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in the shooting, editing, projection, or reception of a film. By refusing
to thus situate his theory, Deleuze completely sidesteps
psychoanalytic and semiological film theories that would locate the
"meaning" of film beneath the surface level of signs. The
ramifications of Deleuze's project far exceed the scope of this paper.
My goal, nevertheless, is to map several of its threads. The first is an
interrogation of what varied meanings the term "representation"
might have for Bergson or Deleuze with specific reference to cinema.
The second involves the relationship between film and the realm
that can be designated as the "real." Finally, the overarching
question that motivates me is whether it is possible to maintain a
commitment to the "art of living" that Bergson (and Deleuze) so
convincingly promote while doing work on the "objects" of visual
culture. These are lines of inquiry that I cannot exhaust, but at the
same time, they are a movement toward understanding the creative
potentials of thinking through and with the work of art.

The Cinema books map a rift in filmmaking which can be roughly

situated at the end of World War II. This split, however, cannot be
reduced to a historical shift, but exists instead in differing
configurations of movement and time. The movement-image,
according to Deleuze, is exemplified by classical Hollywood cinema.
Time proceeds only as dictated by action (the action of narrative, of
cause and effect, of rationality). Temporality in the movement-
image, for Deleuze, is governed by the "sensory-motor schema."[2]
All movements are determined by linear causality, and the
characters are bent toward actions which respond to the situations
of the present. Even when temporal continuity is momentarily
disrupted (e.g. in a flashback), these moments are reintegrated into
the prescribed evolution of past, present, and future. The
movement-image is structured, not only by narrative, but by
rationality: closed framings, reasonable progressions, and
continuous juxtapositions.

The time-image, however, breaks itself from sensory-motor links.

The emphasis shifts from the logical progression of images to the
experience of the image-in-itself. What we find here are pure optical
and sound situations (opsigns and sonsigns), unfettered by narrative
progression, and empty, disconnected any-spacewhatevers. This
move from "acting" to "perceiving" carries over to the characters in
the film, who cease to be "agents" and become,
instead, "seers." Though Deleuze is hesitant to identify any single
film that embodies the time-image, moments in films by Pasolini,
Ozu, and Godard, for example, gesture towards that ideal: moments
of rupture, hesitation, irrational cutting, or prolonged duration.
Movement that is aberrant (i.e. not rational or sensory-motor) can be
seen, according to Deleuze, to be caused by time itself. Built through
irrational movements and op/sonsigns, the time-image exists thus
not as a chronology, but as a series of juxtaposed "presents." What
is achieved is exceedingly rare: a direct image of time.[3]

Deleuze's reading of Bergson explodes all the basic assumptions of

film theory to date (the separation of subject and object, the
primacy of the apparatus, the psychological nature of perception,
etc.). But to designate images "time-" or "movement-" related runs
the risk of remaining merely descriptive if one does not fully grasp
that the distinction between the two is neither a question of form
nor content. For Bergson's writing resists being reduced to a
structural model; the experience of life, he claims, exceeds the
comprehension of the intellect. And the integrated relationship
between subject and object, matter and memory, that Bergson
proposes results in a shift in emphasis from the aesthetic object to
the act of creation. Indeed, Bergson's contribution to thought rests
not in a new analysis of art, but in rethinking the practice of "the art
of living."[4]

To understand the consequences of this shift for film theory, one

must first turn to the distinction that Bergson draws between the
methodologies of the intellect and intuition. The intellect, Bergson
argues, is always bent on action. It is the component of
consciousness which allows a being to comprehend its environment
and survive within it. While its mode of perception is essential to life,
however, the intellect does not have a privileged access to reality.
Bergson writes:

If the intellect were meant for pure theorizing, it would take its
place within movement, for movement is reality itself, and
immobility is always only apparent or relative. But the intellect
is meant for something altogether different. Unless it does
violence to itself, it takes the opposite course; it always starts
from immobility, as if this were the ultimate reality: when it
 tries to form an idea of movement, it does so by constructing
movement out of immobilities put together.... Of immobility
alone does the intellect form a clear idea.[5]

The intellect, in order to act upon reality, must thus reduce it to a

series of frozen moments. Unlike the direct, reflective mode of what
Bergson calls intuition, the intellect works scientifically. It extracts
objects from motion in order to evaluate the action which it might
perform upon them, restoring an abstract idea of motion upon them
after the fact, like lines drawn between points on a graph.

Intuition, by contrast, is the mode through which one gains access to

the undifferentiated flow of life, the real. All matter, for Bergson,
exists as images defined by the range of their possible actions (real
or virtual) upon other images. The human subject is an image/object
like any other, with the distinction that, as a living being, it has both
the potential to generate its own actions and to function as a
perceptive center, organizing itself in relation to other images. While
part of this organization involves the mechanisms of the intellect,
there is a component that is opposed to spatialization and is inclined
instead toward the temporal. Within each "living center" exists a
potential delay between the moment of perception and the moment
of action. The greater this delay or "zone of indeterminacy"
becomes, the greater access the subject will have to an alternative
axis of movement: that of intuition.

Bergson's intuition, unlike the popular usage of the term, involves a

precise methodology. Rather than immobilizing and distilling from
matter that which can be acted upon, intuition delves simultaneously
inward to the depths of the self and outward, beyond the self, to
grasp objects in their entirety, as they exist in duration. Duration
here refers not to "time," which for Bergson is a concept already
fractured into spatial components (minutes, seconds, years, etc.).
Instead, each image contains its own unique duration, its own
capacity for change. Intuition is a mode of unmediated access to the
play of forces that comprise existence. Unlike the intellect, which is
oriented toward the interest that a being has in the objects it can act
upon, intuition is driven by the inward-motion of instinct, a form of
sympathy "that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of
reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely."[6] As
Deleuze writes about the
temporal nature of intuition: "Intuition is not duration itself. Intuition
is rather the movement by which we emerge from our own duration,
by which we make use of our own duration to affirm and
immediately to recognize the existence of other durations, above or
below us."[7]

Cinema, for Bergson, or rather the cinematic apparatus, corresponds

directly to the function of the intellect. He describes the
phenomenon of film as a series of immobile snapshots of reality. The
camera isolates fragments of reality, erasing the nuances of
transformation occurring between frames. In order to achieve
movement, the film must be unwound through the projector, thus
restoring the illusion of continuous motion. But the motion we
perceive is not the unique movement inherent to the object filmed.
The camera/projector apparatus extracts from reality an "impersonal
movement," a movement which can be generalized and regulated at
a precise duration, a calculable frame rate. "Such is the contrivance
of the cinematograph," Bergson writes, "[a]nd such is also that of our
knowledge."[8]

The first pages of The Movement-Image address Bergson's theory of

"the cinematographic illusion." Deleuze suggests, however, that
Bergson makes an oversight in locating cinema and natural
perception along the same continuum. Deleuze argues that while the
mechanisms of film might mask themselves as those of perception,
in actuality the projector "corrects" the illusion from the outset
through its regulated reanimation of the image: "cinema does not
give us an image to which movement is added, it immediately gives
us a movement-image. It does give us a section, but a section which
is mobile, not an immobile section + abstract movement."[9]
Deleuze's argument is that Bergson's concept of the movement-
image might have implications for the cinema that Bergson himself
could not perceive at the time. He further asserts that the apparatus
of the camera possesses temporal capabilities that complicate and
supercede those of the projector.

Deleuze potentially misrepresents the breadth of his theory in this

attempt to recuperate the cinematic apparatus.[10] If one considers
film to be an attempt to reproduce physical reality, there is no doubt
that the image on the screen cannot encompass the complex
existence of the matter before the lens of the camera. Clearly
Deleuze is writing against such a simplistic reading. At the same
time, to argue that the mechanisms of film somehow ameliorate the
visual "illusions" that the film audience necessarily undergoes is to
leave such an assumption unchallenged. This is not a criticism that I
would levy against the Cinema books as a whole. Indeed, Deleuze
deftly avoids easy associations between physical "images" and
Bergson's more complex use of the term, let alone any confusion
between notions of "the real" and the objects that the camera
represents. While I have reservations about Deleuze's argument in
this instance, the goal of his investigation is, in fact, consistent with
Bergson's larger project. The apparent discrepancy between Bergson
and Deleuze's approaches to film is a reflection not of contradiction
nor oversight, but of a fundamental shift in their understandings of
the function of cinema. I see this shift between the way in which
Bergson discusses film (as a metaphoric model for a mode of
thought) and the way in which Deleuze uses Bergson to discuss film
(where film is no longer a "model," but contains its own potential
image of thought) as an entryway for exploring the question of
representation that lies at the heart of the Cinema books.

When Bergson compares cinema to the processes of the intellect, he

describes it as a model of representation. Just as the intellect selects
from the swirling movements of surrounding matter only those
images upon which the body can act, the cinematic apparatus
immobilizes instances, slicing them from the undifferentiated flow of
life and reanimating them through the uniformity of the machine.
Bergson's discussion of the cinematic apparatus perfectly describes
his theory of the intellect (one might even pursue another line of
inquiry: how do technological developments enable or influence the
evolution of concepts?). But the analogy he makes is not sufficient
for describing (or dismissing) the cinematic experience as a whole.

The mechanism of thought that functions "cinematically" creates a

"theoretical illusion" for Bergson, obscuring our perception of "the
true evolution, the radical becoming."[11] But one would be mistaken
to deduce from this that the "reality" which the "cinematographical
mechanism of thought" prevents access to would in fact be
representable given a more fluid apparatus or model. Or further that
Bergson's critique of the mode of thought
can be interpreted as or extended to a critique of the medium. What
his "cinematographical" model does provide, however, is a powerful
critique of the very mechanisms of representation. Representation
operates through immobilization, spatialization. The representation
becomes a "sign" through which we interpret the always implied
referent. It asserts correspondences, analogies, and associations
between elements at the expense of their differences, their
dynamisms, their movements and changes.

The problem of representation is one that extends almost

limitlessly. It is a question that permeates nearly all aspects of
human existence: perception, language, and thought. How is it
possible to move beyond the realm of representation? And if it is
indeed a mechanism that can be overcome, what alternative
methodologies might be left in its wake?

Deleuze and Guattari, in their discussion of the rhizome, make a

distinction between a map and a tracing. The trace is described in
terms strikingly similar to Bergson's model of "cinematographic
thought": The trace is "like a photograph or X ray that begins by
selecting or isolating, by artificial means such as colorations or other
restrictive procedures, what it intends to reproduce."[12] The
strength of the map, by contrast, is that it never operates by means
of resemblance. While a map functions always in relation to
something beyond itself, it engages in those relations as a tool-box,
a set of potentialities that are never predetermined and that can in
turn effect changes upon the images and objects they come up
against:

What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is

entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the
real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in
upon itself; it constructs the unconscious.... The map is open
and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable,
reversible, susceptible to constant modification....A map has
multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing, which always
comes back "to the same."[13]
The function of the map described here, I would argue, suggests a vehicle for thinking outside
representation, a modality not dissimilar from that of Bergson's intuition. Like the flow of images
that Bergson designates as the real, the map interacts with configurations of elements
that defy binaristic classification (subject/object, spectator/text, etc.). With reference to
the rhizomatic potential of literature, Deleuze and Guattari write:

There is no longer a tripartite division between a field of reality

(the world) and a field of representation (the book) and a field of
subjectivity (the author). Rather, an assemblage establishes
connections between certain multiplicities drawn from each of
these orders, so that a book has no sequel nor the world as its
object nor one or several authors as its subject.... The book as
assemblage with the outside, against the book as image of the
world.[14]

The assemblages which film forms with its outside will necessarily
differ from those formed in literature or the other arts. Nevertheless,
Deleuze and Guattari's discussion bears weight on my discussion
here. Practices of filming or writing cannot be generalized as having
"productive" or "regressive" relationships with the real. Books and
films can act equally rhizomatic/crystalline or trace-like, depending
on their individual relation to the outside, the direction of their
movements.

As such, I would agree with Deleuze that it is inaccurate to describe

cinema based on a model of perception. At the same time, both
cinematic and perceptive modalities exist in relation to a "real" that
is, for Bergson (and Deleuze), more complex than has been
indicated thus far. In Matter and Memory, Bergson proposes a
definition of matter:

Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of "images." And by "image"

we mean a certain existence which is more than that which the
idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the
realist call a thing--an existence placed halfway between the
"thing" and the "representation."[15]
For Bergson, the brain does not produce a representation of what it perceives. Perception is the
mutual influence of images upon one another, of which the brain is only another image-it does
not "produce" anything, but filters impulses into actions or non-actions. The implications for film
are two-fold. By addressing the perceiving subject as one image among the world of images,
Bergson steps
outside models that locate perception and memory within the mind of the subject. I would
further suggest, following Deleuze, that Bergson's theory of matter allows us to see film not as a
fixed representation, a concrete image of a "real" object, but as an image in its own right, with
its own duration and axes of movement. What we might call the film-image thus occurs in the
gap between subject and object, through the collision of affective images.

Deleuze's formulation of the film-image as a mobile assemblage

(sometimes a frame, sometimes a shot, a sound, or the film as a
whole) lends itself to this reading, refusing to reduce the physical
image on the screen to a mere reproduction of an assumed "real"
object it represents. Such a formulation similarly reevaluates the
relationship between the concrete optical and sonic images that
comprise the film. Rather than conceiving of each component as a
concrete "building block," it allows for the shifting and multiple
conglomerations of elements which are themselves dynamic and
mobile. A film cannot be distilled to an analyzable structure that
originates from outside itself. Instead, each film-image is
contingent, particular, and evolving.

The potential affective force of film is not that it more closely

resembles the objects that it represents (having a more direct
relationship to those objects via the photographic method than
more abstract systems of representation such as language or
painting). Rather, this potential lies in film's ability to key into
durations which would defy the limitations of the intellect, working
not toward action, but toward the zone of indeterminacy which lies
between perception and action. Bergson writes:

Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious

states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains
from separating its present state from its former states....[I]n
recalling these states, it does not set them alongside its actual
state as one point alongside another, but it organizes them with
itself [avec lui], as it happens when we recall the notes of a
tune , melting, so to speak into one another.[16]

But film-images, while possessing individual durations, cannot

engage in the active process of recollection that Bergson describes.
Indeed, while my investigation of film has been driven by Bergson's
theory of intuition, one could not claim that film functions
"intuitively." The cinematic experience, for Deleuze, is not a pure
state of reflection. One cannot "think inside" film; film must be
conceived of as a problem that arises from outside. Meaning, as
such, cannot be conceptualized as signification, nor as something
garnered through a direct synthesis or sympathetic penetration of
the object. Deleuze posits instead a theory of expression, filmic
images that are temporal and dynamic. It is the image that is
encountered directly, presenting a complex provocation to thought.

It is this provocation that I see as the true potential of film. The act
of creation, for Bergson, is a solution to a challenge from the
outside, from life. The question of cinema is not a question of
representing or perceiving movement, but of thinking through
movement, of creating new movements and new images of thought.
Dorothea Olkowski, in her work on representation, returns to
Bergson's assertion that the most elemental function of philosophy
is to ask whether a problem has been properly stated. One cannot
propose to solve a problem in which the terms are falsely
established. In such cases, one will be bound up in an illusion,
unable to see the qualitative and quantitative differences between
the elements in question. Olkowski writes:

This is the dark thought I have had about representation for so

long; we are immersed in it and it has become inseparable from
our condition. It has created a world, a cosmos even, of false
problems such that we have lost our true freedom: that of
invention.[17]

What Bergson and Deleuze both point to in their writings is a means

of restating the question of representation, rending it open to the
forces of creation and invention.

These forces are tapped into when perception, rather than

isolating an image for the purposes of action, orients itself toward
memory, the virtual potential of the past. "When perception is
attentive," Olkowski writes, "every perception becomes an act of
creation in which the perception opens as many circuits as there
are memory images attracted by this new perception, making of
every perception a qualitative multiplicity."[18] The act of creation
occurs with the introduction of the new. In the case of the body,
the new exists as these perceptions and affections, what it creates
from impulses and images it perceives.

"Style in philosophy," Deleuze writes, "strains toward three different

poles: concepts, or new ways of thinking; percepts, or new ways of
seeing and hearing; and affects, or new ways of feeling. They're the
philosophical trinity, philosophy as opera: you need all three to get
things moving."[19] Cinema, I would argue, contains the potential to
transect all three poles. While its relation to percepts and affects
have been touched upon in terms of the act of perception, the
concept draws cinema toward a new type of image, the image of
thought.

D.N. Rodowick notes that the "image of thought" is not a

representational image (i.e. the concept is not contained within a
concrete, physical image). Rather, the image of thought is a
movement, a process of continual differentiation. While this
movement, in terms of film, takes its roots in what Deleuze calls the
movement-image, Rodowick notes that an image of thought, for
Deleuze, only becomes an active force when it takes a step further:
"But in order to claim for philosophy what is its activity by right, the
philosopher must invoke the more fundamental 'movement' of the
impersonal form of time and eternal recurrence."[20] This is what
leads to the distinction between the movement-image and the time-
image: a qualitative difference, where what is seen, what is
conveyed becomes less significant than what is not revealed, what is
unknown.

[O]nly the movement-image pretends that thought can be

presented directly in or by the image. Alternatively, time always
divides thought from the signs that express or represent it.
Through the force of the eternal return, time affirms a specific
power, or rather "impower" of thought: "we are not yet
thinking."[21]
It is this third axis of movement, toward concept, the image of thought, that allows film the
potential to "get things moving." It never progresses by means of representation, tracing,
but always through the crystal, the rhizome, the unforeseeable foldings of creation.
"[T]here's a hidden image of thought that, as it unfolds,
branches out, and mutates, inspires a need to keep on creating new
concepts, not through any external determinism but through a
becoming that carries the problems themselves along with it."[22]
Born from the unpredictable collision of forces which coalesce in the
act of creation, the image of thought bears the motion of the
question that has been reformulated, carrying it not toward solution,
but opening it further into new, ever-differentiating questions.

Deleuze's assertions in the Cinema books can be read as a call to

action on two fronts. On the one hand, the distinction he draws
between images that rely upon movement-images and time-images
challenge artists to create works that transcend the
representational, that explore the interstices between memory and
perception, that approach what we might call a pure image of time,
an image of thought. I would argue that Deleuze's work on cinema
poses an equal challenge to those who think and write
about/through film, a venture with perhaps even higher stakes. In
opposing the movement-and time-images, Deleuze inadvertently
constructs a structure of valuation that I find suspect (particularly
when the images which he cites as most closely approaching the
time-image-Godard, Passolini, etc.-coincide with those championed
by elitist, modernist traditions). Yet the tools that he provides for
conceiving of film beyond the confines of representation carry
invaluable potential for theorists to manipulate toward their own
ends. A great deal more work remains to be done on the particular
configurations of time within popular works that may be driven by
the sensory-motor schema, but that are never fully contained by
that logic. Likewise, the evolution of digital technology and new
networks of image circulation will give rise to new images of thought
and new theoretical methodologies.

The provocation, then, for both the filmmaker and the film theorist, is
one posed by philosophy. The challenge is to see film not as a means
of representation, but as an assemblage of images in flux with the
world of images, to see the history of film and the history of
philosophy as convergent. The art of living remains the becoming of
true creation, but the image of thought introduces the stutters and
hesitations that give us access to this movement. "It's the image of
thought that guides the creation of concepts. It cries out, so to
speak, whereas concepts are like songs."[23] Bergson
writes of the creative capacity in art, "[w]hen music cries, it is
humanity, it is the whole of nature which cries with it. Truly speaking,
it does not introduce these feelings in us; it introduces us rather into
them, like the passers-by that might be nudged in a dance"[24] It is
somewhere between the crying out and the song that we can hope
to find the movement of becoming that will carry us thus, beyond
ourselves.

Notes

1. Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990, trans. Martin

Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 95.

2. Deleuze develops his concept of the sensory-motor

schema to describe structures and transitions that are
governed by a linear, cause-and-effect logic. It emerges
from Bergson's discussion of the faculties of perception and
the actualization of images into action. In order to act upon
its environment, a body must isolate from the
undifferentiated flow that it perceives only those images
that interest it in particular, upon which it can choose to act.
The complex correlations between objects and images are
thus reduced to causal (and spatial) links. Deleuze finds that
the associations made between elements in the movement-
image progress along a similar trajectory.
3. Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh
Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis, University of
Minnesota Press, 1989), 41, 272.

4. Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to

Metaphysics, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Citadel
Press, 1992), 106.
5. Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell
(Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 1998), 155.

6. Bergson, Creative Evolution, 176.

7. Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and

Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 32-
33.
8. Bergson, Creative Evolution, 306.
9. Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis, University of
Minnesota Press, 1986), 2. Also quoted in D.N. Rodowick,
Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1997), 22.
10. Rodowick similarly notes, "Deleuze's reasoning is
certainly weak here," for Deleuze, in his attempt to
distinguish between film and natural perception, privileges
the automated movements of the projector, eliding any
involvement of "cognitive correction" in the perception of the
filmic event and creating a "curious identity between
movement and image." Rodowick, 22.
11. Bergson, Creative Evolution, 272, 273.

12. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus:

Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. and forward by Brian
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987),
13.
13. Deleuze and Guattari, 12.

14. Deleuze and Guattari, 23.

15. Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and
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W. Scott Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1991),
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16. Bergson, Time and Free000000
Will: An Essay on
000000 the Immediate
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Data of Consciousness, trans. F.L. Pogson
000000 (New
000000 York:
000000
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000000
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1959), 100, as quoted in Dorothea Olkowski, Gilles 00102000000
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Deleuze and
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the Ruin of Representation (Berkeley: University01005 of California
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19. Deleuze, Negotiations, 000000
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22. Deleuze, Negotiations, 000000
149. 000000000000 000000
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23. Deleuze, Negotiations, 148.

24. Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans.

R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton with the assistance
of W. Horsfall Carter (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1935),
30-32 as quoted in Deleuze, Bergsonism, 110.
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