REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 4A

2018-2019

DEAN ALBANO

TABLE OF CONTENTS

#1. SPECIFIED CONTRACTORS AND DEV. INC. V. POBOCAN (JANUARY 11, 2018)

#2. TILAR V. TILAR (JULY 12, 2017)

#3. DELIMA V. GUERRERO (OCTOBER 10, 2017)

#4. CASANAS V PEOPLE (DECEMBER 12, 2017)

#5. HEIRS OF YUSINGCO V. BUSILAK (JANUARY 24, 2018)

#6. HEIRS OF AMISTOSO V. VALLECER (DECEMBER 6, 2017)

#7. GAFFNEY V. BULTEN (NOVEMBER 8, 2017)

#8. RACPAN V. BARROGA-HAIGH (JUNE 6, 2018)

#9. LEY CONSTRUCTION & DEV’T CORP V. SEDANO (AUGUST 23, 2017)

#10. NORTH GREENHILLS ASSOC. INC. V. MORALES (AUGUST 9, 2017)

#11. PSBANK V. PAPA (JANUARY 18, 2018)

#12. INTERLINK MOVIE HOUSES INC. V. CA (JANUARY 17, 2018)

#13. UY V. DEL CASTILLO (JULY 24, 2017)

#14. TI V. DINO (NOVEMBER 6, 2017)

#15. MANILA BANKING CORP V. BCDA (JANUARY 22, 2018)

#16. TRILLANES V. MARIGOMEN (MARCH 14, 2018)

#17. BLAY V. BANA (MARCH 7, 2018)

#18. SIBAYAN V. ALDA (JANUARY 17, 2018)

#19. CRUZ V. TOLENTINO (APRIL 18, 2018)

#20. ALBOR V. CA (JANUARY 27, 2018)

#21. MERCURY DRUG CORP V. HUANG (AUGUST 30, 2017)

#22. ANTIG V. ANTIQUESTA (JANUARY 17, 2018)

#23. RURAL BANK OF MABITAL LAGUNA V. CANICON ET AL (JUNE 27, 2018)

#24. DEPT OF AGRARIAN REFORM V. GALLE (OCTOBER 2, 2017)

#25. BALEARES V. ESPANTO (JUNE 6, 2018)

#26. GATCHALIAN V. FLORES (JANUARY 19, 2018)

#27. IGLESIA DE JESUCRISTO JERUSALEM OF MLA V. DELA CRUZ (APRIL 23, 2018) #28. LERIOU
V. LONGA (OCTOBER 8, 2018)

#29 DATOR VS. MORALES (OCTOBER 08, 2018)

#30. KU V. RCBC SEC INC (OCTOBER 17, 2018)

#31. PAGDANGANAN V. CA (SEPTEMBER 5, 2017)

#32. EIZMENDI V. FERNANDEZ (SEPTEMBER 5, 2018)

#33. SANCHEZ V. AGUILAR (SEPTEMBER 17, 2017)

#34. ALLIANCE OF HOMEOWNERS V. CITY GOV’T OF QC (SEPTEMBER 18, 2018)

#35. ZOSA V. CONSILIUM INC. (SEPT 19, 2018)

#36. DUQUE V. YU (FEBRUARY 19, 2018)

#37. LAGON V. VELASCO (FEBRUARY 14, 2018)

#38. REP V. TIPAY (FEBRUARY 14, 2018)

#39. FRIAS V. ALCAYDE (JULY 28, 2018)

#40. HONGKONG BANK V. HSBC (FEBRUARY 28, 2018)

#41. INTRAMUROS ADM. V. OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION DEV’T COMPANY (MARCH 7, 2018)

#42. SPS DAVIS V. DAVIS (MARCH 7, 2018)

#43. ENCARNACION V. JOHNSON (JULY 11, 2018)

#44. IGNACIO V. REYES (JULY 12, 2017)

#45. ABELLA V. CABANERO (AUGUST 9, 2017) - DE GUZMAN, JAM

#46. DOLINA V. VALLECERA (DECEMBER 15, 2010) - DEL ROSARIO, KAREN

#47. AGUSTIN V. CA (JUNE 15, 2005) - DE VILLA, KRISTINE

#48. TAYAG V. TAYAG (MARCH 24, 2008) - RETARDO, ARLYN

#49. MARIANO V. CITY OF NAGA (MARCH 2018)

Cases:

#1. SPECIFIED CONTRACTORS AND DEV. INC. V. POBOCAN (JANUARY 11, 2018)

GR NO. 212474 (JANUARY 11, 2018)

SPECIFIED CONTRACTORS AND DEVELOPMENT INC. AND SPOUSES OLONAN VS POBOCAN

FACTS: Jose Pobocan’s last position was president of Specified Contractors and subsidiary,
Starland Properties, as well as executive assistant in its other subsidiaries and affiliates. Architect
Olonan allegedly agreed to give Pobocan one (1) unit for every building Specified Contractors
were able to construct as part of respondent's compensation package to entice him to stay with
the company. Two (2) of these projects that Specified Contractors and respondent were able to
build were the Xavierville Square Condominium in Quezon City and the Sunrise Holiday Mansion
Bldg. I in Alfonso, Cavite. Pursuant to the alleged oral agreement, Specified Contractors
supposedly ceded, assigned and transferred Unit 708 of Xavierville Square Condominium and
Unit 208 of Sunrise Holiday Mansion Bldg. I (subject units) in favor of respondent.

In a March 14, 2011 letter addressed to petitioner Architect Enrique Olonan as chairman of
Specified Contractors, Pobocan requested the execution of Deeds of Assignment or Deeds of Sale
over the subject units in his favor, along with various other benefits, in view of his impending
retirement on March 19, 2011. When respondent's demand was unheeded, he filed a Complaint
before the RTC of Quezon City praying that petitioners be ordered to execute and deliver the
appropriate deeds of conveyance and to pay moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees.

Petitioners interposed a Motion to Dismiss denying the existence of the alleged oral agreement.
They argued that, even assuming arguendo that there was such an oral agreement, the alleged
contract is unenforceable for being in violation of the statute of frauds, nor was there any written
document, note or memorandum showing that the subject units have in fact been ceded,
assigned or transferred to respondent.

The RTC dismissed the respondent's complaint but disagreed with petitioners that the action had
already prescribed under Articles 1144 and 1145 of the New Civil Code, by reasoning that the
complaint is in the nature of a real action which prescribes after 30 years conformably with
Article 1141, it nonetheless agreed that the alleged agreement should have been put into writing,
and that such written note, memorandum or agreement should have been attached as
actionable documents to respondent's complaint.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC's Order, reasoning that the dismissal of respondent's
complaint, anchored on the violation of the statute of frauds, is unwarranted since the rule
applies only to executory and not to completed or partially consummated contracts.

ISSUE: WON Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the respondent's complaint
considering that the allegations therein invoked a right over the subject condominium units as
part of his compensation package, thus a claim arising out of an employer-employee relationship
cognizable by the labor arbiter

HELD: YES

RATIO DECIDENDI:

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. We
therefore find that respondent correctly designated his complaint as one for specific performance
consistent with his allegations and prayer therein. Accordingly, respondent's suit is one that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and indeed cognizable by the RTC of Quezon City where both
parties reside.

Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation, viz:

Even if this Court were to entertain the petitioners' belated assertion that jurisdiction belongs to
the labor arbiter as this case involves a claim arising from an employer-employee relationship,
reliance by petitioners on Domondon v. NLRC is misplaced. In Domondon, the existence of the
agreement on the transfer of car-ownership was not in issue but rather, the entitlement of a
former employee to his entire monetary claims against a former employer, considering that the
said employee had not paid the balance of the purchase price of a company car which the
employee opted to retain. In the present case, the existence of the alleged oral agreement, from
which would flow the right to compel performance, is in issue.

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#2. TILAR V. TILAR (JULY 12, 2017)

GR NO. 214529 (JULY 12, 2017)

TILAR VS TILAR and Republic

FACTS: On November 4, 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of private respondent's (respondent) psychological incapacity based on
Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that he and respondent were married on June 29, 1996
in a Catholic Church in Poro, Poro Camotes, Cebu with Rev. Fr. Vicente Igot as the solemnizing
officer; that a son was born of their marriage; that their marriage went well in the first few
months but respondent later became an extremely jealous, violent person which resulted to
frequent quarrels and petitioner being threatened and physically harmed; that she is a
happy-go-lucky and extravagant type of person and a gambler; that they eventually separated in
2002; and, that respondent is now living with another man in Cebu City. Petitioner consulted a
clinical psychologist and respondent was said to be suffering from "aggressive personality
disorder as well as histrionic personality disorder" which made her psychologically incapacitated
to comply with her essential marital obligations.

Respondent failed to file her Answer despite being served with summons. The RTC then required
the Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether collusion existed. In his Manifestation
and Compliance, the Public Prosecutor certified as to the absence of collusion between the
parties.[4] Trial, thereafter, ensued with petitioner and his witness testifying.

On June 3, 2014, the RTC issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this case is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.[5]

In so ruling, the RTC ratiocinated in this wise:

x x x the lingering issue that confronts this Court, whether it can validly [pass] upon the validity of
church marriage in the light of the separation of the Church and the State as enunciated in
Section 6 of Art. (sic) of the 1987 Constitution. Withal, marriage is a sacrament according to the
teaching of the Catholic Church. Being a sacrament, the same is purely religious. Declaration of
nullity, which is commonly called an annulment in the Catholic Church, is a judgment rendered by
an ecclesiastical tribunal determining that the sacrament of marriage was invalidly contracted.
The procedure is governed by the Church's Canon Law not by the civil law observed by the State
in nullity cases involving civil marriages. Ergo, the principle of separation of Church and State
finds application in this case. x x x

xxxx

Clearly, the State cannot encroach into the domain of the Church, thus, resolving the validity of
the church marriage is outside the province of its authority. Although the Family Code did not
categorize the marriage subject of the petition for nullity or annulment, the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the State laid down the principle of separation, ergo, it is beyond cavil that
nullity of a church marriage cannot be taken out of the church jurisdiction. The court being an
entity of the State is bereft of any jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.

ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the said case
HELD: YES

RATIO DECIDENDI:

The contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the requirements and formalities
prescribed by law. The marriage of petitioner and respondent which was solemnized by a
Catholic priest and was held in a church was in accordance with the above-quoted provisions.
Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal
consequences which are governed by the Family Code. As petitioner correctly pointed out, the
instant petition only seeks to nullify the marriage contract between the parties as postulated in
the Family Code of the Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage in the
religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another matter.[17] Notably, the proceedings for church
annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as
the couple is still considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle
of separation of the church and state finds no application in this case.

As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the Family
Code has provided for the grounds for the termination of marriage. These grounds may be
invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of voidable marriage or in a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising
jurisdiction over the matter. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provides:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

xxxx

(15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which petitioner filed before the RTC of
Baybay City, falls within its exclusive jurisdiction; thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for
lack of jurisdiction.

============================================================================

#3. DELIMA V. GUERRERO (OCTOBER 10, 2017)

GR NO. 229781 (October 10, 2017)

DE LIMA VS JUDGE GUERRERO

FACTS: The facts are undisputed. The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several
inquiries on the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP),
inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support of their testimonies. These legislative
inquiries led to the filing of the following complaints with the Department of Justice: NPS No. XVI
INV-16J-00313, entitled "Volunteers against Crime and Corruption (VACC), represented by Dante
Jimenez vs. Senator Leila M De Lima, et al.;" NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00315, entitled "Reynaldo
Esmeralda and Ruel Lasala vs. Senator Leila De Lima, et al.;" NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00331, entitled
"Jaybee Nino Sebastian, represented by his wife Roxanne Sebastian, vs. Senator Leila M. De Lima,
et al.;" and NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00336, entitled "National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) vs.
Senator Leila M. De Lima, et al."

The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing on December 2, 2016. The petitioner argued that
the Office of the Ombudsman has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four
complaints against her. Further, alleging evident partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel, the
petitioner contended that the DOJ prosecutors should inhibit themselves and refer the
complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman.

During the hearing conducted The DOJ Panel accused Leila M. De Lima, being then the Secretary
of the Department of Justice, and accused Rafael Marcos Z. Ragos, being then the
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Corrections, by taking advantage of their public office,
conspiring and confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being then an employee of the
Department of Justice detailed to De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or influence over
inmates in the New Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal drug trading, in the following
manner: De Lima and Ragas, with the use of their power, position, and authority, demand, solicit
and extort money from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the
senatorial bid of De Lima in the May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not being
lawfully authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices,
did then and there willfully and unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter give
and deliver to De Lima, through Ragas and Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting
to Five Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos on 24 November 2012, Five Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos
on 15 December 2012, and One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos weekly "tara" each from
the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, mainly raising the following: the RTC lacks jurisdiction over
the offense charged against petitioner; the DOJ Panel lacks authority to file the Information the
Information charges more than one offense; the allegations and the recitals of facts do not allege
the corpus delicti of the charge; the Information is based on testimonies of witnesses who are
not qualified to be discharged as state witnesses; and the testimonies of these witnesses are
hearsay.

On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order finding probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-accused. The Order stated,
viz.:

After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation conducted in this case by the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court
finds sufficient probable cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the accused LEILA
M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS Z. RAGOS and RONNIE PALISOC DAYAN.

WHEREFORE, let Warrants of Arrest be issued against the above mentioned accused.

SO ORDERED.

Accordingly, the questioned Warrant of Arrest dated February 23, 2017,which contained no
recommendation for bail, was issued against petitioner.

On February 24, 2017, the PNP Investigation and Detection Group served the Warrant of Arrest
on petitioner and the respondent judge issued the assailed February 24, 2017 Order, committing
petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center.

ISSUE: WON the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the violation
of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the assailed Information

HELD: YES

RATIO DECIDENDI:

The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the rules
provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of RA
9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively vested with
the Regional Trial Court and no other. The designation of the RTC as the court with the exclusive
jurisdiction over drug-related cases is apparent in the following provisions where it was expressly
mentioned and recognized as the only court with the authority to hear drug-related cases:

Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act,
Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. –

After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the Court shall
immediately schedule a hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the
offense and all the assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in the
name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be manifestly out of proportion to
his/her lawful income:

During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income derived
therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred
and the same shall be in custodia legis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.

Section 61. Compulsory Confinement of a Drug Dependent Who Refuses to Apply Under the
Voluntary Submission Program. – A petition for the confinement of a person alleged to be
dependent on dangerous drugs to a Center may be filed by any person authorized by the Board
with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where such person is found.

Section 90. Jurisdiction. -The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the
existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving
violations of this Act. The number of courts designated in each judicial region shall be based on
the population and the number of cases pending in their respective jurisdiction.

Applying by analogy the ruling in People v. Simon, People v. De Lara, People v. Santos, and
Ordonez v. Vinarao, the imposable penalty in this case which involves 0.4587 grams of shabu
should not exceed prision correccional. We say by analogy because these cases involved
marijuana, not methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). In Section 20 of RA. No. 6425, as
amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the maximum quantities of marijuana and
methamphetamine hydrochloride for purposes of imposing the maximum penalties are not the
same. For the latter, if the quantity involved is 200 grams or more, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10 million shall be imposed. Accordingly,
if the quantity involved is below 200 grams, the imposable penalties should be as follows:

Clearly, the penalty which may be imposed for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 96-8443
would at most be only prision correccional duration is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years. Does it follow then that, as the petitioner insists, the RTC has no jurisdiction thereon in
view of the amendment of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, which vested upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties?
This Section 32 as thus amended now reads:

The exception in the opening sentence is of special significance which we cannot disregard. x x x
The aforementioned exception refers not only to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases, but also to other laws which specifically
lodge in Regional Trial Courts exclusive jurisdiction over specific criminal cases, e. g., (a) Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A Nos. 1289 and 4363 on written defamation or
libel; (b) Decree on Intellectual Property (P. D. No. 49, as amended), which vests upon Courts of
First Instance exclusive jurisdiction over the cases therein mentioned regardless of the imposable
penalty and (c) more appropriately for the case at bar, Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended
by P.D. No. 44, which vests on Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Courts concurrent exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving
violations of said Act.

That Congress indeed did not intend to repeal these special laws vesting exclusive jurisdiction in
the Regional Trial Courts over certain cases is clearly evident from the exception provided for in
the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A No. 7691. These special
laws are not, therefore, covered by the repealing clause (Section 6) of R.A. No. 7691.

============================================================================

#4. CASANAS V PEOPLE (DECEMBER 12, 2017)

GR NO. 223833 (December 11, 2017)

CASANAS VS PEOPLE

FACTS: That on or about August 12, 2012, in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away with him one (1) Racal motorcycle with plate
number 7539IJ without the consent of its owner CHRISTOPHER CALDERON y DORIGON, to the
damage and prejudice of the said complainant.

For his part, while Casanas admitted that Calderon owned the subject motorcycle, he denied
stealing the same. He averred that he only borrowed the subject motorcycle on August 18, 2012,
but he was unable to return it on that date as he had a drinking session with his friends. The next
day, he was on his way home onboard the subject motorcycle when policemen blocked his way
and forcibly took him to the police station. Thereat, a police officer purportedly took a knife from
his drawer, which led petitioner to believe that he was being investigated and detained because
of the said knife.

The RTC-Valenzuela Ruling found Casanas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate
period of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as
maximum.

The RTC-Valenzuela held that the prosecution had established all the elements of the crime
charged, considering that: (a) Calderon allowed petitioner to drive the subject motorcycle, which
was then attached to a sidecar; (b) Casanas did not return the subject motorcycle within the
agreed period; and (c) Casanas continued to use the same for his personal use, thereby exhibiting
his intent to gain. In this regard, the RTC-Valenzuela ruled that while Casanas's possession of the
subject motorcycle was lawful in the beginning, such possession became unlawful when he failed
to return the same to Calderon in accordance with their agreement.

Aggrieved, Casanas appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling affirmed the RTC Valenzuela ruling in toto. Aside from upholding the
RTC-Valenzuela's findings, the CA likewise pointed out that initially, Casanas borrowed a tricycle
from Calderon; but when he was apprehended, only the subject motorcycle without the sidecar
was recovered from him.

Undaunted, Casanas moved for reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution dated
January 11, 2016; hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the RTC-Valenzuela had jurisdiction over the case

HELD: NO

RATIO DECIDENDI:

it is evident that the crime of Carnapping, including all the elements thereof - namely, that: (a)
there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (b) the vehicle belongs to a person other than the
offender himself; (c) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or that the taking
was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things; and (d) the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle - did not occur in
Valenzuela City, but in Marilao, Bulacan. While the Court notes that Casanas was indeed arrested
in Valenzuela City while in the possession of the subject motorcycle, the same is of no moment,
not only because such is not an element of the crime, but more importantly, at that point in time,
the crime had long been consummated. Case law provides that '"unlawful taking' or
apoderamiento is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. It is deemed
complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same.

The RTC-Valenzuela had no authority to take cognizance of the instant case as the crime was
committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, the RTC-Valenzuela ruling convicting
Casanas of the crime charged, as well as the CA ruling upholding the same, is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that "where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter,
the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which
no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one,
and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out are void. It is not a decision in
contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become executory. It also follows that such a void
judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata,

============================================================================

#5. HEIRS OF YUSINGCO V. BUSILAK (JANUARY 24, 2018)

G.R. No. 210504 (January 24, 2018)

HEIRS OF ALFONSO YUSINGCO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, TEODORO K.

YUSINGCO v. AMELITA BUSILAK, COSCA NAVARRO, FLAVIA CURAYAG AND LIXBERTO CASTRO

FACTS: On August 11, 2005, herein petitioners filed five separate (5) Complaints5 for accion
publiciana and/or recovery of possession against herein respondents and a certain Reynaldo
Peralta. The suits, which were subsequently consolidated, were filed with the MTCC of Surigao
City, which were later raffled to Branch 1 thereof. Petitioners uniformly alleged in the said
Complaints that: they are owners of three (3) parcels of land, denominated as Lot Nos. 519, 520
and 1015, which are all located at Barangay Taft, Surigao City; they inherited the lots from their
predecessor-in-interest, Alfonso Yusingco; they were in possession of the said properties prior to
and at the start of the Second World War, but lost possession thereof during the war; after the
war, petitioners discovered that the subject properties were occupied by several persons, which
prompted petitioners to file separate cases for accion reivindicatoria and recovery of possession
against these persons; during the pendency of these cases, herein respondents entered different
portions of the same properties and occupied them without the knowledge and consent of
petitioners; petitioners were forced to tolerate the illegal occupation of respondents as they did
not have sufficient resources to protect their property at that time and also because their
ownership was still being disputed in the earlier cases filed; subsequently, the cases which they
earlier filed were decided in their favor and they were declared the owners of the subject
properties; thereafter, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the said properties, but
the latter refused.

In their Answer, respondents raised essentially similar defenses, contending, in essence, that:
they have been in possession of the subject properties for more than thirty (30) years; petitioners
never actually possessed the said parcels of land and that they never had title over the same;
thus, petitioners' claim would be in conflict with and inferior to respondents' claim of possession.

After the issues were joined, trial ensued.

MTCC, Branch 1, Surigao City issued an Omnibus Judgment in favor of herein petitioners.

WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, The
MTCC held that: in an earlier case for accion reivindicatoria (Civil Case No. 1645) decided by the
Court of First Instance of Surigao Del Norte on June 8, 1979 and affirmed by the CA in its Decision
dated August 30, 1982 (CA-G.R. No. 66508-R), which became final and executory on December
18, 1986, herein petitioners were declared the true and lawful co-owners of the subject
properties; on the other hand, evidence showed that respondents were mere intruders on the
lots in question; thus, as judicially-declared owners of the said lots, petitioners are entitled to
possession thereof as against respondents whose entries into the said properties are illegal.

Herein respondents filed an appeal with the RTC of Surigao City.

RTC, Branch 30, Surigao City, rendered a Joint Decision, which affirmed, with modification, the
Omnibus Judgment of the MTCC.

Herein respondents then filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court assailing the abovementioned Joint Decision of the RTC.

CA promulgated its Decision granting the petition of herein respondents. The CA ruled that the
RTC and CA Decisions used by the MTCC in holding that herein petitioners are owners of the
subject properties and are, thus, entitled to legal possession thereof, are based on a previous
accion reivindicatoria, which is a suit in personam. The CA held that, being an action in personam,
the judgments in the said case binds only the parties properly impleaded therein. Since
respondents were not parties to the said action, the CA concluded that they could not be bound
by the judgments declaring petitioners as owners of the disputed properties. Hence, petitioners'
present actions to recover possession of the said properties from respondents, on the basis of
the said judgments, must fail.

ISSUE: WON the final and executory decisions rendered in a previous accion reivindicatoria,
finding petitioners to be the lawful owners of the subject properties, are binding upon
respondents.

HELD: YES

RATIO DECIDENDI:

This Court rules in the affirmative.

At the outset, the Court finds it proper to look into the nature of the actions filed by petitioners
against respondents. A perusal of the complaints filed by petitioners shows that the actions were
captioned as "Accion Publiciana and/or Recovery of Possession." However, the Court agrees with
the ruling of the lower courts that the complaints filed were actually accion reivindicatoria.

In a number of cases,10 this Court had occasion to discuss the three (3) kinds of actions available
to recover possession of real property, to wit:
x x x (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (a) accion reivindicatoria

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion)
and unlawful detainer (desahuico) [sic]. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of
real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful
detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in
that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the
issue is which party has prior de factopossession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the
defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.
It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one
year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant's
possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer,
but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover
ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is, thus, an action whereby the plaintiff alleges
ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.11 It is a suit to recover
possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership.12 The judgment in such a case
determines the ownership of the property and awards the possession of the property to the
lawful owner.13 It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely
alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title.14

On the basis of the above discussions, it is clear that the lower courts did not err in ruling that the
suits filed by petitioners are accion reivindicatoria, not accion publiciana, as petitioners seek to
recover possession of the subject lots on the basis of their ownership thereof.

It is settled that a judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in

personam.15 It is conclusive, not against the whole world, but only "between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action."16 An action
to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular
individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.17 Any judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be
heard.18 However, this rule admits of the exception that even a non-party may be bound by the
judgment in an ejectment suit19 where he is any of the following: (a) trespasser, squatter or
agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guest
or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) transferee pendente lite;
(d) sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.

============================================================================

#6. HEIRS OF AMISTOSO V. VALLECER (DECEMBER 6, 2017)

G.R. No. 227124, December 06, 2017

HEIRS OF VICTOR AMISTOSO, NAMELY: VENEZUELA A. DELA CRUZ, FLORA A. TULIO, WILFREDO D.
AMISTOSO, RUFINO D. AMISTOSO, VICENTE D. AMISTOSO, MAXIMO D. AMISTOSO, AND ZENAIDA
D. AMISTOSO v. ELMER T. VALLECER, REPRESENTED BY EDGAR VALLECER

FACTS: Sometime in March 1996, respondent Elmer T. Vallecer (respondent), through his brother
Dr. Jose Benjy T. Vallecer (Benjy), filed a Complaint for recovery of possession and damages
against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. S-606, involving a 2,265-square meter parcel of
land, located in Labason, Zamboanga del Norte, described as Lot C-7-A and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-44214(TCT T-44214) and Tax Declaration No. 93-7329 under
respondent's name. He claimed that he purchased the property sometime in June 1990 after
confirming with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) that the property was not tenanted.
When he started making preparations for the construction of a commercial building on the
property, petitioners, with the aid of their workers, agents, representatives, and/or employees,
stopped or barred him by force, threats, and intimidation. Despite repeated demands and
explanations made by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of the DAR during a pre
litigation conference that no landlord-tenancy relationship ever existed between them as regards
the property, petitioners continued to refuse him from entering and enjoying possession of his
property. Thus, he prayed for the court to, among others, order petitioners, with their
representatives, agents, employees, and assigns, to vacate the property and pay damages.

In their defense, petitioners claimed that they have been in actual, peaceful, and continuous
possession of the land as evidenced by Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-002623 (CLT) issued in
November 1978 to their predecessor-in-interest Victor Amistoso (Victor) by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 27.

RTC declared respondent as the absolute owner of the subject property under his name. On
appeal, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the RTC ruling. It found that Benjy failed to show
proof of his capacity to sue on respondent's behalf and that the CLT issued by the DAR
acknowledges petitioners as "deemed owner" of the land after full payment of its value. This CA
Decision became final and executory on November 4, 2003, and consequently, a Writ of
Execution was issued on May 9, 2005.

The RTC Ruling denied petitioners' Motion to Hear and Resolve Affirmative Defenses for lack of
merit, declaring that the principle of res judicata would not apply in view of the lack of identity of
causes of action. It held that in contrast to Civil Case No. S-606, which involves recovery of
possession, Civil Case No. L-298 is essentially one for declaration of ownership. It also ruled that
since the land is covered by a Torrens title, it can no longer be acquired by prescription or be lost
by laches.

Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied in an Ordre dated
December 3, 2014. Undaunted, they elevated the case before the CA via a petition for certiorari,
arguing that Civil Case No. L-298 for quieting of title is barred by res judicata, and that
respondent lacked cause of action.

The CA Ruling affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
holding that Civil Case No. L-298 is not barred by res judicata, considering that Civil Case No.
S-606 filed by respondent is anchored on his right to possess the real property as the registered
owner; while Civil Case No. L-298 was filed in order to clear his title over the land and remove all
adverse claims against it.

Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration, additionally arguing that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction to cancel their CLT. The CA denied petitioners' motion in a Resolution dated August 10,
2016; hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON Civil Case No. L-298 is barred by res judicata.

HELD: NO

RATIO DECIDENDI:

The petition lacks merit.

Preliminarily, petitioners insist, albeit belatedly, that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
complaint in Civil Case No. L-298, considering that what is sought to be cancelled is their CLT;
hence, an agrarian dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.

The argument is specious.

In order to classify a matter as an agrarian dispute which falls under the jurisdiction of the DARAB,
it must be first shown that a tenancy relationship exists between the parties. For such
relationship to be proven, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, namely:

(a) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;

(b) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;

(c) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;

(d) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;

(e) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and

(f) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

Moreover, it is well-settled that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action
is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was
commenced, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the
claims or reliefs sought therein and regardless of the defenses set up in the court or upon a
motion to dismiss by the defendant.

In this case, a reading of the material allegations of respondent's complaint in Civil Case No.
L-298 and even petitioners' admissions readily reveals that there is neither a tenancy relationship
between petitioners and respondent, nor had petitioners been the tenant of respondent's
predecessors in-interest. In fact, respondent did not even question the validity of petitioners' CLT
nor sought for its cancellation. Rather, what respondent sought was for a declaration that the
property covered by his Torrens title is different from the property covered by petitioners' CLT in
order to quiet his title and remove all adverse claims against it. Clearly, this is not an agrarian
dispute that falls within the DARAB's jurisdiction.

The Court disagrees."Res judicata literally means 'a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon
or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment."' It also refers to the "rule that an existing final
judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit." For res judicata to
absolutely bar a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former
judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d)
there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action.

In this case, the Court finds that Civil Case No. S-606 did not bar the filing of Civil Case No. L-298
on the ground of res judicata as the causes of action in the two cases are not the same.

============================================================================
#7. GAFFNEY V. BULTEN (NOVEMBER 8, 2017)

G.R. No. 219408

GAFFNEY vs. BUTLER

FACTS: On September 21, 2011, Donald Francis Gaffney ("private respondent") filed a Complaint
against Gina V. Butler ("petitioner") for sum of money. Private respondent alleged that sometime
between the years 2006 to 2007, petitioner and her husband Anthony Richard Butler approached
and invited private respondent to invest in ActiveFun Corporation ("ActiveFun"), an entity
engaged in the construction, operation and management of children's play and party facilities.
Petitioner was the President of ActiveFun while her husband was its Treasurer and Chief
Executive Officer.

Private respondent advanced the approximate amount of PhP12,500,000.00 representing his

initial investment in ActiveFun. However, petitioner's husband passed away sometime in
December 2009. Consequently, the proposed investment agreement did not materialize. Private
respondent then demanded the return of his investments from petitioner, who personally
undertook to repay the total amount of his investments plus accrued interest. However, despite
the lapse of a considerable period of time, petitioner was only able to pay private respondent on
October 15, 2010 an initial amount of PhPl,000,000.00. Private respondent was thus constrained
to institute a legal action for the enforcement of his claim against petitioner.

In her Answer filed on April 23, 2012, petitioner averred, among others, that she had no
knowledge of private respondent's investment in ActiveFun. In the meantime, petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss Ad-Cautelam, allegedly not as the defendant originally named in the complaint
but as the purported representative of her late husband, arguing that the death of her husband
did not ipso facto make her the representative of his estate. More importantly, a claim against an
estate of a deceased person is governed by Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

Hence, it cannot be consolidated with an ordinary civil action in which only natural or juridical
persons may be parties pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, the
service of summons intended for the estate of the late Anthony Richard Butler was improperly
served. The CA, in the questioned Decision dated February 6, 2015, granted Gina's CA Petition,
reversed and set aside the RTC Orders and dismissed the entire complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not a deceased person does have the capacity to be sued

HELD: NO
RATIO DECIDENDI:

A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a
case.25 Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court unequivocally states that "[o]nly natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action."In sum, impleading
the deceased Anthony or his estate in the present petition was improper. The action against him
must be dismissed and the same may just be filed as a claim against his estate in a proper
proceeding. The CA thus did not err in reversing the trial court.

============================================================================

#8. RACPAN V. BARROGA-HAIGH (JUNE 6, 2018)

G.R. No. 234499, June 06, 2018

RUDY L. RACPAN v. SHARON BARROGA-HAIGH

FACTS: Petitioner Rudy Racpan filed a Complaint "For Declaration For Nullity of Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase & Attorney's Fees" before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 11
(RTC-Davao). In his Complaint, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 34, 742-2012, petitioner
alleged that after his wife's death on November 12, 2011, he instructed their daughter to arrange
his wife's important documents. In so doing, their daughter discovered a Deed of Sale with Right
to Purchase dated March 29, 2011. The Deed of Sale was purportedly signed by him and his late
wife and appeared to convey to respondent Sharon Barroga-Haigh a real property registered in
his name under TCT No. T-142-2011009374 and located in Bo. Tuganay, Municipality of Carmen,
Province of Davao del Norte.Petitioner maintained that the Deed of Sale was falsified and
fictitious as he never signed any contract, not even any special power of attorney, for the sale or
conveyance of the property which is still in his possession. Thus, he prayed for the declaration of
the Deed of Sale's nullity. 
 
 In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, respondent
contended, by way of affirmative defense, that the venue of the Complaint was improperly laid
and that the filing of the case lacks the mandatory requirement of Barangay Clearance.
Subsequently, respondent filed a motion for preliminary hearing on her affirmative defenses.
 

Acting on the motion, the RTC-Davao set the case for preliminary hearing and thereafter issued
an Order dated September 18, 2013 dismissing the petitioner's Complaint as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the present case is hereby ORDERED DISMISSED for being
improperly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and for failure to comply with a
condition precedent prior to its filing.
 
 SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for the RTC-Davao to reconsider its Order dismissing the complaint but the trial
court remained steadfast and denied his motion in its June 19, 2004 Orde.r Hence, the petitioner
came to the CA on appeal.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's
Complaint as follows:

WHEREFORE, the order dated September 18, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao
City in Civil Case No. 34,742-12 is AFFIRMED.
 
 SO ORDERED.

The CA explained that petitioner's Complaint is a real action as it wants the court to abrogate and
nullify. whatever right or claim the respondent might have on the property subject of the Deed of
Sale. Hence, for the appellate court, Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court is applicable. Under
this Rule, real actions shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved is situated. As the property involved is located
in Bo. Tuganay, Municipality of Cannen, Province of Davao del Norte, the appellate court held
that the Complaint should have been lodged with the RTC of Davao del Norte and not the
RTC-Davao.


ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the petitioner's Complaint.

HELD: YES

RATIO DECIDENDI:

The petition is impressed with merit.
 
 The venue was properly laid as the complaint was a
personal action.
 
 By weight of jurisprudence, the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. In turn, the nature of the action determines its proper venue. Rule 4
of the Rules of Court provides the rules on the situs for bringing real and personal actions, viz:

Rule 4
 
 VENUE OF ACTIONS


 Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over
the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
 
 Forcible entry
and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the
municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
 

Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.

Expounding on the foregoing provisions, the Court delineated the basic distinction between a
real and a personal action and their respective venues in Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Hontanosas, Jr., stating that:

The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the
Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a
real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Such
action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the
action is also referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions
as personal actions. Such actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal
property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for
the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue of
a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is
considered a transitory one.

While there is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon
for conciliation before petitioner instituted Civil Case No. 34, 742-2012, there is likewise no
quibbling that his Complaint was coupled with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. Hence, it falls among the exceptions to the rule requiring the referral to baranggay
conciliation.
 
 As good faith is always presumed, in the absence of proof of improper motive on
the part of the petitioner, the Court cannot countenance the appellate court's assumption that
petitioner was solely intent on evading the requirements of the LGC in applying for a preliminary
injunction. This Court cannot sustain a dismissal of an action on account of an unproven assertion
of bad faith.
 


============================================================================

#9. LEY CONSTRUCTION & DEV’T CORP V. SEDANO (AUGUST 23, 2017)

G.R. No. 222711

LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, represented by its President, JANET C.

LEY 
 vs. MARVIN MEDEL SEDANO, doing business under the name and style "LOLA TABA LOLO
PATO PALENGKE AT PALUTO SA SEASIDE,"

FACTS: On March 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and
Damages against respondent Marvin Medel Sedano (respondent), doing business under the
name and style "Lola Taha Lalo Pata Palengke at Paluto sa Seaside," before the Valenzuela-RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 40-V-12. In its complaint, petitioner alleged that on January 14, 2005,
it leased a 50,000-square meter (sq.m.) parcel of land located at Financial Center Area, Pasay City
(now, Lot 5-A Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard, Pasay City) from respondent third-party defendant,
the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC). On September 11, 2006, petitioner
subleased the 14,659.80-sq.m. portion thereof to respondent for a term often (10) years
beginning November 15, 2005, for a monthly rent of ₱1,174,7yy80.00, subject to a ten percent
(10%) increase beginning on the third year and every year thereafter (lease contract).
Respondent allegedly failed to pay the rent due for the period August 2011 to December 2011,
amounting to a total of P8,828,025.46, and despite demands, refused to settle his
obligations;hence, the complaint.

In his Answer with Third-Party Complaint, respondent countered that he religiously paid rent to
petitioner until PNCC demanded that the rent be paid directly to it, in view of the petitioner's
eviction from the subject property by virtue of a court order. Thus, during the period from August
2011 until December 2011, he remitted the rentals to PNCC. Should he be found liable to
petitioner, respondent maintained that the RTC should hold PNCC liable to reimburse to him the
amounts he paid as rentals; hence, the third-party complaint.

Respondent likewise pointed out that the venue was improperly laid since Section 21 of the lease
contract provides that "[a]ll actions or case[s] filed in connection with this case shall be filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all others." Hence, the complaint should be
dismissed on the ground of improper venue.

In its Comment/Opposition to respondent's affirmative defense of improper venue, petitioner

argued that Section 21 of the lease contract is not a stipulation as to venue, but a stipulation on
jurisdiction which is void. This is because such stipulation deprives other courts, i.e., the
Municipal Trial Courts, of jurisdiction over cases which, under the law, are within its exclusive
original jurisdiction, such as an action for unlawful detainer. Petitioner further posited that
respondent had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Valenzuela-RTC and had
waived any objections on venue, since he sought affirmative reliefs from the said court when he
asked several times for additional time to file his responsive pleading, set-up counterclaims
against petitioner, and impleaded PNCC as a third-party defendant.

Meanwhile, in its Answer to Third Party Complaint with Counterclaim, PNCC contended that
respondent has no cause of action against it, since he acknowledged PNCC’s right to receive rent,
as evidenced by his direct payment thereof to PNCC. Respondent also entered into a contract of
lease with PNCC after learning that petitioner had been evicted from the premises by virtue of a
court ruling.

The Valenzuela-RTC Ruling

In an Order dated June 15, 2015, the Valenzuela-RTC granted respondent's motion and dismissed
the complaint on the ground of improper venue. It held that Section 21 of the lease contract
between petitioner and respondent is void insofar as it limits the filing of cases with the R TC of
Pasay City, even when the subject matter jurisdiction over the case is with the Metropolitan Trial
Courts. However, with respect to the filing of cases cognizable by the RTCs, the stipulation validly
limits the venue to the RTC of Pasay City. Since petitioner's complaint is one for collection of sum
of money in an amount that is within the jurisdiction of the R TC, petitioner should have filed the
case with the RTC of Pasay City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Valenzuela-RTC erred in ruling that venue was improperly laid.

HELD: NO

RATIO DECIDENDI:

The petition has no merit.

Rule 4
 VENUE OF ACTIONS

Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over
the area wherein the

real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of
the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Section 2. Venue of personal actions. -All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.

Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. - If any of the defendants does not reside and is
not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any
property of said defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in
the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is
situated or found.

Section 4. When Rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply -

(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or

(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the
exclusive venue thereof. (Emphases supplied)

Based on these provisions, the venue for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie with the
court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. As an exception, parties may, through a written instrument, restrict the filing of said
actions in a certain exclusive venue. In Briones v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:

Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in
the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the
place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is
essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.

As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that
such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as
"exclusively," "waiving for this purpose any other venue," "shall only" preceding the designation
of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar import, the stipulation should
be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place.

============================================================================

#10. NORTH GREENHILLS ASSOC. INC. V. MORALES (AUGUST 9, 2017)

G.R. No. 222821, August 09, 2017

NORTH GREENHILLS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. ATTY. NARCISO MORALES,

FACTS: Atty. Morales is a resident of North Greenhills Subdivision in San Juan City. His house is
located alongside Club Filipino Avenue and adjacent to McKinley Park, an open space/playground
area owned and operated by NGA. He also has a personal access door, which he built through a
wall separating his house from the park. This access door, when unlocked, opens directly into the
park.

On the other hand, NGA, an association composed of members of the subdivision, organized to
promote and advance the best interests, general welfare, prosperity, and safeguard the
well-being of the owners, lessees and occupants of North Greenhills, is the undisputed owner of
the park. It has acquired ownership thereof through a donation made by the original owner,
Ortigas &. Co. Ltd.

In June 2003, NGA started constructing a pavilion or kiosk occupying the side of the park adjacent
to the residence of Atty. Morales. Part of the design was a public restroom intended to serve the
needs of park guests and members of NGA. Said restroom was constructed alongside the
concrete wall separating the house of Atty. Morales from the park.

Objecting to the construction of the restroom, Atty. Morales filed on July 23, 2003 a complaint
before the HLURB, docketed as HLURB Case No. NCRHOA-072303-309. On August 13, 2013, he
amended his complaint and additionally sought the demolition of the pavilion which was then
being built.

NGA, in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, rejected the assertions of Atty. Morales. It
contended that as the absolute owner of the park, it had the absolute right to fence the property
and impose reasonable conditions for the use thereof by both its members and third parties; that
the construction of the restroom was for the use and benefit of all NGA members, including Atty.
Morales; and that Atty. Morales' use of a side entrance to the park for 33 years could not have
ripened into any right because easement of right of way could not be acquired by prescription.
NGA likewise sought the payment of P878,778.40 corresponding to the annual membership dues
which Atty. Morales had not been paying since 1980.

On April 13, 2003, the HLURB Arbiter conducted an ocular inspection of the park and noted that
the construction started by NGA blocked Atty. Morales' side access to the park.

On February 16, 2005, the HLURB Arbiter rendered a Decision, rendered ordering respondents of
the removal of the pavilion and the relocation of the common toilet in a place where it will not
be a nuisance to any resident. Respondents are further directed to remove the obstruction to the
side door of the complainant. All other claims and counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.

NGA appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board). In its November 22, 2007
Decision,the HLURB Board modified the ruling of the HLURB Arbiter, thus:

Further, the complaint against respondent Alviar should be dropped as no acts have been
particularly attributed to him in his personal capacity.

NGA appealed to the Office of the President (OP).

On February 17, 2010, the OP rendered its decision, affirming in toto the ruling of the HLURB
Board.

NGA moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the OP in its August 8, 2013
Resolution.

Aggrieved, NGA filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA,
arguing that the OP erred in its findings.

Ruling of the CA

In its March 13, 2015 Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the OP. It found no error on the part
of the OP in affirming the characterization of the restrooms built as nuisance per accidens
considering that the structure posed sanitary issues which could adversely affect not only Atty.
Morales, but also his entire household; that even if there existed a perimeter wall between the
park and Atty. Morales' home, the odor emanating from the restroom could easily find its way to
the dining area, and the foul and noxious smell would make it very difficult and annoying for the
residents of the house to eat; and that the proximity of the restroom to Atty. Morales' house
placed the people residing therein at a greater risk of contracting diseases both from improperly
disposed waste and human excrements, as well as from flies, mosquitoes and other insects,
should NGA fail to maintain the cleanliness of the structures.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER THE CA CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE HLURB HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
COMPLAINT FILED BY ATTY. MORALES;

2. WHETHER THE CA CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM OF NGA AGAINST ATTY.
MORALES FOR UNPAID ASSOCIATION DUES WAS A PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM.

HELD AND RATIO DECIDENDI:

The Court partly grants the petition.

On Jurisdiction

Basic is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which
court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined from the allegations contained in the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction remains
vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein.

Relative thereto is the rule that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law.It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the
parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Consequently, questions of jurisdiction
may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.

In this case, it appears that Atty. Morales, by filing his complaint as a member whose rights have
been allegedly violated, has satisfied such requirement. His status as a member has not been
questioned. It is worthy to note that NGA, in its counterclaim, demanded the payment of
association dues from Atty. Morales as he has been refusing to pay his dues for more than three
decades. In sum, there is no dispute that Atty. Morales is a member of NGA, albeit a delinquent
member. In Tumpag v. Tumpag, the Court said:

Counterclaim for unpaid dues was a 
 permissive one and, therefore, the 
 affirmation of its
dismissal was proper
A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending party may
have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected
with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs complaint. It
is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and
will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any
other counterclaim is permissive.

The Court has held that the compelling test of compulsoriness characterizes a counterclaim as
compulsory if there should exist a logical relationship between the main claim and the
counterclaim. The Court further ruled that there exists such a relationship when conducting
separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial duplication of time
and effort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve the same factual and
legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties.

The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive are as follows:

(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same?

(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent the compulsory rule?

(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendant's
counterclaim?

(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the counterclaim?

A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.
Otherwise, the same is permissive.

Here, the main issues in the complaint are limited only to the propriety of barring Atty. Morales
from accessing the park through the side door and whether the restroom constructed by NGA is
a nuisance per se. On the other hand, the counterclaim is simply concerned with collecting from
Atty. Morales his unpaid association dues for the past thirty (30) years. Suffice it to state that
payment or non-payment of association dues are distinct matters that do not relate to whether
the main cause of Atty. Morales against NGA was proper. Whether there was payment or
otherwise is irrelevant to the main issues considering that the pleadings filed by the parties
essentially reflected an admission of membership of Atty. Morales in the association. The failure
to raise the issue of unpaid association dues in this case or its dismissal if properly raised will not
be a bar to the filing of the appropriate separate action to collect it.

============================================================================

#11. PSBANK V. PAPA (JANUARY 18, 2018)

G.R. No. 200469

PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK vs. JOSEPHINE L. PAPA

FACTS: On 30 March 2006, petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) filed before the Me TC a
complaint for collection of sum of money against respondent Josephine L. Papa (Papa). In its
complaint, PSB alleged that Papa obtained a flexi-loan with a face amount of ₱207,600.00,
payable in twenty-four (24) monthly installments of ₱8,650.00 with interest at 38.40% per
annum. For the said loan, Papa executed a promissory note dated 26 July 2005. PSB further
alleged that the promissory note provides additional charges in case of default, to wit: Three
percent (3%) late payment charge per month of the total amount until the amount is fully paid;
Twenty-Five percent (25%) Attorney's Fees, but not less than ₱5,000.00; Ten percent (10%)
liquidated damages, but not less than ₱1,000.00; and costs of suit. When the obligation fell due,
Papa defaulted in her payment. PSB averred that as of 27 March 2006, Papa's total obligation
amounted to ₱173,000.00; and that despite repeated demands, Papa failed to meet her
obligation.

On 26 October 2006, Papa filed her Answer. She alleged that PSB had no cause of action against
her as her liability had already been extinguished by the several staggered payments she made to
PSB, which payments she undertook to prove. She likewise claimed that there was no basis for
the interest and damages as the principal obligation had already been paid.

During the trial on the merits, PSB introduced in evidence a photocopy of the promissory note,
which the MeTC admitted despite the vehement objection by Papa. Meanwhile, Papa chose to
forego with the presentation of her evidence and manifested she would instead file a
memorandum.

After the parties had submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
decision.

The MeTC Ruling rendered a decision in favor of PSB and against Papa. The MeTC was convinced
that PSB was able to establish its cause of action against Papa by preponderance of evidence. It
also emphasized the fact that other than her bare allegation, Papa never adduced any evidence
regarding the payments she had allegedly made. The MeTC, however, deemed it equitable to
award interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum only instead of the stipulated
interest, penalty, and charges. The dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision provides:

Papa moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the MeTC in its Order, dated 14
May 2009.

Aggrieved, Papa elevated an appeal before the RTC.

The RTC Ruling reversed and set aside the MeTC decision. The trial court ruled that PSB failed to
prove its cause of action due to its failure to prove the existence and due execution of the
promissory note. It opined that Papa's apparent admission in her Answer could not be taken
against her as, in fact, she denied any liability to PSB, and she never admitted the genuineness
and due execution of the promissory note. It explained that the fact that Papa interposed
payment as a mode of extinguishing her obligation should not necessarily be taken to mean that
an admission was made regarding the contents and due execution of the promissory note;
specifically the amount of the loan, interests, mode of payment, penalty in case of default, as
well as other terms and conditions embodied therein. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:

Aggrieved, PSB filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court before the
CA.

In her comment, Papa reiterated her position that the 14 October 2009 RTC decision had already
attained finality.

The CA Ruling affirmed the 14 October 2009 decision and the 14 January 2010 order of the RTC.

The appellate court ruled that the R TC decision had already attained finality due to PSB's failure
to serve on Papa a copy of its motion for reconsideration within the prescribed period. The
appellate court noted that in its motion for reconsideration, PSB did not offer any reasonable
explanation why it availed of private courier service instead of resorting to the modes recognized
by the Rules of Court.

The appellate court further agreed with the RTC that PSB failed to prove its cause of action. It
concurred with the RTC that Papa made no admission relative to the contents and due execution
of the promissory note; and that PSB failed to prove that Papa violated the terms and conditions
of the promissory note, if any.

The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision of the Makati Regional Trial Court, Branch 65 dated 14 October 2009 and its subsequent
Order dated 14 January 2010 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in Civil Case No.
09-545 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the petitioner.

ISSUES: Whether or not the court of appeals committed a reversible error when it dismissed
petitioner's appeal by reason of pure technicality thereby prejudicing the substantial right of the
petitioner to recover the unpaid loan of the respondent.

HELD: NO

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Precisely, the Rules require every motion set for hearing to be accompanied by proof of service
thereof to the other parties concerned; otherwise, the court shall not be allowed to act on it,
effectively making such motion as not filed.

The kind of proof of service required would depend on the mode of service used by the litigant.
Rule 13, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 13. Proof of Service. - Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of
the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving,
containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary
mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance
with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such
affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be
filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together
with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
[emphasis supplied]

In some decided cases, the Court considered filing by private courier as equivalent to filing by
ordinary mail. The Court opines that this pronouncement equally applies to service of pleadings
and motions. Hence, to prove service by a private courier or ordinary mail, a party must attach an
affidavit of the person who mailed the motion or pleading. Further, such affidavit must show
compliance with Rule 13, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 7. Service by mail. - Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the
post office in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if
known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to
the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry
service is available in the locality of either the senders or the addressee, service may be done by
ordinary mail. [emphasis supplied]

This requirement is logical as service by ordinary mail is allowed only in instances where no
registry service exists either in the locality of the sender or the addressee. This is the only
credible justification why resort to service by ordinary mail or private courier may be allowed.

In this case, PSB admits that it served the copy of the motion for reconsideration to Papa's
counsel via private courier. However, said motion was not accompanied by an affidavit of the
person who sent it through the said private messengerial service. Moreover, PSB's explanation
why it resorted to private courier failed to show its compliance with Rule 13, Section 7. PSB's
explanation merely states:

Greetings:

Kindly set the instant motion on 20 November 2009 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning or soon
thereafter as matter and counsel may be heard. Copy of this pleading was served upon
defendant's counsel by private registered mail for lack of material time and personnel to effect
personal delivery.
Very clearly, PSB failed to comply with the requirements under Rule 13, Section 7 for an effective
service by ordinary mail. While PSB explained that personal service was not effected due to lack
of time and personnel constraints, it did not offer an acceptable reason why it resorted to
"private registered mail" instead of by registered mail. In particular, PSB failed to indicate that no
registry service was available in San Mateo, Rizal, where the office of Papa's counsel is situated,
or in Makati City, where the office of PSB's counsel is located. Consequently, PSB failed to comply
with the required proof of service by ordinary mail. Thus, the RTC is correct when it denied PSB's
motion for reconsideration, which, for all intents and purposes, can be effectively considered as
not filed.

It is well-settled that judgments or orders become final and executory by operation of law and
not by judicial declaration. The finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or no motion for reconsideration or new
trial is filed. The court need not even pronounce the finality of the order as the same becomes
final by operation of law.

Time and again, the Court has reiterated that rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the
time within which certain acts must be done, are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business.While procedural rules may
be relaxed in the interest of justice, it is well-settled that these are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. The relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of justice was never
intended to be a license for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules can be invoked only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. While litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and
speedy administration of Justice.

============================================================================

#12. INTERLINK MOVIE HOUSES INC. V. CA (JANUARY 17, 2018)

G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018

INTERLINK MOVIE HOUSES, INC. v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On 22 July 2008, petitioner Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. (Interlink), represented by its
president, petitioner Edmer Y. Lim (Lim), filed before the R TC a complaint for sum of money and
damages against respondents Expressions Stationery Shop, Inc. (Expressions), a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, and Joseph Lim Bon
Huan (Bon Huan). Interlink sought from Expressions the recovery of the latter's unpaid rentals
and damages resulting from its alleged breach of their lease contract.

Sheriff Benedict R. Muriel certified that he served the summons issued in the subject case on the
respondents at the office of the defendant company's president through a certain Jonalyn
Liwanan. Interlink filed a motion to declare herein respondents in default for their failure to file
their answer. Respondents on the other hand entered a special appearance through Atty.
Generosa Jacinto alleging that the service of the summons was defective and, as such, the RTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over them. They further prayed that Interlink's motion for declaration
of default be denied.

RTC: Denied Interlink's motion to declare defendants in default. The trial court agreed that the
summons was not served in accordance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court rendering
such service defective. Thus, it ordered the issuance and service of summonses to the
respondents.

(In another Sheriffs Return, Sheriff Muriel certified that he served the summons on Expressions
at the office of its president, Bon Huan, through a certain Amee Ochotorina (Ochotorina), a
person of suitable age and discretion, who introduced herself as one of the secretaries of Bon
Huan. Interlink filed another motion to declare defendants in default, respondent again alleged
that the second service of the summons was still defective.)

RTC: Granted the motion to declare defendants in default and allowed Interlink to present
evidence ex parte. RTC ruled in favor of Interlink. It opined that Interlink was able to prove its
claims against Expressions and Bon Huan.

CA: Annulled the RTC decision. The appellate court ruled that the second service of summons
was still defective, and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondents, thus rendering the RTC decision void.

(Interlink moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.)

ISSUE: WON THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE RESPONDENTS.

HELD: The appeal has no merit. No valid service of summons

It is settled that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of
summons or through voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. In the
absence of service or when the service of summons upon the person of the defendant is
defective, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered against
him is null and void.

In actions in personam, such as collection for a sum of money and damages, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through personal or substituted service of
summons. Personal service is effected by handling a copy of the summons to the defendant in
person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. If the defendant is a
domestic private juridical entity, service may be made on its president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. It has been held that this
enumeration is exclusive. Service on a domestic private juridical entity must, therefore, be made
only on the person expressly listed in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If the service of
summons is made upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11, the same is
invalid.

There is no dispute that respondent Expressions is a domestic corporation duly existing under the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines, and that respondent Bon Huan is its president. Thus, for
the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, service of summons to it must be made to its president, Bon
Huan, or to its managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel. It is further undisputed that the questioned second service of summons was made upon
Ochotorina, who was merely one of the secretaries of Bon Huan, and clearly, not among those
officers enumerated under Section 11 of Rule 14. The service of summons upon Ochotorina is
thus void and, therefore, does not vest upon the trial court jurisdiction over Expressions.

It is settled that resort to substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time. In such cases,
substituted service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with a competent person in charge.
Because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service, and personal service
of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to resort to
substituted service of summons. In this case, the impossibility of prompt personal service was
not shown.

No voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court. At first glance, the respondents may
be seen to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Nevertheless, a reading of
the said omnibus motion reveals that the respondents expressly stated that the said omnibus
motion was filed on special appearance. A party who makes a special appearance in court
challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is
not deemed to have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
respondents either by valid service of summons or by their voluntary appearance. WHEREFORE,
the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

============================================================================

#13. UY V. DEL CASTILLO (JULY 24, 2017)

G.R. No. 223610, July 24, 2017

CONCHITA S. UY, v. CRISPULO DEL CASTILLO

FACTS: The present case is an offshoot of an action for quieting of title, reconveyance, damages,
and attorney's fees involving a parcel of land, filed by Crispulo Del Castillo (Crispulo) against
Jaime Uy (Jaime) and his wife, Conchita. However, since Jaime had died six (6) years earlier in
1990, Crispulo amended his complaint and impleaded Jaime's children, i.e., the Uy siblings, as
defendants. Meanwhile, Crispulo died during the pendency of the action and hence, was
substituted by his heirs, respondents Paulita Manalad-Del Castillo, Cesar Del Castillo, Avito Del
Castillo, Nila C. Duenas, Nida C. Latosa, Loma C. Bernardo, Gil Del Castillo, Liza C. Gungob, Alma
Del Castillo, and Gemma Del Castillo (respondents).

RTC: Rendered a Decision in respondents' favor, declared them as the true and lawful owners of
the Lot 791; and ordered petitioners to pay respondents moral damages and litigation costs in
the amount of P20,000.00 each, as well as attorney's fees equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%)
of the zonal value of the Lot. A hearing was conducted for the determination of attorney's fees.
Thereafter, the parties were ordered to submit their respective position papers to which
respondents complied with. On the other hand, instead of filing the required position paper,
petitioners filed a Consolidated Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC then: (a) pegged the
attorney's fees at ₱3,387,970.00,45 using the zonal value of Lot 791 in 1996, the year when the
Quieting of Title Case was instituted, it being the computation least onerous to petitioners; and
(b) denied petitioners' Consolidated Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

(Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.)

CA: Affirmed the assailed Orders of the RTC. The CA found no merit in the claim that the Uy
siblings were never served with summons, pointing out that in a Manifestation, their counsel Atty.
Trinidad stated that petitioners received the summons with a copy of the amended complaint.
Anent petitioners' argument that they cannot be held personally liable with their separate
property for Jaime's liability and that respondents should have filed a claim against Jaime's estate
in accordance with Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the CA held that such provision only
applies to contractual money claims and not when the subject matter is some other relief and
the collection of any amount is merely incidental thereto, such as by way of damages, as in this
case. Besides, petitioners had all the opportunity to raise such perceived error when they
elevated the case to the CA and to this Court, but they did not. Following the principle of finality
of judgment, the CA can no longer entertain such assignment of errors.

(Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA in its
Resolution; hence, the present petition.)
ISSUE: WON the CA correctly upheld the Orders of the RTC.

HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.

Anent petitioners' claim that they were never served with summons, the CA correctly pointed out
that in the Manifestation, petitioners, through Atty. Trinidad, explicitly stated, that they "received
the Summons with a copy of the Second Amended Complaint" and that "the Answer earlier filed
serves as the Answer to the Second Amended Complaint." Having admitted the foregoing,
petitioners cannot now assert otherwise. "It is settled that judicial admissions made by the
parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are
conclusive and do not require further evidence to prove them. They are legally binding on the
party making it, except when it is shown that they have been made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was actually made, neither of which was shown to exist in this case."

Assuming arguendo that petitioners did not receive summons for the amended complaint, they
were nonetheless deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction by filing an
Answer to the amended complaint and actively participating in the case. It is settled that the
active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, is tantamount to an
invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and
such will bar said party from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction.

As to petitioners' contention that respondents should have proceeded against Jaime's estate
pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is well to point out that based on the
records, the Uy siblings were not merely substituted in Jaime's place as defendant; rather, they
were impleaded in their personal capacities. In this regard, petitioners' argument that they
cannot be held solidarily liable for the satisfaction of any monetary judgment or award must
necessarily fail.

At this point, the Court notes that if petitioners truly believed that Jaime's estate is the proper
party to the Quieting of Title Case, they could and should have raised the lack of cause of action
against them at the earliest opportunity. Obviously, they did not do so; instead, they actively
participated in the case, adopted the answer earlier filed by Conchita, and even litigated the case
all the way to the Court. Petitioners cannot now question the final and executory judgment in the
Quieting of Title Case because it happened to be adverse to them.

Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that "a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made
by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. This principle, known as the
doctrine of immutability of judgment, has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business;
and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely
why courts exist. Verily, it fosters the judicious perception that the rights and obligations of every
litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. As such, it is not regarded as a
mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but rather, a matter of public policy which must be
faithfully complied." However, this doctrine "is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the
power and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice
considering: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (j) that the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby."

In sum, while the courts a quo correctly ruled that the Uy siblings may be held answerable to the
monetary awards in the Quieting of Title Case, such liability cannot exceed whatever value they
inherited from their late father, Jaime.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

============================================================================

#14. TI V. DINO (NOVEMBER 6, 2017)

November 6, 2017 - G.R. No. 219260

BERNICE JOAN TI vs. MANUEL S. DIÑO

FACTS:The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an
information against petitioner and a certain Julieta Fernandez for falsification of public
documents. Petitioner and Fernandez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction with the RTC of Quezon City seeking to enjoin
the MeTC from proceeding with the case claiming that the MeTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted respondent's motion for
reconsideration.

RTC:ruled that the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in reviving and reinstating the criminal case against petitioner and Fernandez on the
basis of respondent's motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecutor without the
concurrence or conformity of the public prosecutor. Respondent, thereafter, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the RTC denied respondent's Motion. It was ruled that the failure of the
respondent movant to comply with the 3-day notice rule on motions rendered the said motion
for reconsideration defective. Thereafter, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal which petitioner
opposed. Respondent also filed a Motion for the Transmittal of the Records of the Case to the
Court of Appeals. RTC disapproved respondent's Notice of Appeal for not having been perfected
within the fifteen-day reglementary period, and thus, no order was made to transfer the records
of the case to the CA. Respondent, therefore, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the
CA assailing the Order of the RTC.

CA:granted respondent's petition and reversed and set aside the RTC's Order and, thus, the
notice of appeal of respondent was given due course. The CA further directed the RTC to transmit
the entire records of the case to the former.

ISSUE:WON the the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that respondent
violated the three-day rule as provided in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

HELD: NO, the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that respondent
violated the three-day rule as provided in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The RTC was
correct in ruling that the Decision rendered in this case has become final after the lapse of fifteen
(15) days or on May 5, 2010, pursuant to the ruling that a defective motion does not toll the
running period to appeal from the judgment or final order.

A close reading of the provisions of Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court clearly shows that the
directive to ensure that the receipt by the other party of the notice of hearing at least three (3)
days before the date of the said hearing is for the party who filed the motion. Nowhere in the
said rule does it state that the court is obligated to determine whether a copy of the motion had,
indeed, been served on the opposing party. The court is not required by the rules to reset the
hearing in case the other party fails to attend the hearing on the motion. In fact, what the rules
allow is for the court to set the hearing on shorter notice for good cause and not to delay or reset
the hearing. The fault, therefore, is with the respondent and not with the RTC. It was the
respondent who resorted to a mode of service other than personal service and, thus, he should
have been the one who ensured that such notice was received by the petitioner. Under the Rules,
whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done
personally. Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. - Whenever practicable, the service and filing
of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating
from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the
service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be the case to consider the
paper as not filed. We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other
modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is
practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is
mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be
had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or
filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court
shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved
therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section
11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation introduced
by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated July
31, 2015 of petitioner Bernice Joan Ti is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated January 10,
2014 and Resolution dated June 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the Order dated May 20, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is AFFIRMED and
REINSTATED.

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#15. MANILA BANKING CORP V. BCDA (JANUARY 22, 2018)

January 22, 2018 - G.R. No. 230144

THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION vs. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

FACTS: Respondent Bases Conversion and Development Authority ("BCDA") was created as a
government corporation by virtue of Republic Act No. 7227, tasked mainly to manage the Clark
and Subic military reservations/camps and their extensions and to adopt and implement a
comprehensive development plan for their conversion into productive uses. Among the powers
expressly granted to it is the power to exercise the right of eminent domain. On November 21,
2003, BCDA filed a complaint against herein petitioner The Manila Banking Corporation ("TMBC")
and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas ("BSP"), seeking to expropriate a parcel of land registered in the
name of TMBC situated in Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Porac, Province of Pampanga, to
pave the way for the implementation of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) Project of the
national government. BCDA also alleged that the subject property was classified as agricultural
land and had the zonal value of P30 per square meter at the time of filing of the complaint.

BCDA prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession upon payment to the landowner of an
amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the subject property based on the current zonal
valuation, but it appears that the property was the subject of a Dacion En Pago Con Pacto de
Retro agreement between TMBC and the Central Bank Board of Liquidators ("CB-BOL"). CB-BOL
assigned all its rights and interests under the Dacion agreement in favor of the BSP. Thus, BSP
sought the release of 100% of the value of the property based on the current zonal valuation of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. TMBC opposed the motion and the issue was submitted for
resolution at the trial during the pre-trial conference.

BCDA then deposited the amount of ₱5,590,650.00 before the Office of the Clerk of Court of
Angeles, Pampanga, equivalent to the value of the actual affected area of the subject property
based on the then current zonal valuation provided by the BIR.

RTC: Ordered respondent BCDA to pay petitioner TMBC the amount of ₱250 per square meter as
just compensation for the property taken, or a total of Php. 37,898,740.00 representing the
principal balance on the just compensation due on the taking of 173,059 sq. m in the name of
Manila Banking Corporation; plus twelve 12% interest per annum, from 2003 until fully paid.

(Respondent BCDA filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the RTC granted such. Judgment was
rendered fixing the just compensation of the subject lot at ₱190.00 per square meter or a total
of Php32,881,210.00. Considering that Php5,366,010 had been deposited as a condition for the
issuance of writ of possession, the plaintiff Bases Conversion Development Authority is directed
to pay the balance of twenty seven million five hundred fifteen thousand and two hundred ten
pesos (Php27,515,210.00) to defendant the Manila Banking Corporation which shall earn interest
at the rate of 12% per annum or the prevailing rate of interest whichever is lower from the time
of actual taking on November 23, 2003)

(Respondent BCDA elevated the case to the CA, seeking to reverse the RTC's determination of
just compensation and imposition of 12% interest rate for the unpaid balance of the just
compensation.)

CA: BSP was dropped as a party from the title of the case after submitting proof of the "Release
and Cancellation" executed by BSP in favor of TMBC concerning the subject property. The CA
gave due course to the petition and ruled in favor of respondent BCDA.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in reversing and setting aside the RTC's Decision and Order on its
determination of just compensation and interest.

HELD: The Court of Appeals was correct in reversing the trial court and in fixing the just
compensation at ₱75 per square meter.

In reversing and setting aside the trial court's determination of just compensation, the CA noted
that while the trial court based its first valuation on the recommendations of the commissioners,
it did not give any explanation on how it arrived at the amount of ₱250 per square meter.
There is no question that at the time of taking of the subject property, it was classified as
agricultural land, based on the records of the Municipal Assessor's Office of Porac, Pampanga.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that the determination of just compensation must be based
on reliable and actual data. The CA, guided by the standards set in RA 8974, took into
consideration the documentary evidence presented by the parties to determine the appropriate
value of the property at the time it was taken in November 2003. The Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in modifying the interest rates to be imposed on the just
compensation. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

============================================================================

#16. TRILLANES V. MARIGOMEN (MARCH 14, 2018)

GR No. 223451, Mar 14, 2018

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. EVANGELINE C. CASTILLO-MARIGOMEN

FACTS: Petitioner, as a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, filed a Proposed Resolution
directing the Senate's Committee on Accountability of Public Officials and Investigations to
investigate, in aid of legislation, the alleged P1.601 Billion overpricing of the new 11-storey
Makati City Hall II Parking Building, and related anomalies purportedly committed by former and
local government officials.

Petitioner admitted that during media interviews at the Senate, particularly during gaps and
breaks in the plenary hearings as well as committee hearings, he expressed his opinion that
based on his office's review of the documents, private respondent appears to be a "front" or
"nominee" or is acting as a "dummy" of the actual and beneficial owner of the estate, VP Binay.

Thus on October 22, 2014, private respondent filed a Complaint for Damages against petitioner,
for the latter's alleged defamatory statements before the media from October 8 to 14, 2014,
specifically his repeated accusations that private respondent is a mere "dummy" of VP Binay.

ISSUE: WON direct filing with the Court is allowed when there is a clear threat to parliamentary
immunity? WON RTC had no jurisdiction over the case?

HELD: NO, the Hierarchy of courts should have been observed. In justifying his direct recourse to
the Court, petitioner alleges that there is a clear threat to his parliamentary immunity as well as
his rights to freedom of speech and freedom of expression, and he had no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could protect him from such threat. The
court is not persuaded.

Adherence to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts ensures that every level of the judiciary
performs its designated role in an effective and efficient manner. This practical judicial policy is
established to obviate "inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction," and to prevent the congestion of the
Court's docket. The Court must remain as a court of last resort if it were to satisfactorily perform
its duties under the Constitution.

Also, Petitioner's statements in media interviews are not covered by the parliamentary speech or
debate" privilege. The statements were clearly not part of any speech delivered in the Senate or
any of its committees. They were also not spoken in the course of any debate in said fora. It
cannot likewise be successfully contended that they were made in the official discharge or
performance of petitioner's duties as a Senator, as the remarks were not part of or integral to the
legislative process. The Speech or Debate Clause in our Constitution did not turn our Senators
and Congressmen into "super-citizens" whose spoken words or actions are rendered absolutely
impervious to prosecution or civil action. The Constitution conferred the privilege on members of
Congress "not for their private indulgence, but for the public good." It was intended to protect
them against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing their decision-making
prerogatives. Such grant of legislative privilege must perforce be viewed according to its purpose
and plain language. Indeed, the privilege of speech or debate, which may "(enable) reckless men
to slander and even destroy others," is not a cloak of unqualified impunity; its invocation must be
"as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department."

Jurisdiction lies with the courts, not the Senate. It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law. An action for damages on account of defamatory statements
not constituting protected or privileged "speech or debate" is a controversy well within the
courts' authority to settle. The Constitution vests upon the courts the power and duty "to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, conferred jurisdiction over actions for damages upon either the
RTC or the Municipal Trial Court, depending on the total amount claimed. WHEREFORE, the
petition is DISMISSED.

============================================================================

#17. BLAY V. BANA (MARCH 7, 2018)

Blay vs Bana

G.R. No. 232189

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS: Alex Blay filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Cynthia Bana filed her answer with compulsory counterclaim.

Blay filed a motion to withdraw his petition having lost interest over the case. Bana filed a
comment/opposition praying that her counterclaims be declared as remaining for the court’s
independent adjudication. Blay filed a reply averring that the Blay’s counterclaims are barred for
failure to file a manifestation within 15 days from the notice of the motion to withdraw.

RTC: Granted Blay’s motion to withdraw. It also declared the counterclaim as remaining for
independent adjudication. Blay filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Blay
elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari.

CA: Dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC. Blay moved for reconsideration which was denied.

Blay filed a petition for review on certiorari assailing the resolution made by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Orders declaring respondent's
counterclaim for independent adjudication before the same trial court.

HELD: YES. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of
the plaintiff's motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal
shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a
separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he manifests his
preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action. Since Bana failed to manifest
her preference to have her counterclaim resolved in the same action within the 15-day period,
she is left with no other option but to prosecute her counterclaim in a separate action.

============================================================================

#18. SIBAYAN V. ALDA (JANUARY 17, 2018)

Sibayan vs Alda

GR No. 233395

Velasco Jr, J.

FACTS: Norlina Sibayan was the Assistant Manager and Marketing Officer of BDO, San Fernando,
La Union branch. Elizabeth Aida charged Norlina with unauthorized deduction of her BDO savings
account as well as for failure to post certain check deposits to the said account. The complaint
alleged that although no withdrawals were made from Aida’s BDO account, its balance of
1,071,561 Php was reduced to merely 334 Php.

Further, Elizabeth claimed that two crossed manager's checks, to wit:

1) United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 0000005197 in the amount of Two Million
Seven Hundred Forty Three Thousand Three Hundred Forty Six Pesos (P2,743,346) issued to her
by Ferdinand Oriente (Ferdinand), and;

2) Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 0000002688 in the amount of Two Million Two
Hundred Thirty Seven Thousand Three Hundred Forty One and 891100 Pesos (P2,237,341.89)
issued to her by Jovelyn Oriente (Jovelyn) were not posted on her BDO savings account despite
the fact that the said checks were deposited on October 27, 2008.

The Office of Special Investigation of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (OSI-BSP) issued a Resolution
dated June 13, 2012 finding a prima facie case against Norlina for Conducting Business in an
Unsafe or Unsound Manner under Section 56.2 of Republic Act No. 8791 ("The General Banking
Law of 2000"), punishable under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653 ("The New Central Bank
Act"). The OGCLS-BSP then directed Norlina to submit her sworn answer to the formal charge
filed by the OSI-BSP.

Norlina filed a Request to Answer Written Interrogatories addressed to Elizabeth, Jovelyn, and
Ferdinand. Norlina also filed a Motion for Production of Documents praying that UCPB and BPI be
ordered to produce and allow the inspection and copying or photographing of the Statements of
Account pertaining to UCPB Account No. 2351047157 and BPI Account No. 85890237923.

Elizabeth and Ferdinand filed their respective Objections to Norlina's request, while Jovelyn's
counsel filed a Manifestation stating that the former could not submit her answer since she is
working overseas.
Office of the General Counsel and Legal Services of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

OGCLS-BSP: Denied Norlina’s motions for production of bank documents and request to answer
written interrogatories. Norlina's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Norlina filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

CA: Upheld the OGCLS-BSP's rulings. The CA found that the OGCLS-BSP did not commit grave
abuse of discretion when it denied Norlina's motion for the production of bank documents and
requests to answer written interrogatories. It highlighted the fact that the proceedings before the
OGCLS-BSP is summary in nature and to grant Norlina's motions would merely delay the
resolution of the case. The CA ruled that Norlina's persistence to utilize modes of discovery will
be futile since the information she supposedly seeks to elicit are sufficiently contained in the
pleadings and attachments submitted by the parties to aid the OGCLS-BSP in resolving the case
before it.

Norlina filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
decision and resolution of the CA.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the denial of the request to answer written

interrogatories was proper

II. Whether or not Norlina was denied due process of law

HELD:

I. YES. Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly adhered to in administrative
investigations.

Norlina persistently relies and quotes the provisions of the Rules of Court on modes of discovery
and argues her right to utilize the same. To her eyes, the denial of her requests to answer written
interrogatories and motion for production of bank documents deprived her of availing of the
rightful remedies which shall bring to the fore material and relevant facts for the OGCLS-BSP's
consideration.

However, the proceeding involved in the present case is administrative in nature. Although trial
courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules on evidence, the same does not
hold true for administrative bodies. The Court has consistently held that technical rules
applicable tojudicial proceedings are not exact replicas of those in administrative investigations.
Recourse to discovery procedures as sanctioned by the Rules of Court is then not mandatory for
the OGCLS¬-BSP. Hence, We cannot subscribe to Norlina's tenacious insistence for the OGCLS-BSP
to strictly adhere to the Rules of Court so as not to purportedly defeat her rights.

In this light, OGCLS-BSP did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying Norlina's request for
written interrogatories as the allowance of the same would not practically hasten, as it would in
fact delay, the early disposition of the instant case.

II. NO. Norlina bemoans that by suppressing her right to avail of discovery measures, the
OGCLS-BSP violated her right to due process. She maintains that the administrative character of
the proceedings involved is not sufficient to defeat such right. However, Administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. It is enough that the
party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.

As established by the facts, Norlina was afforded the opportunity to be heard and to explain her
side before the OGCLS-BSP. She was allowed to submit her answer and all documents in support
of her defense. In fact, her defense of fraud committed by Elizabeth and Ruby is sufficiently
contained in the pleadings and attachments submitted by the parties to aid the OGCLS-¬BSP in
resolving the case before it.

Evidently, the information sought to be elicited from the written interrogatories, as well as the
bank documents, are already available in the records of the case. As correctly pointed out by the
CA, the grant of Norlina's motions would merely delay the resolution of the case. In fine, the
OGCLS-BSP's issuance of the assailed orders did not violate Norlina's right to due process and was
in accord with the summary nature of administrative proceedings before the BSP. The
opportunity accorded to Norlina was enough to comply with the requirements of due process in
an administrative case. The formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be present in
an administrative investigation, as long as the parties are heard and given the opportunity to
adduce their respective sets of evidence.

All told, the denial of Norlina's motions to resort to modes of discovery did not, and will definitely
not, equate to a denial of her right to due process. It must be stressed that Norlina's fear of being
deprived of such right and to put up a proper defense is more imagined than real. Norlina was
properly notified of the charges against her and she was given a reasonable opportunity to
answer the accusations against her. As correctly ruled by the lower tribunals, Norlina's attempt to
resort to modes of discovery is frivolous and would merely cause unnecessary delay in the
speedy disposition of the case.

============================================================================

#19. CRUZ V. TOLENTINO (APRIL 18, 2018)

CRUZ VS TOLENTINO

G.R. NO. 210446

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS: The case involves two parcels of land located in Barrio Baranca, Mandaluyong, Rizal
owned by Alfredo Cruz. The said properties were involved in two transactions with Marylou
Tolentino. The first transaction was contained in a deed of absolute sale for 1.35M Php. The
instrument was not notarized. The second transaction was contained in a deed of absolute sale
for 1.4M Php, ostensibly executed between Tolentino and Alfredo, as represented by Purificacion,
Alfredo’s wife. The latter instrument was notarized and it specifically mentioned the SPA in favor
of Purificacion.

On October 16, 2000, herein petitioners Angelica G. Cruz, Auralita C. Matsuura, Anna Marie Kudo,
Albert G. Cruz, and Arturo G. Cruz (petitioners) filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale & Title,
Damages & Injunction. Docketed as Civil Case No. MC00-1300 in the RTC of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 214 (RTC-Br. 214), the case was filed against Tolentino, Purificacion, and the Register of
Deeds of Mandaluyong City.

Petitioners alleged, among others, that they are the children of Alfredo and Purificacion. Upon
their discovery of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 1, 2002, they orally demanded the
cancellation thereof and the reinstatement of TCT No. 461194. The demands, however, went
unheeded. Petitioner Angelica Cruz (Angelica) then caused the annotation of an affidavit of
adverse claim in Tolentino's title. Petitioners prayed that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 1, 1992 be annulled as the SPA of Alfredo was rendered ineffectual by his death. They
claimed that the sale was also fraudulent as petitioners were denied of their rights to the subject
property. They further sought the cancellation of TCT No. 6724 and the payment of moral
damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

Tolentino then filed her Answer where she specifically denied the averments in the complaint
relating to the SPA and the. death of Alfredo. She claimed that the truth of the matter relative to
the subject property is narrated in the complaint she filed on August 26, 1999 for Registration of
Deed of Sale Covered by TCT Nos. 461194 and 461195, Mandamus and Damages. This case was
docketed as Civil Case No. MC 99-843 in the RTC-Br. 209. Tolentino's causes of action were: (a) to
validate the Deed of Absolute Sale in so far as the 50% and one share of Purificacion over the
property covered by TCT Nos. 461194 and 461195; and (b) to charge and/or collect from
Purificacion the amount representing the value of the property also covered by TCT Nos. 461194
and 461195 belonging to the heirs of Alfredo including the 5% monthly interest thereon until the
amount is paid and/or collected. In the aforesaid case, Tolentino also caused the annotation of a
Notice of Lis Pendens in TCT Nos. 6724 and 461195.

Petitioners filed a motion for consolidation of Civil Case No. MC00-1300 with Civil Case No. MC
99-843 that was pending before the RTC-Br. 209. Petitioners alleged that the two cases involved
the same question of fact and of law, the same subject matter - at least insofar as the property
covered by TCT No. 461194 was concerned - and the parties were more or less the same.
However, it was denied.

RTC: Dismissed the Civil Case No. MC00-1300 since they referred to the same parties, same
evidence, and same subject matter. Civil Case No. MC 99-843 has already been decided finding
that the Deed of Absolute Sale and the SPA executed by Alfredo in favor of Purificacion were valid
and effective. In view of the aforesaid decision, the trial court ruled that Civil Case No.
MC00-1300 was already dismissible on the ground of res judicata or, at best, litis pendentia.

CA: Denied the appeal on the basis of litis pendentia.

ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the RTC to dismiss the case due to Litis Pendentia

HELD: YES. Litis pendentia is a Latin term that literally means "a pending suit" and is variously
referred to as lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for dismissing a civil action, it
refers to the situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same
cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the
policy against multiplicity of suits.

The following requirements must concur before litis pendentia may be invoked:

(a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;

(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same
facts; and

(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in
one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

In this case, it is indubitably clear that litis pendentia exists.

As it turns out, the issue of whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid and legal had
already been decided with finality in Civil Case No. MC 99-843. Thus, the principle of res judicata
applies.

For res judicata to serve as a bar to a subsequent action, the following elements must be present:

(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties;

(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as
between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, res
judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If as between the two cases, only
identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as
"conclusiveness of judgment" applies.

In this case, the elements of res judicata, as a bar by prior judgment, are present.

============================================================================

#20. ALBOR V. CA (JANUARY 27, 2018)

ALBOR VS CA

G.R. NO. 196598

VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS: Editha was the agricultural lessee of a 1.60 hectare riceland portion and a 1.5110 hectare
sugarland portion of Lot 2429 located at Barangay Dinginan, Roxas City. Lot 2429 was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-108 (522),4 registered in the name of Rosario Andrada
(Rosario), married to Ramon Gardose. As agricultural lessee, Editha had been paying rent to the
agricultural lessors, the heirs of Rosario. The heirs of Rosario adjudicated unto themselves Lot
2429 and thereupon sold the same to respondents for ₱600,000.00. Asserting that she had the
right to redeem Lot 2429 from respondents, Editha lodged a complaint for redemption of
landholding and damages before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD).

Editha did not exercise her preemptive right to buy the lot; consequently, the sale was
consummated between the heirs of Rosario and respondents on 6 June 1997.

PARAD: Found that Editha was not properly notified of the sale. It observed that the 16 March
1998 notice which respondents presented failed to indicate the terms and particulars of the sale.
As such, it ruled that Editha's right of redemption did not prescribe for want of a valid written
notice.

While the PARAD sustained Editha's right of redemption, it nevertheless resolved to dismiss her
complaint after finding that only ₱216,000.00 was consigned as redemption price. Citing
jurisprudence on the matter, the P ARAD opined that tender of payment must be for the full
amount of the repurchase price; otherwise, the offer to redeem would be held ineffectual. It
noted that in the extrajudicial settlement and deed of sale which Editha herself procured, the
purchase price stated was ₱600,000.00, and that such price was never disputed. Hence, absent
evidence to the contrary, there can be no doubt that ₱600,000.00 was the actual amount that
respondents paid for Lot 2429. Aggrieved, Editha filed an appeal before the DARAB.

DARAB: Affirmed in toto the PARAD's ruling.

On 25 November 2008, Editha filed before the CA a motion for extension of time to file a Rule 43
petition for review. She prayed for an additional fifteen (15) days, or from 25 November 2008
until 10 December 2008.

Shortly thereafter, on 3 December 2008, a motion to withdraw as counsel, dated 28 November

2008, was filed by Atty. Talabucon. It was alleged that Editha decided to engage the services of
another counsel and for said reason, Atty. Talabucon was withdrawing his appearance. Editha
signified her conformity to the motion to withdraw as counsel.

On 9 December 2008, Editha's new counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Y. Samillano (Atty. Samillano ), filed
with the CA a notice of appearance11 and at the same time moved for an extension of thirty (30)
days, or from 10 December 2008 until 9 January 2009, within which to file the petition for review.
The second motion for extension of time was grounded on heavy workload and the need for
more time to study the case.

Eventually, Editha's petition for review was filed on 5 January 2009.

CA: Dismissed Editha's petition for review for having been filed out of time. The appellate court
ratiocinated that while it may grant Editha's first motion for extension of fifteen (15) days within
which to file the petition, it was devoid of authority to grant her second motion for extension
which asked for an additional time of thirty (30) days.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Editha's petition for review for having been
filed out of time.

HELD: NO.

The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the CA is a petition for review under
Rule 45; and such is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As
provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any
case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to this
Court by filing a petition for review, which in essence is a continuation of the appellate process
over the original case.

On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is a limited form of review and is a remedy
of last recourse. It is an independent action that lies only where there is no appeal nor plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari will issue only to correct
errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the
lower court.

The 24 September 2009 and 15 February 2011 resolutions of the CA were final and appealable
judgments. In particular, the resolution dated 24 September 2009 dismissed Editha's Rule 43
petition for review, while the resolution dated 15 February 2011 denied her motion for
reconsideration of the earlier resolution. The assailed resolutions disposed of Editha's appeal in a
manner that left nothing more to be done by the CA with respect to the said appeal.16 Hence,
Editha should have filed an appeal before this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Editha posits that there is a compelling reason to grant a second extension of time because on 3
December 2008, Atty. Talabucon suddenly withdrew as her counsel. It was only on 9 December
2008 that she hired a new counsel, Atty. Samillano. Having just entered the picture, Atty.
Samillano needed more time to study the case, and he could not be expected to finish drafting
the petition for review in just one (1) day before the expiration of the 15-day extension granted
by the CA. In this accord, Editha contends that the filing of the second motion for extension of
time was justified; and that the CA's dismissal of her petition for review impinged on her
substantive right to due process.

The arguments proffered are specious and deserve scant consideration.

It is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks to
avail of that right must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting an
appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are
considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of
appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as
well. The failure to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court
unavoidably renders the judgment final as to preclude the appellate court from acquiring the
jurisdiction to review the judgment.

It bears stressing that the statutory nature of the right to appeal requires the appealing party to
strictly comply with the statutes or rules governing the perfection of an appeal, as such statutes
or rules are instituted in order to promote an orderly discharge of judicial business. In the
absence of highly exceptional circumstances warranting their relaxation, the statutes or rules
should remain inviolable.

Finally, even on the merits, Editha's petition has no leg to stand on.

Both the PARAD and the DARAB found that Editha only consigned the amount of ₱216,000.00 as
redemption price for Lot 2429. As aptly observed in the PARAD's decision, it was Editha herself
who secured a copy of the extrajudicial settlement and deed of sale from the Clerk of Court of
the RTC in Roxas City. The purchase price stated in the deed of conveyance was ₱600,000.00, and
the administrative tribunals correctly held that absent sufficient evidence to the contrary, it must
be accepted the reasonable price of the land as purchased by the respondents.

The redemption price Editha consigned falls short of the requirement of the law, leaving the
Court with no choice but to rule against her claim.

In fine, there is an abundance of reasons, both procedural and substantive, which has proved
fatal to Editha's cause

============================================================================

#21. MERCURY DRUG CORP V. HUANG (AUGUST 30, 2017)

MERCURY DRUG VS HUANG

G.R. NO. 197654

LEONEN, J.

FACTS: On April 29, 1997, Stephen Huang (Stephen) and his parents, Spouses Richard Y. Huang
and Carmen G. Huang, filed a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against Mercury Drug
Corporation (Mercury Drug) and Rolando J. Del Rosario (Del Rosario). Mercury Drug was the
registered owner of a six (6)-wheeler truck driven by Del Rosario, which figured in an accident
with Stephen's car on the night of December 20, 1996. As a result of the tragic incident, Stephen
suffered serious spinal cord injuries. He is now a paraplegic.

RTC: Rendered a Decision dated September 29, 2004 finding Mercury Drug and Del Rosario
jointly and severally liable for actual damages, compensatory damages, moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

CA: Affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision but reduced the award of moral damages from
P4,000,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. Mercury Drug and Del Rosario elevated the Court of Appeals
Decision to this Court for review.

On June 22, 2007, this Court in Mercury Drug Corporation v. Spouses Huang affirmed the
Decision of the Court of Appeals. Mercury Drug and Del Rosario moved for reconsideration
and/or new trial arguing that Stephen was not entitled to the entire monetary award because he
had partially recovered from his injuries. The Motion was denied with finality in the Resolution
dated August 8, 2007. Entry of judgment was made on October 3, 2007.

On February 1, 2008, Stephen and his parents moved for the execution of the judgment before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati to which Mercury Drug and Del Rosario filed an opposition.
RTC: Granted the Motion for Execution in the Order dated July 21, 2008.

On August 26, 2008, Mercury Drug and Del Rosario moved to quash the Writ of Execution as it
allegedly contravened the tenor of the judgment. They also moved for the inhibition of Presiding
Judge Gina M. Bibat¬-Palamos. Pending the resolution of these motions, the sheriff began to
garnish Mercury Drug and Del Rosario's bank accounts. Mercury Drug and Del Rosario filed an
urgent motion to defer the implementation of the Writ of Execution. All three (3) motions were
denied by the Regional Trial Court. Mercury Drug and Del Rosario then moved for reconsideration
but their motion was denied.

As a result of the garnishment proceedings, Citibank N.A. issued in favor of Richard Y. Huang a
Manager's Check in the amount of P40,434,062.00. Afterwards, Stephen and his parents filed a
Satisfaction of Judgment before the Regional Trial Court.

On December 18, 2008, Mercury Drug and Del Rosario filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. They argued that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion
in allowing the execution of the judgment despite clerical errors in the computation of life care
cost and loss of earning capacity.

In its January 20, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Certiorari holding
that the Regional Trial Court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals
found that "the perceived error in the computation of the award and [its] correction" entailed a
substantial amendment of the judgment sought to be enforced. Under the doctrine on
immutability of judgments, courts are precluded from altering or modifying a final and executory
judgment.

Mercury Drug and Del Rosario moved for reconsideration but their Motion was denied in the
Resolution dated July 6, 2011.

On September 1, 2011, Mercury Drug and Del Rosario (petitioners) filed this Petition for Review
on Certiorari before this Court to which Stephen and his parents (respondents) filed a Comment.
Petitioners then filed a Reply on September 25, 2013.

In the Resolution dated December 11, 2013, this Court gave due course to the Petition and
required both parties to submit their respective memoranda. The parties filed their respective
Memoranda on March 14, 2014.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the case falls under any of the exceptions to the doctrine
of immutability of judgments. Subsumed in this issue is whether or not a clerical error exists that
would warrant the modification of the dispositive portion of the judgment;

II. Whether or not the Writ of Execution conforms to the judgment sought to
be enforced; and
III. Whether or not the monetary awards in dispute should be paid in
installments or in lump sum.

HELD:

I. A final and executory judgment produces certain effects. Winning litigants are entitled to the
satisfaction of the judgment through a writ of execution. On the other hand, courts are barred
from modifying the rights and obligations of the parties, which had been adjudicated upon. They
have the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment.

It is a fundamental principle that a judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. The primary consequence of this principle is that the judgment may no longer be
modified or amended by any court in any manner even if the purpose of the modification or
amendment is to correct perceived errors of law or fact. This principle known as the doctrine of
immutability of judgment is a matter of sound public policy, which rests upon the practical
consideration that every litigation must come to an end.

The rationale behind the rule was further explained in Social Security System v. Isip, thus:

The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose:

(1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business and

(2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely
why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every
litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.

The doctrine of immutability of judgment, however, is not an iron¬clad rule. It is subject to

several exceptions, namely:

(1) The correction of clerical errors;

(2) The so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;

(3) Void judgments; and

(4) Whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable.

In the present case, petitioners assert that the case falls under the first exception: that clerical
errors attended the computation of the amounts awarded as life care cost and loss of earning
capacity. The resolution of the present petition would, therefore, require a comparison between
the dispositive portion and the body of the judgment.

The trial court deemed it adequate and proper to award P23,461,062.00 as life care cost and
P10,000,000.00 as loss of earning capacity based on the evidence presented during trial. In
awarding life care cost, the trial court did not limit itself to respondent Stephen's actual expenses
in 1997 and 1998 and his projected life expectancy. The trial court also considered the
testimonies of respondent Stephen's doctors regarding his future medical expenses. On the
award of loss of earning capacity, the trial court did not likewise limit itself to respondent
Stephen's projected initial monthly salary and life expectancy. It considered other equally
important factors such as respondent Stephen's capacity prior to the injury, physical conditions,
disposition to labor, and his professional habits.

II. Another effect of a final and executory judgment is that winning litigants are entitled to the
satisfaction of the judgment through a writ of execution.

A writ of execution must substantially conform to the judgment sought to be enforced. A writ of
execution that exceeds the tenor of the judgment is patently void and should be struck down.
Upon a finding of its invalidity, the case may be remanded to the lower court for the issuance of
the proper writ.

In this case, the Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court neither varied nor departed
from the terms of the judgment in any manner.

III. The case not falling within any of the exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of judgments,
it becomes the court's ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution, which must "conform to that
ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision." The manner of execution of a
judgment cannot depend upon the choice or discretion of a party.

In this case, the judgment did not indicate, in any manner, that the amounts of life care cost and
loss of earning capacity should be paid in installments or amortized. There is nothing in the
decision that would substantiate petitioners' assertion that life care cost and loss of earning
capacity were awarded as judicial support.

============================================================================

#22. ANTIG V. ANTIQUESTA (JANUARY 17, 2018)

ANTIG VS ANTIPUESTO

GR NO. 192396

MARTIRES, J.

FACTS: Petitioners Lemosnero, Testado, Alladin, and Arangoso, were the registered owners of
four agricultural lots in the Province of Davao del Norte. AMS Farming Corp., a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of cultivating and exporting Cavendish bananas, had been
leasing, developing, and operating portions of the lots as banana plantations since the 1970s, the
leased portions totaled 18,828 sq. m. As lessee, developer, and operator of these banana
plantations, AMS farming asserts ownership over the standing crops (banana trees) and other
improvements found thereon. Correspondingly, AMS Farming had been declaring such ownership
for taxation purposes.

In 2002, during the effectivity of the lease contract, the landowners offered their respective lots
for agrarian reform, and availed of Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme under the CARP. They
proposed that as the just compensation for the lots, the standing crops, and the improvements.
Pursuant to mandate the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) arrived at its valuation which was
disagree by the petitioners as it alleged that it did not include the value of the standing crops and
improvements. Thus, they protested before the DARAB praying for the value of the standing
crops and improvements be included in the determination of just compensation.

Meanwhile, Certificated of Land Ownership Award over the lots were issued in favor of ARBs,
including the herein respondents and the cooperative. In a letter dated August 1, 2003, the PARO
notified AMSFC of impending physical takeover of lots by ARBs , scheduled on August 5, 2003. On
the date of scheduled takeover, petitioners filed before the RTC of Tagum, designated as SAC, a
petition for Injunction with an Application of TRO. As petitioners had argued before the SAC, the
"installation/physical takeover" of the lots when no valuation and deposit had been made on the
standing crops and improvements, would violate their constitutional rights against being
deprived of property without due process of law and just compensation. Incidentally, they also
alleged that herein individual respondent Anastacio Antipuesto had declared that he, the
cooperative he represented, and its members do not intend to make use of the standing crops of
AMS Farming because they planned to plant another crop on the lots. The SAC took cognizance
of the petition for injunction and granted its prayer for a TRO, in an 8 August 2003 Order.

The Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, DAR Provincial Office, Tagum City, filed an answer
praying that the petition be denied on the ground that the SAC had no jurisdiction to enjoin the
implementation of the CARP. The bureau moved for the reconsideration of the order on the same
ground. On its part, the cooperative also filed an answer, echoing the defenses of lack of
jurisdiction and lack of cause of action, and pleading a compulsory counterclaim for damages.
The CA ruled that the SAC had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petition for injunction and denied petitioners' motion
for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly ruled that the SAC had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of petitioner's Petition for
Injunction.

HELD:
The SAC has no jurisdiction over the subject petition for injunction and, correspondingly, has no
authority to issue the subject injunction. The foregoing [Sections 50, 56, and 57 of R.A. No. 6657]
clearly demonstrate that the jurisdiction of the RTC as a Special Agrarian Court is in the nature of
a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, the RTC's authority to hear and determine a class of
cases is confined to particular causes or can only be exercised under the limitations and
circumstances prescribed by statute, particularly the above-quoted Section 57.

Thus, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court as
delineated by law is to cover only the following controversies:

1. All petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and

2. The prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657.

A perusal of the petition for injunction filed by private respondents in DAR Case shows that it
does not raise either of the foregoing issues. The principal averments of the petition and the
relief prayed for therein actually assert a cause of action to enjoin the "installation/physical
takeover" of the subject landholdings by the ARBs affiliated with the Cooperative, and therefore
not within the purview of the limited or special jurisdiction of the public respondent as a Special
Agrarian Court. Clearly, public respondent is bereft of any authority to hear the petition for
injunction in DAR Case as a Special Agrarian Court, and, thus, acted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in taking cognizance of the petition.

============================================================================

#23. RURAL BANK OF MABITAL LAGUNA V. CANICON ET AL (JUNE 27, 2018)

G.R. No. 196015, June 27, 2018

RURAL BANK OF MABITAC, LAGUNA, INC., REPRESENTED BY MRS. MARIA CECILIA S. TANAEL,
Petitioner, v. MELANIE M. CANICON AND MERLITA L. ESPELETA, Respondents.

JARDELEZA, J.

FACTS: Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to economic sabotage, against its employees Rica W.
Aguilar (Aguilar), Melanie M. Canicon (Canicon), and Merlita L. Espeleta (Espeleta).

An information for estafa in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689 was filed against Aguilar,
Canicon, and Espeleta before the RTC Laguna. Subsequently, the RTC, through Judge Stella
Cabuco-Andres (Judge Cabuco-Andres), issued a warrant for the arrest of all three accused. Only
Espeleta and Canicon were arrested, while Aguilar remains at large.
Espeleta filed an urgent motion for reinvestigation before the RTC. RTC arraigned both Espeleta
and Canicon. Both accused entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to amend the information with attached amended
information. The amended information dropped Espeleta from the list of those originally charged,
and recommended bail for all the remaining accused.

RTC, this time through Judge Zenaida G. Laguilles (Judge Laguilles), which recalled and set aside
the order issued by Judge Cabuco-Andres.Espeleta and Canicon filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, which petitioner opposed. RTC, through Judge Rommel O. Baybay (Judge
Baybay), granted private respondents' motion for reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by petitioner, but the same was denied. Thus, it filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 with the CA, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC.

The CA denied certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the present petition, which seeks the reinstatement of the original information,
places Espeleta in double jeopardy.

RULING: No.

Double jeopardy attaches when the following elements concur: (1) a valid information sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent.48 The absence of
any of the requisites hinders the attachment of the first jeopardy.

The first to third elements are non-issues in this petition. There is no dispute that the original
information is valid and was filed with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a court of competent
jurisdiction. Espeleta was arraigned under this original information. The contentious element in
this case is the fourth one, i.e., whether the dismissal was with express consent of Espeleta.

As a rule, where the dismissal was granted upon motion of the accused, jeopardy will not attach.
In this case, Espeleta's filing of the urgent motion for reinvestigation did not amount to her
express consent. However, we still find that Espeleta gave her express consent when her counsel
did not object to the amendment of the information. As we have held in People v. Pilpa, the
dismissal of the case without any objection on the part of the accused is equivalent to the
accused's express consent to its termination, which would bar a claim for violation of the right
against double jeopardy.
The rule that the dismissal is not final if it is made upon accused's motion, of course, admits of
exceptions such as: (1) where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and
operates as an acquittal; and (2) where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused,
because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.
However, the foregoing are neither applicable nor raised in this case.

Considering that the first jeopardy did not attach when the case was previously dismissed as to
Espeleta, this petition will not expose Espeleta to double jeopardy.

============================================================================

#24. DEPT OF AGRARIAN REFORM V. GALLE (OCTOBER 2, 2017)

G.R. No. 171836 October 02, 2017

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by HON. NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN, in his

capacity as DAR-OIC Secretary, Petitioner, vs. SUSIE IRENE GALLE, Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS: On August 11, 2014, the Court issued a Decision in the instant case, decreeing as follows:

xxx

(4). Civil Case No. 4436-2K3 is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, which is directed to receive
evidence and immediately determine the just compensation due to Susie Irene Galle's
estate/heirs - including all applicable damages, attorney's fees and costs, if any - in accordance
with this Decision, taking into consideration Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, the applicable
Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Orders, including Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992, as amended by Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, and prevailing
jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals is further directed to conclude the proceedings and submit
to this Court a report on its findings and recommendations within 90 days from notice of this
Decision; and

(5). The petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines is ORDERED to PAY Susie Irene Galle's estate or
heirs - herein respondents - the amount of SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR
THOUSAND SIXTY THREE AND 91/100 PESOS (P7,534,063.91), in cash, immediately upon receipt
of this Decision.

Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that it
was improper for this Court to declare null and void the Decision in DARAB Case, which fixed just
compensation on the basis of outdated 1991 data instead of valuation criteria as of 1993, the
time of taking of the subject property; that said October 15, 1996 DARAB Decision is already final
and executory and thus beyond judicial review, even by this Court; and that even if it were to be
assumed that said DARAB Decision is null and void, it nonetheless cannot be the subject of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration
insisting that the October 15, 1996 DARAB Decision is correct; that the 1991 valuation is accurate
since the actual taking of Galle's property for purposes of fixing just compensation may be said to
have occurred at that time when the Notice of Coverage was served upon Galle; that a property
valuation discrepancy of three years is not significant in the determination of just compensation
due to the owner of expropriated property; and that the October 15, 1996 DARAB Decision,
being correct and having attained finality, shall prevail as regards the amount of just
compensation to be paid for Galle's expropriated property.

The Court of Appeals (CA) submitted its Report and Recommendation

In summary, this Court recommends that the just compensation due to Galle be set at
Php397,680,657.315. Such valuation, it is respectfully submitted, is fair, reasonable, and
consistent with the letter and spirit of the law and applicable DAR regulations on the fixing of just
compensation, specifically AO 6, as amended.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in determining the just compensation.

RULING: No.

Eminent domain is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty and inherent in government.

However, such power is not boundless; it is circumscribed by two constitutional requirements:
"first, that there must be just compensation, and second, that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law."

Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL) provides that -
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. - In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Salvador Encinas, this Court reiterated this
long-established principle, thus:

The 'taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an
expropriation proceeding.' In computing the just compensation for expropriation proceedings,
the RTC should take into consideration the 'value of the land at the time of the taking, not at the
time of the rendition of judgment.' 'The time of taking is the time when the landowner was
deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic.'

In Alfonso, the Court reiterated the settled doctrine that the ultimate determination of just
compensation in expropriation proceedings remains a judicial prerogative,

The Court finds no merit in applying the rule laid out in DAR Administrative Order No. 5
(II)(C.2)(c), as it goes against the fundamental principle in eminent domain that just
compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking. The reason behind DAR
Administrative Order No. 5 (II)(C.2)(c) is evident: it sets a cap on the expropriation value of
properties placed under the agrarian reform program in order that these properties may be
acquired as cheaply as possible and at little cost to government; understandably, it is aimed at
preventing the dissipation of the state's coffers. But this goes against the mandate of the
Constitution; the great cost to private landowners occasioned by an unwarranted undervaluation
of their properties cannot be ignored. If DAR Administrative Order No. 5 (II)(C.2)(c) were to be
applied in the present case, there would be an unjust taking, a clear violation of due process.

WHEREFORE, the Court adopts the September 15, 2015 Report and Recommendation of the
Court of Appeals with modification as to the amount of attorney's fees. Petitioner Land Bank of
the Philippines is ORDERED to PAY Susie Irene Galle's estate or heirs, herein respondents.

============================================================================

#25. BALEARES V. ESPANTO (JUNE 6, 2018)

G.R. No. 229645, June 06, 2018

NORMA M. BALEARES, DESIDERIO M. BALEARES, GERTRUDES B. CARIASA, RICHARD BALEARES,

JOSEPH BALEARES, SUSAN B. DELA CRUZ, MA. JULIA B. RECTRA, AND EDWIN BALEARES,
Petitioners, v. FELIPE B. ESPANTO, REP. BY MARCELA B. BALEARES, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
Respondent.

VELASCO JR., J.

FACTS: Respondent is the current registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements at
Poblacion, Makati City (subject property). Petitioners, on the other hand, were the heirs of
Santos Baleares (Santos), one of the original co-owners of the subject property, together with his
siblings Tomasa, Juha, Matilde, Marcela, Gloria (now deceased), all surnamed Baleares, and his
nephew, Ernest B. Nonisa, Jr. (now deceased).

Way back on February 18, 1988, The Baleares siblings mortgaged the subject property to Arnold
Maranan (Arnold). The subject property was apparently foreclosed and sold at public auction,
where Arnold appeared to be the highest bidder. Petitioners, lodged a Complaint for the
Cancellation of the Mortgage Inscription grounded on prescription before RTC-Makati City.
Respondent and his mother likewise filed a complaint against Arnold but for Nullification of
Mortgage and/or Foreclosure with TRO/Injunction based also on prescription of the latter's
mortgaged right before RTC-Makati City. The RTC rendered a Decision (cancellation of mortgage
inscription) in favor of the petitioners.

In the same year, all this notwithstanding, Arnold was able to sell the subject property to none
other than the respondent himself but did not immediately take possession of the subject
property. Instead, he allowed the petitioners, who were its actual occupants, to remain therein as
they are his blood relatives.

Respondent sent a demand letter to the petitioners for them to vacate the subject property but
they refused. Even the subsequent barangay settlement proved futile. Respondent instituted a
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer before the MeTC-Makati City against the petitioners (the origin
of this Petition).

In their Verified Answer with Motion to Dismiss and Counterclaim, the petitioners averred that
the MeTC has no jurisdiction over the instant action, as it is one for recovery of possession and
not for unlawful detainer. They also raise the existence of litis pendentia, as there are allegedly
two pending cases involving similar issues of ownership and possession that are still pending
before the RTC-Makati City

MeTC ruled for the respondent and granted the Complaint. It found the complaint to be sufficient
for an unlawful detainer case and upheld that the case should not be dismissed on the ground of
litis pendentia, as the issues in the alleged two pending cases before the RTC-Makati City do not
abate ejectment suit. On appeal, the RTC affirmed in its entirety the MeTC ruling. On further
appeal, the CA affirmed both the Decision and the Order of the RTC. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: Who between the petitioners and the respondent has a better right of possession over the
subject property?

RULING: This Court rules for the petitioners.

An action for unlawful detainer is summary in nature and the only issue that needs to be resolved
is who is entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to possession de
facto, and not possession de jure. Nonetheless, where the parties to an ejectment case raise the
issue of ownership and such is inseparably linked to that of possession, the courts may pass upon
that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property.
The adjudication of the ownership issue, however, is not final and binding. The same is only for
the purpose of resolving the issue of possession. Otherwise stated, the adjudication of the issue
of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving
title to the property.

It is true that a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property
ownership, which necessarily includes possession. As such, ordinarily, the Torrens title holder
over the subject properties is considered the rightful owner who is entitled to possession thereof.
But, in this case, it has not been disputed that the petitioners have been in continuous
possession of the subject property in the concept of ownership and not by mere tolerance of the
respondent.

It bears stressing that the herein ruling is limited only to the determination as to who between
the parties has the better right of possession. It will not in any way bar any of the parties from
filing an action with the proper court to resolve conclusively the issue of ownership.

============================================================================

#26. GATCHALIAN V. FLORES (JANUARY 19, 2018)

Gatchalian vs. Flores

G.R. No. 225176. January 19, 2018

Tijam, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Gatchalian is one of the co-owners of a parcel of land registered under the
name of his parents, spouses Gatchalian. He filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents
Cesar Flores, Jose Paolo Araneta, Corazon Quing and Cynthia Flores with the MeTC.

The survey conducted established that the lot of Segundo Mendoza encroached a portion the
subject which the Gatchalian's had tolerated. But after several years, the lot of Segundo Mendoza
was sold and 'subdivided among the new owners including herein respondents. Verbal and
written demands to vacate were then served upon them but remained unheeded.

For their part, respondents denied that they usurped the property of petitioner. In fact, it was the
Gatchalians who have encroached the land when they put up a fence in their property. They
argued that the road lot is now public property since it is constituted as a right of way because of
a city ordinance and as such, petitioner cannot evict respondents.

ISSUE/RULING:

Who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the subject
property

Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to the physical or material possession of the subject property. At
the outset, petitioner filed before the MeTC an action for ejectment against the respondents. It is
settled that in ejectment proceedings, the only issue for the court's resolution is, who between
the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the subject property. Issues as to
ownership are not involved, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.

It is undisputed that the road lot is registered under the name of petitioner's parents. Even the
respondents did not dispute this fact. It is also undisputed that the municipal government has not
undertaken any expropriation proceedings to acquire the subject property neither did the
petitioner donate or sell the same to the municipal government. Therefore, absent any
expropriation proceedings and without any evidence that the petitioner donated or sold the
subject property to the municipal government, the same is still private property.

The use of the subdivision roads by the general public does not strip it of its private character.
The road is not converted into public property by mere tolerance of the subdivision owner of the
public's passage through it. To repeat, "the local government should first acquire them by
donation, purchase or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road.”

As reiterated in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) v. Sps. Llamas, it was held that:

As there is no such thing as an automatic cessation to the government of subdivision road lots, an
actual transfer must first be effected by the subdivision owner: "subdivision streets belonged to
the owner until donated to the government or until expropriated upon payment of just
compensation."

Since the local government of Parañaque has not purchased nor undertaken any expropriation
proceedings, neither did the petitioner and his siblings donate the subject property, the latter is
still a private property and the did not convert the same to public property.

============================================================================

#27. IGLESIA DE JESUCRISTO JERUSALEM OF MLA V. DELA CRUZ (APRIL 23, 2018)

IGLESIA DE JESUCRISTO JERUSALEM NUEVA OF MANILA V DELA CRUZ

GR NO. 208284 APRIL 23, 2018

FACTS: Petitioner, represented by Francisco Galvez, filed before the MeTC of Malabon City a
Complaint for unlawful detainer with damages against respondent Loida Dela Cruz.

Galvez alleged that he is the nephew of Rosendo Gatchalian, founder and leader of petitioner;
Since 1940, his mother and her family used to occupy and possess and likewise built a house of
their own in the concept of an owner on a certain portion of the subject lot; Dela Cruz] used to
be a member of the petitioner. However, Surprisingly, sometime in 1998, without the knowledge
and consent of all the members and officers of petitioner, Dela Cruz formed, organized, and
created the name of CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST, "NEW JERUSALEM"; The organization formed by
Dela Cruz was used by her as an instrument in claiming that she is the representative of the said
religious organization and had the right over the subject lot.

The CA, affirming the decisions of the MeTc and the RTC, rejected petitioner's claim that it was
the true owner of the Disputed property. It found Dela Cruz's pieces of evidence more consistent,
more credible, and more trustworthy. Petitioner insisted that as the instant case is only for
unlawful detainer, the only issue to be resolved pertains to who has a better right to the
possession of the disputed property, independent of any claim of ownership and that in view of
the existence of the validly issued title in its name, there is no need to determine the issue of
ownership at all.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's contention is correct

RULING: No. Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may
pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right, to possess the
property. However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession,
adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving
the issue or possession.

Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system, is entitled to all the attributes of property
ownership, which necessarily includes possession. Nevertheless, "an ejectment case will not
necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject
property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be
averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven."

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#28. LERIOU V. LONGA (OCTOBER 8, 2018)

LERIOU vs LONGA

G.R. No. 203923 October 8, 2018

Leonardo- De Castro, CJ.:

FACTS: Respondent minors Yohanna and Victoria Longa, represented by their mother, Mary
Jane B. Sta. Cruz, instituted a special proceeding entitled “In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
Enrique T. Long Petition for Letters of Administration,” with the RTC of Muntinlupa City.
Respondents alleged that Enrique died intestate, survived by petitioner Eleptherios and Stephen
and respondents Yohanna and Victoria, his legitimate and illegitimate children, respectively; and
that Enrique left several properties with no creditors.
Acting Presiding Judge Villanueva issued an Order appointing Sta. Cruz as the administratix of
Enrique’s estate. The RTC issued the Letters of Administrator. Petitioners then filed an Omnibus
Motion to remove Jane Sta. Ana as Administratix and appoint Eleptherios L. Longa or His
Nominee as Administrator. Petitioners alleged that they were denied due process of law because
they did not receive any notice about the respondents’ Petition for Letters of Administration.
Petitioners accuse respondent-administratix of: 1) neglect for failing to abide by the order of the
RTC for her to coordinate with the DFA for the proper service of Petition and Order dated July 4,
20117 to petitioners; and 2) two acts of misrepresentation for not disclosing all the assets of the
decedent and for pretending to be a pauper litigant.

Respondent-Administratix filed her Opposition to the Omnibus Motion alleging that she
mailed the Petition for Letters of Administration and the RTC Order to petitioners in the
addresses that the latter gave her, and that she coordinated with the DFA for the service of the
said Petition to petitioners as evidenced by the RTC Order bearing the stamp“RECEIVED”by the
DFA Records Division. Respondent-administratix also exchanged correspondences with
petitioners and their counsels about her decision to let the court settle Enrique’s estate as
shown by her letter addressed to petitioner’s counsels, and her electronic mails (e-mails) with
petitioner Eleptherios.

The RTC issued Order denying petitioners’ Omnibus Motion. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the trial court denied in Order. The Appelate Court affirmed the RTC’s
order and subsequently denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Petition suffers a Technical Infirmity.

2. Whether personal notice to the petitioners is jurisdictional requirement.

RULING:

1. Yes. Rule 45, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court requires the petition to contain a sworn
certification against forum shopping. It should be emphasized that it should be the party-pleader
who must sign the sworn certification against forum shopping for the reason that he/she has
personal knowledge of whether or not another action or proceeding was commenced involving
the same parties and causes of action. If the party-pleader is unable to personally sign the
certification, he/she must execute a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his/her counsel
to sign to sign in his/her behalf.

In the instant case, it was not petitioners but Atty. Baguiran who signed the certification against
forum shopping despite the absence of any showing that petitioners executed an SPA authorizing
Atty. Baquiran to sign in their behalf. By Atty. Baquiran’s own revelation, their law firm had lost
communication and they could not locate any of the petitioners who are apparently residing in
the USA. The petition should be dismissed pursuant to our ruling in Anderson v. Ho where the
Court clarified that a certification signed by a counsel without an SPA is a valid cause for the
dismissal of the Petition.

2. Contrary to petitioners’ argument that personal notice under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 is a

jurisdictional requirement, the Court in Alaban v. Court of Appeals, explained that it is just a
matter of personal convenience. Moreover, it should be emphasized that a testate or intestate
settlement of a deceased’s estate is a proceeding in rem, such that the publication under Section
3 of the same Rule, vests the court with jurisdiction over all persons who are interested therein.

In the instant case, the Order dated July 4, 2007 was published for the consecutive weeks in
Balita, a newspaper of general circulation, on the following dates: July 27, 20078, August 3, 2007,
and August 10, 2007. By such publication which constitutes notice to the whole world,
petitioners are deemed notified about the intestate proceedings of their father’s estate. As
elucidated in Alaban v. Court of Appeals, Publication is notice to the whole world that the
proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of
any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings
in the world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

============================================================================

#29 DATOR VS. MORALES (OCTOBER 08, 2018)

G.R. No. 237742; October 08, 2018

CELSO OLIVIER T. DATOR, Petitioner, v. HON. CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS

THE OMBUDSMAN, AND HON. GERARD A. MOSQUERA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
Respondents.

TIJAM, J.:

FACTS: On May 2, 2016, a complaint was filed against the incumbent Mayor of Lucban, Quezon,
petitioner Celso Olivier T. Dator (Dator), and Maria Lyncelle D. Macandile (Macandile), for grave
misconduct, grave abuse of authority and nepotism.

It was alleged that in his immediately preceding term, Dator hired his sister, Macandile, as Chief
Administrative Officer through a Job Order and designated her as Municipal Administrator
through Special Order (S.O.) No. 2, Series of 2014, dated March 1, 2014. There was no
appointment paper that was submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for the required confirmation
pursuant to Sec. 443(d) of the Local Government Code (LGC).

Meanwhile, on March 20, 2017 the Ombudsman (OMB) dismissed the charges against Macandile,
but finding Dator administratively liable for Simple Misconduct. The same was approved by Hon.
Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales on October 11, 2017 with the footnote prescribing a
shorter penalty

There was disparity between the length of period on the penalty of suspension in the decision of
the OMB penned by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Christine Carol A.
Casela-Doctor (six months suspension) and the footnoted portion of the decision below Hon.
Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales' name (one month and one day suspension).

A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Dator and later on, a Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise filed. Dator also filed a Motion for Clarification seeking clarification
as to the correct penalty imposed – whether it is six (6) months suspension or one (1) month
and one (1) day suspension.

Thereafter, Dator filed before the CA a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (petition for injunction), praying for
respondents to desist and refrain from implementing the OMB's March 20, 2017 Decision.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition outright on the following grounds: 1. an original action
for injunction (under Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) is outside the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals (Allgemeine Bau-Chemie Phils. Inc. vs. Metropolitan Bank, 482 SCRA 247)2.
the correct mode to impugn the Decision of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
is to appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 (Gupilan-Aguilar vs. Office of the Ombudsman,
717 SCRA 503).

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the CA erred in not giving due course to the Petition.

II. Whether or not Dator is entitled to an Injunctive Writ

RULING:

I. Yes. The CA erred in not giving due course to the petition. Indeed, appeals from
decisions in administrative disciplinary cases of the OMB should be taken to the CA via a Petition
for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Rule 43 prescribes the manner of appeal from
quasi-judicial agencies, such as the OMB, and was formulated precisely to provide for a uniform
rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.26

Although Dator filed a petition for injunction, a close scrutiny of the petition, its allegations and
discussion would clearly disclose that it questioned the decision in its entirety. The CA should not
have been quick to dismiss the said petition on procedural grounds alone. Given the peculiar
circumstances of the case, where Dator is unsure of whether the suspension that is immediately
executory is one month and one day or six months, and the resolution of his motion for
clarification is still forthcoming, Dator understandably sought relief. Without further belaboring
the point, We find it very clear that the extreme urgency of the situation required an equally
urgent resolution, and due to the public interest involved, the petitioner is justified in
straightforwardly seeking the intervention of this Court.

While the Rules of Procedure must be faithfully followed, the same Rules may be relaxed for
persuasive and weighty reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure
to comply with the prescribed procedure. Again, as We repeatedly held in prior cases, the
provisions of the Rules should be applied with reason and liberality to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

The petition for injunction set out circumstances that merited the relaxation of the rules. It
cannot be emphasized enough that the suspension from office of an elective official, whether as
a preventive measure or as a penalty, will undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of
the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.

Contrary to the OSG's submission, We find Dator's acts neither willful nor deliberate. As can be
gleaned from the sequence of events, Dator was constrained to file an action to question the
immediately executory suspension because of the seemingly conflicting penalties set out in the
March 20, 201 7 Decision, and the Order resolving his motion for clarification and motion for
reconsideration, was only received by him on June 4, 2018. We cannot fault Dator for doing the
same considering the extreme urgency of the situation, and the public interest aspect of the case.
We note that Dator did not hide the fact that he had a pending petition for review on certiorari
before this court when he filed the petition for review under Rule 43 dated June 19, 2018 with
the CA. Given the foregoing, We are hard-pressed to conclude that there was willful and
deliberate forum shopping on the part of Dator. Be that as it may, the subsequent petition for
review before the CA should be, and is hereby, dismissed.

II. No. Dator is not entitled to an injunctive writ. Essential to granting the injunctive
relief is the existence of an urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage. A
temporary restraining order (TRO) issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave
injustice and irreparable injury would arise unless it is issued immediately. "Under Section 5, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court, a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits
or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on the applicant
before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard."36

Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioner must show that: (1) there exists a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be
enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.37

Dator insists that he has shown that: 1) he has a clear and unmistakable right to be informed of
the correct penalty imposed against him; 2) there is a decision by the honorable respondent
Office of the Ombudsman that is now immediately executory; 3) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ on the ground that the implementation of the
decision would not only violate or defeat his right to be informed of the correct penalty imposed,
but worse, he would be denied due process should the same be imposed now, thus, would cause
him serious and irreparable damage and grave injustice; and 4) petitioner is entitled to relief
because as a public officer, he has a right to be protected in his office pending the resolution of
his case with the OMB.

The Court ruled that Dator was unable to satisfy the said requirements as regards the showing of
a clear and unmistakable right to be protected and that there is an urgent need to prevent a
serious and irreparable damage.Contrary to Dator's allegation, there is no clear and unmistakable
right to be protected. There is no vested right to public office.

============================================================================

#30. KU V. RCBC SEC INC (OCTOBER 17, 2018)

STEPHEN Y. KU vs. RCBC SECURITIES, INC

G.R. No. 219491 October 17, 2018

FACTS: In June 2007, plaintiff [herein petitioner] opened a trade account with RSEC [herein
respondent] for the purpose of buying and selling securities as evidenced by the Customer
Account Information Form and Agreement dated 05 June 2007.

Unknown to plaintiff, the name of M.G. Valbuena ("MGV") was deliberately inserted beside the
name of Ivan L. Zalameda as one of the agents after plaintiff completed and signed the
Agreement.

As to when the fraudulent insertion was made, plaintiff has no idea. Plaintiff only discovered this
anomaly when plaintiff recently requested for a copy of his Account Information.

In the course of plaintiff's trading transactions with RSEC, MGV represented herself as a Sales
Director of RSEC, duly authorized to transact business on behalf of the latter.

With this representation, plaintiff continued to transact business with RSEC through MGV, on the
honest belief that the latter was acting for and in behalf of RSEC.

Every time plaintiff authorized a trade, plaintiff would be furnished with a Trade Confirmation by
RSEC. Having successfully and profitably managed plaintiff's account, or as so represented to
plaintiff, MGV was able to gain the trust and confidence of plaintiff.
In addition to acting as broker for plaintiff's trading account, investment in ARPO was also
successfully solicited by plaintiff. Thus, sometime in November 2007, plaintiff agreed to invest in
ARPO funds, which continued to run for more than two (2) years, the total of which amounted to
Php38,300,205.00. x x x.

Sometime in January 2012, it came to the knowledge of plaintiff that his account with RSEC was
subject of mismanagement. MGV was blacklisted by RSEC due to numerous fraudulent and
unauthorized transactions committed by the former. Worse, MGV allegedly was able to divert
investments made by "high networth" clients of RSEC into some other accounts.

On 17 January 2012, plaintiff was furnished by RSEC of a copy of an undated audit report
(sometimes referred to as "ledger") principally showing that the total claim of plaintiff with RSEC
amounts to Php77,561,602.75

On 18 January 2012, plaintiff wrote RSEC informing the latter that simultaneous to RSEC's audit,
plaintiff likewise is in the process of conducting an independent audit of his own account in order
to validate the amount claimed by RSEC.

In the same letter, plaintiff made clear to RSEC that it has never authorized a discretionary
account with MGV and requested for all documents relative to plaintiff's audit.

After audit, plaintiff has conclusively determined that there were FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN
(467) unauthorized transactions in his account. A review of the said transactions would show that
multiple buying and selling transactions on the same day were repeatedly done over a period of
four (4) years.

Being unauthorized, plaintiff also never received any document confirming any of the said
transactions. Worse, plaintiff was given and is in the possession of fabricated confirmation
statements for trades he actually authorized, but were not, in reality executed.

After evaluation and audit, and after exclusion of all the unauthorized trades, plaintiff should
have remaining cash in his trade account in the amount of Php992,970.78 and the following stock
position under his

However, despite the detailed presentation of plaintiff's payments to RSEC, RSEC, in its
letter-reply dated 29 May 2012, only made categorical denials of its relationship with ARPO and
failed to sufficiently explain what happened to plaintiff's account or where did all of plaintiff's
money intended for ARPO go.

After completing the audit report , plaintiff sent a demand letter dated 11 January 2013 to RSEC,

Without any valid and justifiable reason, however, RSEC refused and still continues to refuse to
heed plaintiff's demand.

ISSUE:
A. Whether or not the RTC or the SEC has jurisdiction ?

B. Whether or not the nature of the petitioners complaint is an ordinary civil action or an intra
corporate controversy?

C. Whether or not there was deliberate intent by the petitioner to defraud the court in the
payment of docket fees?

HELD:

A.

Jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies is transferred by law (RA 8799) from the SEC to the
RTCs in general, but the authority to exercise such jurisdiction is given by the Supreme Court, in
the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution, to RTCs which are specifically
designated as Special Commercial Courts. On the other hand, the cases enumerated under
Section 19 of BP 129, as amended, are taken cognizance of by the RTCs in the exercise of their
general jurisdiction.

Thus, based on the allegations in petitioner's Complaint, in relation to the above provisions of law,
there is no dispute that the case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

B.

The Court finds, and so holds, that the case is not an intra-corporate dispute and, instead, is an
ordinary civil action. There are no intra-corporate relations between the parties. Petitioner is
neither a stockholder, partner, member or officer of respondent corporation. The parties'
relationship is limited to that of an investor and a securities broker. Moreover, the questions
involved neither pertain to the parties' rights and obligations under the Corporation Code, if any,
nor to matters directly relating to the regulation of the corporation.

On the basis of the foregoing, since the Complaint filed by petitioner partakes of the nature of an
ordinary civil action, it is clear that it was correctly raffled-off to Branch 63. Hence, considering
that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioner's complaint, and that
Branch 149 continued and continues to exercise jurisdiction over the case during the pendency of
the proceedings leading to this petition and, thus, has presumably conducted hearings towards
the resolution of petitioner's complaint, this Court, in the interest of expediency and, in
promoting the parties' respective rights to a speedy disposition of their case, finds it proper that
Civil Case No. 13-171 should remain with Branch 149, instead of being remanded to Branch 63 or
re-raffled anew among all courts of the same RTC.

C.
In the present case, the Court does not agree with the CA when it ruled that "the intention of
[petitioner] Ku to evade payment of the correct filing fees[,] if not to mislead the docket clerk in
the assessment of the filing fees[,] is manifest." The fact alone that petitioner failed to indicate in
the body of his Complaint as well as in his prayer, the value of the shares of stocks he wishes to
recover from respondent is not sufficient proof of a deliberate intent to defraud the court in the
payment of docket fees. On the contrary, there is no dispute that upon filing of his Complaint,
petitioner paid docket fees amounting to P1,465,971.41, which was based on the assessment
made by the clerk of court. In a number of cases,this Court has ruled that the plaintiff's payment
of the docket fees based on the assessment made by the docket clerk negates bad faith or intent
to defraud the government. There is, likewise, no dispute that, subsequently, when ordered by
Branch 149 to pay additional docket fees corresponding to the value of the shares of stocks being
recovered, petitioner immediately paid an additional sum of P464,535.83. Moreover, unlike in
Manchester where the complainant specified in the body of the complaint the amount of
damages sought to be recovered but omitted the same in its prayer, petitioner in the instant case
consistently indicated both in the body of his Complaint and in his prayer, the number of shares
sought to be recovered, albeit without their corresponding values. The foregoing, circumstances
would show that there was no deliberate intent to defraud the court in the payment of docket
fees.

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#31. PAGDANGANAN V. CA (SEPTEMBER 5, 2017)

G.R. No. 202678. September 5, 2018.] ERNESTINA A. PAGDANGANAN, RODERICK APACIBLE

PAGDANGANAN, MARIA ROSARIO LOTA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, ERNESTINA A.
PAGDANGANAN, ERNEST JEROME PAGDANGANAN, and SANDRA APACIBLE PAGDANGANAN, as
the heirs and substitutes of deceased ISAURO J. PAGDANGANAN, ALFONSO ORTIGAS OLONDRIZ,
and CITIBANK N.A. HONG KONG , petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MA. SUSANA A.S.
MADRIGAL, MA. ANA A.S. MADRIGAL, MA. ROSA A.S. MADRIGAL, MATHILDA S. OLONDRIZ,
VICENTE A.S. MADRIGAL, ROSEMARIE OPIS-MALASIG, MARIA TERESA S. UBANO, EDUARDO E.
DELA CRUZ, and GUILLER B. ASIDO, respondents.

FACTS: This is a Petition for Mandamus seeking to compel the Court of Appeals to resolve the
Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 104291, 2 alleging that the Court of Appeals committed inordinate
delay in violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases. Solid Guaranty, Inc. (Solid Guaranty)
is a domestic corporation engaged in the insurance business. There was a complaint for
interpleader that was filed because of the alleged conflicting claims of the Madrigals and the
Citbank. Subsequently, there was a Special Stockholders’ Meeting that was held and new
members of the board of directors were elected. Solid Guaranty and Pagdanganan amended their
complaint to implead additional defendants the newly elected directors and officers. Ubano
called for the holding of a Special Stockholders' Meeting. Solid Guaranty and Pagdanganan filed a
motion with the Regional Trial Court to prevent the holding of the meeting. The Regional Trial
Court issued a Joint Order authorizing the holding of the meeting. On July 11, 2008, Solid
Guaranty, Pagdanganan, another minority stockholder, Alfonso, and Citibank filed a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the
Court of Appeals. They alleged that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion
in allowing the holding of the June 30, 2008 stockholders' meeting despite the pendency of the
interpleader suit. While the Motions were pending with the Court of Appeals, or on August 2,
2012, the Heirs of Pagdanganan, Alfonso, and Citibank filed this Petition for Mandamus against
the Court of Appeals, the Madrigals, Mathilda, Vicente, Malasig, Ubano, Dela Cruz, and Asido
before this Court. They allege that the Court of Appeals committed inordinate delay in resolving
their Petition filed on July 11, 2008. They claimed that the Court of Appeals' "continued inaction
on the case is clearly a neglect of its judicial duties." On February 8, 2013, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision dismissing the petition as the questioned orders of the Regional Trial Court
were not rendered in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, respondents the Madrigals, Vicente,
Malasig, Ubano, and Asido filed a Manifestation dated February 18, 2013, attaching a copy of the
Court of Appeals February 8, 2013 Decision and praying that this Court dismiss this case as the
issues raised have already become moot and academic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for mandamus filed by petitioners is proper

HELD: No. The petition was dismissed for being moot and academic. A petition for mandamus
praying for this Court to compel the Court of Appeals to resolve a case becomes moot if the Court
of Appeals resolves the case with finality during the pendency of the petition. A petition for
mandamus may be filed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person who is alleged
to have unlawfully neglected the performance of a duty arising from that office, trust, or station.
In this case, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the Court of
Appeals to resolve their Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 104291. However, the Court of Appeals has
already rendered its Decision on February 8, 2013. It issued a Resolution dated March 10, 2014
on petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Despite the occurrence of these subsequent events,
petitioners, in their Memorandum, reiterated their prayer for this Court to compel the Court of
Appeals to resolve CA-G.R. SP No. 104291. Any issuance of a writ of mandamus in this case,
however, becomes an exercise in futility. The Court of Appeals cannot be compelled to resolve a
case it has already fully resolved. This Petition must be dismissed for being moot.

============================================================================

#32. EIZMENDI V. FERNANDEZ (SEPTEMBER 5, 2018)

G.R. No. 215280. September 5, 2018.

FRANCISCO C. EIZMENDI JR., JOSE S. TAYAG JR., JOAQUIN L. SAN AGUSTIN, EDUARDO D.
FRANCISCO, EDMIDIO V. RAMOS, JR., ALBERT G. BLANCAFLOR, REY NATHANIEL C. IFURUNG,
MANUEL H. ACOSTA JR., and VALLE VERDE COUNTRY CLUB, INC., petitioners, vs.TEODORICO P.
FERNANDEZ, respondent.

PONENTE: Justice Peralta

FACTS: On November 28, 2013, respondent Teodorico P. Fernandez filed a Complaint 3 for
Invalidation of Corporate Acts and Resolutions with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against the individual petitioners, who allegedly constituted themselves as new members of the
Board of Directors (BOD) of Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. (VVCCI), despite lack of quorum during
the annual members' meeting on February 23, 2013.

Fernandez averred that he is a proprietary member in good standing of VVCCI, and that the
individual petitioners held a meeting on October 18, 2013 during which they supposedly acted
for and in behalf of VVCCI, and found him guilty of less serious violations of the by-laws and
imposed on him the penalty of suspension of membership for six (6) months. Fernandez asserted
that since petitioners were not validly constituted as the new BOD in the place of the hold-over
BOD of VVCCI, they had no legal authority to act as such BOD, to find him guilty and to suspend
him.

Petitioners contend that Fernandez is attempting to indirectly violate the rules on, and the period
for, filing an election contest as provided in the Interim Rules. They point out that the trial court
has read Fernandez's complaint and readily sensed that the case is partly an election contest;
thus, it immediately prevented Fernandez from raising the issue on the election of petitioners as
members of the BOD, and limited the issue to whether Fernandez was validly suspended by
petitioners. They add that to allow Fernandez to prove the invalidity of petitioners' election is
also tantamount to reopening the first case between the hold-over BOD and the petitioners in
G.R. No. 209120, entitled "Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. v. Eizmendi, Jr.,"dated October 14, 2013
(Valle Verde), which stemmed from a complaint filed by VVCCI, for misrepresentation of
corporate office against the defendants [herein individual petitioners] with respect to the
February 23, 2013 annual meeting where the latter were elected as directors, despite the alleged
lack of quorum.

Petitioners submit that the Court Resolution in G.R. No. 20912 — where the complaint for
misrepresentation of corporate office was dismissed with finality on two grounds: (1) lack of
cause of action for having been filed by VVCCI instead of the contenders, which include
Fernandez, who are the real parties-in-interest; and (2) for being essentially an election contest
which was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period under the Interim Rules — is conclusive
upon the status of petitioners as the duly-elected members of the BOD of VVCCI. Considering
that Fernandez is a party in G.R. No. 209120 as an appointee of the old BOD and being a
candidate in the February 23, 2013 elections of the members of the BOD, petitioners claim that
he should have filed an election contest within 15 days therefrom or intervened in Commercial
Case No. 13-190, which is the RTC case referred to in G.R. No. 209120.

Petitioners posit that while Fernandez asserts that he is not claiming the office as member of the
BOD, he is, in effect, attempting to unseat them as members thereof, which is in the nature of an
election contest. Besides, petitioners state that their term as members of the BOD of VVCCI
already expired on April 5, 2014, which makes the issue on the validity of their election moot.
Finally, they invoke that the Resolution in G.R. No. 209120 should also be considered as the "law
of the case" under the principle of stare decisis.

For his part, Fernandez counters that his cause of action is his wrongful suspension as member of
the VVCCI, and that he may question petitioners' authority as a board to order his suspension. He
also insists that the case before the RTC is not an election contest as defined by the Interim Rules,
and that his complaint is not barred by res judicata, let alone bound by the Resolution in G.R. No.
209120 under the doctrine of stare decisis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the final resolution in Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. v. Eizmendi, et al., G.R.
No. 209120 dated October 14, 2013 bars Fernandez's complaint under the principles of res
judicata, law of the case and stare decisis, the Court rules that only the stare decisis principle
applies to this case.

RULING: For res judicata to serve as an absolute to a subsequent action, the following requisites
must be present: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must
be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter, and causes of action. Here, res judicata does not apply because there is
no identity of parties, causes of action and reliefs sought between the complaint subject of Valle
Verde and the complaint subject of this case.

First, while the defendants in the complaints subject of Valle Verde [Commercial Case No. 13-190)
and of this case [Commercial Case No. 13-202] are the very same individual petitioners, the
plaintiff in the former case is VVCCI, whereas the plaintiff in this case is Fernandez as plaintiff and
proprietary member in good standing of VVCCI. The absence of identity of parties is underscored
in Valle Verde where the Court upheld the dismissal of the complaint Valle Verde had no cause of
action and was not the real party-in-interest. The Court explained that a corporation does not
have the right to vote and that the reliefs prayed for in the complaint are for the benefit of the
respondents' contenders [like herein respondent Fernandez].

Second, the causes of action of the complaint subject of Valle Verde is distinct from that subject
of this case. In Valle Verde, the cause of action is the individual petitioners' misrepresentation
that they were elected as new members of the BOD and the Officers of VVCCI for 2013 to 2014,
due to the claim that there was no quorumduring the February 23, 2013 annual meeting. In this
case, the cause of action is the invalidation of corporate acts of VVCCI on the ground of lack of
authority of the individual petitioners, as members of the BOD, to suspend the club membership
of Fernandez, and the lack of due process which attended his suspension.

Third, there is also a stark contrast between the reliefs sought in the complaint subject of Valle
Verde and that subject of this case. In Valle Verde, VVCCI sought to enjoin the individual
petitioners from misrepresenting themselves to be members of the BOD and Officers of the Club.
In this case, Fernandez seeks to invalidate the claims off said individual petitioners to the office of
BOD of VVCCI and to nullify the annual members' meeting of February 23, 2013, as well as the
subsequent board meetings conducted by the individual petitioners, including all resolutions and
measures approved thereat relative to his suspension.

The doctrine of the "law of the case" is also inapplicable, because it only applies to the same case
involving the same parties. Valle Verde is separate and distinct from this case in terms of parties,
cause of actions and reliefs sought, despite the fact that both intra-corporate controversies arose
from the February 23, 2013 election of the individual petitioners as members of the BOD of
VVCCI in an annual meeting which was supposedly adjourned due to lack of quorum.

While the doctrines of res judicata and "the law of the case" are not applicable, the principle of
stare decisis et non quieta movere [stand by the decision and disturb not what is settled] applies
to this case, but only to the extent that Valle Verde held that (1) if the allegations and prayers in
the complaint raise the issues of validation of proxies, and the manner and validity of elections,
such as the nullification of election was unlawfully conducted due to lack of quorum, then such
complaint falls under the definition of election contest under the Interim Rules; and (2) the real
parties-in-interest in an election contest are the contenders, and not the corporation.

Considering that Fernandez's first cause of action seeks to nullify the claim of the individual
petitioners to the office of the BOD of VVCCI due to lack of quorum during the election on
February 23, 2013, then the Court must adhere to its ruling in Valle Verde, and hold that his
complaint is partly an election contest. However, Valle Verde cannot be invoked to sustain the
position that an election contest filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period under the Interim
Rules is prescribed.

In sum, the CA gravely erred in allowing Fernandez in Commercial Case No. 13-190 to present
evidence in connection with the election of the individual petitioners as members of the BOD of
VVCCI conducted on February 23, 2013 to invalidate their claims to the office of director, because
that is akin to entertaining an election contest filed beyond the 15-day period under the Interim
Rules.

============================================================================
#33. SANCHEZ V. AGUILAR (SEPTEMBER 17, 2017)

GR NO: 228680, September 17, 2018 - FUENTES

SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND DELMA SANCHEZ represented by HILARIO LOMBOY, Petitioner vs.
ESTHER DIVINAGRACIA DE AGUILAR, TERESITA AGUILAR, ZENAIDA AGUILAR, JUANITO AGUILAR,
JR., AMALIA AGUILAR, and SUSAN AGUILAR, THE MUNICIPALITY of LAKE SEBU, represented by its
Mayor, BASILIO SALIF, NOEMI DUTA D. DALIPE in her capacity as ZONING OFFICER II, ZALDY B.
ARTACHO, in his capacity as CHAIRMAN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON LAND CONFLICT, HON. RENATO
TAMPAC, in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of the 6TH MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF
SURALLA-LAKE SEBU, 17

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: Juanito Aguilar sold to petitioner spouses Aguilar a parcel of lot with a 600 sqm. Located
in South Cotabato on July 2000. 4 years after, the Heirs of Aguilar namely the respondents fenced
the boundary line including such portion owned by the spouses. As a result, petitioner spouses
filed a complaint for forcible entry on the basis that they owned the alleged alluvium deposit., On
the other hand, the heirs asserted that the alluvium was beyond the 600 sqm. portion. When the
MCTC issued the writ of execution, it was discovered that when the surveyor measured that
National Highway at 60 meters wide which the respondents disagreed that it was only 30 and not
60. It was also ruled that the boundary line of the 600 sqm.. amounted to a public easement.
Nevertheless, the spouses received a notice providing that the 150 sqm. of the lots belongs to
the heirs. As a result, spouses filed a complaint to annul the judgment which was granted by the
RTC but reverted by the Court of Appeals. Spouses Aguilar now presented this petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the MCTC lacked jurisdiction over the case?

HELD: No. Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the tribunal to hear, try and decide a case
and the lack thereof refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or
over the subject matter of the action. Lack of jurisdiction or absence of jurisdiction presupposes
that the court should not have taken cognizance of the complaint because the law or the
Constitution does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. On the one hand,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or respondent is acquired by voluntary appearance
or submission by the defendant/respondent to the court, or by coercive process issued by the
court to such party through service of summons.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the MCTC had duly acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner spouses as they were the ones who filed the complaint for forcible entry suit
before the MCTC. On the other hand, it is clearly provided by law that MCTC has exclusive
original jurisdiction over ejectment cases which includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases. Thus, the MCTC did not lack jurisdiction over the case.

============================================================================

#34. ALLIANCE OF HOMEOWNERS V. CITY GOV’T OF QC (SEPTEMBER 18, 2018)

ALLIANCE OF QUEZON CITY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION VS. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON

CITY

GR NO 230651

September 18,2018

Perlas- Bernabe, J

FACTS: On April 7, 2017, petitioner Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners' Association, Inc.
(Alliance), allegedly a non-stock, non-profit corporation,filed the present petition, praying that: (a)
a TRO be issued to restrain the implementation of the 2016 Ordinance; ( b) the said Ordinance be
declared unconstitutional for violating substantive due process, and invalid for violating Section
130 of the LGC; and (c) the tax payments made by the QC residents or individuals based on the
2016 Ordinance's revised schedule of FMV s be refunded. petition, Alliance argued that the 2016
Ordinance should be declared unconstitutional for violating substantive due process, considering
that the increase in FMVs, which resulted in an increase in the taxpayer's base, and ultimately,
the taxes to be paid, was unjust, excessive, oppressive, arbitrary, and confiscatory as proscribed
under Section 130 of the LGC.

Comment, 22 respondents countered that the petition is procedurally infirm because Alliance: (a)
failed to exhaust its administrativeremedies under the LGC, which were to question the
assessments on the taxpayers' properties by filing a protest before the City Treasurer, as well as
to assail the constitutionality of the 2016 Ordinance before the Secretary of Justice; ( b) violated
the hierarchy of courts when it directly filed its petition before this Court; 24 (c) has no legal
capacity to sue since its Certificate of Registration as a corporation was revoked by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in an Order dated February 10, 2004,and it has no separate
juridical personality as a homeowners' association due to its non-registration with the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB); and (d) is not a real party-in-interest because it does
not own any real property in QC to be affected by the 2016 Ordinance

July 14, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) likewise filed its Comment, arguing that
the petition should be dismissed on the grounds of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies,
non-observance of the hierarchy of courts, and lack of locus standi. It further alleged that the
2016 Ordinance was valid because Alliance failed to: (a) overcome the presumption of
constitutionality; ( b) show that the substantial increase in the assessed values of real properties
violates the fundamental principles of taxation; ( c) prove that the public hearing required before
passing an ordinance was not complied with; and (d) submit evidence that the 2016 Ordinance
was abruptly implemented. The OSG added that Alliance failed to demonstrate its clear legal right
to enjoin the implementation of the subject ordinance

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the petition is infirm violation of violations of doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies and hierarchy of court;

2. Whether or not petioner alliance lack legal capacity to sue.

HELD:

1. No. The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine requires that before a party may seek
intervention from the court, he or she should have already exhausted all the remedies in the
administrative level.The LGC provides two (2) remedies in relation to real property tax
assessments or tax ordinances. These are: (1) Sections 226 and 252 thereof which allow a
taxpayer to question the reasonableness of the amount assessed before the city treasurer then
appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals; and (2) Section 187 thereof which allows an
aggrieved taxpayer to question the validity or legality of a tax ordinance by duly filing an appeal
before the Secretary of Justice before seeking judicial intervention. In the present case, Alliance
admitted that these administrative remedies were not complied with, and that the petition was
immediately filed before the Court.

However, the rule on administrative exhaustion admits of exceptions, one of which is when
strong public interest is involved. Although a petitioner's failure to exhaust the required
administrative remedies has been held to bar a petition in court,56 the Court has relaxed
theapplication of this rule "in view of the more substantive matters,"as in this case. In particular,
a local government unit's authority to increase the FMVs of properties for purposes of local
taxation is a question that indisputably affects the public at large.
The hierarchy of courts doctrine prohibits parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief
may be obtained before the lower courts. Nevertheless, this doctrine is not an iron-clad rule; it
also admits of exceptions, such as when the case involves matters of transcendental importance.
In this case, Alliance argues that the implementation of the 2016 Ordinance will directly and
adversely affect the property interests of around "3,085,786 million" residents of QC.

2. No, capacity to sue. Rules of Court mandates that only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Non-compliance with this requirement renders
a case dismissible on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue, which refers to "a plaintiff's
general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical
personality or any other general disqualifications of a party."

Jurisprudence provides that an unregistered association, having no separate juridical personality,

lacks the capacity to sue in its own name. In this case, Alliance admitted that it has no juridical
personality, considering the revocation of its SEC Certificate of Registration and its failure to
register with the HLURB as a homeowner's association. Nevertheless, Alliance insists that the
petition should not be dismissed because it was filed by the members of the Board of Trustees in
their own personal capacities. this case falls under the exceptions to the doctrines of exhaustion
of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, the Court is still constrained to dismiss the
petition due to Alliance's lack of legal capacity to sue.

============================================================================

#35. ZOSA V. CONSILIUM INC. (SEPT 19, 2018)

G.R. No. 196765, September 19, 2018

FRANCIS M. ZOSA, NORA M. ZOSA AND MANUEL M. ZOSA, JR., Petitioners, v. CONSILIUM, INC.,
Respondent.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, C.J.

FACTS: On January 17, 2001, a complaint for "Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale and TCT No.
T-113390, and Quieting of Title" was filed before the RTC by herein petitioners Francis M. Zosa,
Nora M. Zosa and Manuel M. Zosa, Jr. (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Zosas"), against
Rosario Paypa, Rollyben R. Paypa and Rubi R. Paypa (hereinafter collectively referred to as the
"Paypas").

During the pendency of the aforementioned case, on January 29, 2003, respondent Consilium,
Inc. (Consilium) was allowed to intervene therein on the ground that on November 23, 2000, it
had purchased the subject property in good faith from the Paypas for P1,585,100.00.

In a Decision dated September 27, 2007, the RTC ruled in favor of the Zosas. On October 17, 2007,
Consilium filed a Notice of Appeal, alleging to have received the Decision of the RTC on October
10, 2007. Note, however, that the corresponding appeal fee was paid only on October 31, 2007,
or six days from October 25, 2007, the last day to perfect an appeal.

The Zosas opposed the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the appeal was "filed out of time,
while the Notice of Appeal was filed on October 17, 2007, the docket/appeal fee was paid only
on October 31, 2007 which was beyond the period to file the Notice of Appeal. In Consilium's
Comment to the Zosas' Opposition (to the Notice of Appeal), it explained that such omission,
however, was sheer inadvertence. RTC resolved to deny due course thereto in an Order.
Consilium moved for the reconsideration of the above-mentioned Order, and prayed for the
relaxation of the rules of procedure. The motion was set for hearing on February 22, 2008 per the
Notice of Hearing stated in the said motion.

The Zosas, however, sought the outright denial of Consilium's motion for reconsideration on the
ground that it was set for hearing beyond the 10-day period prescribed in Section 5, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court, as amended. Thereafter, Consilium elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The
appellate court held that the "liberal application of the Rules is warranted since the rights of the
parties were not affected even if the hearing of said motion [for reconsideration] was originally
set by petitioner beyond the 10-day period required by the Rules of Court, as amended

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals Erred In Holding That The Regional Trial Court
Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion In Not Acting On Respondent's Motion For Reconsideration
For Being Filed In Violation Of Section 5 Of Rule 15;

RULING: The petition is meritorious.

Fundamental is the rule that the provisions of the law and the rules concerning the manner and
period of appeal are mandatory and jurisdictional requirements; hence, cannot simply be
discounted under the guise of liberal construction. But even if we were to apply liberality as
prayed for, it is not a magic word that once invoked will automatically be considered as a
mitigating circumstance in favor of the party invoking it. There should be an effort on the part of
the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her
failure to comply with the rules. The Zosas maintain that the Court of Appeals erred when it held
that the lack of notice of hearing is cured when the trial court "promptly resets a hearing with a
notice to the parties." They argue that the defect is not about the lack of notice of hearing but
the fact that the motion was set for hearing beyond the 10-day period required under Section 5
of the Rules of Court, as amended.

============================================================================

#36. DUQUE V. YU (FEBRUARY 19, 2018)

G.R. No. 226130, February 19, 2018

LILIA S. DUQUE AND HEIRS OF MATEO DUQUE, NAMELY: LILIA S. DUQUE, ALMA D. BALBONA,
PERPETUA D. HATA, MARIA NENITA D. DIENER, GINA D. YBAÑEZ, AND GERVACIO S.
DUQUE,Petitioners, v. SPOUSES BARTOLOME D. YU, JR. AND JULIET O. YU AND DELIA DUQUE
CAPACIO, Respondents.

VELASCO JR., J.

FACTS: Spouses Duque were the lawful owners of a 7,000sqm lot in Lambug, Badian, Cebu. The
Spouses Duque allegedly donated such parcel of land to their daughter Delia D. Capacio. Capacio
then sold a portion of it(2,745sqm) to Spouses Yu.

With that, Spouses Duque lodged a Verified Complaint for Declaration of Non-Existence and
Nullity of a Deed of Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale and Cancellation of TD (Complaint)
against the respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu, docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-BAR-469, claiming that the signature in the Deed of Donation was forged. Spouses
Duque then prayed (1) to declare the Deeds of Donation and of Absolute Sale null and void; (2) to
cancel TD No. 01-07-05886 in the name of respondent Juliet Yu (married to respondent
Bartolome Yu); and (3) to revive TD No. 05616 in the name Mateo Duque (married to petitioner
Lilia Duque).
Respondent Capacio admitted that falsification of the Deed of Donation. Respondents Spouses Yu,
for their part, refuted Spouses Duque's personality to question the genuineness of the Deed of
Absolute Sale for it was their daughter who forged the Deed of Donation. They even averred that
Spouses Duque's action was already barred by prescription. Repondent filed a motion for
admission of the documents, real estate mortgage, deed of donation, contract of lease, tax
declarations, deed of absolute sale. The petitioner were ordered to file a comment. This
prompted for the court to pronounced that they have admitted the same.

Spouses Yu filed a Demurrer to Evidence in view of the pronouncement which the Spouses Duque
vehemently opposed. The Demurrer to Evidence was granted and thereby dismissed the
complaint by the Spouses Duque.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners' failure to reply to the request for admission is tantamount to
an implied admission of the authenticity and genuineness of the documents subject thereof

HELD: 1. NO. The respondents served the request for admission on the petitioners to admit the
genuineness and authenticity of the Deed of Donation, among other documents. But as pointed
out by petitioners, the matters and documents being requested to be admitted have already
been denied and controverted in the previous pleading, that is, Verified Complaint for
Declaration of Non-Existence and Nullity of a Deed of Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale and
Cancellation of TD. In fact, the forgery committed in the Deed of Donation was the very essence
of that Complaint, where it was alleged that being a forged document, the same is invalid and
without force and legal effect. Petitioners, therefore, need not reply to the request for admission.
Consequently, they cannot be deemed to have admitted the Deed of Donation's genuineness and
authenticity for their failure to respond thereto

In support thereof, respondents Spouses Yu even utilized the questioned document report of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory Office certifying that the signature in
the Deed of Donation is a forgery. Thus, it is then safe to conclude that their request for
admission is a sham. Having said that there was no implied admission of the genuineness and
authenticity of the Deed of Donation, this Court, thus, holds that it was also an error for the trial
court to grant the demurrer to evidence.

With this Court's denial of the demurrer to evidence, it will now proceed to rule on the merits of
the Complaint solely on the basis of the petitioners' evidence on record. Such Deed of Donation
being falsified, Capacio is not the owner of the lot. As such, it cannot be the source of respondent
Capacio's transferable right over a portion of the subject property. Being a patent nullity,
respondent Capacio could not validly transfer a portion of the subject property in favor of
respondents Spouses Yu under the principle of "Nemo dat quod non habet," which means "one
cannot give what one does not have."

============================================================================

#37. LAGON V. VELASCO (FEBRUARY 14, 2018)

GR No. 208424, Feb 14, 2018

ARMANDO LAGON v. DENNIS A. VELASCO

Reyes, JR. J

FACTS: Sometime in December 2000, Lagon obtained a cash loan from private respondent Gabriel
Dizon (Dizon), in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 300,000.00). In payment
thereof, Lagon issued PCIBank Check No. 0064914, postdated January 12, 2001, in an equal
amount. However, when Dizon presented the check for payment, it was dishonored for being
Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.

Consequently, Dizon sent a Letter dated May 6, 2011 to Lagon, demanding the payment Php
300,000.00. However, Lagon refused to pay. On June 6, 2011, Dizon field a Complaint for Sum of
Money, Damages and Attorney's Fees against Lagon. On October 8, 2011, Lagon filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of prescription. In response, Dizon filed an Opposition with Motion to
Amend Complaint. In his Amended Complaint, Dizon averred that he sent two demand letters,
one dated March 23, 2010 and another dated May 6, 2011. Both letters were sent through JRS
Express. On February 29, 2012, Lagon filed his Answer asserting that he has paid the loan.
Meanwhile, during the preliminary conference, the parties were directed to file their respective
pre-trial briefs within five (5) days from receipt of the trial court's order. Thereafter, on August 9,
2012, Judge Velasco issued a Pre-Trial Conference Order.

At the initial trial on June 6, 2013, neither of the parties submitted their judicial affidavits or
those of their witnesses. Hence, Judge Velasco issued the assailed Order[10] requiring the parties
to submit their respective judicial affidavits five (5) days before the trial.[11]The essential portion
of the Order dated June 6, 2013, reads:

In the interest of justice and equity, the plaintiff is hereby allowed to submit his Judicial Affidavits.
But for failure of the plaintiff to submit Judicial Affidavits in due time, the Court imposed a fine of
Three Thousand pesos (Php 3,000.00) and to be reimbursed an amount of Five Thousand pesos
(Php 5,000.00) to the defendant's expenses in coming to Court within five (5) days from today.

The parties are hereby directed to submit Judicial Affidavits of their witnesses within five (5) days
prior to the trial dates. Otherwise, the Court will no longer admit the same. Lagon received a
copy of the same Order on June 26, 2013. On June 27, 2013, Lagon filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. In his Motion, Lagon requested that he be allowed to submit the judicial
affidavit of his witnesses after the plaintiff shall have adduced his evidence. Lagon claimed that
Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, which mandates the submission by both parties of their
judicial affidavits before the pre-trial conference is violative of his right to due process, hence
unconstitutional. On July 10, 2013, Judge Velasco issued the assailed Order denying Lagon's
Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Judge Velasco opined that "the requirement of the
submission of judicial affidavits of witnesses, not later than 5 days before the pre-trial or
preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing, under Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule is
not violative of Lagon's right to due process. Dissatisfied with the ruling, Lagon sought direct
recourse to this Court by filing the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, which requires a defendant to
adduce his testimony and that of his witnesses by judicial affidavits, and submit his documentary
evidence before the pre-trial or preliminary conference, offends his right to due process of law

HELD: The Petition for Certiorari was dismissed.

The parties are required to file the Judicial Affidavits of their witnesses, in lieu of their direct
testimonies. Specifically, Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule ordains that:

Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies. - (a) The
parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, personally or by licensed courier
service, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled
hearing with respect to motions and incidents, the following:

The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such witnesses' direct
testimonies; and

The parties' documentary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to the judicial
affidavits and marked as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant or the plaintiff,
and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the case of the respondent or the defendant.

(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or object evidence in his
possession, he may, after the same has been identified, marked as exhibit, and authenticated,
warrant in his judicial affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to such affidavit is a
faithful copy or reproduction of that original. In addition, the party or witness shall bring the
original document or object evidence for comparison during the preliminary conference with the
attached copy, reproduction, or pictures, failing which the latter shall not be admitted.

This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of the original when
allowed by existing rules.

Incidentally, the failure to comply with Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule shall result to a
waiver of the submission of the required judicial affidavits and exhibits. However, the court may,
upon valid cause shown, allow the late submission of the judicial affidavit, subject to specific
penalties, constituting a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos (Php 1,000.00), nor more than
Five Thousand Pesos (Php 5,000.00), at the discretion of the court.

Despite the noble purpose of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, Lagon comes to this Court bewailing the
same procedural regulation as violative of his right to due process of law, in that it "forces" him to
present evidence even before the plaintiff has rested his case, apparently in violation of the rule
on demurrer to evidence.

Juxtaposing the Judicial Affidavit Rule with that of the rule on demurrer to evidence, it becomes
all too apparent that there exists no conflict between them. Similar to the judicial affidavit, a
demurrer to evidence likewise abbreviates judicial proceedings, and serves as an instrument for
the expeditious termination of an action. It is as "an objection or exception by one of the
parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue." All
that it grants is an option to a defendant, to seek the dismissal of the case, should he believe that
the plaintiff failed to establish his right to relief. The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the
plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict. Thus, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence
raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient proof to sustain the plaintiff's complaint.

Clearly, both the Judicial Affidavit Rule and Demurrer to Evidence can co-exist harmoniously as
tools for a more efficient and speedy administration of trial procedures. On the one hand, the
Judicial Affidavit Rule simply dispenses with the direct testimony, thereby reducing the time at
which a case stands for trial, in the same way that the Demurrer to Evidence abbreviates
proceedings by allowing the defendant to seek for an early resolution of the case should the
plaintiff be unable to sufficiently prove his complaint. These rules do not conflict, and when used
hand in hand will lead to an efficient administration of the trial.

Moreover, by no stretch of the imagination may it be concluded that Lagon was deprived of due
process of law. There is nothing in the provisions of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, which prohibits a
defendant from fililng a demurrer to evidence, if he truly believes that the evidence adduced by
the plaintiff is insufficient. Besides, in the resolution of the demurrer to evidence, only the
evidence presented by the plaintiff shall be considered and weighed by the Court.

Furthermore, the fact that the defendant is mandated to submit his judicial affidavit prior to the
trial and before the plaintiff has rested his case is not a cumbersome requirement or a
circumvention of due process. On the contrary, this is necessary for the orderly administration of
the proceeding before the courts. It must be remembered that in as early as the pre-trial
conference, the defendant is already required to submit a pre-trial brief, where he is then tasked
to state the number and names of his witnesses, as well as the substance of their testimonies;
the issues to be tried and resolved; and the documents or exhibits to be presented and the
purpose thereof. Thus, the defendant is already required in this early stage of the proceedings to
formulate his defense and plan his strategy to counter the plaintiffs complaint. There is nothing
too tedious or burdensome in requiring the submission of the judicial affidavit. In fact, this would
even help the defendant in preparing his opposing arguments against the plaintiff.

All told, the Court has always emphasized that "procedural rules should be treated with utmost
respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy
the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice."

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#38. REP V. TIPAY (FEBRUARY 14, 2018)

[G.R. No. 209527. February 14, 2018.]

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. VIRGIE (VIRGEL) L. TIPAY, respondent.

FACTS: In a petition, Virgel sought the correction of several entries in his birth certificate.
Attached to the petition are 2 copies of his birth certificate, respectively issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental and the NSO. Both copies reflect his gender
as “FEMALE” and his first name as “Virgie”. It further appears that the month and day of birth
in the local civil registrar’s copy was black, while the NSO-issued birth certificate indicates that
he was born on May 12, 1976. Virgel alleged that these entries are erroneous, and sought the
correction of his birth certificate as follows: (a) his gender, from “FEMALE” to “MALE”; (b) his
first name, from “VIRGIE” TO “VIRGEL”; and (c) his month and date of birth to “FEBRUARY
25, 1976.”

There was no opposition to the petition. Soon after, the RTC rendered its Decision
granting Virgel’s petition.

From this decision, the Republic filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due course
by the trial court. The Republic, through the OSG, argued that the change of Virgel’s name from
Virgie should have been made through a proceeding under Rule 103, and not Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. This argument was premised on the assumption that the summary procedure
under Rule 108 is confined to the correction of clerical or innocuous errors, which excludes one’
s name or date of birth. Since the petition lodged with the RTC was not filed pursuant to Rule 103
of the Rules of Court, the republic asserted that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case.
 The CA thereafter denied the Republic’s appeal and upheld the trial court’s decision.
In its assailed Decision, the CA ruled in favor of Virgel, stating that while the correction of the
entry on his gender is considered a substantial change, it is nonetheless within the jurisdiction of
the trial court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court govern the procedure for the correction of
substantial changes in the civil registry.

HELD: Yes. It is true that initially, the changes that may be corrected under the summary
procedure of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are clerical or harmless errors. Errors that affect the
civil status, citizenship or nationality of a person, are considered substantial errors that were
beyond the purview of the rule.

Jurisprudence on this matter late developed, giving room for the correction of substantial errors.
The Court ultimately recognized that substantial or controversial alterations in the civil registry
are allowed in an action filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as long as the issues are
properly threshed out in an appropriate adversarial proceeding – effectively limiting the
application of the summary procedure to the correction of clerical or innocuous errors.

Evidently, the Republic incorrectly argued that the petition for correction under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is limited to changes in entries containing harmless and innocuous errors. Most
importantly, with the enactment of RA No. 9048 in 2001, the local civil registrars, or the Consul
General as the case may be, are now authorized to correct clerical or typographical errors in the
civil registry, or make changes in the first name or nickname, without need of a judicial order. This
law provided an administrative recourse for the correction of clerical or typographical errors,
essentially leaving the substantial corrections in the civil registry to Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

============================================================================

#39. FRIAS V. ALCAYDE (JULY 28, 2018)

BOBIE ROSE FRIAS vs. ROLANDO ALCAYDE

GR# 194262, Feb. 28, 2018

TIJAM, J.:
DOCTRINE: "Due process dictates that jurisdiction over the person of a defendant can only be
acquired by the courts after a strict compliance with the rules on the proper service of
summons."

FACTS: On December 5, 2003, Bobie Frias (Petitioner), lessor and Rolando Alcayde (Respondent),
lessee entered into a contract of lease involving a residential house and lot in Ayala Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa City for a period of 1 year with a monthly rental of P30,000. Alcayde refused
to perform his contractual obligations. This prompted Frias to file a complaint for unlawful
detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). The process server tried to personally serve
the summons to Alcayde but to no avail. Through substituted service, summons was served upon
Alcayde’s caretaker.

On July 26, 2006, the MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of Frias and ordered
Alcayde to vacate the premises and pay Frias the accrued rentals (P30,000) at 12% legal interest
plus P10,000 in attorney’s fees.

On July 25, 2007, Alcayde filed a petition for Annulment of Judgment with a Prayer
for Issuance of TRO and/or Injuction, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) averred that the decision
of the MeTC does not bind him since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person

A copy of the petition for annulment of judgment was allegedly served to Frias.
Based on the Officer’s Return, Sheriff cause the “service of a Notice of Raffle and Summons
together with a copy of the complaints and its annexes to Frias through Sally Gonzales, the
Secretary of Frias’ legal counsel, Atty. Daniel Frias.

On September 25, 2007, Alcayde filed an Ex-Parte Motion, to declare Frias in

default on the ground that despite her receipt of the summons, no pleading was filed.

On October 3, 2007, Frias filed a Special Appearance/Submission (Jursdictional

Infirmity Raised) alleging among others that Alcayde’s Motion to Revive Relief re: Issuance of a
TRO merits neither judicial cognizance nor consideration.

On December 3, 2007, the RTC issued an Order granting Alcayde’s prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the MeTC’s decision. The RTC ruled that
summons and copies of the petition and its attachments were not duly served upon Frias, either
personally or through substituted service in accordance with the Rules. There is no proof that Ms.
Gonzales or Atty. Frias was authorized by Frias to receive summons on her befalf.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
2. Whether or not special appearance to question the court’s jurisdiction is considered
voluntary appearance.

3. Whether or not petition for annulment of judgment was the proper remedy.

HELD:

1. No, there was neither a valid service of summons in person nor a valid substituted
service of summons over the person of the petitioner. The preferred mode of service of summons
is personal service. To warrant substitute service of summons and copy of the complaint, the
serving officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only after the
attempt at personal service has become impossible within a reasonable time may the officer
resort to substituted service. The requisites of substituted service are as follows:

Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service – The party relying on substituted service or the
Sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by
the Sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of 1 month which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. Several attempts means at
least 3 tries, preferably on at least 2 different dates and Sheriff must state why such efforts were
unsuccessful;

Specific Details in the Return;

A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion – This means a person who has attained the age of full
legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the
importance of a summons. Discretion is the ability to make decisions which represent a
responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may
presupposed;

A Competent Persona in Charge.

The Officers Return revealed that no diligent efforts were exerted and no positive step was taken
to locate and serve the summons personally on the petitioner. Petitioner was not present at her
given address. Sheriff immediately resorted to substituted service of summons by proceeding to
the office of Atty. Frias, petitioners counsel. Sheriff failed to show that she made several attempts
to effect personal service fir at least 3 time on at least 2 different dates.

Without specifying the detail if the circumstance of the efforts exerted to serve to the summons,
a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with
the rules of substituted service.

3. No. A party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s
jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority. Records
show that the petitioner never received any copy of the the respondent's petition to annul the
final and executory judgment of the MeTC in the unlawful detainer case. Petitioner never faltered
in declaring that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person, due to invalid and
improper service of summons. When the petitioner filed those pleadings and motions, it was
only in a "special" character, conveying the fact that her appearance before the trial court was
with a qualification, i.e., to defy the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over her person. While it is true that
an appearance in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, the appearance must
constitute a positive act on the part of the litigant manifesting an intention to submit to the
court's jurisdiction. For purposes of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the
Rules require the service of summons and not of any other court processes. The jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner was never vested with the RTC despite the mere filing of the petition
for annulment of judgment. The manner of substituted service by the process server was
apparently invalid and ineffective

3. No, Petition for annulment of judgment is an improper remedy. In this case, it is

evident that respondent failed to interpose an appeal rendering the same final and executor. It is
doctrinal that when a decision has acquired finality, the same becomes immutable and
unalterable. By this principle of immutability of judgments, the RTC is now precluded from
further examining the MeTC Decision and to further dwell on petitioner's perceived errors.

============================================================================

#40. HONGKONG BANK V. HSBC (FEBRUARY 28, 2018)

HONGKONG BANK INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION v. HONGKONG

[ GR No. 218390, Feb 28, 2018 ]

The Case
For consideration is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
questioning the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated October 23, 2014
and May 21, 2015, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 130798. The challenged rulings sustained the
validity of the external credit check as a condition before respondent could grant the application
for salary loans of petitioner's members. This is notwithstanding the non-mention of the said
condition in the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

The Facts

In 2001, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued the Manual of Regulations for Banks (MoRB).
Respondent Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC), on March 12, 2003,
submitted its Financial Assistance Plan to the BSP for approval. The Plan allegedly contained a
credit-checking proviso stating, "repayment defaults on existing loans and adverse information
on outside loans will be considered in the evaluation of loan applications." The BSP approved the
Plan on May 5, 2003. Said Plan was later amended thrice, all of which amendments were
approved by the BSP.

Meanwhile, petitioner Hong Kong Bank Independent Labor Union (HBILU), the incumbent
bargaining agent of HSBC's rank-and-file employees, entered into a CBA with the bank covering
the period from April 1, 2010 to March 31, 2012. And when the CBA was about to expire, the
parties started negotiations for a new one to cover the period from April 1, 2012 to March 31,
2017. During the said negotiations, HSBC proposed amendments to the Article XI of the CBA;
allegedly to align the wordings of the CBA with its BSP­ approved Plan. Particularly, HSBC
proposed the deletion of Article XI, Section 4 (Credit Ratio) of the CBA, and the amendment of
Sections 1 to 3 of the same Article. HBILU vigorously objected to the proposed amendments,
claiming that their insertions would curtail its members' availment of salary loans. This, according
to the Union, violates the existing exceptions set forth in BSP Circular 423, Series of 2004, and
Section X338.3 of the MoRB. In view of HBILU's objection, HSBC withdrew its proposed
amendments and, consequently, Article XI remained unchanged. Despite the withdrawal of the
proposal, HSBC sent an e-mail to its employees on April 20, 2012 concerning the enforcement of
the Plan, including the Credit Checking provisions thereof.

Thereafter, in September 2012, HBILU member Vince Mananghaya applied for a loan under the
provisions of Article XI of the CBA. His first loan application in March 2012 was approved, but
adverse findings from the external checks on his credit background resulted in the denial of his
September application. HBILU then raised the denial as a grievance issue with the National
Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB). It argued that the imposition of an additional requirement
—the external credit checking prior to approval of any loan application under Article XI of the
CBA—is not sanctioned under the CBA. The Union emphasized that under the terms of Article XI,
there is no such requirement and that it cannot, therefore, be unilaterally imposed by HSBC.

Justifying its denial of the loan application, HSBC countered that the external credit check
conducted in line with Mananghaya's loan application was merely an implementation of the
BSP-approved Plan. The adoption of the Plan, HSBC stressed, is a condition sine qua non for any
loan grant under Section X338 of the MoRB. Moreover, the Credit Check policy has been in place
since 2003, and is a sound practice in the banking industry to protect the interests of the public
and preserve confidence in banks.

NCMB-PVA Decision

On May 17, 2013, the Panel held that herein respondent, as an employer, has the right to issue
and implement guidelines for the availment of loan accommodations under the CBA as part of its
management prerogative. The repeated use of the term "qualified employees" in Article XI of the
CBA was deemed indicative of room for the adoption of further guidelines in the availment of the
benefits thereunder. The Panel also agreed that HSBC's Plan is not a new policy as it has already
been approved by the BSP as early as 2003. Thus, the Panel ruled that the salary loan provisions
under Article XI of the CBA must be read in conjunction with the provisions of the Plan.

HSBC's adoption of the Plan was not done for any whimsical or arbitrary reason, but because
the bank was constrained to comply with Section X338 of the MoRB. As a banking institution,
HSBC cannot divorce itself from the regulatory powers of the BSP. Observance of Section X338 of
the MoRB was then necessary before the bank could have been allowed to extend loan
accommodations to its officers and employees.

CA Decision

The CA sustained the findings and conclusions of the NCMB-PVA in TOTO on the ratiocination
that HSBC was merely complying with Section X338 of the MoRB when it submitted the Plan to
BSP. When BSP, in turn, approved the said Plan, HSBC became legally bound to enforce its
provisions, including the conduct of external credit checks on its loan applicants. The appellate
court further ruled that the Plan should be deemed incorporated in the CBA because it is a
regulatory requirement of BSP without which the salary loan provisions of the CBA are rendered
inoperative.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA thru its May 21, 2015
Resolution, HBILU now seeks recourse from this Court.

The Issues

Whether or not the Hon. Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and the Hon. Court of Appeals decisions
and resolutions are tainted with grave abuse of discretion and it showed patent errors in the
appreciation of facts, which led to wrong conclusions of law.

Supreme Court Ruling

The petition is meritorious. Hon. Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and the Hon. Court of Appeals err
on their decisions and the resolutions are tainted with grave abuse of discretion and it showed
patent errors in the appreciation of facts, which led to wrong conclusions of law. A collective
bargaining agreement or CBA is the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization
and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of
employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear
and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is
mandated by the express policy of the law.

In the present controversy, it is clear from the arguments and evidence submitted that the Plan
was never made part of the CBA. As a matter of fact, HBILU vehemently rejected the Plan's
incorporation into the agreement. Due to this lack of consensus, the bank withdrew its proposal
and agreed to the retention of the original provisions of the CBA. The subsequent
implementation of the Plan's external credit check provisions in relation to employee loan
applications under Article XI of the CBA was then an imposition solely by HSBC. In this respect,
this Court is of the view that tolerating HSBC's conduct would be tantamount to allowing a
blatant circumvention of Article 253 of the Labor Code. It would contravene the express
prohibition against the unilateral modification of a CBA during its subsistence and even thereafter
until a new agreement is reached. It would unduly license HSBC to add, modify, and ultimately
further restrict the grant of Salary Loans beyond the terms of the CBA by simply adding stringent
requirements in its Plan, and having the said Plan approved by BSP in the guise of compliance
with the MoRB.

============================================================================

#41. INTRAMUROS ADM. V. OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION DEV’T COMPANY (MARCH 7, 2018)

G.R. No. 196795; March 07, 2018

INTRAMUROS ADMINISTRATION v. OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE: When litis pendentia or res judicata does not exist, neither can forum shopping exist.

FACTS: Intramuros leased certain real properties of the national government, which it
administered to Offshore Construction. Three (3) properties were subjects of Contracts of Lease
and were leased for five (5) years. All their lease contracts also made reference to an August 20,
1998 memorandum of stipulations, which included a provision for lease renewals every five (5)
years upon the parties' mutual agreement. Offshore Construction occupied and introduced
improvements in the leased premises. However, Intramuros and the Department of Tourism
halted the projects due to Offshore Construction's non-conformity with Presidential Decree No.
1616, which required 16th to 19th centuries' Philippine-Spanish architecture in the area.
Consequently, Offshore Construction filed a complaint with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order against Intramuros and the Department of Tourism before the
Manila RTC.

Eventually, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement where they affirmed the validity of
the two (2) lease contracts but terminated the one (over Revellin de Recoletos). The Compromise
Agreement retained the five (5)-year period of the existing lease contracts and stated only certain
areas that may be occupied by Offshore Construction. During the lease period, Offshore
Construction failed to pay its obligation despite several demand letters. Intramuros tolerated the
continuing occupation, hoping that Offshore Construction would pay its arrears. As of July 31,
2004, these arrears allegedly totaled P6,762,153.70.

To settle its arrears, Offshore Construction proposed to pay the Department of Tourism's monthly
operational expenses for lights and sound equipment, electricity, and performers at the Baluarte
Plano Luneta de Sta. Isabel. Intramuros and the Department of Tourism accepted the offer, and
the parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement covering the period of August 15, 2004 to
August 25, 2005. However, Offshore Construction continued to fail to pay its arrears.

Intramuros filed a Complaint for Ejectment. The MTC granted Offshore’s motion and dismissed
the case on the ground of forum shopping. First, it pointed out that there were two (2) pending
cases at the time Intramuros filed its complaint: one for specific performance filed by Offshore
Construction against Intramuros, and another for interpleader against Offshore Construction and
Intramuros filed by 4H Intramuros, Inc. The Metropolitan Trial Court found that the complaint
was similar with those in the specific performance and interpleader cases. It also found that the
specific performance case was anchored on Offshore Construction's rights under the
Compromise Agreement.

Intramuros appealed with the Regional Trial Court, which affirmed the Municipal Trial Court in
toto. Thus, Intramuros filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, arguing that the issue in the specific performance case was whether or not
Intramuros should offset the rentals in arrears from Offshore Construction's expenses in
continuing the WOW Philippines Project; meanwhile, the issue in the interpleader case was to
determine which between Intramuros and Offshore Construction was the rightful lessor of Puerta
de Isabel II.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Intramuros Administration committed forum shopping when it filed its
ejectment complaint despite the pending cases for specific performance and interpleader.

2. Whether or not the Interpleader suit can be res judicata on the ejectment suit.

HELD:

1. No. In its October 19, 2010 Order, the Metropolitan Trial Court found that petitioner
committed forum shopping when it failed to disclose that there were two (2) pending cases in
other trial courts concerning the same parties and similar causes of action. These two (2) cases
were Civil Case No. 08- 119138 for specific performance filed by respondent against petitioner;
and SP CA Case No. 10-123257 for interpleader filed by 4H Intramuros. Both cases were pending
with the Manila Regional Trial Court. The Metropolitan Trial Court found that if it decides
petitioner's Complaint for Ejectment, its ruling would conflict with any resolution in the specific
performance and interpleader cases, since the same contracts were involved in all three (3) cases.
It found that the parties were the same and the reliefs prayed for were the same.

Forum shopping is the practice of resorting to multiple fora for the same relief, to increase the
chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. In Spouses Reyes v. Spouses Chung:

It has been jurisprudentially established that forum shopping exists when a party avails himself of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other
courts.

The test to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in another. Simply put, when litis pendentia or res judicata does not exist, neither can
forum shopping exist.

The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing
the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment
in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. On the
other hand, the elements of res judicata, also known as bar by prior judgment, are: (a) the former
judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first
and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

As observed by the Metropolitan Trial Court, there is an identity of parties in the specific
performance and interpleader cases, and the Complaint for Ejectment. However, there is no
identity of asserted rights or reliefs prayed for, and a judgment in any of the three (3) cases will
not amount to res judicata in the two others. A final judgment in the specific performance case
will not affect the outcome of the ejectment case. As pointed out by petitioner, respondent's
right to possess the leased premises is founded initially on the Contracts of Lease and, upon their
expiration, on petitioner's tolerance in hopes of payment of outstanding arrears. The July 27,
2004 Memorandum of Agreement subject of the specific performance case cannot be the source
of respondent's continuing right of possession, as it expressly stated there that the offsetting was
only for respondent's outstanding arrears as of July 31, 2004. Any favorable judgment compelling
petitioner to comply with its obligation under this agreement will not give new life to the expired
Contracts of Lease, such as would repel petitioner's unlawful detainer complaint.
2. No. A judgment in the Complaint for Interpleader will likewise not be res judicata against the
ejectment complaint. The plaintiff in the interpleader case, 4H Intramuros, allegedly representing
the tenants occupying Puerta de Isabel II, does not expressly disclose in its Complaint for
Interpleader the source of its right to occupy those premises. However, it can be determined
from petitioner's Answer and from respondent's Memorandum that the members of 4H
Intramuros are respondent's sublessees. A sublessee cannot invoke a superior right over that of
the sublessor. A judgment of eviction against respondent will affect its sublessees since the
latter's right of possession depends entirely on that of the former. A complaint for interpleader
by sublessees cannot bar the recovery by the rightful possessor of physical possession of the
leased premises. Since neither the specific performance case nor the interpleader case
constituted forum shopping by petitioner, the Metropolitan Trial Court erred in dismissing its
Complaint for Ejectmemt.

============================================================================

#42. SPS DAVIS V. DAVIS (MARCH 7, 2018)

SPOUSES LARRY AND FLORA DAVIS vs. SPOUSES FLORENCIO AND LUCRESIA DAVIS, Respondents.

VELASCO JR., J.:

FACTS: On January 29, 1991, the petitioners, as vendees, and the herein respondents Spouses
Florencio and Lucresia Davis, as vendors, entered into a Contract to Sell over a 500-square meter
lot in Banga, Meycauayan, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-226201 (M)
(subject property) for a consideration of P500,000. As agreed upon, the petitioners gave the
respondents the sum of P200,000 as downpayment while the remaining balance of P300,000 was
made payable in 12 equal monthly installments. The respondents agreed to execute the
corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale upon full payment of the purchase price. After full payment
thereof and despite repeated demands, however, the respondents failed and refused to execute
the Deed of Absolute Sale to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to initiate a Complaint for
Specific Performance and Damages (with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order) against the former before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan. A notice of lis pendens was then annotated at the back of TCT No. T-226201 (M). In
their Answer, the respondents admitted receipt of the P200,000 downpayment but denied
receipt of the balance of P300,000. They also insisted that the petitioners have no cause of action
against them.

The RTC Malolos (Br. 78) ruled in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion reads:
this Court resolves the instant case in favor of plaintiffs Larry and Flora Davis and against
defendants Florencio and Lucresia Davis ordering the aforesaid defendants to:

1. Execute the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of herein plaintiffs covering the 500-square meter
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-226201, and cause the necessary registration
thereof to the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan;

2. Pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs the following amounts, to wit:

a. P50,000.00 as moral damages;

b. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

c. P40,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses;

3. Pay, jointly and severally, the costs of suit.

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the aforesaid ruling in its Decision dated August 31, 2004,
which became final and executory on October 2, 2004.7

Accordingly, on May 11, 2005, the petitioners moved for the execution of the decision of the
RTC Malolos (Br. 78), which was granted. A writ of execution was subsequently issued.
Unfortunately, this writ was not implemented primarily because the respondents already sold the
subject property to Carmina Erana, Spouses Hector and Maria Victoria Erana, Efren Erana, and
Spouses Ma. Lourdes and Romie Aquino, who were issued new TCT No. 421671 (M). But the
notice of lis pendens was still carried over to the new title. The petitioners moved for the
cancellation of TCT No. 421671 (M) and for the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issue a new
certificate of title in their favor but this was denied on the ground that the new registered owners
of the subject property were not privies to the case.

The petitioners were, thus, compelled to file an action for annulment of title and document
against the new registered owners of the subject property before Br. 15, RTC Malolos,. the RTC
Malolos (Br. 15) ruled in favor of the petitioners and declared TCT No. 421671 (M) as null and
void and restored TCT No. T-226201 (M). This Decision became final and executory on July 23,
2012; thus, the petitioners moved for its execution, which was granted. TCT No. 421671 (M) in
the names of Carmina Erana, Spouses Hector and Maria Victoria Erana, Efren Erana, and Spouses
Ma. Lourdes and Romie Aquino was cancelled and TCT No. T-226201 (M) in the names of the
respondents was restored.

With this in view, the petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion on July 13,
2016 for the implementation of the decision of the RTC Malolos (Br. 78) by issuing a writ of
execution to direct the respondents to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor, or in the
absence of the former, to appoint the clerk of court to execute the same pursuant to Section 10
(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In their Comment, the respondents opposed arguing that the
said Decision cannot be enforced by a mere motion or by an action for revival of judgment since
10 years had already lapsed from the time it became final. In their Reply, the petitioners insisted
that the period within which to move for the execution of the aforesaid Decision was deemed
suspended with their filing of an action for annulment of title and document involving the subject
property before the RTC Malolos (Br. 15) to enable a complete and effective relief in their favor.

The RTC Malolos (Br. 78) denied the petitioners' Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion
explaining that the consequent filing of annulment of title involving the subject property before
Br. 15 does not toll the running of the period. The writ of execution dated June 17, 2005 was not
served on the respondents; thus, the February 13, 1998 Decision of Br. 78 remained
unimplemented/unexecuted. This is the reason why there is a need for its revival unless barred
by the statute of limitations.17

On certiorari to the CA, the latter, in its first assailed Resolution dated May 22, 2017, dismissed
the petition outright as it suffered from serious infirmities, to wit: (1) petitioners failed to file a
Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated February 7, 2017 pursuant to Section 1, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court; and (2) except for RTC Order dated February 7, 2017, only photocopies
of the pertinent pleadings and documents accompanied the petition, as required by the aforesaid
rule. The CA held that a Motion for Reconsideration is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available to the petitioners to assail the said Order and it is a condition sine qua non before a
Petition for Certiorari may be given due course. The subsequent motion for reconsideration
thereof was denied for lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution dated August 10, 2017.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid rulings of the CA, the petitioners filed the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court,

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court committed a grave and reversible error in dismissing
their Petition for Certiorari notwithstanding that the presiding judge of the RTC Malolos (Br. 78)
was guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its
Order dated February 7, 2017?

HELD: There is merit in the instant petition.

Before delving into the merits of the case, it is imperative to first resolve a procedural issue.

While it is true that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a
Petition for Certiorari, the purpose of which is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case, it is not, however, an ironclad rule as it admits well-defined exceptions. One of these
exceptions is where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court.20 This exception is applicable in the instant case.

To note, in the petitioners' Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion for the implementation of
the February 13, 1998 Decision of the RTC Malolos (Br. 78), as well as in their Reply, they
vehemently insisted that the period within which to file a motion for execution of the said
Decision was deemed suspended with their filing of an action for annulment of title and
document involving the subject property before Br. 15 to enable a complete and effective relief in
their favor. But Br. 78 denied the said Urgent Ex¬-Parte Manifestation and Motion reasoning that
the petitioners' filing of another case involving the subject property before Br. 15 does not toll
the running of the period to file a motion for execution. It is clear therefrom that any motion for
reconsideration would then be superfluous, as Br. 78 had already passed upon and resolved the
very same issue raised in the Petition for Certiorari before the CA. It is, therefore, a reversible
error on the part of the CA to outrightly dismiss the petitioners' petition based on that
procedural ground.

Turning now to the merits of the present petition, this Court rules for the petitioners.

Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a "judgment may be executed within five (5) years
from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such
time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action."
Nonetheless, this Court held that there had been many instances where it allowed execution by
motion even after the lapse of five years, upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one
common denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment
debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage

Here, the decision sought to be enforced became final and executory on October 2, 2004. Upon
the petitioners' motion, a writ of execution was issued in 2005, which was well within the said
five-year period. The writ, however, was repeatedly returned unserved and unimplemented. The
petitioners later discovered the reason therefor. The respondents had sold the subject property
to other parties. Worse, a new title has already been issued to the latter. As such, the petitioners
were compelled to file an action for annulment of title and document against these new
registered owners. Fortunately, the court ruled in petitioners' favor, which ruling became final
and executory on July 23, 2012. Petitioners consequently moved for its execution resulting in the
cancellation of the title in the names of the new registered owners and the restoration of the title
in the names of the respondents. Chronologically speaking, the motion for execution filed on July
13, 2016 was almost 12 years after the decision became final and executory. Petitioners, however,
maintain that the period during which it was compelled to file another action involving the
subject property just to enable a complete and effective relief in their favor should not be taken
into account in the computation of the five-year period.

This Court sustains the petitioners' position. Considering that the delay was not due to the fault
of the petitioners but of the respondents, who deliberately sold the subject property to another
to avoid the outcome of the case filed against them, and which delay incurred to their
benefit/advantage, it is only logical, just, and equitable that the period during which an action for
annulment of title and document was being litigated upon shall be deemed to have interrupted
or tolled the running of the five-year period for enforcement of a judgment by mere motion.
Otherwise, the respondents were rewarded for escaping the fulfilment of their obligation.
Therefore, in computing the time limited for suing out an execution, the time during which
execution is stayed should be excluded, and the time will be extended by any delay occasioned by
the debtor. It bears stressing that the purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for
enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. Moreover, the
statute of limitations has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do so for
causes beyond their control. In the case under consideration, there has been no indication that
the petitioners had ever slept on their rights to have the judgment executed by mere motions
within the reglementary period.

With the foregoing, this Court holds that the CA, indeed, committed a reversible error in
dismissing outright the petitioners' petition despite its being meritorious.

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#43. ENCARNACION V. JOHNSON (JULY 11, 2018)

MATEO ENCARNACION (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, NAMELY: ELSA

DEPLIAN-ENCARNACION, KRIZZA MARIE D. ENCARNACION, LORETA ENCARNACION, CARMELITA E.
STADERMAN, CORAZON S. ENCARNACION, RIZALINA ENCARNACION-PARONG, VICTORIA
ENCARNACION-DULA, MARIA HELEN ENCARNACION-DAY, TERESITA ENCARNACION-MANALANG,
GEORGE ENCARNACION, MARY MITCHIE E. EDWARDSON, ERNESTO ENCARNACION, MATEO
ENCARNACION, JR., AND GRACE WAGNER, Petitioners, v. THOMAS JOHNSON, Respondent.

Ponente: JARDELEZA, J.:

FACTS: On October 6, 2000, respondent filed an action for breach of contract with prayer for
damages and costs against spouses Narvin Edwarson (Narvin) and Mary Mitchie Edwarson (also
known as Mary Encarnacion; hereinafter shall be referred to as Mary), Mateo's daughter, before
the Vancouver Registry of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Canada. Respondent alleged
that Narvin and Mary convinced him to invest his money and personal property in a vehicle
leasing company owned by the couple, which turned out to be a fraudulent business scheme.
The couple neither deposited the promised profits into his account nor gave an accounting or
explanation as to where his funds went.

The Supreme Court of British Columbia gave due course to respondent's action and ordered
summons to be served upon Narvin and Mary. While service of summons was being attempted,
respondent moved that the Supreme Court of British Columbia grant him a Mareva injunction,
with ex juris affect, to restrain Narvin and Mary from dealing with any of their assets except as is
necessary for payment of ordinary living expenses or to carry on their ordinary business. The
Supreme Court of British Columbia issued a Mareva injunction7 and authorized respondent,
among others, to obtain orders in foreign jurisdictions which would permit its enforcement in
those jurisdictions.

the Supreme Court of British Columbia issued a Default Judgment finding Narvin and Mary liable
to respondent in the amount of C$380,431.00 with interest in the amount of C$18,385.56,
C$1,198.04 as cost, and for damages to be determined It ordered Narvin and Mary to each pay
respondent the sum of C$25,000.00 as aggravated damages.

The respondent filed an action for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment with prayer
for the recognition of the Mareva injunction with Branch 72 of the RTC of Olongapo City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 110-0-2003. Respondent also simultaneously petitioned to be allowed
to litigate as a pauper litigant before RTC of Olongapo City. Respondent also simultaneously
petitioned to be allowed to litigate as a pauper litigant. The RTC granted his petition on the
condition that a lien representing the amount of the filing fees, would be imposed upon him in
the event of a favorable judgment.

the RTC issued an Order13 restraining Narvin and Mary from disposing or encumbering their
assets. Thereafter, the RTC ordered the service of summonses by publication upon Narvin and
Mary.15 Despite publication, Narvin and Mary still failed to file their answer. the RTC declared
them in default, and subsequently rendered a judgment in default in accordance with the
judgment of the Supreme Court of British Columbia.

the RTC issued a Writ of Execution authorizing the sheriff to attach sufficient properties
belonging to Narvin and Mary to satisfy the judgment award. On August 3, 2004, the RTC, acting
on respondent's motion to modify the Writ of Execution (to include in the writ the properties
under the name of Mateo whose title and tax declarations were previously annotated), modified
the Writ of Execution.18 It issued an Amended Writ of Execution on September 9, 2004
authorizing the sheriff to include the properties registered in the name of Mateo as subject of the
execution.

Subsequently, 13 levied properties not covered by certificates of title were sold in public auction
wherein respondent placed the highest bid of P10,000,000.00.

Subsequently, Mateo filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim dated January 17, 2005 before the RTC,
which was noted on January 20, 2005,24 claiming that he is the owner of 14 parcels of land
which were being levied. The records, however, are not clear as to what action was taken by the
RTC on Mateo's third party claim.

Mateo filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 100483). He
alleged that he is the owner of 18 properties levied in Civil Case No. 110-0-2003; that he was not
made a party to the case; and that the inclusion of his properties in the levy and execution sale
were made without notice to him.28 Mateo, nonetheless, admitted before the CA that he has no
standing to question the proceedings on the action for recognition and enforcement of judgment.
He asserts that he is only questioning the February 17, 2005 Order which deprived him of his
properties.29

On August 12, 2009, the CA denied the petition. It upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
action of recognition of foreign judgment. By filing an Affidavit of Third Party Claim, Mateo was
deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It also ruled that the
remedy of annulment of judgment is not proper because the February 17, 2005 The CA also said
that even if procedural rules were relaxed, the petition would still fail because it has already been
barred by estoppel and laches due to Mateo's delay in filing the petition despite numerous
opportunities to do so. Lastly, the CA pointed out that Mateo is not the proper party to file the
petition, as he had already transferred the properties to Mary by virtue of a deed of quitclaim on
February 27, 1995. the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether an action for annulment of judgment is the proper remedy of a third-party
claimant of properties levied and sold under execution sale?

HELD: We deny the petition.

An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled is rendered.The ultimate objective of the remedy is "to undo or
set aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to
prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense.” The remedy is provided by Section 1 of Rule 47
of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 1. Coverage. - This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner.

A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may
be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final
resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic
fraud. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack
of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A
petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.

there are requirements that must be complied with before the remedy is granted. First, the
remedy is only available when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the
petitioner. Second, the ground for the remedy is limited to either extrinsic fraud or lack of
jurisdiction Third, the time for availing the remedy is set by the rules: if based on extrinsic fraud,
it must be filed within four years from the discovery of extrinsic fraud; if based on lack of
jurisdiction, it must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel. Fourth, the petition
should be verified and should allege with particularity the facts and law relied upon, and those
supporting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense. In the case at bar,
petitioners failed to show their standing to file the petition.

The proper party to file a petition for annulment of judgment or final order need not be a party
to the judgment sought to be annulled. Nevertheless, it is essential that he is able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that he is adversely affected by the judgment. A person not adversely
affected by a decision in the civil action or proceeding cannot bring an action for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The exception is if he is a successor in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action, or if the action or proceeding is in rem, in
which case the judgment is binding against him.

Considering the foregoing, Mateo is not a party who could be adversely affected by the outcome
of Civil Case No. 110-0-2003. To begin with, he was not an indispensable party to the action for
recognition whose interest in the controversy is such that a final decree will necessarily affect his
rights, as he was not the judgment debtor in the action. Neither is Mateo a real party in
Interest58 in Civil Case No. 110-0-2003, as aptly noted by the CA, having already transferred his
interest in the properties to Mary. Lastly, he is not a successor in interest of Narvin and Mary.

Any alleged irregular implementation of a writ of execution (or resulting levy) cannot be
corrected through the equitable relief of annulment of judgment; the remedy lies elsewhere.
There are, however, other appropriate remedies available to him that he could have resorted to.

Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the remedies of a third-party claimant of an
alleged wrongfully levied property: Based on this section, a third-party claimant has the following
cumulative remedies: (a) he may avail of "terceria" by serving on the levying officer making the
levy an affidavit of his title, and serving also a copy to the judgment creditor; (b) he may file a
case for damages against the bond issued by the judgment debtor within 120 days from the date
of the filing of the bond; and (c) he may file "any proper action" to vindicate his claim to the
property.

============================================================================

#44. IGNACIO V. REYES (JULY 12, 2017)

CASE TITLE: TERESA R. IGNACIO vs. RAMON REYES, FLORENCIO REYES, JR., ROSARIO R. DU and
CARMELITA R. PASTOR

G.R. No. 213192 July 12, 2017

PONENTE: Peralta, J.
FACTS: On July 11, 1967, Angel Reyes and Oliva R. Arevalo filed before the then CFI (intestate
court) a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of their father Florencio Reyes, Sr. The
intestate court appointed Oliva as the special administratrix of the estate of Florencio Sr., and
then as the regular administratrix. Florencio, Jr. replaced Oliva in 1982. Thereafter, Teresa became
the administratrix of the Florencio Sr. estate in 1994.

Teresa executed a lease contract over a parcel of land located at Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City
(Magsaysay property). The intestate court approved the lease contract upon Teresa's motion.
Likewise, the intestate court allowed Teresa to enter into a lease contract over the parcel of land
located at Session Road, Baguio City (Session Road property) and the properties located at
Loakan Road, Baguio City (Loakan and Military Cut-off properties).

On September 25, 2001, herein respondents filed before the RTC of Baguio, three complaints for
partition, annulment of lease contract, accounting and damages with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction against Teresa and the lessees of the subject Baguio properties. The
plaintiffs alleged in their Complaints that, with the exception of the lessees, the parties and the
Florencio Sr. estate own one-tenth (1/10) of each of the subject properties. They claimed that
Teresa misrepresented that the Florencio Sr. estate is the sole owner of the properties and leased
the same to the other parties without their conformity. They averred that, as co-owners, they
have not received their share in the monthly rentals of the properties aforementioned due to
Teresa's failure to duly account for the same.

The Baguio RTC manifested that it shall await a Request Order from the intestate court regarding
the possible distribution of the subject properties. Subsequently, respondents and the others
filed a motion before the intestate court praying for the issuance of an order allowing the
distribution of the heirs' aliquot shares in the co-owned properties' net income, and the partition
of the said properties by the Baguio RTC. However, the intestate court denied the motion.

Thereafter, the respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari which granted the
petition and annulled and set aside the assailed Orders of the intestate court. Upon denial of her
motion for reconsideration, Teresa filed before this Court the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari before the CA is proper

RULING: YES. As a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is valid only
when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising
quasi-judicial functions. In this case, the propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a
remedy depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature.
The assailed Orders denying respondents' motion to allow the distribution of the estate's and
co-owners' shares in the subject properties were interlocutory. This is because such denial was
not a final determination of their alleged co-ownership. In fact, the intestate court merely
asserted its jurisdiction over the properties which were allegedly co-owned with the Florencio Sr.
estate. Jurisprudence teaches that jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special
and limited as it relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.

We note that respondents presented certificates of title of the properties registered under their
names and the Florencio Sr. estate, and their respective shares. As such, they are considered the
owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action.
The co-ownership of the said properties by virtue of the certificates of title is a common issue in
the complaints for partition filed before the Baguio RTC. Thus, the intestate court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it asserted jurisdiction over the subject properties since its
jurisdiction relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons. Any decision that the intestate court would render on the title of the properties would
at best be merely provisional in character, and would yield to a final determination in a separate
action.

============================================================================

#45. ABELLA V. CABANERO (AUGUST 9, 2017)

============================================================================

#46. DOLINA V. VALLECERA (DECEMBER 15, 2010)

CHERRYL B. DOLINA v. GLENN D. VALLECERA

G.R. No. 182367, 15 DECEMBER 2010

ABAD, J.

FACTS: In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the RTC of
Tacloban City for alleged woman and child abuse under RA 9262. In filling out the blanks in the
pro-forma complaint, Dolina added a handwritten prayer for financial support from Vallecera for
their supposed child. She based her prayer on the latter’s Certificate of Live Birth which listed
Vallecera as the child’s father. The petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines,
Vallecera’s employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem
appropriate.

Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolina’s petition was essentially one for
financial support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses; that he was not the
child’s father; that the signature appearing on the child’s Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that
the petition is a harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the child as his and give it
financial support; and that Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering
unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him.

On March 13, 2008 the RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior judgment exists
establishing the filiation of Dolina’s son and granting him the right to support as basis for an
order to compel the giving of such support. Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC
denied it in its April 4, 2008 Order, with an admonition that she first file a petition for compulsory
recognition of her child as a prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the present
petition for review directly with this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for temporary protection
and denied her application for temporary support for her child.

HELD: YES

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262
under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are
victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent
in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that
both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support.

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the
child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her
son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The
child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short,
illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be
duly proved.

Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may
directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated
and resolved.

It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the entire case based
solely on the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolina’s child
since the main issue remains to be the alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina
and her child and whether they are entitled to protection. But of course, this matter is already
water under the bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on review. This omission lends
credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the petition is to obtain support
from Vallecera.

While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and
filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy
and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family. Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies
having a hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be
resolved in an appropriate case.

============================================================================

#47. AGUSTIN V. CA (JUNE 15, 2005)

[G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005]

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE
PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE,
respondents.

CORONA, J.:

FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City
RTC.

In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an
intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnel’s
insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The baby’s
birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal
and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his
adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel
also denied having fathered the child.
On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and
Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This
incident was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and
has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support.

Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves
to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against
self-incrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this
petition.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner’s MTD

W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of
unreasonable search

HELD:

1. No. The trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss because the private
respondents’ complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner.
The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s
corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by
which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by
the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.

2. No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized
identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements
that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the
infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been
critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his
right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.
============================================================================

#48. TAYAG V. TAYAG (MARCH 24, 2008)

Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor

G.R. No. 174680, [March 24, 2008]

FACTS: Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. Respondent alleged that she is one of the three (3)
illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester C. Angeles. The decedent was married to
petitioner herein, Victoria C. Tayag, but the two allegedly did not have any children of their own.
Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two (2) real properties both of which are in the
possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold preparatory to the settlement
of the decedent's estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give respondent and her brothers
P100,000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale.

Respondent further averred that petitioner has allegedly intends to dispose of the decedent’s
properties to the respondent's and her brothers' prejudice.

Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that she purchased the properties subject of the
petition using her own money. She claimed that she and Ismael Tayag got married and that they
have an adopted daughter, Carmela Tayag, who is presently residing in the USA. It is allegedly not
true that she is planning to sell the properties. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the suit
because respondent failed to state a cause of action.

In a Motion, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the properties and presented the
transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is necessary to allege
that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child.
There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be
brought after the death of the putative father. To prevent further encroachment upon the court's
time, petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses.

The appellate court, upheld the denial of petitioner's motion. The Court of Appeals ruled, in
essence, that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices for a cause of action,
without need to state that she had been recognized and acknowledged as such. However,
respondent still has to prove her allegation and, correspondingly, petitioner has the right to
refute the allegation in the course of the settlement proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether respondent's petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently
states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an
illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized
as such by the latter.
RULING: Yes. The mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices. Rule 79 of the
Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of administration must be filed
by an interested person. In Saguinsin v. Lindayag, the Court defined an interested party as one
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor. This interest, furthermore, must be material and direct, not merely indirect or
contingent.

Hence, where the right of the person filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
is dependent on a fact which has not been established or worse, can no longer be established,
such contingent interest does not make her an interested party.

Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters of administration is a suit for the settlement of
the intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to maintain such a suit is dependent
on whether she is entitled to successional rights as an illegitimate child of the decedent which, in
turn, may be established through voluntary or compulsory recognition.

Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a record of birth appearing in the civil
register, a final judgment, a public instrument or private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned. The voluntary recognition of an illegitimate child by his or her parent needs no
further court action and is, therefore, not subject to the limitation that the action for recognition
be brought during the lifetime of the putative parent. Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the
other hand, may be demanded by the illegitimate child of his parents and must be brought
during the lifetime of the presumed parents.

Petitioner's thesis is essentially based on her contention that by Ismael Tayag's death,
respondent's illegitimate filiation and necessarily, her interest in the decedent's estate which the
Rules require to be material and direct, may no longer be established. Petitioner, however,
overlooks the fact that respondent's successional rights may be established not just by a judicial
action to compel recognition but also by proof that she had been voluntarily acknowledged and
recognized as an illegitimate child.

We find, therefore, that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the decedent
suffices even without further stating that she has been so recognized or acknowledged. A motion
to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically
admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. Assuming the fact alleged to be true, i.e., that
respondent is the decedent's illegitimate child, her interest in the estate as such would definitely
be material and direct. The appellate court was, therefore, correct in allowing the proceedings to
continue, ruling that, "respondent still has the duty to prove the allegation (that she is an
illegitimate child of the decedent), just as the petitioner has the right to disprove it, in the course
of the settlement proceedings."
============================================================================

#49. MARIANO V. CITY OF NAGA (MARCH 2018)

Facts:

The officers of City Heights Subdivision wrote to the mayor of the City of Naga (City), offering to
construct the Naga City Hall within the premises of the Subdivision. Their letter indicated that the
City Hall would be built on an area of not less than two hectares within the Subdivision, which
would be designated as the open space reserved for a public purpose. Upon the City's request,
the Subdivision amended its offer and agreed to donate five hectares to the City. The area is a
portion of the land registered in the names of Macario Mariano and Jose Gimenez under TCT No.
671 measuring a total of 22.9301 hectares.The amended offer was signed by Mariano and
Gimenez to indicate their "conforme," together their respective spouses. Thereafter, the
Municipal Board adopted Resolution No. 89 accepting the Subdivision's offer of donation and its
proposed contract.

According to the City, the Mayor Imperial and the registered landowners, Mariano and
Gimenez,executed a Deed of Donation on August 16, 1954, whereby the latter donated five
hectares of land (subject property), two hectares of which to be used as the City Hall site,
another two hectares for the public plaza, and the remaining hectare for the public market. By
virtue thereof, the City entered the property and began construction of the government center. It
also declared the five-hectare property in its name for tax purposes. Subsequently, other
government agencies and instrumentalities entered the same property and built their offices
thereon.

However, the heirs of Mariano (petitioners) aver that the plan to donate five hectares to the City
did not materialize as the contract to build the City Hall was not awarded to the Subdivision but
to a another contractor (Francisco Sabaria). This caused Mariano and officers of the Subdivision
to meet with Mayor Imperial to demand the return of the five-hectare lot as the condition for the
donation was not complied with. Mayor Imperial purportedly assured them that the City would
buy the property from them. On May 14, 1968, Mariano instructed the Subdivision's President to
make a follow-up on the City's payment for the subject lot. The purchase, however, did not
materialize. In 1971, Mariano died without receiving payment from the City.

In 1976, a certain Tirso Mariano filed an action for partition of Mariano's estate. The action was
opposed by his widow, Irene, and their adopted children, Jose and Erlinda. Irene died in 1988.
Jose's heirs and Erlinda were declared as Irene's heirs.
In 2003, Danilo Mariano, as administrator of Irene's estate, demanded upon then City Mayor of
Naga, Jesse M. Robredo, to vacate and return the subject property. When the City did not comply,
petitioners, as heirs of Jose and Erlinda, filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against the City.
The MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that the City’
s defense, which involved a claim of ownership, removed the issue from the case of unlawful
detainer. The RTC reversed the dismissal and ruled in favor of petitioners by ordering the City of
Naga and the other government agencies occupying the subject property to vacate therefrom
and pay back rentals to petitioners.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), in an amended decision, overturned the RTC and upheld
the dismissal of the MTC. The CA thus concluded that the existence and due execution of the
Deed of Donation had been duly established, warranting the dismissal of the ejectment case. The
CA also found that petitioners' claim was barred by laches, noting that the City had been in open,
public and adverse possession of the subject property for 49 years at the time the ejectment case
was filed.

Issue : Whether or not the Petitioners, as heirs of a registered owner of the subject property,
have the preferred or better right of possession

Held:

Yes! The Court has consistently upheld the registered owners' superior right to possess the
property in unlawful detainer cases. A fundamental principle in land registration is that the
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property
in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It is conclusive evidence as regards
ownership of the land therein described, and the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of
ownership of the property, including possession Thus, the Court has time and again reiterated
the age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens title over a parcel of land is entitled to
possession thereof.

The title to the subject property remains registered in the names of Macario and Gimenez. The
alleged Deed of Donation does not appear to have been registered and TCT No. 671 does not
bear any inscription of said Deed. It has likewise been constantly emphasized that when the
property is registered under the Torrens system, the registered owner's title to the property is
presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful
detainer. It has even been held that it does not even matter if the party's title to the property is
questionable.
It has been held that a certificate of title has a superior probative value as against that of an
unregistered deed of conveyance in ejectment cases. As against the City's unregistered claim, the
Torrens title in the name of Mariano and Gimenez must prevail, conferring upon the registered
owners the better right of possession. This superior or preferred right of possession applies to
petitioners as Mariano's hereditary successors who have stepped into said decedent's shoes by
operation of law.

-End-