CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

CHAPTER 1. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS (ARTS. 1-17)

1. Honasan vs. The Panel of FACTS:

Investigating Prosecutors of the
Dept. of Justice, ● On August 4, 2003, an affidavit-complaint was filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) by respondent CIDG-PNP/P Director Eduardo Matillano.
et. al., G.R. 159747, April 13, 2004 A crime of coup d'etat was indeed committed by military personnel who occupied Oakwood on the 27 day of July 2003 and Senator Gregorio
"Gringo"Honasan, II.
AGUSTIN
● In the early morning of July 27, 2003, Capt. Gerardo Gambala, for and in behalf of the military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public statement
aired on nation television, stating their withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo and they are willing to risk their lives in order to achieve the National Recovery Agenda of Sen. Honasan, which they believe is
the only program that would solve the ills of society

● On August 27, 2003, petitioner, together with his counsel, appeared at the DOJ. He filed a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction
over the case, asserting that since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ,
that has the jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the charge be filed in court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not
the regular courts, that can legally take cognizance of the case considering that he belongs to the group of public officials with Salary Grade 31; and
praying that the proceedings be suspended until final resolution of his motion.

● Hence, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed the herein petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its
members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation.

Honasan’s contention:

The Ombudsman and not the DOJ has the jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation over all public officials including him, as he is a senator since Honasan is
charged with coup d’etat in relation to his office. According to Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, it confers to the Ombudsman the power to investigate motu proprio,
or by complaint of any person, any act or omission that appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Petitioner rationalizes that the 1987 Administrative Code
and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 cannot prevail over the Constitution.

DOJ’s contention:

DOJ has the jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code and that coup d’etat is not directly related to his public
office as a senator. Thus, the jurisdiction of the DOJ is a statutory grant and is not derived from provisions of the joint circular.

Ombudsman contention:

DOJ has the jurisdiction because coup d’etat falls under the Sandiganbayan only if it’s committed in relation to office. Thus, Joint Circular need not be published
because it is mere an internal arrangement between DOJ and Ombudsman and it neither regulates nor penalizes conduct of persons.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation over the charge of coup d’etat against Senator Gringo Honasan II.

HELD:

The Court finds the petition without merit.

The authority of respondent DOJ Panel is based not on the assailed OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 but on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under
Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ.

Petitioner claims that it is the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation under paragraph (1), Section 13, Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution, which confers upon the Office of the Ombudsman the power to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Petitioner rationalizes that the
1987 Administrative Code and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 cannot prevail over the Constitution, pursuant to Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show that the power of investigation including preliminary investigation vested on the Ombudsman
is exclusive.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the
cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.

Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation, the respective heads
of said offices came up with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 for the proper guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the conduct of their investigations

Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation because petitioner is a public officer with salary Grade 31 so that the
case against him falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Considering the Court's finding that the DOJ has concurrent jurisdiction to investigate
charges against public officers, the fact that petitioner holds a Salary Grade 31 position does not by itself remove from the DOJ Panel the authority to investigate the
charge of coup d'etat against him.

The question whether or not the offense allegedly committed by petitioner is one of those enumerated in the Sandiganbayan Law that fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan will not be resolved in the present petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation being conducted by the DOJ Panel
as to the questions whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of the information against the petitioner; and to which court should the information be
filed considering the presence of other respondents in the subject complaint.

2. Gatbonton vs. NLRC, et. al., G.R. FACTS:

146779, January 23, 2006 ● Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent Mapua Institute of Technology (MIT), Faculty of Civil Engineering. Some
time in November 1998, a civil engineering student of respondent MIT filed a letter-complaint against petitioner for unfair/unjust grading system,
AMATORIO sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming of an academician.
○ MIT, through its Committee on Decorum and Investigation, placed the petitioner under a 30-day preventive suspension effective
January 11, 1999 while the case is pending.
● Petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension, damages and attorney's fees.
○ The petitioner questioned the administrative proceedings in a petition with the RTC but the case was terminated due to a
compromise made wherein respondent MIT agreed to publish in the school organ the rules and regulations implementing Republic
Act No. 7877 (R.A. No. 7877) or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act; disregard the previous administrative proceedings and conduct
anew an investigation on the charges against petitioner.
● The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the preventive suspension illegal while the rest of the petitioner’s claims are dismissed.
● Both petitioner and respondent appealed the decision; the petitioner questioning the dismissal of claim for damages.
● NLRC: denied the petitioner’s appeal and granted the respondent’s appeal, setting aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
● CA: affirmed the NLRC decision.

ISSUE:
WON there is a justification with the petitioner’s preventive suspension - NO

HELD:
Petitioner's preventive suspension was based on respondent MIT's Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, or
R.A. No. 7877.

It must be noted however, that respondent published said rules and regulations only on February 23, 1999. The rules were not promulgated at the time
 of his suspension on January 11, 1999. In Tañada vs. Tuvera, it was ruled that:

“...all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.

...Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation…”

The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law
of general application. In fact, the Mapua Rules itself explicitly required publication of the rules for its effectivity, as provided in Section 3, Rule IV (Administrative
Provisions), which states that "[T]hese Rules and Regulations to implement the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
publication by the Committee." Thus, at the time of the imposition of petitioner's preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules were not yet
legally effective, and therefore the suspension had no legal basis.

The records of this case are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent MIT acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in preventively suspending
petitioner, thus, the Labor Arbiter was correct in not awarding any damages in favor of petitioner.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10, 2000 and Resolution dated January 16, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 57470 as well as the NLRC Decision dated September 30, 1999 together with its Resolution dated December 13, 1999, are hereby SET ASIDE
and the Labor Arbiter's Decision dated June 18, 1999 is REINSTATED.

3. Marcos vs. Judge Fernando Vil.
Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062,
January 18, 2011
CASTIL
Doctrine: Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Facts: Imelda Marcos filed a complaint affidavit charging Judge Pamintuan with Gross Ignorance of the law for reversing motu proprio the final and executory order
of then presiding Judge Reyes in civil case entitled “Albert Umali, in his capacity as the exclusive administrator and as President of the Treasure Hunters
Association of the Philippines v. Jose D. Roxas, et al.” The case was dismissed already by Judge Reyes and ordered the return of the Buddha statuette to the party
of Roxas. All motions for reconsideration have been denied.

10 years later, Judge Pamintuan set the case for a hearing and subpoeanaed the parties including Marcos, to which Judge Pamintuan issued an order stating that
the Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Roxas, but will stay with under custodia legis until final settlement of the estate of late Roxas. Also, it was noted that
the Buddha is a fake one and the authentic one has been missing since 1971 and is in the possession of persons who have no right to have such. Hence the case
filed by Marcos against Judge Pamintuan for gross ignorance of the law. According to Marcos this is in conflict with Rule 36 or Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides a judgment or final order shall state “clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based...”

In the answer of Judge Pamintuan, he mentioned that the remedy Marcos coursed through should not have been such. However, Marcos claimed that she was not
a party to the said case and could not have filed for a Motion for Reconsideration.

The Office of the Court Administrator found that it was reasonable for Judge Pamintuan to be dismissed and the forfeiture of his benefits for the violation of Canon 4
of the Judicial Code of Conduct.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Pamintuan is liable for gross ignorance of the law

Held: Yes. Despite the fact that the Order of the return of the Buddha to the estate of the late Roxas, they still have not received such. Judge Pamintuan did rule as
well that the Buddha Statuette is a fake and a replica. There was no longer any issue needed to be resolved or clarified as the order and decisin has been final and
executory becoming immutable and unalterable. They may no longer be reviewed by anyone.

This is a legal principle not expected to be overlooked by a Judge. Hence, suspending the latter from service, to which he filed a motion for reconsideration which
was granted. Soon after, his letter of request for his benefits which was denied.

The court agrees with the findings of the OCA as well as its decision to suspend him. Besides the case at bar, they found that said Judge has been charged by
gross ignorance of the law in Office and Members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Baguio-Benget Chapter v. Pamituan; grave misconduct, conduct
unbecoming of an officer of the judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best intrest of the service in Atty. Gacayan v. Hon. Pamintuan; and, gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law and unjust and malicious delay in the resolution of criminal case no. 25383-R in Biggel v. Pamintuan.

The Court finds that Judge Pamintuan might not even have taken seriously previous warnings given to him and is grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. He is dismissed and is ordered to cease and desist from performing any official act of service.

4. People vs. Quiachon, G.R. 170236, Civil Code: Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
August 31, 2006
Doctrine: Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which
DELA CRUZ provides as follows:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.[28]

However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides that “persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole.”

Facts: Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape. On May 12, 2001, the accused, by means of force and intimidation had sexual
intercourse with Rowena, his 8-yr. old daughter, who is deaf-mute minor. Rowel, his son, recounted that he saw his father on top of his sister, covered by a blanket.
His father's buttocks were moving up and down, and Rowel could hear Rowena crying. He could not do anything because he was afraid of their father. Rowel
remained in the room but the following morning, he told his aunt, Carmelita Mateo about what he had witnessed. Together, Carmelita and Rowel went to the police
to report what had transpired.

RTC: Regional Trial Court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and B of the
Revised Penal Code. The court imposed death penalty against the accused.

Appellant: The defense argued that the benefits of RA 9346 should be extended to the accused.

Issue: Whether the appellant can benefit from R.A. 9346 which abolished the death penalty law.

Held: Yes. In view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be meted on
appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 thereof which reads:

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code.

The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa
restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides as follows: Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished with
reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."

5. Jarillo vs. People, G.R. 164435, Doctrine: Laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
June 29, 2010
Facts:
GLORIA
6. Atty. Ferrer vs. Spouses Diaz, et.
al., G.R. 165300, April 23, 2010
GONZALES
CHAPTER 2. HUMAN RELATIONS (ARTS. 19-35)
7. Diaz vs. Encanto, et. al., G.R.
171303, Jan. 20, 2016
KANG
- On November 1979, the accused Victoria S. Jarillo,being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo in 1974, and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, contracted a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered in
1999.
- On the same year, Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) filed against the appellant a civil case for annulment of marriage before the RTC. Parenthetically,
Jarillo filed for declaration of nullity of their marriage against Alocillo in 2000.
- Petitioner insisted that:
(1) her marriage to Alocillo was null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of
the celebration of their marriage;
(2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and
(3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
- Notwithstanding her defenses, the RTC found Jarillo guilty for the crime of bigamy in 2001 which was affirmed by CA and subsequently ruled the
same by the Supreme Court.
- Petitioner filed Motion for Reconsideration at the Supreme Court arguing that since her marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the
Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage.
Issue: Whether the Section 40 of the Family Code should be retroactively applied to the case
Held:
Yes. The Court already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code
itself provides that said Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.
The court further explained the fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
FACTS
Pet’s Version
● The Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante, through an SPA, obtained a loan from Ferrer.
● Comandante executed in his favor an instrument entitled ‘Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided)’, waiving
and/or repudiating all his hereditary rights and interests as a legitimate heir/daughter of the Spouses Diaz in favor of Atty. Ferrer.
● The Diazes reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were dishonored, and despite repeated demand, the respondents
failed to settle the loan.
Rep’s Version
● Comandante alleged that pet and his wife were her fellow members in the couples for Christ Movement
● She sought help of pet regarding a mortgage with a bank of her parents’ lot.
● She also claimed to have sought financial loans from the couple, however, she could not comply with them. The couple executed a Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) pertaining to a waiver of her hereditary share over her parents’
abovementioned property. The execution of said waiver was to secure Comandante’s loan with the couple which at that time had already ballooned
to P600k.
● A year later, the couple required Comandante to sign the ff docs 1) A Real EState Mortgage Contract over her parents property 2) Promissory NOte
of her obligation to the couple. Comandante explained that she was not the registered owner of the subject property and that although her parents
granted her SPA, same only pertains to her authority to martgage the peroty to banks and not to individuals. Pet however assured her that it also
included their transaction
● Comandante, with the fear of losing her livelihood, signed over the mortgage agreement and promissory notes.
● After, Comandante executed and Affidavit of Revocation of Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests… and additionally arguing that the executed
‘Waiver’ is prohibited by CC 1347 thus it cannot be the source of any right or obligation in petitioner’s favor, the Real Estate Mortgage was not valid
as she executed the same without valid authority from her parents.
● The Diaz sps assert that they do not even know petitioner and did not execute an SPA in favor of Comandante.
ISSUE
1. WON a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the parents are still living valid - NO
HELD
● Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered “future”, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A
contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following
requisites concur:
○ That the succession has not yet been opened.
○ That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,
○ That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.[38]
● In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest over a Real Property (Still
Undivided), succession to either of her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the other two
requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of the properties
that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary
in nature.
● From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving the former’s future inheritance as embodied in the
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner’s favor. The Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the
source of any right or create any obligation between them for being violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
● Here, as no right or interest on the subject property Pows from Comandante's invalid waiver of hereditary rights upon petitioner, the latter is thus not
entitled to the registration of his adverse claim. Therefore, petitioner's adverse claim is without any basis and must consequently be adjudged
invalid and ineffective and perforce be cancelled.
● Petition is denied.
Doctrine: Human Relations; Abuse of Rights; Abuse of right under Article 19 exists when the following elements are present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
Facts:
● This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA. Which seeks to reverse and set aside the April 28, 2005
decision and January 20, 2006 Resolution of the CA (which was reversed in April 17, 1996 decision and September 17, 1996 Order of RTC - Pasig)
● Petitioner (Diaz), a professor in UP since 1963, applied for sabbatical leave with pay for 1 year. The Chair of the Broadcast Department initially
recommended to CMC Dean Encanto that the sabbatical application be granted.
● Encanto referred the sabbatical application to the Secretary of U.P., recommending its denial. Also, she requested the salary of Diaz be withheld
effective July 1, 1988 until further notice since the sabbatical application has not yet been approved and that Diaz did not teach that semester.
● July 4, 1988; it was recommended that Diaz be granted a leave without pay in order to enable the CMC to hire a substitute.The next day, the U.P.’s
Secretary referred to the Vice- President for Academic Affairs, the fact of denial of such sabbatical request, for his own recommendation to the U.P.
President.
● July 8, 1988; Abad returned the Reference Slip indicating therein that Diaz had promised him to put down in writing the historical backdrop to the
latest denial of her sabbatical leave, but she did not do so.
● On Diaz’s request to teach for that semester, the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and the HRDO Director instructed Encanto that until Prof.
 Diaz officially reports for duty, accomplishes the Certificate of Report for Duty, and the Dean of CMC confirms her date of actual report for duty, she
is considered absent without official leave.

● November 8, 1988; Abad, issued a Memorandum to Diaz to confirm as valid Encanto’s reason of shortage of teaching staff in denying her
sabbatical. Later, he also informed Diaz of her lack of service during the first semester of AY 1988-89, hence she is not entitled to be paid.

● Diaz was able to teach during the second semester of AY 1988-89, she was not able to claim her salaries for her refusal to submit the Report for
Duty Form.

● Diaz, filed a complaint against the respondents to RTC, praying that the latter be adjudged, jointly and severally to pay her damages.

○ not paying her salaries from July 1, 1988 in the first semester of academic year 1988-89,

○ entire period when her sabbatical application was left unresolved,

○ salaries she earned from teaching in the second semester from November 1988 to May 1989 was not likewise paid.

● RTC held that Diaz was entitled to a sabbatical leave and that they delay in the resolution of her application was unreasonable and unconscionable.

● CA reversed it on appeal, ruling that there was neither negligence nor bad faith in denying her application and withholding her salaries.

Issue:

● W/N the respondents acted in bad faith when they resolved petitioner’s application for sabbatical leave and withheld her salaries - NO

Held:

● No. The respondents did not act in bad faith.

● Diaz’s complaint for recovery of damages before the RTC was based on the alleged bad faith of the respondents in denying her application for
sabbatical leave vis-à-vis Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.

● The Ombudsman and all three courts, starting from the RTC to this Court, have already established that a sabbatical leave is not a right and
therefore petitioner Diaz cannot demand its grant.

● It does not matter that there was only one reason for the denial of her application, as the approving authorities found that such reason was enough.

● The Ombudsman, the CA, and this Court, have ruled that the respondents did not act in bad faith when petitioner Diaz’s sabbatical leave
application was denied.

● The Court does not find any reason to disregard those findings, especially when our own perusal of the evidence showed no traces of bad faith or
malice in the respondents’ denial of petitioner Diaz’s application for sabbatical leave.

● They processed her application in accordance with their usual procedure – with more leeway, in fact, since petitioner Diaz was given the chance to
support her application when she was asked to submit a historical background; and the denial was based on the recommendation of respondent
Encanto, who was in the best position to know whether petitioner Diaz’s application should be granted or not.

● “It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the
same.”

● Petitioner Diaz has failed to prove bad faith on the part of the respondents. There is nothing in the records to show that the respondents purposely
delayed the resolution of her application to prejudice and injure her. She has not even shown that the delay of six months in resolving a sabbatical
leave application has never happened prior to her case.

● On the contrary, any delay that occurred was due to the fact that petitioner Diaz’s application for sabbatical leave did not follow the usual procedure;
hence, the processing of said application took time.

● Given that the respondents have not abused their rights, they should not be held liable for any damages sustained by petitioner Diaz.

● the Court cannot grant petitioner Diaz’s claim for attorney’s fees as no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.

● Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where there is no
sufficient showing of bad faith in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 55165 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the University of the Philippines,
through its appropriate officials, is directed to pay petitioner Elizabeth L. Diaz her withheld salaries

1) from July 1, 1988 to October 31, 1988, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, computed from the date of the Decision of the RTC on April
17, 1996 until fully paid; and 2) from November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989 and July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum computed from the date petitioner Elizabeth L. Diaz submits the documents required by the University of the Philippines until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Notes:

A sabbatical leave is not a right.

Damnum Absque Injuria; The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal wrong.

8. California Clothing, Inc., et. al. vs. FACTS:

Quiñones, G.R.175822, ● On July 25, 2001, Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique
October 23, 2013 at the second floor of Robinson’s in Cebu City
● She bought a pair of black jeans and allegedly paid the cashier evidenced by a receipt issued by the store
KO ● She was then approached by a Guess employee and was informed that she failed to pay for the jeans. She suggested they talk about it at the the
Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of the mall
● When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and
repeatedly demanded payment for the black jeans
● Several letters were sent to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air and the Cebu Pacific Office narrating the incident. The HR Department of Robinson’s
was also furnished a letter which prompted an investigation for the purpose of cancelling Quiñones’ Robinson’s credit card. She claims the she was
not given a copy of such letter
● Due to these, she claims to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation,
moral shock, and social humiliation. She thus filed a complaint for damages
● The petitioners claimed that instead of the cashier issuing the receipt, it was the invoicer who did it manually and that there was a
miscommunication between the employees at the time. They claim that they were gentle and polite in talking with Quiñones and that it was her who
was arrogant in answering their questions
● RTC: dismissed the complaint, finding that it was not damaging for Quiñones when the confrontation took place because it was her who put herself
in the situation by choosing the venue of discussion. The letters were merely asking for assistance and not to embarrass or humiliate her
○ The petitioners merely exercised a right under honest belief that no payment was made
● CA: reversed the RTC decision and ordered the petitioners to pay Quiñones

ISSUE:
W/N the petitioners abused their rights by subjecting Quiñones to ridicule and humiliation by their act of questioning and by sending a letter to the Cebu Pacific
Office -YES

HELD:
In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and the invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to
Quiñones. When they realized the mistake, they made a cash count and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of the black jeans was missing.
They then concluded that it was Quiñones who failed to make such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from her whether she indeed paid or not
and collect from her if she did not. However, the question now is whether such right was exercised in good faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause
of action against them.

Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if
he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It
consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a
conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.

Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking her whether she paid or not. The Guess employees were able to talk to her at the Cebu Pacific Office. The
confrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the RTC and the CA, such was the natural
consequence of two parties with conflicting views insisting on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that Quiñones was in possession of the item purchased
from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a mere
speculation. Their claim should have been proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum.

It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to force her to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking
for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to her employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of
Quiñones.Petitioners claimed that after receiving the receipt of payment and the item purchased, Quiñones "was noted to hurriedly left the store." They also
accused her that she was not completely being honest when she was asked about the circumstances of payment.

It can then be inferred that in sending the demand letter to Quiñones’ employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount
but to tarnish her reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign Quiñones without substantial evidence and despite the latter’s possession of enough evidence in
her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.

9. Ardiente vs. Spouses Pastorfide, FACTS:

et. al., G.R. 161921, July 17, 2013 ● A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the then decision of the RTC regarding its judgment sums of money for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
MAGARZO The decision being contested sprouted from the cutting off of water supply of Pastorfide by the Cagayan de Oro Water District as requested by
Ardiente.
● Joyce Ardiente owned a property at Emily Homes.
● Joyce Ardiente sold the property to Ma. Theresa Pastorfide.
● It has been agreed by the parties that the water bill will remain in the account of of Joyce Ardiente.
● On March 12, 1999, the water supply at the property was disconnected without notice.
● Subsequently, Pastorfide found out that the account has become delinquent.
● Pastorfide wrote a letter to Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to question why her water connection was cut without prior notice.
● The general manager of the COWD, Gaspar Gonzalez, replied that it was Joyce Ardiente who requested the disconnection of the water supply.
● A complaint for damages was filed against Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez by Ma. Theresa. The RTC ruled in favor of Pastorfide on the ground that
the defendants committed abuse of their rights.
○ P200,000.00 for moral damages;
○ P200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
○ P50,000.00 for attorney's fee.
● The ruling of the RTC was upheld by the CA on appeal with modification that the awarded damages is reduced to P100,000.00 each for moral and
exemplary damages, while attorney's fees is lowered to P25,000.00. Costs against appellants.

ISSUE:
W/N the decision of CA is Valid? - YES (Certiotari - Denied)

HELD:
● Ardiente is liable for damages by ordering the cutting of the water supply of the respondent without giving notice about such intention. The COWD
and Gonzalez are likewise liable for damages by disconnecting the water supply without prior notice and for their subsequent neglect of
reconnecting the water supply even when Pastorfide already paid the delinquent account.
● The court ruled that the principle of abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code was violated.
● It provides that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith."
● This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not
only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the performance of one's duties.
● These standards are the following:
○ to act with justice;
○ to give everyone his due;
○ and to observe honesty and good faith.
● The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
● But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

10. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et. al. Doctrine:

vs. Reyes, G.R. 154259, The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury") refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which
Feb.28, 2005 precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by
petitioners, however, this doctrine does not and application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party,
MANLONGAT petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary
ridicule and shame.

Facts:
● The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations provisions of the New Civil Code.
Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that in the evening of 13
October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then
approached him.
● Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel's penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel's manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.
Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: "of course." Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket

11. Spouses Hing vs. Choachuy, et.
al., G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013
Del Castillo, J.
OCULTO
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code:
Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar
of fruits which was the latter's present for the celebrant.
● After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. In a loud
voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party
("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang ").
● Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding
to his shame and humiliation. Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked
him to step out of the hotel. Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman.
● Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms.
Lim narrated that she was the Hotel's Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years. One of her functions included organizing the birthday party
of the hotel's former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruoka's party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive
guest list and extended invitations accordingly. The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka's closest friends and some
hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited. At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.
As Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait. When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim
approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindi ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at
pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo." She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her
surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.
● Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited
Mr. Reyes to the party. According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was
likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49. When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down
as he was not properly dressed and was not invited. All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar
talking to Col. Batung. Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting. She ignored Mr. Reyes. She was embarrassed and did not
want the celebrant to think that she invited him.
● After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking
Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
uninvited:
o Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He
assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not invited by the host. Damages are
pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no
recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of
Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her
and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must
therefore fail.
Issue:
1. W/N Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof
thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code? No.
2. If Ruby Lim were so liable, W/N Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her? No.
Held:
1. The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate
court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave
the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart's invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the
party.
a. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame,
it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for
twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the
contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that — Considering
the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly
kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to
cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff's reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what
transpired
b. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable
to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held
liable as its liability springs from that of its employee. Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible." The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following:
(1) There is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation
of law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements:
(1) There is an act which is legal;
(2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and
(3) it is done with intent to injure.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional. As applied to herein case and as earlier
discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of
13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim's alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at
44 years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen."
The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffce it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has
nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
2. Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages 72 especially for
the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held — Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latter's lowly
station in life. This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions under
consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good and to avert further
commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellee.
Dispositive Portion:
The petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution
dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
FACTS
● Spouses Bill & Victoria Hing filed with the RTC of Mandaue City a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Mandatory
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order against Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. Spouses Hing owns a parcel of land adjacent to the Aldo
Development & Resources, Inc., of which the Choachuys are owners. Spouses Hing allege that the Choachuys constructed an auto-repair shop building.
This is a dispute regarding boundaries between the two properties. ALDO filed a case for injunction/TRO, claiming the spouses were constructing a fence
without a valid permit, alleging the said construction would destroy the wall of its building.
● RTC denied ALDO’s application for failure to substantiate its claims. In order to get evidence, respondents, through their employees, illegally set-up and
installed surveillance cameras facing the petitioners’ property, without the consent of petitioners. They took pictures of the ongoing construction, acts which
violate the petitioners’ right to privacy. Petitioners prayed for the removal of the cameras and for the respondents to be enjoined from conducting illegal
surveillance. Respondents denied the allegations.
● RTC granted the petition. Respondents moved for a reconsideration but RTC denied the same for lack of merit. Respondents filed with the CA a Petition for
acts, though may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s
residence:...”
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION (ART. 36)
12. De Zuzuarregui vs. Hon. Villarosa,
et. al, G.R. 183788, April 5, 2010
PATALUD
13. Pimentel vs. Pimentel, G.R.
172060, September 13, 2010
PINEDA
Certiorari with application for a TRO.
● CA ruled in favor of the Choachuys saying the TRO was issued with grave abuse of discretion since petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable
right to an injunctive writ; that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property in controversy is not
used as a residence. Further, CA said that since the Choachuys are not owners of the building, but mere stockholders of ALDO which has a separate
juridical personality, they could not have installed video surveillance cameras and are therefore not the proper parties.
● Petitioners filed this instant case, arguing that Art. 26(1) pertains to the privacy of another’s residence but also of business offices. Petitioners claim that
respondents and ALDO are one and the same and that respondents only want to hide behind corporate fiction. Choachuys had no business consenting to
the ocular inspection by the court if respondents are not the real owners.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not there is a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy - - - YES
(2) Whether or not respondents are the proper parties to this suit - - - YES
(1) The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
● Right to privacy: a. “the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities.”; b. right of an individual “to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by
the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned.”
● The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s abuse of power. The State recognizes the right of the
people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except “in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural
safeguards,” can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.
The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the public are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals
are allowed to enter.
● A man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied nor even restricted by others.. An individual’s right to privacy should be not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access.
“Reasonable expectation of privacy” test - case-to-case basis
● Ople v. Torres: 2-part test - “(1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; (2) this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable.” Customs, community norms, and practices may limit or extend an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”
The grant of TRO was justified. The revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the ongoing construction. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof
of the factory of ALDO. If the purpose of setting up a camera was really to secure the building and factory premises, as the respondents claimed, the camera should
revolve only towards their properties at the back.
(2) The respondents are the proper parties to the suit.
Real party-in-interest as defined by Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court: ”party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.”
● A real party defendant: “one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission
which had violated the legal right of the former.”
● Respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of ALDO as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. The fact that respondents are not the
registered owners of the building does not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras. As early as 1998,
there has already been a dispute between two families concerning the boundaries of their respective properties.
○ Records show that although ALDO has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, it is a family-owned corporation
managed by the Choachuy family.
○ Despite the respondents’ claim that they are not the building owners, they allowed the court to enter the ALDO compound and conduct an
ocular inspection. They even toured Judge Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her questions regarding the set-up and installation
of the cameras.
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision granting the issuance of a TRO REINSTATED.
This is regarding Bella Torres’s estate. When she died, a compromise agreement was entered into by Rosemary Torres (Bella’s daughter) and Krizia
Torres-de Zuzuarregui(Bella’s granddaughter and Rosemary’s niece)regarding the letters of administration of Bella’s estate. In said compromise agreement, they
both alleged that they are the only living heirs of Bella, and that they have reached an amicable settlement regarding Bella’s estate.The same was approved by the
RTC.
However, subsequently after the RTC decision, three others claimed to be living heirs of Bella (Peter, Catherine,and Fannie). These three filed a petition to
annul the said compromise agreement as they are also legal and living heirs of Bella.
While the case in the CA is still pending, Fannie filed a criminal complaint against Rosemary and Krizia for perjury and falsification in the MeTC. She alleges
that these two committed these crimes when they falsified a sworn statement claiming to be the only living heirs of Bella in the compromise agreement, when in
truth and fact,three others are also living heirs. Rosemary and Krizia motioned to suspend proceedings in the MeTC. They invoke prejudicial question.
Issue: Whether or not there is prejudicial question in the case at bar.Ruling: Yes, there is a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal
case against Rosemary and Krizia.
Held: Petition GRANTED.
For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend a criminal action, it must appear not only that said civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two (2) conflicting decisions.
The determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the
pleadings in the civil case are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would also
determine the judgment in the criminal case.
Requisites of Prejudicial question:
1.) The facts and issues raised in the previously instituted civil action are intimately related with the issues in the criminal case;
2.) The resolution of the issues in the civil case would necessarily determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in the criminal case.
It is evident, in the case at bar, that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in the criminal case for perjury and falsification. If
it is finally adjudged in the civil case that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not entitled to a share in the
estate, then there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal cases against Rosemary and Krizia, who could not have committed perjury and falsification in her
pleadings filed before the RTC, for the truth of her statements regarding Peter, Catherine, and Fannie having been judicially settled.
FACTS:
● October 25 2004 - Maria Pimentel (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the RTC
of QC
● February 7 2005 - petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC of Antipolo for the pre-trial and trial for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
● February 11 2005 - petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC QC. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship
between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the Civil Case above would have a bearing in the criminal case
filed against him before the RTC QC
● RTC QC ruled - the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
● Petitioner filed for MR, denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order before the CA
● CA dismissed the petition
● CA ruled - even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.
ISSUE:
WON the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner.
HELD:

14. Tomlin II vs. Atty. Moya II, A.C.
No. 6971, February 23, 2006
SARENAS
TITLE 1. CIVIL PERSONALITY
CHAPTER 1. GEN. PROV. (ARTS. 37-39)
CHAPTER 2. NATURAL PERSONS (ARTS. 40-43)
15. Geluz vs. CA, G.R. L-16439, July
20, 1961
SOBREVEGA
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
NO
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
● The civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action.
● In this case, the Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated August 30, 2004. It was raffled to RTC QC on October 25, 2004. The RTC QC set
Criminal Case for pre-trial and trial on February 14, 2005. Petitioner was served summons in a Civil Case on February 7, 2005. Clearly, the civil
case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. So the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met.
A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and
for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
● The resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
● The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was
charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will.
● At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married.
● Even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
● The Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case may proceed
Tomlin II vs. Atty. Moya II, A.C. No. 6971, February 23, 2006
Doctrine: Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. The
burden of proof in a criminal case is guilt beyond reasonable doubt while in an administrative case, only preponderance of evidence is required. Thus, a criminal
prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.
Facts:
● Quirino Tomlin II filed a complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Salvador N.
Moya II.
● Complainant filed:
○ A case for seven counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent
○ Filed for the respondent’s disbarment
● Complainant Tomlin stated that Respondent Moya borrowed from him P600,000.00 partially covered by seven postdated checks.
○ However, upon encashing them on their respective due dates, the checks were all dishonored by the drawee bank.
● Complainant made several demands, yet respondent failed and refused to pay his debt without justifiable reason
● Respondent alleges:
○ Case should be dismissed outright for violation of the rule on non-forum shopping.
○ The complainant did not inform the IBP about the cases he filed for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent which was pending
in the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
● The Commission on Bar Discipline required parties to submit their respective verified positions papers after which the case shall be considered
submitted for resolution.
○ Only the complainant submitted his position paper.
● In the Report and Recommendation dated March 31, 2005
○ The Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent failed to file an answer and/or position paper despite several requests for
extension, in disregard of the orders of the IBP.
○ It was observed the pending criminal action against respondent does not pose a prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues
in the present administrative case.
■ Hence, it was recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
ISSUES: Whether the complainant violated the rule against forum shopping with the filing of this administrative complaint
HELD: No, The Court states that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of
criminal cases. The contention that complainant violated the rule against forum shopping with the filing of this administrative complaint is bereft of merit.
● Forum shopping
○ Occurs:
■ whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or
■ when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or
the other court would make a favorable disposition.
○ Applies: only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings.
● The Criminal Case Nos. 6-367-03 to 6-373-03 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
○ refer to the respondent’s act of making or drawing and issuance of worthless checks;
● WHILE: The present administrative case seeks to discipline respondent as a lawyer for his dishonest act of failing to pay his debt in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
● The Court states that the respondent, being a member of the bar should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own.
○ They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases.
○ The burden of proof in a criminal case is guilt beyond reasonable doubt while in an administrative case, only preponderance of
evidence is required.
○ Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative proceedings.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years, effective immediately, with a warning that any further infraction by him shall be dealt with most severely.
FACTS:
● Nita Villanueva was impregnated by her present husband before both of them were legally married. Deciding to conceal her pregnancy, she
had herself aborted by the petitioner, Antonio Geluz.
● After her marriage, Villanueva got pregnant once more, but since she was then employed by the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be an
inconvenience, she had herself aborted again by Geluz.
● 2 years later, Villanueva incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, which her husband was not made aware nor consented to the
abortion.
● The private respondent, Oscar Lazo, sued petitioner, Geluz, for damages based on the third and last abortion.
● RTC rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit.
● Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
● Hence, Dr. Geluz appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the husband can recover damages from the death of the fetus.
 HELD: No.

Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise
the fetus will be considered as never having possessed legal personality.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a
cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take
place from one that lacked juridical personality.

It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil Code. Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, the child should
be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". (Read Art 41 of the Civil Code) In the present
case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

As to the reward of moral damages to Lazo: The court ruled that evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by
the appellant, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.

The SC reversed the RTC and CA’s decision.

16. Continental Steel Manufacturing FACTS:

Corp. vs. Hon. Accredited ● Petition for Review on Certiorari. Hortillano is an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a
Voluntary Arbitrator, G.R.182836, member of Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms
October 13, 2009 (Union).
● On 9 January 2006, Hortillano filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependents, due to the
ZUÑO death of his unborn child. His wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of her pregnancy. (Google: Pregnancy lasts for about
280 days or 40 weeks. A premature baby is delivered before 37 weeks of pregnancy.)
● Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits.
● Seeking the reversal of the denial, the Union tried to help by mediating with Continental under the process provided for in their Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA).
● Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute, prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
● In their defense, Continental Steel posited that the express provisions of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without
legal personality.
● They claimed that there are three indispensable elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) there is “death”; (2) such death must be of
employee’s “dependent”; and (3) such dependent must be “legitimate.” They claimed that none of these existed in Hortillano’s case.
● Relying on Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the Civil Code, Continental further claimed that only one with civil personality could die. They
insisted that the death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was
contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical
personality. They also asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said child’s birth, otherwise, no such appellation
can be had.
● On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution ruling that Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
● Counter to Continental’s contentions, Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate
dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had
to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else,
specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was
also no question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
● Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari, but the latter affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution,
and denied the former’s Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:
● Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to the benefits in question, considering the circumstances with which his unborn child had died. -
YES

HELD:
● First, the issue of the child’s civil personality raised by Continental is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural
persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality. We need not
establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. The
rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.
● Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. While the Civil Code expressly provides that
civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could
die.
● Third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of
the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation
thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
● Fourth, as Atty. Montaño noted, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. Continental Steel itself defines, a
dependent is “one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else.” Under said
general definition, even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational
life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance.
● Fifth, the term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents. A legitimate child is a product of, and,
therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.” It is apparent that according to the Family Code and jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that
their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.
● Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same
should have been granted by Continental Steel.

● WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the Resolution of Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits, grounded on the death
of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED.