The Court may, upon proper application by the plaintiff, order the

defendant to surrender the possession of the property to the

plaintiff even before the main case has been resolved. The order
of the court partakes only of an interim remedy because if the
evidence adduced in the proceedings unequivocally shows that it
is the defendant who is rightfully entitled to the possession of the
land, then a judgment awarding the possession to the defendant
will have to be rendered by the court.

CASE 1: The plaintiff-mortgagee files an action to foreclose the

real estate mortgage against the defendant. The subject building
is rapidly depreciating in value because of the gross neglect of
the mortgagor. What provisional remedy may be availed of?
A: The plaintiff-mortgagee may avail of a remedy even before the
finality of proceedings by applying for the appointment of a
receiver who will be tasked with the administration and
preservation of the property.

CASE 2: An illegitimate minor who, with the assistance of his

mother files an action for support against his natural father. The
minor is impoverished, the mother being sick, jobless and poor.
What is the provisional remedy available?
A: While the principal action for support is pending, he may apply
for support pendente lite or support pending the resolution of the
case.

NATURE OF PROVISIONAL REMEDIES:

1. Temporary, preliminary or tentative
2. They are not causes of action in themselves but merely
adjuncts to the main suit. Such remedies presuppose an
existing principal or main action.

PURPOSE OF PROVISIONAL REMEDIES:

1. To preserve or protect their rights or interests while the
main action is pending
2. To secure judgment
3. To preserve the status quo
4. To preserve the subject matter of the action

COURT WITH JURISDICTION OVER PROVISIONAL REMEDIES:

1. The court which grants or issues a provisional remedy is
the court which has jurisdiction over the main action.
2. The authority to grant a provisional remedy is not the
sole prerogative of superior courts. Even inferior courts
may grant a provisional remedy in an action pending
with it and within its jurisdiction.
3. Under Sec.33 of B.P. 129, as amended, the jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Court includes the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases
4. Where the principal action is for specific performance,
any provisional remedy applied for in the case can only
be issued by the RTC hearing the same case. The
provisional remedy cannot be issued by a MTC which
has no jurisdiction over an action for specific
performance, an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
5. Where the main action is one for support , the
provisional remedy for support pendent lite may not be
granted by a MTC because the main action is one within
the jurisdiction of the family court.

KINDS OF PROVISIONAL REMEDIES UNDER THE RULES OF COURT

1. Preliminary attachment
2. Preliminary injunction
3. Receivership
4. Replevin
5. Support pendent lite

G.R. No. 145368. April 12, 2002.*

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, respondent.

Constitutional Law; Ombudsman; Public Officers; The Ombudsman has the power to
investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or
employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; Public Officer Defined.—In
sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however,
defines who public officers are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is
that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject: A public office is the
right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer.

Same; Same; Same; The characteristics of a public office include the delegation of
sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary,
continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an
office.—The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the
delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath,
salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position
as an office.
Same; Same; Same; Court holds that the National Centennial Commission (NCC)
performs executive functions.—We hold that the NCC performs executive functions.
The executive power “is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the
laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their
due observance.” The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of
the policies as set forth by law.

Same; Same; Same; The NCC performs sovereign functions; It is a public office and
petitioner is a public officer.—Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is,
therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.

Same; Same; Same; Fact that petitioner did not receive any compensation during his
tenure is of little consequence.—That petitioner allegedly did not receive any
compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a
necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The
salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is
annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to
be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair
may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office
of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. But it is a public
office, nonetheless. Laurel vs. Desierto, 381 SCRA 48, G.R. No. 145368 April 12, 2002

Deposit as a provisional remedy in the exercise of equity

jurisdiction of the court:

CASE 3: In an action for specific performance and the

nullification of sale and title plus damages, the buyer moved that
the seller be ordered to deposit with the cashier of the trial court
the P10M down payment on the land paid by the buyer to
prevent the dissipation of the amount pending the resolution of
the case. The seller opposed this on the ground that deposit is
not one of the provisional remedies under the Rules of Court.
A: This is a case of silence or insufficiency of the Rules of Court.
The trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly
order the deposit of the 10M down payment in court. The
purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to
prevent unjust enrichment and ensure restitution. Equity is the
principle by which substantial justice may be attained in cases
where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are
inadequate (Reyes v. Lim).

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Pilipinas Shell

Petroleum Corporation783 scra 490

G.R. No. 180402. February 10, 2016.*REYES, J.:

FACT:

Pilipinas Shell subsequently filed two separate claims for the refund or credit of the
excise taxes paid on the foregoing sales, totaling P49,058,733.09. Due to the

inaction of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on its claims, Pilipinas Shell
decided to file a petition for review with the CTA.CTA Second Division rendered its
Decision granting Pilipinas Shell’s claim but at a reduced amount of P39,305,419.49

The arguments raised by the CIR are basically the same as those raised before the
CTA Second Division and En Banc, that is, Pilipinas Shell is not entitled to a
refund/credit of the excise taxes paid on its sales and deliveries to international
carriers for the following reasons: (1) excise taxes are levied on the
manufacturer/producer prior to sale and delivery to international carriers and,
regardless of its purchaser, said taxes must be shouldered by the
manufacturer/producer or in this case, Pilipinas Shell; (2) the excise taxes paid by

Pilipinas Shell do not consitute taxes erroneously paid as they are right fully due
from Pilipinas Shell as manufacturer/producer of the petroleum products sold to

international carriers; (3) the intent of the law

Whether or not the CTA erred in granting refund/tax credit?

RULING:

NO. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court must adhere to the principle of law laid
down in Pilipinas Shell and apply the same in the present case, especially since the facts,
issues, and even the parties involved are exactly identical. Thus, the Court hereby holds
that Pilipinas Shell’s claim for refund/tax credit must be granted pursuant to Pilipinas
Shell, as its petroleum products sold to international carriers for the period of November
2000 to March 2001 are exempt from excise tax, these international carriers being exempt
from payment of excise tax under Section 135(a) of the NIRC.
Immutability of Judgment

17. Bigler vs. People 785 scra 497

G.R. No. 210972. March 2, 2016.*PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts: the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel
and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of
one (1) year, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (21) days to two (2) years, eleven (11)
months, and ten (10) days, and to pay the costs of suit. Aggrieved, petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which was, however, denied for being filed 2 days late. Consequently,
he was arrested and taken into custody. Petitioner filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion
praying that the RTC: (a) reopen the criminal proceedings against him; (b) allow him to
file a notice of appeal. The RTC denied petitioner’s Urgent Omnibus Motion and,
likewise, denied due course to his Notice of Appeal. the RTC found as immaterial
petitioner’s contention that he did not receive the Order of his conviction, considering
that he filed his Motion for Reconsideration two (2) days beyond the prescribed 15-day
period reckoned from the promulgation of the RTC order. the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling in toto.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner belatedly filed his Motion for Reconsideration, thus,
rendering said judgment final and executory

Ruling: Yes.

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and
law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the
land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down. Nonetheless,
the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power
and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice
considering: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special
orcompelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable
to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that

has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect. Nonetheless, the Court has the power relax the same in order
to serve the demands of substantial justice. In a catena of similar cases where the
accused failed to perfect their appeal on their respective judgments of conviction, the
Court corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the finality of the decisions
because they were outside the range of penalty prescribed by law. There is thus, no
reason to deprive herein petitioner of the relief afforded the accused in the aforesaid
similar cases.

18. Navarra vs. Liongson 790 SCRA 155

G.R. No. 217930. April 18, 2016.*MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: Jose Liongson, the deceased husband of respondent Yolanda Liongson, filed a
complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution against Spouses Navarra and
Spouses Bernardobefore the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners argue that it is beyond
the power of the CA to amend its original decision in this case, dated December 8,
2011, for it violates the principle of finality of judgment and its immutability. They
point out that the said CA decision had acquired finality, hence, it could no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification was meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law, or it would be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred and violated the principle of immutability of
judgment

HELD: Well-settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality "becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it
be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land." The
rationale of this doctrine is to avoid delay in the administration of justice and in order
to put an end to judicial controversies.

The issue posed before the Court is not of first impression. It involves three conflicting
final and executory judgments rendered by the RTC and the CA.

Where a certain case comprises two or more conflicting judgments which are final and
executory, the Court, offered three (3) options in resolving the same. First, the court
may opt to require the parties to assert their claims anew; second, to determine which
judgment came first; and third, to determine which of the judgments had been
rendered by a court of last resort.

University of the Philippines vs Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja.

(211 SCRA 451; GR No. 96189, July 14. 1992, Narvasa, C.J.)

FACTS:

The Organization of Non-Academic Working Personnel of UP (ONAPUP) filed a

petition for certification election with the BLR, to which UP did not object. It
claimed to have a membership of 3,236 members—more than 33% of the 9,617
persons constituting the non-academic personnel of four UP campuses Diliman,
Manila, Los Baños, and Visayas. On April 18, 1990, All UP Workers’ Union filed a
comment and alleged that its membership covers both academic and non-academic
personnel, and that it aims to unite all rank-and-file employees in one union. It
assented to the holding of the certification election provided that appropriate
organizational unit was first clearly defined. It observed in this connection that the
Research, Extension and Professorial Staff (REPS), who are academic non-teaching
personnel, should not be deemed part of the organizational unit. UP’s General
Counsel was of the stand that there should be two unions—one for the non-
academic/administrative, and one for the academic personnel.

ISSUES:

Wheter or not the professors, associate professors and assistant professors are
considered exercising manegerial or highly confidential function? And should there
be a bargaining unit separate and distinct from that of the non-academic employees
of UP?

LAW APPLICABLE TO THE CASE:

Executive Order No. 180, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations

CASE HISTORY:

August 7, 1990 - Director Calleja ruled on the matter. She declared that xx should
embrace all the regular rank-and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching, of the
University of the Philippines, including all its branches” and that there was no
sufficient evidence “to justify the grouping of the non-academic or administrative
personnel into an organization unit apart and distinct from that of the academic or
teaching personnel. Motion for reconsideration was denied.

RULING:
No. Professors, associate professors and assistant professors cannot be considered
as exercising such managerial or highly confidential functions as would justify their
being categorized as “high-level employees” of the University of the Philippines.
Our labor laws do not provide the criteria for determining the proper collective
bargaining unit. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is
whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all
employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.. non-academic rank-
and-file employees of the University of the Philippines shall constitute a bargaining
unit to the exclusion of the academic employees of the institution.

OPINION:

I agree with the Supreme Courts decision. Indeed, if there is no exercise of

authority and use of independent judgment, then it cannot be considered as power
of prerogative pertaining to high level employees; such is only exercise by the Board
of Regents. And in this case is true that there are dissimilarity in the nature of the
work and duties as well as in the compensation and working condition of academic
as against non teaching workers.

Government Service Insurance System vs. Cancino-Erum 680 SCRA 44

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2182. September 5, 2012.* BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

Civil Case No. MC08-3660 was raffled on July 21, 2008 xxx, there is no need to spin the
roulette, which was used in the raffle of cases, since it was only the court of the undersigned
which has not received its share of civil cases with application force a TRO/Injunction for the
particular “round.” Judge Valenzuela clarified that FGU Insurance Corporation was not a party
in Civil Case No. MC08-3660. He assured that all the parties in Civil Case No. MC08-3660 were
given the opportunity to argue for or against the issuance of the TRO; that although he
had granted a period of five days to STRADCOM within which to file its own
comment/opposition to Martizano’s application for the TRO, he did not wait anymore for
STRADCOM’s written comment/opposition owing to the public interest involved and the
urgency of resolving the issues concerning DO 2007-28. He said that the nonimposition of a
bond on Martizano was justified under Rule 58, Section 4(b) of the Rules of Court; that he
denied the motion to dismiss because the requisites for the grounds relied upon were not met; and
that the supposed anomaly attending the raffle proceedings was only the product of GSIS’s
“polluted mind.
ISSUE:

Were the respondents properly held administratively liable for violating the standing rules on the
raffle of cases?

RULING:

NO. The Court dismisses Administrative charges against the respondents. Given the urgent
nature of TRO or injunction cases, each of them had to be immediately attended to. This
peculiarity must have led to the adoption of the practice of raffling such cases despite their
number being less than the number of the Branches in Mandaluyong City. The practice did not
absolutely contravene Circular No. 7 in view of the circular itself expressly excepting under its
fourth paragraph, supra, any incidental or interlocutory matter of such urgent nature (like a TRO
application) that might not wait for the regular
raffle.

The urgent nature of an injunction or TRO case demands prompt action and immediate attention,
thereby compelling the filing of the case in the proper court without delay. To assume that a
party desiring to file an injunction or TRO case will just stand idly by and mark time until his
favored Branch is the only Branch left without an assigned injunction or TRO case is obviously
speculative. Moreover, the “anomalous situation” is highly unlikely in view of the uncertainty of
having the favored Branch remain the only Branch without an injunction or TRO case following
the series of raffle.

Jonsay vs. Solidbank Corporation (now MetropolitanBank and Trust

Company)
788 SCRA 552 : G.R. No. 206459. April 6, 2016.* REYES, J.:

FACTS:

Momarco, controlled and owned by the Spouses Jonsay, is an importer,

manufacturer and distributor of animal health and feedmill products catering to
cattle, hog and poultry producers. On November 9, 1995, and again on April 28,
1997, Momarco obtained loans of P40,000,000.00 and P20,000,000.00, respectively,
from Solidbank for which the Spouses Jonsay executed a blanket mortgage over
three parcels of land they owned in Calamba City, Laguna. Momarco religiously
paid the monthly interests charged by Solidbank from November 199510 until
January 1998, when it paid P1,370,321.09. Claiming business reverses brought on
by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Momarco tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a
moratorium or suspension in its interest payments. Solidbank proceeded to
extrajudicially foreclose on the mortgage, and at the auction sale held on March 5,
1999, it submitted the winning bid of P82,327,249.54, 12 representing Momarco’s
outstanding loans, interests and penalties, plus attorney’s fees of P3,600,000.00. ut
Momarco now claims that on the date of the auction the fair market value of their
mortgaged lots had increased sevenfold to P441,750,000.00.

The RTC ruled that the mortgage contract and the promissory notes prepared by
Solidbank, which the Spouses Jonsay signed in blank, were contracts of adhesion;
that Solidbank failed to take into account Momarco’s payments in the two years
preceding 1998 totaling P24,277,293.22 (this amount was not disputed by
Solidbank); that the interest rates, ranging from 19% to 30%, as well as the
penalties, charges and attorney’s fees imposed by Solidbank, were excessive,
unconscionable and immoral, and that Solidbank has no carte blanche authority
under the Usury Law to unilaterally raise the interest rates to levels as to enslave
the borrower and hemorrhage its assets. CA rendered judgment affirming the RTC
in toto, but later reversed its decision, the CA not only found the parties’ mortgage
contract valid, but also declared that Solidbank’s extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage enjoyed the presumption of regularity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA was correct in in amending its decision?

RULING: YES

The rule is that while the decision of a court becomes final upon the lapse of the period to
appeal by any party, but the filing of a motion for reconsideration or new trial interrupts or
suspends the running of the said period, and prevents the finality of the decision or order
from setting in. A motion for reconsideration allows a party to request the adjudicating
court or quasi-judicial body to take a second look at its earlier judgment and correct any
errors it may have committed. As explained in Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 312 SCRA 447
(1999), a motion for reconsideration allows the adjudicator or judge to take a second
opportunity to review the case and to grapple anew with the issues therein, and to decide
again a question previously raised, there being no legal proscription imposed against the
deciding body adopting thereby a new position contrary to one it had previously taken.