Assignment

REASONS OF THE FAILURE OF A STRUCTURE

Submitted to: Dr. Burhan Shareef

Muhammad Sultan (2018-MS-CES-27)

| Seismic design of structures |

12-03-2019
 Hanshin Expressway
Introduction
The collapse of 18 spans (total length 630 m) of the Hanshin Expressway Route 3
elevated highway bridge in Fukae during the 1995 Kobe earthquake was investigated.
The overturned concrete deck was monolithically connected to 3.1 m diameter circular
column piers, founded on 17-pile groups in alluvium sand and gravel. The collapse has
been attributed by many research engineers to inadequate structural design, stemming
from insufficient and prematurely terminated longitudinal reinforcement, inadequate hoop
anchorage, and (for the large intensity of shaking) insufficient shear capacity. The
importance of other factors has been largely ignored. The role of Soil Foundation
Structure Interaction (SFSI) was significant and decisively detrimental cause the failure
of the structure.
Reasons of collapse
The extreme distress of the structure severely affected the piles, which were found to
have suffered flexural cracking near their top; lateral pile load tests confirmed the decline
of their structural stiffness and strength by about 50%. But the stiffness of the pile-soil
system apparently only marginally decreased.

(Photo from: The January 17, 1995 Kobe Earthquake: An EQE Summary Report. April 1995)
The fundamental flaw in bridge and highway construction was emphasis on brute
strength. Massive round RC pillars were ineffectively relied upon for seismic resistance.
The elevated highway overturned starting at a section where there is a transition from
steel girders to RC girders (Pollack, 1995). The additional weight from the concrete likely
caused the collapse. The Hanshin expressway failed in two other locations as well. In the
first location, the columns moved and displaced in opposite directions dislodging the
roadbed from supports. In the other location, there was shear and flexure failure in the
hammerhead RC piers. It is interesting to note that the Hanshin Expressway was
supported by a single row of columns, which allowed the roadbed to overturn (Pollack,
1995).

Bending of central columns of expressway, Kobe earthquake. (Photo from: The January 17, 1995
Kobe Earthquake: An EQE Summary Report. April 1995)

The failure was triggered at the point where some of the longitudinal reinforcement was
terminated. The 180 longitudinal bars at the base of the 3.1 meter diameter columns were
reduced to 120 bars 2.5 m above ground level. These columns were designed according
to pre-1980 design specifications and were scheduled for retrofitting. The 1995 tentative
design specification no longer permits the termination of longitudinal reinforcement in
columns at mid-height. It also calls for reduction of shear reinforcement spacing from a
maximum of 30 cm to 15 cm.
Virtually every column-footing connection was investigated after the quake by direct
observation at the time of excavation. Very few cracks were found on the top surface of
footings. As for reinforced concrete piles, bore-hole cameras were used to determine their
condition. Tension cracks were observed near the top of piles supporting the piers of the
18-span viaduct section that collapsed. These piles were repaired by drilling a 36 mm
diameter hole at their center and subsequently filling it with very fine cement slurry.
Detailed investigations of the performance of Fukae section have been presented by
several authors who studied certain aspects of the problem to explain the inadequate
structural design of the piers for this earthquake. They considered factors such as:
1. The inadequate transverse reinforcement in the piers
2. The inadequate anchorage of longitudinal reinforcement
3. The use of un-conservative (elastic) methods to determine design shear forces
Super Structure Damage
Most superstructure damage was caused by the brittle failure of the steel bearings. The
percentage of steel bearings that suffered from severe damage was much higher than
that experienced by rubber bearings. Reports from an investigation by the U.S.-Japan
Program in Natural Resources (UJNR) indicated that premature failure of some bearings
appears to have reduced the seismic loads in their supporting substructures by
uncoupling the superstructure from the violent ground motions. This fuse like action may
have saved the columns from shear and flexural failure and saved a number of spans
from collapse. This points to the potential effectiveness of seismic isolation. Today, the
Japanese are relying more on the use of seismic isolation bearings. Isolation bearings
are very effective at sites with stable soil.
Conclusions
At least 60 percent of all bridge structures in the Kobe area were damaged. The damage
to the majority of reinforced concrete columns was no surprise once the column
reinforcement details were examined. The pre-dominate failure mechanism of these
columns was either shear failure or flexural shear degradation failure. These two types of
failure are related to a non-ductile design that is the result of inadequate shear or
confinement reinforcement. These bridges were designed and constructed in the 1960s
before the introduction of modern seismic codes.
Before the Hanshin/Awaji Earthquake, the Kobe area was considered to be a region of
low or even negligible risk of moderate earthquakes even though a past earthquake hit
the area causing light damage.
Analytical and recorded evidence is presented on the triple detrimental role of soil in the
collapse of Hanshin Expressway at Fukae. First, the soil modified the incoming seismic
waves such that the resulting ground surface motion became very severe for the
particular bridge. Second, the presence of compliant soil at the foundation resulted to an
increase in natural period of the bridge which moved to a region of stronger response;
third, ductility demand in the pier was higher than the ductility demand of the system. All
three phenomena might have simply worsen an already dramatic situation for the bridge
due to: (i) its proximity to the fault and the strong forward rupture directivity effects which
produced very high long period acceleration normal to the fault, which is exactly in the
transverse direction of the bridge; and (ii) the structural deficiencies of the pier which were
almost unavoidable given the time of design of the bridge (1969).

References:
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/3-540-27438-3_7
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/96fall/p96au17.cfm