Project Assignment on Public International Law

Topic: Principles of Jus Cogens In International Law: An

Analysis

Submitted By: -

Snehal Singh Divya Verma

PRN: - 16010324373 PRN: - 16010324378

B.B.A. LL.B.

Division-D

Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad

Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune

In December-April, 2019

Under The Guidance of

Ms. Ambrina Khan

Public International Law

Assistant Professor
SLS-Hyderabad

1
 CERTIFICATE

The project entitled “Principles of Jus Cogens In International Law: An Analysis”

submitted to the Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad for Public International Law as part of
Internal Assessment is based on my original work carried out under the guidance of Ms.
Ambrina Khan from December to April, 2019. The research work has not been submitted
elsewhere for award of any degree.

The material borrowed from other sources and incorporated in the research paper has been duly
acknowledged.

I understand that I myself would be held responsible and accountable for plagiarism, if any,
detected later on.

Signature of the Candidate:

Date: 23th March, 2019

2
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Before we get into thick of things, I would like to add a few words of appreciation for the
people who have been a part of this project right from its inception. The writing of this project
has been one of the significant academic challenges I have faced and without the support,
patience and guidance of the people involved, this task would not have been completed. It is to
them I owe my deepest gratitude.

It gives me immense pleasure in presenting this project report on “Principles of Jus Cogens
In International Law: An Analysis”. The success of this project is a result of sheer hard work,
and determination put in by me with the help of my project guide. I hereby take this opportunity
to add a special note of thanks for my Public International Law teacher Ms. Ambrina Khan
who undertook to act as my mentor despite her many other academic and professional
commitments. Her wisdom, knowledge, and commitment to the highest standards inspired and
motivated me. Without her insight, support and energy, this project wouldn’t have kick-started
and neither would have reached fruitfulness.

I also feel heartiest sense of obligation to my library sir & ma’am, and other staff members,
who helped me in collection of data and resource material and also in its processing as well as
in drafting manuscript. The project is detailed to all those people, who helped me while doing
this project.

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 INDEX

Abstract ………………………………………………………………….Page 05

Research Methodology…………………………………………………. Page 06

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

MODE OF CITATION

Introduction…………...…………………………………………….……Page 07

Origin ………………………………………………………………….....Page 08

Jus cogens in Traditional International Law………...……………………Page 08

Status of the Norm in International Law……..…………………………..Page 09

Recognition and Development……………………………………………Page 10

Vienna Convention on law of Treaties 1969………………….…………..Page 12

Applicability and Enforceability of Jus Cogens……………………….….Page 13

Acceptance and Current Status of Jus Cogens………..………………….Page 14

Conclusion…………………………………………….………………….Page 17

Bibliography……………..……………………………………………….Page 18

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 ABSTRACT
This article will offer an overview regarding the concept, origin and development and the
current Status of Jus Cogens; evolution of this principle has come a long way which shall be
highlighted by all the landmark cases in the past, a significant judicial approach to the same
shall be given. Jus Cogens as a manifestation of ‘Value Formalism’ is a controversial debate
in the later period; arguing the proposition of this principle the article would bring into notice
the wear about of Vienna Convention on law of treaties 1969 and the acceptance given to the
principle of Jus Cogens by the International Community. The factual basis of this principle
proves its peremptory nature and the allowance of no derogation in any circumstance. The
article would also discuss the binding nature of this particular principal.

Key Words: concept, origin, status of Jus Cogens, International Law.

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 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The object of the study is to analyse the Principle of Jus Cogens, and its applicability
in the international perspective and till what extent it is valid and recognised.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology adopted is largely analytical and descriptive. Reliance has been placed
largely on secondary sources like books and articles. The lectures and classroom discussion
have been rich with valuable pointers and gave direction to the research.

MODE OF CITATION

A uniform system of citation is followed throughout in the contents.

6
Principles of Jus Cogens in International Law: An Analysis.

Fundamental Concept:

The concept of Jus Cogens had existed in international law for a long term even if in inchoate
form. There were, however, profound differences opinion as to the reason for its existence and
the foundation on which rested some based is on positive law, others on natural law, while yet
other attributed to it a higher or even a divine origin. The concept of Jus Cogens expressed
some higher social need. In principle, all legal rules were equal; the very concept of Jus Cogens,
therefore was a derogation from a fundamental legal principle. Ultimately, it was more society
and less the law which defined the content of Jus Cogens.1

Jus Cogens, the literal meaning of which is “compelling law,” is the technical term given to
those norms of general international law that are argued as hierarchically superior. These are,
in fact, a set of rules, which are peremptory in nature and from which no derogation is allowed
under any circumstances. The doctrine of international Jus Cogens was developed under a
strong influence of natural law concepts, which maintain that states cannot be absolutely free
in establishing their contractual relations. States were obliged to respect certain fundamental
principles deeply rooted in the international community.2 The power of a state to make treaties
is subdued when it confronts a super-customary norm of Jus cogens. In other words, Jus cogens
are rules, which correspond to the fundamental norm of international public policy and in which
cannot be altered unless a subsequent norm of the same standard is established. This means
that the position of the rules of Jus cogens is hierarchically superior compared to other ordinary
rules of international law.

As a result, Jus cogens rules gained the nature of international constitutional rules for two
reasons. First, they limit the ability of states to create or change rules of international law.
Second, these rules prevent states from violating fundamental rules of international public
policy since the resulting rules or violations of rules would be seriously detrimental to the
international legal system. Clearly defined contents of the rules of Jus cogens are not yet likely
to be decided. Existence of such norms is now universally recognized and well established.

1
685th Meeting of the international law commission.
2
International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making, 2 EUR. J. INT’L L. 42, 44 (1991), available at
http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol2/No1/art3.html.

7
Origin:

The term jus cogens means the compelling law3. The recognition of the jus cogens was
established during the early nineteenth century. In his book, Professor Oppenheim stated that
a number of universally recognised principles of international law existed in the jus cogens
which rendered any conflicting treaty void and a jus cogens was unanimously recognised as a
customary rule of international law. However, Byers argues that the concept of jus cogens
originates from ancient writing and later on it was discussed in the twentieth century.4 Byers
quoted the similar definition of Professor Oppenheim.5 According to Professor Harris, the
concept of jus cogens originated in the law of treaties, in which there is a rule prohibiting states
from making a treaty which seeks to conflict with a rule of jus cogens.6 In the judicial context
the concept of jus cogens first found in the decision of the French-Mexican Claims Commission
in the Pablo Nájera Case in 1928, and secondly, it was found by Schücking, the judge of the
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Oscar Chinn Case7 in 1934. Following from the
Oscar Chinn Case8judges of the International Court of Justice made similar references to jus
cogens in a number of separate and dissenting opinions. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in the Nicaragua Case clearly affirmed that the rules of jus cogens as an accepted doctrine in
international law.9 The ICJ relied on the prohibition on the use of force as being “a conspicuous
example of a rule of international law having the character of jus cogens.10” In the context of
the international instrument the doctrine of jus cogens first embodied in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT), it was subsequently confirmed by same treaties on 1986.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 has recognised the norms of jus cogens
in Article 53. Article 53 of the VCLT 1969 provides that: “A treaty is void if, at the time of its
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes
of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted
and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no

3
Jus cogens is defined in A. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
4
Byers, M., ‘Conceptualizing the relationship between jus cogens and erga omnes rules’ (1997) 66 Nordic Journal
of International Law 211.
5
Ibid
6
Harris, D.J., Cases and Materials on International Law, (7 th edn. Sweet & Maxwell 2010).
7
[1934] PCIJ 2 (12 December 1934).
8
Ibid
9
Military and Parliamentary Activities in and against Nicaragua (1986) ICJ Rep 14.
10
Gennady M. Danilenko, ‘International Jus cogens: Issues of Law Making’ (1991) 2 European Journal of
International Law 1.

8
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.” Therefore it means that if a treaty at the time of
its conclusion conflicts with the norm of jus cogens, which are peremptory nature, that treaty
is no longer treated as an international document.

Jus cogens in Traditional International Law

In 1937, a continental naturalist, Alfred Verdross argued that, like all other legal systems,
international law also includes-indeed, must by necessity include-certain norms which, as an
integral part of the ordre public of the international community may not be repealed or changed
by agreements between a smaller groups of states. Verdross drew attention to the fact that until
the rise of legal positivism the existence of such peremptory rules was not disputed. Natural
law scholars defended the view that positive international law rested on immutable norms (jus
necessarium). For him law and morality were interdependent by necessity and a ‘general
principle of law’ undoubtly existed belonging to the fundamental, peremptory category
outlined in the preceding section, which prohibited states from concluding treaties that were
contra bonos mores. In forbidden treaties, he argued that ‘no juridical order can admit treaties
which are obviously in contradiction to the ethics of the community. Verdross then enumerated
a list of treaties that may never be admitted in the international juridicial order. He argued that
the tribunal before which such treaties are sought to be enforced might properly regard them
as void.

Thus, in the version of jus cogens before the Vienna Convention, the international judge rather
than the community of states was the actor that would fashion a putative rule of jus cogens.

Having analysed how the rule-like characteristics of jus cogens are problematic, in this part, a
normative claim is made about the form of jus cogens. This article articulates a definition of
jus cogens that has a standardlike orientation. A. 53 does not claim a set of norms as absolute
but rather identifies a definition of the concept and the source from which such norms would
emerge. However, before this a brief summary of the problems associated with jus cogens is
offered.

 The voluntarist basis of the A. 53 definition of jus cogens that causes theoretical
confusion about the concept and the origin;
 The information costs associated with the ‘accepted and recognised by International
Community of states as a whole ‘threshold of A.53;

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  Preference cleavage among states that would make codifying the content of jus cogens
a costly exercise.

Due to their peculiar nature, jus cogens norms could be more properly explained by assuming
that the basis of obligation in international law lies in natural law. However the modern variant
that stipulates that the norm must be accepted and recognised by the international community
of states as a whole is reflective of the fact that consent is the basis of the modern variant that
stipulates that the norm must be accepted and recognised by the international community of
states as a whole is reflective of the fact that consent is the basis of the modern version of jus
cogens. This brings in an inevitable circularity of reasoning. It also seems paradoxical because
even in jurisdictions dominated by positivist influences, it is the adjudicators that establish
public policy. Translated, that means the lawmakers do not retain control (any explicit control
at any rate) over public policy norms. If jus cogens is the international law equivalent of public
policy norms, this positivist rule like formulation is an oddity.

STATUS OF THE NORM IN INTEERNATIOANL LAW

Status of the Norm in International Law a peremptory norm may it would appear, be derived
from a custom or a treaty but not it is submitted from any other source. This statement is
however, self-contradictor). Indeed there are serious problems associated with the assertions
that a norm offus cogens could be the result of the natural law or one or any of the traditional
primary sources of international law namely treaties customs or general principles of laws.'"
According to Professor Michale Byers of the Duke University Law School treaties can at best
only be contributing factors in the development of jus cogens rules for two reasons. First a
treaty cannot bind its parties' abilities to modify the treaty terms nor to relieve the party's
obligations under it, such as through a subsequent treaty to which all the same parties have
consented. Second all generally accepted as cogens rules apply universally yet none of the
treaties which have codified these rules have been universally ratified. No treaty not even the
Charter of the Charter of the United Nations can establish a rule of general international law.
Treaties can only create obligations between their parties.' As for the assertion that jus cogens
rules to be considered as customary international law more ambiguity exists. Customs are
binding only in the case of an established opinio juris wherein a state believes to be bound by
a said practice due to its creation from customary rule. However persistent objection of any
customary principle creates an exception to have the binding nature of such rules. There are
also other ways to supersede customary rules such as through the development of rules of

10
special customary international law and the conclusion of treaties. On the other hand in case of
the rules of jus cogens these rules are binding regardless of the consent of the parties concerned
and regardless of the states' own individual opinion to be bound since these rules are too
fundamental for states to escape responsibility. Modification of the rules of jus cogens is only
possible when a new peremptory norm of equal weight emerges. As for the binding character
of jus cogens acceptance by the large majority of states of such norm would amount to universal
legal obligation for the international community as a whole. These are superior rules and bear
the common values for the international community as a whole. Michael Byers, however, tends
to show that jus cogens rules are derived from the -process of customary international law."
which is itself a part of international constitutional order. He argues that opinio juris (or
something resembling opinio juris) appears to be at the root of the non-detractable character of
jus cogens rules, because states simply do not believe that it is possible to contract out of jus
cogens rules or to persistently object to them. States regard these rules as being so important to
the international society of states and to how that society defines itself.such that they cannot
conceive of an exception.' Article 53 of the Vienna Convention however, contains no reference
to any element of practice. One could then hardly conceive jus cogens as a strengthened form
of custom' David Kennedy termed jus cogens as super-customary norm!'

Recognition and Development:

During the early nineteenth century, recognition of Jus cogens was established. Professor
Oppenheim stated that there existed a number of “universally recognized principles” of
international law that rendered any conflicting treaty void, and therefore, the peremptory effect
of such principles was itself a “unanimously recognized customary rule of International
Law.”11 For instance, he stated that a treaty supporting piracy is void for being contrary to the
“universally recognized principles” of international law.12

Moreover, the concept of Jus cogens twice found favour in a judicial context, first, in the
decision of the French-Mexican Claims Commission in the 1928 Pablo Nájera Case, and
later by Judge Schücking of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 1934 Oscar
Chinn Case [1934] PCIJ 2 (12 December 1934). Subsequent to this 1934 case, judges of the

11
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL. 1 PEACE, introduction & part I (1992).
12
During the years of 1963 to 1966, several members pointed out in the ILC commentary that the emergence of
rules having the character of Jus Cogens was not the product of recent time, rather it has more long-standing
character. They further stated that the concept of Jus Cogens had originated in regard to such universal crimes as
piracy and the slave-trade as well as such principles as the freedom of high seas and other rules on the law of the
sea.

11
International Court of Justice made similar references to Jus cogens in a number of separate
and dissenting opinions. For example, in a 1993 Bosnian case, Judge Lauterpacht expressed
his opinion on the possibility that the Security Council had violated the genocide prohibition
and therewith alleged Jus cogens when imposing an arms embargo on both Serbia and Bosnia.
In 1991, Resolution 713 of the Security Council imposed arms embargo. While this resolution
disregarded the state’s inherent right of self-defence, the Security Council had been unable to
take measures necessary to maintain peace and security in Bosnia. The consequences led to
ethnic cleansing, genocide and large-scale human sufferings. Therefore, the argument of
alleged violation of Jus cogens has some potential weight.

On the other hand, Finnish scholar Lauri Hannikainen demonstrated that if a norm of general
international law protects an overriding interest or value of the international community, and
if any derogation would seriously jeopardize that interest or value, then the peremptory
character of the norm may be presumed if the application of the criteria of peremptory norms
produces no noteworthy negative evidence.

Recognition of the rules of Jus cogens was again confirmed in 1986 at the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or Between
International Organizations. The importance of the rules of Jus cogens was confirmed by the
trend to apply it beyond the law of the treaties, in particular, in the law of state responsibility.
Specifically, the International Law Commission (ILC) proposed the notion of international
crimes resulting from the breach by a state of an international obligation “essential for the
protection of fundamental interests of the international community,” which is, in fact, closely
linked to the doctrine of international Jus cogens. In the Nicaragua Case, the International
Court of Justice clearly affirmed Jus cogens as an accepted doctrine in international law. The
ICJ relied on the prohibition on the use of force as being “a conspicuous example of a rule of
international law having the character of Jus cogens.”

Vienna Convention on law of Treaties 1969:

During the early nineteenth century, recognition of jus cogens was established. Professor
Oppenheim stated that there existed a number of "universally recognized principles" of
international law that rendered any conflicting treaty void, and therefore, the peremptory effect
of such principles was itself a "unanimously recognized customary rule of International Law."13

13
Oppenheim ET AL., Oppenheim’s International Law Vol.1 Peace, introduction & Part 1 (1992)

12
For example, he stated that a treaty supporting piracy is void for being contrary to the
"universally recognized principles" of international law.' Moreover, the concept of jus cogens
twice found favour in a judicial context, first, in the decision of the French-Mexican Claims
Commission in the 1928 Pablo Najera Case, and later by Judge Schneking of the Permanent
Court of International Justice in the 1934 Oscar Chinn Case [1934] PCU 2 (12 December
1934).14 Subsequent to this 1934 case, judges of the International Court of Justice made similar
references tojus cogens in a number of separate and dissenting opinions/ For example, in a
1993 Bosnian case, Judge Lauterpacht expressed his opinion on the possibility that the Security
Council had violated the genocide prohibition and therewith alleged jus cogens when imposing
an arms embargo on both Serbia and Bosnia. In 1991, Resolution 713 of the Security Council
imposed arms embargo. While this resolution disregarded the state's inherent right of self-
defense, the Security Council had been unable to take measures necessary to maintain peace
and security in Bosnia. The consequences led to ethnic cleansing, genocide and large-scale
human sufferings. Therefore, the argument of alleged violation of jus cogens has some potential
weight.

Furthermore, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has given the recognition of the
norms of jus cogens in A. 53. That means a treaty is no longer an international legal document
if at the time of its conclusion it conflicts with the norms of jus cogens, which are peremptory
in nature. This article sets up the four criteria for a norm to be determined as jus cogens.
specifically: (1) status as a norm of general international law; (2) acceptance by the
international community of states as a whole; (3) immunity from derogation; and (4) modifiable
only by a new norm having the same status. On the other hand. Finnish scholar Lauri
Hannikainen demonstrated that if a norm of general international law protects an overriding
interest or value of the international community and if any derogation would seriously
jeopardize that interest or value, then the peremptory character of the norm may be presumed
if the application of the criteria of peremptory norms produces no noteworthy negative
evidence."15 Recognition of the rules of jus cogens was again confirmed in 1986 at the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or Between
International Organizations. The importance of the rules of jus cogens was confirmed by the
trend to apply it beyond the law of the treaties, in particular in the law of state responsibility.
Specifically the International Law Commission proposed the notion of international crimes

14
Byers, at 213-214 n.8-9.
15
Lauri Haninkaienen, Premptory Norms (Jus cogens) in International Law 20,207.

13
resulting from the breach by a state of an international obligation --essential for the protection
of fundamental interests of the international community,” which is, in fact, closely linked to
the doctrine.16 In the Nicaragua case, the international court of justice clearly affirmed jus
cogens as an accepted doctrine in international law. The ICJ relied on the prohibition on the
use of force as being “a conspicuous example of a rule of international law having the character
of jus cogens.

Applicability and Enforceability of Jus cogens:

The Jus cogens rules have been accepted by the international community in such a way that it
as fundamental rules which are non-derogable. Therefore Genocide, Slavery, Piracy, Torture,
Prohibition on the Aggressive use of force, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity etc. are
the significant part of Jus cogens norm.

In the context of Human Rights including war crimes and crime against humanity the
applicability and enforceability of the Jus cogens started following the Second World War. The
prosecutions of Axis leaders at Nuremberg and Tokyo for the war crimes and crime against
humanity in 1948 are the great example in this regard.17 In addition to prohibiting genocide,
crime against humanity, and gross human rights violations the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights 1948 (UDHR) was introduced by United Nation. After that following UDHR 1948,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) was introduced. The
International Judges and the Lawyers have declared unequivocally that these international
instruments are universal norms which bind the States irrespective of State consent.18 In other
words, it can be said that these are the parts of Jus cogens. These two strands of the post war
human rights movement-multilateral Conventions and peremptory norms-converged in a
remarkable way during the 1950s and 1960s with the United Nations International Law
Commission’s (ILC) preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969
(VCLT).

Thus it can be seen the relationship between human rights and Jus cogens are intrinsic, as such,
they inherently possess an extraordinary force of social attraction that has an almost magical
character.19 The prohibition of the use of force is also a part of Jus cogens rule. Article 2 (4)

16
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 19, available at http:// www.javier-leon-
diaz.com/humanitarianIssues/State_Resp.pdf.
17
Lauri Hannikainen, ‘Premptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical Development, Criteria,
and Present Status’ (1988) 150.
18
A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens’ (2009) 34 Yale Journal of International Law 331.
19
Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 491

14
of the Charter of the United Nations (1945), prohibits the unilateral use of force and threat of
armed force and corresponds to the pre-existent norms of international law. Article 2 (4) of the
Charter provides that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. Thus it appears that the
Charter in relation to the prohibition on the use of force is a norm of Jus cogens. If was
confirmed through the case of Military and Parliamentary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v United States of America) in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the
prohibition of the use of force was a recognised normative regime before under the rules of
customary international law before invoked in the Charter. Therefore it is clear that Articles 53
and 64 of the VCLT would be effective as a customary international law where the VCLT 1969
would not be effective.

Acceptance and Current Status of Jus cogens:

It may appear that as a peremptory norm, the Jus cogens have derived from a custom or a treaty
but not from any other sources.20 Nonetheless, this idea gives raises self-contradiction because
the Jus cogens norm could be the result of the natural law or any other primary sources of the
international law or general principle of international law21. The ambiguity exists when it is
asserted that the Jus cogens are considered as customary international law. The Customs are
binding in the context of an established opinion juries and the doctrine of opinion Juris means
and includes that a state believes to be bound by a said practice due to its creation from the
customary rule. In the Lotus Case, the PCLJ emphasised that opinion Juris was an essential
element in the formation of customary law. In North Sea Continental Self the court said in dicta
regarding opinion Juris that “… The states concerned must, therefore, feel that they are
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.” However, there are exceptions to the rules
opinion Juris which can supersede the binding nature due to the development of rules of special
customary international law and the conclusion of treaties.22 On the other hand, the noticeable
point in the context of Jus cogens rules is that it is a binding rule regardless of the consent of
the parties concerned and regardless of the states’ own individual opinion to be bound.23 Of

20
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (1986) ICJ Rep 14 at 97, 100.
21
‘Conceptualizing the relationship between jus cogens and erga omnes rules’(1997) 66 Nordic Journal of
International Law 211
22
‘The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation under the U.N. Charter’ (2005) 3 Santa Clara Journal of
International Law 78.
23
‘Nature of Jus Cogens’ (1987-1988) 3 Connecticut Journal of International Law 359.

15
course, the reason behind these strict rules is that these rules are too fundamental for the States
to escape responsibility. Nevertheless, Modification of the Jus cogens rules could be possible
when a new peremptory norm of equal weight is inaugurated. Due to the binding character of
the Jus cogens, majority of the State accepted that such norm that it is the amount of universal
legal obligation for the international community as a whole. However, Michel Byers argued
that Jus cogens rules are derived from process of customary international law which is itself a
part of the international constitutional order.24

24
‘Conceptualizing the relationship between jus cogens and erga omnes rules’(1997) 66 Nordic Journal of
International Law 222

16
 CONCLUSION

In the light of the above discussion, it can be said that the concept of jus cogens in the VCLT
originally was more in the nature of progressive development rather than codification. Of
course, the jus cogens norm obtained its strong position since 1969. However, there is still
disagreement about the concept of jus cogens and its role in the law of treaties. In particular,
the disagreement is which customary rules fall into the category of jus cogens. Some Parties to
the Vienna Convention has expressed hesitation in accepting the principle at all. Nonetheless,
it is given that a treaty will be void if it conflicts with a rule of jus cogens. This appears to
compromise a State’s ability to create international obligations through express consent.
Nevertheless, there appears to be broad acceptance of the concept of jus cogens and so it must
follow that treaties which conflict with those rules are void.

17
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Research Papers:

 International Journal of Law, ‘The concept and status of Jus cogens: An overview’
ISSN: 2455-2194, Volume 3; Issue 6; November 2017.
 International law commission, ‘Peremptory norms of general international law (jus
cogens)’. Statement of the Chairperson of the Drafting Committee, Oral interim report
by Mr Charles Chernor Jalloh, 26 July 2018.
 ‘The Creation of Jus cogens – Making Sense of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention’,
article by Associate Professor of International Law at the Faculty of Law, Lund
University, Sweden, 71 (2011).
 (2007) 6 Law Rev. GLC 101 Jus cogens: A Rules-Standards Analysis by Mandar
Kagade
 44 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. The Political Economy of Jus cogens by Paul B. Stephan
 Law Commission of India Two Hundred Seventy-Three Report on Implementation of
“United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment” through Legislation October 2017.

Books

 Malcolm N. Shaw, Eighth Edition, International Law

 S.K. Verma, Second Edition, An Introduction to Public International Law
 Dr. S.R. Myneni, First Edition, Public International Law
 M.P. Tandon & Rajesh Tandon, Fourth Edition, Cases on International Law

18