1. TUNAY NA PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA SA ASIA BREWERY VS. ASIA BREWERY, INC G.R. No.

162025

Topic: Right to Self-Organization; Excluded Employees/ Workers; Confidential Employees

FACTS:

1) Respondent ABI entered into a CBA with Bisig at Lakas ng mga Manggagawa sa Asia-Independent (BLMA-
INDEPENDENT), the exclusive bargaining representative of ABI’s rank-and-file employees.

2) Article I of the CBA defined the scope of the bargaining unit, as follows: The UNION shall not represent or accept
for membership employees outside the scope of the bargaining unit herein defined.

Section 2. Bargaining Unit. The bargaining unit shall be comprised of all regular rank-and-file daily-paid employees of
the COMPANY. However, the following jobs/positions as herein defined shall be excluded from the bargaining unit, to
wit:

xxx

Confidential and Executive Secretaries

xxx

Purchasing and Quality Control Staff.

3) The CBA expressly excluded Confidential and Executive Secretaries from the rank -and-file bargaining unit, for
which reason ABI seeks their disaffiliation from petitioner. ABI’s management stopped de ducting union dues from 81
employees, believing that their membership in BLMA-INDEPENDENT violated the CBA. 18 of these affected employees
are QA Sampling Inspectors/Inspectresses and Machine Gauge Technician (checkers) who formed part of the Quality
Control Staff. The rest are secretaries/clerks directly under their respective division managers.

4) Petitioner, however, maintains that except for those who had been promoted to monthly paid positions, the
other secretaries/clerks are deemed included among the rank-and-file employees of ABI. BLMA-INDEPENDENT
claimed that ABI’s actions restrained the employees’ right to self-organization.

5) VA ruled that the subject employees qualify under the rank-and-file category because their functions are merely
routinary and clerical. He noted that the positions occupied by the checkers and secretaries/clerks in the different
divisions are not managerial or supervisory, as evident from the duties and responsibilities assigned to them. With
respect to QA Sampling Inspectors/Inspectresses and Machine Gauge Technician, he ruled that ABI failed to establish
with sufficient clarity their basic functions as to consider them Quality Control Staff who were excluded from the
coverage of the CBA. Accordingly, the subject employees were declared eligible for inclusion within the bargaining
unit represented by BLMA-INDEPENDENT.

6) CA reversed the VA, ruling that the 81 employees are excluded from and are not eligible for inclusion in the
bargaining unit as defined in Section 2, Article I of the CBA.

ISSUE: WON the checkers and secretaries/clerks of respondent company are rank-and-file employees who are eligible
to join the Union of the rank-and-file employees.
RULING: YES. The checkers and secretaries/clerks of respondent company are rank-and-file employees who are eligible
to join the Union of the rank-and-file employees.

Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to
managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason
of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and
hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records. Confidential employees are thus excluded from
the rank-and-file bargaining unit. The rationale for their separate category and disqualification to join any labor
organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial employees because if allowed to be affiliated with a Union, the
latter might not be assured of their loyalty in view of evident conflict of interests and the Union can also become
company-denominated with the presence of managerial employees in the Union membership. Having access to
confidential information, confidential employees may also become the source of undue advantage. Said employees
may act as a spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.

Confidential employees are defined as those who:

1) assist or act in a confidential capacity,

2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations.

The two (2) criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee
that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must
handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. The exclusion from bargaining units of employees
who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a
principal objective sought to be accomplished by the confidential employee rule.

A perusal of the job descriptions of these secretaries/clerks reveals that their assigned duties and responsibilities
involve routine activities of recording and monitoring, and other paper works for their respective departments while
secretarial tasks such as receiving telephone calls and filing of office correspondence appear to have been commonly
imposed as additional duties. Respondent failed to indicate who among these numerous secretaries/clerks have
access to confidential data relating to management policies that could give rise to potential conflict of interest with
their Union membership. It is not even farfetched that the job category may exist only on paper since they are all
daily-paid workers. With respect to the Sampling Inspectors/Inspectresses and the Gauge Machine Technician, the job
descriptions of these checkers showed that they perform routine and mechanical tasks preparatory to the delivery of
the finished products. No evidence was presented by the respondent to prove that these daily -paid checkers actually
form part of the company’s Quality Control Staff who as such were exposed to sensitive, vital and confidential
information about [company’s] products or have knowledge of mixtures of the products, their defects, and even their
formulas which are considered trade secrets.

DISPOSITIVE: Petitioner won.

DOCTRINE: Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization
to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by
reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees
and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records. Confidential employees are thus ex cluded
from the rank-and-file bargaining unit.

2. SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INCORPORATED VS SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS and EXEMPT UNION G.R.
No. 146206

Topic: Determination of Appropriate Bargaining Unit; Factors – Unit Determination

QUICKIE FACTS: San Miguel Foods has factory/branches in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis. The employees from
these three branches wanted to form a single bargaining unit. This was opposed by the compan y as being against the
“one company, one union” policy. SC ruled that applying the mutuality of interest test, there should only be one
bargaining unit.

FACTS:

In the case of San Miguel Corporation Supervisors and Exempt Union v. Laguesma, the Court he ld that even if they
handle confidential data regarding technical and internal business operations, supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the
exempt employees of petitioner San Miguel Foods, Inc. are not to be considered confidential employees, because the
same do not pertain to labor relations, particularly, negotiation and settlement of grievances. Consequently, they
were allowed to form an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. The Court also declared
that the employees belonging to the three different plants of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants
in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis, having community or mutuality of interests, constitute a single bargaining unit.

A certification election was conducted. On the date of the election, petitioner filed the Omnibus Objections and
Challenge to Voters, questioning the eligibility to vote by some of its employees on the grounds that some employees
do not belong to the bargaining unit which respondent seeks to represent or that there is no existence of employer-
employee relationship with petitioner.

Based on the results of the election, the Med-Arbiter issued the Order stating that since the Yes vote received 97% of
the valid votes cast, respondent is certified to be the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisors and exempt
employees of petitioner's Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis.

On appeal, the then Acting DOLE Undersecretary, in the Resolution, affirmed the Order of the Med-Arbiter.
CA affirmed the Resolution of DOLE Undersecretary with modification stating that those holding the positions of
Human Resource Assistant and Personnel Assistant are excluded from the bargaining unit.

Hence, this petition by the San Miguel Foods

ISSUE: W/N CA departed from jurisprudence when it expanded the scope of the bargaining unit.

RULING: No. In San Miguel vs Laguesma, the Court explained that the employees of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia
Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis constitute a single bargaining unit, which is not contrary
to the one-company, one-union policy. An appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties
of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

It held that while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in determining the
appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of
grouping is community or mutuality of interest. This is so because the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise
of their collective bargaining rights. Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees. Their functions
mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the same way that the company needs them both. There may
be differences as to the nature of their individual assignments, but the distinctions are not enough to warrant the
formation of a separate bargaining unit.

The Court affirms the finding of the CA that there should be only one bargaining unit for the employees in Cabuyao,
San Fernando, and Otis of Magnolia Poultry Products Plant involved in dressed chicken processing and Magnolia
Poultry Farms engaged in live chicken operations. Certain factors, such as specific line of work, working conditions,
location of work, mode of compensation, and other relevant conditions do not affect or impede their commonality of
interest. Although they seem separate and distinct from each other, the specific tasks of each division are actually
interrelated and there exists mutuality of interests which warrants the formation of a single bargaining unit.

DISPOSITIVE: Respondent won

DOCTRINE: An appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all
or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with
equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law.
It held that while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in determining the
appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of
grouping is community or mutuality of interest. This is so because the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise
of their collective bargaining rights. Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees. Their functions
mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the same way that the company needs them both. There may
be differences as to the nature of their individual assignments, but the distinctions are not enough to warrant the
formation of a separate bargaining unit.

4. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs Lepanto Capataz Union, G.R. No. 157086 February 18, 2013

Facts: As a domestic corporation authorized to engage in large-scale mining, Lepanto operated several mining claims
in Mankayan, Benguet. On May 27, 1998, respondent Lepanto Capataz Union (Union), a labor organization duly
registered with DOLE, filed a petition for consent election with the Industrial Relations Division of the Cordillera
Regional Office (CAR) of DOLE, thereby proposing to represent 139 capatazes of Lepanto. In due course, Lepanto
opposed the petition, contending that the Union was in reality seeking a certificati on election, not a consent election,
and would be thereby competing with the Lepanto Employees Union (LEU), the current collective bargaining agent.
Lepanto pointed out that the capatazes were already members of LEU, the exclusive representative of all ran k-and-
file employees of its Mine Division.

Issues: Whether or not the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the decision by the DOLE Secretary is a condition
precedent in a petition for certiorari.

Whether or not respondent LCU may form a separate union.

Held: Yes. To start with, the requirement of the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration as a precondition to the
filing of a petition for certiorari accords with the principle of exhausting administrative remedies as a means to afford
every opportunity to the respondent agency to resolve the matter and correct itself if need be.

And, secondly, the ruling in National Federation of Labor v. Laguesma reiterates St. Martin’s Funeral Home v. Nati onal
Labor Relations Commission, where the Court has pronounced that the special civil action of certiorari is the
appropriate remedy from the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in view of the lack of any
appellate remedy provided by the Labor Code to a party aggrieved by the decision of the NLRC. Accordingly, any
decision, resolution or ruling of the DOLE Secretary from which the Labor Code affords no remedy to the aggrieved
party may be reviewed through a petition for certiorari initiated only in the CA in deference to the principle of the
hierarchy of courts.

Yet, it is also significant to note that National Federation of Labor v. Laguesma also reaffirmed the dictum issued in St.
Martin’s Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations Commission to the effect that “the remedy of the aggrieved party
is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then
seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Yes. Capatazes or foremen are not rank-andfile employees because they are an extension of the management, and as
such they may influence the rank-and-file workers under them to engage in slowdowns or similar activities detrimental
to the policies, interests or business objectives of the employers.

The word capataz is defined in Webster’s Third International Dictionary, 1986 as “a boss”, “foreman” and “an
overseer”. The employer did not dispute during the hearing that the capatazes indeed take charge of the
implementation of the job orders by supervising and instructing the miners, mackers and other rank -and-file workers
under them, assess and evaluate their performance, make regular reports and recommends (sic) new systems and
procedure of work, as well as guidelines for the discipline of employees. As testified to by petitioner’s president, the
capatazes are neither rank-and-file nor supervisory and, more or less, fall in the middle of their rank. In this respect,
we can see that indeed the capatazes differ from the rank-and-file and can by themselves constitute a separate
bargaining unit.

5. STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR ANDEMPLOYMENT and STA.
LUCIA EASTCOMMERCIAL CORPORATION WORKERSASSOCIATION (CLUP LOCAL CHAPTER)

Facts:

On 27 February 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), in behalf of its chartered local, instituted
a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial
Corporation (SLECC) and its Affiliates. The affiliate companies included in the petition were SLE Commercial, SLE
Department Store, SLE Cinema, Robsan East Trading, Bowling Center, Planet Toys, Home Gallery and Essentials.

On 10 October 2001, CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates Workers Union [CLUP-SLECC and
its Affiliates Workers Union] reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation
Workers Association (herein appellant CLUP-SLECCWA), limiting its membership to the rank-and-file employees of Sta.
Lucia East Commercial Corporation. It was issued Certificate of Creation of a Local Chapter No. RO400-0110-CC-004.

On the same date, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed the instant petition for direct certification. It alleged that [SLECC] employs
about 115 employees and that more than 20% of employees belonging to the rank-and-file category are its members.

On 22 November 2001, SLECC filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It averred that it has voluntarily recognized
[SMSLEC] on 20 July 2001 as the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees, and that collective
bargaining negotiations already commenced between them. SLECC argued that the petition should be dismissed for
violating the one year and negotiation bar rules under pars. (c) and (d), Section 11, Rule XI, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

On 29 November 2001, a CBA between [SMSLEC] and [SLECC] was ratified by its rank-and-file employees and
registered with DOLE-Regional Office No. IV on 9 January 2002.

In the meantime, on 19 December 2001, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed its Opposition and Comment to [SLECC’S] Motion to
Dismiss.

In his Order dated 29 July 2002, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin dismissed CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for direct
certification on the ground of contract bar rule. The prior voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and the CBA between SLECC
and SMSLEC bars the filing of CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for direct certification. This was reversed by the Secretary of
Labor. The Secretary held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC
could not bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union constituted a registered labor
organization at the time of SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC.
 On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court further ruled that the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(Secretary) was correct when she held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) executed by SLECC with Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial (SMSLEC) could not
bar Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association’s (SLECCWA) petition for direct certification.

Issue:

Can the subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC could n ot bar CLUP-
SLECCWA’s petition?

Ruling:

No. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union constituted a registered labor organization at the time of SLECC’s
voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. It may be recalled that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union’s initial problem
was that they constituted a legitimate labor organization representing a non-appropriate bargaining unit. However,
CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union subsequently re-registered as CLUP-SLECCWA, limiting its members to
the rank-and-file of SLECC. SLECC cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union was a legitimate
labor organization at the time of SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. SLECC and SMSLEC cannot, by themselves,
decide whether CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union represented an appropriate bargaining unit.

The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a union in unorganized establishments. SLECC
was not an unorganized establishment when it voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as its exclusive bargaining
representative on 20 July 2001. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union filed a petition for certification election
on 27 February 2001 and this petition remained pending as of 20 July 2001. Thus, SLECC’s voluntary recognition of
SMSLEC on 20 July 2001, the subsequent negotiations and resulting registration of a CBA executed by SLECC and
SMSLEC are void and cannot bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s present petition for certification election.

We find it strange that the employer itself, SLECC, filed a motion to oppose CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for certification
election. In petitions for certification election, the employer is a mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or
appeal the Med-Arbiter’s decision. The exception to this rule, which happens when the employer is reques ted to
bargain collectively, is not present in the case before us.

6. HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL V. HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS

FACTS:

A petition for certification election was filed by private respondent Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis – Holy
Child Catholic School Teachers and Employees Labor Union (HCCS-TELUPIGLAS). Holy Child Parochial School raised
that members of private respondent do not belong to the same class; it is not only a mixture of managerial,
supervisory, and rank-and-file employees – as three (3) are vice-principals, one (1) is a department head/supervisor,
and eleven (11) are coordinators – but also a combination of teaching and non-teaching personnel – as twenty-seven
(27) are non-teaching personnel. It insisted that, for not being in accord with Article 24510 of the Labor Code, private
respondent is an illegitimate labor organization lacking in personality to file a petition for certification election The
Med-Arbiter denied the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for certification election is dismissible on the ground that the labor organization’s
membership allegedly consists of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.
RULING:

No. Before, when the 1989 Rules was still in application, mingling will prevent an otherwise legitimate and duly
registered labor organization from exercising its right to file a petition for certification election. But then, the 1989
Amended Omnibus Rules was further amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus
Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules – that the petition for
certification election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not been mingled with
supervisory employees – was removed.

Petitioner argued that, in view of the improper mixture of teaching and non-teaching personnel in private respondent
due to the absence of mutuality of interest among its members, the petition for certification election should have
been dismissed on the ground that private respondent is not qualified to file such petition for its failure to qualify as
a legitimate labor organization, the basic qualification of which is the representation of an appropriate bargaining unit.
The Supreme Court disagreed and said that the concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different
from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit.

In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an employer like petitioner
is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to m isrepresentation, false
statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended. To reiterate,
private respondent, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired
juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally.

7. Ren Transport Corp. and/or Reynaldo Pazcoguin III Vs. National Labor Relations Commission

FACTS: Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Ren Transport (SMART) is a registered union with a CBA with Ren Transport Corp.
(Ren Transport) set to expire on December 31, 2004. The 60-

day freedom period of the CBA passed without a challenge to SMART’s

majority status as bargaining agent. Subsequently, two members of SMART wrote to DOLE-NCR informing the latter
office that a majority of the members of SMART had decided to disaffiliate from their mother federation to from
another union, Ren Transport Employees Association (RTEA) and SMART contested the same. During the pendency
of the disaffiliation dispute, Ren Transport stopped the remittance to SMART of the union dues as provided under the
CBA. Further, Ren Transport voluntarily recognized RTEA as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of their company.
ISSUE\S: (1)Did Ren Transport commit acts of unfair labor practice? (2) Did Ren Transport interfere with the exercise
of the employees’ right to self

-organize? RULING: (1) YES. Violation of the duty to bargain collectively is an unfair labor practice under Article 258(g)
of the Labor Code. Ren Transport had a duty to bargain collectively with SMART. Under Article 263 in relation to Article
267 of the Labor Code, it is during the freedom period at the last 60 days before the expiration of the CBA when
another union may challenge the majority status of the bargaining agent through the filing of a petition for a
certification election. In the present case, no petition for certification election challenging t he majority status of
SMART was filed during the freedom period, SMART therefore remained the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank -
and-file employees. (2) YES. The Labor Arbiter found that the failure to remit the union dues to SMART and the
voluntary recognition of RTEA were clear indications of interference with the employees’ right to self-organization.
8. PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES v. PHILTRANCO WORKERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF GENUINE LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS, GR No. 180962, 2014-02-26

Facts:

On the ground that it was suffering business losses, petitioner Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc., a local land
transportation company engaged in the business of carrying passengers and freight, retrenched 21 of its employees
Consequently, the company union, herein private... respondent Philtranco Workers Union-Association of Genuine
Labor Organizations (PWU-AGLU), filed a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
claiming that petitioner engaged in unfair labor practices. Unable to settle their differences... at the scheduled...
preliminary conference held befor... the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)... the case was thereafter
referred to the Office of the Secretary of... the DOLE (Secretary of Labor) Acting DOLE Secreta Danilo P. Cruz issued a
Decision Acting DOLE Secretary Danilo P. Cruz issued a Decision... we hereby ORDER Philtranco to: REINSTATE to their
former positions... he Secretary of Labor declined to rule on petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and private
respondent's "Partial Appeal", citing a DOLE regulation[9]... which provided that voluntary arbitrators' decisions,
orders, resolutions or awards shall not be the subject of motions for reconsideration... petitioner filed before the CA
an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, and sought injunctive relief,... p... remises considered, the instant
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is
hereby DISMISSED... in assailing the Decision of the DOLE voluntary arbitrator, petitioner erred in filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules, when it should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43 thereof, which
properly covers decisions of... voluntary labor arbitrators.

The CA added that since the assailed Decision was not timely appealed within the reglementary 15-day period... under
Rule 43, the same became final and executory. Petitioner argues that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and not a
petition for review under Rule 43 is the proper remedy. Petitioner adds that, contrary to the CA's ruling, NCMB-NCR
CASE No. NS-02-028-07 is not a simple voluntary arbitration case. The character of the case, which involves an
impending strike by petitioner's employees; the nature of petitioner's business as a public transportation... company,
which is imbued with public interest.

Issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER AVAILED OF THE ERRONEOUS REMEDY
IN FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 INSTEAD OF UNDER RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

whether the Petition for Certiorari was timely filed

Ruling:

The fact is undeniable that by referring the case to the Secretary of Labor, Conciliator-Mediator Aglibut... conceded
that the case fell within the coverage of Article 263 of the Labor Code; the impending strike in Philtranco, a public
transportation company whose business is imbued with public interest, required that the Secretary of Labor assume
jurisdiction over the case, which he... in fact did. By assuming jurisdiction over the case, the provisions of Article 263
became applicable, any representation to the contrary or that he is deciding the case in his capacity as a volunt ary
arbitrator notwithstanding.

Accordingly, the Secretary of Labor's Decision in Case No. OS-VA-2007-008 is a proper subject of certiorari... the Court
agrees with petitioner's submission. Rule 65 states that where a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall... be filed not later than 60 days counted from the notice of
the denial of the motion.
So also, considering that a decision of the Secretary of Labor is subject to judicial review only through a special civil
action of certiorari and, as a rule, cannot be resorted to without the aggrieved party having exhausted administrative
remedies through a motion... for reconsideration, the aggrieved party, must be allowed to move for a reconsideration
of the same so that he can bring a special civil action for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Principles:

While a government office[1] may prohibit altogether the filing of a motion for reconsideration with respect to its
decisions or orders, the fact remains that certiorari inherently requires the filing of a motion for... recon sideration,
which is the tangible representation of the opportunity given to the office to correct itself. Unless it is filed, there
could be no occasion to rectify. Worse, the remedy of certiorari would be unavailing. Simply put, regardless of the
proscription... against the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the same may be filed on the assumption that
rectification of the decision or order must be obtained, and before a petition fo r certiorari may be instituted.

when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor case in an industry indispensable to national interest,
"he exercises great breadth of... discretion" in finding a solution to the parties' dispute.[24] "[T]he authority of the
Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to national interest includes... and extends to all questions and controversies arising therefrom. The
power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary
dispute."[25] This wide latitude of discretion given to the Secretary of

Labor may not be the subject of appeal.

Though appeals from the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor were eliminated, presently there are sev eral instances in the
Labor Code and its implementing and related rules where an appeal can be filed with the Office of the Secretary of
Labor or the Secretary of Labor... issues a ruling, to wit:... x x x x

(6) Art. 263 provides that the Secretary of Labor shall decide or resolve the labor dispute [over] which he assumed
jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from the date of the assumption of jurisdiction. His decision shall be final and
executory ten (10) calendar days after... receipt thereof by the parties.

From the foregoing we see that the Labor Code and its implementing and related rules generally do not provide for
any mode for reviewing the decision of the Secretary of Labor. It is further generally provided that the decision of the
Secretary of Labor shall be final and... executory after ten (10) days from notice. Yet, like decisions of the NLRC which
under Art. 223 of the Labor Code become final after ten (10) days, decisions of the Secretary of Labor come to this
Court by way of a petition for certiorari even beyond the ten-day period provided... in the Labor Code and the
implementing rules but within the reglementary period set for Rule 65 petitions under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. x x x

11. Basan v. Coca-Cola

Romeo Basan, Danilo Dizon, Jaime L. Tumabiao, Jr., Roberto Dela Rama, Jr., Ricky S. Nicolas, Crispulo Donor, Galo
Falguera filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines,
alleging that respondent dismissed them without just cause and prior written notice required by law.

Coca-cola countered that it hired petitioners as temporary route helpers to act as substitutes for its absent regular
route helpers merely for a fixed period in anticipation of the high volume of work in its plants or sales offices.

Petitioners essentially maintain that contrary to the findings of the CA, they were continuously hired by respondent
company to perform duties necessary and desirable in the usual trade or business and are, therefore, regular
employees. They allege that if their services had really been engaged for fixed specific periods, respondent should
have at least provided the contracts of employment evidencing the same.
Respondent: pay slips presented show that they rendered work for less than one year, not regular employee

-where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the petitioners, the duration of
which was made known to them at the time of their engagement, petitioner cannot now claim otherwise. In addition,
it disagrees with the contention that petitioners, as route helpers, were performing functions necessary or desirable
to its business.

COURT: In Magsalin v. National Organization of Working men, Court has categorically declared that the nature of work
of route helpers hired by Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. is necessary and desirable in its usual business or trade
thereby qualifying them as regular employees. Their task is to go with route salesmen on board delivery trucks and
undertake the laborious task of loading and unloading softdrink products of petitioner company to its various delivery
points. The repeated rehiring of respondent workers and the continuing need for their services clearly attest to the
necessity or desirability of their services in the regular conduct of the business or trade of petitioner company.

Respondent, in its position paper, expressly admitted that petitioners were employed as route helpers in anticipation
of the high volume of work in its plants and sales offices.23 As such, respondent’s contention that petitioners could
not have attained regular employment status for they merely rendered services for periods of less than a year cannot
be sustained in view of the Magsalin doctrine previously cited. Court has recognized a fixed -term type of employment
embodied in a contract specifying that the services of the employee shall be engaged only for a definite period, the
termination of which occurs upon the expiration of said period irrespective of the existence of just cause and
regardless of the activity the employee is called upon to perform. The fixed period of employment was knowingly and
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon
the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or it satisfactorily appears that the employer
and the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former
or the latter. While fixed term employment is not per se illegal or against public policy, the criteria above must first
be established to the satisfaction of this Court.

12. UNIVERSIDAD DE STA. ISABEL vs. MARVIN-JULIAN L. SAMBAJON, JR.

FACTS:

Universidad de Sta. Isabel (petitioner) is a non-stock, non-profit religious educational institution. Petitioner hired
respondent as a full-time college faculty member on probationary status, as evidenced by an Appoi ntment Contract.
After the aforesaid contract expired, petitioner continued to give teaching loads to respondent who remained a full -
time faculty member for the two semesters of school -year (SY) 2003-2004; and two semesters of SY 2004-2005.
Sometime in June 2003, after respondent completed his course in Master of Arts in Education, he submitted the
corresponding Special Order from the CHED, together with his credentials for the said master’s degree, to the Human
Resources Department of petitioner for the purpose of salary adjustment/increase. Subsequently, respondent’s salary
was increased. He was likewise re-ranked from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor. In a letter dated October
15, 2004 addressed to the President of petitioner, Sr. Evidente, re spondent vigorously argued that his salary increase
should be made effective as of June 2003 and demanded the payment of his salary differential but was denied.
Respondent insisted on his demand for retroactive pay. In a letter dated January 10, 2005, Sr. Evidente denied and
reiterated the school policy on re-ranking of teachers. However, respondent found the above explanation insufficient
and not clear enough. In his letter dated January 12, 2005, he pointed out the case of another faculty member. To
resolve the issue, a dialogue was held between respondent and Sr. Evidente and the parties gave conflicting accounts.
On February 26, 2005, respondent received his letter of termination. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against the petitioner.

ISSUE: Is respondent a regular employee?

RULING:

NO. The probationary employment of teachers in private schools is not governed purely by the Article 281 of the Labor
Code. The Labor Code is supplemented with respect to the period of probation by special rules found in the Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools. On the matter of probationary period, Section 92 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools regulations states: Section 92. Probationary Period.

Subject in all instances to compliance with the Department and school requirements, the probationary period for
academic personnel shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the
elementary and secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary
level, and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses
are offered on a trimester basis. Thus, it is the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, and not the Labor Code, that
determines whether or not a faculty member in an educational institution has attained regular or permanent status .

ISSUE:

Was respondent illegally dismissed?

RULING:

YES, notwithstanding the limited engagement of probationary employees, they are entitled to constitutional
protection of security of tenure during and before the end of the probationary period. The services of an employee
who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized
cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by
the employer. Thus, while no vested right to a permanent appointment had as yet accrued in favor of respondent
since he had not completed the prerequisite three -year period (six consecutive semesters) necessary for the
acquisition of permanent status as required by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools-- which has the force of
law -- he enjoys a limited tenure. During the said probationary period, he cannot be terminated except for just or
authorized causes, or if he fails to qualify in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by pet itioner for the
acquisition of permanent status of its teaching personnel. In a letter dated February 26, 2005, petitioner terminated
the services of respondent stating that his probationary employment as teacher will no longer be renewed upon its
expiry on March 31, 2005, respondent’s fifth semester of teaching. No just or authorized cause was given by petitioner.
Prior to this, respondent had consistently achieved above average rating based on evaluation by petitioner’s officials
and students. He had also been promoted to the rank of Associate Professor after finis hing his master’s degree cours
on his third semester of teaching. Clearly, respondent’s termination after five semesters of satisfactory service was
illegal.

13. GADIA V. SYKES ASIA, INC., G.R. NO. 209499, JANUARY 28, 2015

Sykes Asia is a corporation engaged in Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) which provides support to its international
clients from various sectors (e.g., technology, telecommunications, retail services) by carrying on some of their
operations, governed by service contracts that it enters with them. On September 2, 2003,12 Alltel Communications,
Inc. (Alltel), a United States-based telecommunications firm, contracted Sykes Asia’s services to accommodate the
needs and demands of Alltel clients for its postpaid and prepaid services (Alltel Project). Thus, on different dates, Sykes
Asia hired petitioners as customer service representatives, team leaders, and trainers for the Alltel Project.

Sometime in 2009, Alltel informed Sykes that it is terminating its contract with Sykes. As a result, Sykes sent each of
the petitioner’s end-of-life notices informing them of their dismissal from service due to the termination of the
contract with Alltel. Aggrieved, they filed a case for illegal dismissal with the NLRC.
As a defense, Sykes alleged that the petitioners were merely project employees, which was clearly shown by their
respective employment contracts.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are project employees.

YES.

Article 294 (now, Article 195[280]) of the Labor Code provides that an employee is deemed regular when he has been
engaged to perform activities which are deemed usually necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, except (i) where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or (ii) where the work or
services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment if for the duration of the season.

Accordingly, the principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as project
employees as distinguished from "regular employees," is whether or not the employees were assigned to carry out a
"specific project or undertaking," the duration (and scope) of which were specified at the time they were engaged for
that project. The project could either be (i) a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business
of the employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from the other undertakings of
the company; or (ii) a particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the corporation. In order
to safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word "project" to prevent employees from attaining
a regular status, employers claiming that their workers are project-based employees should not only prove that the
duration and scope of the employment was specified at the time they were engaged, but also, that there was indeed
a project.

Thus, for an employee to be considered project-based, the employer must show compliance with two (2) requisites,
namely that: (a) the employee was assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking; and (b) the duration and
scope of which were specified at the time they were engaged for such project.

In this case, the Court held that Sykes was able to prove both requisites.

As regards the first requisite, it held that Sykes adequately informed the petitioners of their employment status at the
time of their engagement. As was shown by their respective employment contracts, they were hired for the Alltel
Project and their positions were “project-based and as such is co-terminus to the project.”

As regards the second requisite, it held that “the duration of the undertaking begins and ends at determined or
determinable times” which means capable of being determined or fixed. As such, indicating in the contract that their
employment is “co-terminus with the project” is sufficient compliance with this requisite.

14.