on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v.

PCGG
held that “information on inter-government exchanges prior
AKBAYAN vs. Aquino to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may
be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national
interest.”
on 11:38 AM in Case Digests, Political Law
0
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is
G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008
clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential – since there should be “ample
opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved” – the
offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
o JPEPA
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published.
o Diplomatic Negotiations are Privileged
It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese
o Executive Privilege, an Exception to Congress' Power of
representatives submitted their offers with the understanding
Inquiry
that “historic confidentiality” would govern the same.
o Treaty-making Power
Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
o Executive Privilege vs. People's Right to Information
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations.
FACTS:
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should
This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade
not be open to public scrutiny would discourage future
agreement ratified by the President with Japan, concerning
Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their
trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures,
views during negotiations. While, on first impression, it
paperless trading, trade in services, investment, etc.
appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from
entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty
Prior to President’s signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006,
negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally
petitioners – non-government organizations,
involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators
Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers – sought via
have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of lesser
petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from
importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an
respondents the full text of the JPEPA, including the
area of greater national interest.
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as
annexes thereto. Particularly, Congress through the House
privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations
Committee are calling for an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at
constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that
the same time, the Executive is refusing to give them the
such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita
said copies until the negotiation is completed.
holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does
not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances.
ISSUES:
Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is
made may it be determined if there is a public interest that
o Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong
o Whether or not the Philippine and Japanese offers during the
enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.
negotiation process are privileged
o Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress,
Does the exception apply even though JPEPA is primarily
exercising its power of inquiry and power to concur in
economic and does not involve national security?
treaties, from the negotiation process
While there are certainly privileges grounded on the
RULING:
necessity of safeguarding national security such as those
involving military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One
Standing
example is the “informer’s privilege,” or the privilege of the
Government not to disclose the identity of a person or
In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to
persons who furnish information of violations of law to
information on matters of public concern, which is a public
officers charged with the enforcement of that law. The
right by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they
suspect involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat
have any legal or special interest in the result, it being
to national security for this privilege to apply in any given
sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of
instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable in all
the general public which possesses the right. As the present
but the most high-profile cases, in which case not only would
petition is anchored on the right to information and
this be contrary to long-standing practice. It would also be
petitioners are all suing in their capacity as citizens and
highly prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in general.
groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the
House of Representatives who additionally are suing in their
Also illustrative is the privileged accorded to presidential
capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to file the
communications, which are presumed privileged without
present suit is grounded in jurisprudence.
distinguishing between those which involve matters of
national security and those which do not, the rationale for the
JPEPA, A Matter of Public Concern
privilege being that a frank exchange of exploratory ideas
and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and
To be covered by the right to information, the information
pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a
independence of decision-making of those tasked to
matter of public concern xxx
exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade
In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations
agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese
does not depend on the nature of the case deliberated upon,
offers submitted during the negotiations towards its
so presidential communications are privileged whether they
execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents
involve matters of national security.
do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations
are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus
It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to
constituting an exception to the right to information and the
presidential communications is not absolute, one significant
policy of full public disclosure.
qualification being that “the Executive cannot, any more than
the other branches of government, invoke a general
Privileged Character of Diplomatic Negotiations Recognized
confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees
from investigations by the proper governmental institutions
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been
into possible criminal wrongdoing.” This qualification applies
recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations
whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a
1 CONSTI 2 DIGEST
judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid
of legislation.
Closely related to the “presidential communications” privilege
is the deliberative process privilege recognized in the United
States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co, deliberative process covers
documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations
and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably,
the privileged status of such documents rests, not on the
need to protect national security but, on the “obvious
realization that officials will not communicate candidly among
themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery
and front page news,” the objective of the privilege being to
enhance the quality of agency decisions.
The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close
resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential
communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that
the rationale for the confidential character of diplomatic
negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential
communications is similar, if not identical.
The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus shows that
the privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant to
encourage a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between
the negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations from
public view. Similar to the privilege for presidential
communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks,
through the same means, to protect the independence in
decision-making of the President, particularly in its capacity
as “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and
its sole representative with foreign nations.” And, as with the
deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded to
diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the content
of the information per se, but because the information is part
of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public
interest, must be presumed confidential.
Clearly, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations
follows as a logical consequence from the privileged
character of the deliberative process.
Does diplomatic privilege only apply to certain stages of the
negotiation process?
In Chavez v. PEA and Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that
with regard to the duty to disclose “definite propositions of
the government,” such duty does not include recognized
exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and
public order.
Treaty-making power of the President
xxx they (petitioners) argue that the President cannot
exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations since
whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate
international trade agreements is derived only by delegation
of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the
Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential
Decree No. 1464.
The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is
not the power to negotiate treaties and international
agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and
export quotas, and other taxes xxx.
As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis
thereof is Section 21 of Article VII – the article on the
Executive Department.
xxx
While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly
belongs to Congress, and is exercised by the President only
be delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that
the power to enter into treaties is vested directly and
exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence
of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the
validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the
2 CONSTI 2 DIGEST
President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations
provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an
acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its office. It
may not be used as basis to hold the President or its
representatives accountable to Congress for the conduct of
treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to
enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of
Senate concurrence, since the President must still enure that
all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant
provisions of the Constitution.
It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while
possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the
field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21
provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the
validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct
of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not
even Congress as a while that has been given the authority
to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of
the President, but only the Senate.
Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as
private citizens, petitioners-members of the House of
Representatives fail to present a “sufficient showing of need”
that the information sought is critical to the performance of
the functions of Congress, functions that do not include
treaty-negotiation.
Did the respondent’s alleged failure to timely claim executive
privilege constitute waiver of such privilege?
That respondent invoked the privilege for the first time only in
their Comment to the present petition does not mean that the
claim of privilege should not be credited. Petitioner’s position
presupposes that an assertion of the privilege should have
been made during the House Committee investigations,
failing which respondents are deemed to have waived it.
xxx (but) Respondent’s failure to claim the privilege during
the House Committee hearings may not, however, be
construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. xxx
what respondents received from the House Committee and
petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for
information. And as priorly stated, the House Committee
itself refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a
subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de
Venecia’s alleged request to Committee Chairperson
Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance.
The privilege is an exemption to Congress’ power of inquiry.
So long as Congress itself finds no cause to enforce such
power, there is no strict necessity to assert the privilege. In
this light, respondent’s failure to invoke the privilege during
the House Committee investigations did not amount to
waiver thereof.
“Showing of Need” Test
In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that
parties present a “sufficient showing of need” only means, in
substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of
disclosure sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of
privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages in a
balancing of interests. Such a balancing of interests is
certainly not new in constitutional adjudication involving
fundamental rights.
xxx However, when the Executive has – as in this case –
invoked the privilege, and it has been established that the
subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being
claimed, can a party overcome the same by merely asserting
that the information being demanded is a matter of public
concern, without any further showing required? Certainly not,
for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege of no
force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to
information, because then the sole test in such controversies
would be whether an information is a matter of public
concern.
Right to information vis-a-vis Executive Privilege
xxx the Court holds that, in determining whether an
information is covered by the right to information, a specific
“showing of need” for such information is not a relevant
consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of
public concern. When, however, the government has
claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the
information is indeed covered by the same, then the party
demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show
that that information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of
its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably
participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.

3 CONSTI 2 DIGEST

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Posted by kaye lee on 9:43 PM
G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008
Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic
of the Philippines
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public
concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of
the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD
and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also
pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The
Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the
same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the
MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to
information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under
a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation
under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to
conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of
the respondents to consult the local government units or
communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents
from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of
guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged
violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is
a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of
paramount public interest or of transcendental importance,
the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention
and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in
keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v.
Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or
the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said
to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without
any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our
constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x
settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility
of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not
negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the
Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7
Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including
4 CONSTI 2 DIGEST
public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code
of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of
the people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes
the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to
information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature,
subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may
be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public
concern involving public interest in the highest order. In
declaring that the right to information contemplates steps
and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing
consultations on both national and local levels and for a
principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty
of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments,
advice, and recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other
things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status
closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the
present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an “associative”
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the
concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever
granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the
associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however,
does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than
the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine
territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the
autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is
not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of
its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE
is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a
state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government,
and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not
necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit
animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of
the concept of association – runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the
national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the
present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the
specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and
powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and
the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous
region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just
quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to
conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD
requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall
come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive
Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the
legal framework,” implying an amendment of the and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary
Constitution to accommodate the MOA- and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion
AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty
amendment of the Constitution . enjoined.

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated
in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however,
extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply
to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as
she limits herself to recommending these changes and
submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need
not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the
very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on
its way to independence.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of

the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to

propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required
amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit
these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or
the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright
of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to
identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It
defines “Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including
Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or
colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full
blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand

of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros” as traditionally
understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that
the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be
respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not
been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to
the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is
vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of
their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD
acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the
public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act

of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition
and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among
other things, the observance of the free and prior informed
consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive
Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code

of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations
beforeany project or program critical to the environment and
human ecology including those that may call for the eviction
of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program
that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively
and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a
great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry
out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O.
No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371.
The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority,
5 CONSTI 2 DIGEST
RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO of the Quezon City Hall of Justice has remained to be a
Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano Holding of Religious public property devoted for public use because the holding of
Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC its primary purpose.
March 7, 2017

Facts:

This controversy originated from a series of letters written by

Valenciano and addressed to the Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of
Quezon City had been converted into a Roman Catholic
Chapel, complete with Catholic religious icons and other
instrument for religious activities. He believe that such
practice violated the constitutional provisions on the
separation of Church and State and the constitutional
prohibition against the appropriation of public money and
property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or
any other system of religion. He further averred that the
holding of masses at the basement of Hall of Justice showed
that it tended to favor the Catholic litigants; that the
rehearsals and other activities caused great disturbance to
the employees; and that court functions are affected due to
the masses that is being held from 12:00 to 1:15 in the
afternoon.

Issue:

Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of the

Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the constitutional
principle of separation of Church and State as well as the
constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public
money or property for the benefit of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution or system of religion.

Ruling:

The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does

not amount to the union of Church and State. The 1987
constitution provides that the separation of Church and the
State shall be inviolable; if further provides that the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the
principle of separation of Church and state. In fact, these two
principles are in perfect harmony with each other. The
Roman Catholic express their worship through the holy mass
and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the
right to the free exercise of their religion.

It is also the view of the Supreme Court that the holding of

Catholic masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of
Justice is not a case of establishment but merely
accommodation wherein the government recognize the
reality that some measures may not be imposed on a certain
portion of the population for the reason that these measures
are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be
shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the
public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit
such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.

No appropriation of Public money or property for the benefit

of any Church. The constitution provides that “No public
money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution,
or system of religion, or any priest, preacher, minister or
other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.

The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the

appropriation is primarily intended for the furtherance of a
particular church. The aforecited constitutional provision
“does not inhibit the use of public property for religious
purposes when the religious character of such use is merely
incidental to a temporary use which is available
indiscriminately to the public in general. Thus, the basement
6 CONSTI 2 DIGEST
 1. Power of Judicial Review
Imbong vs Ochoa 2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free Speech; 4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
Privacy; Due Process Clause; Equal Protection Clause
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Standi;

Declaratory Relief; One Subject One Title Rule

Issue/s:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH)

IMBONG VS OCHOA Law is unconstitutional for violating the:

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

1. Right to life
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for
themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA 2. Right to health
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG 3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC.,
Petitioners, 4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
vs.
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of 6. Due process clause
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. 7. Equal protection clause
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture 8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.
PROCEDURAL:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review

over the controversy.
Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the 1. Actual Case or Controversy
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2. Facial Challenge
2012. 3. Locus Standi
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning 4. Declaratory Relief
the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following 5. One Subject/One Title Rule
grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Discussions:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. PROCEDURAL

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to
protection against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on
involuntary servitude.
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that
the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
lis mota of the case.

5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the
law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s
family protected by the Constitution
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power
of judicial review over the controversy.
7 CONSTI 2 DIGEST
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means
an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It
must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical
question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case
or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is
ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had
a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is that individual Members could express their own views
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a on this matter.
result of the act complained of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the the life of the unborn from conception.”
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory
Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the
construction), the traditional meaning of “conception”
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press
according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is
and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right
that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support
to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which
the view that conception begins at fertilization.
one’s thoughts are externalized.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a
(a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and
personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
(b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal
being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female
issues upon which the court so largely depends for
ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the permissible.
doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of procedure,
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the
hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in
society, or of paramount public interest.”
defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also
does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that
index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is bounded duty to protect it.
comprehensive enough as to include the general object
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized
than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec.
impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses
3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the
that the average person reading it would not be informed of
unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12,
the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)),
indicating one subject where another or different one is really
which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it
had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the
court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does
not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the
Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines
the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no
existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its
declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.
Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature
must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown
by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2)
The valid portion can stand independently as law.
2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA
4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe
contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the
DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the
contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that
the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will be done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner.

Ruling/s: Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to

SUBSTANTIAL be considered “mandatory” only after these devices and
materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the
FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are
1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

question of when life begins is a scientific and medical

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without
contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH
proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed
measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b)
8 CONSTI 2 DIGEST

right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief.
However, the Court has the authority to determine
whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives
without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion.
To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other
groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution
or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state
religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control
program through the RH Law even if the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g.
the petitioners.
4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which
permits RH procedures even with only the consent of
the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding
spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional
safeguards for the family as the basic social institution.
Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution
mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses
to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood
and (b) the right of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law
cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and
endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor
undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and
violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which
states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii)
which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of
parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons
exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required
only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the
right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is
“non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to
procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not
deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor
child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether
to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an
exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of
Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to
provide Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education. Although educators
might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment
should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the
Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum
on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
9 CONSTI 2 DIGEST
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more
importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of
parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the
State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and
corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than
supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations,
school officials, and other interest groups in developing the
mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the
program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.
6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of
the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must
be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which
defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health
care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to “private health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to
include providing of information and rendering of medical
procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are
exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH
Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used
together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect”
and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and
effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the
State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged,
sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it
shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce
their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor
and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility
issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law
does not prescribe the number of children a couple may
have and does not impose conditions upon couples who
intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide
priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid.
There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of
private educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards
the teaching of reproductive health education
8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for
private and non-government health care service
providers to render 48 hours of pro
bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary
servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of
medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it
is both the power and a duty of the State to control and

regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private
and non-government RH service providers to render pro
bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty
is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17
as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render
RH service, pro bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case
or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and
its implementing rules have already taken effect and
that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated
earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so
because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for
vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers
who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at
least, be heard on the matter now.
2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines
originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the
Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those
involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights. The underlying reason for this modification is
simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court,
under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of
Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have
seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
10 CONSTI 2 DIGEST
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the
Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch
of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has
been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be
assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still, the
Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus
standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with
material interest affected by a Government act, provided
a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is
invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a
procedural technicality which the Court has, on more
than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public
interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured
by the operation of a law or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition
for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the
petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein
have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral
well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their
proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is
in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of
procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs
and so the Court would just consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching
implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court
may consider them as petitions for prohibition under
Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill
rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive
health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated
and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph
of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and
guarantees the human rights of all persons including their
right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the
right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education
and information, and the right to choose and make decisions
for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions,
ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive
health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human
development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT

UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR

insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or
minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the

RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his or her
religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the

RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the

RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the

RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the same facility
or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or
her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-

IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless
of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-

IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which

added the qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null
and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

11 CONSTI 2 DIGEST