Professional Documents
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1-E L-170133
CHAPTER 7
STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
A. In General
1. Generally
Whether a statute is to be given a strict or liberal construction depends upon:
the nature of the statute
the purpose to be subserved
the mischief to be remedied
The interpretation to be given to a statute must be that will best accomplish the end desired and
effectuate legislative intent.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellant was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of article 68,
paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING:
There are well recognized rules of statutory construction which are against the Government's
contention. One of these rules is that all parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled.
This rule applies in the construction of a statute and its amendment, both being read together as
whole. Criminal and penal statutes must be strictly construed, that is, they cannot be enlarged or
extended by intendment, implication, or by any equitable considerations. The language cannot
be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms in order to carry into effect the general
purpose for which the statute was enacted. The Court finds no irreconcilable conflict between
article 68, paragraph 2, and article 80 as amended. There is no incompatibility between granting
accused of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the
maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution.
ISSUE: Whether Andres Gomez at the time of his death, had such qualifications that he
could be considered as a regular and permanent employee for the purposes of collecting
the amount of his insurance policy by the beneficiary.
RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and ordered the defendant
to pay plaintiff the insurance of her deceased husband Andres Gomez. It held: “The test
of the competence, of the suitability of the examinee, was carried out before his
death; therefore, it must be given effectiveness from the date on which the test took
place. However, it is argued that Gomez's approval cannot be given retroactive effect in
its examination, since Article 663 (d) of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended,
provides that "a period of trial service shall be required before appointment or
employment is made permanent; " and it is clear that Gomez, having domesticated after
the examination and before his result was announced, could not be submitted to said
trial period for 6 months. This way of interpreting the law has the defect of being too
literal, and "the letter kills (sometimes), while the spirit vivifies”. It is evident that the
Government's National Life Insurance System has been created for social and
humanitarian purposes.
Article 3 of Commonwealth Law No. 186, which creates and regulates said System,
says positively that it establishes "in order to promote the efficiency and well-being of
the employees of the Philippine Government and replace the currently established
pension systems.
J. Perfecto: The system was established "in order to promote the efficiency and
welfare of the employees of the Government of the Philippines”.
There is absolutely no principle of justice which can justify circumscribing the
benefits of the system only to permanent and regular employees, when it was expressly
intended for all employees, and to continue the hateful discrimination which compelled
the National Assembly to abolish the then existing special pension systems.
Certainly, this principle of social justice in our Constitution as generously conceived
and so tersely phrased, was not included in the fundamental law as a mere popular
gesture. It was meant to a vital, articulate, compelling principle of public policy. It
should be observed in the interpretation not only of future legislation, but also of all
laws already existing on November 15, 1935. It was intended to change the spirit of our
laws, present and future. Thus, all the laws which on the great historic event when the
Commonwealth of the Philippines was born, were susceptible of two interpretations —
strict or liberal, against or in favor of social justice, now have to be construed broadly in
order to promote and achieve social justice.
ISSUE: Whether the term cockpit as used in the statute should be construed to mean
any place at which a cockfight takes place.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that such contention counter to the plain language of the
statute. The Court agreed with counsel for the appellants that while it appears that
the accused were participants in, or spectators at an unlicensed cockfight, the
evidence of record fails utterly to sustain a finding that this cockfight took place in a
cockpit. It stated that the statute does not penalize all unlicensed cockfighting, but
merely unlicensed cockfighting in a cockpit. The penalties prescribed in this statute
cannot be imposed unless it affirmatively appears not only that the accused engaged
in, or were spectators of cockfighting, but also that this cockfighting took place in a
cockpit.
J. Malcom’s Disenting Opinion: The term cockpit does not necessarily carry with it
the idea of a building or place maintained for the fighting cocks.
A diametrically opposed to this standpoint, there is for me in all cases a principle of
statutory construction not to be found in the books, but which for the Philippine
Islands is all-important. In the resolution of all questions, I begin with these queries:
What is for the best interest of the Filipino People? How under the law can the
progress of the Philippine Islands be advanced? From this viewpoint, which as a
matter of fact is herein in accord with the logical interpretation of the law, there is
but one possible result-to assist the Legislature in its enactment of the law and the
Executive in his enforcement of the law by a judicial interpretation which will make
legislative intention and executive action effective.
J. Perfecto, concurring opinion in Garcia v Government Insurance Board: The State
in general has two, and only two, articulate organs for law-making purposes — the
Legislature and the Tribunals. The first organ makes new law, the second attests and
confirms old law, though under cover of so doing it introduces many new principles.
For statutes and judicial decisions alike come into being and grow out of the same
common roots, the supreme good of society. It is a consecrated legal axiom that the
reason of the law is the life of the law. The reason lies in the soil of the common
welfare. Consequently, if the judge limits himself to the printed page of the statute,
and does not go out into the open spaces o factuality and dig down deep into this
common soil, he fails in his noble calling, and becomes subservient to formalism.