Fall 2017

Political Economy in the Shadow of Conflict

SA.610.702.01
Professor Andrew Cheon
08/07/2017

*Disclaimer: Please note that the syllabus may

change before or during the class. The most up-to-
date syllabus can be found in Blackboard.
 SA.610.702
Political Economy in the Shadow of Conflict
FALL 2017

Andrew Cheon
Email: acheon1@jhu.edu
Phone: (202) 587-3252
Seminar: Thurs, 8:30 - 10:30 AM
Office: Bernstein-Offit Building 737
Office Hours: Thurs, 11:00 - 12:00 noon

Description
This is an advanced research seminar that examines theoretical and empirical work at the intersection
of political economy and conflict studies. The seminar, intended for students with working knowledge
of IR theory, will encourage critical engagement of the latest examples of scholarship on the subject,
challenging their assumptions, interrogating their internal logic, and devising rigorous new ways to test
their observable implications.
The seminar has two distinct characteristics. First, the assigned readings and weekly discussions will be
organized around “mechanisms” and themes, consistent with the focus of the seminar on identifying room
for contribution in the most current literature. Second, while prior knowledge of quantitative methods
is not a requirement, insightful methodological critique of the readings, as well as original research that
demonstrates creativity in theory testing, will be most welcome.
An integral component of the seminar will be an original research paper, the contribution of which
may be theoretical or empirical. Over the course of the semester, students will have numerous opportuni-
ties to consult with the professor, as well as present their research to colleagues for constructive feedback
in an in-class workshop. Papers developed in this seminar may form the basis for an honors paper or an
independent study.

Course Objectives
The acronym, TRACK, can summarize the criteria by which students can keep track of their progress.

Theoretically-grounded: By the end of this course, students will be able to recognize, engage, and de-
velop their own taste for theoretically-grounded arguments in international relations.

Rigorous: The research paper component and the frequent consultations with the professor will encour-
age students to become not only consumers but also producers of knowledge. These sessions will focus
on how to collect and present the most compelling empirical evidence in favor of or against theoretically-
grounded arguments.

Articulate: The presentation component and the weekly discussions are designed to equip students with
the necessary vocabulary to articulate their own theoretical arguments in a coherent and convincing way.
Their theoretical formulations will be constantly challenged, sharpening their logic and strengthening the
presentation of empirical evidence in the process.

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Critical: The reaction paper component will encourage critical engagement of the assigned readings, both
theoretical and empirical. Interrogating the assumptions behind theories, as well as the strength of the em-
pirical evidence, students will emerge from the course as critical consumers of scholarship.

Key Debates: Last but not least, students will gain an understanding of the key and ongoing debates in
international relations, such as the importance of institutions, audience costs, leaders, bargaining, reputa-
tion, interdependence, and ideas.

Requirements
As a prerequisite, students should have taken Theories of International Relations or passed the core exam.
Students with a background in IR theory outside the context of SAIS are encouraged to consult with the
professor prior to finalizing their enrollment.
Students are expected to attend every session prepared to discuss the assigned readings. While the
professor will provide the context behind the readings and a broad overview of substantive arguments,
the quality of the discussion will depend in part on student preparation and active participation. Student
grades are based on participation (10%), presentation (10%), reaction paper (20%), and research paper
(60%). Auditors are required to formally register and attend all sessions prepared to discuss the readings.

Course Outline
1. Review of IR and rationalist foundations, September 7th, 2017

• James D. Fearon. Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3):379–414, 1995
• Geoffrey Blainey. The Causes of War. The Free Press, 3rd edition, 1988, Chapter 8
• Thomas C. Schelling. The Strategy of Conflict. Oxford University Press, London, 1963, Chapter 2

2. Role of institutions, September 14th, 2017

• Kenneth A. Schultz and Barry R. Weingast. The democratic advantage: Institutional foundations
of financial power in international competition. International Organization, 57(1):3–42, 2003
• Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam. Democracies at War. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002,
Chapter 2
• James D. Fearon. Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. Ameri-
can Political Science Review, 88(3):577–592, 1994

3. Role of communication, September 21st, 2017

• Kenneth A. Schultz. Domestic opposition and signaling in international crises. American Political
Science Review, 92(4):829–844, December 1998
• Jessica Chen Weiss. Authoritarian signaling, mass audiences, and nationalist protest in China. In-
ternational Organization, 67(1):1–35, 2013
• Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard. The cost of empty threats: A penny, not a pound. American
Political Science Review, 105(3):437–456, 2011

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Recommended:

• Joshua D. Kertzer and Ryan Brutger. Decomposing audience costs: Bringing the audience back into
audience cost theory. American Journal of Political Science, 60(1):234–249, 2016

• Kenneth Schultz. Do democratic institutions constrain or inform? International Organization,

53(2):233–266, 1999

4. Role of interest groups, September 28th, 2017

• Jeffry Frieden. The economics of intervention: American overseas investments and relations with
underdeveloped areas, 1890-1950. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 31(1):55–80, 1989

• Kevin Narizny. The Political Economy of Grand Strategy. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2007,
Chapter 1

• Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley. Sailing the Water’s Edge: The Domestic Politics of American
Foreign Policy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2016, Chapter 3

5. Role of reputation, October 5th, 2017

• Thomas Schelling. Arms and Influence. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966, Chapter 2

• Jonathan Mercer. Reputation And International Politics. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1996,
Chapters 2 and 5

• Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo. Revisiting reputation: How past actions matter in interna-
tional politics. International Organization, 69(2):473–495, 2015

• Michael Tomz. Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007, Chapters 1, 2, and 9

6. Role of interdependence, October 12, 2017

• Stephen G. Brooks. Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing
Calculus of Conflict. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007, Chapters 1, 3, and 6

• Dale C. Copeland. Economic Interdependence and War. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014,
Chapter 1

• Sergey Mityakov, Heiwai Tang, and Kevin K. Tsui. International politics and import diversification.
Journal of Law and Economics, 56(4):1091–1121, 2013

Recommended:

• Paul A. Papayoanou. Interdependence, institutions, and the balance of power: Britain, Germany,
and World War I. International Security, 20(4):42–76, 1996

• Peter Liberman. Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1998

• Christopher F. Gelpi and Joseph M. Grieco. Democracy, interdependence, and the sources of the
liberal peace. Journal of Peace Research, 45(1):17–36, 2008

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 • Andrew Cheon and Johannes Urpelainen. Escaping oil’s stranglehold: When do states invest in
energy security? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(6), 2015

7. Role of deterrence, October 19, 2017

• James D. Fearon. Signaling versus the balance of power and interests: An empirical test of a crisis
bargaining model. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38(2):236–269, 1994

• Austin Carson and Keren Yarhi-Milo. Covert communication: The intelligibility and credibility of
signaling in secret. Security Studies, 26(1):124–156, 2017

• Keren Yarhi-Milo, Joshua D. Kertzer, and Jonathan Renshon. Tying hands, sinking costs, and leader
attributes. Working paper, February 2017

Recommended:

• Paul K. Huth. Extended deterrence and the outbreak of war. American Political Science Review,
82(2):423–443, 1988

• Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein. Deterrence: The elusive dependent variable. World
Politics, 42(3):336–369, 1990

• Paul Huth and Bruce Russett. Testing deterrence theory: Rigor makes a difference. World Politics,
42(4):466–501, 1990

8. Role of ideas, October 26, 2017

• Ronald R. Krebs. How dominant narratives rise and fall: Military conflict, politics, and the Cold
War consensus. International Organization, 69(4):809–845, 2015

• Joshua D. Kertzer. Making sense of isolationism: Foreign policy mood as a multilevel phenomenon.
Journal of Politics, 75(1):225–240, 2013

• Jonathan Renshon. Status deficits and war. International Organization, 70(3):513–550, 2016

• Background: Emanuel Adler. Constructivism in international relations: Sources, contributions, and

debates. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, editors, Handbook of Interna-
tional Relations, chapter 5. Sage Publications, London

Recommended:

• Stacie Goddard. When right makes might: How Prussia overturned the European balance of power.
International Security, 33(3):110–142, 2008/09

• Robert Jervis. Understanding beliefs. Political Psychology, 27(5):641–663, 2006

• Ron E. Hassner. “To halve and to hold”: Conflicts over sacred space and the problem of indivisibility.
Security Studies, 12(4):1–33, 2003

• Alastair Iain Johnston. Thinking about strategic culture. International Security, 19(4):32–64, 1995

9. Role of alliances, November 2nd, 2017

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 • Thomas J. Christensen. Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy
in Asia. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011, Chapter 5

• Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper. Strategic logic of arms transfers and
alliances. International Security, 41(2):90–139, 2016

• Michael Beckley. The myth of entangling alliances: Reassassing the security risks of U.S. defense
pacts. International Security, 39(4):7–48, 2015

10. Role of leaders, November 9th, 2017

• Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. The Logic
of Political Survival. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, Chapter 1

• Giacomo Chiozza and H.E. Goemans. International conflict and the tenure of leaders: Is war still
ex post inefficient? American Journal of Political Science, 48(3):604–619, 2004

• Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis. Why Leaders Fight. Cambridge University
Press, New York, 2015, Chapter 2

11. Role of bargaining, November 16th, 2017

• Dan Reiter. How Wars End. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009, Chapters 2, 3, and 5

• Hein Goemans. War Termination. In Robert A. Denemark, editor, The International Studies Asso-
ciation Compendium Project. Blackwell Publishing, Ltd., 2009

• Virginia Page Fortna. Scraps of paper? Agreements and the durability of peace. International Orga-
nization, 57(2):337–372, 2003

Recommended:

• Thomas J. Christensen. Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American
Conflict, 1947-1958. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996

• Abhinay Muthoo. A non-technical introduction to bargaining theory. World Economics, 1(2):145–

166, 2000

[****Fall Break, November 23, 2017****]

12. Student Presentations, November 30, 2017

13. Rise of China, December 7th, 2017

• Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry. Racing toward tragedy?: China’s rise, military competition in
the Asia Pacific, and the security dilemma. International Security, 39(2):52–91, 2014

• Taylor Fravel. Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008, Chapter 1

• Oriana Skylar Mastro. The vulnerability of rising powers: The logic behind China’s low military
transparency. Asian Security, 12(2):63–81, 2016