office is deemed
to subsist.

Issue:
Whether Petitioner Romeo Jalosjos is qualified to run as Mayor of Zamboanga
City
Held:
No. On the question of petitioner’s right to run for elective office, he submits
that Article 301of the RPC was partially amended by the LGC, and thus his
perpetual absolute disqualification had already been removed.
The Court found this submission untenable and ruled that the provisions of law
can be reconciled—while section 40(a) allows a prior convict to run for local
elective office after the lapse of two years from the time he served his sentence,

5
 51. Aratea v COMELEC
-An ineligible candidate is not considered a candidate at all.
-A void Certificate of Candidacy (COC) cannot produce any legal effect.
-All the votes for the ineligible candidate are stray votes.
Facts:
Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in 2010.
Rodolfo filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to
cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was
elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4)
consecutive terms.
The COMELEC Second Division cancelled Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy. Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc remained pending during said elections. Lonzanida and Aratea garnered
the highest number of votes and were proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor,
respectively. Subsequently, the COMELEC disqualified Lonzanida from
running for Mayor based on two grounds: (1), Lonzanida had served as Mayor
for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and (2) Lonzanida
had been convicted by final judgment of ten counts of falsification under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Second-placer Antipolo intervened and claimed her right to be proclaimed as
Mayor.
Issue:
1. Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the OEC, or
made a false material representation under Section 78 of the OEC that
resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio
2. Whether the second-placer or the Vice-Mayor elect should succeed as
Mayor in this case.
Held:
The Court ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified under Sec. 78 of the
OEC. It also held that Antipolo, the "second placer," should be
proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void
ab initio.
In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were
stray votes. Thus, Antipolo actually garnered the highest number of votes for
the position.
Qualifications and Disqualifications
The qualifications and disqualifications are laid by Sections 39 and 40 of the
Local Government Code. Section 40 expressly provides, among others:
. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
xxx
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Sec. 12.
Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which
he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. x x x
False Material Representation
Section 78 of the OEC states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or
cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the
certificate of candidacy. The contents of the certificate of candidacy included
among others a statement that the person filing it is eligible for said office.
A person suffering from permanent disqualification is ineligible to run for
elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he states
in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the
constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and second, he is known to have
been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification. On
election day, respondent Lonzanida’s disqualification is notoriously known in
fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for
the position, the votes cast for him should be considered stray.
6
 52. Japzon v COMELEC
Facts:
Both petitioner Japzon and private respondent Ty were candidates for the
Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Japzon filed before the COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty's
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation.
Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino,
migrated and became a citizen of the United States of America. That he falsely
represented that he was a resident of Eastern Samar, for one year before 14
May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign
country. That after he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven
by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the
Municipality.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant has complied with the residency requirement for
elective positions.
Held:
Yes. Ty was a natural-born Filipino. Even if he became an American citizen,
he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic in accordance with RA No. 9225. He then, became a dual citizen. It
was only on when he renounced his American citizenship before a notary
public that he became a pure Philippine citizen again.
RA No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of
the natural-born Filipino. Citizenship and residence are independently treated
in RA No 9225. Residency only becomes relevant when the natural-born
Filipino with dual citizenship runs for public office. He must:
1 2
'the intention of remaining.'
(1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws; and
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath
Ty complied with the second requirement. By the time he filed his COC, he
had already effectively renounced his American citizenship. Under Section 39
of the Local Government Code (RA No 7160), it is required that an elective
official be a resident of the independent component cities, component cities, or
municipalities where he intends to be elected for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the day of the election
His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship had no impact on his
residence/domicile. He did not necessarily regain his domicile in Gen.
Macarthur, but merely had the option to establish his domicile of choice
therein. The length of his residence shall be determined from the time he made
it his domicile of choice and shall not retroact to the time of his birth.
The principle of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a
candidate has an intention to return to the place where he seeks to be elected.
In order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur:
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(2) an intention to remain there; and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
There must be animus manendi1 coupled with animus non revertendi2. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. The
COMELEC found that Ty had been a resident of Gen Macarthur 1 year prior
to the elections. Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice became
apparent when, after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, he applied for a
Philippine passport indicating his address at Eastern Samar. He paid his
community tax, securing CTCs, and registered as voter stating this address.
‘With intention to return’
7
 53. Teodora Sobejana-Condon Vs. Commission On
Elections, Luism. Bautista
Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold an
elective public office.
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She became a naturalized
Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
She filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the
Philippine Embassy pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The application
was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines.
In 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous
Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September
27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
She sought elective office during the 2010 elections for the position of Vice-
Mayor and won.
Private respondents sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her
elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to
execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
Issue:
W/N petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to
renounce her Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225
Held:
Yes. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino
citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant
therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5.
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public
office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia.
Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact
mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be
sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship was
invalid due to it was not oath before any public officer authorized to administer
it rendering the act of Condon void.
The solemn promise and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures
truthfulness to the prospective public officer’s abandonment of his adopted
state and promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public
office.
8
 54. Cordora v COMELEC
Facts:
Cordora filed a complaint before COMELEC against Tambunting asserting
that Gustavo Tambunting made false assertion in his certificate of candidacy
by claiming that he was a Natural Born Filipino and resident before the election
in 2001and 2004.
Cordora alleged that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office
because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency
requirements. Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he
is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines in 2000 and upon departure
from the Philippines in 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates
confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through
naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii.
Tambunting maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his
certificates of candidacy. He presented a copy of his birth certificate which
showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American father.
Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. The
certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting’s
father petitioned him merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which he
acquired at birth. Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not
mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen.
Issue:
Whether or not Tambunting is natural born Filipino
Held:
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American
father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS
Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his father’s citizenship.
3 (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’
Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
Tambunting claims that because of his parents’ differing citizenships, he is
both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that
Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting
possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was
no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to
acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only
served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at
birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora
presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an
American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual
citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001
elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him
from running for public office.
Dual citizenship3 is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other
natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks
public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of
allegiance contained therein.
Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states
Under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another
country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of
allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign
citizenship.
country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless
by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
9
 55. Kida v Senate In Osme v COMELEC, the Court explained that in the 1987 Constitution, the
terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the
Facts: local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized
on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and
scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. The It is likewise evident that the term synchronization is used synonymously as
election was reset thrice, and was to be held on the 2nd Monday of August the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating
2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. their Office Tenure in the same day or occasion. This common termination
date will synchronize future elections to once every three years.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should
on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election
regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
Issue:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections
[including the ARMM elections]?
Held:
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective
can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission,
by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,
sought to attain synchronization of elections.
The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections,
starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

10
 56. Abundo v COMELEC
Three Consecutive Terms may be broken or interrupted by Involuntary Interruption.
Facts:
Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the position of municipal
mayor for four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007
and 2010 national and local elections. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he
emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral
derby, however, the municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as
winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of
the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation.
Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest, paving the way for his assumption of office 2006 until the end of the
2004-2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each
other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat
relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought the formers disqualification to
run.
The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run
in the 2010 elections for the position of mayor. In its Resolution, the
COMELEC affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue:
while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-
2007 term, Abundos full term has been substantially reduced by the actual
service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary
interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served
the full 2004-2007 term.
Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s
office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position. During the pendency of
the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority.
Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor
should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because prior to
the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundos opponent, Torres, who
was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
Addt’l
The instances wherein such consecutive terms are not considered as having
been “involuntarily interrupted or broken” are as follows:
1. Assumption of Office by Operation of Law;
2. Recall Election;
3. Conversion of a Municipality into a City;
4. Period of Preventive Suspension; and
5. Election Protest

Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms.

Held:
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three
successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-
2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably
disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings,
was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.

The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local
elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily,

11
 57. Borja v COMELEC
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as
well as the right to serve in the same elective position. It is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office; he must also have been elected to
the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on 1988 for a term
ending on June 30, 1992. He became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the
death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served
as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998.
more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should
not be counted in the application of any term limit.
The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to
prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom
of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of Art.
X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional
Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice
of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political
power.

On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the
Pateros in the 1998 election. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election.
a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible
Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to
30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern
them.
The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the
Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for
mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation
of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term
in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Held:
No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was
not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself
thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because
he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.
The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is

12
 58. Aldovino vs. Commission on Elections
Article 10, Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
Facts:
Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for 3 consecutive terms. During
his 3rd term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90
days in relation with a criminal case he then faced.
In the next election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position. Aldovino petitioned to have Asilo’s certificate of candidacy denied
or cancelled on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three
terms; his candidacy for a 4th term therefore violated the three-term limit rule
under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160
(Local Government Code).
The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled in Asilo’s favour. It reasoned out that
the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete
service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan
had ordered. The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second
Division’s ruling. Hence, this petition
Issues:
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an
interruption of the three-term limit rule, which would allow him to run for
a 4th term;
2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
Decision: Asilo’s third term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-
imposed preventive suspension. The Constitutional limitation refers to the
term, not to the service that a public official may render.
1. Preventive suspension is not an interruption of the three-term limit. The
“interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term
limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to
office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length
of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur.
2. Preventive suspension is – by its very nature – the exact opposite of
voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the
actual delivery of service, not the title to the office. But temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if
involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term
because it does not involve the loss of title to office; the office holder, while
retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office.
The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence
of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since
no vacancy exists.
Voluntary renunciation is an example of what does not constitute an
interruption. In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not
considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to
avoid the application of the term limitation. “Voluntary renunciation” is more
general than abandonment and resignation. The framers’ intent apparently was
to close all gaps that an elective official may seize to defeat the three-term limit
rule.
Preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it
does not require relinquishment or loss of office. Since it can easily be
fabricated and dismissed later on, recognizing preventive suspension as an
effective interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention more potent than
the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows as an
interruption.
Secondary notes
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections: Involuntary severance from office
when a term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment by
COMELEC is an interruption. It is severance from office, or loss of title, that
renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.
13
 59. Adormeo v COMELEC
The two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and
2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms (cited Lonzanida vs. COMELEC).
Facts:
Adormeo and Talaga Jr. were the only candidates for mayor of Lucena City in
the 2001 elections. Talaga Jr. was then the incumbent mayor.
Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992 (served full term) then got re-
elected in 1995-1998. However, in the 1998 election, he lost to Bernard G.
Tagarao.
In the recall election of 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of
Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
Adormeo filed a Petition to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy and/or
Disqualify Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground that Talaga Jr. was elected
and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecutive terms.
Talaga Jr. responded that he was not elected City Mayor for 3 consecutive
terms pointing to his defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because of his
defeat the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted. Respondent
added that his service for 13 months and 18 days was not a full term.
On, 2001, after canvassing, Talaga Jr. was proclaimed as the duly elected
Mayor of Lucena City.
Issue:
Whether or not Talaga Jr. had already served 3 consecutive terms in office and
is therefore disqualified to run for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001
elections
Held:
No, Talaga Jr. has not served 3 consecutive terms; still qualified to run for
mayor.
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. It is
not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office; he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply (cited in Borja Jr. vs
COMELEC).
The two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur:
1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms
in the same local government post; and
2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms (cited Lonzanida vs.
COMELEC).
COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms should be upheld. The continuity of his mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections, not by voluntary renunciation.
Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term
in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance
from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
Addt’l
To bolster his case, petitioner adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
a Constitutional Commission member, stating that in interpreting said
provision that “if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of
another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered one term for
the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed.” As pointed
out by the COMELEC, Fr. Bernas’ comment is pertinent only to members of
the House of Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is no
recall election provided for members of Congress.
DISPOSITION: Instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The resolution of
public respondent Commission on Elections dated May 9, 2001, in Comelec
SPA No. 01-055 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
14
 60. Socrates v COMELEC election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary
A recall election is no longer covered by the prohibition because it is no longer an immediate interruption in the continuity of service.
re-election after three consecutive terms and the intervening period constitutes an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of service. Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the
Facts: Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following
three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a
Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is not
three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-
aware of the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent
mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and eventually election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.
won.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-
However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the election to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of
recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as mayor. office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the three-term limit rule.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24,
Issue: 2002 is not an immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which
ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate re-election that the Constitution
W/N one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is
barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001.
qualified to run for mayor in the recall election.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor
Held:
of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was
Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the
Article X of the Constitution and reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160. continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of his voluntary
renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.
The first part of the provisions provide that an elective local official cannot
serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only
consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule.
The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that
involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity
of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being
joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
re-election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no
longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent

15
 61. Latasa v COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del
Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. He filed a certificate of candidacy for city mayor
for the 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and
disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of
the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position
of city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the
COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's candidacy.
The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy.
Pending his MR, he was proclaimed winner. After the proclamation, Comelec
issued a resolution that declared him disqualified.
Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a
municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality separate from
the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city
mayor, it should not be construed as vying for the same local government post.
Issue:
Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the
newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive
terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?
Held:
No. As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed
freely to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the
Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of
the people.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for
same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct
from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the
purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the
municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post
as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality.
Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the
city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner
Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also
the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief
executive for nine years.
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the
peoples’ freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the
evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.
To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having
served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously
defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should
he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos,
petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the
same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive
years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not
abhorred by it. (Latasa vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, 10 December 2003)
Addt’l
It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v.
COMELEC that after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the
elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications.
An opposing party's remedies after proclamation would be to file a petition for
quo warranto within ten days after the proclamation. Time and again, this
Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to
suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor
of what is fair and just.
16
 62. Ong v Alegre
Facts:
Private respondent Alegre and petitioner Francis Ong were candidates who
filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in
the 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.
Alegre filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course
and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francis. The petition was predicated
on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in
the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have
assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3)
consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
In the May 1998 elections, Alegre and Francis opposed each other for the
office of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being
subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC as winner. Alegre filed an election
protest, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In it, the RTC declared Alegre
as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, however, the
decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the
1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-
2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente
Issue:
W/N petitioner Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor for the mayoralty term
1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-
term limit rule.
Held:
Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Section 43 (b) of the Local Government
Code restates the same rule. For the three-term limit for elective local
government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms
in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3)
consecutive terms.
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present
herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections.
The herein controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit
there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same
municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001
mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, “service for
the full term,” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of
the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions,
supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more
than three consecutive term for the same position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case
No. 6850, that it was Francis’ opponent (Alegre) who “won” in the 1998
mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente.
However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and
legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the
contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only
a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was
under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor.
His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the
duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption
of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to
finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule. The absurdity and the deleterious effect
of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that
Alegre would — under the three-term rule — be considered as having served
a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when
another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due
course after an election.
17
 63. Mendoza v COMELEC balance of the term assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall
election should not also be held to be one term in reckoning the three--term
Facts: limit.
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish
a number of times: his term nor the elected local official who only assumes the balance of the
term of the ousted local official following the recall election could be
a) 1986 – 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by former Pres. Aquino
considered to have served a full three--year term set by the Constitution.
and served up to 1988
The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for
b) 1988 – 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992
more than three consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-
c) 1994 – 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election in 1993, assumed term limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such
office on 28 June 1994 and served up to 1995 interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an
incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during
d) 1995 – 1998 Elected Governor and served up to 1998 which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue
e) 1998 – 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001. of a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14,
2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two
In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that day was
the same post in the May 2001 regular elections. On 16 May 2001, Leonardo actually only his third term for the same position.
Roman was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan.
A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary
Petitioners seek to declare respondent Roman’s election as governor of Bataan interpretation would in effect cut short the elected official’s service to less than
as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the Constitution. nine years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly
Issue: of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters’
obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent
Should Roman's incumbency to the post of Governor following the recall of the votes cast.
elections be included in determining the three--consecutive term limit fixed by
law?
Held:
No. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local
official merely serves the balance of the latter's term of office; it is not a full
three--year term.
The law contemplates a continuous full three--year term before the
proscription can apply, providing for only one exception, i.e., when an
incumbent voluntarily gives up the office. If involuntary severance from the
service which results in the incumbent’s being unable to finish his term of
office because of his ouster through valid recall proceedings negates “one
term” for purposes of applying the three--term limit, it stands to reason that the

18
 64. Rivera III vs. Comelec
Facts:
In the May 2004 elections, respondent Morales ran as candidate for mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 2004-2007. Petitioner Dee filed with the
COMELEC a petition to cancel Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as
mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.
Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the
term 1995-1998 (first term) and 2001-2004 (third term), but he served the
second term from 1998-2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de
facto officer" since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was also preventively suspended by the
Ombudsman in an anti--graft case from January to July 1999.
Issue:
1. Has Morales already served his 3-consecutive term?
2. If so, who should then take his position?
Held:
1. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two
conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post,
and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Respondent Morales was elected for the term 1998-2001. He assumed the
position. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision
of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him
(Morales) as mayor (because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only
after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term). Respondent Morales is now serving
his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any
break since 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been
mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.
His assumption of office for the second term constituted “service for the full
term” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-
-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions barring
local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three
consecutive terms for the same position.
The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to
establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a
result of consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent Morales
ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be
cancelled. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE
COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.
2. The question now is whether it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who shall
serve for the remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term. In Labo v. Comelec,
this Court has ruled that a second-place candidate cannot be proclaimed
as a substitute winner, thus:
“The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.”
As a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the
contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in
accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code, to wit:
Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor,
Mayor and Vice-Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of
the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall
become the governor or mayor.
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 65. Dizon v COMELEC
Facts:
Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the
COMELEC to disqualify Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the
ground that the latter was elected and had fully served three previous
consecutive terms. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995,
1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have
filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and
same municipality.
Morales contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run because he was
not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He averred that the
COMELEC affirmed the decision of the RTC declaring Dee as the duly elected
Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. His term should be reckoned from
2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for his second term.
COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition.
It took judicial notice of SC’s ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May
9, 2007 where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in
1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral
protest case that the then proclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in
that case that Morales violated the three--term limit under Section 43 of
the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a candidate in the 2004
elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and
allows him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections.
Issues:
1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004--2007 term (although he
was ousted from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be
considered his fourth term
2. WON the 2007--2010 term of Morales is his 5th term
Held:
1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated
Morales during his fourth term, cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy which
disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The
votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.
Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local
Government Code state that the term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Except in case of Voluntary renunciation.
There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the
disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.
In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat
for four consecutive terms. Hence, we disqualified Morales from his candidacy
in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit.
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance
from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance
from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The vice mayor
assumed the office of the mayor, and such assumption, no matter how short it
may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales
did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4th term)
2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office. NO.
Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following
periods:1995-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, 2004-2007.
However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected
mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor
of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served
the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before
the expiration of the term. Morales’ occupancy of the position of mayor of
Mabalacat from 2004-2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of
computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30
June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the
present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule.
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 66. Bolos, Jr. v COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner was elected as the Punong Barangay in Bohol for 3 consecutive
terms (1994, 1997, 2002). In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran for
Municipal Councilor and won. He assumed office leaving his post as Punong
Barangay. After serving his term as a councilor he filed his candidacy for the
position of Punong Barangay in the 2007 Barangay Elections.
Cinconiegue, then incumbent Punong Barangay and also a candidate for the
same office, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Bolos Jr.
has already served the maximum limit of three term hence no longer eligible
to run and hold the position in accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991. Cinconiegue contended that Bolos’ relinquishment of the position of
Punong Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be
presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal councilor in the
May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections. He added that petitioner knew
that if he won and assumed the position, there would be a voluntary
renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay.
The Comelec resolved the petition in favor of Cinconiegue.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a voluntary renunciation of the office of Punong
Barangay by Bolos when he assumed the post of Municipal Councilor so that
he is deemed to have served for three consecutive terms.
Held:
The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall
be for five (5) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay
officials on the second Monday of May 1997.
Socrates vs. Comelec held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in
the Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts: x x x The first
part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office
for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term.
The Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification
must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same government post; and (2) that he has fully served
three consecutive terms.
In this case, petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive
terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification. What is to be
determined is whether petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his
position as Punong Barangay.
The Court agrees with the Comelec that petitioner’s relinquishment of the
office of Punong Barangay in Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption
to office as Sangguniang Bayan member is a voluntary renunciation.
When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of
Sangguniang Bayan, he was not deemed resigned. All the acts attending his
pursuit of his election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and
readiness to give up his post as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher
elective office. He knew that his election as municipal councilor would entail
abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it.
Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.
Petitioner erroneously argues that when he assumed the position of
Sangguniang Bayan member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by operation
of law; hence, he did not fully serve his third term as Punong Barangay.
The term "operation of law" is defined by the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia
as "a term describing the fact that rights may be acquired or lost by the effect
of a legal rule without any act of the person affected."
In this case, petitioner did not fill or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law.
He instead relinquished his office as Punong Barangay during his third
term when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of
Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of
Punong Barangay.
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67. COMELEC v Cruz

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