SPOUSES OMAR & MOSHIERA LATIP v.
ROSALIE CHUA The entire lease rentals for the 2 cubicles for 6 years had already been paid in the
FACTS: Rosalie is the owner of Roferxane Building in Baclaran. Spouses Latip
entered into a lease contract with Rosalie.
A year after the commencement of the lease, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the
spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so
to vacate the leased cubicles.
When spouses did not heed Rosalie’s demand, she filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer + damages against them. She attached to the complaint a contract of
lease over 2 cubicles in Roferxane Bldg.
Spouses Latip argues that he lease of the 2 cubicles had already been paid in full
as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of
P2,570,000. There were 3 receipts in Rosalie’s handwriting.
1. P2M
2. P500K
3. P70K
Spouses also averred that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale
lease rights over 2 cubicles. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the
Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalie’s offer to purchase lease rights.
The immediate payment of P2M+ would be used to finish construction of the
building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles. And as
soon as the 2 cubicles were finished, Spouses occupied them.
Spouses averred that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their
purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to
receive a demand letter from Rosalie’s counsel.
METC’s Ruling:
In favor of Rosalie. It ordered the spouses to vacate and pay rent arrearages,
10% increase in the rent, atty’s fees and cost of suit.
RTC’s Ruling:
Reversed MTC’s ruling. Spouses Latio could not be ejected until the expiration of
the lease period.
It did not give credence to the contract of lease since it was not notarized and
incomplete, lacking:
1. Signature of Ferdinand, Rosalie’s husband
2. Signatures of Spouses Latip on the 1st page
3. Specific dates for the term of the contract
4. Exact date of execution of the document
5. Provision for payment of deposit or advance rental which is supposedly
uncommon in big commercial lease contracts
amount of P2M+.
RTC shot down Rosalie’s claim that the P2M+ was simply goodwill payment by by
prospective lessees to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease
rights. The court said that apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce
evidence to substantiate this claim.
CA’s Ruling:
Reversed RTC’s decision and reinstated METC’s decision.
The alleged defects in the contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective.
On the issue of whether the amount of P2M+ merely constituted payment of
goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of
Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to CA, this
judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at
Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to
occupying the stalls thereat.
Spouses Latip appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the payment of 2M can be considered as judicial notice
constituting goodwill money?
SC DECISION:
NO. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of
judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus State Prosecutors
v. Muro is instructive.
The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care
must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on
the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially
known is that of notoriety.
The matter which the CA judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of
notoriety. Only CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill
money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation,
adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of P2M+ simply
constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an
annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under
oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to
Rosalie as their lessor.
The reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be
proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the
taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it
will not be disputed by the parties.
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of
attaching documentary evidence, i.e., Joint Affidavit of the stallholders. In short,
the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court—What need not be proved.
In the end, the court ruled that the amount of P2,570,000 shall be considered as
advance rentals.
People v Malimit
FACTS:
 Onofre Malaki (victim) was attending to his store. Malaki's houseboy Edilberto
Batin, was busy cooking supper at the kitchen located at the back of the store.
 He proceeded directly to the store to ask Malaki if supper is to be prepared.
As Batin stepped inside the store, he saw accused Encarnacion “Manolo”
Malimit coming out of the store with a bloodied bolo while his boss, bathed in
his own blood, was sprawled on the floor.
 He also noticed that the store's drawer was opened and ransacked and the
wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket
Malimit was then captured. He pointed to the police officers where he hid
the wallet. He was subsequently convicted of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide.
He argues that the wallet of Malimit should not be admitted as evidence since it
violates his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE:
WON the wallet may be admitted as evidence?
HELD:
YES. The wallet is considered as Object Evidence and NOT AN INCRIMINATING
STATEMENT.
The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds
no application in this case. The evidence (Wallet) sought to be excluded is not an
incriminating statement but an object evidence.
This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, 26 ". . . is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications
from him . . ." It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from
the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. 27
Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken
from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence
certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to
prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore, even assuming
arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will not detract
from appellant's culpability considering the existence of other evidence and
circumstances establishing appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of the
crime charged.
National Irrigation Administration vs Gamit
Facts: Estanislao Gamit filed a complaint against the defendant National
Irrigation Administration for reformation of contract, recovery of possession and
damages. Gamit alleges that in the contract of lease entered into, the real
agreement or intention of the parties was only for the lease of the twenty five
(25,000) thousand square meters by defendant at the rate of P0.10 centavos per
square meter, for a period of ten (10) years from date of execution with the right of
defendant to purchase the area upon the termination of the lease, on a price to
be negotiated and agreed upon, by and between the parties after the lapse of the
ten (10) year period.
Gamit alleges that there was a mistake in its part and that NIA fraudulently
inserted in the contract the provision that after 10 years of lease, the rentals paid
forms part of the purchase price which shall not exceed P25,000.00.
National Irrigation argues that there was no fraud in the agreement which was
signed by Gamit and his wife and it clearly stated that after 10 years of lease, the
rentals paid forms part of the purchase price which shall not exceed P25,000.00.
RTC did not order the reformation of the instrument since it is only a question of
law and not a question of fact. It then interpreted the contract as contract of lease
with right to purchase. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals has properly interpreted the contract.
Held: NO. As a general rule, parol evidence is not admissible for the purpose of
varying the terms of a contract. However, when the issue that a contract does not
express the intention of the parties, the court should hear the evidence for the
purpose of ascertaining the true intention of the parties.
A perusal of the complaint at bar and the relief prayed for therein shows
that this is clearly a case for reformation of instrument.
As a general rule, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing,
it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement, EXCEPT when it fails to express
the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto, in which case, one of the
parties may bring an action for the reformation of the instrument to the end that
such true intention may be expressed.
The lower court erred in not conducting a trial for the purpose of determining the
true intention of the parties. It failed to appreciate the distinction between
interpretation and reformation of contracts. While the aim in interpretation of
contracts is to ascertain the true intention of the parties, interpretation is not,
however, equivalent to reformation of contracts. Since the complaint in the case at
bar raises the issue that the contract of lease does not express the true intention
or agreement of the parties due to mistake on the part of the plaintiff (private
respondent) and fraud on the part of the defendant (petitioner), the court a quo
should have conducted a trial and received the evidence of the parties for the
purpose of ascertaining the true intention of the parties when they executed the
instrument in question.
People vs Castaneda
Facts: Victoria filed a complaint for Falsification of Public Document against her
husband, Benjamin. Victoria alleged that Benjamin falsified her signature in a
deed of sale of a house belonging to the conjugal partnership, making it appear
that she gave her marital consent to said sale. At the trial, the prosecution called
to the witness stand Victoria, but the defense moved to disqualify her as a
witness, invoking the rule that a spouse cannot be examined without the consent
of the other spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against another. The prosecution opposed the
motion on the ground that the case falls under the exception, contending that it is
a criminal case committed by one against the other. The trial court granted the
motion, disqualifying Victoria from testifying against Benjamin. Their motion for
reconsideration denied, the prosecution elevated the case to the Supreme Court
on pure question of law
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document may be
considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his
wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
Held:
Yes. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal
case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.
The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public
Document is the forgery by the accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale,
thereby making it appear therein that said wife consented to the sale of a house
and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did
not. It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing
of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the
consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband
Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave
rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the
wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case. To rule, therefore, that such
criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse against the other is
to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of
the instant case.
It is undeniable that the act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in
personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in
her insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set
aside the order disqualified her from testifying against her husband. Taken
collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the martial
and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, the "identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is
nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private
life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals which, through their
absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Thus, there is no reason to
apply the martial disqualification rule.