Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
5. Competence and diligence
People v. Sevilleno
G.R. No. 129058, 29 March 1999
FACTS:
The accused was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide committed against a 9 year old minor. He entered
the plea of guilty for the crime charged. When the prosecution
rested its case, Atty. Saldavia of the PAO appointed as counsel
de oficio for the accused manifested that since his client had
already pleaded guilty he would no longer present any
evidence. He only invoked the mitigating circumstances of plea
of guilty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the counsel de officio of the accused
acted properly as defense counsel.
RULING:
No. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with
utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not
neglect a legal matters entrusted to him, and his negligence in
this regard renders him administratively liable. In the instant
case, the defense lawyer did not protect, much less uphold the
fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly
performed their function as counsel de officio to the detriment
and prejudice of the accused.
a. Adequate protection
Felipe C. Dagala v. Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. and Atty.
Amado T. Adquilen
A.C. No. 5044, December 2, 2013
FACTS:
Complainant Dagala, assisted by Atty. Quesada filed
before the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional
Arbitration Branch No. I, San Fernando City, La Union a
Complaint for illegal dismissal, overtime pay, separation pay,
damages and attorney’s fees against Capitol Allied Trading &
Transport on November 8, 1994. However, the case was
dismissed for failure of complainant and Atty. Quesada to
appear during the two scheduled mandatory conference
hearings despite due notice. Thereafter, complainant engaged
the services of Atty. Adquilen, a former Labor Arbiter, who re-
filed his labor case. Similarly, the case was dismissed due to the
parties’ failure to submit their respective position papers.
Complainant and Atty. Adquilen refiled the case for a third
time on August 27, 1996.
During the pendency of the case, the representative
of Capitol allegedly offered the amount of P74,000.00 as
settlement of complainant’s claim, conditioned on the
submission of the latter’s position paper. Atty. Adquilen,
however, failed to submit one, resulting in the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of interest and failure to prosecute.
On July 11, 1997, complainant this time assisted by
Atty. Imelda L. Picar filed a motion for reconsideration from
the February 27, 1997 Order, which was treated as an appeal
and transmitted to the NLRC-National Capital Region.
However, the NLRC-NCR dismissed the same in a Resolution
for having been filed out of time, adding that the negligence of
counsel binds the client. Due to the foregoing, Atty. Picar sent
separate letters dated November 18, 1998 to respondents,
informing them that complainant is in the process of pursuing
administrative cases against them before the Court.
The Court directed respondents to comment on the
Complaint within ten days from notice. However, despite
notices and the extension granted, Atty. Adquilen failed to
comply with the directive and the subsequent show-cause
resolutions. He also claimed that when he was informed of the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, he advised
complainant to re-file the case with the assistance of another
lawyer as he had to attend to his duties as Chairman of the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino for the Second District of La
Union Province.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Quesada should be held administratively liable
for gross negligence in handling complainant’s labor case
RULING:
The Court emphasized that the relationship between
a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers
would be ever mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise
the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For
his part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention,
skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance
and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He is likewise
expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with
the courts. These principles are embodied in Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18 of the Code.
x x x CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
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Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo

In the case at bar, the Court finds Atty. Quesada to IBP-Investigating Commissioner: Atty. Agleron violated the
have violated the foregoing Rules and Canons. Atty. Quesada Code of Professional Responsibility when he neglected a legal
acted with less candor and good faith in the proceedings matter entrusted to him; suspended from the practice of law
before the IBP- CBD when he denied the existence of any for a period of four (4) months.
lawyer- client relationship between him and complainant, and
IBP-BOG: adopted and approved the report and
claimed that the labor case was handled by another lawyer,
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
despite his previous admission before the Court of having
modification that Atty. Agleron be suspended from the
accepted complainant’s case. To add, a perusal of the
practice of law for a period of only one (1) month.
complaint dated November 8, 1994 in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-
1123-94 reveals that Atty. Quesada signed the same as counsel ISSUE:
for complainant. Respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. is found
Whether the acts of Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the
guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon
CPR?
10, Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. On the other hand, the RULING:
administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Amado T.
Yes. Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Adquilen is hereby dismissed in view of his supervening death.
Professional Responsibility, which provides that:
Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
b. Negligence to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez, represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact, Vicente A. Pichon v. Atty. Amulfo M. Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is
Agleron Sr. duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend
A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014. to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion
regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He
FACTS: Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez was owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the
the widow of the late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular trust and confidence reposed on him.
accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental, on October 18, 1995,
involving a dump truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga. In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure
Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges against the to file the complaint against the Municipality of Caraga, Davao
Municipality of Caraga and engaged the services of respondent Oriental, despite the fact that it was already prepared and
Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. On three (3) occasions, Atty. signed. He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges
Agleron requested and received from complainant the on the failure of complainant to remit the full payment of the
following amounts for the payment of filing fees and sheriffs filing fee and pay the 30% of the attorney's fee. Such
fees, to wit: (1) P3,000.00; (2) Pl,800.00; and P5,250.00 or a justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would
total of P10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, exonerate him from liability.
no complaint was filed by Atty. Agleron against the Disposition: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
Municipality of Caraga. of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition
Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with more
professional service and received the amount of P10,050.00. severely.
He, however, explained that their agreement was that
complainant would pay the filing fees and other incidental
expenses and as soon as the complaint was prepared and
ready for filing, complainant would pay 30% of the agreed
attorney’s fees of P100,000.00. On June 7, 1996, after the
signing of the complaint, he advised complainant to pay in full
the amount of the filing fee and sheriff’s fees and the 30% of
the attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do so. Atty.
Agleron averred that since the complaint could not be filed in
court, the amount of P10,050.00 was deposited in a bank while
awaiting the payment of the balance of the filing fee and
attorney’s fee.

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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
c. Collaborating counsel
d. Duty to apprise client
Aurora H. Cabauatan v. Atty. Freddie A. Venida
A.C. No. 10043, November 20, 2013
FACTS: The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) thru its
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) received a Complaint filed
by Aurora H. Cabauatan (complainant) against respondent
Atty. Freddie A. Venida for serious misconduct and gross
neglect of duty. x x x Complainant alleged that she was the
appellant in CA-G.R. [No.] 85024 entitled Aurora Cabauatan,
Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Philippine National Bank, Defendant-
Appellee. The case was originally handled by a different lawyer
but she decided to change her counsel and engaged the
services of the Respondent x x x. Complainant was then
furnished by the Respondent of the pleadings he prepared,
such as "Appearance as Counsel/Dismissal of the Previous
Counsel and a Motion for Extension of time to File a
Memorandum. “Complainant made several follow-ups on her
case until she lost contact with the Respondent. Complainant
alleged the gross, reckless and inexcusable negligence of the
Respondent that led to the case is “x x x deemed ABANDONED
and DISMISSED on authority of Sec. 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1996
Rules of Civil Procedure. x x x” Certified on March 31, 2006.
Respondent did not submit any pleading with the
Court of Appeals. It is likewise very noticeable that the
Respondent was not among those furnished with a copy of the
Entry of Judgment hence it is crystal clear that he never
submitted his Entry of Appearance with the Court of Appeals
[insofar] as the case of the Complainant is concerned.
Respondent assured the Complainant that he was doing his
best in dealing with the case, nevertheless, later on
Complainant lost contact with him. x x x including the fact that
he was not one of the parties furnished with a copy of the Entry
of Judgment proved the inaction and negligence of the
Respondent. x x x
ISSUE:
Whether respondent can be held liable for his gross
negligence and inaction against his clients’ case
RULING:
Yes. It is beyond dispute that complainant engaged
the services of respondent to handle her case which was then
on appeal before the Court of Appeals. Indeed, when a lawyer
takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will exercise due
diligence in protecting the latter's rights. Complainant also
established that she made several follow-ups with the
respondent but the latter merely ignored her or made her
believe that he was diligently handling her case.
Thus, complainant was surprised when she received a
notice from the Court of Appeals informing her that her appeal
had been abandoned and her case dismissed. The dismissal
had become final and executory. This is a clear violation of Rule
18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which enjoins lawyers to keep their clients informed of the
status of their case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the clients' request for information.
The Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently provides:
o Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him.
o Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence. x x x x
o Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
o Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of
the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for
information.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective
immediately, with WARNING that a similar violation will be
dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to this
Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable this
Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect. Let
a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of
respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in thecountry.SO ORDERED.
Spouses Garcia v. Bala
A.C. No. 5039, 25 November 2005
FACTS: Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia filed a
complaint against Atty. Bala for his failure in rendering legal
service contracted.
According to the findings of Investigating IBP
Commissioner Herbosa, complainants engaged the services of
respondent (sometime in May 1998) to appeal to the CA the
adverse Decision of the Department of Agrarian Relations
Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Instead, he erroneously filed a Notice of Appeal with the
DARAB. Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the
decisions of the DARAB should be filed with the CA through a
verified petition for review. Because of respondent‘s error, the
prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, to the prejudice
of his clients. Furthermore, Atty. Bala refused to the return the
money paid by Spouses Garcia.
Thus, the IBP recommended the respondent should be
reprimanded and suspended from the practice of law for six
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
months; and that he should return, within thirty days from his
receipt of the Decision, the amount of P9, 200, with legal
interest from the filing of the present Complaint with this
Court.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Bala is guilty of negligence and conduct
unbecoming a lawyer.
RULING:
Yes. Negligence for Wrong Remedy.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
lawyers to serve their clients with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.02 states that ― a lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation.
Specifically, Rule 18.03 provides that a lawyer ―shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client,
they owe fidelity to the cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in them.
A client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense authorized by law, and is expected to rely
on the lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
Evidently, respondent failed to champion the cause of
his clients with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
Despite adequate time, he did not familiarize himself with the
correct procedural remedy as regards their case. Worse, he
repeatedly assured them that the supposed petition had
already been filed. Since he effectively waived his right to be
heard, the Court can only assume that there was no valid
reason for his failure to file a petition for review, and that he
was therefore negligent.
6. Representation with zeal within legal bounds
Re: Verified Complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Hon.
Vicente S.E. Veloso, etc. /Re: Resolution dated October 8,
2013 in OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J against Atty. Homobono A
daza II
IPI No. 12-205-CA- J/A.C. No. 10300, December 10, 2013
Facts:
In a Resolution dated October 8, 2013, the Court
directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II to show cause on why he
should not be cited for contempt. In his explanation, Atty.
Adaza points out that he was merely performing his duty as
counsel when he assisted his client in preparing the
administrative complaint against Justice Veloso. He claims that
he and his client observed Justice Veloso’s partiality during the
oral arguments but instead of filing an administrative
complaint against him, he counselled that his client first file a
Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from the case. Upon finding
that Judge Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Atty. Adaza’s
client repeated his request to file an administrative complaint
against Justice Veloso to which Atty. Adaza acceded.
Issue: WON Atty. Adaza is guilty of contempt
Held:
Yes, Atty. Adaza is guilty of contempt.
While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with
zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law. He is
also duty-bound to impress upon his client the propriety of the
legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage
compliance with the law and legal processes.
In the case at bar, the complaint of Atty. Adaza’s client
shows an apparent failure to understand that cases are not
always decided in one’s favour and that an allegation of bias
must stem from an extrajudicial source other than those
attendant to the merits and the developments in the case.
Atty. Adaza cannot be helped but be attributed with the failure
to impress upon his client the substance of the law on ethics
and respect for the judicial system, and his own failure to heed
what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court
demand of him in acting for his client before the courts.
Therefore, in failing to properly perform his duties
properly as an officer of the Court and as a professional, Atty.
Adaza is found guilty of contempt.
a. Use of fair and honest means
b. Client's fraud
c. Procedure in handling the case
7. Attorney's fees
Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., et al.
G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2013
FACTS:
Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and
illegal dismissal against KRAFT (KFPI) and Bautista in the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor
Arbiter found and declared her suspension and dismissal
illegal, and ordered her reinstatement, and the payment of her
full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, plus
attorney’s fees. NLRC and CA affirmed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. After the judgment in her favor became final
and executor, Malvar moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution but the execution failed due to questionable
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
computation of the award. Malvar requested for the 2nd
issuance of the writ of execution and was partially complied
with but with protest on the part of Kraft by filing TRO for
further execution since the computation is incorrect. CA ruled
in favor of Kraft. Thus, Malvar appealed.
While her appeal was pending in the Court, Malvar
and Kraft entered into a compromise agreement. Thereafter,
Malvar filed an undated Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case,
praying that the appeal be immediately dismissed/withdrawn
in view of the compromise agreement, and that the case be
considered closed and terminated. Before the Court could act
on Malvar’s Motion to Dismiss/Wiithdraw Case, the Court
received a so-called Motion for Intervention to Protect
Attorney’s Rights from Malvar’s counsel. The counsel indicated
that Malvar’s precipitat action had baffled, shocked and even
embarrassed the Intervenor/counsel, because it had done
everything legally possible to serve and protect Malvar’s
interest.
ISSUE:
WON, the Motion for Intervention to protect
attorney’s rights prosper?
RULING:
YES. A client has an undoubted right to settle her
litigation without the intervention of the attorney, for the
former is generally conceded to have exclusive control over
the subject matter of the litigation and may at any time, if
acting in good faith, settle and adjust the cause of action out
of court before judgment, even without the attorney’s
intervention. It is important for the client to show, however,
that the compromise agreement does not adversely affect
third persons who are not parties to the agreement. By such,
a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client
relationship at any time with or without cause. But this right of
the client is not unlimited because good faith is required in
terminating the relationship. It is basic that an attorney is
entitled to have and to receive a just and reasonable
compensation for services performed at the special instance
and request of his client. The attorney who has acted in good
faith and honesty in representing and serving the interests of
the client should be reasonably compensated for his service.
As a final word, it is necessary to state that no court
can shirk from enforcing the contractual stipulations in the
manner they have agreed upon and written. As a rule, the
courts, whether trial or appellate, have no power to make or
modify contracts between the parties. Nor can the courts save
the parties from disadvantageous provisions. The same
precepts hold sway when it comes to enforcing fee
arrangements entered into in writing between clients and
attorneys. In the exercise of their supervisory authority over
attorneys as officers of the Court, the courts are bound to
respect and protect the attorney’s lien as a necessary means
to preserve the decorum and respectability of the Law
Profession. Hence, the Court must thwart any and every effort
of clients already served by their attorneys’ worthy services to
deprive them of their hard-earned compensation.
WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the compromise
agreement; GRANTS the Motion for Intervention to Protect
Attorney's Rights; and ORDERS Czarina T. Malvar and
respondents Kraft Food Philippines Inc. and Kraft Foods
International to jointly and severally pay to Intervenor Law
Firm
DOY Mercantile, Inc. v. AMA Computer College
G.R. 155311, 31 March 2004
FACTS: Dionisio O. Yap, a Director of Doy Mercantile, Inc.,
sold two (2) lands of Doy Mercantile, Inc. (DMI) to AMA
Computer College without proper authorization from the
other members of the Board. Furthermore, DMI questioned
the Secretary’s Certificate which was executed by DMI
Corporate Secretary Francisco P. Yap, authorizing Dionisio to
sell the properties and to sign the contract in behalf of DMI.
During pre-trial, AMA proposed to enter into a
compromise agreement with DMI, which proposal the parties
later agreed to adopt.
DMI, however, refused to satisfy Atty. Eduardo P.
Gabriel, Jr. (counsel)’s attorney’s fees, prompting the lawyer to
file with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Motion to Allow
Commensurate Fees. At this point, DMI had already obtained
the services of a new counsel to attend to the enforcement of
the Judgment of the RTC.
RTC fixed the attorney’s fees at P200,000, but upon
Atty. Gabriel’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC increased
the fees to P500,000. DMI filed several petitions with the Court
of Appeals (CA) to set aside the RTC Orders involving the award
of attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: WON the CA Decision is not consistent with the
guidelines prescribed by Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court and Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RULING:
The petition has no merit. According to the guidelines:
Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees.— An
attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a
view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound
by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper
compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written
contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees:
Rule 20.01
A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining
his fees:
1. The time spent and the extent of the services rendered
or required;
2. The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
3. The importance of the subject matter;
4. The skill demanded;
5. The probability of losing other employment as a result
of acceptance of the proffered case;
6. The customary charges for similar services and the
schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he
belongs;
7. The amount involved in the controversy and the
benefits resulting to the client from the services;
8. The contingency or certainty of compensation;
9. The character of the employment, whether occasional
or established; and
10. The professional standing of the lawyer.
In this case, Atty. Gabriel was the counsel of DMI up to the
time the compromise agreement was confirmed by the trial
court. A perusal of the pleadings enumerated by the plaintiff-
appellant reveals the competence of Atty. Gabriel, Jr. in
handling the case.
Thus, the Court held that he trial court’s initial award of
P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees of Atty. Gabriel is reasonable.
On the other hand, the increased award of cannot be justified,
taking into account the recognized parameters of quantum
meruit.
a. Acceptance fees
Yu v. Bondal
A.C. No. 5534, 17 January, 2005
FACTS: Atty. Renato Lazaro Bondal was charged by Jayne Y.
Yu for gross negligence and violation of Canon 16 and Rule
16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because of his
alleged failure to attend to the five cases Yu referred to him
and to return, despite demand, the amount of P51,716.54 she
has paid him.
On 30 March 2000, Yu engaged in the services of
Bondal as her counsel in five (5) cases and in the Retainer
Agreement of the same date, complainant agreed to pay
respondent the amount of P200,000.00 as Acceptance Fee for
the said cases, with an Appearance Fee of P1,500.00 pesos per
hearing; and in the event that damages are recovered, she
would pay respondent 10% thereof as success fee.
Complainant later issued two checks, dated 20 February 2001
and 5 April 2001 in the amount of P30,000.00 and P21,716.54,
respectively.
Despite receipt of above-said amounts, respondent
failed to file a case against Swire Realty and Development
Corp; due to respondent’s negligence, the case for estafa
against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon was dismissed by the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati City and was not timely appealed
to the Department of Justice; respondent negligently failed to
inform complainant, before she left for abroad, to leave the
necessary documents for purposes of the preliminary
investigation of the case filed against Julie Teh before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City, which case was
eventually dismissed by Resolution dated August 14, 2000; and
respondent compelled her to settle the two cases for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 against Mona Lisa San Juan and Elizabeth Chan
Ong under unfair and unreasonable terms.
On 14 June 2001, complainant demanded from
respondent for the return of all the records she had entrusted
him bearing on the subject cases. Through her counsel, she
sent a letter in which she demands for the return of the
records of the cases. Respondent returned only two of the five
records (the records bearing on the estafa case against
Lourdes Fresnoza Boon and the B.P. Blg. 22 case against Mona
Lisa San Juan). On 8 August 2001, she demanded the return of
the rest of the files and in the same letter; she also demanded
the refund of the amounts covered by the two checks she
issued. Respondent failed and continued to refuse to comply
with complainant’s valid demands. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Bondal violated Canon 16 and Rule
16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: No. An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is
an absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to get
paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation.
That complainant was dissatisfied with the outcome of the
four cases does not render void the retainer agreement for
respondent appears to have represented the interest of
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
complainant. Litigants need to be reminded that lawyers are
not demi-gods or "magicians" who can always win their cases
for their clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same
or how passionate the litigants may feel about their cause.
In sum, this Court finds well taken the finding of the
Office of the Bar Confidant that complainant failed to establish
the guilt of respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof. The charges against him must thus be dismissed.
However, since respondent had been advised by
complainant through Counsel Chavez Laureta and Associates,
by letter of July 18, 2001, that she intended to terminate his
services, as of said date, he was obliged, under Rule 22.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility to immediately turn
over all papers and property which complainant entrusted to
his successor.
Rule 22.02 – A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall,
subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate
with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter,
including all information necessary for the proper handling of
the matter.
b . Contingency fee arrangements
The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Cadavedo v. Lacaya
G.R. No. 173188. 15 January 2014
FACTS: Spouses Cadavedo acquired a homestead grant which
they sold to spouses Ames. The spouses Cadavedo filed an
action for sum of money and/or voiding the contract of sale of
homestead on the ground of non-payment of the purchase
price by spouses Ames. The spouses Cadavedo initially
engaged the services of Atty. Bandal, who was later
substituted by herein respondent Atty. Lacaya due to health
concerns.
Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the
nullity of the sale. The amended complaint stated that the
spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee
basis. The contingency fee stipulation specifically reads: “10.
That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were
forced to hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if they become
the prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will pay the sum
of ₱2,000.00 for attorney’s fees.”
The RTC ruled in favor of spouses Ames, upholding
the validity of the sale. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty.
Lacaya, appealed the said decision. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC. Spouses Ames filed a petition for review
on certiorari but was dismissed by the SC.
Atty. Lacaya immediately informed the spouses
Cadavedo of the foreclosure sale (DBP) and filed an Affidavit of
Third Party Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff. With
the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721, Atty. Lacaya
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, which
was granted. Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot
as attorney’s fees. He caused the subdivision of the subject lot
into two equal portions, based on area, and selected the more
valuable and productive half for himself; and assigned the
other half to the spouses Cadavedo.
Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-
law entered the portion assigned to the respondents and
ejected them. The latter responded by filing a counter-suit for
forcible entry before the MTC. On May 13, 1982, Vicente and
Atty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement (compromise
agreement), re-adjusting the area and portion obtained by
each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the
agreement, which was approved by the MTC.
On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before
the RTC an action against the respondents, assailing the MTC-
approved compromise agreement. The RTC declared the
contingent fee of 10.5383 hectares as excessive and
unconscionable. The RTC reduced the land area to 5.2691
hectares and ordered the respondents to vacate and restore
the remaining 5.2692 hectares to the spouses Cadavedo. On
appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, ruling that the
time spent and the extent of the services Atty. Lacaya
rendered for the spouses Cadavedo in the three cases, the
probability of him losing other employment resulting from his
engagement, the benefits resulting to the spouses Cadavedo,
and the contingency of his fees justified the compromise
agreement and rendered the agreed fee under the
compromise agreement reasonable.
ISSUE: WON the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the
subject lot is valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners.
RULING: The Court ruled in the NEGATIVE. An agreement
between the lawyer and his client, providing for the former’s
compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules governing
contracts in general. As the rules stand, controversies involving
written and oral agreements on attorney’s fees shall be
resolved in favor of the former. Hence, the contingency fee of
₱2,000.00 stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over
the alleged oral contingency fee agreement of one-half of the
subject lot.
Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and
Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent fee
agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot,
the agreement is nevertheless void for violating Article 1491 of
the Civil Code and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct the
litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to
save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of
the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law." The
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
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rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting His compensation should be governed by Section 24,
with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and not Article 111 of the Labor
conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to Code. The contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides
prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him for a contingent fee which shall control unless found by the
and his client. In addition to its champertous character, the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. The decree of
contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly transgresses unconscionability of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee
Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “A lawyer may not contract will not preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing
properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat by the court of a reasonable compensation for the lawyer’s
the expense of litigation.” services.
Rule 20.01, Canon of Profession responsibility set the
criteria for assessing the proper amount of compensation that
c. Attorney's liens
a lawyer should receive:
i. Retaining Lien
a. The time spent and the extent of the services
ii. Charging Lien rendered or required;
b. The novelty and difficulty of the question
d. Fees and controversies with clients Concepts of attorney's
involved;
fees
c. The importance of the subject matter;
i. Ordinary concept d. The skill demanded;
e. The probability of losing other employment
ii. Extraordinary concept
as a result of acceptance of the proffered
Masmud v. NLRC case;
G.R. No. 183385, 13 February 2009 f. The customary charges for similar services
and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter
FACTS: In 2003, Evangeline Masmud filed a complaint on to which he belongs;
behalf of her late husband Alexander Masmud against First g. The amount involved in the controversy and
Victory Shipping Services (Hellas) for non-payment of the benefits resulting to the client from the
permanent disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness service;
allowance, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. h. The contingency or certainty of
Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Rolando Go as his compensation;
counsel. In consideration of Atty. Go’s legal services, Alexander i. The character of the employment, whether
agreed to pay on contingent basis: 20% of total monetary occasional or established; and
claims as settled or paid and an additional 10% in case of j. The professional standing of the lawyer.
appeal. And any award for attorney’s fees shall pertain to
respondent’s law firm as compensation. Contingent fee contracts are subject to supervision
and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients may be
The Labor Arbiter granted monetary claims of protected from unjust charges. The court finds nothing illegal
Alexander. Hellas appealed to NLRC, during pendency in the contingent fee contract between Atty. Go and Alexander
Alexander died, Evangelina as substituted as complainant. (Evangelina’s husband). CA committed no error of law when it
NLRC dismissed the appeal of Hellas. After appeals before the awarded attorney’s fees.
CA, the decision the decision of the NLRC eventually became
final. The check of P 3454079.00 was granted to Evangelina
and P680000 to Atty. Go. Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion
to record and enforce the attorney’s lien alleging that
Evangelina only paid the amount equivalent to 20% of the
award as attorney’s fees leaving 10% balance, plus the award
to the counsel as attorney’s fees. Evangelina manifested that
the claim for attorney’s fees of 40% of the total monetary
award was null and void based on Art. 111 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Go’s compensation should be
determined under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
or under Article 11 of the Labor Code.
RULING:

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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
8. Preservation of client's confidences.
Siong Yao v. Aurelio
A.C. No. 1023, 30 March 2006
FACTS:
Atty. Aurelio was the brother-in-Law of Mrs. Yao (Bun
Siong Yao’s wife). Mrs. Yao and Atty. Aurelio had a
disagreement hence, the latter demanded the return of his
investments in the two (2) companies where majority share
was held by Bun Siong Yao. However, Bun Siong Yao refused
which made Aurelio file these suits to retaliate. Bun Siong Yao
challenged these suits, saying that he is abusing the attorney-
client relationship by filing suits against the company in which
he is retained as counsel, by using information (for the suits)
he obtained in his capacity as counsel and as Bun Siong Yao’s
personal lawyer, under the guise of a “concerned
stockholder”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent has violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
Yes. The long-established rule is that an attorney is
not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his
professional character by a client, unless the latter consents.
This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a
client arises at the inception of their relationship and
continues until termination of that relationship.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that “a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him
thus, protection given to the client is perpetual and does not
cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by
the party’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining
another, or by any other change of relation between them. It
even survives the death of the client.”
In sum, we find that respondent's actuations amount
to a breach of his duty to uphold good faith and fairness,
sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective upon receipt of this Decision.
Hilado v. David
G.R. L-961, 21 September 1949
FACTS: Petitioner alleged that she and the counsel for the
defendant had an attorney-client relationship with her when,
before the trial of the case, she went to defendant’s counsel,
gave him the papers of the case and other information
relevant thereto, although she was not able to pay him legal
fees. “That respondent’s law firm mailed to the plaintiff a
written opinion over his signature on the merits of her case;
that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had
submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in
submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's
professional services.” Atty. Francisco appeared as counsel for
defendant and plaintiff did not object to it until (4) months
after. Then, plaintiff moved to dismiss the case between her
and defendant.
ISSUE: Was there an attorney-client relationship between
plaintiff and Atty. Francisco?
RULING:
YES. In order to constitute the relation a professional
one and not merely one of principal and agent, the attorneys
must be employed either to give advice upon a legal point, to
prosecute or defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare
and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts
and the like.
To constitute professional employment it is not
essential that the client should have employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary
that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged
for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward undertake the case about which the consultation
was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his
professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established.
“An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his
professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he is
listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or
when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is
drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating his client's cause
in open court. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the
part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his client in
pursuance of a request by the latter.”
a. Prohibited disclosures and use
b. Disclosure, when allowed
9. Withdrawal of services
a. Discharge by the Client
i. With just cause
ii. Without just cause
b. Withdrawal by the Attorney
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
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iii. Hot Potato Doctrine
e. SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF
LAWYERS
In re: Suspension from the practice of law in the territory of
Guam of Atty. Maqueras
A.M. No. 793, 30 July 2004
Facts: In a Letter dated August 20, 1996, the District Court
of Guam informed our courts of the suspension of Atty. Leon
G. Mauera from the practice of law in Guam for two years. The
Court referred the matter of Maqueras suspension in Guam to
the Bar Confidant for comment in its Resolution dated
November 19, 1996. In a Memorandum dated February 20,
1997, then Bar Confidant Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa
recommended that the Court obtain copies of the record of
Maqueras case since the documents transmitted by the Guam
District Court do not contain the factual and legal bases for
Maqueras suspension and are thus insufficient to enable her
to determine whether Maqueras acts or omissions which
resulted in his suspension in Guam are likewise violative of his
oath as a member of the Philippine Bar. The IBP found out that
he was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for having
acquired his client’s property as payment for his legal services,
sold it, and obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his
client’s case.
Issue:
WON a member of the Philippine Bar who was
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign
jurisdiction can be meted in the same sanction as a member of
the Philippine Bar for the same infraction in the foreign
jurisdiction
Held: Yes, a member of the Philippine Bar disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law abroad can be meted in
the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been
admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or
suspension in this realm, provided the foreign courts action is
by reason of an act or omission constituting deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral
conduct, or a violation of the lawyers oath.
In the case at bar, the IBP concluded that although the
said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, there is no
evidence to establish that Maquera committed a breach of
ethics in the Philippines. The Court must determine whether
his acts violated Philippine law or the standards of ethical
behaviour for members of the Philippine Bar.
Therefore, a member of the Philippine Bar who was
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign
jurisdiction can also be disbarred or suspended in the
Philippines if it is proven that his acts were violative of
Philippine laws or the standards of ethical behaviour for
members of the Philippine Bar.
f. READMISSION TO THE BAR
i. Lawyers who have been suspended
Maniago v. de Dios
A.C. No. 7472, 30 March 2010
FACTS: On April 2, 2007, an Affidavit-Complaint was filed by
Ligaya Maniago, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. De
Dios. It alleged that Maniago filed a criminal case against
Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national, for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 603. The accused was represented by
Atty. De Dios. Complainant then learned from the RTC staff
that Atty. De Dios had an outstanding suspension order from
the Supreme Court since 2001, and was, therefore, prohibited
from appearing in court. Complainant further alleges that
there is a civil case and another case (special proceeding) filed
against Miyata before the RTC in Makati City where Atty. De
Dios appeared as his counsel. Complainant averred that Atty.
De Dios ought to be disbarred from the practice of law for her
flagrant violation and deliberate disobedience of a lawful order
of the Supreme Court.
Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed
against her client, Miyata. She, however, denied that she was
under suspension when she appeared as his counsel in the
cases. She explained that an administrative case was indeed
filed against her by Diana de Guzman where she was meted
the penalty of 6-month suspension. She served the suspension
immediately upon receipt of the Courts Resolution on May 16,
2001 up to November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation filed on
October 19, 2001, respondent formally informed the Court
that she was resuming her practice of law on November 17,
2001, which she actually did.
A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales,
erroneously issued a directive ordering respondent to desist
from practicing law and revoking her notarial commission for
the years 2007 and 2008. the Court issued a resolution on April
23, 2007 to DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios to have SERVED her
six (6) month suspension and her recommencement of law
practice on 17 November 2001 as PROPER.
ISSUE: WON, the lifting of the suspension order is automatic.
RULING:
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
No. It is not automatic. A suspended lawyer must first
present proof(s) of his compliance by submitting certifications
from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from the
Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted from the practice
of law during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court,
after evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from
the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the order of suspension
and thus allow him to resume the practice of law. Atty. De Dios
was able to resume her practice of law without submitting the
required certifications and passing through the OBC for
evaluation.
It must be remembered that the practice of law is not
a right but a mere privilege and, as such, must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact
compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities. Whenever
it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes
not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme Court,
which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege
of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege.
However, as much as the Court will not hesitate to discipline
an erring lawyer, it should, at the same time, also ensure that
a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and right to
exercise his profession unreasonably.
ii.. Lawyers who have been disbarred
iii. Lawyers who have been repatriated
Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin
Dacanay, Petitioner
B.M. 1678, 17 December 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in
March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he
took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter,
he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his
law practice.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship
RULING:
The Constitution provides that the practice of all
professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino
citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss
thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In
other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by
reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because
“all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed
never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it
in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never
to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the
legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice.
iv. Dual Citizens
In re: del Rosario
23 September 2014
FACTS:
Before moving to the US, Marcos Del Rosario passed
the Philippine Bar exams after finishing his law degree from the
University of the Philippine in 1995. He then obtained his
Master of Laws in International Business from Fordham
University in New York, NY, U.S.A in 2003 and was admitted to
practice law in the State of New York and the US District Courts
for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York after
becoming a naturalized American citizen. Del Rosario filed the
petition in the SC, saying he wanted to continue practicing law
in the country.
ISSUE: WON Del Rosario can resume practice of law in the
Philippines.
RULING:
Yes. The Court resolved to allow petitioner Del
Rosario to resume practice of law in the Philippines, subject to
the conditions that he re-takes his lawyer’s oath on a date set
by the Court. The high court also required petition to pay “the
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
appropriate fees, and (submit) the original or certified true
copy of the proof of payment of the professional tax for 2013.
The SC cited Article XII, Section 14 of the Constitution,
which provides that “the practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases
prescribed by law.
g. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
Bar Matter No. 850
i. Purpose
ii. Requirements
iii. Compliance
iv. Exemptions
v. Sanctions
II. JUDICIAL ETHICS
a. Sources
i. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
(A.M. No. 03-05-01)
ii. Code of Judicial Conduct
b. Qualities
i. Independence
1. Institutional vis-à-vis individual independence
In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of
Mr. Amado P. Macasaet Published in Malaya dated
September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007,A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, 8
August 2008
FACTS:
This case resolves a contempt charge against
respondent Amado A.P. Macasaet, a newspaper columnist, for
authorizing publications imputing bribery to a member of the
Supreme Court, namely Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
amounting to P10-million, allegedly received in boxes by
Cecilia Delis, who is said to be the secretary of Justice Ynares-
Santiago, in relation to a criminal case which was decided in
favor of the accused Henry T. Go.
Justice Santiago denied the accusation and Macasaet
was ordered to submit an explanation on why no sanctions
should be imposed on him for indirect contempt of court
under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which states that a person guilty of “any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice” may be punished for indirect
contempt.
Macasaet testified that the information was received
by him from confidential sources, while Delis denied having
any knowledge of the bribery. An Investigating Committee was
created to investigate the alleged bribery committed by Justice
Santiago. The Committee reported that the columns of
Macasaet appeared to be just mere hearsays and concluded
that the bribery story was “unbelievable” and further
recommended that Macasaet be held in indirect contempt.
ISSUE:
WON Macasaet is liable for indirect contempt under
Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
HELD:
Yes. While Freedom of Speech and of the Press is a
public right to scrutinize and criticize the government, this is,
however, not absolute and not without limitations. Many
types of criticism become harmful and irresponsible attacks
which threaten the judicial independence.
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when
public confidence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained,
and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority.
These kinds of personal attacks damage and threaten the
integrity and independence of the judiciary.
Upholding the findings stated in the Comprehensive
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee
which enumerated the gross inconsistencies and assumptions
of the respondent, which lacked veracity and showed the
reckless disregard of whether the alleged bribery was false or
not, the Court held Macasaet guilty of indirect contempt of
Court.
Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog,
A.M. No. R-351-RTJ, 26 September 1986
FACTS Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog, an RTC Judge,
stands charged in six separate complaints of various forms of
misconduct in the performance of her official duties. One was
dismissed for lack of merit where the other five were indeed
serious. Taken collectively, they cast a heavy shadow on
respondent's moral, intellectual and attitudinal competence to
remain a member of the Bench.
I. AM R 351 RTJ and R-621-RTJ: charged having acted
arbitrarily or capriciously in causing the arrest;
ignorance, graft or deliberate distortion of the law for
pecuniary motives for issuing restraining orders
without conducting hearings. The release order
issued proves the impropriety of her act; while the
recall order demonstrates the impetuosity by which
the arrest order was issued in the first place.
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
II. AM R-359-RTJ: charged for failure to order the service
of summons and copy of the third-party complaint on
the third-party defendant. Respondent judge failed to
act with reasonable dispatch required of judicial
officers.
III. AM R-684-RTJ: failure to decide on a Civil Case despite
the case having been submitted for decision for more
than 18 months. Respondent judge admitted to have
succumbed to pressure in deciding the case in order
to promote peace so nobody would call her again by
telephone telling her to do so.
IV. AM 86-4-9987-RTC: appealed case required to file
memorandum within 30 days from notice of the order
but plaintiff had done so only at the time of transfer.
Referral the case to Respondent Judge was solely for
the purpose of acting upon the motion to consolidate
and transfer, such referral did not in any manner
empower or authorize her to decide the case on the
merits.
ISSUE Whether respondent Jude Corpuz-Macandog acted
with independence in performance of her duty.
HELD No. In view of the disclosure by respondent that the
decisions were was rendered under undue pressure and
influence, the party aggrieved thereby may take such remedial
steps as may be warranted.
Judges are required to observe due care in the performance of
their official duties. They are likewise charged with the
knowledge of internal rules and procedures, especially those
which relate to the scope of their authority. The hasty and
reckless attitude of respondent judge in taking cognizance of
and deciding Cases despite the strong objection against her
authority and the reasonable request for referral of the
question to this Court, constitutes misconduct in office
warranting disciplinary sanction.
Respondent Judge Macandog has shown herself to be mentally
and morally unfit to remain in her office. Her removal must
perforce be effected. She is hereby ordered dismissed from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay, and
with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities.
Libarios v. Dabalos
A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, 11 July 1991
2. Principle of Sub-judice; Sec 3, Canon 1 NCJC
FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed by Roan I.
Libarios for and on behalf of his client Mariano Corvera, Jr.
against respondent Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, for grave
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, gross
misconduct and partiality, relative to the issuance of a warrant
of arrest of the respondent judge against the accused
Tranquilino Calo Jr.and Belarmino Alloco for the crime of
murder fixing their bail without any prior hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos violated the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.
HELD: Yes. As provided by Canon 3 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, a judge should endeavor diligently to
ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by
partisan or personal interests, public opinion or fear of
criticism. He should not have allowed himself to be swayed
into issuing an order fixing bail for the temporary release of the
accused charged with murder, without a hearing, which is
contrary to established principles of law. It has been an
established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person
is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a
hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence
it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail
for the temporary release of the accused.
A judge should not only render a just, correct and
impartial decision but should do so in a manner as to be free
from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity
thus, the respondent judge is imposed of a fine of twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and warned to exercise more
care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge,
and that the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt
with more severally.
Sabitsana, Jr. v. Viffamor
RTJ No. 90- 474, 4 October 1991
Facts: Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr., a practicing lawyer in
Naval, Biliran Sub province, Leyte, charged respondent, Judge
Adriano R. Villamor of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16,
Naval, Leyte, with falsification of his monthly Certificates of
Service by making it appear that he had resolved all cases
submitted for decision within the ninety day period required
by the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Complainant further furnished the Court with an
Affidavit of Judge Dulcisimo Pitao of the Municipal Trial Court
of Maripipi, Leyte, stating that Respondent had intervened for
the accused in Criminal Case No.959 then pending with the
said Municipal Court.
In his Comment filed on 20 December 1990,
Respondent claimed that the Complaint was more for
harassment and vengeance. That there were other cases not
decided within the 90 day rule, including those listed in the
Complaint allegedly because the transcripts were incomplete.
ISSUE:
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
WON the respondent violated Section 3 Canon 1 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct
HELD:
Yes. From the Investigative Report of Justice Fermin
Martin, the imputation that respondent intervened in Criminal
Case No. 959 is sufficiently substantiated. That a letter was
sent to judge Pitao by the wife of he accused and that the
respondent mentioned the case during their conversation.
Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall
refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2,
Rule 2.04).Interference by members of the bench in-pending
suits with the end in view of influencing the course or the
result of litigation does not only subvert the independence of
the judiciary but also undermines the people’s faith in its
integrity and impartiality (Commentaries on the Code of
Judicial Conduct).
Respondent is dismissed from service.
Alfonso v. Alonzo-Legasto
A.M. No. MTJ 94-995, 5 September 2002
Facts:
Complainants herein were employees of the City
Government of Quezon City and were assigned at the Office of
the Clerk of Court-Metropolitan Trial Court(OCC-MeTC) and
the different branches of the MeTC-Quezon City to assist the
organic staff of the judiciary. The instant administrative
complaint had its roots from the transfer of complainants to
other offices in the City Government made by respondent
Judge. Complainants alleged that conspiracy existed between
respondents. Complainants alleged that respondent judge
favoured some of her “favourite” national employees hence,
their arbitrary transfer to other offices and the unfair
treatment as shown in the recording of attendance.
Issue:
WON Judge Legasto’s acts were valid in light of
judicial independence.
Ruling:
No, Judge Legasto’s acts were not valid in light of
judicial independence.
In Bagatsing vs. Herrera, it was ruled that for judicial
independence to be a reality, the least interference by or
influence from other governmental departments is of the
essence.
In the case at bar, the Court stresses that only the
Court itself has the authority to order a personnel accounting
of locally-funded employees assigned in the lower courts to
determine the necessity of their detail, and that, accordingly,
all requests for detail of locally-funded employees including
complainants herein must pass the Office of the Court
Administrator for review and appropriate action.
Therefore, in light of judicial independence, Judge
Legasto’s acts were invalid as she did not have the authority to
assign personnel in the lower courts.
ii. Integrity
Re: Complaint of Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and Her Children
against Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, RTC, Br. 20, Cebu City,
A.M. No. 97-2-53 RTC, 6 July 2001
FACTS: The case arose from a complaint made by the wife of
Judge Marcos, Mrs. Marcos. She alleged that Judge Marcos
was not supporting the family properly and that he had a
mistress, named Mae Tacaldo. Presenting evidences such as a
Islacom Statement of Account, showing that Judge Marcos has
been paying the phone bill of his mistress, a birthday card
given to him saying -"It is wonderful to share my life with you."
-and ending it with -"MT cares a lot, you know.", Paying for a
restaurant bill, that the wife has never been to, buying
jewellery that was not received by his wife or daughter, buying
groceries that was never received by the family. And by living
together with his mistress in an apartment. And a testimony of
the Chief Justice Davide, that Judge Marcos admitted to him,
in a fun run, that he was living with his mistress.
Judge Marcos denies the allegations. And said since
his wife/complainant, has already made an affidavit of
desistance the case should be dismissed.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Judge should be dismissed based on the
evidence?
2. W/N the affidavit of desistance would dismiss the case?
RULING:
1. Yes, the Islacom Statement of Account was addressed
to Judge Marcos not in his conjugal dwelling, but at the
residence of Mae Tacaldo. While Judge Marcos denied owning
a cell phone there is an improbability that Islacom would send
a phone bill to him if he were not the real owner thereof. If he
did not really own the cell phone was it not expected of him,
being a judge and all, to have stood his ground and insisted
that as he did not own nor lose a cell phone, it is preposterous
of him to execute an Affidavit of Loss.
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
Someone with the initials M.T. sent Judge Marcos for
his birthday a birthday card. This person could be Mae Tacaldo
(mistress) or Monalila Tecson (clerk of court). Although Judge
Marcos' Branch Clerk of Court has these initials we, as well as
Judge Marcos, do not believe that she would send Judge
Marcos a card with the greeting -"It is wonderful to share my
life with you." -and ending it with -"MT cares a lot, you know."
Only a person who is truly intimate with Judge Marcos would
send such a card. We are not swayed by the denials made by
respondent judge that he and Ms. Tacaldo were the owners of
a Toyota Revo. Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo jointly bought a
motor vehicle - a Toyota Revo - and had it registered in their
names as co-owners. They obtained insurance for the same
vehicle with them as joint beneficiaries. They executed a
chattel mortgage over the same in favor of PCI Leasing and
Finance, Inc. and when they finally sold the same vehicle on
September 18, 2000 to Amina Advincula, they both signed the
Deed of Sale as joint owners. These actions clearly indicate
that they were the joint owners of the Toyota Revo. Marcos
wanted us to believe that if his name was put in the motor
vehicle's registration, the Tacaldos' entry in the cooperative's
business of running public utility vehicles would be assured. He
went to extraordinary lengths to help the Tacaldos by having
the vehicle registered in his and Ms. Tacaldo's names.
There is nothing in the records to show that it was
essential for respondent to be registered as an owner in order
that the motor vehicle could ply the Toledo City -Cebu City
routes. A simple phone call/oral request by Judge Marcos to
the cooperative officers would have been sufficient, to our
mind, to allow the Tacaldos' entry to the cooperative business
of transporting passengers. Respondent's posture that Mrs.
Marcos is also guilty of immorality does not excuse nor even
mitigate his actions. It is respondent's private action that is
being investigated not his wife's. The personal behavior of a
judge should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and
his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life,
should be beyond reproach.
If good moral character is required of a lawyer, with
more reason is the requirement exacted of a member of the
judiciary who at all times is expected to observe irreproachable
behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency. Keeping
a mistress is certainly not an act one would expect of a judge
who is expected to possess the highest standard of morality
and decency. If a judge fails to have high ethical standards, the
confidence and high respect for the judiciary diminishes as he
represents the judiciary. Jurisprudence is rich in cases where
the Court has inflicted on judges the punishment of dismissal
for immorality especially when it is committed openly and
flagrantly, causing scandal in the place where his court is
situated.
2. Herein respondent cannot find comfort in the
"affidavit of desistance" signed by his wife and children.
Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits
of desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought.
The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the
administrative case against herein respondent judge will not
necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once charges have
been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its
jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter
alleged in the complaint. Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos has
demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He has
violated the code of Judicial Conduct which requires every
judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence and to avoid the appearance of impropriety in
all activities as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary. Having tarnished the image of
the Judiciary, respondent must be meted out the severest
form of disciplinary sanction – dismissal from the service.
Chan v. Majaducan
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1697 15 October 2003
FACTS: These are complaints for non-feasance, impropriety,
partiality, and inefficiency filed against respondent Jose S.
Majaducon, former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, General Santos City.
A concerned citizen charged respondent Judge Jose S.
Majaducon (respondent judge) with not wearing [a] black robe
during court sessions and with being habitually tardy.
In another complaint, dated 3 November 2000,
complainant Eugenio K. Chan (complainant) charged
respondent judge with committing acts of improprieties [and]
irregularities. Complainant alleged that respondent judge:
1. xxx starts his hearings at 10:00 oclock in the
morning and 2:30-3:00 oclock in the afternoon.
2. xxx does not wear his robe despite the requirement
of the Supreme Court xxx;
3. xxx entertains lawyer[s] in his sala despite the
absence of the opposing lawyer[s];
4. xxx continued to hear cases despite obvious
appearance of impartiality [sic]. He insist [sic] to hear
the case despite the fact that her [sic] daughter being
[sic] involved in the defendant bank;
5. xxx was already reprimanded by the Honorable
Supreme Court and he is a subject of adverse write
ups in the newspapers;
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
6. xxx does not prepare or study the cases. He reads
the cases during the hearing time
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge committed violations.
RULING:
Yes, the judge Majaducan committed violations.
On Respondent Judges Refusal to Wear
the Mandated Judicial Robe
Respondent judge admits violating Circular No. 25.
Nevertheless, he seeks exculpation from administrative
liability for his non-compliance because of his illness.
Respondent judge’s plea is futile.
The wearing of robes by judges during official
proceedings, which harks back to the 14th century, is not an
idle ceremony. Such practice serves the dual purpose of
heighten[ing] public consciousness on the solemnity of judicial
proceedings, as Circular No. 25 states, and of impressing upon
the judge the exacting obligations of his office. As well put by
an eminent jurist of another jurisdiction:
Judges are xxx clothed in robes, not only, that they
who witness the administration of justice should be properly
advised that the function performed is one different from, and
higher, than that which a man discharges as a citizen in the
ordinary walks of life; but also, in order to impress the judge
himself with the constant consciousness that he is a high priest
in the temple of justice and is surrounded with obligations of a
sacred character that he cannot escape and that require his
utmost care, attention and self-suppression. Consequently, a
judge must take care not only to remain true to the high ideals
of competence and integrity his robe represents, but also that
he wears one in the first place.
On Respondent Judges Practice of Entertaining Lawyers
and Litigants with Pending Cases in his Sala
The Code of Judicial Conduct (Code) provides:
Rule 1.01. A judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence.
CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. A judge should behave at all times so as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
The Court cannot emphasize enough the pivotal role
lower court judges play in the promotion of the peoples faith
in the judiciary. Unlike the appellate court justices, they are the
so-called front-liners who give human face to the judicial
branch at the grassroots level in their interaction with litigants
and those who do business with the courts. The admonition in
Canon 2 that judges must not only avoid impropriety [but also]
the appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to them.
It is in this light that the Court frowns upon the holding by trial
court judges of in-chamber meetings with litigants or their
counsels without the presence of the adverse party.
Instead of taking heed of this ethical prohibition,
respondent judge readily admitted transgressing it. Worse, he
reveals his ignorance of the prohibitions purpose by claiming
that his in-chamber dealings are above-board as nothing illegal
or improper transpires during those meetings. Respondent
judge should have realized that his very conduct of
entertaining litigants and their counsels in his chamber
without the presence of the adverse party or his counsel
constitutes an impropriety. While judges are not expected to
shun the world, neither are they supposed to make themselves
freely accessible under such circumstances as to invite
suspicions of impropriety if not bias. Respondent judge should
have borne in mind and all those in the bench who are similarly
disposed as him are reminded that:
No position is more demanding as regards xxx
uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench xxx.
Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration
of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor
bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at
all times in such a manner that his conduct, xxx can bear the
most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as
the epitome of integrity and justice. In insulating the Bench
from unwarranted criticism, thus preserving our democratic
way of life, it is essential that judges, like Caesars wife, should
be above suspicion.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Jose S. Majaducon,
former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
General Santos City guilty of violating Circular No. 25 dated 9
June 1989, Rules 1.01 and 2.01 and Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Respondent Jose S. Majaducon is ordered to
pay a fine of P10,000, the same to be deducted from whatever
retirement benefits he is entitled.
In matter of the Charges of Plagiarism etc. Against Associate
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, 8 February 2011
FACTS: On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a
decision which dismissed a petition filed by the Malaya Lolas
Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio
Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et al, questioned the said
decision. He raised, among others, that the ponente in said
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
case, Justice Mariano del Castillo, plagiarized three books
when the honorable Justice “twisted the true intents” of these
books to support the assailed decision. These books were: a. A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-
Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009); b. Breaking
the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and c.
Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams,
Cambridge University Press (2005).
As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism,
misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence. Interestingly,
even the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that
their works were used inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo
and that the assailed decision is different from what their
works advocated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.
RULING:
No. There is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as
emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on
plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.
No Plagiarism
At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of
another person’s language, thoughts, or ideas. To plagiarize, as
it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take
(ideas, writings, etc.) from (another) and pass them off as one’s
own. The passing off of the work of another as one’s own is
thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.
According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the
“deliberate and knowing presentation of another person’s
original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.”
This cannot be the case here because as proved by
evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed decision, there
was attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by
Justice del Castillo’s researcher, the attributions were
inadvertently deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice
del Castillo to take these foreign works as his own.
Petitioners insist that intent is not material in
committing plagiarism since all that a writer has to do, to avoid
the charge, is to enclose lifted portions with quotation marks
and acknowledge the sources from which these were taken.
On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past
decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313 SCRA 404), the
Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not material in
plagiarism. To adopt a strict rule in applying plagiarism in all
cases leaves no room for errors. This would be very
disadvantageous in cases, like this, where there are reasonable
and logical explanations.
On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were
used inappropriately
According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted
from their works were merely used as background facts in
establishing the state on international law at various stages of
its development. The Supreme Court went on to state that the
foreign authors’ works can support conflicting theories. The
Supreme Court also stated that since the attributions to said
authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to conclude
that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies that the works
espouse.
No Misconduct
Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The
error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud or
corruption.
No Inexcusable Negligence (explanation of Justice Del
Castillo)
The error of Justice del Castillo’s researcher is not
reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is a highly
competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here
and abroad from reputable educational institutions. The
researcher finished third in her class and 4th in the bar
examinations. Her error was merely due to the fact that the
software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise
her that certain important portions of her drafts are being
deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part cannot be said to
be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that
Justice del Castillo was grossly negligent when he assigned the
case to her. Further, assigning cases to researchers has been a
long standing practice to assist justices in drafting decisions. It
must be emphasized though that prior to assignment, the
justice has already spelled out his position to the researcher
and in every sense, the justice is in control in the writing of the
draft.
With the advent of computers, however, as Justice
Del Castillos researcher also explained, most legal references,
including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in
electronic diskettes or in internet websites that offer virtual
libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found
items that were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded
or copied them into her main manuscript, a smorgasbord plate
of materials that she thought she might need.
She electronically cut relevant materials from books
and journals in the Westlaw website and pasted these to a
main manuscript in her computer that contained the issues for
discussion in her proposed report to the Justice. She used the
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
Microsoft Word program. Later, after she decided on the
general shape that her report would take, she began pruning
from that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing
the positions in the general scheme of those that remained,
and adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences, and words as
her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief
editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme
that computer-literate court researchers use every day in their
work. The case was DISMISSED.
iii. Impartiality
Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr.
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1535, 12 March 2004
FACTS: The instant administrative case traces its roots from
an unlawful detainer case filed by Benjamin and Desmond
Montemayor against Lolita Marco. The case was raffled to
MeTC Judge, Hon. Juan Bermejo Jr., herein respondent. Dr.
Montemayor asserts that respondent Judge failed to decide
the case within the period provided under Section 11, Rule 70
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dr. Montemayor filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) the instant Administrative Complaint
charging Judge Bermejo with gross incompetence and
inefficiency, gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law, gross
misconduct, and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. Moreover, Judge Bermejo did not resolve the
three Motions for Execution and two Motions to Require
Defendant’s Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received
a Copy of the Judgment. Dr. Montemayor also avers that Judge
Bermejo prevented the transmittal of the records of the case
to the appellate court within 15 days from the perfection of
the appeal in violation of Section 6, Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court. According to him, it was only after the respondent Judge
received the defendant’s supersede as bond that the former
issued the Order dated May 5, 2003 directing the Branch Clerk
of Court to transmit the records of the case to the appellate
court.
The respondent Judge maintains that he is not liable
for delay in the rendition of judgment. In essence, he argues
that since the Order deeming the case submitted for resolution
was issued on September 23, 2002, the rendition of judgment
on October 10, 2002 was made within the mandatory 30-day
period.
ISSUE: WON the respondent judge is guilty of partiality,
violating the Canon 2 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. Under Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a
judge should avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety
in all activities. Specifically, under Rule 2.01 of the Code, a
judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The
appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public
confidence and the administration of justice as actual bias or
prejudice.
In this case, Judge Bermejo is suppressing proof of the
registry return receipts, in which case, he is not only guilty of
dragging his feet in the resolution of the motions but, worse,
bias in favor of the defendant. As per respondent Judge’s
excuse in the delay in acting upon the motions, the registry
receipts are indeed missing from the records but Judge
Bermejo is denying it to cover up such loss. This conclusion is
buttressed by the odd fact that, despite the seriousness of Dr.
Montemayor’s allegations, the respondent Judge has not
offered in these administrative proceedings any evidence of
the existence of the registry receipts. An obvious disregard of
keeping records is evidence of incompetence and lack of
professionalism. A judge is charged with exercising extra care
in ensuring that the records of the cases and official
documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification
for missing records save fortuitous events.
By countenancing, permitting, and even creating the many
delays in obvious disregard of the letter and the spirit of the
Rules of Court and the Rule on Summary Procedure, Judge
Bermejo has put in question his partiality. It bears reminding
him that a judge must at all times not only be impartial but
maintain the appearance of impartiality.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Judge
Juan O. Bermejo, Jr. of delay in the rendition of judgment in
violation of Rules 1.02 and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
for which he is fined the amount of P5,000.00. Respondent
Judge is also declared guilty of impropriety in violation of
Canon 2 of said Code and is fined the amount of P10,000.00.
iv. Propriety
Hadap v. Lee
A.M. No. 1665-MJ, 29 June 1982
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Hadap and thirty other
Barangay Captains, charging Municipal Judge Abelardo Lee, of
(1) Dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a Judge; (2)
Partiality in the administration of justice; (3) Using
prisoners/detailed persons for personal purposes; (4) Using
his residence as Municipal Judge's Office instead of the
Government Building where a room has been provided for the
purpose by the local government; (5) Habitual use of vulgar
and obscene words and phrases; and (6) Willful refusal to
attend regular flag ceremonies.
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
An extensive investigation was performed in which
findings led to a recommendation for the dismissal of all
charges except on two counts:
1. Dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a Judge
It was found that the Judge was writing and sending
of letters to one Mrs. Tuazon, inviting her to go to his house
after office hours, was motivated by an immoral purpose. It
may be argued that nobody may ever be held accountable for
an immoral intention not coupled with an act to implement the
intention but his letters constitute overt acts to open the door
for the commission of an immoral purpose. As admitted by the
Judge, he is alone in his big house for which reason he had to
ask at times the company of detention prisoners to sleep with
him. We have to reject as unsatisfactory or unbelievable that
the respondent, in sending the two letters was motivated by
the good intention of informing Mrs. Tuazon.
2. Habitual use of vulgar and obscene words and
phrases on wedding ceremonies.
During the Navarro-Jarme wedding, it was alleged
that the Judge waid, "You woman, you should satisfy sexually
your husband otherwise your husband will look for another
woman because the husband is sexually hot and you man, you
should continuously satisfy your wife otherwise your wife will
look for another man."
ISSUE: Whether Judge Lee may be held responsible for such
conduct.
HELD: Yes, he should be. The Canons of Judicial Ethics,
particularly Canon No. 3, provides:
"Avoidance of appearance of impropriety. - A judge's official
conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety, and
his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life,
should be beyond reproach." has been thrown to the winds.”
Such conduct and gutter-language is even rarely
heard in the slums. When used by a judge, respect for the
entire judiciary plummets to levels where people begin to
doubt the moral standard of judges and their capacity and
fitness to dispense justice. Judge Abelardo Lee is hereby
DISMISSED as Judge of the Municipal Court of Bacon,
Sorsogon, with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with
prejudice to re-employment in any national or local
government office or agency, including government owned or
controlled corporation or instrumentality.
Spouses Cabreana v. Avelino
A.M. No. 1733-CFI, 30 September 1981
FACTS: Complainant-spouses were plaintiffs in a complaint
for rescission of contract with damages filed with respondent’s
court against the defendant who sold them pieces of furniture
which were allegedly not made in accordance with
specifications and/or defective.
In this administrative complaint, complainants
charged respondent judge with "serious misconduct, abuse of
authority, prevarications and oppression" in connection with
the ocular inspection of the subject furniture which
respondent conducted personally at complainants’ residence.
Respondent asked for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
basis. Upon manifestation of the parties, the case was
submitted for resolution, based solely on complainants’ joint
affidavit and the transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings during the ocular inspection, and respondent’s
answer.
The Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals
observed, that during the entire ocular inspection, respondent
judge participated most actively, asking question and making
comments and observations which conveyed the impression
that he was brusque and severe towards the complainants;
that he displayed undue interference in the conduct of the
inspection or trial and showed unwarranted intolerance and
unjustified impatience to the point of almost maliciously
distorting facts in the presence of complainants and despite
their protest; that he practically charged complainants with
planting evidence; and that he went to the residence of
complainants for the inspection in the company of and riding
in the car of defendant, all of which constitute reprehensible
conduct on the part of respondent judge who is supposed to
be an impartial person. The Investigating Justice
recommended respondent’s suspension for one month.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge’s actuations
constitute serious misconduct.
RULING:
Yes. The observations and conclusions of the
Investigating Justice in the case at bar that during the entire
ocular inspection, respondent judge participated most
actively, asking questions and making comments and
observations which conveyed the impression that he was
brusque and severe towards complainant; that he displayed
undue interference in the conduct of the inspection or trial and
showed unwarranted intolerance and unjustified impatience
to the point of almost maliciously distorting facts in the
presence of complainants and despite their protest; that he
practically charged complainants with planting evidence; and
that he went to the residence of complainants for the
inspection in the company of and riding in the car of the
defendant, all of which constitute reprehensible conduct on
the part of respondent judge who is supposed to be an
impartial person, are fully substantiated and supported by the
evidence on record. Indeed, it appears clear that respondent
judge falls short of the required judicial norm of conduct. That
the acts complained of have been done in the performance of
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
official duties, as respondent contends, aggravates his
intolerance, lack of restraint, and impatience.
The Supreme Court found the Inquest Justice’s
observations and conclusions to be supported by the evidence
on record and held that respondent Judge falls short of the
required judicial norm of conduct, aggravated by the fact that
the acts complained of have been done in the performance of
his official duties. For his serious misconduct, respondent was
ordered to pay a fine equivalent to his three (3) months’ salary
and was warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
Dionisio v. Escano
A.M. No. RTJ-98-1400, 1 February 1999
FACTS: Escano posted an advertisement for waitresses and
singers to work at his restaurant at the RTC bulletin board. He
also conducted interviews for this in his sala. He was later
caught when a reporter from “Hoy Gising!” taped an interview
which revealed that he intended to operate a drinking pub
with scantily clad waitresses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Escano violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RULING: Yes.
SUSPENDED. Rules 2.00, 5.02 and 5.03 provide that a judge
should avoid impropriety and even the appearance of
impropriety. He should also refrain from financial and business
dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court’s
impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial
activities, or increase involvement with lawyers and litigants.
He should also manage financial interests so as to minimize the
number of cases giving grounds for disqualification. Finally, the
halls of justice should not be used for unrelated purposes.
Reyes v. Duque
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2136, 21 September 2010
FACTS: Reyes charged respondent Judge Duque of the RTC,
Branch 197, Las Piñas City, with Impropriety, Corruption and
Gross Misconduct. Reyes alleged that she was a party-in-
intervention in Land Registration Case No. 06-005 entitled “In
re: Petition of Philippine Savings Bank for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession under Act No. 3135 over two (2) properties filed by
the Philippine Savings Bank against the spouses Choi. Judge
Duque granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of the bank and ordered the spouses Choi
and all those claiming rights under them to vacate the
properties covered by TCT Nos. T-85172, T-84848, and T-84847
situated in BF Resort Village, Talon 2, Las Piñas. On August 13,
2007, Reyes filed an Urgent Petition for Lifting and Setting
Aside of Writ of Possession and Quashal of Notice to Vacate,
claiming that she bought the subject property covered by TCT
No. T-85172 from the spouses Choi and that she was in actual
possession of the property with full knowledge of the bank.
At the hearing of Reyes’ petition, Atty. Herminio
Ubana, Sr., the lawyer of Reyes, introduced her to Judge Duque
who allegedly gave Reyes 30 days to settle matters with the
bank. Reyes was unable to re-negotiate with the bank. On the
first week of December 2007, Reyes allegedly received a phone
call from Judge Duque and the latter instructed Reyes to go “to
his house and bring some money in order that he can deny the
pending motion to break open.” As she did not have the money
yet, Reyes allegedly told Judge Duque that she would see him
the following day as her allotment might arrive by that time.
The following day, Reyes went to the PNB Cubao Branch in
Quezon City to withdraw P20,000. She, her secretary, and
driver went to the house of Judge Duque. The son of Judge
Duque opened the gate. At his house, Judge Duque demanded
P100,000. Reyes gave him P20,000 and she asked for time to
give him the balance. After a week, Atty. Ubana called Reyes
telling her that Judge Duque was asking for her and waiting for
the balance he demanded. On December 21,2007, Reyes went
to the house of Judge Duque with P18,000 on hand. Judge
Duque allegedly scolded her for not bringing the whole
amount of P80,000. Reyes explained that she had difficulty
raising the amount. Judge Duque locked the main door of his
house and asked Reyes to step into his office. Judge Duque
pointed to a calendar posted on the wall and pointed to
December 26 as the date when she should complete the
amount. All of a sudden, Judge Duque held the waist of Reyes,
embraced and kissed her. Reyes tried to struggle and free
herself. Judge Duque raised her skirt, opened her blouse and
sucked her breasts. He touched her private parts and
attempted to have sexual intercourse with Reyes. Reyes
shouted for help, but the TV was too loud. As a desperate
move, Reyes appealed to Judge Duque saying: “kung gusto mo,
huwag dito. Sa hotel, sasama ako sayo.” Judge Duque suddenly
stopped his sexual advances and ordered Reyes to fix her hair.
ISSUE: WON Judge Duque is guilty of impropriety and gross
misconduct.
HELD:
Yes. After a thorough investigation conducted by the
Investigating Justice, it was established, and Judge Duque
admitted, that Reyes went to his house. Substantial evidence
also pointed to Judge Duque’s liability for impropriety and
gross misconduct when he sexually assaulted Reyes. There is
no need to detail again the lewd acts of Judge Duque. The
Investigating Justice’s narration was sufficient and thorough.
The Investigating Justice likewise observed that Judge Duque
merely attempted to destroy the credibility of Reyes when he
insinuated that she could be a "woman of ill repute or a high
class prostitute" or one whose "moral value is at its lowest
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
level." However, no judge has a right to solicit sexual favors
from a party litigant even from a woman of loose morals.
Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all of their activities. Judges should conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to
freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in
exercising such rights, they should always conduct themselves
in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office
and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
The conduct of Judge Duque fell short of the exacting
standards for members of the judiciary. He failed to behave in
a manner that would promote confidence in the judiciary.
Considering that a judge is a visible representation of the law
and of justice, he is naturally expected to be the epitome of
integrity and should be beyond reproach. Judge Duque’s
conduct indubitably bore the marks of impropriety and
immorality. He failed to live up to the high moral standards of
the judiciary and even transgressed the ordinary norms of
decency of society. Had Judge Duque not retired, his
misconduct would have merited his dismissal from the service.
(₱40,000 FINE, to be deducted from his retirement benefits).
Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC,
Br. 2. Batangas City
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, 2 April 2014
FACTS: Lorenzana was the Executive Vice President and Chief
Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the Philippines, a
company undergoing rehabilitation proceedings. He filed a
verified complaint against Judge Austria, the presiding judge of
the proceedings, alleging that the latter committed Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross
Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the
Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of
Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to
Observe Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of
Responsibility for having biases against SCP and working for
her own personal motives, and for posting inappropriate
photos of herself on the social networking site, Friendster.
Austria denied the claims and asserted that she was
only exercising her functions as presiding judge to provide
fairness and equity to the parties. She furthermore asserted
that her photos were in no way inappropriate as to warrant
administrative sanctions.
The investigating justice, ruled that the issues were
judicial in nature since it involved Austria’s appreciation of
evidence, and that the complainant failed to present clear and
convincing proof of bias and partiality. However, The
investigating justice found that the respondent judge was
unnecessarily arrogant in dealing with SCP’s legal counsel, in
violation of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge was guilty of
the charges imputed to her
RULING
Yes. On the matter of conduct unbecoming of a judge,
the Court ruled that a judge should always conduct himself in
a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and
respect for himself or herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a
whole. The respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s
legal counsel, her expressions of exasperation over trivial
procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as
her condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot
allow.
On the ground of impropriety, the Court ruled that
while judges are not prohibited from becoming members of
and from taking part in social networking activities, they do not
shed off their status as judges. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other
citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression so long as they
always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.
Wherefore, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria
guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law for which she is fined
Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (P21,000,00). Judge Austria is
likewise hereby admonished to refrain from further acts of
impropriety and to refrain from conduct unbecoming of a
judge, with the stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee hearing held on September 26, 2013 Against
Associate Justice Gregory S . Ong, Sandiganbayan
A.M . No. SB-14-21-J. 23 September 2014
Facts:
In the middle of 2013, local media ran an expose on
the “pork barrel scam”. In the course of the investigations
conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee, names of certain
government officials had allegedly transacted with the
mastermind of the scam, Mrs. Napoles. One of the names was
that of respondent, incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice Gregory S. Ong. Marina Sula, an employee under Ms.
Napoles, claims that respondent Justice Ong visited Ms.
Napoles. Justifying such visit, respondent admits that he went
to Napoles’ office twice saying that at Jinggoy Estrada’s
birthday, Napoles approached him and introduced herself.
Respondent claims that she talked about charity works and
mentioned that Msgr. Ramirez is in possession of the robe of
the Holy Black Nazarene. Respondent was then interested as
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 Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law
Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo
he wanted to be healed so he asked if he could have access to
it. Napoles made some arrangements and respondent gained
access to the robe, thus, his visit to Napoles’ office to give her
his thanks. Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent,
inviting him to her office, but he kept on declining. Then finally
after two weeks, he acceded for she might think he is "walang
kwentang tao." They just engaged in a small talk for about 30
minutes and had coffee.
Issue:
WON respondents acts meet the required propriety
of a judge
Ruling:
No, respondent’s acts do not meet the required
propriety of a judge.
Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
In the case at bar, respondent cannot be excused for
his unconcern for the position he holds. The reason for his first
visit was to thank Napoles for her help in making it possible for
him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. Instead of
visiting her, respondent could have extended his gratitude by
simply calling her by phone. Worse, he visited her again
because she may think he is an unworthy person. This is an
extremely frail reason.
Therefore, for the display of unconcern for the
position he holds, respondent is guilty of impropriety and his
acts are violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
v. Equality
Atty. Mane v. Judge Belen.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119, June 30, 2008
FACTS: An alumnus of a particular law school has no
monopoly of knowledge of the law.
Petitioner Atty. Melvin Mane filed a letter-complaint
to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging
respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of demeaning,
humiliating, and berating him during a hearing of Rural Bank of
Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samue Malabanan, et al. where Mane was
counsel for the plaintiff. During the proceedings, Belen asked
Mane about the latter’s law school. When Mane answered
that he came from Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU), Belen
told him: Then you’re not from UP. Then you cannot equate
yourself to me because there is a saying and I know this, not
all law students are created equal, not all law schools are
created equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite what
the Supreme Being that we all are created equal in His form
and substance.
Belen further lambasted Mane and lectured him on
the latter’s person, seemingly disregarding the case at hand.
Subsequently, the OCA, upon evaluation, found that
Belen’s insulting remarks were unwarranted and inexcusable
and recommended a reprimand of Belen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the statements and actions made by
Judge Belen during the hearing constitute conduct
unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct
HELD
The Court held that an alumnus of a particular law
school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling
the Bar Examinations which the Court administers, taking of
the Lawyer’s oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a
lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions
and duties as, inter alia an officer of the court, irrespective of
where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine
the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on his alma
mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad
hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not
the person of the counsel. If Judge Belen felt that his integrity
and dignity were being assaulted, he acted properly when he
directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for
contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he engaged
on a supercilious legal and personal discourse.
The Court reminded members of the bench that even
on the face of boorish behavior from those they deal with, they
ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen
and high officers of the court.
vi. Competence and diligence
c. Disciple of member of the Judiciary
i. Members of the Supreme Court
-Constitutional provisions on impeachment
ii. Lower court judges and Justices of the Court of Appeals and
Sandiganbayan
-Section 11, Art. VIII, 1986 Constitution
-Rule 140, Rules of Court
iii. Grounds
iv. Sanctions
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