EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY.
TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
SALVACION v. CENTRAL BANK
FACTS:
Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion,
then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Bartelli detained Salvacion for 4
days and raped her several times. After policemen and people living nearby rescued
Karen, Greg was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen
recovered from Bartelli several dollar checks and dollar account in the China
Banking Corp. Fiscal Condaya filed a case for Serious Illegal Detention and four
counts of rape charges against Bartelli. Petitioners also filed a civil case for damages
with preliminary attachment against Bartelli.
Bartelli was able to escaped from jail on the day there was a scheduled hearing for
his petition for bail. Pending the arrest of the accused, the criminal cases were
archived. Meanwhile, in the civil case, petitioners were granted the application for
the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. The Deputy Sheriff served a
Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corp. but the latter in its answer invoked
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of
Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of
any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body,
whatsoever.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426,
as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be
made applicable to a foreign transient
HELD:
NO. Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. The
provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 insofar as it
amends Sec. 8 of RA 6426 are held to be inapplicable to the present case because
of its peculiar circumstances.
The court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and
award of damages that Karen and her parents fully deserve. That the law RA 6426
was enacted at a time when the country’s economy was in a shambles; when
foreign investments were minimal but the realities of the present times show that
the country has recovered economically and even if not, the questioned law still
denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive.
The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and
inequality such as the case at hand.
The court adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the
protection against attachment, garnishment or other court process accorded to
foreign currency deposits by PD 1246 and CB Circular 960 applies only when the
deposits come from a lender or investor not just from a mere transient or tourist
who is not expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long. Considering that
Bartelli is just a tourist or transient, he is not entitled to the protection of CB
Circular 960 and PD 1246.
1
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if
we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is
applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10
of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail.
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK v. SENATE IMPEACHMENT COURT
FACTS:
The Philippine Senate acting as Impeachment Court granted the prosecution’s
request for subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to PSBank and/or its
representatives requiring them to testify and produce before the Impeachment
Court documents relatives to the foreign currency accounts that were alleged to
belong to then Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
PSBank and Pascual Garcia III, as the president filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition seeking to nullify and set aside the Resolution of the Senate on the
ground of that it will violate Sec. 8 of RA 6426 or the Foreign Currency Deposit Act.
ISSUE:
Whether the TRO issue a TRO on the resolution of the Senate Impeachment Court?
HELD:
Yes. The Court approved the TRO. There are two requisite conditions for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction:
(1) The right to be protected exists prima facie
(2) The acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be
proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an
irreparable injustice.
A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the
CJ is provided under Sec. 8 of the Foreign Currency Deposit Act. This law
establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits:
Sec. 8: Secrecy of foreign currency deposits – All foreign currency deposits
authorized under this Act, as amended by PD 1035, as well as foreign
currency deposits authorized under PD 1034, are hereby declared as and
considered of an absolutely confidential nature and except upon the
written permission of the depositor, is no instance shall foreign
currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever.
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
There is only one exemption to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits that is
disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor. Where
the accounts in question are US dollar deposits, the applicable law is not RA 1405
but RA 6426. The court ruled on a later case that both laws support the
confidentiality of bank deposits. RA 1405 was enacted for the purpose of giving
encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking institutions and to
discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by banks in
authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the country. It covers
deposits in the PH with no distinction as to domestic or foreign deposits. Thus, RA
1405 is considered a law of general application while RA 6426 was
intended to encourage deposits from foreign lenders and investors. It’s a
special law designed especially for foreign currency deposits in the
Philippines.
The written consent under RA 6426 constitutes a waiver of the depositor’s right to
privacy in relation to such deposit. In the present case neither the prosecution nor
the Impeachment Court has presented any such written waiver by the alleged
depositor, CJ Renato Corona. Also, while impeachment may be an exemption
to the secrecy of bank deposits under RA 1405, it is not an exemption to
the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits under RA 6426.
GAANAN v. IAC
FACTS:
A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed by complainant Atty. Tito
Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon. The said complainants made a telephone call
to Laconico to give their terms for withdrawal of their complaint.
Laconico, later on called appellant Gaanan (also a lawyer) to come to his office to
advise him of the proposed settlement.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested Gaanan to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the
following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault. After
enumerating some of the conditions, several calls were made to finally confirm if the
settlement is agreeable to both parties.
As part of their agreement, Laconico has to give the money to the complainant's
wife at the office of the Department of Public Highways. But, he insisted to give the
money to the complainant himself. After receiving the money, the complainant was
arrested by the agents of the Philippine Constabulary, who were alerted earlier
before the exchange.
Appellant stated on his affidavit that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for
the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of
appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against the
complainant.
2
In defense, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act as the appellant heard the telephone conversation without
complainant's consent.
TRIAL COURT: both Gaanan and Laconico were guilty of violating Sect. 1 of RA No.
4200.
IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
WON an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the
Republic Act No. 4200
HELD:
NO. Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200, it refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable
or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,
dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use
thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement", although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same
or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to
tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or
presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by
their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for
tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
SALCEDO-ORTANEZ v. CA
FACTS:
On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages
against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license
and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence
Exhibits "A" to "M". Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three
(3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and
unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of
evidence on 9 June 1992. The trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of
the evidence offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone
conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to
wire tap his home telephone.
A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing
the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
On 10 June 1993, the Court of appeals rendered judgment which is the subject of
the present petition, which in part reads: "It is much too obvious that the petition
will have to fail, for two basic reasons:
(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant
thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on
how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes
them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed
administration of justice
ISSUE:
Whether the courts erred in admitting the cassette tapes as evidence
HELD:
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of
Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or
by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described. . . ."
"Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information
therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding
sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation."
Clearly, respondents’ trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-
quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed to
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under
Rep. Act No. 4200.
3
RAMIREZ v. CA
FACTS:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC
alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood”
and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy.”
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and
sought moral damages, attorneys fees and other litigation expenses. The transcript
on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case
before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit
and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication,
and other purposes.”
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash Information on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. RTC granted the
motion holding that:
a) facts charged do not constitute an offense under RA 4200
b) violation punished by RA 4200 refers to the taping of a communication by a
person other than a participant to the communication
The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR,
hence the instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Ramirez’ recording violated RA 4200;
2. Whether the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the
parties in the conversation
RULING:
YES. Section 1 of R.A. 4200, provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by
the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently,
as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent
court’s conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to
make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A.
4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording
private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded
as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third
person should be professed.”
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A.
4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from
the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or
signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include
the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office.
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO
FACTS:
Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station
DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment
City following reports that it was showing nude dancers.
After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad
dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her
brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture.
After that, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco,
approached Jalbuena and asked why he took a picture. Jalbuena said it is his job
then Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter that he would
kill him.
4
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. In a
while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle. Sioco and Liquin were met by
petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen minutes.
Petitioner Navarro, a policeman, said: "Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin,
anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?"
There was heated argument between Petitioner and the victim. As the victim was
about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above
the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to
get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored
him.
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange
between petitioner and the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the recording is admissible?
HELD:
Yes. The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was
not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is
authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the
conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3)
that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. In
the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice
recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and that the
speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation
was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution
UNIWIDE SALES v. TITAN-IKEDA
FACTS:
Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corp (Titan) undertook to 3 construction
projects for Uniwide Sales Realty (Uniwide). One of the projects (Project 1) was
stipulated in the agreement by the parties that it would be completed not later than
November 30, 1991 however the building was finished only on February 15, 1992
because of “additional works”. Uniwide paid but wants to get a refund on the ground
of solution indebti, claiming that the additional works were unauthorized and that
they made an overpayment. Uniwide further claims that by reason of the delay in
the completion of the project 1, they are seeking liquidated damages. On the other
hand, since Titan received from the other projects, the case for collection of sum of
money was filed by against Uniwide. Since the companies have an arbitration
agreement, they underwent arbitration in the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC) in which the arbiter ruled that the additional works on Project 1
were not unauthorized and denied the claim for liquidated damages of Uniwide.
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of CIAC. Uniwide alludes to an alleged the Under Rule 123, section 14, it states that:
judicial admission made by Engr. Tablante wherein he stated that Project 1 was
competed on March 10, 1992 thus by virtue of Engr. Tablante’s statement, Titan Section 14.
had admitted that it was in delay. Confession. - The
declaration of an
ISSUE: accused expressly
acknowledging the
Whether the judicial admission made by Engr. Tablante is admissible to establish truth of his guilt as
delay on the part of Titan to the offense
charged, may be
HELD: given in evidence
against him.
NO. The testimony of Engr. Tablante was offered only to prove that Project 1 was
indeed completed. It was not offered to prove the fact of delay. It must be Under the multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji’s confession may not
remembered that the purpose for which evidence offered must be specified because be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter,
such evidence may be admissible for several purposes under the doctrine of or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by
multiple admissibility, or may be admissible for one purpose and not for another, other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence
otherwise the adverse party cannot interpose the proper objection. Evidence of the declarant’s own guilt and should have been admitted as such.
submitted for one purpose may not be considered for any other purpose.
Furthermore even assuming, for the sake of argument, that said testimony on the The rule cited by the lower court, Rule 123, section 12 refers to statements made by
date of completion of Project 1 is admitted, the establishment of the mere fact of one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises and in furtherance of
delay is not sufficient for the imposition of liquidated damages. its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy
had been brought to an end.
PEOPLE v. YATCO, Et. Al.
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy
FACTS: between the two accused and had not yet even been identified, much less formally
offered in evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce
Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban and another whose identity is still unknown, other proof of conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions
were charged with having conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos. are formally offered in evidence.
During trial, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo
Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the making of a Suffice it to say that the lower court should have allowed such confessions to be
certain extrajudicial confession by the defendant Juan Consunji before him, counsel given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the
for the other defendant interposed a general objection to any evidence on such same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance
confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges.
the other accused Panganiban.
YAO-KEE v. SY-GONZALES
Thus, the court ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an
altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to FACTS:
introduce confessions of defendants Juan and Alfonso to prove conspiracy between
them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Caloocan City where he was then residing,
conditions, and circumstances. leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Aida Sy-Gonzales, et. al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration and
alleged among others that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion
Whether the judge is correct in excluding the extrajudicial confession made by the Gillego, and that they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix
Juan Consunji to Atty. Xavier. of the intestate estate of the deceased.
HELD: The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, et. al arguing that Yao Kee is the lawful wife
of Sy Kiat whom he married in China. They argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to
The lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven. To
exclusion of the alleged confession of the accused. buttress this argument they rely on testimonial and documentary evidences:

5
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
First, Yao Kee’s testimony, which provided that she does not have a marriage
certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to agree upon the
betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who
contracted or entered into an agreement with the parents of her husband; that the
practice during the time of her marriage was a written document [is exchanged]
just between the parents of the bride and the parents of the groom, or any elder for
that matter; that in China, the custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of
marriage broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of the
bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be
their son in-law, then they agree on a date as an engagement day; there is no
solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines; that during the wedding day, the
document is signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the parents
of the bride; that the parties themselves do not sign the document.
Second, Gan Ching’s testimony, a younger brother of Yao Kee was also presented.
He stated that he was among the many people who attended the wedding of his
sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese
government, a document signed by the parents or elders of the parties being
sufficient.
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial
court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese
custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he
married according to Chinese custom
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following entries are
found: "Marital status—Married"; "If married give name of spouses—Yao Kee";
"Address-China; "Date of marriage—1931"; and "Place of marriage—China"
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration where the following entries are
likewise found: "Civil status—Married"; and, 'If married, state name and address of
spouse—Yao Kee Chingkang, China"
And lastly, the certification issued by the Embassy of the People's Republic of China
to the effect that "according to the information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat
a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were married.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee has been proven valid in accordance
with the laws of China.
2) Whether judicial notice of Chinese law on marriage had been taken by this Court.
RULING:
As to proof of validity in accordance with Chinese marriage laws
These evidences may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy
Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in
accordance with Chinese law or custom.
6
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory". The law
requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.]
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states
that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were performed and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law
as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With
respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled
therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign
country, as are also printed and published books of reports of decisions
of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be commonly admitted
in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132
section 25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an entry
therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer
has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the
testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law.
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the
law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot
be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they
are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are
competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law
or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
As to judicial notice Chinese marriage laws
NO, it did not take judicial notice. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle
that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be
alleged and proved as any other fact.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken judicial notice
of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners however have not
shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc
Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage
of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be
presumed that it is the same as ours. Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that
there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines when her
alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated, it therefore follows that her marriage to
Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
ATIENZA v. BOARD OF MEDICINE
FACTS:
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical
Center (RMC) for check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the
same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly,
ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney
is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is nonfunctioning and
non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondent's husband, Romeo Sioson (as
complainant), �led a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before
the [BOM] against the doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney
operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio
Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence
committed by the said doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of
private respondent's fully functional right kidney, instead of the left nonfunctioning
and non-visualizing kidney.
After Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, Editha filed her formal offer
documentary evidence, which consisted of certified photocopies of X-ray request
forms where interpretation of the ultrasound results were written, for the purpose of
proving that her kidneys were both in proper anatomical locations at the time she
was operated.
Petitioner led his comments/objections to private respondent's [Editha Sioson's]
formal offer of exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because the
same are mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and intended
to establish matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are incompetent
to prove the purpose for which they are offered.
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ISSUE:
WON the exhibits are inadmissible in evidence
HELD:
NO. Petition denied. To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are
not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM. 6
Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of
evidence, 7 in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful
relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:
“[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical
grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent,
for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the
court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their
admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.”
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance
(or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of
evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioner's insistence that the admission of Editha's exhibits violated his
substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner
mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission
Rules of Procedure. As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the
exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate,
the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their
proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under
Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court on Disputable presumptions.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12,
1996, January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection
with Editha's medical case. The documents contain handwritten entries interpreting
the results of the examination. The fact sought to be established by the admission
of Editha's exhibits, that her "kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations
at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory
judicial notice. these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical
locations of Editha's kidneys. To further drive home the point, the anatomical
positions, whether left or right, of Editha's kidneys, and the removal of one or both,
may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal
area.
Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable.
Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. —
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
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(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM
are liable for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha
instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of
Editha's kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of
Editha's kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not
only through the exhibits offered in evidence.
PEOPLE v. CABIGQUEZ
“The differences of testimonies of witnesses do not always amount to
inconsistencies, they may be caused by differences in perspective. The evidence of
a minor, when consistent even through cross-examination, should be given great
weight.”
FACTS:
The Crime
On the eve of March 26, 2001, AAA and her three minor children BBB, CCC, and
DDD, were sleeping in their Sari-sari store attached to their house.
On the morning of March 27, 2001, at around 3:00 AM, AAA was awoken by clothes
falling on her face from the dresser she slept next to, upon waking, she saw a man,
who was later identified as Romulo Grondiano, standing over her with a gun pointed
at her. She screamed and this caused her three minor children to wake up.
Upon waking up, BBB crawled to her mother, thinking her mother was merely
dreaming, however she then saw Grondiano and proceeded to hug her mother in
fear. BBB was the one who identified Grondiano at this instance due to a mole
located below his left eye. Grondiano was one of their neighbors. BBB also noticed
that there was a man standing outside on their balcony.
Grondiano demanded that they all lie face down on the floor, after the four family
members followed this command, he proceeded to ransack the store, taking money
in the amount of around three thousand pesos (P 3,000.00) as well as several
grocery items, the value of which amounted to seven thousand pesos (P 7,000.00).
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After ransacking the store, Grondiano ordered them to remain quiet and issued
threats on their life for anyone who told them about what happened. Grondiano
then left through the door as his companion who was on the balcony entered. BBB
identified this man to be the accused Juanito Cabigquez, also one of their neighbors.
Cabigquez proceeded to take of the shorts of AAA and placing a pillow on her
abdomen, and despite AAA pleading him not to he had carnal knowledge with her in
view of her minor children.
After the Crime
On the same morning, AAA reported the incident to the Puerto Police Station,
however no criminal complaint was filed however, BBB at this point had not
disclosed that she identified the victims for fear of retaliation by the two men. AAA’s
vagina tested positive for spermatozoa.
Sometime in May 2001, both perpetrators of the crime were separately arrested for
possession of illegal drugs, it was at this point that BBB admitted that she had
identified the accused during the incident, no longer in fear due to their arrest.
The Case
The RTC convicted Grondiano and Cabigquez of Robbery and also convicted accused
Cabigquez of the crime of Rape. On automatic appeal to the CA, the CA upheld the
conviction. Grondiano no longer appealed but Cabigquez appealed on several
grounds. One, that the testimonies of the witnesses were inconsistent, and two,
that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused also claimed that it is contrary to human experience that BBB, having
allegedly identified them during the incident, would fail to come forth until they had
been arrested for a drug related incident.
ISSUE:
Whether the testimony of BBB as well as other corroborating evidences was
sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
The SC sustained the judgement of the CA.
The testimony of BBB was consistent throughout the whole trial, even during the
scrutiny of cross-examination. BBB, a 13-year old girl, had no reason to have
fabricated any of the events at which she testified.
It was sufficiently proven during trial that BBB was aware that she was under oath
and the penalties that she would incur if she broke that oath. After this was proven,
BBB went on the positively identify the accused in open trial, pointing him out as
the one who had raped her mother in front of her eyes. She narrated how she had
known the accused as one of her neighbors since she was old enough to perceive
her surroundings, she even knew the nickname of the accused.
The contention of the accused that her not coming forward with her knowledge
earlier is not against human experience, it is even consistent with it. She feared for
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the well-being of her family, since she knew that Grondiano had a gun and he knew
where they lived and so she kept to herself until the threat was alleviated by the
accused and Grondiano’s subsequent arrest.
The testimony of a witness of BBB’s age group, which holds consistent through and
through, should be given great evidentiary weight. It is only natural for a human
being to engrave the face of their assailant in their minds, more so for those of
tender age.
The accused also claims that the fact that the sperm from AAA’s vagina could not be
positively identified as that of the accused’s due to the mistake in the crime lab
should exonerate him. The sperm could not be identified because the one brought in
for testing was not actually a sperm sample but a sample of AAA’s vaginal
discharge.
Although if found to be a match, that evidence would have been directly used to
prove the guilt of the accused, the fact that it was not proven whether it was a
match or not in no way exonerates the accused.
With the testimony of AAA and BBB in mind, it is sufficient to hold that the accused
was the one who perpetrated the crime, beyond reasonable doubt.
DR. DE LLANO v. BIONG
FACTS:
Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota. His sister, Dra. dela Llana was seated at
the front passenger seat. A few second s after the car halted, a dump truck
suddenly rammed the car’s rear end. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela
Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have
suffered from any other visible physical injuries.
The traffic investigation identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated that Joel
was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck. Joel later revealed that his employer
was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and style of
"Pongkay Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and sand business.
Few days after, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side
of her neck and shoulder. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no
longer move her left arm. She suffered from a whiplash injury 1. She underwent
physical therapy but her condition did not improve. She underwent cervical spine
surgery which incapacitated her from the practice of her profession.
Dra. dela Llana demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries but Rebecca
refused to pay. The doctor sued Rebecca for damages before the RTC. She alleged
that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident.
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against
her as no reasonable relation existed between the accident and the injury. She
1
an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand
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pointed out that Dra. dela Llana’s illness became manifest one month and one week
from the date of the vehicular accident.
At trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as hostile
witness. Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of
the vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she identified and authenticated a
medical certificate dated November 2000 issued by a Dr. Milla. The medical
certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury.
RTC: ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of the
whiplash injury was Joel’s reckless driving
CA: reversed the ruling and held that there was failure to establish connection
between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of
evidence- it declared that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular cause
whiplash injuries.
Dra. dela Llana comes before the Supreme Court to assert that she has established
by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligent act was the proximate cause of
her whiplash injury. First, pictures of her damaged car show that the collision was
strong. She posits that it can be reasonably inferred from these pictures that the
massive impact resulted in her whiplash injury. Second, Dr. Milla categorically
stated in the medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana suffered from whiplash injury.
Third, her testimony that the vehicular accident caused the injury is credible
because she was a surgeon.
She points out that expert opinion is unnecessary if the opinion merely
relates to matters of common knowledge. She maintains that a judge is
qualified as an expert to determine the causation between Joel's reckless driving
and her whiplash injury. Trial judges are aware of the fact that whiplash injuries are
common in vehicular collisions.
ISSUE:
Whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash
injury
HELD:
The case involves a quasi-delict under Article 2176 and the following are the
elements necessary to be establish a quasi-delict case: (1) damages to plaintiff, (2)
negligence, by act or omission, (3) the connection of cause and effect between
such negligence and the damages.
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of
evidence the three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca's liability
as Joel's employer. She should show the chain of causation between Joel's reckless
driving and her whiplash injury. Only after she has laid this foundation can the
presumption — that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Joel — arise.
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None of the pieces of evidence mentioned by her show the causal relation
between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury.
A. The pictures of the damaged car only demonstrate the impact of the collision:
These pictures indeed demonstrate the impact of the collision. However, it is a far-
fetched assumption that the whiplash injury can also be inferred from these
pictures.
B. The medical certificate cannot be considered because it was not admitted in
evidence (in RTC): Even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of
this case, the medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a
basic rule that evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative
value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge
of another person who is not on the witness stand. Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who
had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical certificate. However, she
was not presented to testify in court and was not even able to identify and affirm
the contents of the medical certificate. Furthermore, Rebecca was deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her findings.
The medical certificate failed to substantially relate the accident to the injury, rather
the medical certificate only chronicled her medical history and physical
examinations.
C. Dra. dela Llana's opinion that Joel's negligence caused her whiplash injury has no
probative value: Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in the sense that Dra.
dela Llana, as the plaintiff in this quasi-delict case, was the lone physician-witness
during trial. Significantly, she merely testified as an ordinary witness before the trial
court.
Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary
witness and an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received
in evidence regarding: (a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate
knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the
mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Furthermore, the
witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person. On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may
be received in evidence on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or
training which he shown to possess.
In the present case, Dra. dela Llana's medical opinion cannot be given probative
value for the reason that she was not presented as an expert witness. As an
ordinary witness, she was not competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and
effects of whiplash injury
D. The Supreme Court cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents
cause whiplash injuries: Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by
the parties before the trial court shows that Dra. dela Llana did not present any
testimonial or documentary evidence that directly shows the causal relation
between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana's injury . Her claim that Joel's
negligence caused her whiplash injury was not established because of the deficiency
of the presented evidence during trial. We point out in this respect that courts
cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.
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This proposition is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. We have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and judges are
only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties' pieces of
evidence and their corresponding legal arguments.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her case by preponderance of
evidence.
ELAYDA v. CA
FACTS:
Amelia Elayda filed in the CFI – Quezon City against the spouses Roxas which
sought the recovery of loans extended to the spouses at the aggregate sum of 90k
with interest. Loans are secured by post-dated checks issued and receipts are
signed by them (spouses). In their answer, spouses claimed that the loans have
been paid in full and in which it exceeded the total obligations due them by reason
of usurious interests which they paid.
Trial ensued. Elayda presented testimonial and documentary proofs in due course
in substantiation of the cause of action amounting to 90k plus interest. The spouses
Roxas showed that they have received the loans aggregating 90k on 2 separate
occasions- amounting to 40k and 50k. That they have already paid the loan and
including a kick-back of 10k and 4% interest per month. The total payment
amounted to 112,674.00
To counteract, Elayda tried to submit a statement prepared by her accountant to
the effect that the total loan given by her amounted to 186k and not 90k. She
explained that the payment made by the spouses on account thereof came up to
only 110k, around 14k was charged to the 14% interest.
Upon objection, the statement was rejected by the court on the ground that it was
contrary to the judicial admissions made in the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whose version of the material occurrences has been established by preponderance
of evidence.
HELD:
The factual determination of the issue is already conclusive on and may not be
reviewed by the SC.
The Court ruled that the rejection is correct. An admission made in the pleadings
cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as
to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent
therewith, should be ignored whether objection is interposed by the party or not.
Sec. 2, Rule 129 - Judicial Admissions. – Admissions made by the parties in
the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or the other proceedings do not
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require proof and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have
been made through palpable mistake.
The records do not show that there was indeed a palpable mistake. The evidence of
indebtedness in excess of the 90k is appears to be a mere afterthought which is
difficult to accept at face value.
Elayda’s failure to deny the accusations (requiring kickback and interest in excess of
legal rate) under oath, constituted an admission of the accusation. This is in accord
with Sec. 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. “Allegations of usury are deemed admitted
if not denied specifically and under oath.”
The admission is a judicial admission, albeit implied and cannot be negated unless
done in palpable mistake.
GARDNER v. CA
FACTS:
A chain of successive transfers of real property, 5 in all, is involved.
Petitioner Ruby Gardner, wife of Frank Gardner, Jr., an American (GARDNERS), was
the registered owner of 2 adjoining parcels of agricultural land situated in Laguna
with an area of 93,688 square meters more or less.
FIRST TRANSFER – GARDNERS to the SANTOSES
The GARDNERS and the SANTOSES entered into an agreement for the subdivision of
the 2 parcels, with the SANTOSES binding themselves to advance the amount of
P93K in installments. For the protection of both parties, they executed the following
documents referring to the same parcels of land:
1. Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of SANTOSES
2. Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement; and
3. Supplemental Agreement
Despite the “sale”, the GARDNERS were still considered as “owners” in the
Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement and in the Supplemental Agreement with
Ariosto SANTOS merely as “broker”.
It appears from the evidence that the sale to the SANTOSES was one “in trust” for
the protection of the SANTOSES who had obligated to give cash advances to the
GARDNERS from time to time. Later on, new titles were issued in favor of the
SANTOSES.
SECOND TRANSFER – The SANTOSES to the JOSE CUENCAS and the JUAN
CUENCAS
Unknown to the GARDNERS, the SANTOSES transferred one parcel of land (Lot No.
1426-New) to Jose Cuenca, married to Amanda Relova (the JOSE CUENCAS), and
another parcel of land (Lot No. 4748-New) to Juan Cuenca, married to Soledad
Advincula (the JUAN CUENCAS). Titles were thereafter issued in their respective
names.
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Upon learning of the Transfer to the CUENCAS, petitioner GARDNER caused the
inscription of an Adverse Claim on the titles of the CUENCAS with the Register of
Deeds.
THIRD TRANSFER – The JUAN CUENCAS and the JOSE CUENCAS,
respectively, to MICHAEL VERROYA
The JUAN CUENCAS and the JOSE CUENCAS, respectively, transferred the lots to
Michael C. VERROYA, an office assistant of Ariosto SANTOS. Titles were issued in
VERROYA’s name with the Adverse Claim carried over.
FOURTH TRANSFER – VERROYA to the NATIVIDADS
VERROYA constituted a mortgage on both lots in favor of Anita Nolasco and Rosario
Dalma, which encumbrance was registered on the existing titles.
Later on, VERROYA executed a deed of transfer of the properties to respondent
Deogracias Natividad, married to Juanita Sanchez (the NATIVIDADS).
FIFTH TRANSFER – The NATIVIDADS to the BAUTISTAS
The NATIVIDADS transferred the lots to Ignacio Bautista and Encarnacion de los
Santos (the BAUTISTAS). No titles were issued to the BAUTISTAS.
It should be noted that from the titles of the CUENCAS (Second Transferees) to the
titles of the NATIVIDADS (the Fourth Transferee), the Adverse Claim of the
GARDNERS continued to be carried, and that throughout the successive transfers
(for over 6 years), the GARDNERS continued to remain in possession, cultivation
and occupation of the disputed properties.
Aggrieved by the series of transfers, the GARDNERS filed a suit for Declaration of
Nullity, Rescission and Damages against the 5 transferees, including the
mortgagees, Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalma, before the CFI, praying for the
declaration of nullity of all the 5 transfers and the cancellation of all titles issued
pursuant thereto on the ground that they were all simulated, fictitious, and without
consideration.
ANSWERS:
1. The SANTOSES
Claimed that the sale to them was conditional in the sense that the properties were
to be considered as the investment of the GARDNERS to the subdivision venture and
that in the event that this did not materialize, they were to reconvey the lots to the
GARDNERS upon reimbursement by the latter of all sums advanced to thim
2. The NATIVIDADS
Contended that they were purchasers in good faith notwithstanding the adverse
claim as the titles were not shown to them by VERROYA at the time of the sale
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3. The CUENCAS
Contended that their transfer to VERROYA of the properties in question was not
simulated and was supported by valuable consideration
4. VERROYA and the BAUTISTAS
Declared in default for their failure to seasonably file their responsive pleadings
The GARDNERS, aside from their documentary evidence, adduced in their favor the
testimonies of the following persons:
a) Ruby GARDNER herself
b) Jose Infante (an employee of the Register of Deeds)
c) Defendant Ariosto SANTOS (presented as an adverse witness)
Only NATIVIDAD testified on his behalf. SANTOS merely adopted as his own
evidence the declaration he had given as an adverse witness. The JOSE CUENCAS
and the JUAN CUENCAS neither presented any testimonial evidence but just
adopted the testimony of SANTOS. Defendants Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalma,
the mortgages, submitted their case after the genuineness of the deed of mortgage
executed in their favor by VERROYA was admitted by the parties.
TRIAL COURT’S DECISION
Declared the five transfers as null and void, rescinding the Subdivision Joint Venture
Agreement as well as the Supplemental Agreement
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
NATIVIDADS appealed to the CA which affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
A Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion
for Reconsideration was filed by the NATIVIDADS, however it was denied by the
CA.
A 2 Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the NATIVIDADS. The CA reconsidered
nd
its Resolution denying the respondent’s Motion for Leave to File Second Motion
for Reconsideration, and admitted the 2nd motion. Thereafter, the CA issued the
questioned Resolution declaring as valid the sale of the land to them as well as the
titles issued pursuant thereto.
The GARDNERS sought to set aside the questioned Resolution and moved for entry
of judgment averring that said Resolution was null and void for having been issued
without jurisdiction as the Decision had already became final and executory. The
motion was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioners now seek to set aside the Appellate Court’s Resolutions (granting leave
to file a 2nd Motion for Reconsideration) and (reversing the original judgment).
ISSUES:
1. W/N the five transfers are considered null and void
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2. W/N the testimonies of SANTOS under oath on the witness stand can
prevail over the allegations in his Answer (not verified and only signed by
SANTOS’ counsel) and, regarding which there is no substantial conflict or
variance
HELD:
As to the first issue:
The evidence preponderantly shows that all 5 transfers were null and void for
having been simulated and fictitious.
1. FIRST TRANSFER IN FAVOR OF THE SANTOSES
It was indubitably established to have been without consideration and is therefore
void and inexistent. The sale was executed merely as a means of protection to the
Santoses for their promised cash advances to the GARDNERS.
2. SECOND TRANSFER TO THE CUENCAS
It was fictitious and simulated for not having been supported with any
consideration. By his own admission, SANTOS transferred to the CUENCAS the
disputed properties merely to conceal his ownership and “to protect them from
persons who had filed suits against him and were running after the properties
registered in his name”.
3. THIRD TRANSFER IN FAVOR OF VERROYA
It was similarly without consideration and, therefore, void ab initio. The evidence on
record shows that SANTOS himself caused the execution of the deeds of sale in
favor of VERROYA, who is SANTOS’ office manager in his brokerage business.
4. FOURTH TRANSFER FROM VERROYA TO NATIVIDADS
It was SANTOS who had caused the preparation of the deed of sale in favor of the
NATIVIDADS after sensing that VERROYA was not inclined to return the title to the
properties.
5. FIFTH TRANSFER TO THE BAUTISTAS
A simulated and fictitious transaction, for being without consideration, as shown by
the evidence
As to the second issue:
In its Resolution in the original Decision of respondent Court discredited the
testimony of SANTOS for being at variance with the allegations in his Answer. The
fact, however, that the allegations made by SANTOS in his pleadings and in his
declarations in open Court differed will not militate against the findings herein made
nor support the reversal by respondent Court.
As a general rule, facts alleged in a party’s pleading are deemed admissions of that
party and binding upon it, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An Answer
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is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not
evidence. As SANTOS himself, in open Court, had repudiated the defenses he had
raised in his Answer and against his own interest, his testimony is deserving of
weight and credence. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court believed in his
credibility and we find no reason to overturn their findings thereon.
ATILLO III v. CA
FACTS:
Amancor, Inc., owned and controlled by Atillo III, contracted a loan with a bank
which was secured by real estate properties owned by the Atillo. Before the said
loan could be paid, Atillo entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Michell
Lhuillier whereby the latter bought shares of stock in AMANCOR.
Due to an immediate need for fresh capital to support the business operations of
AMANCOR, Atillo and LHUILLIER executed another Memorandum of Agreement
wherein LHUILLIER undertook to invest additional capital in AMANCOR.
Subsequently, a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by the
Atillo and LHUILLIER, which provides that Atillo may dispose off his properties at P.
del Rosario St., Cebu City which may involve pre-payment of AMANCOR'S mortgage
loan to the bank estimated at 300,000.00 and while AMANCOR may not yet be in
the position to re-pay said amount to him, it shall pay the interests to him
equivalent.
Pursuant to this stipulation, Atillo assumed AMANCOR' s outstanding loan balance
of P300,000.00 with the bank. After offsetting the amount of P300,000.00 with
some of the accounts that petitioner had with AMANCOR, the amount which
remained due to the petitioner was P199,888.89. Because of the failure of
AMANCOR to satisfy its obligation to repay Atillo, the latter filed a complaint for
collection of a sum of money.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties admitted that the three agreements
(mentioned above) were entered into and that the defendants admit that the claim
of the Atillo amounted to P199,888.89. Hence, they submitted the issue: “is Michell
J. Lhuillier personally liable to the Atillo?”
The trial court ruled in favor of Atillo and ordered AMANCOR to pay the entire
amount. Lhuillier was absolved from liability. However, Atillo appealed to CA,
arguing that as LHUILLIER made a judicial admission of his personal liability in his
Answer wherein he stated that:
"3.11. In all the subject dealings, it was between plaintiff and Lhuillier personally
without the official participation of Amancor, Inc.
xxx xxx xxx
3.14 . Since the board of Amancor, Inc. did not formally ratify nor acceded (sic) to
the personal agreement between plaintiff and Lhuillier through no fault of the latter,
the corporation is not bound and the actionable documents are, at most,
unenforceable insofar as the subject claim of plaintiff is concerned."
13
Hence, LHUILLIER should have been declared solidarliy liable with AMANCOR. But
the CA was not persuaded by Atillo.
ISSUE:
When a party, by his judicial admissions, has affirmed that he has personal liability
in a certain transaction, may a court rule against such an admission despite clear
indications that it was not affected by mistakes palpable or otherwise?"
HELD:
We find petitioner's contention to be without merit and the reliance on the general
rule regarding judicial admissions enunciated by the abovementioned provision of
law and jurisprudence misplaced.
As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that
a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require
proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made
through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in
fact made.[14] The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by
denying that he made such an admission.
"For instance, if a party invokes an 'admission' by an adverse party, but cites the
admission 'out of context', then the one making the admission may show that he
made no 'such' admission, or that his admission was taken out of context.
This may be interpreted as to mean 'not in the sense in which the admission is
made to appear.' That is the reason for the modifier 'such'."
Here, Atillo appears to have taken the admissions made by LHUILLIER in paragraph
3.11 of his Answer "out of context". If the answer is read on its entirety, it will
show that paragrahp 3.11 is part of the affirmative allegations recounting how
LHUILLIER was persuaded to invest in AMANCOR. Contrary to Atillo’s allegations,
LHUILLIER had categorically denied personal liability for AMANCOR's corporate debts
in the succeeding paragraphs of the Answer.
Granting arguendo that LHUILLIER had in fact made the alleged admission of
personal liability in his Answer, the SC hold that such admission is not conclusive
upon him. Applicable by analogy is our ruling in the case of Gardner vs. Court of
Appeals which allowed a party's testimony in open court to override admissions he
made in his answer. Thus:
As a general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that
party and are binding upon it, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An
answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it
is not evidence. As ARIOSTO SANTOS himself, in open court, had repudiated the
defenses he had raised in his ANSWER and against his own interest, his testimony is
deserving of weight and credence.
It is clear that in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party's
pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence
presented. The alleged admission made by Lhuillier was taken out of context by
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
Atillo because while there was such an admission, such admission refers to another
transaction and not the transaction sued upon by Atillo where he sued or tries to
collect the corpo obligation of Amancorp.
Hence, Lhuillier is exonerated from personal liability.
PEOPLE v. ACEJO
FACTS:
Allegations of the Prosecution:
In the evening of Christmas day, December 25, 1969, spouses Ricardo Bonifacio
and Herminia Belalo (the victims) were staying in their home near the fishpond
when Carlito Acejo and two unidentified persons arrived in a motorized banca. Acejo
solicited Christmas gifts from Bonifacio. The latter said that he could give only a few
pants and shirts. That answer angered Acejo. Acejo stabbed Bonifacio in the back
while the victim was held by Acejo’s two companions. Acejo struck him on the head
with an iron bar, known as tagad or tara-tara. Bonifacio slumped on the floor. Then,
Acejo turned to Herminia Belalo (she was staying in the bedroom) and raped her.
Sensing that Acejo's two companions would also ravish her, Herminia fled to the
kitchen, pursued by Acejo, who hit her with another club. The blow rendered her
unconscious.
After she regained consciousness, Herminia was able to escape. She was taken to
the hospital and results show that she had a laceration on the head and contusions
on the arms and shoulders. There was no medical examination of her private part.
An autopsy of the cadaver of Bonifacio revealed that he had two incised wounds in
the head, two incised wounds in the back, one of which penetrated his right lung,
and minor wounds in other parts of the body. Herminia, on returning to her home
nine days after the incident, found that four pants, six polo shirts, a wrist watch, a
rifile, a transistor radio and cash of three hundred pesos were missing. The rifle and
radio were recovered and turned over to the local police through the initiative of
Perlita Acejo, the mother of Carlito Acejo (herein accused).
On May 12, 1970, Acejo, Tito Evangelio and John Doe were charged by the fiscal
with robbery with homicide, rape and frustrated homicide. Acejo pleaded not guilty.
He invoked self-defense.
Uncorroborated version of the Accused:
Acejo and Evangelio were dispatched by Acejo’s mother to get shrimps from
Bonifacio, who was a godson of his mother. As Bonifacio allegedly had no shrimps,
Acejo requested that he be allowed to remain for a while so that he could listen over
the radio to a soap opera called Tita Rebecca. Bonifacio denied his request and
advised him to leave.
Because Acejo did not leave, Bonifacio got his .22 caliber rifle and aimed it at
Acejo. Meanwhile, Bonifacio was armed with an iron bar used in constructing
fishpond dikes, and he pursued Acejo. When Bonifacio was about to hit Acejo, the
latter was able to grab that weapon from Bonifacio. He struck Bonifacio with the
tagad, hitting him on the head and also hitting his wife who was behind him
14
(Bonifacio). Acejo brought with him the rifle and radio on the pretext that other
persons might take them and he would be claimed for their loss. When Acejo
arrived at the Poblacion, he told his mother about the killing and he surrendered to
the police. According to Acejo, after he struck the Bonifacio spouses with the iron
bar, they ran in the direction opposite to that where he and his companions went,
thus implying that Bonifacio left his house.
The case was elevated to this Court for review of the death penalty. Acejo's counsel
contends that the robbery with homicide was not proven beyond reasonable doubt,
that there was no robbery because there was no intent to gain, and that the crime
committed was homicide only.
ISSUE:
Whether Acejo’s plea of self-defense is credible.
HELD:
NO, Acejo’s plea of self-defense is not credible. It is complicated and obviously
fabricated.
The supposed circumstance that Bonifacio did not want Acejo to stay longer and
tune in on the radio was not a sufficient motive for Bonifacio to commit an unlawful
aggression against Acejo, considering that the latter was the son of Bonifacio's
wedding sponsor (ninang) and bearing in mind the ingrained hospitality of our
people especially during Christmas. Acejo contended that Bonifacio left his
house. But Bonifacio's body was found on the floor of his house on the following
morning. It was there where the rural health physician conducted the autopsy (Exh.
A). The fact that Acejo was in possession of the rifle and radio and that his
explanation as to how he came to possess the same is not satisfactory is sufficient
to incriminate him and to prove that he took them with animo lucrandi (See sec. 5[b
and j], Rule 131, Rules of Court). His mother delivered them to the police because
she knew that Acejo had no right to have them in his custody. That restitution did
not affect Acejo's criminal liability because the robbery was already consummated.
It merely extinguished his civil liability for those objects of the robbery. However,
the alleged taking of the pants, polo shirts, wrist watch and cash amounting to
three hundred pesos was not conclusively proven. No eyewitness testified as to the
taking of those articles. The testimony of Herminia Belalo that, on returning from
the hospital nine days after the incident, she discovered that those articles were
missing, is not a conclusive evidence that Acejo should be responsible for the loss of
those things.
Acejo is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and
physical injuries. That special complex crime was aggravated by abuse of
superiority, dwelling, nocturnity and use of a motorized banca. The mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender to the authorities is not sufficient to offset
those aggravating circumstances. Hence, the death penalty was properly imposed
by the trial court. However, for lack of the requisite ten votes, the trial court's
imposition of the death penalty cannot be affirmed. The penalty that should be
meted out to the accused is reclusion perpetua.
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
PEOPLE v. NEWMAN
FACTS:
The two-accused were charged and convicted with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide.
Efren Bantillo, a taxi driver, was rushed to the hospital by Rosita Empio for his
stabbed. Upon arrival, Eduardo Yanson, a police investigator, happened to be in the
vicinity. Sensing that the wounded man was in a serious condition, he immediately
took a piece of paper and began investigating by asking questions. He was able to
obtain the victim’s name, address, and the facts that he was held up by two men
not known to him, but one was a short fellow with long hair and the other was tall
and stout.
The Police Officers, pursuant to confidential information given, were able to arrest
the two suspects. Taken from the suspects were the watch of the victim and his
driver’s license. When already taken into custody, the two accused were
investigated thoroughly. They also went to the crime scene and asked to reenact
the incident. After the reenactment, police took the written statements of the two
accused. But before their statements were taken, the police informed them of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and assistance of a counsel. Both, however,
admitted that they knew their rights but were waiving them as they would only tell
the truth. They agreed to sign a waiver of their rights to counsel or to remain silent.
While both accused executed extra-judicial confessions, they have, however,
repudiated them. Upon arraignment, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, both
accused entered a plea of not guilty.
The accused-appellants argued that they had not been duly informed of their
constitutional rights. They contend that their oral and written extra-judicial
confessions and the photographs showing the alleged re-enactment of the crime,
are inadmissible in evidence. They further claim that they were not accorded the
right to due process.
ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial admission and the re-enactment of the crime are
admissible in evidence?
Whether the two accused were guilty of the killing and robbing of the victim?
HELD:
As to Extrajudicial Admission – Inadmissible in evidence!
In the case at bar, the two (2) extrajudicial statements and waivers carry the same
quoted prefatory statement. This, to the mind of the Court, indicates that lack of
zeal and initiative on the part of the investigating officers to fully and truly inform
the accused of their rights to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial
investigation. The "informing" done by the police in the case at bar was nothing
more than a superficial and mechanical act, performed not so much to attain the
15
objectives of the fundamental law, as to give a semblance of compliance
therewith. The right of a person under interrogation to be informed of his rights to
remain silent and to counsel, implies a correlative obligation on the part of the
police investigator to explain and contemplates an effective communication that
results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of
the right, as it cannot truly be said that the accused has been "informed" of his
rights.
The record also shows that the interrogations were conducted in a police-
denominated environment. When the accused gave their confession, their
companions in the room were police officers. Indeed, the Court is far from certain or
satisfied that the waivers of counsel and the subsequent confessions were indeed
voluntary and free. Thus, even if the confession of the accused speaks the truth, if it
was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given. Conviction, therefore, cannot be based thereon.
As to the reenactment of the crime, the Court notes that such reenactment was
scripted. Thus, it is inadmissible in evidence.
As to the guilt of the accused – They were guilty beyond reasonable doubt!
Recovered from the accused Newman at the time of his arrest by the police officers
was a watch borrowed by the victim from his close friend; on the other hand, taken
from the accused Tolentino was the Driver's license of the deceased Bantillo but
whose picture was replaced with the picture of Tolentino. In other words, the two-
accused were positively Identified as the persons in possession of the stolen
properties — the watch and the Driver's license. Both accused offered no
satisfactory explanation as to the fact of their possession of the stolen
properties. Such evidence abundantly incriminates them and proves that they took
them with animus lucrandi. A disputable presumption exists that a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the
doer of the whole act. Appellants offered no evidence to overcome or contradict
such presumption. Not even an alibi was presented for their defense.
It is not also disputed that the victim, before he died, told Police Investigators
Yanzon and Rosita Empio that he was held-up by two men — one was tag and stout
and the other was a short fellow with long hair — descriptions which fit the two (2)
accused; that he was stabbed twice; and that P60.00 were forcibly taken from his
person. The ante-mortem statement, taken together with the other evidence,
especially, the stolen watch and the driver's license of the victim found in the
possession of the accused, points to a conclusive finding that indeed the accused
are guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.
The appellants contend, however, that the dying declaration was not made by the
deceased under consciousness of an impending death. The Court holds otherwise.
The victim was brought to the hospital in a very serious condition. The nature of the
two (2) stab wounds was fatal. When the victim opened the bandage (towel given
by Rosita Empio,) his intestines came out.
The connection between the appellants' unexplained possession of the stolen
personal properties taken from the victim and the homicide committed or the attack
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
on Efren Bantillo, is too close and too obvious. It can only lead to the inevitable
conclusion that the men who stole the wristwatch and driver's license of deceased
Bantillo were the very same persons who stabbed and killed him. Logic and
experience easily allow such inference.
PEOPLE v. PADIERNOS
The presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the
evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution. (Refer to the
3rd issue)
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of RTC Rizal finding the Nona Salazar Padiernos
guilty of the crime of parricide.
Nona Salazar Padiernos and Rodolfo Padiernos were husband and wife with (4)
children, namely: Ronald, Rommel, Racquel, and Rosemarie. Rodolfo (tall, big and
robust man) was an agent of the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and as such was issued
a gun, which he used to keep under the mattress of their bed.
On one night, Nona waited for Rodolfo, but Rodolfo came home only at 4:00 o'clock
in the morning drunk. At about 6:30 in the morning, Nona brought her son Ronald
to Lourdes School using the family car driven by Roberto Valeriano (Vale), the
family driver. Upon her return to the house she went directly to their bedroom. She
came out of the room and asked Letty Basa, a cousin of Rodolfo: "Letty, nasaan ang
gamit ng Kuya mo?" At that time, Rodolfo was already awake and was on the bed
lying on his stomach, reading a newspaper. Having been informed that the things
were in their bedroom, Nona returned inside and closed the door.
Shortly, thereafter, Nona and Rodolfo came out of the room, at which instant Nona
called for help, shouting: "Vale, Vale". Vale responded to the call, and when he
entered the house, he saw Nona holding with her' right hand, a blood-stained knife,
and Rodolfo sprawled in a bloody mess on the floor, groaning and moaning in pain.
Nona was very angry and said: "Ganyan na lang ang pagmamahal ko sa iyo,
niloloko mo pa ako."
Rodolfo was brought to the hospital but was pronounced “dead on arrival.”
However, on the way to the hospital Nona was still mad and cursed Rodolfo, saying:
"Putang ina mo, iyan ang nababagay sa iyo, pag namatay ka magpapakamatay na
din ako."
Vale suggested to Nona that she surrender to the police authorities, but she
refused. Instead, she asked Vale to bring her to her uncle's house at San Juan.
Meanwhile, the hospital notified the police and immediately thereafter Capt. Enrique
Aguinaldo and Pat. Arsenio Santos arrived, and then proceeded to the residence of
Rodolfo where they conducted an investigation. The police were able to interview
Letty Basa and recover the gun kept under matress as well as the knife used by
Nona in stabbing Rodolfo.
16
Dr. Enrique Jimenez, under the direct supervision of Dr. Ernesto Brion, both of the
N.B.I., performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the deceased. The Necropsy
Report shows that Rodolfo sustained one (1) lacerated wound and three (3) stab
wounds, which cause his death.
Nona’s story/Alibi
Nona admitted that she killed the Rodolfo. However, she claims that she did it in
self-defense. According to her, after taking Ronald to school, she returned to their
house and went directly to their room. Inside, she found that Rodolfo was already
awake and was on the bed reading a newspaper. While she and Rodolfo were in the
room, Rodolfo accused her of stealing P1,000.00 from his brief case, which she
allegedly gave to her brother Jose Salazar. After a heated argument, Rodolfo pulled
her hair and slapped her on the face. She held the clothes of the Rodolfo, and when
the Rodolfo pushed her back, they fell on the floor together. Rodolfo stood up first,
and then, kicked her on the stomach, saying: "Putang ina mo, papatayin kita."
Then, he got his gun under the mattress and pointed it at her. Believing that
Rodolfo would kill her, she grabbed, with her left hand, the knife under the bed.
Then she stood up and with Rodolfo in front of her, covered her eyes with her right
hand, and began swinging the knife from left to right and from right to left to
prevent Rodolfo from coming near her. After awhile, she opened her eyes and
seeing that Rodolfo was about two (2) meters away from her, she opened the door
and ran out fast. Rodolfo followed her but he fell on the floor in a bloody mess.
The version of Nona was disbelieved by the trial court. Nona insist that RTC
erred in rejecting her claim of self-defense, and assails the trial court in admitting
and in giving 'weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
1st ISSUE:
Whether the plea of self-defense is tenable.
HELD: No, it is untenable.
1. If Nona really inflicted the wounds sustained by swinging the knife sidewise
from left to right and from right to left, then Rodolfo would have sustained
"slash wounds and not stab wounds". The autopsy report, however,
shows that the Rodolfo sustained three (3) stab wounds, one of which,
the fatal wound, being located at the left part of the back. Moreover, these
stab wounds, especially the fatal wound at the back, could not have been
sustained by Rodolfo if he had been facing Nona. The nature and location
of the stab wounds indicate that Nona inflicted those wounds while she was
behind or at the back of Rodolfo. These physical facts belie and negate the
Nona’s claim of self-defense.
2. If Nona covered her eyes with her right hand when she began to swing the
knife from left to right and from right to left, how was she able to hit her
husband without seeing him? Why did her husband remain standing in
front of her, immobile like a post without avoiding the knife and allowed
himself to be killed? If it were true that Rodolfo was standing in front of her
with a gun pointed at her and angry enough to kill her, why didn't he shoot
her?
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
3. After the stabbing incident, Nona did not surrender to the authorities, but
fled and went into hiding and surrendered only after almost four (4)
years from the commission of the crime. Such conduct of Nona is
inconsistent with and casts doubt upon her claim of self defense. On the
Contrary, it tends to establish her guilt.
It is now a well-settled rule that one who admits the infliction of injuries which
caused the death of another has the burden of proving self-defense with
sufficient and convincing evidence. If such evidence is of doubtful veracity,
and is not clear and convincing, the defense must necessarily fail, for having
admitted that she was the author of the death of Rodolfo. It was incumbent upon
Nona, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance
claimed by her without relying on the weakness of that of the prosecution but on
the strength of her own evidence, for even if the evidence of the prosecution were
weak it could not be disbelieved after Nona herself admitted the killing. Having
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence her plea of self-defense,
she must suffer the consequences of her unlawful act.
2nd ISSUE:
Whether RTC erred in admitting and in giving 'weight to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.
HELD: No.
The rule consistently adhered to by this Court is to give due respect to the
finding of the trial court on the matter, the trial court having had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of witnesses while
testifying and, therefore, is in a better position to properly gauge their
credibility. Thus, appellate tribunals will not disturb the findings of fact of the trial
court unless there is proof that said court, in making the findings, had failed to
appreciate some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would
have altered the results of the case.
In this case, SC finds no reason to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial
court.
1. Nona’s contention that prosecution witness Letty Basa is biased because
she is the cousin of Rodolfo, is without merit. While witnesses may be said
to be interested by reason of their relationship with one of the parties, their
declarations should not be disregarded or rejected capriciously on the
ground of bias alone where, in the present case, they are reasonable,
consistent and supported by facts and circumstances.
2. We find no merit in the contention that the non-presentation of the written
statement of Letty Basa to the police which she allegedly did not sign, gave
rise to the presumption that it "contained declarations disastrous to
the prosecution case". The presumption that suppressed evidence
is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the
disposal of both the defense and the prosecution. In the case at bar,
the alleged statement of prosecution witness Letty Basa was in the
possession of the police authorities. Hence, the defense could have
17
requested the court below to issue a subpoena requiring the police to
produce such statement, but as the defense failed to do that, they
cannot now argue that said statement if produced would have been
adverse to the prosecution.
3RD ISSUE:
Whether prosecution witness Dr. Brion is competent and credible to testify.
HELD: Yes. Nona argued that it was Dr. Enrique Jimenez and not Dr. Brion, who
conducted the autopsy examination on the body of Rodolfo. This contention is
equally devoid of merit. As correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief, Dr. Ernesto
Brion was presented as an expert witness, and his competency as such was
admitted by Nona’s counsel. Besides, he testified that the autopsy examination
of the body of Rodolfo was conducted under his direct supervision. Hence, he
was competent to testify on the nature, extent, and location of the wounds
sustained by Rodolfo, and on the basis thereof could, with some degree of certainty,
deduce the possible relative positions of Nona and Rodolfo during the stabbing
incident. Therefore, the testimony is fully supported and corroborated by the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
ANGELES v. MAGLAYA
FACTS:
On March 25, 1998, respondent filed a petition for letters of administration and her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles.
Petitioner opposed the petition and prayed that she be made the administratrix of
Francisco's estate. Petitioner alleged having married Francisco on August 7, 1948,
and that Francisco represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that
time. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco
for, although she was recorded as Francisco's legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Respondent alleged, inter
alia, that per certification of the appropriate offices, records of marriages of the Civil
Registrar where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were
destroyed. Respondent presented her birth certificate and four witnesses. After
presentation of evidence, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action. RTC granted the motion. It was reversed by the
CA and made the respondent the administratix.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent was a legitimate child of the decedent? Is she entitled to be
an administratix?
HELD:
NO. A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke
such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence
to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed.
However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact thus prima
facie established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
proved, the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be
availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefore, i.e., that the
child's parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred
during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a child is
legitimate does not arise. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract,
doubtless the best evidence of Francisco's and Genoveva's marriage, if one had
been solemnized, was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other
solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to declare that he solemnized
the marriage between the two. None of the four witnesses respondent presented
could say anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At best, their
testimonies proved that respondent was Francisco's daughter.
Ironical as it may seem, respondent herself undermined her very own case. As it
were, she made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion ' as well as
the appellate court's conclusion - that Francisco was legally married to Genoveva.
Respondent declared that Genoveva died in 1988, then if there was a legitimate
marriage between Francisco and Genenova in 1938, the 1948 wedding between
Francisco and petitioner would be void and the petitioner would not be considered
an heir of the deceased. However, it was still declared by the respondent’s petition
that the only surviving heirs of the deceased was the respondent herself as the
daughter and the petitioner as the surviving spouse of the deceased, thus negating
her own stand.
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is
preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of
'next of kin', the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of
distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such
that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir.
In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of
administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court
perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate
action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the
trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the
claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.
CONCEPCION v. CA
FACTS:
In December 1989, petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma.
Theresa Almonte got married. They lived in Fairview, Quezon City. In December
1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. In December 1991, Gerardo filed a
petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He
alleged that 9 years before he married Ma. Theresa, she had married one Mario
Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario was
still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa's marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting
when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being
bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The
18
custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted
visitation rights.
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the CA. She argued that there was nothing in the
law granting "visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child”
and further maintained that Jose Gerardo's surname should be changed from
Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate
child shall use the mother's surname. The CA held that Jose Gerardo was not the
son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage. The appellate
court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose
Gerardo was their son and it gave little weight to Jose Gerardo's birth certificate
showing that he was born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
were married. Gerardo moved for a reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario or the illegimate
child of Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.
HELD:
Jose Gerardo, is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
Presumption of Legitimacy
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family
Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is
legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy,
Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,
particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on
the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband
to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is
not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of
physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days
of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child. To rebut the
presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital
intimacy impossible. This may take place, for instance, when they reside in different
countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of
conception. Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it
appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison regulations.
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in
Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon
City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart. Not only
did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at
all was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these
circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario,
was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the
marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the
assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such
evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the
issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Proof of Filiation
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo's birth certificate is misplaced. It has no
evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial
court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been
formally offered. Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the
moment of his birth. Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as
primary evidence of the filiation of a child, as the status of a child is determined by
the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the
child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days
following the termination of marriage is sought to be established. Here, the
status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be
contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary
cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was
improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be
rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect
to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties.
Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose
Gerardo's illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law
(rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the
latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more conducive to
the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.
DATALIFT MOVERS v. BELGRAVIA REALTY
FACTS:
There was a warehouse (bodega) used by petitioner Datalift Movers, Inc. (Datalift)
for its cargoes in connection with its brokerage business. The warehouse is owned
by the Philippine National Railways (PNR) and located at No. 883 Santibañez Street
corner Cristobal Street, Pandacan, Manila.
In 1987, PNR leased out the lot to Sampaguita Brokerage, Inc. (Sampaguita),
pursuant to a written contract starting on July 1, 1987 up until June 30, 1990 for a
monthly rental of P6,282.49, subject to a ten (10%) percent increase every year.
19
Sampaguita then subleased the area to its sister company, Belgravia Realty &
Development Corporation (Belgravia) whereby the latter would put up on the lot a
warehouse for its own use. Belgravia put up a warehouse occupying an area of
about 3,000 sqm. of the lot. However, Belgravia sublet it to petitioner Datalift,
represented by its president Jaime B. Aquino, pursuant to a 1-year written contract
of lease dated October 2, 1990, commencing on October 5, 1990 and ending on
October 5, 1991, subject to extension upon mutual agreement by the parties. By
the terms of lease, Datalift shall pay Belgravia a monthly rental of P40,000.00
payable on or before the 15th day of each month, provided an advance rental for
two (2) months is paid upon execution of the contract.
After the 1 year contract period expired, Datalift continued in possession and
enjoyment of the leased warehouse by verbal understanding of the parties.
Subsequently, Belgravia unilaterally increased the monthly rental to P60,000.00
starting June 1994 to October 1994. Monthly rental was again increased
from P60,000.00 to P130,000.00 beginning November 1994 onwards, allegedly in
view of the increased rental demanded by PNR on Sampaguita for the latter’s lease
of the former’s lot.
Because of the rental increase made by Belgravia, Datalift stopped paying its
monthly rental for the warehouse. Sampaguita addressed demand letters to Datalift
asking the latter to pay its rental in arrears in the amount of P4,120,000.00 and to
vacate and surrender the warehouse. The demands having proved futile, Belgravia
and/or Sampaguita filed with the MeTC of Manila their complaint for ejectment
against Datalift and/or its controlling stockholder, Jaime B. Aquino.
MeTC Ruling
The MeTC of Manila, Branch 3, rendered judgment for plaintiffs Sampaguita and
Belgravia but reduced the amount of rental arrearages to a reasonable level
of P80,000,00 a month, finding the increase to be arbitrary and highly
unconscionable.
The MeTC decreased the P130,000 rental fee to P80,000. Thus, the rental in arrears
due and demandable upon defendants would be P20,000.00 per month from June,
1994 to October, 1994, defendants having paid already P60,000.00 per month
during the five (5) months period, the P80,000.00 per month from November, 1994
to the present.
MeTC also ordered defendants and all persons, natural or juridical, claiming rights,
interest or title under them, to vacate and surrender peacefully to plaintiffs that
warehouse and the area/premises occupied by them.
Appeal to RTC
Both parties appealed to the RTC, raffled to Branch 36 thereof.
Datalift and its co-defendant Jaime B. Aquino: Questioned the MeTC’s finding
that there was an implied new lease between PNR and Sampaquita on the lot on
which the warehouse in question stands, and accordingly fault the same court for
ordering them to vacate the same warehouse and to pay rentals as well as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
Sampaguita and Belgravia: Assailed the MeTC decision for not ordering Datalift
and Aquino to pay the increase rental of P130,000.00 a month beginning June
1994, and for not ruling that both defendants are jointly and subsidiary liable for
the amounts awarded to them.
The RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in toto.
Court of Appeals
Only Datalift and its co-petitioner Jaime B. Aquino elevated the case to the CA.
The CA dismissed the petitioners’ petition and affirmed the RTC decision with slight
modification, by deleting the P30k attorney's fees,
ISSUES:
Whether the CA erred:
1) IN HOLDING THAT AN IMPLIED NEW LEASE WAS CREATED BETWEEN PNR AND
RESPONDENTS (i.e. SAMPAGUITA and BELGRAVIA) WHEN THE FORMER DID NOT
TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO EJECT THE LATTER FROM THE SUBJECT PREMISES.
2) IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO QUESTION
WHETHER AN IMPLIED NEW LEASE WAS CREATED BETWEEN PNR AND THE
RESPONDENTS.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
1) As held by the CA:
There is no definite showing that the lease contract between PNR and Sampaguita
Brokerage, Inc. had been effectively terminated. As held by the court a quo: "(B)y
PNR not taking a positive action to eject Sampaguita from the leased premises up to
the present, again, there is a tacit renewal of the lease contract between PNR and
Sampaguita.
The Rules of Court sufficiently shields respondent Belgravia, as lessor, from being
questioned by the petitioners as lessees, regarding its title or better right of
possession as lessor because having admitted the existence of a lessor-lessee
relationship, the petitioners are barred from assailing Belgravia's title of better right
of possession as their lessor.
Section 2, Rule 131, of the Rules of Court provides the following instances of
conclusive presumptions:
xxx (b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between
them.
Conclusive presumptions have been defined as "inferences which the law makes so
peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof
20
however strong." As long as the lessor-lessee relationship between the petitioners
and Belgravia exists as in this case, the former, as lessees, cannot by any proof,
however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that Belgravia has valid title
to or better right of possession to the subject leased premises than they have.
Belgravia's title or right of possession should only be taken cognizance of in a
proper case between PNR and Belgravia, but not in the present case.
The logical consequence of the operation of this conclusive presumption against the
petitioners is that they will never have the personality to question whether an
implied new lease was created between PNR and the respondents, because so long
as there is no showing that the lessor-lessee relationship has terminated, the
lessor’s title or better right of possession as against the lessee will eternally be a
non-issue in any proceeding before any court.
2) Additionally, petitioners, being non-privies to the contract of lease between PNR
and respondent Sampaguita, the petitioners have no personality to raise any factual
or legal issue relating thereto.
Despite non-merit of petitioners' arguments, the Court corrected this plain error,
and adjusted the rental due in accordance with the facts as borne by the evidence
on record. It is clear from the records that the rental due and demandable, and
which the petitioners already paid to respondent Belgravia from June 1994 to
October 1994 was only P60,000.00. It was only when Belgravia drastically increased
the monthly rental from P60,000.00 to P130,000.00, effective November 1994, that
the petitioners altogether stopped paying rentals. Thus, the order to pay unpaid
rentals in the adjusted amount of P80,000.00 should be reckoned only from
November 1994 until the time that the petitioners finally vacate the premises.
The CA decision is affirmed.
BLUE CROSS HEALTH v. OLIVARES
FACTS:
Neomi Olivares applied for a health care program and paid the amount in full worth
Php 12, 000.00 more or less including the unlimited consultations. The health care’s
coverage excluded ailments due to pre-existing conditions. Barely 38 days later,
Olivares suffered a stroke and was admitted at the Medical City. When the bill came,
petitioner (BC) refused to pay thus constraining the spouses Olivares to pay. A
collection suit was then filed and as per respondent, the claim was not denied but
only pending report from one Dr. Saniel to determine if there was a pre-existing
condition. In a letter to petitioner (BC), Dr. Saniel told BC that the patient (Olivares)
was invoking patient-physician confidentiality and any medical information
regarding her neurological status must not be released without her (Olivares)
approval.
MeTC: Dismissed for lack of cause of action.
RTC: Reversed decision from MeTC and ordered Blue Cross to pay actual and other
damages.
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
CA: Affirmed RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was able to prove that respondent Neomi's stroke was caused by
a pre-existing condition and therefore was excluded from the coverage of the health
care agreement.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner was not able to prove pre-existing condition.
Under the health care program provision, petitioner is not liable for pre-existing
conditions if they occur within one year from the time the agreement takes effect.
BC argues that Olivares prevented the Dr. Saniel from submitting his report and in
effect, the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced should apply in its favor. Olivares countered that it was incumbent upon
BC to prove the pre-existing condition; BC failed to do this.
Petitioner never presented any evidence to prove that respondent Neomi's stroke
was due to a pre-existing condition. It merely speculated that Dr. Saniel's report
would be adverse to Neomi, based on her invocation of the doctor-patient privilege.
This was a disputable presumption at best.
Suffice it to say that this presumption does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the
disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely
corroborative or cumulative and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Here, respondents' refusal to present or allow the presentation of Dr. Saniel's report
was justified. It was privileged communication between physician and patient.
Since petitioner had the burden of proving exception to liability, it should have
made its own assessment of whether respondent Neomi had a pre-existing condition
when it failed to obtain the attending physician's report. It could not just passively
wait for Dr. Saniel's report to bail it out. The mere reliance on a disputable
presumption does not meet the strict standard required under our jurisprudence.
BPI v. REYES
FACTS:
The conflicting versions of the parties are aptly summarized by the trial court, to
wit:
Plaintiff in trial court (JESUSA REYES) allegations of facts:
- On December 7, 1990 at around 2:00 p.m., plaintiff Jesusa Reyes
together with her daughter, Joan Reyes, went to BPI Zapote
Branch to open an ATM account, she being interested with the
ongoing promotions of BPI entitling every depositor with a deposit
amounting to P2,000.00 to a ticket with a car as its prize to be
raffled every month.
21
- She was accommodated by Cicero Capati (Pats) who was an
employee of the bank and in charge of the new accounts and time
deposits
- Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM account
for the amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be
withdrawn from her existing savings account with BPI bank and
the other P100,000.00 will be given by her in cash.
- Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip
for P200,000.00 to be withdrawn from her existing savings
account with said bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes believing in
good faith that Capati prepared the papers with the correct
amount signed the same unaware of the mistakes in figures.
- Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati
returned to where the plaintiff was seating and informed the latter
that the withdrawable balance could not accommodate
P200,000.00.
- Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of
P100,000.00 only and then changed and correct the figure two (2)
into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto signifying
the change, afterwhich the amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two
bundles containing 100 pieces of P500.00 peso bill were given to
Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing the same. Thereafter
Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the name of
plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new account no. 0235-0767-48 and
brought the same to the teller's booth.
- After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her duplicate
copy of her deposit to account no. 0235-0767-48 reflecting the
amount of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing December 7,
as the date. Then plaintiff and daughter then left.
- Thereafter, she was made aware by her statement of account sent
to her by BPI bank that her ATM account only contained the
amount of P100,000.00 with interest
- On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructed Efren Luna, one of her
employees, to update her savings account passbook at the BPI
with the folded deposit slip for P200,000.00 stapled at the outer
cover of said passbook. After presenting the passbook to be
updated and when the same was returned, Luna noticed that the
deposit slip stapled at the cover was removed and validated at the
back portion thereof.
- Plaintiff then asked the bank manager why the deposit slip was
validated, whereupon the manager assured her that the matter
will be investigated into.
- When no word was heard as to the investigation made by the
bank, Mrs. Reyes sent two (2) demand letters thru her lawyer
demanding return of the missing P100,000.00 plus interest
- The last letter prompted reply from defendant inviting plaintiff to
sit down and discuss the problem. The meeting resulted to the
bank promising that Capati will be submitted to a lie detector test.
Plaintiff, however, never learned of the result of said test. Plaintiff
filed this instant case.
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
DEFENDANT IN TRIAL COURT (BPI) allegations of facts:
o Defendant on the other hand claimed that Bank of the
Philippine Island admitted that Jesusa Reyes had effected a
fund transfer in the amount of P100,000.00 from her ordinary
savings account to the express teller account she opened on
December 7, 1990
o However, it was the only amount she deposited and no
additional cash deposit of P100,000.00 was made. That
plaintiff wanted to effect the transfer of P200,000.00 but the
balance in her account was not sufficient and could not
accommodate the same. Plaintiff thereafter agreed to reduce
the amount to be withdrawn from P200,000.00 to
P100,000.00 with plaintiff's signature superimposed on said
corrections; that the original copy of the deposit slip was also
altered from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00, however, instead
of plaintiff signing the same, the clerk-in-charge of the bank,
in this case Cicero Capati, signed the alteration himself for
Jesusa Reyes had already left without signing the deposit slip.
o Defendant claimed that there was actually no cash involved
with the transactions which happened on December 7, 1990
as contained in the bank's teller tape.
o Defendant further claimed that when they subjected Cicero
Capati to a lie detector test, the latter passed the same with
flying colors, indicative of the fact that he was not lying when
he said that there really was no cash transaction involved
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Jesusa Reyes, hence the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether Jesusa Reyes made an initial deposit of P200,000 in her newly
opened account
HELD:
- SC held that the issue raises a factual question, the Court is not a trier of
facts, but this case falls under the exceptions which constrain us to resolve
the factual issue.
- It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own
affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required by law. In civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence, or that evidence which is of greater weight or
is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it.
- For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must
first be stressed that the judge who had heard and seen the witnesses
testify was not the same judge who penned the decision. Thus, not having
heard the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would
not be in a better position than this Court to assess the credibility of
witnesses on the basis of their demeanor.
22
- Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the
witnesses' testimonies and examined the pieces of evidence on record.
- After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence
presented by the parties, we find that respondents failed to successfully
prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa made an initial
deposit of P200,000.00 in her Express Teller account.
- Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the outset,
respondent Jesusa told Capati that she was opening an Express Teller
account for P200,000.00; that she was going to withdraw and transfer
P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new account, and that she
had an additional P100,000.00 cash.
- However, these assertions are not borne out by the other evidence
presented. Notably, it is not refuted that Capati prepared a withdrawal
slip for P200,000.00. This is contrary to the claim of respondent Jesusa
that she instructed Capati to make a fund transfer of only P100,000.00
from her savings account to the Express Teller account she was opening.
Yet, respondent Jesusa signed the withdrawal slip.
- We find it strange that she would sign the withdrawal slip if her intention in
the first place was to withdraw only P100,000.00 from her savings account
and deposit P100,000.00 in cash with her.
- Moreover, respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the withdrawal slip
without looking at the amount indicated therein fails to convince us,
for respondent Jesusa, as a businesswoman in the regular course
of business and taking ordinary care of her concerns, would make
sure that she would check the amount written on the withdrawal
slip before affixing her signature. Significantly, we note that the space
provided for her signature is very near the space where the amount of
P200,000.00 in words and figures are written; thus, she could not have
failed to notice that the amount of P200,000.00 was written instead of
P100,000.00.
- The fact that respondent Jesusa initially intended to transfer the amount of
P200,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller account
was further established by the teller's tape presented as petitioner's
evidence and by the testimony of Emerenciana Torneros. Also Torneros
then called Capati to her cage and told him of the insufficiency of
respondent Jesusa's balance. Capati then motioned respondent Jesusa to
the teller's cage; and when she was already in front of the teller's cage,
Torneros told her that she could not withdraw P200,000.00 because of
overdraft; thus, respondent Jesusa decided to just withdraw P100,000.00.
- Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her daughter,
that the former deposited P100,000.00 cash in addition to the fund transfer
of P100,000.00, is not established by physical evidence. While the
duplicate copy of the deposit slip was in the amount of P200,000.00 and
bore the stamp mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy failed to show
that there was a cash deposit of P100,000.00.
- Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it
ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. We have, on many
occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the
truth. Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we consistently rule that
the physical evidence should prevail.
- Thus, the complaint filed by respondents, together with the counterclaim of
petitioner, is DISMISSED
VICTORY SHIPPING LINES v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION
FACTS:
Pedro Icong was an employee of Victory Shipping Lines. On February 23, 1954, M/V
“Miss Leyte,” the vessel of Victory Shipping was razed by a fire. Awakened by the
fire, Pedro jumped overboard. Since then, he has not been heard of. As such, Juan
Icong, his father, filed a claim for death compensation against Victory Shipping,
before the Workmen's Compensation Commission. The Commission rendered an
award in favor of respondent Juan Icong in the sum of P2,038.40, plus P200.00 for
burial expenses and P20.00 as legal fee. Aggrieved, Victory Shipping filed an
appeal.
Main Contention of Victory Shipping:
 The presumption of death under Article 391 of the Civil Code of persons on
board a vessel which was lost during sea voyage, does not apply to Pedro.
The said provision requires that the person must be unheard of for at least
4 years. However, Pedro Icong had been missing only for a few months
from the incident.
ISSUE:
Whether the presumption of death of persons lost during sea voyage applies to
Pedro.
HELD:
NO, the said presumption does not apply to Pedro in this case.
Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines relating to presumption of death of
persons aboard a vessel lost during a sea voyage applies to a case wherein the
vessel cannot be located nor accounted for, or when its fate is unknown or
there is no trace of its whereabouts, inasmuch as the word "lost" used in
referring to a vessel must be given the same meaning as "missing" employed in
connection with an aeroplane, the persons taking both means of conveyance being
the object of the rule expressed in the same sentence. In the instant case, none of
the foregoing conditions appear to exist. The fate of Victory Shipping’s vessel is
not unknown. It was not lost or missing. As a matter of fact, it had been
definitely destroyed by fire and washed ashore. And in view of the further fact that
when Victory Shipping’s vessel caught fire, Pedro Icong jumped overboard and since
then had not been heard from, the aforementioned rule on presumption of death
does not apply. Instead the rule on preponderance of evidence applies to
establish the fact of death. In the same case of Madrigal Shipping Co.,
Inc., supra, we said:
23
Where a person was last seen in a state of imminent peril that might
probably result in his death and has never been seen or heard from again,
though diligent search has been made, inference of immediate death may
be drawn. (Brownlee, et al., vs. Mutual Benefit, Health and Accident
Association, 29 Fed [2nd] 71).
TN: In employer's report of the accident submitted by Victory Shipping, laborer
Pedro Icong was reported as the only casualty, and in transmitting said report
Victory Shipping’s counsel had implicitly admitted the fact of Pedro Icong's
death.
EASTERN SHIPPING v. LUCERO
“Presumption of death may arise even before the periods provided for by law if
there exists strong indications that the death did in fact occur”
FACTS:
M/V Eastern Minicon, a vessel of Eastern Shipping Lines Inc, encountered a very
strong storm en route to its destination. As the weather worsened, Capt. Julio J.
Lucero, Jr. sent 3 radio messages to Eastern Shipping’s Manila Office, asking for
assistance and detailing the grave situation of the ship and crew. The vessel,
however, was never found again after the incident.
The company offered to pay the widow Josephine his husband’s death benefits but
the latter refused. She argued that the contract of employment entered into his
husband was voyage-to-voyage which would only terminate upon the vessel’s
arrival. Hence, she claimed that his husband’s wages still accrued since the
presumption of his husband’s death has not yet taken effect, and that for all intents
and purposes, his wages must be paid as if he was still alive until the said period
arrives.
ISSUE:
Is the contention of Josephine correct?
RULING:
NO, there is enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss of the
M/V Eastern Minicon and the death of its crew. Capt. Lucero’s 3 radio message, the
last of which, received at 9:50 p.m. of that day, was a call for immediate assistance
in view of the existing "danger,” claiming that the "sea water was entering the
hatch," that the vessel "was listing 50 to 60 degrees port," and that they were
"preparing to abandon the ship any time”; was proof of the inevitability of their
doom. After this message, nothing more has been heard from the vessel or its crew
until the present time.
There is, therefore, a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons
aboard had perished with it. Upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death
under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of
evidence.
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
PEOPLE v. BONGCARAWAN
FACTS:
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged to have in his possession,
custody and control eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated
drug commonly known as Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams, in violation of
Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended by RA 7659.
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence of the Prosecution: M/V Super Ferry 5 sailed from Manila to Iligan City.
When vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City, one of its security officers
received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry.
Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. The
security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found
at the economy baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this
back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the
suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white
crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be shabu, the security
personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of
the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine
Coast Guard for assistance.
The Philippine Coast Guard officers arrived and took custody of the accused and the
seized items--the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag and eight (8) small
plastic packs of white crystalline substance.
The accused and the seized items were later turned over by the coast guard to the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).
Chief Inspector Graciano Mijares and his men brought the accused to the
PAOCTF Headquarters, while the packs of white crystalline substance were
sent to the NBI for laboratory examinations, which later confirmed the
substance to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu,
weighing 399.3266 grams.
Accused’s Contentions: He was in Quiapo, Manila when he met Alican Alex
Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in Marawi City. The latter requested him to
bring a Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and watches to Iligan City, and to
give it to Macapudi’s brother at the Iligan port. He boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5
on the same night, carrying a big luggage full of clothes, a small luggage or maleta
containing the sunglasses and brushes he bought from Manila, and the Samsonite
suitcase of Macapudi.
While he was conversing with a friend, Ansari Ambor, he was told about the
suspicion and then was frisked. He took the big luggage and Macapudi’s Samsonite
suitcase. He voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused to do the same to the
Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was not his and had a secret combination lock.
24
Accused contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing the shabu was forcibly
opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired
pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence
against him.
Moreover, accused contends that he is not the owner of the Samsonite suitcase and
he had no knowledge that the same contained shabu. Thus, without knowledge or
intent to possess the dangerous drug, he cannot be convicted of the crime charged.
ISSUES:
I. DID THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG CONFISCATED
IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT?
II. DID THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT OWNED
THE CONFISCATED EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE
AGAINST HIM?
HELD:
NO. The contentions are devoid of merit.
ON THE FIRST ISSUE, the court a quo was correct in so holding that the drug
confiscated is admissible in evidence. The right against unreasonable search and
seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. Evidence acquired in
violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and
seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression
committed by the government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case of
People v. Marti, [i]n the absence of governmental interference, liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom
the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the
vessel security personnel. It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase
that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure
of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without
government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
The search and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should not be
considered as one conducted by the police authorities for the vessel security officer
in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental
function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the
sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
them and other agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures may be invoked.
ON THE SECOND ISSUE, the court a quo was correct in holding that accused-
appellant owned the confiscated evidence, and thus admissible in evidence against
him. In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following facts must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a
regulated drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
The first two elements were sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact
undisputed. We are left with the third.
In the case of United States v. Tan Misa, this Court has ruled that to warrant
conviction, the possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the
accused, or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control
of such articles.
However, possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence
of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession.
Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence
of knowledge or animus possidendi. In this respect, the accused-appellant has
utterly failed. His testimony, uncorroborated, self-serving and incredulous, was not
given credence by the trial court.
Moreover, evidence must be credible in itself to deserve credence and
weight in law. In this case, the accused-appellant admits that when he was asked
to get his baggage, he knew it would be inspected. Why he got the Samsonite
suitcase allegedly not owned by him and which had a combination lock known only
to the owner remains unclear. He also claims that he did not present his small
maleta for inspection for fear that its contents consisting of expensive sunglasses
and brushes would be confiscated, but he brought the Samsonite suitcase which is
not his and also contained expensive sunglasses, and even watches.
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by
him.
To overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican Alex
Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his
claim. As aptly observed by the trial judge:
… He says that Alex Macapudi is a friend and a fellow businessman who has
a stall selling sunglasses in Marawi City. But no witnesses were presented to
prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person named
Alex Macapudi who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he
25
does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could
testify and support the claim of the accused.
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar,
it is the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be
fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that a
courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to
possess the same.
PEOPLE v. UMANITO
FACTS:
Umanito was found by the RTC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
The decision was affirmed by the CA and was appealed to the SC.
The alleged rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy
and the birth of a child named BBB. In view of that fact, as well as the defense of
alibi raised by Umanito, the SC in a resolution dated 26 October 2007, resolved for
the first time, to apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence
(DNA Rules) directing the accused, AAA, and BBB to undergo DNA testing and
remanded the case to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence.
The DNA analysis was conducted by the NBI. Based on the findings of the DNA
analysis, there is 99.9999% Probability of Paternity that Rufino Umanito is the
biological father of BBB.
The public prosecutor offered in evidence the result of the DNA analysis and
presented the Forensic Chemist of the NBI who conducted the analysis to testify.
The defense did not interpose any objection and also did not present evidence to
controvert the results of the DNA analysis hence it was admitted.
ISSUE:
Whether the DNA evidence established the paternity of Umanito
HELD:
Sec. 6 of A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that: "If the value of Paternity is 99.9% or
higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity."
Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted
and overcome by other evidence. (Rule 131, Section 3, Rules of Court)
The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was
not contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did
not object to the admission of the results of the DNA testing nor presented evidence
to rebut the same.
The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion on Umanito's defense of alibi and
his specific assertion that he did not engage in sexual relations with the
complainant.
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
After such finding, Umanito filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal. By such motion,
Umanito is deemed to have acceded the rulings of the RTC and CA finding him guilty
of the crime of rape.
EDU v. GOMEZ
FACTS:
The 1968 model Volkswagen, bantam car, allegedly owned by Lt. Walter A. Bala
under whose name it was originally registered, was reported to the Office of the
Commission on Land Transportation as stolen on June 29,1970 from the residence
of Lt. Bala. Upon receipt of such information the agents of Anti-Carnapping
Unit(ANCAR) of the Philippine Constabulary, on detail with the Land Transportation
Commission recognized subject car on 2 February 1971 in the possession of LUCILA
ABELLO and immediately seized and impounded the car as stolen property.
Romeo F. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation, seized the car pursuant
to Section 60 of Republic Act4136 which empowers him to seize the motor vehicle
for delinquent registration aside from his implicit power deducible from Sec. 4(5),
Sec. 5 and 31 of said Code, "to seize motor vehicles fraudulently or otherwise not
properly registered.”
Lucia Abello filed a complaint for replevin with damages in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. CFI ruled in favor of ABELLO. CFI found that the car was
acquired by ABELLO by purchase from its registered owner Marcelino Guansing for
P9,000 and that she has been in possession thereof since then until when the car
was seized from her by ANCAR who acted in belief that the car was stolen from Lt.
Bala.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure of the car by the officials are valid.
HELD:
NO.
There is no merit in the petition considering that the acquirer or the purchaser in
good faith of a chattel of movable property is entitled to be respected and protected
in his possession as if he were the true owner thereof until a competent court rules
otherwise. In the meantime, as the true owner, the possessor in good faith cannot
be compelled to surrender possession nor to be required to institute an action for
the recovery of the chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in his favor.
The filing of an information charging that the chattel was illegally obtained through
estafa from its true owner by the transferor of the bona fide possessor does not
warrant disturbing the possession of the chattel against the will of the possessor.
Finally, the claim of petitioners that the Commission has the right to seize and
impound the car under Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 which reads:
Sec. 60. The lien upon motor vehicles. Any balance of fees for registration,
re-registration or delinquent registration of a motor vehicle, remaining
26
unpaid and all fines imposed upon any vehicle owner, shall constitute a
first lien upon the motor vehicle concerned.
is untenable. It is clear from the provision of said Section 60 of Republic Act 4136
that the Commissioner's right to seize and impound subject property is only good
for the proper enforcement of lien upon motor vehicles. The Land Transportation
Commission may issue a warrant of constructive or actual distraint against motor
vehicle for collection of unpaid fees for registration, re-registration or delinquent
registration of vehicles.
ERMITANO v. PAGLAS
FACTS:
Paglas (Respondent) through her representative, and Ermitano
(petitioner) executed a contract of lease wherein petitioner leased in favor
of respondent a residential house and lot for a period of 1 year.
Subsequent to the execution of the lease contract, petitioner mortgaged
the subject property in favor of a certain Charlie Yap and later on the
property was foreclosed in an extrajudicial foreclosure with Yap as the
purchaser. The subject lot was later sold to respondent evidenced by a
deed of sale of real property executed by the parties with the stipulation
that the property was still subject to petitioner’s right of redemption.
Petitioner filed a suit for declaration of nullity of the mortgage she
executed in favour of Yap as well as the sheriff’s provisional certificate f
sale which was issued after the property was sold on a foreclosure sale.
After her two demands for payment of rentals went unheeded, petitioner
filed another case of unlawful detainer against respondent demanding
payment of rentals and asking the respondent to vacate the leased
premises.
Petitioner’s basic postulate is that she remains the owner of the subject
property and she insists that based on the contract of lease with
respondent, petitioner argues that respondent is not permitted to deny her
title over the said property in accordance with Section 2(b), Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the presumption known as estoppel against tenant is applicable in
this case
HELD:
The Court does not agree.
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules
of
Court, known as estoppel against tenants, provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances of
conclusive presumptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at
the
time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant
between them. (Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the abovequoted provision that what a tenant is estopped
from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement
of the landlord-tenant relation.
If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired
subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the
presumption will not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that the
landlord's title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself;
and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been
ousted or evicted by title paramount.
In the present case, what respondent is claiming is her supposed title to
the subject property which she acquired subsequent to the
commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and petitioner.
Hence, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court does not apply.
NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION INC. v. SANGGUNIANG
BARANGAY
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the "BSV Sangguniang
Barangay") issued a Resolution opening Rosemallow and Aster Streets to vehicular
and pedestrian traffic.
The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI) filed a Petition for a
"Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for issuance of
TRO" with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City.
Petitioner’s contention:
27
Claiming that the Resolution would "cause grave injustice and irreparable injury" as
"[the] affected homeowners acquired their properties for strictly residential
purposes";6 that the subdivision is a place that the homeowners envisioned would
provide them privacy and "a peaceful neighborhood, free from the hassles of public
places";7 and that the passage of the Resolution would destroy the character of the
subdivision.
Respondent’s contention:
The subject streets Aster and Rosemallow inside Sun Valley Subdivision are owned
by the local government. Such streets have long been part of the public domain and
beyond the commerce of man. The power or authority to close or open the said
streets is vested in the local government units and not on homeowner’s
associations, pursuant to Section 21 of the local Government Code.
RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order but was later on lifted.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Orders of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has a right to the protection of the law that would entitle it to
injunctive relief against the implementation of the Resolution.
HELD:
Being the party asking for injunctive relief, the burden of proof was on petitioner to
show ownership over the subject roads. This, petitioner failed to do.
Petitioner dared to question the barangay’s ownership over the subject roads when
it should have been the one to adduce evidence to support its broad claims of
exclusivity and privacy. Petitioner did not submit an iota of proof to support its acts
of ownership, which, as pointed out by respondents, consisted of closing the subject
roads that belonged to the then Municipality of Parañaque and were already being
used by the public, limiting their use exclusively to the subdivision’s homeowners,
and collecting fees from delivery vans that would pass through the gates that they
themselves had built. It is petitioner’s authority to put up the road blocks in the first
place that becomes highly questionable absent any proof of ownership.
On the other hand, the local government unit’s power to close and open roads
within its jurisdiction is clear under the Local Government Code.
Petitioner wants this Court to recognize the rights and interests of the residents of
Sun Valley Subdivision but it miserably failed to establish the legal basis, such as its
ownership of the subject roads, which entitles petitioner to the remedy prayed for.
It even wants this Court to take "judicial knowledge that criminal activities
such as robbery and kidnappings are becoming daily fares in Philippine
society."71 This is absurd. The Rules of Court provide which matters
constitute judicial notice Rule 129 sec 1.
The activities claimed by petitioner to be part of judicial knowledge are not found in
the rule and do not support its petition for injunctive relief in any way.
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
As petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled to the protection of
the law, and it also failed to exhaust administrative remedies by applying for
injunctive relief instead of going to the Mayor as provided by the Local Government
Code, the petition must be denied.
ASIAN TERMINAL’S INC. v. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO. INC
FACTS:
Shandong Weifand Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV Jinliann I 60,000
plastic bags of soda ash dense from China to Manila. Upon arrival in Manila on
November 21, 1995, the stevedores of petitioner Asian Terminals Inc unloaded the
bags from the vessel and brought them to the open storage area for temporary
storage and safekeeping. When the unloading of the bags was completed, it was
found out that the more than 2k bags were in bad order condition. Thus, respondent
insurer was compelled to pay Shandong the insurance proceeds for the lost cargo
and subrogated the rights of Shandong against Asian Terminals.
RTC and Court of Appeals Ruling:
It was found out by the RTC that Asian Terminals was liable for the damage or loss
because the proximate cause of the damage/loss was the negligence of petitioner’s
stevedores who handled the unloading of the cargoes from the vessel. It found out
that despite the admonitions of the two marine cargo surveyors, it still used the
steel hooks which pierced the bags. The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s decision.
Petitioner’s contention:
1) There was no cause of action because respondent insurer was not able to
produce the insurance contract or policy covering the subject matter.
2) It also avers that the finding of the RTC and CA that the stevedores were
negligent is contrary to the documentary evidence presented (TOSBOC, the
RESBOC, and the Reporter’s survey. The said documents proved that no
additional damage was sustained by the subject shipment under its
custody.
3) Petitioner also contends that amount of damages should not be more than
5K pursuant to its Management Contract for cargo handling services with
PPA. It contended that the CA should have taken judicial notice of the said
contract since it is an official act of an executive department subject to
judicial recognizance.
ISSUES:
1) Whether non-presentation of insurance contract is fatal to insurer’s cause
of action.
2) Whether the proximate cause of the damage or loss was the negligence of
the petitioner’s stevedores.
3) Can the court take judicial notice of the Management Contract?
HELD:
28
1) Non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not fatal. Moreover, in
this case, the issue was raised first time with the SC. The subrogation receipt is
sufficient enough to establish not only the relationship of insurer and the
assured but also the amount paid to settle the insurance claims. (Murag dili ni
ang main issue)
2) Witness Antonio testified that it was only after all the bags were unloaded that
the actual counting of the bad order bags was made and this was corroborated
by marine cargo surveryor Liceralde. On the other hand, ATI presented its own
witness to testify that a survey was conducted by the shipping company and
ATI before the shipment was turned over to the possession of ATI and that the
Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes was prepared by ATIs Bad Order (BO)
Inspector.
Considering that the shipment arrived on November 21, 1998 and the
unloading operation commenced on said date and was completed on November
26, 1998, while the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes, reflecting a figure
of 2,702 damaged bags, was prepared and signed on November 28, 1998 by
ATIs BO Inspector and co-signed by a representative of the shipping
company, the trial courts finding that the damage to the cargoes was due to
the improper handling thereof by ATIs stevedores cannot be said to be without
substantial support from the records.
We thus see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the trial court that
ATI should be made liable for the 2,702 bags of damaged shipment. Needless
to state, it is hornbook doctrine that the assessment of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, which had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor, conduct or attitude of the witnesses. The
findings of the trial court on this point are accorded great respect and will not
be reversed on appeal, unless it overlooked substantial facts and circumstances
which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case.
3) [Main issue for Evidence] Petitioner cannot avail of judicial notice.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provide that:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of
states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality,
the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their
seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of
the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws
of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.
The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not
among the matters which the courts can take judicial notice of. It cannot be
considered an official act of the executive department. The PPA, which was
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended, is a government-
owned and controlled corporation in charge of administering the ports in the
country. Obviously, the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it
entered into a Management Contract with petitioner. As such, judicial notice
cannot be applied.
PEOPLE v. LAUGA
FACTS:
Antonio Lauga was accused of the crime qualified rape against his own daughter, 13
years old. Testimonies revealed that the victim was left alone at home while his
father was having a drinking spree at the neighbor’s place. Victim’s mother decided
to leave because appellant has the habit of mauling her every time he gets drunk.
While the victim’s brother went out in the company of some neighbor.
The family sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the
barangay, about the incident. He then invited appellant to the police station, to
which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped
AAA because he was unable to control himself.
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the
charge against him was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his
wife in front of their children after engaging in a heated argument, and beats the
children as a disciplinary measure.
RTC found the appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority. CA
affirmed with modifications. The appellate court found that appellant is not eligible
for parole and it increased both the civil indemnity and moral damages from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting, without the
assistance of a counsel, admissible in evidence.
HELD:
NO. This Court is convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the
nature of watch groups, as in the case of the bantay bayan, are recognized by the
local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and
order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken
by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities
delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided
for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda
Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken
without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
29
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the
appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but from
the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances
The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship with the
offender in the instant case has likewise been adequately established. Both
qualifying circumstances were specifically alleged in the Information, stipulated on
and admitted during the pre-trial conference, and testified to by both parties in their
respective testimonies. Also, such stipulation and admission, as correctly pointed
out by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court because they are judicial
admissions within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of
Court. It provides:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
CELODONIO v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
A certain Marquez saw Celedonio robbing Guzman’s house. Guzman was out visiting
a wake. Celedonio’s house was beside Guzman while Marquez’s house was just
adjacent them. After informing Guzman, she went to the police who caught
Celedonio based on the report which was also based on Marquez’s account. Thee
police went to an area frequented by Celedonio together with Marquez. Upon seeing
him, Celedonio pointed at him. The police confronted the man who was riding a
motorcycle but he did not reply. He was then asked where are the items, he opened
the motorcycle compartment where some of the stolen items were found. He was
asked if this were the items and he replied “iyan po”. During trial he said the search
on the motorcycle was illegal and he presented his alibi that he was sleeping at
home which was corroborated by his wife.
RTC and CA convicted him.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the evidence against Celedonio should be admitted
2. Whether he is guilty of the crime imputed against him
HELD:
As to conviction due to Circumstantial Evidence
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)
In this case there was an unbroken chain of events that would lead the court to a
decision that Celedonio was the perpetrator. The circumstantial evidence are as
follows:
1. Accused was a next door neighbor of private complainant;
2. He was seen by another neighbor going over the concrete fence separating
their houses and ransacking a room in complainant's house;
3. During the time, no one was inside complainant's house as all of them
were at the wake of private complainant's recently demised husband;
4. Two (2) days after, most of the items discovered to have been stolen that
night were found in the compartment of the accused's motorcycle which he
was riding on when accosted by the police;
5. The items recovered from him were identified by the complainant as her
stolen property;
6. During the trial accused denied that the stolen items were found in his
possession and claimed that they were "planted" by the police investigators
to frame him up of the robbery. In short, the accused could not explain his
possession of the recently stolen items found in his sole possession.
As to the legality of the arrest
He was caught in possession of stolen items when his motorcycle was flagged down
during follow-up operations. He could not explain how he got into possession of
such items. Under Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a person
found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is owned by him. When the items
were found in his possession, the disputable presumption was that he was the
taker. He could have overcome this by providing logical explanations but he failed to
do so.
As to legality of search
When the police asked him about the stolen items, this was a mere general inquiry
as apart of follow-up operations. He was not frisked, the police had no hint that the
items were in his motorcycle. Celedonio himself voluntarily opened his motorcycle
compartment. He even confirmed it to the police. At that time, the police had
probable cause that he could e the culprit of the robbery. Taking also into
consideration that the items were taken form a moving vehicle so the police had to
immediately act upon it.
As to credibility of Marquez
In this case, if only to discredit Marquez, Celedonio claimed that they once had a
fight over a water meter. Court declared it to be insignificant. However, a witness
cannot be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts, unless there is a
30
showing of previous conviction by final judgment such that not even the existence
of pending information maybe shown to impeach him. No testimony was presented
to show that the reputation of Marquez for truth, honesty or integrity is bad; no evil
motive has been established against prosecution witness Marquez that might
prompt him to testify falsely against accused.
Alibi and denial were the only defenses of Celedonio. Unless he can strongly support
his claims that the items were "planted" and that it was physically impossible for
him to be in De Guzman's house other than the mere averment that he was asleep
at the time, his defenses cannot prevail over the strong circumstantial evidence.
REPUBLIC v. KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS:
Kenrick built a concrete perimeter fence around parcels of land behind the Civil
Aviation Traininger Center of the Air Transportation Office. As a result of this, ATO
was dispossessed of huge tracts of land. Kenrick, on the other hand, claimed that
the land was theirs, showing a TCT issued in its name which was sold to it by
Alfonso Concepcion. The Registrar of Deeds had no record of such TCT nor of its
ascendant TCT.
By virtue of a report, OSG filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and
cancellation of certificates of title against Kenrick et al and an Answer was filed by
the latter.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted a
hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. During the
hearing, Atty. Garlitos (former counsel of Kenrick) testified that he prepared
Kenrick’s answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to Mr. Ong (Kenrick’s
President). He further stated that the the signature in the answer was not his and
he authorized no one to sign in his behalf and he did not know who signed the
answer.
When the Republic found out about this, they promptly filed an urgent motion to
declare Kenrick in default for failure to file a valid answer since it was an unsigned
pleading which in effect is a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect
pursuant to Sec. 3 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether Kenrick should be declared in default.
HELD:
Yes, Kenrick must be declared in default for failure to file a valid answer since only
the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a
pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed. Moreover, a counsel's
authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to
just any person. The blanket authority Garlitos’ entrusted to just anyone was void.
There was no way it could have been cured or ratified by his subsequent acts.
EVIDENCE | 1st Batch of Cases | ATTY. TORREGOSA | EH403 (2nd Sem, SY 2017-2018)

However, even if Kenrick is declared in default for failure to file a valid answer,
Kenrick adopted the statement of Garlitos, thereby making it its own admission.

A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another's

statement. Where it appears that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or
adopted the statements of another, evidence of those statements is admissible
against him. This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.

An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another

person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of
something stated or implied by the other person. By adoptive admission, a third
person’s statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it.
This may occur when a party:

a) Expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another

b) Hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it
c) Utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertions of another
d) Replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but
ignores further points which he or she has heard the other maker
e) Reads and signs a written statement made by another

In the case at bar, Kenrick built its case on the pronouncement of Atty. Garlitos and
they neither deny nor contradicted his statements. Kenrick completely adopted
Garlitos’ statements as its own. The adoptive admission constituted a judicial
admission which was conclusive on it. Therefore, it does not matter if Garlitos’
statements were done in the blue ribbon committee hearing and it was not subject
to cross-examination because Kenrick adopted them anyway.

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