PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING (BOMBO RADYO PHILS.
, WITH THE SC: petitioner argues that the National Labor Relations
INC.), Petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII,
and JANDELEON JUEZAN, Respondents.
FACTS: The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the decision
and the resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The petition traces its origins to a complaint filed by Jandeleon Juezan
(respondent) against People’s Broadcasting Service, Inc. (Bombo Radyo
Phils., Inc) (petitioner) for illegal deduction, non-payment of service
incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and
illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and non-coverage
of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth (non-diminution of benefits in the amount
allegedly 6K) before the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE)Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City.2 On the basis of the complaint,
the DOLE conducted a plant level inspection on 23 September 2003. Labor
Inspector wrote under the heading “Findings/Recommendations” “non-
diminution of benefits” and “Note: Respondent deny employer-employee
relationship with the complainant- see Notice of Inspection results.”
PETITIONER’S POSITION: Management representative informed that
complainant is a drama talent hired on a per drama ” participation basis”
hence no employer-employeeship [sic] existed between them. As proof of
this, management presented photocopies of cash vouchers, billing statement,
employments of specific undertaking (a contract between the talent director
& the complainant), summary of billing of drama production etc. They (mgt.)
has [sic] not control of the talent if he ventures into another contract w/ other
broadcasting industries.
RULING OF DOLE REGIONAL DIRECTOR: respondent is an employee of
petitioner, and that the former is entitled to his money claims amounting
toP203,726.30. MR denied; Appeal with the DOLE Secretary, dismissed the
appeal on the ground that petitioner did not post a cash or surety bond and
instead submitted a Deed of Assignment of Bank Deposit.
APPEAL WITH THE CA: claiming that it was denied due process when the
DOLE Secretary disregarded the evidence it presented and failed to give it
the opportunity to refute the claims of respondent. Petitioner maintained that
there is no employer-employee relationship had ever existed between it and
respondent because it was the drama directors and producers who paid,
supervised and disciplined respondent. It also added that the case was
beyond the jurisdiction of the DOLE and should have been considered by
the labor arbiter because respondent’s claim exceeded P5,000.00. CA denied.
Commission (NLRC), and not the DOLE Secretary, has jurisdiction over
respondent’s claim, in view of Articles 217 and 128 of the Labor Code.
RESPONDENT’S POSITION: respondent posits that the Court of Appeals
did not abuse its discretion. He invokes Republic Act No. 7730, which
“removes the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his
duly authorized representatives, from the effects of the restrictive provisions
of Article 129 and 217 of the Labor Code, regarding the confinement of
jurisdiction based on the amount of claims.”; and wrong mode of appeal.
ISSUE: WON the Secretary of Labor have the power to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.
HELD: No To resolve this pivotal issue, one must look into the extent of the
visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE found in Article 128 (b) of the
Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act 7730. It reads:
Article 128 (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of
this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-
employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to
give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor
legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement
officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection xxx
The provision is quite explicit that the visitorial and enforcement power
of the DOLE comes into play only “in cases when the relationship of
employer-employee still exists.” Of course, a person’s entitlement to labor
standard benefits under the labor laws presupposes the existence of
employer-employee relationship in the first place.The clause signifies that
the employer-employee relationship must have existed even before the
emergence of the controversy. Necessarily, the DOLE’s power does not
apply in two instances, namely: (a) where the employer-employee
relationship has ceased; and (b) where no such relationship has ever
existed.
The first situation is categorically covered by Sec. 3, Rule 11 of the Rules on
the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases15 issued by the DOLE Secretary.
It reads:
Rule II MONEY CLAIMS ARISING FROM COMPLAINT/ROUTINE
INSPECTION
Sec. 3. Complaints where no employer-employee relationship actually exists.
Where employer-employee relationship no longer exists by reason of the fact
that it has already been severed, claims for payment of monetary benefits fall
within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the labor
arbiters. Accordingly, if on the face of the complaint, it can be
ascertained that employer-employee relationship no longer exists, the
case, whether accompanied by an allegation of illegal dismissal, shall
immediately be endorsed by the Regional Director to the appropriate
branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Clearly the law accords a prerogative to the NLRC over the claim when the
employer-employee relationship has terminated or such relationship has not
arisen at all. The reason is obvious. In the second situation especially, the
existence of an employer-employee relationship is a matter which is not
easily determinable from an ordinary inspection, necessarily so, because the
elements of such a relationship are not verifiable from a mere ocular
examination. The determination of which should be comprehensive and
intensive and therefore best left to the specialized quasi-judicial body
that is the NLRC.
It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and
enforcement power somehow has to make a determination of the existence of
an employer-employee relationship. Such prerogatival determination,
however, cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement power
itself. Indeed, such determination is merely preliminary, incidental and
collateral to the DOLE’s primary function of enforcing labor standards
provisions. The determination of the existence of employer-employee
relationship is still primarily lodged with the NLRC.
Thus, before the DOLE may exercise its powers under Article 128, two
important questions must be resolved: (1) Does the employer-employee
relationship still exist, or alternatively, was there ever an employer-employee
relationship to speak of; and (2) Are there violations of the Labor Code or of
any labor law?
A mere assertion of absence of employer-employee relationship does not
deprive the DOLE of jurisdiction over the claim under Article 128 of the
Labor Code. At least a prima facie showing of such absence of relationship,
as in this case, is needed to preclude the DOLE from the exercise of its
power.
Without a doubt, petitioner, since the inception of this case had been
consistent in maintaining that respondent is not its employee. Certainly,
a preliminary determination, based on the evidence offered, and noted
by the Labor Inspector during the inspection as well as submitted during
the proceedings before the Regional Director puts in genuine doubt the
existence of employer-employee relationship. From that point on, the
prudent recourse on the part of the DOLE should have been to refer
respondent to the NLRC for the proper dispensation of his
claims.Furthermore, as discussed earlier, even the evidence relied on by the
Regional Director in his order are mere self-serving declarations of
respondent, and hence cannot be relied upon as proof of employer-employee
relationship.
Petition GRANTED.
Other Issues (Just in case it will be asked, mahaba2 ung case)
 Aside from lack of jurisdiction, there is another cogent reason to to set
aside the Regional Director’s 27 February 2004 Order. A careful study
of the case reveals that the said Order, which found respondent as an
employee of petitioner and directed the payment of respondent’s money
claims, is not supported by substantial evidence, and was even made in
disregard of the evidence on record.
 Even if the labor inspector had noted petitioner’s manifestation and
documents in the Notice of Inspection Results, it is clear that he did not
give much credence to said evidence, as he did not find the need to
investigate the matter further. The labor inspector could have exerted a
bit more effort and looked into petitioner’s payroll, for example, or its
roll of employees, or interviewed other employees in the premises.
 The Court further examined the records and discovered to its dismay that
even the Regional Director turned a blind eye to the evidence presented
by petitioner and relied instead on the self-serving claims of respondent.
REPONDENT’S CLAIM IN HIS POSITION PAPER: hired by petitioner in
September 1996 as a radio talent/spinner, working from 8:00 am until 5 p.m.,
six days a week, on a gross rate of P60.00 per script, earning an average
of P15,0000.00 per month, payable on a semi-monthly basis xxx In support
of his position paper, respondent attached a photocopy of an identification
card purportedly issued by petitioner, bearing respondent’s picture and name
with the designation “Spinner”; at the back of the I.D., the following is
written: ” This certifies that the card holder is a duly Authorized MEDIA
Representative of BOMBO RADYO PHILIPPINES …
Certificates were also submitted by respondent to support his claim.
EXISTENCE OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIP: Furthermore, respondent’s pieces of evidence—the
identification card and the certification issued by petitioner’s Greman
Solante— are not even determinative of an employer-employee relationship.
The certification, issued upon the request of respondent, specifically stated
that “MR. JANDELEON JUEZAN is a program employee of PEOPLE’S
BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC. (DYMF- Bombo Radyo Cebu),” it is
not therefore “crystal clear that complainant is a station employee rather than
a program employee hence entitled to all the benefits appurtenant
thereto,”26 as found by the DOLE Regional Director. Respondent should be
bound by his own evidence. Moreover, the classification as to whether one is
a “station employee” and “program employee,” as lifted from Policy
Instruction No. 40,27 dividing the workers in the broadcast industry into only
two groups is not binding on this Court, especially when the classification
has no basis either in law or in fact.28
Even the identification card purportedly issued by petitioner is not proof of
employer-employee relationship since it only identified respondent as an
“Authorized Representative of Bombo Radyo…,” and not as an employee.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: It has long been established that in
administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, substantial evidence is
sufficient as a basis for judgment on the existence of employer-employee
relationship. Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in
labor cases, is “that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”
 In the instant case, save for respondent’s self-serving allegations and
self-defeating evidence, there is no substantial basis to warrant the
Regional Director’s finding that respondent is an employee of petitioner.
RE APPEAL BOND: The purpose of an appeal bond is to ensure, during the
period of appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish
recovery by the aggrieved employees under the judgment if subsequently
affirmed.40 The Deed of Assignment in the instant case, like a cash or surety
bond, serves the same purpose. First, the Deed of Assignment constitutes not
just a partial amount, but rather the entire award in the appealed Order.
Second, it is clear from the Deed of Assignment that the entire amount is
under the full control of the bank, and not of petitioner, and is in fact payable
to the DOLE Regional Office, to be withdrawn by the same office after it had
issued a writ of execution. For all intents and purposes, the Deed of
Assignment in tandem with the Letter Agreement and Cash Voucher is as
good as cash. Third, the Court finds that the execution of the Deed of
Assignment, the Letter Agreement and the Cash Voucher were made in good
faith, and constituted clear manifestation of petitioner’s willingness to pay
the judgment amount.
MODE OF APPEAL: it is settled, as a general proposition, that the
availability of an appeal does not foreclose recourse to the extraordinary
remedies, such as certiorari and prohibition, where appeal is not adequate or
equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient xxx
This Court has even recognized that a recourse to certiorari is proper not only
where there is a clear deprivation of petitioner’s fundamental right to due
process, but so also where other special circumstances warrant immediate
and more direct action. After all, this Court has previously ruled that the
extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie if it is satisfactorily1avvphiestablished
that the tribunal had acted capriciously and whimsically in total disregard of
evidence material to or even decisive of the controversy
CASE DIGEST: ZIALCITA V. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (Case
No. RO4-3-3398-76; February 20, 1977)
FACTS: Zialcita is a stewardess of PAL. She was fired from work because
she had gotten married. PAL argued and cited its policy that stewardesses
must be single. The policy also states that subsequent marriage of a
stewardess shall automatically terminate employment.
Zialcita anchored on Article 136 of the Labor Code. PAL sought refuge from
Article 132.
Article 132 provides, "Article 132. Facilities for women. The Secretary of
Labor and Employment shall establish standards that will ensure the safety
and health of women employees. In appropriate cases, he shall, by
regulations, require any employer to: To determine appropriate minimum age
and other standards for retirement or termination in special occupations such
as those of flight attendants and the like."
Article 136 provides, "Article 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be
unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or
to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee
shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
her marriage."
ISSUE:
Was Zialcita's termination proper?
HELD: The termination was improper. First of all, during the time Zialcita
was terminated, no regulation had yet been issued by the Secretary of Labor
to implement Article 132. Second, even assuming that the Secretary of Labor
had already issued such a regulation and to the effect that stewardesses
should remain single, such would be in violation of Article 136 of the Labor
Code.
Article 136's protection of women is broader and more powerful than the
regulation provided under Article 132.
Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol
487 SCRA 228
FACTS: Petitioner was the employer of the respondents. Under the policy of
Star Paper the employees are:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a
relative, up to the 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the
company.
2. In case of two of our employees (singles, one male and another female)
developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and
then decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy
stated above.
Respondents Comia and Simbol both got married to their fellow employees.
Estrella on the other hand had a relationship with a co-employee resulting to
her pregnancy on the belief that such was separated. The respondents allege
that they were forced to resign as a result of the implementation of the said
assailed company policy.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled in favor of petitioner. The decision
was appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the prohibition to marry in the contract of employment is
valid
HELD: It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired
after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they
married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of
Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an
employee of the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business
operations. Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in
the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting
Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-
machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to
each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without
valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven
presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to
security of tenure.
Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee
marries a co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-
employees. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the
Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate
impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it
is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The
failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the
questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from
arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working
together in one company.
Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination
in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to
labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw
inferences from the legislature’s silence that married persons are not
protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a
prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed
proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is
an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollary, the issue as to
whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become
moot and academic.
In the case of Estrella, the petitioner failed to adduce proof to justify her
dismissal. Hence, the Court ruled that it was illegal.
Petition was denied.