Petition For Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition Against Judge John J. Coughlin

Maureen F.
O’Neil, Superior Court Clerk January 15th, 2019

Rockingham Superior Court
Paul Maravelias
Rockingham County Courthouse
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
10 Route 125
Windham, NH 03087
Brentwood, NH 03833
RE: Paul Maravelias v. Hon. John J. Coughlin, Derry Circuit Court, and its Concerned
Judicial Officer(s)
Dear Clerk O’Neil,
Please find enclosed herewith Petitioner’s Original Complaint and attached Petition for
Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition pursuant to RSA 491:7 and RSA 498:1 for filing with
the Court.
A signed Appearance is included with this enclosure pursuant to Rule 17(b), as well as
the requisite $225 filing fee and applicable Rule 201. (III) surcharges.
Please do not hesitate to contact me should you have any questions regarding this
enclosure. Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
Paul J. Maravelias
CC: 10th Circuit Court – District Division – Derry

Hon. John J. Coughlin
Hon. Gordon J. MacDonald, Attorney General
Simon R. Brown, Esq.
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
ROCKINGHAM, SS SUPERIOR COURT

DOCKET NO.
PAUL MARAVELIAS
PETITIONER,
V.
HON. JOHN J. COUGHLIN, DERRY CIRCUIT COURT,

AND ITS CONCERNED JUDICIAL OFFICER(S)
RESPONDENTS,
CHRISTINA DEPAMPHILIS,
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

AND PROHIBITION IN CASE NO.
473-2016-CV-00124
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION
COMES NOW Paul J. Maravelias (“Petitioner”), in propria persona, and respectfully
petitions this Honorable Court to issue a writ of peremptory mandamus and prohibition against
the above-enumerated Respondents. This action seeks equitable injunctive relief in the form of
common law prerogative writ for 1) Respondents’ redressable non-performance of statutorily
mandated legal duties and 2) prospective relief enjoining Respondents from continuing ongoing
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
recalcitrant lawbreaking and other willful/negligent breach of legal duties. Petitioner asserts the
following points of fact and law in support of this petition:
INTRODUCTION
1. This action arises from the ongoing civil stalking protective order case Christina
DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias (473-2016-CV-00124) at 10th Circuit Court – District Division –
Derry (hereinafter, “Derry Circuit Court”). DePamphilis filed a Stalking Petition against
Maravelias on 12/28/16. A Final Stalking Order of Protection was issued on 2/7/17. DePamphilis
motioned to extend on 1/5/18. On 6/15/18, after a three-day Hearing at Derry Circuit Court, Hon.
John J. Coughlin approved a one-year extension of the Order until 2/5/2019. DePamphilis
recently motioned on 1/11/2019 again to extend the Order until 2024.
2. Maravelias’s alleged “stalking” was to invite DePamphilis to dinner on 12/12/2016 and
then never speak a single word to her again after that day, when she politely rejected him.
Maravelias has vociferously maintained that DePamphilis’s stalking accusations are legally
erroneous, malicious, and machinated for the sole purpose of defamatory harassment.
3. The 6/15/18 extension Order is currently being appealed to the Supreme Court (Case No.
2018-0483), where Maravelias raises constitutional challenges and alleges abuse of discretion.
Said appeal’s merits are extraneous to the instant action; this action does not seek to overturn the
underlying restraining order, however wrong it is.
4. Derry Circuit Court and Hon. John J. Coughlin have openly violated and continue to
violate controlling court rules, statutory law, and case law in prejudice of Maravelias.
Respondents refuse to desist, after being petitioned through competent legal pleadings.
5. This action is exigent and necessary. Four days ago, on 1/11/19, Christina DePamphilis
chose to perpetuate her legal attack on Maravelias by motioning for another extension.
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6. Maravelias objected, and new proceedings at Derry Circuit Court are imminent. See RSA
633:3-a, III-c., mandating the trial court hold a Hearing on an objection to extension of stalking
order “within 30 days” of the extension.
7. The current appeal-on-the-merits affords the Supreme Court scant opportunity, if any, to
address Judge Coughlin’s willful defiance of certain court rules and unlawful refusal to recuse
himself, inter alia, necessitating the instant petition for emergent relief by extraordinary writ.
8. This action also seeks relief for Respondents’ unethical dilatory practices since late 2018
which promote Judge Coughlin’s personal interest to complicate expected judicial disciplinary
proceedings against him at injury to Maravelias’s presently-aggrieved constitutional rights.
PARTIES
9. Petitioner PAUL J. MARAVELIAS is a natural person residing in Windham, NH. He is a
23-year-old Dartmouth College graduate employed as a software engineer. He has authored two
books, one regarding his experience being falsely accused of civil stalking in this state’s courts.
10. Respondent HON. JOHN J. COUGHLIN is a natural person residing in Mont Vernon,
NH. He is a Judge at Derry Circuit Court. Judge Coughlin in July 2018 represented that he would
retire on 9/5/18. In November 2018, the Administrative Office of the Courts confirmed he has
taken Senior Active Status. Hon. John J. Coughlin is being sued in his official capacity.
11. Respondent DERRY CIRCUIT COURT is an entity within the judicial branch of the
State of New Hampshire, pursuant to RSA 490-F.
12. Respondent(s) CONCERNED JUDICIAL OFFICER(S) is/are the presiding justice(s) at
Derry Circuit Court who is/are concerned by Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2, Rule 2.15 to act
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upon Petitioner’s judicial misconduct allegations against Hon. John J. Coughlin, and to rule in
his place. Said judicial officer(s) is/are being sued in their official capacity.
13. Real Party in Interest CHRISTINA DEPAMPHILIS is a natural person and legal adult.
She is the Plaintiff/Petitioner in the underlying civil case whence this action is taken.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
14. The Superior Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this matter both as
authorized statutorily by RSA 491:7, RSA 498 and, being a court of general jurisdiction,
pursuant to the English common law of Great Britain and this colony’s inheritance thereof.
15. Venue is appropriate pursuant to RSA 507:9 as Petitioner resides in Rockingham County,
within which Respondent Derry Circuit Court is located, and as individual Respondent persons
carry out their official function therein. The acts of misconduct alleged to sustain this Petition
occurred at Derry District Court within Rockingham County at all times material.
FACTUAL STIPULATIONS
16. “A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief … shall contain a statement of the material
facts known to the pleading party on which the claim is based”. Super Ct. Civ. R. 8(a). The
following stipulations may be judicially noticed in majority through 1) transcripts of proceedings
currently on file with the Supreme Court in appeal Case No. 2018-0483, 2) Maravelias’s
docketed pleadings in Derry Circuit Court, and 3) Judge Coughlin’s Orders.
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JANUARY 2018 MOTION TO EXTEND THE STALKING ORDER
17. On 1/5/18, Christina DePamphilis petitioned the circuit court to extend the stalking order
for another year. Hon. Sharon DeVries approved the preliminary extension on 1/12/18.
Maravelias objected. A Hearing was scheduled.
18. The first Hearing on the extension was scheduled for 2/15/18 at 8:00am at Derry Circuit
Court, 34 days after the 1/12/18 extension order.
19. On 2/15/18, the circuit court continued the matter to 2/16/18. On 2/16/18, the circuit
court continued the matter to 2/20/18. On that day, being heard for the first time on the extension
motion, the parties agreed to continue. A Hearing was scheduled for 5/3/18.
20. On 3/29/18, Maravelias filed a Motion to Dismiss which sought dismissal of the stalking
order extension case as a matter of law.
JUDGE COUGHLIN’S STANDING ORDER VIOLATING THE RIGHT TO RECORD PUBLIC HEARINGS
21. At the 5/3/18 Hearing, Maravelias politely demanded the circuit court respect his
incontrovertible right to videotape the entire public proceeding, explicitly guaranteed by Circuit
Court – District Division Rules – Dist. Div. R. 1.4 (hereinafter, “Circuit Court Rule 1.4”).
Maravelias recited the relevant text of the rule to Judge Coughlin.
22. Judge Coughlin willfully violated said court rules, prohibiting Maravelias from
videotaping certain aspects of the Hearing. Judge Coughlin ordered in open court, referencing a
prior denial of Maravelias’s first request made in February 2018 to record the entire proceeding,
“Well, my February order with regard to this case will continue to stand, okay. And I’m going to
deny your verbal request [to videotape the entire Hearing].”
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See Exhibit A, Maravelias’s 10/31/2018 Motion to Set Aside Judgement, Paragraph 431, and
attached transcript pages.
23. To wit, Judge Coughlin ordered that Maravelias’s professional videographer not
videotape the movant, Christina DePamphilis, giving her testimony against Maravelias. See Id.
This illegal order “continue[s] to stand”. It is in-effect and controlling over the upcoming
Hearing at Derry Circuit Court to be held on DePamphilis’s 1/11/19 Motion within 30-days.
24. Maravelias had filed the standard advance notice form for audio/video recording as
required by Circuit Court Rule 1.4(a). Judge Coughlin’s verbal prohibition did not occasion any
court order supported “by particularized findings of fact that demonstrate the necessity of the
court’s action.” See Circuit Court Rule 1.4(f).
25. After a three-day Hearing concluded 6/8/18, Hon. John J. Coughlin granted the stalking
order extension against Maravelias. This written Order, dated 6/15/18, appears as Exhibit B.
JUDGE COUGHLIN’S ALARMING 6/15/18 ORDER AGAINST MARAVELIAS2
26. Beyond finding good cause for the extension citing some facts regarding Maravelias’s
private email to an attorney and to his high-school teacher, Judge Coughlin made an additional
finding that, “further the Petitioner [DePamphilis] has a reasonable basis to fear for her personal
safety”. He did not make any specific findings of fact to support this tangential statement nor
offer any reason/argument therefor whatsoever. See Exhibit B.
1
The factual stipulations of Maravelias’s 10/31/18 Motion to Set Aside Judgement are liberally
reproduced passim in this document. Petitioner notes that his 10/31/18 Motion discusses other areas of
Judge Coughlin’s alleged misconduct which exceed the scope of this Petition.
2
The actual merits of the protective order extension case are irrelevant to this Petition. This Petition does
not attempt to correct past errors or substitute proper appeal on the merits. However, insofar as this Court
is curious about the recklessness and patent unreasonableness of Judge Coughlin’s 6/15/18 Order, and/or
whether Judge Coughlin wrote it in bad-faith against Maravelias, Maravelias invites public inspection of
his 11/1/18 Supreme Court appeal brief uploaded to the following internet link: https://goo.gl/p9KnDj
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27. Judge Coughlin never ruled upon the 3/29/18 Motion to Dismiss, nor addressed its
arguments in his 6/15/18 Order granting the extension, nor addressed it in any form whatsoever.
28. Shocked and outraged, on 6/25/18, Maravelias submitted a 10-page Motion for
Reconsideration elucidating many legal and factual errors. Those challenges mostly concerned
the merits of the case and are thus immaterial to this Petition.
29. Relevantly, however, Maravelias there asserted the court needed to dismiss the stalking
order extension as a matter of law, because it 1) violated the statutory within-30-days hearing
requirement, and 2) prejudiced Maravelias by willfully violating his rights per Circuit Court Rule
1.4 to record the proceedings in which he was accused.
JUDGE COUGHLIN DENIES 10-PAGE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN ONE WORD
30. On 7/13/18, Hon. John J. Coughlin denied Maravelias’s entire 6/25/18 Motion for
Reconsideration with a one-word Order, scribbling “Denied” on the final page of Maravelias’s
Motion, attached in full as Exhibit C.
31. Hon. John J. Coughlin did not explain his reasoning for not vacating the Order even
though his court violated the within-30-days hearing requirement – a matter first raised in the
Motion for Reconsideration, unlike the recording rule violation matter raised at trial.
32. After Judge Coughlin’s above-rehearsed acts, Maravelias became curious to learn
whether Judge Coughlin treated other stalking defendants similarly. Maravelias contacted the
Administrative Office of the Courts to obtain a list of all stalking order cases at Derry Circuit
Court that year prior to Judge Coughlin’s putative 9/5/18 retirement.
MARAVELIAS DISCOVERS JUDGE COUGHLIN’S RAMPANT HABIT OF ISSUING STALKING ORDERS

WITHOUT MAKING REQUIRED SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT
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33. In September and October 2018, Maravelias scrutinized vast amounts of public court
records revealing Judge Coughlin’s habitual misconduct against other stalking protective order
defendants. Having obtained troves of hard-data – not subjective, collateral challenges on the
merits of his case – suggesting he was prejudiced by Judge Coughlin’s bias and judicial
misconduct, Maravelias composed a Motion to Set Aside Judgement. (Exhibit A) Maravelias
submitted this Motion to Derry Circuit Court on 10/31/18, almost two months after Judge
Coughlin’s putative retirement.
34. Maravelias, in said Motion, dialectically proved through many examples that “John
Coughlin’s pre-retirement conduct was incompetent and dismissive not only in Maravelias’s
case: throughout, Coughlin would 1) totally ignore his duty to substantiate his stalking orders
with particularized factual allegations against defendants and, as an improper substitute therefor,
2) sprinkle-in amplified legal-sounding buzz-word terms in strange, inapplicable places, without
any factual corroboration whatsoever”. See Exhibit A, Paragraphs 26-35.
JUDGE COUGHLIN ATTEMPTS TO DISMISS THE ALLEGATIONS OF HIS OWN MISCONDUCT
35. On 11/16/18, the parties were shocked to find a written Order mailed from the court on
Maravelias’s Motion, signed and authored by Judge John J. Coughlin himself, stating:
“Upon consideration of the Motion to Set Aside Judgement, the Court finds no legal and
factual basis upon which the Court may grant relief. Motion to set aside Judgment is
Denied. /s/ John J. Coughlin” (Exhibit D)
36. While dismissing allegations of his own misconduct, Judge Coughlin illegally disclosed
the whereabouts of the protective order plaintiff, Christina DePamphilis. See Exhibit D.3
3
Maravelias redacts the offending address in Exhibit D, which appears unredacted in Judge Coughlin’s
actual order as mailed to the parties.
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37. On 11/21/18, Maravelias filed a Motion for Recusal and Reconsideration. (Exhibit E) It
asserted Judge Coughlin must recuse himself given the impropriety of his obvious conflict of
interest in dismissing allegations of his own misconduct. Citing the relevant Code of Judicial
Conduct rules, Maravelias exhorted the justice replacing Judge Coughlin to read and properly
rule upon the 10/31/18 Motion to Set Aside Judgement.
RESPONDENTS’ SUBSEQUENT UNETHICAL DILATORY PRACTICES

CAUSING MARAVELIAS IRREPARABLE INJURY
38. Derry Circuit Court has still rendered no further ruling in this matter since the 11/16/18
mailing. Maravelias continues to suffer limited constitutional rights because of a protective order
falsified by DePamphilis and, regardless, a byproduct of judicial bias and misconduct.
39. On 12/10/18, Maravelias filed a Motion to Amend Stalking Final Order of Protection to
Exclude Second-Amendment-Protected Activity and lengthy memorandum of law thereon. The
circuit court has not ruled on this Motion, keeping Maravelias deprived of his firearms property.
40. On 1/4/19, Maravelias filed a Motion for Timely Ruling with Derry Circuit Court.
(Exhibit F) He 1) reminded the circuit court of the live injury its moratorium is causing for
Maravelias, and 2) identified the outcomes by which such dilatory practices aggrandize Judge
Coughlin’s self-interests at the expense of Maravelias’s basic liberty and due process rights, as
explained infra. On 1/11/19, Christina DePamphilis moved Derry Circuit Court to extend the
stalking order for five additional years, triggering a soon-to-be-scheduled Hearing with the
parties present.
9
STATUTES AND AUTHORITES
41. RSA 633:3-a, III-c. provides, in relevant part,
“A defendant shall have the right to a hearing on the extension of any order under this
paragraph to be held within 30 days of the extension.”
42. “Where the legislature, out of liberty interest concerns, has mandated time limits for
holding hearings, we have held that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is lost, absent waiver,
if the case is not heard within the statutory period.” Appeal of Martino, 138 N.H. 612, 615
(1994). See also McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643,645 (2005) (vacating civil domestic
violence order because the court failed to hold a hearing within statutorily mandated time limit).
43. Circuit Court Rule 1.4(a) provides, in relevant part, that “any person … shall be
permitted to photograph, record and broadcast all court proceedings that are open to the public,
provided that such person provides advance notice to the presiding justice in accordance with
section (c) of this rule that he or she intends to do so.” As this rule secures a guaranteed right for
all citizens, individual judges are not allowed to contravene these rules at discretion. Circuit
Court Rule 1.4(e) states,
“No court or justice shall establish notice rules, requirements or procedures that are different than
those established by this rule.”
44. The provided comment within Circuit Court Rule 1.4 states,
“Given the strong presumption under New Hampshire law that photographing, recording and/or
broadcasting court proceedings that are open to the public is allowable, this subsection is not
intended to impose lengthy or onerous advance notice requirements; instead, it recognizes that
frequently such requests will be filed only shortly before the proceeding in question is to begin.”
45. Circuit Court Rule 1.4(f) establishes specific process requirements if a party, in
exceptional circumstances, wishes to limit another party’s recording rights “to advance an
overriding public interest”. Id. After such process is obeyed,
10
“any order prohibiting or imposing restrictions beyond the terms of this rule upon the
photographing, recording or broadcasting of a court proceeding that is open to the public shall be
supported by particularized findings of fact that demonstrate the necessity of the court’s action.”
46. When a new issue is raised within a Motion for Reconsideration (as with Maravelias’s
notice of the 30-day-requirement violation), an additional responsibility sets upon the court if it
denies such motion. It must then “set forth the exact basis for its denial of the motion for
reconsideration to allow for meaningful appellate review.” Smith v. Shepard, 144 N.H. 262
(1999), citing Palazzi Corp. v. Stickney, Comm’r, 136 N.H. (1992).
47. When issuing civil protective orders under RSA 633:3-a or RSA 173-B, due process
requires that the trial court judge make specific findings on the facts which support the court’s
reasoning that stalking or abuse (respectively) was shown by a preponderance of the evidence.
See Fisher v. Minichiello, 155 N.H. (2007). Protective orders in which the judge “gives no
indication of the facts upon which the trial court relied in issuing the order, nor the reasoning”
are unlawfully violative of Supreme Court case law and automatically vacated on appeal.
Kiesman v. Middleton, 156 N.H. (2007). See also Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283 (2001).
48. The New Hampshire Supreme Court promulgates the Code of Judicial Conduct to
promote the constitutional right to an impartial judiciary. N.H. Const., Part I., Article 35 states:
“It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every individual, his life, liberty, property, and
character, that there be an impartial interpretation of the laws, and administration of justice. It is
the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as impartial as the lot of humanity will admit.”
49. The Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1, provides:
Rule 1.1 Compliance with the Law

A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Rule 1.2 Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary

A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid
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impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.
Rule 1.3 Avoiding Abuse of the Prestige of Judicial Office

A judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or
economic interests of the judge or others, or allow others to do so.
50. The Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2, provides in relevant parts:
Rule 2.2 Impartiality and Fairness

(A) A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of
judicial office fairly and impartially.
Rule 2.3 Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment

(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including administrative
duties, without bias or prejudice.
Rule 2.4 External Influences on Judicial Conduct

(B) A judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests
or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.
Rule 2.6 Ensuring the Right to Be Heard

(A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding,
or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.
Rule 2.7 Responsibility to Decide

A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge, except when
disqualification is required by Rule 2.11 or other law.
Rule 2.11 Disqualification

(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned…
Rule 2.15 Responding to Judicial and Lawyer Misconduct

(A) A judge having knowledge that another judge has committed a violation of
this Code that raises a substantial question regarding the judge’s honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a judge in other respects shall inform the appropriate
authority.
(C) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that
another judge has committed a violation of this Code shall take appropriate
action.
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51. RSA 492:1 states:
“A justice shall not sit in any case in which he has been concerned as party or attorney or in any
appeal in which he has acted as judge in the court below, or act as attorney or be of counsel for
either party or give advice in any matter pending or which may come before the court for
adjudication.”
52. In the context of DV/Stalking Protective Orders, RSA 173-B:5, VIII.(b) establishes a
legal duty, vital for sufficient due process protection, incumbent upon the issuing court to afford
defendants the opportunity to petition for modification of said orders’ terms. It states:
“If either party wishes the defendant to be excused from any provisions of an order of protection,
the remedy is to petition the court for modification of such order.”
53. Mootness is a federal justiciability doctrine which can bar once-valid claims in the
absence of a “live controversy”. See Ali v. Cangemi, 419 F.3d 722, 723 (8th Cir. 2005), Chafin v.
Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017 (2013). Far outside the scope of this Petition, Paul Maravelias maintains
sound cause for legal action against Respondent John Coughlin for willful violation of federal
constitutional rights in the form of declaratory relief. Further, the said cause of action merits
unusual relief in the form of equitable and punitive damages, as judicial immunity does not
extend to judicial act committed in the absence of personal jurisdiction. See Rankin v. Howard,
457 F. Supp. 70 (D. Ariz. 1978), Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 13 Wall. (1871) at 351. If
Respondents continue to ignore all of Maravelias’s pending Motions until the Supreme Court
potentially vacates the underlying stalking order, their dilatory practices may arguably have
enabled them, unfairly, to plead mootness as a defense to Maravelias’s intended federal
litigation. See Robinson v. City of Chicago, 868 F.2d 959, 966 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying “live
controversy” requirement also to declaratory judgement actions). See also City of Hammond v.
Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 152 Ind. App. 480, 284 N.E.2d 119, 126 (Ind. App. 1972).
13
CAUSES OF ACTION
A. PROHIBITION–
54. Prohibition is a common law writ of ancient origin. “A writ of prohibition is an
extraordinary writ used to prevent an inferior tribunal or agency from improperly exercising
jurisdiction not granted”, in excess of legal authority. In re McDonough, 149 N.H. 105, 816 A.2d
1022 (2003). A writ of prohibition may also issue to prevent a judicial officer of a lower tribunal
from abusing discretion in the exercise of the legal authority vested in it. Powell v. Pappagianis,
108 N.H. 523 (1968). Though an extraordinary measure, it is a writ of right in some cases. See
Smith v. Sampson, 114 N.H. 638 (1974), where prohibition issued against the same Respondent,
Derry District Court, for imposing certain conditions in excess of its legal authority.
55. A writ of prohibition will not lie unless “the right to relief is clear” and there is “a clear
case of necessity”. Hillsborough County v. Superior Court, 109 N.H. 333 (1969). The Petitioner
must also be without adequate alternate forms of relief. See State v. Superior Court and Justice of
the Peace Michael P. Hall, 116 N.H. 1, 350 A.2d 626 (1976) (denying prohibition where other
viable procedures offered “adequate protection” against the anticipated/ongoing harm).
Count #1: Willful Violation of Videotaping Rights in Defiance of Circuit Court Rule 1.4
56. Paragraphs 21 through 25 are incorporated by reference herein as though set forth in full.
58. Here, it is not disputed that Petitioner Maravelias has a “clear right” to record court
proceedings which are already open to the general public and in which he himself is being
accused of civil stalking. Maravelias submitted the standardized audiovisual advance notice form
prior to the 5/3/18 Hearing and fulfilled all procedural requirements pursuant to Circuit Court
Rule 1.4(f). Indeed, Maravelias was permitted to record certain limited parts of the Hearing.
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59. That Judge Coughlin’s order exceeds legal authority and improperly exercises
jurisdiction not granted him is plain. His still-in-effect standing order violates Petitioner’s
recording rights guaranteed by Circuit Court Rule 1.4(a) and promulgates a set of different rules
in direct violation of Circuit Court Rule 1.4(e). Further, the opposing party never furnished the
three distinct showings required by Circuit Court Rule 1.4(f) for extraordinary limitations on the
regular right; nor did Judge Coughlin make “particularized findings of fact that demonstrate the
necessity of the court’s action” as the rule requires. Id.
60. Petitioner is without any other adequate remedy. His pending Supreme Court appeal on
the merits of the 2018 extension mounts challenges to the constitutionality of RSA 633:3-a, III-c.
and asserts unsustainable exercise of discretion by finding of “good cause” to extend. Assuming
the Supreme Court partially or wholly affirms the extension and disposes of said challenges, its
review of the record is neither guaranteed nor expected to encompass Judge Coughlin’s illegal
standing-order limiting Maravelias’s recording rights in defiance of Circuit Court Rule 1.4.
61. Further, even if the narrow Supreme Court appeal could possibly cure Respondents’
harms noticed in this Petition, the imminent 2019 stalking order renewal Hearing will assuredly
predate any final Supreme Court mandate rendered in the appeal on the merits. As DePamphilis
has recently petitioned Derry Circuit Court to extend the order on 1/11/19, a preliminary
Supreme Court ruling issued today, 1/15/19, would be the best possible scenario undermining the
exigent necessity of this Petition. Even in such an unlikely event, this Petition would still remain
Maravelias’s sole adequate remedy: N.H. Supr. Ct. R. 22 affords 20 days to Motion for
Reconsideration litigation, on which the Supreme Court takes at least one further week to rule,
followed by 7 additional days until issuance of the mandate. See N.H. Supr. Ct. R. 24. However,
the circuit court is statutorily confined by RSA 633:3-a, III-c. to schedule a hearing on
15
DePamphilis’s new 2019 extension motion on or before 2/10/19, long-before any possible
Supreme Court resolution in Case No. 2018-0483.
62. Maravelias will thus suffer irreparable harm and injury unless this Petition is granted. He
will be forced either to forfeit his right to videotape-in-full the Hearing his accuser compels him
to attend, or be coerced to suffer restricted constitutional rights by a restraining order extended
without the benefit of guaranteed due-process time limits, if indeed he must postpone the
imminent Hearing until the Supreme Court appeal could theoretically resolve these issues – itself
quite improbable. Cf. Hillsborough County, supra, denying otherwise-merited prohibition only
where it did “not appear that any irreparable harm [would] result” absent the writ.
63. Whether Judge Coughlin’s unlawful anti-videotaping order was a good-faith
misinterpretation of the law does not inform whether a writ of prohibition should lie. See N.H.
Retail Grocers’ Ass’n v. State Tax Comm’n, 113 N.H. 511, 309 A.2n 890 (1973) (issuing
prohibition to discontinue erroneous interpretation of the law and wrongful enforcement thereof).
64. Accordingly, this case meets all prerequisite elements for a writ of prohibition.
Respondents persist in ongoing breach of legal authority, threatening to cause further imminent
injury by violating Petitioner’s “clear right” to videotape the upcoming public Hearing against
him, and Petitioner is without alternate adequate remedy. Immediate action is necessary.
Count #2: Violation of Due Process Rights by Issuance of Stalking Orders Not Containing
Specific Findings of Fact as Required by Controlling Supreme Court Case Law
65. Paragraphs 26 and 32 through 34 are incorporated by reference herein as though set forth
in full.
66. Paragraph 47 is incorporated by reference herein as though set forth in full.
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67. The cited paragraphs establish that Respondent Hon. John J. Coughlin has been and is
expected to continue violating controlling law in this area. Petitioner has standing to request a
writ of prohibition enjoining Respondent Hon. John J. Coughlin from continuing this behavior
because Respondent’s 6/15/18 Order granting the stalking order extension (Exhibit B) offered
no factual findings nor reasoning whatsoever to support his illogical, defamatory assertion that
Maravelias causes DePamphilis “reasonable fear” for her “personal safety”.4
68. For the reasons expounded in Paragraphs 60 through 62 above, Petitioner is without
alternate adequate remedy and will suffer irreparable harm without this requested writ of
prohibition. The Supreme Court appeal does not substantially address Judge Coughlin’s issuing
such orders without specific findings of fact – an ingrained behavior he is likely soon to repeat
absent the requested writ.
Count #3: Issuing Stalking Order Injunctions/Extension Thereof in Absence of Personal

Jurisdiction
69. Paragraphs 17 through 19, 25, and 28 through 31 are incorporated by reference herein as
though set forth in full.
70. Paragraphs 41 and 42 are incorporated by reference herein as though set forth in full.
71. The cited paragraphs prove that Respondents extended a stalking order in 2018 against
Maravelias in complete absence of personal jurisdiction over Maravelias. Civil protective orders
in New Hampshire cannot be “extended” once they have already lost effect. T.P. v. B.P.,
Supreme Court Case No. 2018-0139 (preliminary opinion published 12/21/2018).
4
Though disciplined not to digress into the irrelevant merits of the underlying case, Maravelias notes that
Judge Coughlin admitted and comprehended Maravelias’s exhibits revealing Christina DePamphilis’s
public social media posts inciting Maravelias, wherein she and her boyfriend middle-fingered Maravelias
and belittled him with insulting language during her “stalking” order, validating everything Maravelias
asserted to Judge Coughlin about this case: that Christina DePamphilis never had any “fear” of
Maravelias, that she is a false vexatious litigant hurling bad-faith attacks against Maravelias’s reputation.
17
72. Therefore, since DePamphilis recently motioned Respondents on 1/11/2019 for a new
extension, Respondents are now unlawfully exercising nonexistent personal jurisdiction over
Maravelias. If DePamphilis seeks further relief, she must file a brand-new stalking petition.
73. Accordingly, Maravelias will suffer irreparable harm and injury absent the petitioned writ
of prohibition. Maravelias’s First and Second Amendment rights under the federal constitution,
inter alia, are “clear” substantive “rights” which will be violated if and when the circuit court
grants any preliminary or final extension of the stalking order, lacking personal jurisdiction to do
so. Cf. Petition of CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 146 N.H. 683 (2001), granting writ of prohibition as
a matter of right where the inferior tribunal enforced an injunction similarly issued in the absence
of proper jurisdiction. “We … conclude that in light of our prior rulings on the [lower court’s]
jurisdiction, the court’s lack of jurisdiction in this case was sufficiently clear to warrant a writ of
prohibition.” Id. at 690.
alternate adequate remedy and immediate action is necessary.
B. MANDAMUS–
75. Mandamus is a common law writ of ancient origin. “A writ of mandamus is used to
compel a public official to perform a ministerial act that the official has refused to perform, or to
vacate the result of a public official’s act that was performed arbitrarily or in bad faith.” Petition
of CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., supra. For a writ of mandamus, Petitioner must show an apparent
right to the relief requested. Guarracino v. Beaudry, 118 N.H. 435 (1978); Siegel v. State, 111
N.H. 395, 396, 285 A.2d 803, 804 (1971). The Petitioner must also have no other remedy which
would afford full and adequate relief. Appeal of Morrissey, 165 N.H. 87, 70 A.3d 465 (2013).
18
76. Mandamus will lie against a governmental officer even when the action or inaction
complained of “is based upon a mistaken view of the law”. Fortier v. Grafton County, 112 N.H.
208 (1972).
Count #4: Unreasonable Delay to Rule, Self-Interested Dilatory Practices Causing

Irreparable Harm, Dereliction of Duty to Decide, and Violation of the Right of All
Interested Parties to be Fully Heard
77. Paragraphs 20 and 27 through 40 are incorporated by reference herein as though set forth
in full.
79. The cited paragraphs demonstrate Respondents’ current unethical dilatory practices are
injuring Petitioner Maravelias, creating actual prejudice against his right to seek further
warranted relief in federal court should the Supreme Court subsequently vacate the underlying
stalking order and arguably terminate any “live controversy”.
80. The cited paragraphs demonstrate Respondent’s current unethical dilatory practices are in
violation of Maravelias’s “apparent” constitutional rights, as the stalking order restricts these
rights, and as Maravelias’s discarded 3/29/18, 10/31/18, and 12/10/18 Motions seek relief which
would partially or wholly dissolve the restrictions of said Order.
81. The cited paragraphs demonstrate Respondent’s current unethical dilatory practices are in
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. These rules prohibit judges from weighing private
interests in their judicial acts (or lack thereof), establish a clear legal duty for them to act (“duty
to decide”), and guarantee Maravelias’s right to be fully heard.
19
82. Therefore, a writ of mandamus instructing Respondents to rule immediately on all
outstanding motions – one pending since March 2018 in a one-year protective order case – is a
necessary implementation of this writ.
alternate adequate remedy and will suffer irreparable harm without the requested writ of
mandamus.
Count #5: Mandatory Recusal of Hon John. J. Coughlin
86. The cited paragraphs indicate that the Code of Judicial Conduct categorically requires
Hon. Judge J. Coughlin to recuse himself in this case.
87. “When an official is given discretion to decide how to resolve an issue before him, a
mandamus order may require him to address the issue, but it cannot require a particular result.”
Rockhouse Mt. Property Owners Assoc. v. Town of Conway, 127 N.H. 593, 602, 503 A.2d 1385
(1986). Here, Judge Coughlin does not have “discretion” in the matter of his recusal: Code of
Judicial Conduct Canon 1, Rule 1.2 sets forth the clear legal duty that a judge “shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety”. (Emphasis added)
88. Since Petitioner Maravelias has accused Judge Coughlin of extensive judicial misconduct
and bias through the 57-page Motion to Set Aside Judgement, as well as throughout Supreme
Court litigation and in this very Petition, Judge Coughlin’s refusal to self-recuse doubtlessly
emanates the “appearance of impropriety”, regardless of the question of actual impropriety.
20
89. Judge Coughlin’s refusal to self-recuse implicates Petitioner’s apparent rights under Part
I., Article 35 of the State Constitution, guaranteeing Maravelias’s right “to be tried by judges as
impartial as the lot of humanity will admit”. “The object of mandamus is to compel the
performance of official duty by the unwilling, not by the willing.” Goodell v. Woodbury, 71
N.H. 378 (1902).
90. Having petitioned Judge Coughlin months ago to recuse himself, and for the reasons
expounded in Paragraphs 60 through 62 above, Petitioner is without any alternate adequate
remedy and shows the necessity of immediate action to prevent irreparable continued harm.
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition should be granted.
21
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, undersigned Petitioner Paul J. Maravelias reverentially prays The Honorable
Court:
I. Grant this Petition;
II. Issue prerogative writs to Respondents, ordering:
a. Prohibition – That Derry Circuit Court and its judicial officer(s) immediately cease
and desist unlawful recording restrictions in violation of Circuit Court Rule 1.4,
thereby respecting Maravelias’s right to videotape the entirety of the imminent
public Hearing in which Christina DePamphilis intends to accuse him;
b. Prohibition – That Derry Circuit Court and its judicial officer(s) immediately cease
and desist the unlawful practice of issuing civil protective orders without required
specific factual findings, containing only threadbare recitals of statutory language;
c. Prohibition – That Derry Circuit Court and its judicial offer(s) immediately cease
and desist granting protective order injunctions, or extensions thereof, in the
absence of personal jurisdiction over said injunctions’ respondents;
d. Mandamus – That the judicial officer(s) of Derry Circuit Court issue rulings statim
on undersigned Petitioner’s time-sensitive pending Motions in Christina
DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias (473-2016-CV-00124), to wit:
i. Maravelias’s 3/29/18 Motion to Dismiss,
ii. Maravelias’s 12/10/18 Motion to Amend Stalking Final Order of

Protection to Exclude Second-Amendment-Protected Activity,
iii. Maravelias’s 11/21/18 Motion for Recusal and Reconsideration, and
iv. As a consequence of the latter, Maravelias’s 10/31/18 Motion to Set Aside

Judgement;
e. Mandamus – That Hon. John J. Coughlin recuse himself from all further
proceedings concerning Paul Maravelias and/or Christina DePamphilis, the real
22
parties in interest;
III. Hold a Hearing, if necessary, on this matter;
IV. If there be a Hearing, order Hon. John J. Coughlin to appear at said Hearing;
V. Order Respondents to reimburse Petitioner’s costs associated with filing this action;
and
VI. Grant such other relief as may be just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,
in propria persona
_____________________________________ Dated: January 15th, 2019

/s/ Paul J. Maravelias
Windham, NH 03087
paul@paulmarv.com
603-475-3305
23
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Mandamus and
Prohibition and appended exhibits, along with signed Original Complaint and Appearance, was
forwarded on this day via first-class mail to the following recipients and addresses:
Hon. John J. Coughlin, Respondent

10 Courthouse Ln
Derry, NH 03038
10th Circuit Court – District Division – Derry, Respondents (two copies)

10 Courthouse Ln
Derry, NH 03038
Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the Real Party in Interest, Christina DePamphilis,
P.O. Box 1318
Concord, NH 03302-1318
Hon. Gordon J. MacDonald, Esq.

Attorney General of New Hampshire
New Hampshire Department of Justice
33 Capitol Street
Concord, NH 03301
January 15th, 2019 ___________________________________
/s/ Paul J. Maravelias
24
EXHIBIT A
10/31/18 MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGEMENT
October 31st, 2018

Robin E. Pinelle, Circuit Clerk
NH Circuit Court Paul Maravelias
10th Circuit – District Division – Derry 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
10 Courthouse Lane Windham, NH 03087
Derry, NH 03038
RE: Christina DePamphilis vs. Paul Maravelias

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124
Dear Clerk Pinelle,
Enclosed please find Respondent’s Motion to Set Aside Judgement to be filed in the
above-referenced case.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
Paul J. Maravelias
CC: Simon R. Brown, Esq.

EXHIBIT A
ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY
Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124
Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGEMENT
NOW COMES the Respondent, Paul Maravelias, and respectfully submits the within Motion
to Set Aside Judgement. In support thereof, he represents as follows:
1. Earlier in 2018, Judge John J. Coughlin oversaw a stalking order extension case
involving the parties. Plaintiff motioned to extend the stalking order on 1/5/18. The Court
granted the initial extension on 1/12/18 and scheduled a Hearing for 2/15/18, later continued to
5/3/18. Additional Hearing days were held on 5/4/18 and 6/8/18. John Coughlin granted the
stalking order extension on 6/15/18. Maravelias filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 6/25/18,
to which Coughlin gave a short-shrift one-world denial. The case is currently on appeal as
Supreme Court No. 2018-0483.
2. Maravelias was party to two other cases from the same approximate period over which
Judge Coughlin partially or fully presided: 1) as pro se Petitioner in Paul Maravelias v. David
DePamphilis (437-2017-CV-150) and 2) as Petitioner’s non-lawyer representative in Patti Cascio
v. John Chan (431-2018-CV-113).

EXHIBIT A
3. The summation of Judge Coughlin’s judicial activity around Mr. Maravelias throughout
these legal matters objectively evinces a common pattern of systematic bias, hostility, and
prejudice by which Judge Coughlin severely injured Maravelias through deprivation of basic
liberty and judicial libel, inter alia.
4. Maravelias files this Motion to Set Aside Judgement 1) solely in relation to the wrongful
stalking order extension in the instant case, birthed of judicial misconduct, and 2) solely on the
basis of the alleged bias and judicial misconduct.
5. That is, for the purposes of this motion, Maravelias does not 1) discuss the other weighty
legal and factual errors the trial court committed in the stalking order extension, nor 2) request
reversal of the false award of attorney’s fees Judge Coughlin wrongly issued against Maravelias.
These are matters of law currently under review by the Supreme Court.
6. Rather, Maravelias files the instant Motion to Set Aside Judgement for the first-time
seeking redress for disturbing indications hereunder of John Coughlin’s pre-retirement
misconduct, being obviously unable to do so prior to Coughlin’s 9/5/18 retirement.
7. Since Defendant Maravelias was not given a fair opportunity under Judge Coughlin’s
pre-retirement spree of dismissive, biased, and prejudiced conduct, Maravelias respectfully
requests this Court reverse the stalking order extension dated 6/15/18. See 6/15/18 Order
appended to Notice of Appeal, itself attached herewith.
A. The Timing of Judge Coughlin’s Orders Suggests Impure Motives
8. On 7/13/18, Coughlin went on a four-fold “denied”-scribbling-spree on Maravelias’s
pleadings, some of which had been pending for well-over two weeks awaiting his ruling. To wit,
Judge Coughlin reflexively denied 1) Maravelias’s 10-page Motion for Reconsideration, 2)

EXHIBIT A
Maravelias’s Motion to Strike, 3) Maravelias’s Reply to DePamphilis’s Objection to
Reconsideration, and 4) Maravelias’s Objection to DePamphilis’s outrageous motion for
expanded, draconian “stalking” order terms – all on the same day, 7/13/18.1
9. The day immediately prior on 7/12/18, Judge Coughlin had his final verbal interactions
with Maravelias when the Petitioner in Patti Cascio v. John Chan (431-2018-CV-113)
successfully motioned the Court to permit Mr. Maravelias to serve as her non-lawyer counsel in
that case.
10. Given the timing, it seems highly unlikely John Coughlin’s dismissive 7/13/18
outburst legally crucifying Maravelias every-which-way was anything but a retaliatory,
vindictive act, annoyed to see Maravelias appear once-more in his courtroom.2
11. It goes without saying that Maravelias comported himself with incredible respect
before Judge Coughlin throughout the entire history of all three cases. While Judge Coughlin
was likewise cautious to behave respectfully, amicably, and professionally during public court
proceedings outward-personality-wise, his reckless judicial actions are without any legitimate
purpose and constitute misconduct.
B. Judge Coughlin Contradicted His Honest Comments from the Hearing in His Fact-
Amnestic Extension Order, Highlighting the Dishonesty Thereof
1
The Supreme Court Notice of Appeal for this case is attached, containing all of Judge Coughlin’s
referenced Orders.
2
Upon information and belief, further indications of Judge Coughlin’s strange, perverse, and unhealthy
distaste for Maravelias were noted on 7/24/18. Maravelias attended the Roseanna Mullin v. Kimberly
Nichols (431-2018-CV-156) stalking hearing as a mere member of the public seated in the gallery. The
Petitioner failed to show up and the absurd case was dismissed; when the parties were departing,
Coughlin stared-down Maravelias with a facial expression of determined, enraged, though partially
confused, offense, as if Maravelias’s mere existence were somehow a threat to Coughlin’s authority.
Maravelias dared not acknowledge Coughlin’s non-verbal communication and proceeded straight out the
courtroom.
EXHIBIT A
12. After perceiving the undisputed fact that Christina DePamphilis incitatively bullied
and harassed Paul Maravelias with her 21-year-old boyfriend on 6/21/17 through social media by
targeting Maravelias in a public post with her and her boyfriend middle-fingering Paul
Maravelias, Judge Coughlin tossed-in a gratuitous finding in his 6/15/18 stalking-order-extension
Order, wholly unnecessary by RSA 633:3-a, III-c., that Christina DePamphilis had “reasonable
fear” of Maravelias, because Maravelias communicated to two third-parties disagreeing with the
stalking order he called “legal abuse”.
13. Coughlin’s reckless judicial libel against Maravelias, not a “stalker” but the victim of
DePamphilis’s fearless bullying, totally contradicted Coughlin’s honest comments and
impressions during trial (Transcript 73:12-18)3 wherein he indicated he understood Christina
DePamphilis clearly did not “fear” the young man she was calling-out and provocatively middle-
fingering on public social media along with her boyfriend, while she had a “stalking”
“protective” order against her victim.
14. Therefore, John Coughlin’s comment about “reasonable fear” in his 6/15/18
extension Order proves it was totally disingenuous and shamefully dismissive in Maravelias’s
prejudice.
15. Even more disturbingly, John Coughlin included in his Order the ridiculous verbal
posturing that Maravelias has a “strange, perverse and unhealthy obsession” with DePamphilis
“which … continues to this day”. See 6/15/18 Order in appended Notice of Appeal.
16. However, John Coughlin at-trial openly commented to Maravelias that he understood
the obvious fact Maravelias was repulsed by and disinterested in the false-accuser Plaintiff,
3
Referenced transcript pages are attached herewith
EXHIBIT A
saying: “it appears that you do not want to have any contact and that you’re going to do that on a
voluntary basis … you indicated that, you don’t want to have anything to do with the family, you
don’t want to have anything to do with this young woman, and you just want to be left alone and
you’re going to leave her alone. At least that’s my impression”. (Transcript 479-480)
17. Accordingly, John Coughlin’s rash stalking order extension against Maravelias is
undeniably rooted in biased, dishonest judicial conduct. The above-noted disparities indicate
John Coughlin simply ignored the facts of the case in Maravelias’s prejudice.
C. Judge Coughlin Demonstrated his Bias Against Maravelias Through Negligent

Dismissiveness
18. In Paul Maravelias v. David DePamphilis (437-2017-CV-150), Coughlin denied
Maravelias’s meritorious petition, included an alternate-universe-imagining comment that
Maravelias provided “no credible evidence” to sustain his allegations (one of the allegations was
a reproduced-as-entered-exhibit social media post in which David DePamphilis had bullied
Maravelias), and ordered Maravelias to pay his abuser $9,000 of attorney’s fees. While this
outrageous injustice is mostly a matter of law outside the context of this motion and currently
under review by the Supreme Court, a certain notable phenomenon therefrom is profitable to the
narrow judicial-misconduct-showing discussion herewith.
19. Judge Coughlin ordered Paul Maravelias to pay one of DePamphilis’s itemized
expenses of “attorney’s fees” from before the stalking petition was ever filed. When Maravelias
noted this larcenous error in his 5/21/18 Motion for Reconsideration in that case, John Coughlin
reflexively denied the reconsideration in toto, claiming Maravelias did not indicate any
overlooked “facts” or “law” to challenge the Court’s decision.

EXHIBIT A
20. That Judge Coughlin wholly ignored Maravelias’s Motion for Reconsideration to the
extent of failing to undue his veritable larceny (i.e., assuming attorney’s fees were warranted, the
Court has no jurisdiction to order payment of extraneous costs incurred months before the
stalking petition was filed) is incontrovertible proof of his biased, prejudicial, and hostile
misconduct against Maravelias.
D. Judge Coughlin Deserted his Judicial Duty to Decide
21. John Coughlin failed to issue any ruling whatsoever on Maravelias’s 3/29/18 Motion
to Dismiss in this case, ignoring its compelling legal arguments in toto. This was a willful act of
negligence: oral argument from both parties spanned the last few minutes of the final 6/8/18
Hearing before Judge Coughlin, whereupon he “[took] the matter under advisement” to conclude
the Hearing.
22. Professional standards of judicial conduct do not permit Judge Coughlin simply to
issue a rash extension Order, wash his bloody hands in the river, and retire. Maravelias rightfully
expected a ruling on his Motion to Dismiss and an articulated basis in the law for the said ruling,
not a symbolic denial thereof by way of the extension Order, seized as a pathetic opportunity for
John Coughlin to finagle his way out of actually listening to and considering Maravelias’s legal
arguments.
23. Therefore, in this particular episode of John Coughlin’s conduct, Code of Judicial
Conduct Canon 2 Rule 2.7, Rule 2.3(A), Rule 2.5(A), and Rule 2.6(A) were violated.
E. Judge Coughlin Was Adamant to See the Parties Reach a Settlement, Foreshadowing
his Prejudicial Inability to Side Against the Younger, Lawyer-Represented Female Party
24. Towards the end of the 5/4/18 Hearing, Coughlin emphatically implored the parties to
see if they could settle the case and reach an agreement, dissolving the need for him to rule on
EXHIBIT A
the motion to extend the stalking order. (Transcript 295-297) Coughlin strangely and
emphatically reanimated the same request towards the end of the 6/8/18 Hearing: he actually had
the parties take a recess to see if they could work-out a settlement. (Transcript 479-480)
25. Viewed in the context of the subsequent judicial terrorism of his libelous, fact-
amnestic 6/15/18 Order against Maravelias, John Coughlin’s adamant fixations on evading
having to rule in this case are retrospectively suggestive of his identity-politics-rooted inability to
side against the younger, female, lawyer-represented party. The absurdity of the injustice he
prejudicially expected he’d otherwise have to do against Maravelias moved John Coughlin to
seek out a potential way out of prostrating himself before the altar of feminist false-victim-
advocacy. Clearly, male, 22-year-old, pro se Maravelias did not have a fair chance when Plaintiff
motioned to extend her already-criminally-falsified “stalking” order.
F. In His 2018 Pre-Retirement Decisions Against Maravelias and Other Stalking

Defendants, Judge Coughlin Demonstrated a Habit of Unlawfully Ignoring Facts and
Baselessly Amplifying His Orders’ Language with Wholly Unsupported Legal Buzz-
Words, Reminiscent of an Autistic Child Pretending to be a Firefighter or an Astronaut
26. Through examination of public records, Maravelias has scrutinized all of Judge
Coughlin’s 2018 stalking order conduct. The results are disturbing. They are further indicative
that Maravelias was prejudiced in this case.
27. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has clarified multiple times what expectations
are binding against judicial officers granting DV/stalking orders, per the relevant statutory due-
process requirements. The most basic of these requirements is that when issuing stalking orders,
judges must specifically cite which factual allegations were relied upon as forming a “course of
conduct” under RSA 633:3-a, II. (a) to sustain the finding of stalking. “We hold that when
issuing a stalking order in response to a civil petition filed pursuant to RSA 633:3-a, III-a, the
EXHIBIT A
trial court must make findings on the record that a defendant engaged in two or more specific
acts ‘over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.’” Fisher v.
Minichiello, 155 N.H. (2007) The Supreme Court readily vacates stalking orders where the
judge’s order “gives no indication of the facts upon which the trial court relied in issuing the
order, nor the reasoning”. Kiesman v. Middleton, 156 N.H. (2007). See also Fillmore v.
Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283 (2001).
28. John Coughlin’s pre-retirement conduct was incompetent and dismissive not only in
Maravelias’s case: throughout, Coughlin would 1) totally ignore his duty to substantiate his
stalking orders with particularized factual allegations against defendants and, as an improper
substitute therefor, 2) sprinkle-in amplified legal-sounding buzz-word terms in strange,
inapplicable places, without any factual corroboration whatsoever, in order to fool the casual
reader into the deceptive semblance that Judge Coughlin was being thorough and doing his job
properly. (Exhibit D)
29. For the period 1/1/8 – 9/1/18, Derry District Court granted 9 new stalking petitions
and 2 extant stalking order extensions, inclusive of the instant case. (Exhibit A) Judge Coughlin
authored all these decisions, except for the 431-2018-CV-46 stalking petition, which was granted
in an order written by Judge Elizabeth M. Leonard, and the 431-2018-CV-139 stalking petition,
which was handled by Judicial Referee Philip Cross. (Exhibit A)
30. For some reason, Judge Leonard and Referee Cross possess the competency to do
their jobs correctly and make specific reference to factual allegations sustaining a “course of
conduct” in their stalking orders (Exhibits B and C) whereas John Coughlin totally violated the
law, and committed judicial misconduct, by completely omitting any specific factual reference
whatsoever in 7 of the 8 stalking orders he issued. (Exhibit D) Only in one stalking order, 431-
EXHIBIT A
2018-CV-69, did Judge Coughlin make any reference at all to any specific allegation against a
defendant, noting that David Morehouse “stalked” Amy Callahan when Mr. Morehouse “pointed
a power drill” at Amy during an argument. (Exhibit D)
31. If John Coughlin’s dismissive incompetency in failing to substantiate his stalking
injunctions by itself were not concerning enough, the stalking orders in question indicate another
disturbing pattern: Coughlin’s meaningless stylistic embellishments with unsupported legal
buzz-words attempting to adorn said orders with a superficial gloss of seeming competency.
32. A perfect example is John Coughlin’s highly concerning 2/1/18 stalking order in
Patricia D’Avella v. Clint DePalmer (431-2018-CV-001):
“The Petitioner appeared, was sworn and testified. Upon consideration of the
evidence, the Court finds that the Plaintiff met her Burden of Proof by a
preponderance of the evidence with regards to the allegations as set forth in the
Petition and the Petitioner is in fear of her personal safety and the Petitionee
purposely, knowingly or recklessly engaged in such Course of Conduct.”
(Exhibit D)
33. Judge Coughlin mindlessly recited the patently non-specific “purposely, knowingly
or recklessly” language of RSA 633:3-a, I(a) and even went out of his way to pepper-in the legal
buzz-word “Course of Conduct”. But, unfortunately, none of this enables Mr. DePalmer to
understand what specific acts of his caused a New Hampshire trial court to label him a “stalker”.
34. This pattern of ridiculous, incompetent, and unsubstantiated judicial behavior is
repeated throughout all 7 of Coughlin’s 8 pre-retirement 2018 stalking orders. A particularly

EXHIBIT A
striking display of vapid, meaningless repetition of statutory language within an absolutely fact-
less Order is observed at Mary Peterson v. Richard Garrigus (431-2018-CV-89).4 (Exhibit D)
35. Given Judge Coughlin’s repeated pre-retirement misconduct with stalking orders, his
reckless 6/15/18 Order against Maravelias (blanket-referencing factual allegations not supporting
whatsoever his false legal claims that Maravelias put the Petitioner “in reasonable fear”, has a
“present” “obsession”, and communicated to third-parties for “the sole purpose of
harassing/stalking the Petitioner”) is clearly disingenuous, biased, and dismissive drivel. The
resultant extended stalking order against Maravelias is a product of clear injustice and must be
reversed.
H. Judge Coughlin Wrongly Crowned Himself with Self-Fantasized Clinical Credentials
36. Where Judge Coughlin was emotionally offended by Maravelias’s non-expert use of
the generic English word “psychotic” (Page 58 of Transcript of 2/15/18 Hearing in 473-2017-
CV-150, not attached), Judge Coughlin conferred upon himself clinical credentials to allege
“obsession” in his 6/15/18 extension Order against Maravelias.
37. Aside from the obvious dishonesty of Coughlin’s amplified verbal posturing that
Maravelias has a present-day “obsession”, and aside from the fact an allegation of an
“obsession” appeared nowhere in Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend, Judge Coughlin has no business
issuing such clinical declarations while lacking necessary credentials. There was no expert
4
It is worth mentioning that Mr. Garrigus, an amicable and peaceful senile man, has been languishing in
Rockingham County Jail since the summer because of Ms. Peterson’s specious accusation he violated
Coughlin’s outrageous “stalking” order. John Coughlin committed woeful judicial misconduct in that case
by allowing the matter to continue where Mr. Garrigus clearly lacked the mental capacity to even
understand what was happening, let alone testify in own self-defense (he did not). The Petitioner in that
case, Ms. Peterson, is a demonstrable vexatious litigant who filed a different stalking petition on 6/25/18
so incredibly ridiculous that even John Coughlin dismissed it immediately without a hearing. (431-2018-
CV-121) Unsurprisingly, the defendant in that case (where Coughlin behaved sensibly, denying the
petition on-the-spot) was female.
EXHIBIT A
psychologist testimony, no supporting letters from professionals, and most importantly, no
allegation of “obsession” in the Plaintiff’s extension motion. Coughlin’s foolhardy folly of
alleging “present-day obsession” further evidences his fact-amnestic bias against Maravelias.
I. Judge Coughlin Willfully, Criminally Violated RSA 641:5, I.(B) While Further Abusing
Maravelias’s Constitutional Rights
38. DePamphilis filed a Motion on 7/2/18 in the instant case petitioning for expanded
“protective” order terms which would criminalize Maravelias’s mere possession of court exhibits
for his self-defense: Petitioner’s “social media communications”, some of which document her
middle-fingering and harassing the victimized young man she falsely accused of “stalking” and
falsely claimed to “fear” (Defendant Maravelias).
39. On 8/7/18, Judge John J. Coughlin – the prince of perversity – granted this assault on
Maravelias’ First Amendment free-speech rights, despite Maravelias’s pellucid premonitions in a
prior objection pleading that such would be in direct violation of RSA 641:4, I.(B), which
prohibits the suppression of evidentiary exhibits being used or about to be used in a court case
(to wit, the Christina-DePamphilis’s-middle-fingers-bullying-post against Maravelias in use
within the ongoing Supreme Court appeal, No. 2018-0483):
641:5 Tampering With Witnesses and Informants. –

A person is guilty of a class B felony if:
I. Believing that an official proceeding, as defined in RSA 641:1, II, or investigation is
pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person to:
(a) Testify or inform falsely; or
(b) Withhold any testimony, information, document or thing; or
(c) Elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or
(d) Absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has been
summoned; or
II. He commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by another in his
capacity as witness or informant; or
EXHIBIT A
III. He solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of his doing any
of the things specified in paragraph I.
40. John Coughlin therefore also violated criminal law as part of his rampant spree of
biased, prejudicial legal abuse against Mr. Maravelias.
J. Judge Coughlin Knowingly Violated Court Rules in Prejudice of Maravelias
41. Judge Coughlin’s knowing, reckless, and tortious violation of Maravelias’s
constitutional rights through unilateral acts of restraining-order tyranny are matters of law,
currently under Supreme Court review, which exceed the scope of the present motion.
42. However, Judge Coughlin’s willful violation of court rules in Maravelias’s prejudice
is relevant here and supports a view of Coughlin’s biased misconduct against Maravelias.
43. On 5/3/18, at the onset of the Hearing in the instant stalking order extension case,
Maravelias politely demanded the Court respect his incontrovertible right to videotape the entire
proceeding, guaranteed by Circuit Court Rule 1.4. Maravelias recited the rule to Judge Coughlin.
Coughlin willfully violated the court rules, prohibiting Maravelias from videotaping certain
aspects of the Hearing. (Transcript 5-9)
44. The New Hampshire Code of Judicial Conduct defines that:
“Law” denotes court rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions and decisional law.
45. Through his willful violation of the Circuit Court Rules guaranteeing Maravelias’s
recording rights, and through his willful or negligent disobedience of the Supreme Court’s
mandate that stalking orders be rooted in specific factual findings, John J. Coughlin has
rampantly violated Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2 Rule 2. (A) in the months immediately
prior to his 9/5/18 retirement:

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“A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”
K. The Proper Remedy for Coughlin’s Bias and Judicial Misconduct is to Set Aside
Judgement and Terminate the Stalking Final Order of Protection
46. As a generic fairness argument, since the stalking order extension was an obvious
product of Judge Coughlin’s undeniable dismissive, biased misconduct as extensively indicated
hereinabove, the stalking order extension should be reversed.
47. This is consistent with well-established federal case law. Where the New Hampshire
Family Court Rules do not specifically mention Motions to Set Aside Judgement, reference to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (“Relief from a Judgement or Order”) is proper. It
permits relief from final judgement on the grounds of:
“(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or

misconduct by an opposing party;” or
“(6) any other reason that justifies relief.”
48. Judge Coughlin’s violation of “law” while carrying out his judicial function, both
criminal statute and “law” as defined the Code of Judicial Conduct, constitutes a “fraud” upon
the Court. “It is thus fraud where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is
attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function.” Bulloch v. United
States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985). (Emphasis added)
49. For the foregoing reasons, this Honorable Court should reverse Judge Coughlin’s
6/15/18 Order extending the stalking order and his 8/7/18 Order approving DePamphilis’s
motion for further draconian terms thereto.

EXHIBIT A
WHEREFORE, the foregoing compels the Respondent, Paul Maravelias, to pray this Court:
I. Grant this Motion;
II. Reverse its 6/15/18 Order granting Petitioner’s Motion to Extend Duration of
Stalking Final Order of Protection, terminating the Stalking Final Order of
Protection;
III. Perfunctorily reverse its 8/7/18 Order granting Petitioner’s Motion for
Modification of Final Stalking Order of Protection to Include Further Terms; and
IV. Hold a Hearing, if necessary, on this matter.
PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,
in propria persona
October 31th, 2018 __________________________________

EXHIBIT A
I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the within Motion to Set Aside Judgement was
forwarded on this day through USPS Certified Mail to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the
Petitioner, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.
______________________________
October 31st, 2018

EXHIBIT A
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A list, as provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts, of all 1/1/18-9/1/18 stalking cases
at Derry District Court wherein a final order was issued or extended
EXHIBIT B
Judge Leonard’s 2018 Stalking Order, Properly Following the Law by Referencing Specific
Facts Underlying the Finding of Stalking
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EXHIBIT C
Referee Cross’s 2018 Stalking Order, Properly Following the Law by Referencing Specific Facts
Underlying the Finding of Stalking
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EXHIBIT D
John Coughlin’s 2018 Original Stalking Final Orders of Protection
EXHIBIT A
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REFERENCED TRANSCRIPT PAGES

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THE10/31/18
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
EXHIBIT A
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGEMENT
JUDICIAL BRANCH
http://www.courts.state.nh.us
RULE 7 NOTICE OF MANDATORY APPEAL
This form should be used for an appeal from a final decision on the merits issued by a superior court or circuit
court except for a decision from: (1) a post-conviction review proceeding; (2) a proceeding involving a collateral challenge
to a conviction or sentence; (3) a sentence modification or suspension proceeding; (4) an imposition of sentence
proceeding; (5) a parole revocation proceeding; (6) a probation revocation proceeding; (7) a landlord/tenant action or a
possessory action filed under RSA chapter 540; (8) an order denying a motion to intervene; or (9) a domestic relations
matter filed under RSA chapters 457 to 461-A other than an appeal from a final divorce decree or from a decree of legal
separation. (An appeal from a final divorce decree or from a decree of legal separation should be filed on this form.)
1. COMPLETE CASE TITLE AND CASE NUMBERS IN TRIAL COURT
Christina DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias

473-2016-CV-00124
2. COURT APPEALED FROM AND NAME OF JUDGE(S) WHO ISSUED DECISION(S)
10th Circuit Court - District Division - Derry

Hon. John J. Coughlin
3A. NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS OF APPEALING 3B. NAME, FIRM NAME, MAILING ADDRESS,
PARTY. IF REPRESENTING SELF, PROVIDE E-MAIL E-MAIL ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF
ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER APPEALING PARTY’S COUNSEL
Paul Maravelias
Windham, NH 03087
E-Mail address: paul@paulmarv.com E-Mail address:

Telephone number: (603) 475-3305 Telephone number:
4A. NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS OF OPPOSING 4B. NAME, FIRM NAME, MAILING ADDRESS,
PARTY. IF OPPOSING PARTY IS REPRESENTING E-MAIL ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF
SELF, PROVIDE E-MAIL ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE OPPOSING PARTY’S COUNSEL
NUMBER
Simon R. Brown, Esq.
Christina DePamphilis Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP
P.O. Box 1318
Concord, NH 03302
E-Mail address:
E-Mail address: sbrown@preti.com
Telephone number:
Telephone number: (603) 410-1500
EXHIBIT A
5. NAMES OF ALL OTHER PARTIES AND COUNSEL IN TRIAL COURT
6. DATE OF CLERK’S NOTICE OF DECISION OR 7. CRIMINAL CASES: DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE

SENTENCING. ATTACH COPY OF NOTICE AND AND BAIL STATUS
DECISION.
June 28th, 2018
DATE OF CLERK’S NOTICE OF DECISION ON POST-
TRIAL MOTION, IF ANY. ATTACH COPY OF NOTICE
AND DECISION.
August 7th, 2018 and August 13th, 2018
8. APPELLATE DEFENDER REQUESTED? YES NO

IF YOUR ANSWER IS YES, YOU MUST CITE STATUTE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY UPON WHICH CRIMINAL
LIABILITY WAS BASED AND ATTACH FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT (OCC FORM 4)
9. IS ANY PART OF CASE CONFIDENTIAL? YES NO

IF SO, IDENTIFY WHICH PART AND CITE AUTHORITY FOR CONFIDENTIALITY.
SEE SUPREME COURT RULE 12.
10. IF ANY PARTY IS A CORPORATION, LIST THE NAMES OF PARENTS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES.
11. DO YOU KNOW OF ANY REASON WHY ONE OR MORE OF THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES WOULD BE
DISQUALIFIED FROM THIS CASE? YES NO
IF YOUR ANSWER IS YES, YOU MUST FILE A MOTION FOR RECUSAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUPREME
COURT RULE 21A.
12. IS A TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS NECESSARY FOR THIS APPEAL?

YES NO
IF YOUR ANSWER IS YES, YOU MUST COMPLETE THE TRANSCRIPT ORDER FORM ON PAGE 4 OF THIS
FORM.
EXHIBIT A
13. LIST SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO BE RAISED ON APPEAL, EXPRESSED IN TERMS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THE CASE, BUT WITHOUT UNNECESSARY DETAIL. STATE EACH QUESTION IN A SEPARATELY NUMBERED
PARAGRAPH. SEE SUPREME COURT RULE 16(3)(b).
1. Is 633:3-a, III-c unconstitutionally overbroad or otherwise void for vagueness

facially and/or as-applied to this case?
2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Christina
DePamphilis had “reasonable fear” of the Defendant given her mid-order incitative
harassment against him?
3. Did the trial court commit an unsustainable exercise of discretion and/or an error of
law in granting the stalking order extension?
4. Has the same trial court judge presiding over this case and Mr. Maravelias’s
stalking petition against David DePamphilis (Hon. John J. Coughlin) carried out an
unjust course of conduct on the brink of his retirement, marked by rampant
prejudicial bias against Mr. Maravelias?
5. Did the trial court violate Defendant Maravelias’s procedural due process rights?
6. Did the trial court violate de novo Defendant’s rights afforded by substantive due
process or by the specific advance notice requirement of 173-B:3, I, and/or
wrongly re-commit similar violation(s) previously committed by the initial
protective order by virtue of extending it?
7. Assuming 633:3-a, III-c is constitutional on its face, do acts of lawful, non-

threatening speech constitute sufficient “good cause” concern for Plaintiff’s “safety
or well-being” to warrant stalking order extension?
8. Did Judge Coughlin commit a class B felony violation of RSA 641:5, I (B) in
granting Plaintiff’s 7/2/18 post-trial motion for expanded protective orders,
forbidding Maravelias inter alia from even “possessing” her vulgar harassment
social media posts against him, which are public legal exhibits necessary for his
legal defense?
9. Did the trial court err in granting Plaintiff’s 7/2/18 post-trial motion for addition of
expanded protective orders?
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14. CERTIFICATIONS
I hereby certify that every issue specifically raised has been presented to the court below and has
been properly preserved for appellate review by a contemporaneous objection or, where appropriate,
by a properly filed pleading.
Appealing Party or Counsel
I hereby certify that on or before the date below, copies of this notice of appeal were served on all
parties to the case and were filed with the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken in
accordance with Rule 26(2).
August 16th, 2018

Date Appealing Party or Counsel
EXHIBIT A
TRANSCRIPT ORDER FORM
INSTRUCTIONS:
1. If a transcript is necessary for your appeal, you must complete this form.
2. List each portion of the proceedings that must be transcribed for appeal, e.g., entire trial (see Supreme Court Rule
15(3)), motion to suppress hearing, jury charge, etc., and provide information requested.
3. Determine the amount of deposit required for each portion of the proceedings and the total deposit required for all
portions listed. Do not send the deposit to the Supreme Court. You will receive an order from the Supreme Court
notifying you of the deadline for paying the deposit amount to the court transcriber. Failure to pay the deposit by the
deadline may result in the dismissal of your appeal.
4. The transcriber will produce a digitally-signed electronic version of the transcript for the Supreme Court, which will be
the official record of the transcribed proceedings. Parties will be provided with an electronic copy of the transcript in
PDF-A format. A paper copy of the transcript will also be prepared for the court.
PROCEEDINGS TO BE TRANSCRIBED
PROCEEDING TYPE OF PROCEEDING NAME OF LENGTH OF RATE DEPOSIT

DATE (Motion hearing, opening JUDGE PROCEEDING (standard rate
(List each day statement, trial day 2, etc.) (in .5 hour unless ordered
separately, e.g. segments, by Supreme
5/1/11; 5/2/11; e.g.,1.5 hours, 8 Court)
6/30/11) hours)
DV/Stalking PO
5/3/18 Coughlin, J. 1.5 hrs. X $137.50 $206.25
Extension Hearing
DV/Stalking PO
5/4/18 Coughlin, J. 2.5 hrs. X $137.50 $343.75
Extension Hearing
DV/Stalking PO
6/8/18 Coughlin, J. 2.5 hrs. X $137.50 $343.75
Extension Hearing
TOTAL
DEPOSIT $893.75
PROCEEDINGS PREVIOUSLY TRANSCRIBED
PROCEEDING TYPE OF NAME OF NAME OF DO ALL DEPOSIT

DATE PROCEEDING JUDGE TRANSCRIBER PARTIES FOR
(List date of (Motion hearing, opening HAVE COPY ADDITIONAL
each transcript statement, trial day 2, (YES OR NO) COPIES
volume) etc.)
DV/Stalking Final Sheri Chism Yes No TBD
1/5/2017 Stephen, R.
Hearing (AVTranz)
Brittany Donnell Yes No TBD
DV/Stalking Final
1/12/2017 Stephen, R. and Nancy Dewitz
Hearing
(AVTranz)
Nancy Dewitz and Yes No TBD
DV/Stalking Final
2/1/2017 Stephen, R. Susan Leong
Hearing
(AVTranz)
NOTE: The deposit is an estimate of the transcript cost. After the transcript has been completed, you will be required to
pay an additional amount if the final cost of the transcript exceeds the deposit. Any amount paid as a deposit in excess of
the final cost will be refunded. The transcript will not be released to the parties until the final cost of the transcript is paid
in full.
EXHIBIT A
Enclosed hereinafter (p. 7 – 20) pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(6)(A):
1. 6/28/18 NOTICE OF DECISION AND FINDINGS OF FACT ON MOTION TO EXTEND STALKING ORDER AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
a. CLERK’S 6/28/18 NOTICE OF DECISION – P. 7
b. 6/15/18 ORDER ON STALKING ORDER EXTENSION – P. 8
c. FINDING OF FACTS IN 6/15/18 ORDER ON STALKING ORDER EXTENSION – P. 9
d. 6/12/18 DENIAL ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY – P. 10
2. 8/7/18 CLERK’S NOTICE AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ORDER
ON DEFENTANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE
a. CLERK’S 8/7/18 NOTICE – P. 11
b. 7/13/18 DENIAL ORDER OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION – P. 12
c. 7/13/18 DENIAL ORDER OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE – P. 13
3. 8/13/18 CLERK’S NOTICE AND ORDERS ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF STALKING
FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION TO INCLUDE FURTHER TERMS AND RELATED PLEADINGS; DENIAL
ORDER OF DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
a. CLERK’S 8/13/18 NOTICE – P. 14
b. 8/7/18 DENIAL ORDER OF DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF STALKING FINAL ORDER OF
PROTECTION – P. 15
c. 7/13/18 ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE – P. 16
d. 8/7/18 ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR MODIFICATION OF STALKING FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION – P. 17
e. 7/13/18 DENIAL ORDER OF DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
MODIFICATION OF STALKING FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION – P. 18
f. 7/13/18 DENIAL ORDER OF DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION – P. 19
g. 8/7/18 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF STALKING FINAL
ORDER OF PROTECTION – P. 20
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JUDGE COUGHLIN'S 6/15/18 EXTENSION ORDER AGAINST MARAVELIAS
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JUDGE COUGHLIN'S 6/15/18 EXTENSION ORDER AGAINST MARAVELIAS
EXHIBIT C
6/25/18 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND JUDGE COUGHLIN'S ONE-WORD DENIAL THEREOF
ROCKINGHAM, SS 10th CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY
Docket No. 473-2016-CV-124
v.
Paul Maravelias
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Paul Maravelias, the Respondent, in dutiful compliance with the customs necessitated by proper court
etiquette, restrains his justified indignation and submits respectfully this Motion for Reconsideration of
the Court’s unlawful 6/15/18 Order extending the Stalking Order in the above-referenced case.
1. Christina DePamphilis (hereinafter, the “Petitioner”) is a high school senior turning 18 this year. She
has pictured herself consuming and/or under the influence of alcoholic and other controlled substances
in social media artifacts submitted to this Court while complaining that Maravelias’s non-threatening,
lawful expressions made in private to other parties endanger her “personal safety”. She filed a
Stalking Petition against Mr. Maravelias in late 2016 after he respectfully invited her to dinner and
never spoke to her ever again after the day of her rejection. She complained of his older age in the
Petition and then pictured herself united to a 21-year-old boyfriend weeks later as a 16-year-old. At
the 5/3/18 Hearing, she said she feels she is being “stalked” by Mr. Maravelias “every single day”
because he continues to “mention [her and her legal action against him] to other people”.
2. Paul Maravelias (hereinafter, the “Respondent”) is a 23-year-old author and recent Ivy League
graduate who is presently employed as a software engineer. The first time he asked a young woman
1
EXHIBIT C
out to dinner, she filed a vindictive Stalking Petition weeks later against him because her father David
DePamphilis had an argument with him and was extremely angry. The Petitioner later had Mr.
Maravelias arrested for attempting to defend himself against her false accusations in her Stalking
Petition. To disprove her malignant claims about what he had actually said to her, he introduced a
sentimental, happenstance cell-phone audio recording he had made with a popular Android
smartphone app outdoors during his date proposal to her. Unbeknownst to Mr. Maravelias, the victim,
this is apparently illegal in New Hampshire and called “wiretapping”. For context, unlike the “minor”
Petitioner, Maravelias has not had a drink in years, is chaste, and refrains from criminal perjury.
3. In a 6/15/18 Order signed by Judge John J. Coughlin, this Court extended Petitioner’s Stalking Order.
A. THIS COURT’S FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER HAS FEARED “FOR HER PERSONAL SAFETY” IS
LAUGHABLY ABSURD, GIVEN HER DOCUMENTED CONDUCT OF CRUELLY BULLYING MR.
MARAVELIAS ON THE INTERNET WITH VULGAR GESTURES DURING THE PENDENCY OF HER
FRAUDULENT STALKING ORDER, IN A FAILED ATTEMPT TO GET HIM TO VIOLATE IT AND HAVE
HIM ARRESTED, SHOWING HER MALICIOUS BAD-FAITH AND FULL CONFIDENCE THAT HE IS A
NON-VIOLENT AND LEVEL-HEADED PERSON
4. Petitioner’s testimony and Respondent’s accepted exhibits in this case both established that the
Petitioner made a public social media post specifically directed at Respondent on 6/21/17.
5. Her inciting, harassing, and vulgar post against Mr. Maravelias pictured herself with her father and
21-year-old boyfriend, all three parties middle-fingering the camera to insult Mr. Maravelias that he
had failed to have a relationship with Petitioner and was then subject to her falsified restraining order.
6. At the Hearing, Petitioner also confessed to posting another image wherein her boyfriend addressed
Mr. Maravelias with incendiary remarks. This was after the Petitioner lied about having “fear” of him.
7. To put it lightly, this Court’s conduct is shocking and reckless in condoning Christina DePamphilis’s
and David DePamphilis’s 1) willful legal abuse through a bad-faith Stalking Petition, 2) perjury about
having any “fear” of the Respondent, and 3) outright provocative bullying against Mr. Maravelias in
said social media post(s), by actually granting her Motion to Extend a Stalking Order wherein the
roles of victim and perpetrator are undeniably reversed.
2
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8. This Court turns a blind eye to Petitioner’s public interpersonal terrorism against Mr. Maravelias on
social media and her documented illegal acts (such as her underage alcoholic intoxication pictured in
Respondent’s exhibit(s) and even in her own), but has no qualms about issuing a baseless extension
against Respondent even when the “personal safety” of the Petitioner was clearly never threatened.
9. This Court then dares the audacity to uphold its recent ruling inculpating Mr. Maravelias of “bad
faith” conduct in his honest Stalking Petition against David DePamphilis, in an Order dated 6/14/181.
10. This Court has woefully calpestated the natural rights of Respondent through inexcusable, biased
conduct and should expect to be sanctioned accordingly by higher state and/or federal authorities.
B. THE PETITIONER, CHRISTINA DEPAMPHILIS, HAS ABSOLUTELY NO CREDIBILITY, AS

MARAVELIAS IRREFUTABLY DOCUMENTED HER DELUSIONAL, REVISIONIST MEMORY AND/OR
OUTRIGHT WILLFUL LYING AT MULTIPLE OCCASIONS DURING THE HEARING; THE COURT
THEREFORE ERRS TO RELY UPON HER MATERIAL REPRESENTATIONS
11. This Court granted an extension on a Stalking Order in which the Petitioner’s lies or false
representations of fact, in whole or in part, are beyond dispute. Respondent submitted her testimony
transcript from the 1/5/17 Hearing wherein she admitted to falsely inserting words into Maravelias’s
mouth, confessing he never said the phrase “you will learn to love me” as she alleged in her Petition.
12. The Court also saw a cell-phone video of a 2013 Turkey Trot outdoor event showing Petitioner
walking across a crowd to interrupt Respondent’s conversation with friends and say hello to him,
when her false Petition perjuriously claimed that “he came up to [her]” and made her “scared”.
13. This Court sat back and watched as the Petitioner perjured during the Hearing, as Maravelias pointed
out in testimony, yet still granted her abusive extension. The Petitioner claimed the sole purpose for
her demeaning middle-finger post against Mr. Maravelias was “to let him know” that she knew he
could view the account. But, Maravelias then revealed a posting from her same social media account
two days prior to the 6/21/17 vulgar post, which had already directly identified Maravelias on 6/19/17.
1
Maravelias’s unnecessarily polite Motion to Reconsider in that matter had documented clear facts and points of law
overlooked by this Court’s oppressive award of attorney’s fees, even to the extent that one of the granted expenses was dated
from months before Maravelias even filed his truthful Stalking Petition. That this Court would wholly ignore this fact and all
others raised in a knee-jerk, thoughtless, nondescript, and hastily-scribbled rejection of said motion in entirety is reminiscent of
its reckless finding in the instant case. Clearly, this Court automatically disregards all of Maravelias’s presented facts and
arguments, and is but a slave unto the contrived optics of the side flashing a 17-year-old female before the Court and whining
baselessly about “victimization”. Thus, judicial malpractice has obstructed a fair outcome for Mr. Maravelias.
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14. The 6/19 exhibit (which Petitioner didn’t know Respondent had) also shows her dishonesty in
claiming to be the “only one who knew” to whom the vulgar gestures were directed. Her boyfriend
addressed Maravelias in her 6/19 post; therefore, he and, by extension, David DePamphilis, all knew
exactly whom they were bullying in the 6/21/17 post2. For this Court to validate a bold liar of such
turpitude by extending her falsified order against the victim is shameful, rash, and utterly emetic.
15. This Court’s Order has thus endorsed a felony crime under the perjury statute (RSA 641:1): willful
misrepresentation of fact in a protective order case. Ergo, it is noted that this Court does not operate
whatsoever according to the laws of the land, but rather only to its arbitrary and capricious diktats3.
C. THE COURT’S ORDER IS BLATANTLY ERRONEOUS INSOFAR AS IT RELIES UPON A WRONG

FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS AN “OBSESSION” WITH THE PETITIONER “TO THIS DAY”,
WHICH NEGLIGENTLY IGNORES A MOUNTAIN OF EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY TO THE
CONTRARY CONVENIENTLY IGNORED BY THE COURT’S ORDER
16. The Court cites Respondent’s wrongly-pluralized “letters” (Maravelias’s 11/2017 reply to Attorney
Brown’s legal threat) and “emails” (Maravelias’s private complaint email to an honor society) as
indications of a “strange, perverse and unhealthy obsession” he allegedly has for the Petitioner.
17. This wanton act of libel against Mr. Maravelias is highly disturbing, considering that both referenced
communications 1) enthusiastically declared his disgraced disinterest in the Petitioner, 2) were made
to parties other than Petitioner, and 3) fulfilled a legitimate purpose of responding to a legal threat and
complaining to a public honor society in a private email to a close mentor of his, respectively.
18. The Court unethically abuses its judicial immunity in libeling Maravelias in this fashion,
misconstruing his rightful “letter” and “email” completely out of context as “obsessive” acts. The
2
Respondent also noted for the Court that Christina DePamphilis deleted her public social media account containing these posts
mere days before filing her Motion to Extend on 1/5/18. Also, the Court’s “obsession” finding attempts to make a medical,
psychological finding when the testimony of an expert in the field would be necessary to sustain a finding of “obsession”.
3
This Court’s illegal misconduct with Stalking Orders is hardly new or unusual. For instance, this Court recently granted a
Stalking Final Order of Protection in Mary Peterson v. Richard Garrigus (431-2018-CV-0089) on 6/4/18 with a written Order
containing absolutely no specific findings of fact articulating a “stalking” “course of conduct” whatsoever. This flies in the face
of judicial requirements imposed by the NHSC. (See Fisher v. Minichiello, 155 N.H. 188, 193, 921 A.2d 385 (2007) “We have
interpreted RSA 633:3-a, II(a), since it ‘contains an enumerated list of prohibited conduct,’ to require trial courts to make
specific findings as to the course of conduct warranting a final stalking order.”, South vs. McCabe, 943 A.2d 779 (2008) “The
trial court failed to make such findings in this case. The final stalking order … gives no indication of either the facts or the
reasoning upon which the trial court based its decision. Both this court and the respondent are thus left to speculate as to the
precise nature of the trial court's findings, and whether sufficient evidence was in fact introduced to support them. We therefore
vacate the final stalking order and remand. Kiesman, 156 N.H. at 482, 937 A.2d at 919.”)
4
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record reflects they were actually self-defensive expressions begotten of the same false accusation of
“obsessive”, stalking behavior. Given these outrageous comments in its finding, it follows that the
Court too has a “stalking obsession” with Mr. Maravelias, since it has engaged in the exact same act
as his “letter” and “email”: i.e., writing in a detached, objective fashion about someone’s perceived
wrongdoing. If such acts of speech signify a “stalking obsession”, then everyone is a “stalker”.
19. Judicial estoppel prevents Petitioner from stating Respondent has an ongoing “obsession”, since even
her counsel termed it a “previous obsession” in a recent filing. Therefore, to fuel its verbal posturing
against Mr. Maravelias in its finding, this Court asserts an unspecified liberty to make representations
against him even beyond what Petitioner and counsel themselves alleged.
20. Respondent also testified amply to his disinterest in his legal abuser, the Petitioner, disclosing that her
recent corpulence inhibited his ability to even recognize her when seen in the Court parking lot.
D. THE COURT’S WRITTEN FINDINGS OF “REASONABLE FEAR” AND AN “OBSESSION” CONFLICT

WITH ITS ACCURATE STATEMENTS IN THE HEARING AND THUS FORM AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
21. On 6/8/18, the Court accurately remarked while listening to Respondent’s closing argument,
“You indicated that you don't want to have anything to do with the family, you don't want to have anything
to do with this young woman, and you just want to be left alone and you're going to leave her alone - at
least that’s my impression, and that’s what you’ve indicated.” (Hon. John Coughlin, 12:03:02pm 6/8/18)
22. But, on 6/15/18, the Court impetuously defamed Maravelias with the following amplified verbal
posturing in its Order: “[Respondent’s acts of private speech] clearly demonstrate a strange, perverse and
unhealthy obsession by the Petitionee towards the Petitioner which … continues to this day.”
23. This inconsistency is confusing and inexplicable. The Court’s palpably insincere self-contradiction
regarding a “present” “obsession” by Respondent must therefore be estopped, and its Order vacated.
24. The same is true concerning the Order’s unsupported finding of “reasonable fear” given the Court’s
following 5/3/18 remark during cross-examination of Petitioner:
“I think you had a good point there in terms of posting this, and where it was posted, and the circumstances,
and the context, and whether or not she felt a concern for her personal safety or well-being.” (Hon. John
Coughlin, 2:42:57pm 5/3/18)
E. THE COURT WRONGFULLY BASED ITS EXTENSION DECISION ON PHOTOGRAPHS PETITIONER

INTRODUCED OF RESPONDENT’S PRIVATE SENTIMENTAL ARTIFACTS IN HIS BEDROOM FROM
YEARS AGO WHICH IN FACT DEPICTED HIS LONG-PRIOR ATTRACTION THERETO, BEFORE HER
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EXHIBIT C
LEGAL ABUSE OF THE VICTIM WITH A FALSE STALKING PROTECTIVE ORDER, AND NOT AT ALL
NOT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE STALKING ORDER
25. On 6/8/18, after the Petitioner had rested, she submitted four photographs of Respondent’s private
interior bedroom and office space, dated 4/6/17.
26. Respondent testified that the pictures snapshotted a state of existence from prior to his victimization
in the false “stalking” matter, since he had been living at college and not in the pictured space
substantially or entirely from late December 2016 through April 2017.
27. That the Court would bestow validation upon the Petitioner’s bad-faith, malicious attempt to humiliate
Mr. Maravelias with such irrelevant intrusions of his privacy by daring to libel him a further “stalker”
just because he once put a motivational quote on his wall constitutes a strange, perverse, and
unhealthy exercise of discretion by this Court in clear prejudice of the Respondent.
28. Respondent is victim of a corrupt judicial tyranny which violates his Fourteenth Amendment right to
privacy by injunctively penalizing him for exercising his full right to have “coke bottles” in his room
and “motivational phrases” on his wall, even regardless of these happenstances’ past-nature.
29. In the past year, Christina DePamphilis has 1) incessantly, falsely complained to the police to try to
get Maravelias arrested, 2) illicitly collected pictures of Maravelias’s private bedroom without his
knowledge, and 3) cruelly targeted Maravelias with vulgar, incitative gestures on the web – all while
Maravelias remained silent to her and ignored her attempts for attention. Who is the “stalker”?
F. THE SAID PHOTOGRAPHS WERE UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED BY WINDHAM POLICE IN TORTIOUS

EXCESS OF THE LIMITED TERMS OF THE SEARCH WARRANT GRANTED IN THE AUDIO
RECORDING MATTER IN WHICH PETITIONER FURTHER ABUSED MR. MARAVELIAS; THE COURT
MAY THEREFORE NOT LAWFULLY RELY UPON THEM
30. The said photographs were taken by Windham Police during an unconstitutional raid on Maravelias’s
house to seize his digital property for evidence of his banal sentimental cell-phone recording.
31. The terms of the search warrant were highly specific. Taking pictures of unrelated sentimental
objects/fixtures on the Respondent’s bedroom wall grievously exceeded the scope of the warrant and
violated Respondent’s Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The exclusionary rule
enjoins this evidence, taken illegally by a government agency, from being used against Respondent.
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EXHIBIT C
G. THE COURT’S GRANTING PETITIONER’S EXTENSION MOTION IS ERRONEOUS SINCE HER

MOTION IS PATENTLY UNREASONABLE, AS RESPONDENT’S ALLEGED CONDUCT, EVEN IF
PROVEN, DOES NOT THREATEN HER “SAFETY OR WELL-BEING”
32. Petitioner’s Motion to Extend is rooted in her complaint that Maravelias sent an email to one of his
teachers and responded to an attorney’s threatening letter, claiming that she is a “disreputable whore”.
33. To find that Respondent’s provoked, offensive, and accurate language to a person who is not the
Petitioner could possibly constitute a threat to her “safety or well-being” is groundless and asinine.
H. THE COURT’S ORDER EGREGIOUSLY VIOLATES RESPONDENT’S STATE AND FEDERAL

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS SINCE IT RELIES UPON HIS TWO ACTS OF CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED, LAWFUL SPEECH MADE FOR A LEGITIMATE PURPOSE
34. The Respondent denied authorship of Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, which was not sent to Petitioner’s whole
“family” but to David DePamphilis. Respondent’s only acts of speech cited in the Court’s order for
which he is actually responsible were made for legitimate, constitutionally valid purposes.
35. I.e., Respondent’s 1) response to Attorney Brown’s threatening letter and 2) private email to his high
school mentor who also runs the public honor society are acts of free speech lying entirely outside the
narrow categories of First Amendment protection exceptions, such as “fighting words” or obscenity.
I. THE COURT’S ORDER IS NULL AND VOID SINCE RESPONDENT WAS NOT GIVEN A FAIR TRIAL
I. (a) THE COURT ILLEGALLY LIMITED HIS RIGHT TO VIDEOTAPE THE HEARING AND ENABLED
PETITIONER THEREBY TO PERSIST IN HER DISHONEST, BAD-FAITH CONDUCT AGAINST THE VICTIM
36. In keeping with its known habit of delegating unto itself powers found nowhere in the law, this Court
granted the Petitioner’s obscurantist motion to limit Respondent’s right to videotape the entirety of the
public hearing on Petitioner’s Motion to Extend the Stalking Order in this case.
37. Respondent had shown the Court its own rule (District Court Rule 1.4) which permits any person to
“photograph, record and broadcast all court proceedings that are open to the public” and gave
“advance notice” as required. The rule further states in 1.4 (e), “no court or justice shall establish
notice rules, requirements or procedures that are different than those established by this rule.”
38. Since this Court operates entirely outside the boundaries fixed by written rules and laws, it
nonetheless granted Petitioner’s request to partially limit Respondent’s right to videotape, prohibiting
that the “minor” Petitioner be videotaped. The Court endorsed her pictured underage illegal substance
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EXHIBIT C
consumption and online criminal harassment (RSA 644:4) of Maravelias by granting the extension,
yet made sure to protect her face from being videotaped in her own open-to-the-public Hearing. This
error substantially interfered with Maravelias’s right to a fair trial, since it enabled Petitioner to persist
in her storied dishonesty while testifying, without the accountability of being videotaped.
I. (b) THE COURT DISOBEYED THE WITHIN-30-DAYS HEARING REQUIREMENT OF 633:3-A III-c
39. The Petitioner filed her Motion to Extend on 1/5/18, with the temporary extended Stalking Order,
pending hearing, issued on 1/12/18 by Judge Sharon DeVries. Respondent objected, and a Hearing
was finally scheduled for Thursday 2/15/18 – 34 days thereafter. Furthermore, the Court did not
actually afford Respondent an opportunity to hold the Hearing until 2/20/18 – 39 days after extension.
40. Since the Court violated Respondent’s state and federal constitutional rights to a speedy trial, and
even violated the specific statutory requirement in RSA 633:3-A III-c, the extended Order is null and
void. (see Id., “A defendant shall have the right to a hearing on the extension of any order under this
paragraph to be held within 30 days of the extension.”)
J. THE COURT MAY NOT EXTEND AN ALREADY-ILLEGAL STALKING ORDER ISSUED IN PLAIN-
ERROR CONTRAVENTION OF PERTINENT STATUTORY LAW AS INTERPRETED BY THE SUPREME
COURT; THE COURT FAILED TO EVEN RULE ON A MOTION TO DISMISS ON THIS ISSUE
41. As documented in Respondent’s ignored 3/29/18 Motion to Dismiss, the original Stalking Order was
issued in violation of the advance notice requirement of RSA 173-B:3 as clarified by NHSC case law.
42. Thus, it is unfair to subject Respondent to a different and lower standard of Stalking Order extension
(633:3-a III-c.) predicated on a valid initial finding of stalking in principio (a higher standard under
633:3-a III-a.) when such an original finding of stalking was never lawfully made in this matter.
K. THIS COURT’S ACT OF IGNORING RESPONDENT’S TWO MOTIONS IN THIS CASE AND
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS HIS ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE IN ITS
FINDING CONSTITUTE A CLEAR VIOLATION INTER ALIA OF MARAVELIAS’S FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT SUBSTANTIVE AND/OR PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
43. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Extension and Vacate Stalking Order dated 3/29/18 and a
Motion for Discovery dated 5/29/18 in the case at bar. The opposing party filed reply briefs to both
motions. The Court heard oral argument on these motions from both parties on 6/8/18 at the Hearing.
8
EXHIBIT C
44. The Court’s 6/15/18 Order granting extension completely ignores these motions, as well as the legal
issues they raised. The Court simply cast them out into the wind, refusing to rule on them either way.
45. In neglecting to perform its required “ministerial act” of ruling on critical motions, the Court violated
Maravelias’s federal due process rights and state constitutional right “to be fully heard in his defense”.
L. THE STALKING STATUTE IS FACIALLY INVALID AND/OR INVALID AS APPLIED ACCORDING TO

THE STATUTORY OVERBREADTH AND/OR VAGUENESS DOCTRINES, AS THE COURT BASELESSLY
FOUND LAWFUL SPEECH TO THIRD PARTIES TO CAUSE “REASONABLE FEAR” AND THREATEN
PETITIONER’S “SAFETY AND WELL-BEING”
M. THE COURT’S FINDING THAT RESPONDENT’S COMMUNICATIONS CREATED “REASONABLE

FEAR” IS INCORRECT AND/OR INVALID, SINCE RESPONDENT NEVER EXPLICITLY THREATENED
PETITIONER NOR IMPLIED HARM TO ANYONE, AND SINCE NONE OF HIS CONDUCT WAS
OBJECTIVELY LIKELY TO BE FOLLOWED BY VIOLENCE OR CRIME
N. PETITIONER’S NEW SURPRISE-ACCUSATION OF “OBSESSIVE” CONDUCT WITH THE 4/6/17

PICTURES APPEARED NOWHERE IN HER EXTENSION MOTION; THE COURT AGAIN VIOLATED
RESPONDENT’S RIGHT TO ADVANCE NOTICE OF ACCUSATIONS BY RELYING ON THEM
O. THIS COURT’S ORDER IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT IS PUNCTUATED BY AN ENTIRELY

UNSUPPORTED “SOLE PURPOSE OF HARASSING AND STALKING THE PETITIONER” COMMENT
WHICH IS BUT A PUSILLANIMOUS ACT OF VERBAL POSTURING TO MAKE THE OUTRAGEOUS
EXTENSION ORDER SOUND REASONABLE; THE COURT OPERATES WELL OUTSIDE ITS GENERAL
EQUITABLE POWERS IN SLANDERING MR. MARAVELIAS, THE VICTIM, AS ENGAGED IN THE
CRIME OF “STALKING” WITH SUCH GRATUITOUS OBITER DICTA EXPRESSED ALONGSIDE NO
FACTUAL BASIS THEREFOR WHATSOEVER
46. This illogical comment in the Court’s Order would have one believe that Mr. Maravelias’s choice to
respond to Attorney Brown’s letter threatening him with a lawsuit was not a “legitimate” “behavior”,
and that said act of responding to the threatening letter shows a “sole purpose” of “stalking” the
daughter of Attorney Brown’s client. While such a creative endeavor of absurdity might be humorous
elsewhere, it is right-appalling within a context where Respondent’s basic liberties are at stake.
47. This Court’s automatic, reflexive rejection of any and all of Mr. Maravelias’s evidence or arguments
in toto against Petitioner and/or her father in its findings has become an irrefutable pattern, especially
given its unsustainable exercise of discretion in the related Petition against Mr. DePamphilis which
completely ignored all of Mr. Maravelias’s truthful evidence (testimony, letters, and pictures) and
instead asserted an imagined, alternate reality wherein Maravelias gave “no credible evidence”.
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EXHIBIT C
EXHIBIT D
JUDGE COUGHLIN'S 11/16/18 ORDER
DISMISSING THE 10/31/18 MOTION ALLEGING HIS OWN BIAS AND MISCONDUCT
EXHIBIT E
11/21/18 MOTION FOR RECUSAL AND RECONSIDERATION
November 21st, 2018

Robin E. Pinelle, Circuit Clerk
NH Circuit Court Paul Maravelias
10th Circuit District Division Derry 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
10 Courthouse Lane Windham, NH 03087
Derry, NH 03038
RE: Christina DePamphilis vs. Paul Maravelias

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124
Dear Clerk Pinelle,
Enclosed please find Respondent s Motion for Recusal and Reconsideration to be filed in
the above-referenced case.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
Paul J. Maravelias
CC: Simon R. Brown, Esq.

EXHIBIT E
ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT DISTRICT DIVISION DERRY
Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124
v.
Paul Maravelias
MOTION FOR RECUSAL AND RECONSIDERATION
COMES NOW Respondent Paul Maravelias and respectfully submits the within Motion for
Recusal and Reconsideration pursuant to New Hampshire Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1,
Rule 1.2 and Canon 2, Rule 2.2 and 2.11; Circuit Court District Division Rules 1.8-A.(H) and
3.11(E); RSA 492:1; and Part I, Article 35 of the Constitution of the State of New Hampshire.
In support thereof, Respondent asserts the following:
1. On 10/31/18, undersigned Respondent filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgement in this
case identifying nine general areas in which Judge Coughlin did commit, potentially committed,
or could reasonably be argued to have committed judicial misconduct in Respondent s prejudice.
2. Respondent Maravelias noted in Paragraph 6 of said Motion that he sought
disturbing indications hereunder of John Coughlin s pre-retirement misconduct, being obviously
unable to do so prior to Coughlin s 9/5/18 retirement.
3. In 431-2018-CV-113, Judge Coughlin represented verbally on 7/12/18 and in a written
Order dated 7/17/18 that he was retiring and would be uninvolved in further legal matters.
1
PAUL MARAVELIAS 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD , WINDHAM, NH 03087
EXHIBIT E
4. Remarkably, on 11/16/18, this Court mailed the parties a written Order, denying
Respondent Maravelias s Motion, which was itself signed by Judge John J. Coughlin, the same
judge whose alleged conduct was the factual substance of said denied Motion s merits.1
5. Given the undeniable conflict of interest inherent to Judge Coughlin s denying a motion
for relief predicated on allegations of his own prejudicial misconduct, Respondent respectfully
requests that the Court appoint a new judge to read and reconsider Maravelias s 10/31/18
Motion, and that Judge Coughlin recuse himself from participating hereinafter in this case.
I. THE NEW HAMPSHIRE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT MANDATES

THE IMMEDIATE RECUSAL OF JUDGE JOHN J. COUGHLIN
6. If Judge Coughlin s unexpected continued involvement derives from a senior active
status , he is still bound by the Judicial Code of Conduct rules applicable to part-time judges. See
, Paragraph B. None of the part-time judge exemptions apply
to the following authorizations cited for mandatory recusal in this case. Ibid., Paragraph C(1).
7. The Judicial Code of Conduct, Canon 1, Rule 1.2 stipulates:
A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. (Emphasis added)
The Rules comment thereon stipulates:
The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in the
mind of a reasonable, disinterested person fully informed of the facts a perception
that the judge s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity,
1
It appears that Judge Coughlin, not the Court s Clerk, criminally violated RSA 173-B:3 I. in said
whereabouts of the plaintiff
address at the top of said decision, even though she has an active Stalking Final Order of Protection which
Judge Coughlin himself extended. However, Respondent Maravelias was not prejudiced by this careless
error; therefore, it is excused from further discussion in this Motion.
2
EXHIBIT E
impartiality and competence is impaired.
8. Judge Coughlin s 11/16/18 nondescript boilerplate rejection of Maravelias s highly
specific Motion alleging Judge Coughlin s misconduct atrociously emanates the appearance of
impropriety and is, in fact, improper. Judge Coughlin s impartiality is undeniably compromised
where the factual allegations at-hand concern his own judicial conduct.
9. Likewise, Judge Coughlin s mere judicial involvement in relation to the Motion violates
A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall
perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.
10. Canon 2, Rule 2.11 expressly necessitates Judge Coughlin s recusal in relation to this
Court s decision on the Motion to Set Aside Judgement. Rule 2.11(A) provides as follows:
A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the

judge s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to
the following circumstances:
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party s
lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.
(2) The judge knows that the judge is
(c) a person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding; or
(d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
(5) The judge:
(c) was a material witness concerning the matter.
(Emphasis added)
11. It lies beyond dispute that Judge Coughlin 1)
conduct, 2) that he has personal knowledge of facts and circumstances of his own judicial
conduct disputed within Maravelias s Motion, and 3) that Judge Coughlin has more than a de
3
EXHIBIT E
minimis interest in the outcome of a proceeding which could possibly result disciplinary
sanctions against him by the New Hampshire Judicial Conduct Committee.
12. The appearance of a judge ruling on a motion in which his own alleged misconduct
sustains argued grounds for relief is a horrendous spectacle of bias in the eyes of any average
citizen having reasonable sensibilities, let alone cause to
Judge Coughlin exponentiated all his impartiality by writing no more
than an insipid two-sentence, white-label denial addressing none of the Motion s merits at all.
13. The urbane tonal posturing of Judge Coughlin s three-line 11/16/18 Order harkens to
his prior instant-case rulings which the 10/31/18 Motion argues were prejudicially dismissive
byproducts of rarefied judicial onanism, as opposed to honest applications of fact and law.
14. A fact-pattern emerges to suggest a habit of idiosyncratic violation of Judicial Code
of Conduct Canon 2, Rule 2.6, guaranteeing Respondent s right to be heard. By reflexively
denying pleadings with boilerplate, nondescript judicial-fluff language even in response to the
Motion to Set Aside Judgement which itself analytically criticized the very same prejudicial
pattern, Judge Coughlin has necessitated his recusal to preserve the dignity of this Court and to
uphold the integrity of the judiciary.
II. THE NEW HAMPSHIRE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 2, RULE
15. The aforecited provides:
(C) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that

another judge has committed a violation of this Code shall take appropriate
action.
4
EXHIBIT E
Comment: [2] A judge who does not have actual knowledge that another judge
or a lawyer may have committed misconduct, but receives information
indicating a substantial likelihood of such misconduct, is required to take
appropriate action under paragraphs (C) and (D).
16. The law unequivocally requires Hon. Elizabeth M. Leonard, as the co-presiding judge
at Derry District Division where this pleading is being filed, to take appropriate action regarding
the alleged bias and/or prejudicial misconduct purported in the 10/31/18 Motion, oversee Judge
Coughlin s recusal, and appoint herself or another judicial officer to read and reconsider it.
III. JUDGE COUGHLIN S IMMEDIATE RECUSAL IS MANDATORY UNDER

RSA 492:1 AND PART I, ARTICLE 35 OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION
17. RSA 492:1 provides:
A justice shall not sit in any case in which he has been concerned as party or
attorney or in any appeal in which he has acted as judge in the court below, or act
as attorney or be of counsel for either party or give advice in any matter pending or
which may come before the court for adjudication. (Emphasis added)
18. -to-be-retired
Judge Coughlin in. The Motion alleged an almost-year-long sustained pattern of
unlawful, biased conduct which, if proven, could result in JCC disciplinary penalties. The motion
rendered John Coughlin, though not a named litigating party in the provenant stalking case,
narrowly to the misconduct-complaint Motion, on which he ruled.
19. Part I, Article 35 of the New Hampshire Constitution states:
property, and character, that there be an impartial interpretation of the laws, and
administration of justice. It is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as
impartial as the lot of humanity will admit.
5
EXHIBIT E
20. In ethically ruling upon a Motion requesting certain relief warranted by a judge s
objectively demonstrable course of biased, dishonest, and dismissive conduct, the populous
grants ample existence of judicial officers to serve as such arbiters who are not
themselves the concerned party in the judicial misconduct allegation. Judge Coughlin s 11/16/18
two-sentence ruling on a serious complaint of his own alleged misconduct forms a preposterous
travesty of justice, transgressive of constitutional provision and contumelious to the Court s
ethical dignity.
IV. A NEW JUDGE MUST EXAMINE AND RECONSIDER MARAVELIAS S

21. Since Maravelias trusted Judge Coughlin s indications of 9/5/18 retirement were
accurate, he never motioned for Coughlin s recusal prior to the 10/31/18 Motion to Set Aside
Judgement. Accordingly, this Court should rule-anew on that Motion with fresh, unbiased eyes.
22. However, assuming that Judge Coughlin s 11/16/18 ruling was valid, Respondent
here moves for post-recusal reconsideration thereof pursuant to Circuit Court District Division
Rule 3.11(E). comprehensively
or misapprehended
23. Further, Respondent addresses and corrects the flawed counterarguments proposed in
Petitioner s 11/15/18 Objection to Respondent s Motion to Set Aside Judgement.
24. Petitioner lodges not a modicum of specific objection to the actual merits of
Maravelias s 10/31/18 Motion; rather, she unoriginally attacks the timeliness of said Motion.
6
EXHIBIT E
25. Maravelias s 10/31/18 Motion was not untimely, being subject to no time limit.
Petitioner cites Rule 3.11, ibid., presumably at (E), which controls solely motions for
reconsideration and like post-decision motions contesting the legal correctness of said decisions.
26. Maravelias s 10/31/18 Motion to Set Aside Judgement was not such kind of Motion,
as he articulately prefaced in Paragraphs 4 and 5 thereof. The similarity in consequential relief
between reversing the stalking order extension because the judge was objectively biased,
prejudiced, and misconduct-committing (a Motion to Set Aside Judgement) and granting the
same relief because a fair judge overlooked or misapprehended errors of facts or law (a Motion
for Reconsideration, subject to 10-day time limit) does not render the latter a form of the former.
They are distinct types of motion. Rule 3.11(E) is inapplicable to Respondent s 10/31/18 Motion.
27. Petitioner s futile argument essentially reduces to a delusional interpretation of the
Court rules wherein a party s access to the Court system becomes categorically revoked ten days
after the Court renders any initial decision in a case i.e., that parties at that time forfeit all
ability whatsoever to file any motions in an ongoing case where oppressive injunction exists.
28. Petitioner s argument directly contradicts statutory law in this case of a protective
order, where RSA 173-B:5, VIII.(b) acknowledges a Respondent s obvious due process right to
motion the Court for certain relief pertaining to said protective order at any time during the
pendency thereof.2
2
Undersigned Respondent has never filed any untimely motion in any case, contrary to Petitioner s
threadbare accusation to the contrary. If Petitioner were correct in this regard, Judge Stephen would not
have ruled on Maravelias s December 2017 motion . Petitioner also
falsely claims in a s 3/29/18 Motion to Dismiss and Vacate
Stalking Order. In reality, this Court never ruled on that Motion whatsoever.
7
EXHIBIT E
29. If this Court were to accept Petitioner s baseless argument that Maravelias s 10/31/18
as filed over ten days after the prior decision in this case, then it
accordingly must outlaw Petitioner s 1/5/18 Motion to Extend the Stalking Order filed 325 days
after 2/14/17 notice of the immediately-prior judicial decision and therefore dissolve the same
stalking order regardless.
30. Mechanical objection is made to Petitioner s predictable, groundless prayer for
attorney s fees in connection to responding to Maravelias s 10/31/18 Motion to Set Aside
Judgement. Unable to accept the adversarial realities of the adversarial process, Petitioner has
consummated a tiresome pattern of demanding compensation for responding to legitimate
pleadings opposing her course of malicious protective order abuse against Maravelias, as she did
in response to Maravelias s 3/29/18 Motion to Dismiss and Vacate, a pleading by Maravelias
which similarly contained well-articulated, weighty legal arguments.
31. As a bar- or should know that such
conduct, not in response
to compelling, necessary legal arguments. This habit of Petitioner s counsel appears to be some
abstruse form of bizarre psychological autoeroticism and lacks legal validity.
WHEREFORE, for all reasons hereinabove set forth, the Respondent Paul Maravelias
respectfully prays The Honorable Court:
II. Effect the immediate recusal of Judge John J. Coughlin from all further
proceedings in this case, appointing a new judicial officer to read and reconsider
Maravelias s 10/31/18 Motion to Set Aside Judgement;
8
EXHIBIT E
III. Grant said 10/31/18 Motion to Set Aside Judgement as well as all prayers for relief
contained therein; and
IV. Deny Petitioner s 11/15/18 Objection Motion thereto.
PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,
in propria persona
November 21st, 2018 __________________________________
I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the within Motion for Recusal and Reconsideration was
forwarded on this day through USPS Certified Mail to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the
Petitioner, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.
______________________________
November 21st, 2018
9
EXHIBIT F
1/4/19 MOTION FOR TIMELY RULING
ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY
Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124
v.
Paul Maravelias
MOTION FOR TIMELY RULING
COMES NOW Respondent Paul Maravelias and respectfully submits the within Motion for
Timely Ruling pursuant to RSA 173-B:5, VIII.(b), Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1 Rule 1.1,
Rule 1.2, Canon 2 Rule 2.2, Rule 2.3(A), Rule 2.5, Rule 2.6, Rule 2.7, Rule 2.11, Rule 2.15, the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution, and Part I, Articles 15 and 35 of
the Constitution of New Hampshire. In support, Respondent avers the following points of fact
and law.
1. On 10/31/18, Respondent filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgement in this case, objectively
documenting Judge Coughlin’s hostile bias against Maravelias, based on judicially noticeable
facts, which injuriously prejudiced Maravelias prior to Judge Coughlin’s 9/5/18 retirement.
2. On 11/16/18, this Court mailed a written Order flatly denying Maravelias’s Motion with a
nondescript two-sentence order, itself remarkably signed by Judge Coughlin himself. The
Administrative Office of the Courts later confirmed he has taken Senior Active Status.
1
EXHIBIT F
3. On 11/21/18, Respondent Maravelias filed a Motion for Recusal and Reconsideration
decrying the spectacle of rank injustice, and further judicial misconduct, inherent to Judge
Coughlin dismissing a Motion alleging his own material misconduct. Maravelias cited the
relevant law requiring another judge to rule upon the 10/31/18 Motion to Set Aside Judgement
and for John Coughlin to recuse himself from all further involvement.
4. Well over one month thereafter, this Court has still not ruled on Respondent Maravelias’s
11/21/18 Motion nor, therefore, on his 10/31/18 Motion in a lawful fashion.
5. A Stalking Final Order of Protection is currently in effect against Maravelias, wrongly,
because of biased and dishonest judicial misconduct, inter alia. (See 10/31/18 Motion)
Maravelias’s basic liberties are at stake; thus, the matter is of extreme exigency.
6. Maravelias repeats the points of fact and law in his 11/21/18 Motion for Recusal and
Reconsideration which charge the presiding justice at Derry District Court to rule upon
Maravelias’s outstanding Motions. Maravelias respectfully demands that this Court rule on
his urgent Motions to dissolve immediately the unjust abridgement of his constitutional
rights. The Code of Judicial Conduct, cited in relevant portions above, stipulates that failing to
do so is grounds for a second judicial misconduct complaint against the presiding justice at Derry
District Court, whose responsibility is to respond to Judge Coughlin’s noticed misconduct.
7. The Stalking Order is set to expire in approximately one month regardless; therefore, it is
imperative that this Court rule upon Maravelias’s Motion in a timely fashion, before, arguably,
the request becomes nominally moot.
8. Further, on 12/10/18, Respondent Maravelias filed a Motion to Amend Stalking Final
Order of Protection to Exclude Second-Amendment-Protected Activity and associated
2
EXHIBIT F
memorandum of law thereon.1 This Motion, which arguably becomes moot if this Court grants
the 10/31/18 Motion deposing of this entire stalking order, seeks to amend the unjust Order as a
minimal concession, insofar as its current state violates Maravelias’s constitutional rights even
more so that the committed legal errors (by which the Order was extended) would allow.
9. This Court’s over-one-month inaction on the 11/21/18 Motion and nearly-one-month-
inaction on the 12/10/18 Motion – where Maravelias’s basic liberties are at stake – strongly
suggest a course of improper conduct infringing upon Maravelias’s right to be heard. Combined
with his extensive documentation of Judge Coughlin’s misconduct, this intentional delaying
cannot be seen as anything but a corrupt dilatory practice which weighs the interests of the Court
(and individual judicial officers’ interests) ahead of the liberty interests of Respondent
Maravelias, a participant in the case.2,3
1
In response to Respondent’s 12/10/18 Motion, Petitioner filed a wholly unavailing Objection which
failed to address any of Maravelias’s crucial legal arguments, rather assembling continued dramatic spin-
drivel disparaging Maravelias and baselessly whining that his legal self-defense shows “hostility”, and
therefore the government should steal his firearms. Besides that obvious nonsense, Petitioner did include
one legal point when she invited this Court to withhold ruling on the 12/10/18 Motion until the related
Supreme Court appeal is decided. Said argument is entirely unfounded: the Supreme Court is reviewing
the 6/15/18 Extension Order, but the firearms modification subject is not at all related to that appeal. This
Court has original jurisdiction and therefore has the responsibility to act immediately on all outstanding
Motions, as Maravelias’s basic liberties are currently besieged by an illegal and erroneous restraining
order. See RSA 633:3-a and RSA 173-B, providing for mandatory timeliness requirements passim in
situations like the instance case where protective order terms restrict constitutional rights and therefore
necessitate high standards of due process.
2
Maravelias here raises and preserves the argument that he will still have standing to pursue recourse for
the judicial misconduct noted even if the Stalking Order is subsequently vacated in entirety by the
Supreme Court, notwithstanding this Court’s dilatory practice of delaying ruling on the 11/21/18 Motion.
3
For the purposes of potential civil litigation in federal district court and/or New Hampshire courts,
Maravelias here records his present intention to pursue declaratory and/or other forms of relief through
civil procedure against the judicial officer(s) who have willfully violated constitutional rights, willfully
violated laws and court rules, and/or committed other forms of misconduct which have injured
Maravelias. Once the Stalking Order is no longer in-effect, the matters of the 10/31/18 Motion and
11/21/18 Motion do not become moot; rather, they remain relevant within Maravelias’s intended
litigation, as well as the rulings they seek. Maravelias preserves the argument that this Court’s self-
interested dilatory practices could have the potential unjust effect of excusing the concerned party/parties
3
EXHIBIT F
WHEREFORE, Respondent Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:
II. Rule upon and grant Respondent’s 12/10/18 Motion to Amend Stalking Final
Order of Protection to Exclude Second-Amendment-Protected Activity;
III. Rule upon and grant Respondent’s 11/21/18 Motion for Reconsideration and
Recusal;
IV. As a consequence of the latter, rule upon and grant Respondent’s 10/31/18 Motion
to Set Aside Judgement, ending this case;
V. Grant any further relief deemed just and necessary.
PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,
January 4th, 2019 in propria persona
from adverse effects proceeding from the judicial rulings sought by Maravelias if the Stalking Order is
soon vacated and therefore the 10/31/18 and 11/21/18 Motions not ruled upon. Before the filing of the
10/31/18 Motion, all judicial officers concerned were aware that Maravelias was appealing the Stalking
Order to the Supreme Court; therefore, there is the requisite knowledge and illicit personal interest present
to demonstrate in Maravelias’s intended litigation tortious and/or unlawful dilatory conduct.
4

Petition For Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition Against Judge John J. Coughlin

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Petition For Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition Against Judge John J. Coughlin

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Maureen F.

O’Neil, Superior Court Clerk January 15th, 2019

Dear Clerk O’Neil,

CC: 10th Circuit Court – District Division – Derry

ROCKINGHAM, SS SUPERIOR COURT

HON. JOHN J. COUGHLIN, DERRY CIRCUIT COURT,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION

COMES NOW Paul J. Maravelias (“Petitioner”), in propria persona, and respectfully

common law prerogative writ for 1) Respondents’ redressable non-performance of statutorily

following points of fact and law in support of this petition:

DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias (473-2016-CV-00124) at 10th Circuit Court – District Division –

recently motioned on 1/11/2019 again to extend the Order until 2024.

2. Maravelias’s alleged “stalking” was to invite DePamphilis to dinner on 12/12/2016 and

underlying restraining order, however wrong it is.

order “within 30 days” of the extension.

proceedings against him at injury to Maravelias’s presently-aggrieved constitutional rights.

9. Petitioner PAUL J. MARAVELIAS is a natural person residing in Windham, NH. He is a

State of New Hampshire, pursuant to RSA 490-F.

12. Respondent(s) CONCERNED JUDICIAL OFFICER(S) is/are the presiding justice(s) at

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

following stipulations may be judicially noticed in majority through 1) transcripts of proceedings

docketed pleadings in Derry Circuit Court, and 3) Judge Coughlin’s Orders.

Maravelias objected. A Hearing was scheduled.

Court, 34 days after the 1/12/18 extension order.

order extension case as a matter of law.

Maravelias recited the relevant text of the rule to Judge Coughlin.

court’s action.” See Circuit Court Rule 1.4(f).

JUDGE COUGHLIN’S ALARMING 6/15/18 ORDER AGAINST MARAVELIAS2

offer any reason/argument therefor whatsoever. See Exhibit B.

1.4 to record the proceedings in which he was accused.

JUDGE COUGHLIN DENIES 10-PAGE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN ONE WORD

Motion, attached in full as Exhibit C.

Court that year prior to Judge Coughlin’s putative 9/5/18 retirement.

MARAVELIAS DISCOVERS JUDGE COUGHLIN’S RAMPANT HABIT OF ISSUING STALKING ORDERS

misconduct, Maravelias composed a Motion to Set Aside Judgement. (Exhibit A) Maravelias

Coughlin’s putative retirement.

2) sprinkle-in amplified legal-sounding buzz-word terms in strange, inapplicable places, without

any factual corroboration whatsoever”. See Exhibit A, Paragraphs 26-35.

JUDGE COUGHLIN ATTEMPTS TO DISMISS THE ALLEGATIONS OF HIS OWN MISCONDUCT

rule upon the 10/31/18 Motion to Set Aside Judgement.

RESPONDENTS’ SUBSEQUENT UNETHICAL DILATORY PRACTICES

falsified by DePamphilis and, regardless, a byproduct of judicial bias and misconduct.

Exclude Second-Amendment-Protected Activity and lengthy memorandum of law thereon. The

41. RSA 633:3-a, III-c. provides, in relevant part,

Court Rule 1.4(e) states,

overriding public interest”. Id. After such process is obeyed,

(1999), citing Palazzi Corp. v. Stickney, Comm’r, 136 N.H. (1992).

49. The Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1, provides:

Rule 1.1 Compliance with the Law

Rule 1.2 Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary

Rule 1.3 Avoiding Abuse of the Prestige of Judicial Office

50. The Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2, provides in relevant parts:

Rule 2.2 Impartiality and Fairness

Rule 2.3 Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment

Rule 2.4 External Influences on Judicial Conduct

Rule 2.6 Ensuring the Right to Be Heard

Rule 2.7 Responsibility to Decide

Rule 2.11 Disqualification

Rule 2.15 Responding to Judicial and Lawyer Misconduct

enabled them, unfairly, to plead mootness as a defense to Maravelias’s intended federal

54. Prohibition is a common law writ of ancient origin. “A writ of prohibition is an

viable procedures offered “adequate protection” against the anticipated/ongoing harm).

necessity of the court’s action” as the rule requires. Id.

Supreme Court resolution in Case No. 2018-0483.

to attend, or be coerced to suffer restricted constitutional rights by a restraining order extended