CONSTI cases

1. *Article 8, Section 1

Ilustrative Cases

 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 US) 137, 2 l. ed. 60 (1803)

Brief Fact Summary. William Marbury (Marbury), an end-of-term appointee of President John Adams
(President Adams) to a justice of the peace position in the District of Columbia, brought suit against
President Thomas Jefferson’s (President Jefferson) Secretary of State, James Madison, seeking delivery
of his commission.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has constitutional
authority to review executive actions and legislative acts. The Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction,
the bounds of which are set by the United States Constitution (Constitution), which may not be
enlarged by the Congress.

Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams attempted to secure
Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with Federalist
appointees. Included in these efforts was the nomination by President Adams, under the Organic Act of
the District of Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the District, which were
confirmed by the Senate the day before President Jefferson’s inauguration. A few of the commissions,
including Marbury’s, were undelivered when President Jefferson took office. The new president
instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions. Marbury sought
mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to deliver his commission.

Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?

Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

As the President signed Marbury’s commission after his confirmation, the appointment has been made,
and Marbury has a right to the commission
Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver Marbury’s commission, that
the Supreme Court has the power to review executive actions when the executive acts as an officer of
the law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct an officer of the government “to do a
particular thing therein specified,”� mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme
Court.
To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original action, which is (in this
case) outside the constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.

Discussion. The importance of Marbury v. Madison is both political and legal. Although the case
establishes the traditions of judicial review and a litigable constitution on which the remainder of
constitutional law rests, it also transformed the Supreme Court from an incongruous institution to an
equipotent head of a branch of the federal government.

 Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-36142. March 31, 1973

FACTS:

On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases,
Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the
provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition
filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and
in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had
announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents
including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
constitution upon ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority
to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to
proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to
ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree,
and proclamation which have the same import and objective.

ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political
question, and therefore non-justiciable.
2.Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been
ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
3.Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid
ratification) by the people.
4.Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5.Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.

HELD:

First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said
new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is
well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled
applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old
constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we
patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.

Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the
qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.

The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void.
Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age
can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s
Assemblies must be considered null and void.

Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution
envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the
persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the
American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely,
uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the
advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the
election returns.

The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is
void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention
of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of
those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no
reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said
plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the
fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and
honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is
null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution.

Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution
places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive. But there is not even a
certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon
in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of
Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had certified to the President
the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizen’s assemblies did not
adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no
such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the
Philippines.

Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive
Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the
proposed Constitution.

A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the
acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of
Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in
session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of
Public Officers. The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not
constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that
the people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of
Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary
effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said
Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these
conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.

As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the
same refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both
Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is
an act of the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which
Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.

In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be
given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not
been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or
has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force
and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice
to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or
rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the
Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.

Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold
that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes
on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted
or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself
voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the
result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

 Lagman vs Medialdea G.R. No. 231658/G.R. No. 231771/G.R. No. 231774. July 4, 2017

FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
In accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President, on May 25, 2017,
submitted to Congress a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless
violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
On May 23, 2017, as the President stated in his Report, the Maute terrorist group took over a hospital in
Marawi City; established several checkpoints within the city; burned down certain government and
private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces; and started flying the flag of
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby indicating a removal of allegiance
from the Philippine Government and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities – the
President, foremost – of their powers and prerogatives.
The Report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City; the role it plays in Mindanao, and
the Philippines as a whole; and the possible tragic repercussions once it falls under the control of the
lawless groups.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate declared that it found “no compelling
reason to revoke Proclamation 216.
The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned the Supreme Court,
questioning the factual basis of President Duterte’s Proclamation of martial law.
ISSUES:
[1] W/N the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding” covered by paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the Court;
[2] A. Is the President required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts?
B. Is the President required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon bf the Secretary of
National Defense? C. Is the President is required to take into account only the situation at the time of
the proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported?
[3] Is the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual
actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately;
[4] W/N there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; A. What are the parameters for review? B. Who has the
burden of proof? C. What is the threshold of evidence?
[5] Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of
graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief?
[6] W/N Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and thus null and void: a.
with its inclusion of “other rebel groups;” or b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual
operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region;
[7] W/N the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President to
Congress are sufficient bases: a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or b. for a declaration of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region;
[8] W/N terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion and the
requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; and
[9] W/N nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of23 May 2017 will: A. have the effect of recalling
Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or B. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces
to quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.

RULING:
1. The Court agrees that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of Section
18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. The phrase “in an
appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers
to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers, as in these cases.
It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
2. a.) In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis,
and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of
the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be
expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency
of the situation. To require him otherwise would impede the process of his decision-
making.
b.) The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A plain reading of
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President’s power to declare
martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or
rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense
if the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter
ego. Only on the President can exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.
c.) As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law
and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of
Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call
of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual
basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by or
available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension which facts or
information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to
Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was
made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from the present depends on
the President.
3. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section
18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is independent of the actions taken by Congress.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed
by any citizen on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress
may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not
only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they
have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation.
4. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual
rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur;
and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or
invasion.
The President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in determining
the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law, and that
probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient standard by which
the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary for a
declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. To require him to satisfy a higher
standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers.
5. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the
calibration of the President’s decision of which among his graduated powers he will avail of
in a given situation. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive
domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially,
lies with the President.
6. a.) Inclusion of “other rebel groups ” does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague. The
term “other rebel groups” in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the
context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to
“other rebel groups” found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its
Whereas clauses.
b.) Lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague.
Operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the
proclamation.
There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or
operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the
proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Any act committed under the said orders in
violation of the Constitution and the laws should be resolved in a separate proceeding.
Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as
trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its
power to revoke.
7. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus. By a review of the facts available to him that there was an armed
public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the
Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any
of his power and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable
cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires
the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a
valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
8. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. Rebellion may be subsumed under the
crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In
fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can be committed.
Meanwhile, public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. For a declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there
must be concurrence of 1.) actual rebellion or invasion and 2.) the public safety
requirement.
In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the
Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or establishment but
 likewise against civilians and their properties. There were bomb threats, road blockades,
burning of schools and churches, hostages and killings of civilians, forced entry of young
male Muslims to the group, there were hampering of medical services and delivery of basic
services, reinforcement of government troops, among others. These particular scenarios
convinced the President that the atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public
safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
9. a.) The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law
and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55.
The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law. Even
so, the Court’s review of the President’s declaration of martial law and his calling out the
Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular purpose.
b.) Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the
acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the operative fact doctrine,” the
unconstitutional statute is recognized as an “operative fact” before it is declared
unconstitutional.
***
Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region. The Court FINDS
sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as
CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

 The Trillanes amnesty controversy – see links sent by email

In issuing Proclamation No. 572, the President revoked the amnesty granted to Senator Sonny Trillanes
for being void ab initio on the ground that he did not comply with the "minimum requirements to
qualify under the amnesty proclamation."

The Proclamation cited a certification from the Armed Forces of the Philippines' Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel that there is no available copy of Trillanes' application for amnesty, and
that he refused to admit his guilt. Much like Sereno who was booted out of office after her appointment
was declared void ab initio, Trillanes now finds himself under threat of arrest after his amnesty
proclamation is being revoked for the same reason.

A patent illegality
The revocation of the Trillanes amnesty is illegal. Without any doubt, Proclamation 572 is a patent
illegality, if not outright unconstitutional. It is riddled with legal loopholes to such an extent that it
gives the unmistakable impression that it has been dished out for no other reason than to silence a
staunch and implacable critic of the President.

Proclamation 75, under which Senator Trillanes applied for amnesty in connection with his
involvement in the Oakwood mutiny, was processed by the military, approved by then president
Benigno Aquino III, and concurred in by Congress.

Unlike pardon, amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which Trillanes was charged that he, being released by
amnesty, stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. There is no question
that Trillanes is a grantee of a valid amnesty proclamation, as such his criminal liability was fully
extinguished.

Contrary to the President’s statement that Trillanes did not submit an application and a copy of which
cannot be found in the Requirement Room, there is ample evidence that this application was in fact
submitted. Abigail Valte, a spokesperson of former President Aquino, in fact shared on Twitter a photo
of Trillanes' amnesty application and a video of the document's filing.

Even assuming that a copy of the application could not be found, can the presumption of regularity at
least be held in favor of the officials who issued, processed, and had custody of his amnesty
application? Same goes with Trillanes’ admission of guilt which, prior to the issuance of Proclamation
572, had never been questioned nor put under scrutiny by the previous administrations.

The Proclamation tethers as an ex post facto law for ostensibly inflicting punishment upon Trillanes for
an act done prior to its issuance when before the eyes of the law, he has not committed any crime. It is
akin to a bill of attainder which singles out the opposition senator for punishment without trial. Both
are proscribed under the Constitution and have no place in a democratic and civilized society.

It should also be noted that an amnesty is not a unilateral act by the President. Granting it required
congressional concurrence. This is to make sure the whole government, indeed the country, is bound
that decision. It cannot be undone by the presidential fiat.
Other Stories

DOCUMENT: Proclamation No. 572 voiding Trillanes' amnesty

Here's a copy of President Rodrigo Duterte's Proclamation No 572 voiding amnesty granted to Senator
Antonio Trillanes IV and ordering the military and police to apprehend him

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dissent and political opposition,' the Amnesty International report says

That the President is ordering the immediate arrest of Trillanes, a civilian, is another reason to declare
the Proclamation illegal. We all know that a warrant to arrest an individual can only be issued by the
courts. The President is but the chief implementor or executive and is not vested under the Constitution
with judicial powers. Hence, he cannot simply order the arrest of an individual whimsically, without a
judicial fiat.

The courts on the other hand cannot issue an arrest warrant for cases that have already been dismissed
by virtue of the amnesty.

An unwise policy

The revocation of the Trillanes amnesty is not right for the country long-term. Indeed, policy-wise, the
revocation of any amnesty is disastrous for a country riven by social conflicts. Time and again, political
amnesties have been resorted to as a means of healing social and national strife.

In the Philippine-American war, as the hostilities wound down, amnesty was resorted to so that
everyone would have an option to come down from the hills. After World War II, even as it was
controversial, amnesty was offered even to collaborators with the Japanese so the country could move
on. In the 1960s and 1970s, and even during the Martial Law era, amnesties were resorted to bring the
Huks, Moro rebels, and other groups back to the fold of the law.

More recently, members of the Moro National Liberation Front, the Cordillera People’s Liberation
Army, several left-wing groups independent of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and military
rebels were granted amnesty. In the future, amnesty has to be granted to the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front as well as the cadres and combatants of the Communist Party of the Philippines, New People’s
Army, and National Democratic Front of the Philippines if a permanent peace settlement is achieved
with the latter groups.

As far as I know, there has never been an instance when amnesty given by one president has been
revoked by a subsequent president. If this becomes a rule, future presidents would have lost an
important tool for national healing and unity. Who would trust any president who makes promises to
rebel groups if his or her successor could at a whim revoke an amnesty?

Immoral and unjust

The revocation of the Trillanes amnesty is evil. It is immoral and unjust because it is done for a
personal reason, for partisan political motives, and not for the good of the country.

Most of President Duterte’s most vociferous critics have been silenced or are in danger of being
silenced. First on the chopping block was Senator Leila de Lima who had the misfortune of initiating
an investigation against then mayor Duterte for supposed human rights violations when she was still
the head of the Commission on Human Rights.

Then the Commission on Human Rights itself was attacked when it questioned the President’s
prosecution of the war on drugs, the administration’s centerpiece campaign. His allies in Congress
made an attempt to emasculate the constitutional body with a paltry P1,000-budget. Fortunately, this
attempt proved too blatant even for administration allies. Then came former chief justice Maria
Lourdes Sereno who had to go after she was ousted under dubious circumstances by her own
colleagues via a quo warranto conviction.
Vice President Leni Robredo’s position is also under threat because of a pending electoral protest
before the Supreme Court sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. Of course, we all have been
witness to the verbal attacks made by no less than Duterte against the Catholic Church, the President’s
favorite whipping boy, which remains an influential institution in the country.

So, it is no small wonder that Senator Trillanes, President Duterte’s nemesis, would be targeted next. If
at all, it is a cause of wonderment why it took this government so long, more than two years, to make
its move. It may be because the senator proved to be the hardest nut to crack of all the lot.

Considering all the recent actions being undertaken by this administration to stifle any and all
opposition and critics, coupled with the President’s chilling pronouncements giving preference to a
dictatorship or a military junta over the Vice President, as the mandated Constitutional successor, one
cannot help but entertain the thought that we are inexorably sliding towards an extraconstitutional
regime.

Is a repeat of the Marcos dictatorial regime in the offing? After Trillanes, who’s next? The prospects are
simply too chilling to contemplate. – Rappler.com