IV.
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS return to the Scallon spouses the 800 shares of stock of Manila
152. WILLIAM B. BORTHWICK vs HON. FLORELIANA
CASTRO-BARTOLOME, JOSEPH SCALLON, AND JEWEL SCALLON
GR No. 57338 | July 23, 1987 | Narvasa, J. | I.E.B.Z.
FACTS:
· ​Joseph Scallon alleged that William Borthwick, an American
citizen living in the Philippines, owned real property interests in
Hawaii where he last resided and transacted business.
· The business dealings of Borthwick which transpired in
Honolulu, Hawaii had given rise to four promissory notes
amounting to $104,826.48.
· That Borthwick failed to pay the sums he owed upon maturity
of the notes and upon demand.
· The promissory notes were supposed to be paid in Palos
Verdes, Los Angeles, California but also contains the following
terms:
"​in the event that payment . . . shall not have been made in full on
or before the maturity date . . . at . . . (such) place . . ., payee may
select, at his option, Manila, Philippines, or Honolulu, Hawaii as
additional places for payment . . . and . . . any court in any of said
places having jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be a proper
Court for the trial of any action brought to enforce payment of this
note and the law of the place in which said action is brought shall
apply."
· Summons was served upon Borthwick personally in Monterey,
California. This is at the time when he was still located in
California. This is pursuant to Hawaiian law allowing service of
process on a person outside the territorial confines of the State.
· Borthwick, ignored the summons.
HAWAIIAN COURT:
· [April 30, 1987] Default was entered against Borthwick having
the courts of Hawaii ordering him to pay Scallon the amount he
owed.
· One of the judgment at the Hawaiian court is that aside from
the money, the ownership of real estate situated in Hawaii be
recovered by Scallon from Borthwick.
· However, Scallon’s attempt to have the judgment executed in
both Hawaii and California failed since Borthwick did not have
any assets in both states.
· [March 15, 1980] ​Scallon and his wife went to the Philippines
and brought a suit against Borthwick at the CFI of Makati
seeking the enforcement of the judgment of the Hawaii court.
· Summonses were sent to Borthwick at his Greenhills residence,
but he was always “out on official business”. In which case, his
house caretaker, ​Fred Daniel was the one who received such
summonses.
CFI:
· ​ orthwick filed no answer to the complaint, hence he was
B
declared in default by the CFI.
· The decision of the CFi states that Borthwick should return the
$104,826.48 to Scallon. An alternative to this is the rescission of
the original agreement between the two and to have Borthwick
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. and 180 shares of stock of
Trans-Pacific Development Management Corporation and all
stock dividends, cash dividends accrued from the said shares of
stocks.
· ​Borthwick still did not reply, up until the moment the CFI
amended the decision stating that the sums due under the
Hawaii decision be paid by Borthwick to the Scallons in its
Philippine Peso equivalent.
· This time, the notice of the amendment was personally
received by Borthwick.
· Borthwick moved for a new trial stating that the summonses
that were previously sent to his Greenhills address were
received by his “on and off itinerant gardener”. And that Daniel
failed to remit the summonses to him.
· Borthwick also contended that the judgment sought to be
enforced was invalid for want of jurisdiction of the Hawaii Court
over the cause of action and over his person.
RTC:
· The Trial Court denied the motion for new trial stating the
Daniel is a responsible person to have remitted the summonses
to Borthwick.
· As to Borthwick's attack on the validity of the Hawaiian
judgment, the Trial Court ruled that "under the . . . (Hawaii
Revised Statute) cited by Borthwick, the Hawaii Court has
jurisdiction" because the factual premises upon which the
exercise of such jurisdiction was based "had not been refuted
by the Borthwick" although he "appears to be a lawyer, and the
summons in the Hawaii case was served personally on him."
· Hence, this petition for review at the SC.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether or not the Hawaiian Court acquired jurisdiction over the
case rendering the default of Borthwick valid?
HELD:
YES. ​It is true that a foreign judgment against a person is merely
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties," and
rejection thereof may be justified, among others, by "evidence of a
want of jurisdiction" of the issuing authority, under Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. In the case at bar, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court
of Hawaii hinged entirely on the existence of either of two facts in
accordance with its State laws, i.e., either Borthwick owned real
property in Hawaii, or the promissory notes sued upon resulted
from his business transactions therein.
Scallon’s complaint clearly stated the two facts. Borthwick had the
opportunity to impugn the two facts, but he didn’t do so when he
failed to appear and was then, declared in default.
OTHER ISSUE:
Whether or not the Hawaiian Court’s judgment is enforceable in
the Philippines?
HELD:
YES. ​When the Scallon spouses filed the case at the CFI, Borthwick
failed to appear, hence, he was also declared in default.
Failing to appear at the Hawaiian Court, Borthwick failed to dispute
the said court’s competence.
Borthwick may may have challenged the jurisdiction of Hawaii over
him only if he succeeded in showing that the declaration of his
default was incorrect. He has unfortunately not been able to do that
since he failed to show at the CFI. Hence, the verdict must go against
him.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied, with costs against
petitioner.
153. Querubin vs. Querubin, G.R. No. L-3693, 29 July 1950
FACTS:
● In 1934, Silvestre Querubin, a Filipino, married petitioner
Margaret Querubin New Mexico. They had a daughter,
Querubina.
● Margaret filed for divorce in 1948 alleging "mental
cruelty."
● Silvestre filed a countersuit for divorce alleging Margaret's
infidelity.
● In 1949, the Superior Court of Los Angeles granted the
divorce and awarded "joint custody" of the child.
○ Querubina was to be kept in a neutral home
subject to reasonable visits by both parties.
○ Both parents were restrained from taking
Querubina out of California without the
permission of the Court.
● On March that year, custody was granted to Silvestre
under an interlocutory decree (although the child was still
kept in the neutral home) because at the time of the trial,
Margaret was living with another man.
● Upon Margaret's petition, the interlocutory decree was
modified. Since she had then married the man she was
living with and had a stable home, the Court granted
custody to Margaret with reasonable limitations on the
part of the father.
● Silvestre, together with Querubina, left San Francisco on
November of the same year, went to the Philippines and
stayed in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, with the intent of protecting
the child from the effects of her mother's scandalous
conduct. He wanted the child to be raised in a better
environment.
● In 1950, Margaret, through counsel, presented to the CFI a
petition for habeas corpus for the custody of Querubina
urder the interlocutory decree of the California Court.
○ She claims that under Art. 48 of Rule 39, the
decree of the Los Angeles Court, granting her the
child's custody, must be complied within the
Philippines.]
ISSUE:
WON the decree of a foreign court may be complied with in the
Philippines.
HELD:
● "The decree is by no means final. It is subject to change
with the circumstances. The first decree awarded the
custody of the child to the father, prohibiting the mother
from taking the child to her (Margaret's) home because of
her adulterous relationship with another man. The decree
was amended when Margaret was not in Los Angeles.
● Because the decree is interlocutory, it cannot be
implemented in the Philippines. Where the judgment is
merely interlocutory, the determination of the question by
the Court which rendered it did not settle and adjudge
finally the rights of the parties.
● In general, a decree of divorce awarding custody of the
child to one of the spouses is respected by the Courts of
other states "at the time and under the circumstances of
its rendition" but such a decree has no controlling effects
in another state as to facts and conditions occurring
subsequently to the date of the decree; and the Court of
another state may, in proper proceedings, award custody
otherwise upon proof of matters subsequent to the decree
which justify the decree to the interest of the child.
● In the case at bar, the circumstances have changed.
Querubina is not in Los Angeles, she is in Cagayan, Ilocos
Sur, under her father's care. It is a long way from one place
to the other. Neither can Margaret prove that she can pay
the cost of passage for the minor. She is not a packet of
cigarettes one can send by mail.
● Neither can she answer for Querubina's support, care and
education. In comparison, the father has shown both
interest in the child and capacity to provide for the needs
of the child."
Dispositive: The judgment appealed is upheld. The appellant shall
bear the costs.
154. Philippine International Shipping vs. CA,172 SCRA 810
3 Philippine International Shipping Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77085, April 26, 1989
FACTS
Petitioner PISC leased from respondent Interpool several
containers under its Membership Agreement and Master
Equipment Leasing Agreement. Other 9 petitioners-guarantors
guaranteed to pay all monies due.
Having failed to pay, respondent filed a case against PISC before
the US District Court, Southern District of New York. Default
judgment was rendered.
Due to unjustifiable failure and refusal to pay, including its
guarantors, PISC filed a complaint with RTC-QC to enforce the
Default Judgment of the US Court against PISC and the guarantors
under the Continuing Guaranties. They were duly summoned.
Declared in default. PISC and guarantors were ordered to pay,
jointly and severally.
PISC filed with CA a Petition to Annul Judgment. Denied.
Hence, this petition. PISC contends that both the Default Judgment
are null and void on jurisdictional grounds:
1. ​US District Court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons
as they had not been served with summons and copy of the
Complaint;
2. ​Such jurisdictional infirmity effectively prevented RTC-QC from
taking cognizance and from enforcing the Default Judgment,
plus the non-service of notice or summons in the PH case
3. ​Assuming valid, the same may be enforced only to PISC and
not to the other 9 petitioners-guarantors not having been
impleaded in the US case.
ISSUE
1. ​Whetherthe Default Judgment in the US case may be
recognized in our courts
2.​ W
​ hether RTC-QC acquired jurisdiction over PISC
3. ​Whether the other 9 petitioners-guarantors may be ordered to
pay by the PH courts, despite not being impleaded in the US
case
HELD
1.​ Y
​ es.
US District Court had validly acquired jurisdiction over PISC under
the procedural law of that forum.
· ​Copies of Summons and Complaints were stamped indicating
that service had been made upon and acknowledged by PISC
office in Manila
· ​It
was likewise served (actual notice) upon Prentice-Hall Corp.
(NY), PISC’s agent expressly designated in the Master
Equipment Leasing Agreement with Interpool (for purpose of
accepting service in cases of claim).
· ​PISC, without, however, assailing the jurisdiction of the U.S.
District Court over the person of petitioner, had filed a Motion
to Dismiss which was denied.
Judgment imposing upon petitioner PISC a liability of in favor of
Interpool, is valid and may be enforced in this jurisdiction.
Foreign judgment had become final and executory, no appeal
having been made. Thus, it is considered as presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title. There was no showing that Default Judgment
was vitiated by “want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.”
2.​ Y
​ es.
When petitioners filed their motion for extension of time to file
answer and for bill of particulars, they voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Quezon City court, hence they
are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of said court.
3.​ Y
​ es.
Existence of liability duly established
Since the liability of PISC has been duly established in the US case,
it was proper to implead the other 9 petitioners-guarantors herein
as defendants in the action to enforce said foreign judgment in
Philippine courts, even if they were not impleaded in the US case.
The nine (9) other petitioners-guarantors are considered as
persons “against whom a right to relief in respect to or arising out
of the same transaction or series of transaction [has been] alleged
to exist,” as contemplated in the Rule on permissive joinder of
parties.
155. Asiavest Merchant Bankers vs. Court of Appeals, supra at
9.
FACTS:
The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers Berhad is a corporation
organized under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent
Philippine National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly
incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.
petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent,
then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur
entitled Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP
Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines.
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance
bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the
completion of the Felda Project and the non-payment of the loan it
extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh
Hanai and Kuantan By-Pass Project.
The High Court of Malaya rendered decision in favor of petitioner
and issued an order directing the respondent to pay petitioner the
sums covered by the said judgment
Following unsuccessful attempts ​to secure payment from private
respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint
before RTC to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case contending
that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be
denied recognition or enforcement since on its face, it is tainted
with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent,
collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact.
Dismissal was denied by the trial court considering that the
grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to
dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court
the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired
jurisdiction over the person of private respondent by its voluntary
submission to the courts jurisdiction through its appointed
counsel, Mr. Khay Chay Tee. Furthermore, private respondents
counsel waived any and all objections to the High Courts
jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court.
TC: dismissed petitioner’s complaint; CA: affirmed
ISSUE:
WON both the TC and CA erred in denying recognition and
enforcement to the Malaysian Court judgment (YES)
HELD:
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity,
utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among
civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal
may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the
underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is
convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full
and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis
of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due
notice in the foreign forum.
Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by
the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against
a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to
pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the
presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its
jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment
is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with
the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence
of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the
evidence it offered.
Vinayak Prabhakar Pradhan, presented as petitioners sole witness,
testified to the effect that he is in active practice of the law
profession in Malaysia;that he was connected with Skrine and
Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981; that private respondent,
then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines, was sued by his client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M)
Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur;that the writ of summons were served on
March 17, 1983 at the registered office of private respondent and
on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a financial planning officer of
private respondent for Southeast Asia operations; that upon the
filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and
Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan
Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their conditional appearance for
private respondent questioning the regularity of the service of the
writ of summons but subsequently withdrew the same when it
realized that the writ was properly served; that because private
respondent failed to file a statement of defense within two (2)
weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary judgment and
submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its
claim; that the matter was then heard before the High Court of
Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where private respondent was
represented by counsel; and that the end result of all these
proceedings is the judgment sought to be enforced.
In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner offered
documentary evidence.
Having proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and
authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys
presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who
disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove
otherwise.
Private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that
fell upon it to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds
which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High
Court judgment
The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private
respondent in preventing enforcement and recognition of the
Malaysian judgment primarily refer to matters of remedy and
procedure taken by the Malaysian High Court relative to the suit
for collection initiated by petitioner.
The recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not
necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of
the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that
of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on.
Matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the
service of summons or court process upon the defendant, the
authority of counsel to appear and represent a defendant and the
formal requirements in a decision are governed by the ​lex fori or
the internal law of the forum, ​i.e​., the law of Malaysia in this case.
In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the
judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the service
of court process on private respondent as well as other matters
raised by it.
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a
duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then
incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as to
what that Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it,
the assailed service of summons upon a financial officer of a
corporation, as alleged by it, is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the
presumption of validity and regularity of service of summons and
the decision thereafter rendered by the High Court of Malaya must
stand
On the matter of alleged lack of authority of the law firm of Allen
and Gledhill to represent private respondent, not only did the
private respondents witnesses admit that the said law firm of Allen
and Gledhill were its counsels in its transactions in Malaysia,but of
greater significance is the fact that petitioner offered in evidence
relevant Malaysian jurisprudence to the effect
Furthermore, there is no basis for or truth to the appellate courts
conclusion that the conditional appearance of private respondents
counsel who was allegedly not authorized to appear and represent,
cannot be considered as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the High Court of Malaya, inasmuch as said conditional appearance
was not premised on the alleged lack of authority of said counsel
but the conditional appearance was entered to question the
regularity of the service of the writ of summons. Such conditional
appearance was in fact subsequently withdrawn when counsel
realized that the writ was properly served.
On the ground that collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact and
law tainted the judgment of the High Court of Malaya, no clear
evidence of the same was adduced or shown.
The trial courts finding on the absence of judgment against
Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. is contradicted by evidence on record that
recovery was also sought against Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. but the
same was found insolvent.Furthermore, even when the foreign
judgment is based on the drafts prepared by counsel for the
successful party, such is not ​per se indicative of collusion or fraud.
Fraud to hinder the enforcement within the jurisdiction of a
foreign judgment must be extrinsic, ​i.e​., fraud based on facts not
controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is
rendered,or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or
would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a
chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious defense.
Lastly, there is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment
is not enforceable in view of the absence of any statement of facts
and law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner was
based. As aforestated, the ​lex fori or the internal law of the forum
governs matters of remedy and procedure.Considering that under
the procedural rules of the High Court of Malaya, a valid judgment
may be rendered even without stating in the judgment every fact
and law upon which the judgment is based, then the same must be
accorded respect and the courts in this jurisdiction cannot
invalidate the judgment of the foreign court simply because our
rules provide otherwise.
156. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 241
SCRA 192, 1995
DOCTRINE:
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes until the contrary is shown.
FACTS:
● Northwest Orient Airlines and C.F. Sharp & Co. (through
its Japan branch) entered into an International Passenger
Sales Agency Agreement. C.F. Sharp was authorized by
Northwest to sell the latter’s airlines tickets.
● C.F. Sharp failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales
it made on behalf of Northwest under the agreement
which led the latter to sue in Tokyo for collection of the
unremitted amount.
● The Tokyo District Court of Japan issued a writ of
sum​mons against Sharp at its office in Japan but the
bailiff failed to serve the writs twice. The Tokyo District
Court decided to have the writs of summons served at
Sharp's head office in Manila.
● C.F. Sharp failed to appear at the hearings. The District
Court ordered C.F. Sharp to pay Northwest.
● Northwest failed to execute the decision in Japan, hence,
it filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment before the
RTC of Manila. C.F. Sharp filed its answer averring that
the judgment of the Japanese court is null and void and
unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered
without due and proper notice to them.
● The case for enforcement of judgment was tried on the
merits. Sharp filed a Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer
to Evidence.
RTC: granted the demurrer motion, hold​ing that the foreign
judgment in the Japanese court sought to be enforced is null and
void for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
CA: sustained the trial court, holding that the process of the court
has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction was acquired over
the person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries
of the state.
ISSUE: Whether the Japanese Court can acquire jurisdiction over a
Philippine corporation doing business in Japan by serving summons
through diplomatic channels on the Philippine corporation at its
principal office in Manila
RULING:
Yes. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown.
Consequently, the party challenging (C.F. Sharp) a foreign
judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its
validity. The presumption of validity and regularity of the service of
summons and the decision rendered by the Japanese court must
stand.
In the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption
of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption
may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is
presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of
summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines.
Sec. 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may
be made: 1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with
law for that purpose, or 2) if there is no such resident agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect, or 3) on any
of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a
resident agent authorized to receive court processes in Japan. This
silence could only mean, or at least create an impression, that it
had none. Hence, service on the designated government official or
any of its officers or agents in Japan could be availed of.
The Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to
cause the delivery of the summons to the Philippines. The Supreme
Court of Japan sent the summons to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Japan, which in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese
Embassy in Manila. Thereafter, the court processes were delivered
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines then to the
Executive Judge of the CFI of Manila, who forthwith ordered
Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its
principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on
the proper government official.
Inasmuch as C.F. Sharp was admittedly doing business in Japan
through its four registered branches at the time the collection suit
against it was filed, then in the light of the processual
presumption, C.F. Sharp may be deemed a resident of Japan. The
extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court
was valid not only under the proces​sual presumption but also
because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty.
157. Priscilla C. Mijares et al., v. Hon. Santiago Javier Ranada
et al., G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005
Petitioners are Filipino human rights victims who filed for tortious
violations against estate of Marcos before the Hawaii District court. This is
pursuant to the Alien Tort Act allowing aliens to file before US courts and
latter shall acquire jurisdiction.
US court ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the estate of Marcos to
pay them damages worth P1.9B
Petitioners subsequently came to RTC Makati to enforce said judgment.
Marcos estate MTD: RTC no juris because did not file correct filing fee. Fee
should be P472M but petitioners only paid P410.00
RTC favored Marcos estate and dismissed petitioner’s cause relying on
Rules of Court provision regarding filing fees for money claim against an
estate.
CHR intervened and urged enforcement of said foreign judgment
Petitioner countered: their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and
not collection of money or recovery of damages.
ISSUE: Whether the action before the lower court is a claim against an
estate not based on judgment
HELD: NO. It is a claim against estate based on foreign judgment
Understand first the nature of enforcing Foreign judgment
Ø Comity dictates that final foreign judgments are reciprocally respected
and rendered efficacious under conditions that may vary in different
countries
Ø FJ for action in rem – deemed conclusive upon title to the thing
Ø FJ for action in personam – presumptive of right between parties
Ø But both cases are impeachable for want of jurisdiction
Ø To enforce foreign judgment here in Ph, filing civil action is usually
proper but the cause of action (coa) is different from other oca. Likewise,
the matter of proof is different.
Thus, in ordinary civil actions for tortious acts, the coa lies on the act itself
while for enforcement of judgment the coa lies on the judgment/award
itself.
Knowing that, this action therefore is correctly not a claim against estate
per se but one for enforcement of judgment. Yet, it is capable of pecuniary
estimation since it involves collection of money or recovery of damages as
the root coa. However, computation of filing fees corresponds to the
amount for other actions not involving property.
The judge therefore was incorrect in adjudging that Petitioners failed to file
correct filing fees.
Even so, given the nature of foreign judgments, by international custom it
must be enforced. Unless contrary to public policy.
Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of worldwide
renown, points out:
Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing foreign
judgments, there can be little dispute that the end is to protect the
reasonable expectations and demands of the parties. Where the
parties have submitted a matter for adjudication in the court of one
state, and proceedings there are not tainted with irregularity, they
may fairly be expected to submit, within the state or elsewhere, to
the enforcement of the judgment issued by the court.
PETITION GRANTED
158. Fujiki vs. Marinay (GR No. 196049, June 26, 2013)
Doctrine: A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require re-litigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. They cannot substitute their judgment on the
status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is
under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, ​Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules
of evidence.
Facts:
· ​Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national, who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in
the Philippines. Their marriage did not sit well with Fujiki’s
parents so Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
· ​In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara contracted her second marriage in
Quezon City.
· ​Due to their marriage, Maekara was able to bring Marinay to
Japan. Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She was able to leave Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.
· ​Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship.
· ​In 2010, Marinay obtained a judgment from a family court in
Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. (Foreign judgment
which is the subject of this case)
· ​Fujiki filed a petition for “Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).",
before the RTC praying that (1) the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio
under the Family Code of the PH and (3) to direct the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the foreign
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the NSO.
· ​RTC dismissed the petition ruling that it is in “gross violation”
of Sec. 2[1] and 4[2] of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). Only “the husband or wife” (either
Maekera or Marinay), can file the petition to declare the
marriage void, and not Fujiki.
·​ ​Fujiki moved to reconsider, arguing the following:
o ​A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply as it
only applies to ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, and the
case he filed is a special proceeding.
o ​Fujiki also argued that Sec. 2 only applies to
void marriages on the ground of psych
incapacity. Applying the rule that “a
petition may only be filed by the husband
or wife” in a bigamy case would be absurd
as only the guilty parties would be
permitted to sue.
·​ ​RTC denied the MR for the following reasons:
o ​A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies since the
petition filed, in effect, prays for a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage. And under
such law, Fujiki is considered a “third
person” in the proceeding since he was not
the husband in the decree of divorce issue
by the Japanese court; hence, he lacks
personality to sue/file the petition.
o ​The RTC also held that under Braza v The
City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, the
trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages in a special proceeding for
correction of entry under Rule 108.
· ​OSG filed its comment and agreed that Fujiki, as the spouse of
the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare
the bigamous marriage void.
o ​Itcontended that the petition to recognize
the Japanese court’s judgment may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding, as its
object is precisely to establish a status or
right of a party or a particular fact.
o ​It also argued that the law requires the
entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees
that produce legal consequences upon a
person’s legal capacity and status.
 o S​ ince the Japanese court’s judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino
citizen, it should therefore be proven as a
fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Issue 1: W/N the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108.
Held 1: Yes.
A.M No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable in this case. For foreign
courts to recognize a foreign judgment, the petition only ​needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact​, through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who
has custody of the judgment. To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is
applicable is absurd as it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat
the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues.
However, ​the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic​. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.
This is the ​rule of lex nationalii in private international law, as
embodied by Art. 15 of the Civil Code. Thus, the Philippine State
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage
void does not require re-litigation under a Philippine court of the
case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. ​Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.
The court merely exercises limited review on foreign judgment.
Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine
court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. ,
"want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a
fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While
the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under
the Family Code.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the
"validity of marriage[ x x x can be questioned only in a direct
action" to nullify the marriage.
However, Braza does not apply as Braza does not involve a
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
In this case, there is neither circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of
a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and
decided under foreign law.
Article 26 of the FC confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido, this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article
26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" under the laws
of his or her country.
The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under
the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
spouse cannot remarry.
Notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not
contravene domestic public policy. In the recognition of foreign
judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether
the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public
policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able
to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e.
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with
public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine
courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of
the comity of nations.
Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction
or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will
be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of
the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
Issue 2: W/N a husband or wife of a prior marriage (Fujiki) can file
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the second
marriage between his spouse and another person on the ground of
bigamy.
Held 2: Yes
Fujiki has personality to file the petition to recognize the Japanese
court’s judgment. Once the recognition of a foreign judgment only
requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108. As correctly noted by the SolGen, "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted
and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt
that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record
of his marriage.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a
public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and
prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action, there is
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the
wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share
in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is
also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting
his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated,
the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in
the judgment of the suit. Being a real party in interest, the prior
spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage
void.
DISPOSITIVE:
PETITION GRANTED.
159. Roehr vs. Rodriguez, GR No. 142820, June 20, 2003
DOCTRINE: ​As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in
other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects
thereof, ​e.g. ​on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.
FACTS: This case stemmed from the declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by Maria Carmen Rodriguez as to her marriage with
a German national who was the present petitioner of this case,
Wolfgang Roehr.
Roehr and Rodriguez got married in Hamburg, Germany and
subsequently ratified such marriage in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.
They bore 2 children out of their union.
● Rodriguez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC Makati. Roehr filed a motion to
dismiss.
● Roehr was assailing the decision by the Hon. Judge of
Guevara-Salonga of RTC Makati as she have granted the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by his
wife, Rodriguez and have denied his motion to dismiss.
● Upon appeal, Roehr filed a petition for certiorari with CA
but the appellate court denied the petition and
remanded the case back to RTC.
Meanwhile, Roehr then obtained a divorce decree from the CFI of
Hamburg-Blankenese and was granted with its dissolution.
Parental custody was granted to Roehr.
● Roehr then filed a 2nd motion to dismiss on the ground
that RTC Makati has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action as a divorce decree was already
promulgated and had dissolved the marriage between
him and Rodriguez.
● Judge Guevara-Salonga granted the motion to dismiss.
Rodriguez filed a motion to partial reconsideration in
order to discuss the issues of custody of the children and
the distribution of their properties. This was opposed by
Roehr as he alleged that there is nothing to be done
anymore as their marital ties have been cut already by
virtue of the divorce decree.
● Roehr furthered that under Art. 261 of the Family Code,
the divorce decree has already been recognized by the
RTC and had endowed Roehr with capacity to remarry
under the PH law.
● Judge Guevara-Salonga partially set aside the assailed
order in order to settle the matters on child custody and
some property distribution. Roehr filed for motion for
reconsideration but to no avail.
ISSUE/S: Whether the foreign divorce decree obtained by Roehr in
Germany can be enforced with respect to the child custody,
property relations and support issues of his dissolved marriage
with Rodriguez.
HELD: YES BUT ONLY WITH RESPECT OF THEIR PROPERTY
RELATIONS ONLY,, it ​is essential that there should be an
opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to
actions ​in personam​, as distinguished from actions ​in rem​, a foreign
judgment merely constitutes ​prima facie​evidence of the justness of
the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the
contrary.
Property Relations
Roehr asserts that Judge Guevara-Salonga of RTC Makati has
exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed
cognizance of the issue concerning property relations between him
and Rodriguez.
● Rodriguez, herself, has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage they have not
acquired any conjugal or community property nor have
they incurred any debts during their marriage and such
remained undisputed by Roehr.
1
​Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
 ● Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted
by the allegations and the proof. ​Given the factual
admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is
no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has
no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a
matter no longer deemed in controversy.
Custody of the Children
It cannot be said that Rodriguez, the PH citizen, was given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that
there is basis for declaring that judgment as ​res judicata with
regard to the rights of Roehr to have parental custody of their 2
children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. The
divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the
proceedings nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services
Office.
More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to Roehr by
virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a
couple lived separately for 3 years, the marriage is deemed
irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to
who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that Rodriguez
is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct
in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental
custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests
of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in the
Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the
paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody.
160. St. Aviation Services vs. Grand international Airways (GR
No. 140288, October 23, 2006
Facts:
● St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., (petitioner) is a foreign
corporation based in Singapore. It is engaged in the
manufacture, repair, and maintenance of airplanes and
aircrafts.
● Grand International Airways, Inc., (respondent), is a
domestic corporation engaged in airline operations
● Petitioner and respondent executed an Agreement for
the Maintenance and Modification of Airbus.
● They agreed to undertake maintenance and modification
works on respondents aircraft. They also agreed that the
construction, validity and performance thereof shall be
governed by the laws of Singapore. Also they agreed to
submit any suit arising from their agreement to the
non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts.
● Petitioner undertook the contracted works and
thereafter promptly delivered the aircrafts to respondent
● Despite petitioners repeated demands, respondent failed
to pay.
● Petitioner filed with the High Court of the Republic of
Singapore an action.
● Court issued a Writ of Summons to be served
extraterritorially or outside Singapore upon respondent.
● The court sought the assistance of the sheriff of Pasay
City to effect service of the summons upon respondent.
However, despite receipt of summons, respondent failed
to answer the claim.
● the Singapore High Court rendered a judgment by default
against respondent.
● Petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Enforcement
of Judgment
● Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on two
grounds: (1) the Singapore High Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over its person; and (2) the foreign judgment
sought to be enforced is void for having been rendered in
violation of its right to due process
● RTC denied respondents motion to dismiss,
● Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied by the RTC
● Respondent alleged that the extraterritorial service of
summons on its office in the Philippines is defective and
that the Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction over
its person.
● the Court of Appeals issued its Decision granting the
petition
Issue:
(1) Whether the Singapore High Court has acquired jurisdiction
over the person of respondent by the service of summons upon its
office in the Philippines; and (YES)
(2) Whether the judgment by default in Suit No. 2101 by the
Singapore High Court is enforceable in the Philippines. (YES)
Ruling:
● The conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment in our legal system are contained in
Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, thus:
SEC. 48. ​Effect of foreign judgments. ​The effect of a judgment or
final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title;
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
● Respondent, in assailing the validity of the judgment
sought to be enforced, contends that the service of
summons is void and that the Singapore court did not
acquire jurisdiction over it.
Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating
to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the ​lex
fori ​or the internal law of the forum, which in this case is the law of
Singapore
The Singapore High Court granted leave to serve a copy of the Writ
of Summons on the Defendant by a method of service authorized
by the law of the Philippines for service of any originating process
issued by the Philippines or elsewhere in the Philippines
This service of summons outside Singapore is in accordance with
Order 11, r. 4(2) of the Rules of Court 1996 of Singapore
(2) Where in accordance with these Rules, an originating process is
to be served on a defendant in any country with respect to which
there does not subsist a Civil Procedure Convention providing for
service in that country of process of the High Court, the originating
process may be served
a) through the government of that country, where that
government is willing to effect service;
b) through a Singapore Consular authority in that country, except
where service through such an authority is contrary to the law of
the country; or
c) by a method of service authorized by the law of that country for
service of any originating process issued by that country.
In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of
summons by the sheriff, his deputy or other proper court officer
either personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant or by
substituted service.
In this case, the Writ of Summons issued by the Singapore High
Court was served upon respondent at its office
But respondent completely ignored the summons, hence, it was
declared in default.
Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon
respondent in accordance with our Rules, jurisdiction was acquired
by the Singapore High Court over its person.
Clearly, the judgment of default rendered by that court against
respondent is valid
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
161. Philippine Aluminum Wheels vs. FASGI Enterprises GR
No. 137378, October 12, 2000
G.R. No. 137378 October 12, 2000
PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC., ​petitioner, ​vs.
FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC., ​respondent.
DOCTRINE: In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment
rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar
as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of
action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown
that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair
hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial
upon regular proceedings has been conducted, and
under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an
impartial administration of justice; and that there is
nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the
system of laws.
FACTS:
1. FASGI Enterprises Inc. (FASGI), a
Californian company, entered into a
distributorship agreement with Philippine
Aluminum Wheels, Inc. (PAWI), a Philippine
corporation and Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo (FPS),
an Italian company.
2. Under the agreement, FASGI will
distribute in the US the aluminum wheels made
by PAWI. Pursuant to such, PAWI shipped
8,594 wheels, with FASGI paying for the value
for such wheels.
3. However, it was found that the wheels
were defective, as there were requirements that
were not complied with (specific stamps, wheels
did not fit the automobiles designed for it, no
SEMA approval). Hence, FASGI instituted an
action against PAWI and FPS for breach of
contract and recovery of damages before the
California District Court.
4. During the pendency, the parties agreed
to settle, where it was stipulated that PAWI and
FPS would return the money via 4 irrevocable
letters of credit while FASGI will return the
wheels. PAWI proposed a schedule of payment
where one letter of credit (LC) will be issued per
month starting April 1980. However, later on, it
failed to open the first LC on April but assured
FASGI that it will comply with its obligation.
FASGI insisted that PAWI open the LC on April.
5. Since PAWI still failed to open the LC
allegedly due to CB restrictions, FASGI
continued its complaint for damages. However,
the parties again entered into another
agreement. It stated that PAWI will open 4 LCs
for every month starting June 1980. In case
PAWI fails to make good the payments, FASGI
will have the right to enforce the Judgment
against PAWI in the US and in any other country
where PAWI assets may be located. Also, it was
agreed that PAWI consents to the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts in any action brought by FASGI
to enforce the judgment in the Philippines.
6. The agreement was executed by FASGI
President and PAWI counsel Mr. Thomas
Ready.
7. PAWI still was remiss in its obligation as
it delayed in paying the first LC on June 1980,
and totally failed to open and pay the remaining
LCs. Despite this lapse, FASGI still already
returned two containers of wheels. Irked by the
continuous default, FASGI filed with the
California Disctrict Court a motion for entry of
judgment against PAWI pursuant to the
Stipulation for Judgment int heir agreement. The
California court granted this and ordered PAWI
to pay damages.
8. Unable to obtain satisfaction of the
judgment within the United States, FASGI filed a
 complaint for “enforcement of foreign judgment”
before the RTC Makati.
9. RTC Makati dismissed the complaint,
holding that the foreign decree was tainted with
collusion, fraud and clear mistake of law and fact
as it ignored the reciprocal obligations of the
parties, since the foreign judgment ordered
payment by PAWI of the amount but did not
order FASGI to return the remaining containers
of wheels. This amounted to unjust enrichment.
10. ​FASGI appealed to the CA, which reversed
the RTC and ordered the full enforcement of the
California judgment.
11. ​Hence, this appeal. PAWI argues that Mr.
Ready acted without its authority when it settled
the case with FASGI. It argued the Mr. Ready
had no authority to sign and not authority to
enter into a stipulation for judgment as it had
already terminated Mr. Ready’s services.
ISSUE: W/N the foreign judgment can be enforced
against PAWI
HELD:​ Yes!
1. Generally, in the absence of a special
compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country; ​however, the rules of
comity, utility and convenience of nations have
established a usage among civilized states by
which final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected
and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries.
2. In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment
rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate parties and
the underlying cause of action are concerned so
long as it is convincingly shown that there has
been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing
before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial
upon regular proceedings has been conducted,
and under a system of jurisprudence likely to
secure an impartial administration of justice; and
that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice
in court and in the system of laws.
3. A foreign judgment is presumed to be
valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of
a presumption of regularity of proceedings and
the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.
Rule 39, section 48 of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines provides:
Sec. 48​. ​Effect of foreign judgments or final orders -
The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is ​presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors-in-interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
4. In this case, PAWI’s claims that there
was collusion or fraud since Mr. Ready was not
authorized to act in behalf of it is untenable. ​phi1
If Mr. Ready was indeed not authorized by PAWI
to enter into the supplemental settlement
agreement, PAWI could have forthwith signified
to FASGI a disclaimer of the settlement. Instead,
more than a year after the execution of the
supplemental settlement agreement, PAWI
failed to mention Mr. Ready's supposed lack of
authority.
5. If PAWI were indeed hoodwinked by Mr.
Ready who purportedly acted in collusion with
FASGI, it should have aptly raised the issue
before the forum which issued the judgment in
line with the principle of international comity that
a court of another jurisdiction should refrain, as
a matter of propriety and fairness, from so
assuming the power of passing judgment on the
correctness of the application of law and the
evaluation of the facts of the judgment issued by
another tribunal.
6. Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within
this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be
extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not
controverted or resolved in the case where
judgment is rendered, or that which would go to
the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the
party against whom judgment is rendered a
chance to defend the action to which he has a
meritorious case or defense. In fine, intrinsic
fraud, that is, fraud which goes to the very
existence of the cause of action - such as fraud
in obtaining the consent to a contract - is
deemed already adjudged, and it cannot militate
against the recognition or enforcement of the
foreign judgment, as in this case.
7. PAWI cannot, by this petition for review,
seek refuge over a business dealing and
decision gone awry. Neither do the courts
function to relieve a party from the effects of an
unwise or unfavorable contract freely entered
into.
162. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh v.
Stolt-Nielsen Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 87958 (26 April 1990)
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURG,
PA/AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL UNDERWRITER (PHIL.) INC.,
petitioners,
vs.
STOLT-​NIELSEN PHILIPPINES, INC. and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 87958| 26 April 1990 | MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Topic: Execution of Foreign Judgement
DOCTRINE: ​Foreign arbitration as a system of settling commercial
disputes of an international character was likewise recognized when
the Philippines adhered to the United Nations "Convention on the
Recognition and the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of
1958," under the 10 May 1965 Resolution No. 71 of the Philippine
Senate, giving reciprocal recognition and allowing enforcement of
international arbitration agreements between parties of different
nationalities within a contracting state.
FACTS:
● 9 January 1985: United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (SHIPPER)
shipped 404.774 metric tons of distilled C6-C18 fatty acid
on board MT "Stolt Sceptre," a tanker owned by
Stolt-Nielsen Philippines Inc. (CARRIER), from Bauan,
Batangas, Philippines, consigned to "Nieuwe Matex" at
Rotterdam, Netherlands
● Above shipment was insured under a marine cargo policy
with Petitioner National Union Fire Insurance Company of
Pittsburg (INSURER), a non-life American insurance
corporation, through its settling agent in the Philippines,
the American International Underwriters (Philippines),
Inc., the other petitioner herein
● Upon receipt of the cargo by the CONSIGNEE in the
Netherlands, it was found to be discolored and totally
contaminated
● This prompted shipper to file a claim vs. carrier
● Carrier denied payment, but insurer indemnified the
shipper pursuant to its marine cargo policy
● 21 April 1986: As subrogee of the shipper-assured, insurer
(petitioner) filed a claim against carrier (private
respondent) for recovery of sum of P1.6M, representing
the amount it paid the shipper-assured.
● Carrier ​moved to dismiss/suspend the proceedings on the
ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the claim the
same being an arbitrable one
○ Arbitration must be done pursuant to the terms
of the Charter Party, as embodied in the Bill of
Lading
· Insurer ​opposed the dismissal/suspension of the proceedings on
the ground that it was not legally bound to submit the claim for
arbitration
○ The arbitration clause provided in the Charter
Party was not incorporated into the Bill of
Lading, and that the arbitration clause is void for
being unreasonable and unjust
· RTC: denied​ the motion
○ Deferred resolution on the Motion to
Dismiss/Suspend Proceedings until trial on the
merits "since the ground alleged in said motion
does not appear to be indubitable."
· Carrier then filed a ​Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
prayer for TRO before CA
· CA: Granted​ = claim of dispute is arbitrable
ISSUES:
WON the terms of the Charter Party, particularly the provision on
arbitration, binding on the Insurer? - YES
HELD:
(1) YES; Affirmed.
· ​The pertinent portion of the Bill of Lading in issue provides in
part:
“x x x ​all the terms whatsoever of the said Charter except the rate
and payment of freight specified therein apply to and govern the
rights of the parties concerned in this shipment. x x x”
·​ ​The provision on arbitration in the Charter Party reads:
“4. Arbitration. Any dispute arising from the making, performance or
termination of this Charter Party shall be settled in New York, Owner
and Charterer each appointing an arbitrator, who shall be a
merchant, broker or individual experienced in the shipping business;
the two thus chosen, if they cannot agree, shall nominate a third
arbitrator who shall be an admiralty lawyer. Such arbitration shall be
conducted in conformity with the provisions and procedure of the
United States arbitration act, and a judgment of the court shall be
entered upon any award made by said arbitrator. Nothing in this
clause shall be deemed to waive Owner's right to lien on the cargo
for freight, deed of freight, or demurrage.”
· ​Clearly, the Bill of Lading incorporates by reference the terms
of the Charter Party​. It is settled law that ​the charter may be
made part of the contract under which the goods are carried by
an appropriate reference in the Bill of Lading​. ​This should
include the provision on arbitration even without a specific
stipulation to that effect. ​The entire contract must be read
together and its clauses interpreted in relation to one another
and not by parts.
o ​In cases where a Bill of Lading has been
issued by a carrier covering goods shipped
aboard a vessel under a charter party, and
the charterer is also the holder of the bill of
lading, "the bill of lading operates as the
receipt for the goods, and as document of
title passing the property of the goods, but
not as varying the contract between the
charterer and the shipowner"
· Insurer "cannot feign ignorance of the arbitration clause since it
was already charged with notice of the existence of the charter
party due to an appropriate reference thereof in the bill of
lading and, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, it could have
easily obtained a copy thereof either from the shipper or the
charterer.
· ​We hold, therefore, that the INSURER cannot avoid the binding
effect of the arbitration clause. By subrogation, it became privy
to the Charter Party as fully as the SHIPPER before the latter
was indemnified, because as subrogee it stepped into the shoes
of the SHIPPER-ASSURED and is subrogated merely to the
latter's rights.
[Obiter as to Arbitration]
· Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settling disputes, has long
been recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction (Chapter 2,
Title XIV, Book IV, Civil Code).
· ​Republic Act No. 876 (The Arbitration Law) also expressly
authorizes arbitration of domestic disputes. ​Foreign arbitration
as a system of settling commercial disputes of an international
 character was likewise recognized when the Philippines
adhered to the United Nations "Convention on the
Recognition and the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
of 1958," under the 10 May 1965 Resolution No. 71 of the
Philippine Senate, giving reciprocal recognition and allowing
enforcement of international arbitration agreements between
parties of different nationalities within a contracting state.
Thus, it pertinently provides:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
2. The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in
a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or
contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a
matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement
within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the
parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.
· ​It has not been shown that the arbitral clause in question is null
and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed. Nor has
any conflict been pointed out between the Charter Party and
the Bill of Lading.
· ​Infine, referral to arbitration in New York pursuant to the
arbitration clause, and suspension of the foregoing
proceedings, pending the return of the arbitral award, is,
indeed called for.
163. Philsec vs. Court of Appeals, supra at 17
G.R. No. 103493 |June 19, 1997 | A. Soledad
FACTS:
1. Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from
petitioners Ayala International Finance Limited (AYALA) and
Philsec Investment Corp (PHILSEC), secured by shares of
stock owned by Ducat.
2. In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private
respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private
respondent Daic, assumed Ducat’s obligation under an
Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed
with Vendor’s Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona
Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A.,
while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as
initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be
paid by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in
favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the
money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat
from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the
shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.
3. As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the
entire amount covered by the note became due and
demandable. Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc. sued
petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United
States for payment of the balance and for damages for breach
of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in
misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock
delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement.
4. While the Civil Case was pending in the United States,
petitioners filed a complaint “For Sum of Money with Damages
and Writ of Preliminary Attachment” against private
respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint reiterated the
allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in the
Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern
Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling the
property at a price 400 percent more than its true value.
5. Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the
RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1) ​litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the
Civil Action in the U.S., (2) ​forum non conveniens​, and (3)
failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of
action​.
6. The trial court granted Ducat’s MTD, stating that “the
evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more
suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S.,
under the principle in private international law of forum non
conveniens,” even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the
U.S. case.
7. Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial
court erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum
non conveniens.
8. The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against
Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia.
ISSUE: W/N the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the
judgment of the U.S. court?
RULING AND RATIO: NO. CA reversed. Case remanded to
RTC-Makati
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign
judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to
the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them
on grounds allowed under the law. This is because in this
jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of
a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. Rule
39, §50 provides:
Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a
judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the
judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the
judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given
the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as
basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of
private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were
summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was
even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or
apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper
determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the
U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that
the judgment that might be rendered would constitute res
judicata.
Second. Nor is the trial court’s refusal to take cognizance of
the case justifiable under the principle of forum non
conveniens:
First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16,
sec.1, which does not include forum non conveniens.
The propriety of dismissing a case based on this
principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is
more properly considered a matter of defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this
ground, it should do so only after “vital facts are
established, to determine whether special
circumstances” require the court’s desistance.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and Civil Case No. 16563 is
REMANDED ​to the Regional Trial Court of Makati for
consolidation with Civil Case No. 92-1070 and for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision. The temporary
restraining order issued on June 29, 1994 is hereby LIFTED​.
164. Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429 (1 February 2006)
Facts​: The Ninoy Aquino International Airport
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA 3) was conceived,
designed and constructed and upon its completion it has
yet to start its operations due to several controversies.
In the first case that reached this Court, Agan v.
PIATCO,the contracts which the Government had with
the contractor were voided for being contrary to law and
public policy. The second case before the Court involves
the matter of just compensation due the contractor for
the terminal complex it built, to which the SC ruled that
R.A. 8974 should be applied, as it is in conformity with
the previous resolution of the Court that PIATCO must
be paid of just compensation in order for the
Government to take over NAIA 3.
In this case, the Government devotes significant
effort in diminishing PIATCO’s right to just compensation
as builder or owner of the NAIA 3. Particularly brought to
fore are the claims relating to two entities, Takenaka
Corporation (Takenaka) and Asahikosan (Asahikosan)
Corporation, who allegedly claim "significant liens" on
the terminal, arising from their alleged unpaid bills by
virtue of an Engineering, Procurement and Construction
Contract they had with PIATCO. On account of these
adverse claims, the Government now claims as
controvertible the question of who is the builder of the
NAIA 3.
Issue​: WoN the Court should reconsider its ruling
inasmuch as a foreign judgment would affect its previous
ruling(as contended by the Govt)
Held​: NONONONO
Whatever claims or purported liens Takenaka and
Asahikosan against PIATCO or over the NAIA 3 have
not been judicially established. Neither Takenaka nor
Asahikosan are parties to the present action, and thus
have not presented any claim which could be acted upon
by this Court. The earlier adjudications in ​Agan v.
PIATCO made no mention of either Takenaka or
Asahikosan, and certainly made no declaration as to
their rights to any form of compensation. If there is
indeed any right to remuneration due to these two
entities arising from NAIA 3, they have not yet been
established by the courts of the land.
It must be emphasized that the conclusive ruling in
the Resolution dated 21 January 2004 in ​Agan v.
PIATCO ​(Agan 2004) is that PIATCO, as builder of the
facilities, must first be justly compensated in accordance
with law and equity for the Government to take over the
facilities. It is on that premise that the Court adjudicated
this case in its 19 December 2005 Decision.
While the Government refers to a judgment
rendered by a London court in favor of Takenaka and
Asahikosan against PIATCO in the amount of US$82
Million, it should be noted that this foreign judgment is
not yet binding on Philippine courts. It is entrenched in
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that
a foreign judgment on the mere strength of its
promulgation is not yet conclusive, as it can be annulled
on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is likewise recognized in Philippine jurisprudence and
international law that a foreign judgment may be barred
from recognition if it runs counter to public policy.
Assuming that PIATCO indeed has corresponding
obligations to other parties relating to NAIA 3, the Court
does not see how such obligations, yet unproven, could
serve to overturn the Decision mandating that the
Government first pay PIATCO the amount of 3.02 Million
Pesos before it may acquire physical possession over
the facilities. This directive enjoining payment is in
accordance with Republic Act No. 8974, and under the
mechanism established by the law the amount to be
initially paid is that which is provisionally determined as
just compensation. The provisional character of this
payment means that it is not yet final, yet sufficient under
the law to entitle the Government to the writ of
possession over the expropriated property.
165. Jorge Gonzales, et al. v. Climax Mining Ltd., et al., G.R.
No. 161957 (22 January 2007)
Facts:
Gonzales as a claimowner of mineral deposit, entered into a
joint-venture via Production-Sharing Letter-Agreement(First
Contract) with Geophil Inc. (Geo) and Inmex Ltd. (Inmex) giving
Geo and Inmex 36 months (which was thereafter extended), to
develop, operate, mine and exploit the mining claims of Gonzales.
Thereafter, Gonzales, Armico, Geo, Inmex and Aumex signed an
Addendum Contract (Second Contract) allowing Armico to apply
for FTAA. Climax, Climax-Armico and Australasian then executed a
Financial Accomodation Contract (Third Contract) and Assignment
Accession Agreement (Fourth Contract) between Climax-Armico
and Australasian and Memorandum of Agreement (Fifth Contract)
between Climax-Armico and Australasian transferring the mining
claim to Australasian. Gonzales sought the nullity of the the
Second Contract, FTAA, Third Contract, Fourth Contract, and Fifth
Contract with preliminary injunction with the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau-DENR (MGB-DENR).
Issue:
Whether or not MGB-DENR has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
No, the case is not a dispute involving rights to a mining areas, nor
a dispute involving claim holders or concessionaires. The issue
involves a judicial question, which involves the determination of
what the law is and what are the legal rights of the parties with
respect to the matter in controversy and therefore, within the
jurisdiction of regular courts
166. Korea Technologies Co. Ltd. v. Lerma, G.R. No. 143581 (7
January 2008)
V. Internet/ Cyber Era
167. Panavision International vs. Dennis Toeppen, 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals, No. 97-55467 (1998) CompuServe vs. Patterson,
89 F. 3d 1257 (1996)
FACTS:
● Toppen registered with the Network Solutions Inc. the
domain name for his website which is Panavision. It
displays images of Panama, Illinois. Toppen is located in
Illinois.
● Panavision was the trademark holder for “Panavision” and
“Panaflex” in connection with motion picture camera
equipment. It promotes its trademarks through motion
picture and television credits and other media
advertisements. Panavision has its primary place of
business in California.
● Panavision attempted to register a website on the internet
with a domain name containing its trademark however,
they found out that they could not do so since the domain
name is already registered by Toppen.
● Panavision sent a letter to Toppen asking him to stop using
their trademark in the Internet and failure to heed the
request will prompt Panavision to pursue legal actions.
● Toppen replied and tried to bargain with Panavision to
have a settlement. He asked Panavision to buy the domain
name from him. Panavision did not heed his proposal.
● Panavision filed a case against Toppen with the District
Court of California for dilution of its trademark under
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 and California
Anti-Dilution Statute.
● The District Court of California took cognizance of the case
and ruled that Toppen violated the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995 and California Anti-Dilution Statute.
● Toppen alleged that he did not dilute the trademark of
Panavision since he did not make any commercial use of
the trademark of Panavision. He further alleged that the
District Court of California failed to acquire personal
jurisdiction over him since he was not a resident of
California and it was in Illinois where he registered the
domain name.
Issue 1: ​WON the district court of California acquired jurisdiction
over Toppen
Held 1: Yes the district court acquired jurisdiction over Toppen.
Personal jurisdiction may be founded on General Jurisdiction and
specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction exists when a defendant is
domiciled in the forum state or his activities there are "substantial"
or "continuous and systematic. Here, the district court did not have
general jurisdiction over Toppen since he was not a resident of
California.
As to specific jurisdiction, 3 tests apply. (1) The nonresident
defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with
the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must
be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's
forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction must be
reasonable. Applying principles of personal jurisdiction to conduct in
cyberspace is relatively new. "With this global revolution looming on
the horizon, the development of the law concerning the permissible
scope of personal jurisdiction based on Internet use is in its infant
stages. The cases are scant." In acquiring personal jurisdiction there
must be a substantial contact with the forum. In each case where
personal jurisdiction was exercised, there had been "something
more" to "indicate that the defendant purposefully (albeit
electronically) directed his activity in a substantial way to the forum
state."
Here, the district court validly acquired personal specific jurisdiction
due to the effects doctrine. The case of Panavision is likened to a
Torts case. In tort cases, jurisdiction may attach if the defendant's
conduct is aimed at or has an effect in the forum state. Under
Calder, personal jurisdiction can be based upon: "(1) intentional
actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing harm, the
brunt of
which is suffered--and which the defendant knows is likely to be
suffered--in the forum state." Here, Toppen registered the
trademarks of Panavision in order for him to make money off of it by
selling it to Panavision who is its rightful owner. This act of Toppen
was directly experienced by Panavision in California. The injury or
the burn of his action was felt in California. Toeppen knew
Panavision would likely suffer harm there because, although at all
relevant times Panavision was a Delaware limited partnership, its
principal place of business was in California, and the heart of the
theatrical motion picture and television industry is located there.
Under the "effects test," the purposeful availment requirement
necessary for specific, personal jurisdiction is satisfied. Toppen had
the burden of proving that California will be an inconvenient forum
but he failed to prove such.
Issue 2:​ WON Toppen diluted the trademark of Panavision
Held 2: Yes. He engaged in the commercial use of the trademarks
and exposed it to the threat of dilution.
Toppen’s use of the trademarks can be considered as a commercial
use because he engaged in a scheme wherein he registers well
known marks in the NSI as a domain name in order for him to profit
off of such trademarks by selling the use of the domain name to the
rightful owners. "Dilution" is defined as "the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2)
likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception. By using the
trademarks as a domain name and registering it to Toppen’s name,
he effectively diluted the trademark of Panavision.
A domain name is more than just a mere address of a website. It will
serve as a connection between the costumer and the company. A
significant purpose of a domain name is to identify the entity that
owns the website. "A customer who is unsure about a company's
domain name will often guess that the domain name is also the
company's name.""A domain name mirroring a corporate name may
be a valuable corporate asset, as it facilitates communication with a
customer base." It is also the easiest way to find the company’s
website. Moreover, potential customers of Panavision will be
discouraged if they cannot find its web page by typing in also puts
Panavision's name and reputation at his mercy.
168. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., No. 4:96CV01340 ERW /
947 F. Supp 1328, 19 August 1996;
FACTS
● Maritz, Inc. filed an action against Cybergold, Inc. for
alleged violation of Sec. 43(a) of the Lanham Act in relation
to the latter’s internet activities
● Martiz sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin Cybergold
for alleged trademark infringement and unfair
competition.
● Cybergold move to have the action dismissed on the
ground that the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction
over it as he complaint failed to allege facts on which
jurisdiction over it can be based.
○ It claims that it maintains no other contacts with
the state of Missouri.
○ It advertising services are not yet available or
operational. It claims that it has not yet
rendered, sold, or transported its good or
services in commerce.
● Marks:
(1) GOLDMAIL – Marit, Inc.
(2) CYBERGOLD – Cybergold, Inc
ISSUE: ​WON the Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over
Cybergold
HELD: YES
The Court ruled using a two-part inquiry:
1. Whether personal jurisdiction exists under Missouri’s
long-arm statute
2. Whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction will be
consistent with due process
1. There is personal jurisdiction under Missouri’s long-arm statute.
● The Missouri long-arm statute provides that: Any persons
or form whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
or any corporation, who in person or through an agent
does any of the acts enumerated in this section thereby
submits such person, firm, or corporation, and, if an
individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising
from doing any of such act:
(1) The transaction of any business within this state
-----
(3) The commission of a tortious act within this state
● “Transaction of any business” within the state test ruled
that the requirement is satisfied when a party conducted
promotional activities directed towards recipients located
in Missouri (citing ​Danforth v. Reader’s Digest​)
● Applying such in this case, the activities of Cybergold
meets the requirements. It maintains a website on the
 world wide web which has presumably a server in
California. The website is accessible to every
internet-connected computer in Missouri and the world.
● A violation of the Lanham Act is tortious in nature.
● Based on this, Missouri’s long-arm statute reaches
Cybergold, as that even if the alleged infringing acts were
wholly outside of Missouri, it will produce an effect in
Missouri as it allegedly caused Maritz economic injury.
2. The exercise of personal jurisdiction will not violate due process
● Due process requires that there be “minimum contact”
between the nonresident defendant and the forum of the
state before a court can exercise personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.
● Citing ​World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson​, sufficient
contacts exist when the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum state are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there, and
when the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In
assessing the defendant's "reasonable anticipation," there
must be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits of its laws.
● Citing ​Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Hawker Siddeley Canada, Inc.​,
the five-part test of measuring minimum contacts:
(1) The nature and quality of the contracts with the
forum state;
(2) The quantity of those contacts;
(3) The relation of the cause of action to the contacts;
(4) The interest of forum state in providing a forum for
its residents;
(5) The convenience of the parties.
● Cybergold’s act of posting of information about its new,
up-coming service throgfh a website seeks to develop a
mailing list of internet users, as such users are essential to
the success of its services. Contrary to Cybergold’s
contention that it is maintaining a “passive website”, the
intent to reach all internet users is not passive.
● Through its website, Cybergold has consciously decide to
transmit advertising information to all internet users,
knowing that such information will be transmitted
globally.
● In addition, the information transmitted is clearly intended
as a promotion of Cybergold’s upcoming service and
solicitation for internet users. It is purposefully availing
itself to the privilege of conducting activities in Missouri.
● While CyberGold has not yet set up its service of sending
advertisements to internet users on its mailing list,
CyberGold's acts of developing a mailing list through its
acceptance of addresses on its website are also part of the
allegedly infringing activity about which plaintiff
complains.
MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED
Additional:
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
● The action filed under the Lanham Act is not premature
contrary to Cybergold’s claim.
● A claim under the Act can exist even before Cybergold
opens the business, so long as the act are imminent and
impending.
● The Court also concludes that it is imminent and
impending that Cybergold will be fully operating its
internet advertising service in the near future. Both
developing a mailing list and obtaining advertisers are
integral to defendant's business. Maritz need not wait
until both are fully established before it can maintain an
action for violation of the Lanham Act.
Motion to Stay
● Cybergold has a pending registration of its CYBERGOLD
trademark, CyberGold argues that this Court should stay
its proceedings and await the outcome of any opposition
proceedings regarding its recently published mark.
CyberGold argues that the outcome of the PTO
proceedings will determine, at least through prima facie
evidence, whether CyberGold has priority in the use of its
CYBERGOLD mark, and that the outcome of the PTO
proceedings will affect whether plaintiff will be able to
succeed in its Lanham Act claim against CyberGold
● Doctrine of Primary jurisdiction, a court can stay a
proceeding to allow an administrative agency to make a
determination as to an issue important to the court
proceeding.
● Factors to consider to stay proceedings and defer to an
administrative agency: ​1) whether the relevant
administrative agency has exclusive primary jurisdiction;
(2) whether awaiting the decision of issues by the
administrative agency will be of importance in resolving
issues in the litigation before the district court; (3)
whether the administrative agency has specialized
expertise and experience and the issues in dispute are not
within the conventional experience of judges; and (4)
whether deferring to an administrative agency is likely to
prolong the dispute rather than lead to a judicially
economical disposition.
● In this case, the Court finds that the doctrine does not
apply. The action is for infringement and unfair
competition under the Lanham Act. The decision of the
PTO will not be determinative of any issue in this case. A
decision to issued a registered trademark is only prima
facie evidence of Cybergold’s right of priority use, it is not
a conclusive evidence.
169. CompuServe v. Patterson, No. 95-3452 / 89 F. 3d 1257, 22
July 1996;
FACTS: Plaintiff-Appellant CompuServe, Inc. ("CompuServe"), a
nationwide provider of both electronic network and information
services, has its headquarters in Ohio. Among the services
provided by CompuServe is the opportunity for subscribers to post
and sell software in the form of "shareware." Shareware, provided
to the end user initially free of charge, allows the user to test the
software for a specified length of time, after which he or she must
decide whether to pay the software's author for continued use, or
terminate the use of the software. CompuServe accepted payment
for the shareware from purchasers and remitted that payment,
less a commission, to the authors of the software.
Richard S. Patterson ("Patterson"), a resident of Texas, subscribed
to CompuServe. Patterson took advantage of CompuServe's
shareware service by posting Internet navigation software that he
developed but marketed via his own corporation, Flashpoint
Development. Before use of the shareware service, Patterson
entered into a "Shareware Registration Agreement" ("SRA") that
provided that Ohio law governed the parties' relationship.
Subsequent to the posting of Patterson's navigation software,
CompuServe itself began to market its own navigation software.
Patterson believed that CompuServe's software was confusingly
similar to his own trademarked software and notified CompuServe.
CompuServe filed a declaratory judgment action in the District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, seeking a declaration that it
had not infringed Patterson's trademarks. Patterson filed a motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court
granted Patterson's motion.
CompuServe filed an appeal arguing that Patterson's repeated
availment of the shareware sales procedures constituted minimum
contacts with the forum state. CompuServe further argued that the
existence of the Shareware Registration Agreement clearly
stipulating that Ohio law governed disputes regarding the
agreement meant that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
comported with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.
ISSUE: Whether an Internet service provider's home state can
exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state author of software who
subscribes to the Internet service provider and receives
commissions for software sold via the Internet service provider
HELD: Yes.​To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists over a
defendant, federal courts apply the law of the forum state, subject
to the limits of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; the defendant must be amenable to suit under the
forum state's long-arm statute and the due process requirements
of the Constitution must be met.
The Ohio long-arm statute allows an Ohio court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents of Ohio on claims arising
from, inter alia, the nonresident's transacting any business in Ohio.
It is settled Ohio law, moreover, that the "transacting business"
clause of that statute was meant to extend to the federal
constitutional limits of due process, and that as a result Ohio
personal jurisdiction cases require an examination of those limits.
As always in this context, the crucial federal constitutional inquiry
is whether, given the facts of the case, the nonresident defendant
has sufficient contacts with the forum state that the district court's
exercise of jurisdiction would comport with "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."
This court has repeatedly employed three criteria to make this
determination:
(1) The defendant must purposefully avail himself of the
privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a
consequence in the forum state ​(purposeful
availment)​.
(2) The cause of action must arise from the defendant's
activities there.
(3) The acts of the defendant or consequences caused
by the defendant must have a substantial enough
connection with the forum to make the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable
(reasonableness requirement)​.
170. Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., No. CV-3:95
CV-01314 (AVC) / 937 F. Supp 161, 17 April 1996;
INSET SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff, v. INSTRUCTION SET, INC.,
Defendant.
FACTS:
1. Inset is a corporation organised under the laws of the
state of Connecticut. Its office can be found also in
Connecticut. It develops and markets computer
softwares and other related services around the world.
2. Instruction Set or ISI is a corp organised and found in
Massachusetts. It provides computer technology and
support to thousands of organisations around the world.
It does not have any employees, offices, nor conduct
business in Connecticut.
3. In 1985 - Inset filed for registration as the owner of the
federal trademark INSET. After a year, it received Reg
number 1,414,031.
4. ISI obtained “​INSET.COM​" as its internet domain address,
which it uses to advertise goods and services. ISI also
uses the tel number “1-800-US-INSET”
5. In 1995 - Inset learned of ISI’s domain address when it
attempted to obtain the same domain address. Inset filed
this action for damages and injunctive relief based upon
an alleged infringement of a trademark
Connecticut Long Arm Statute:
Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a
resident of this state ... on any cause of action arising ... (2) out of
any business solicited in this state ... if the corporation has
repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or offers
relating thereto were accepted within or without the state ...
Minimum Contact Rule:
● "[Due Process] limitations require that a nonresident
corporate defendant have 'minimum contacts' with the
forum state such that it would reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there.
● there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.
● Maintenance of the suit in the forum state cannot offend
traditional notions of fair place and substantial justice.
ISSUES:
1. whether the Connecticut long-arm statute, C.G.S. §
33-411(c) confers jurisdiction over the defendant,
Instruction Set, Inc.? YES
● Court found that ISI has been soliciting business in
Connecticut over the internet through advertisements.
The Court cites a case where it was held that posting
advertisements in the state is considered as soliciting
business. Thus, the Connecticut long-arm statute
conferred jurisdiction upon ISI.
1. whether the statute's jurisdictional reach as applied to ISI
meets the "minimum contacts" required to satisfy
constitutional due process? YES
 ● ISI argues that there is no sufficient minimum contact to
satisfy constitutional due process. Court held that the
advertising of ISI over the internet and its toll free
number is considered doing business within Connecticut.
Jurisprudence provides that a business that supplies
catalogs advertised so that people can order is
solicitation and is doing business within the state. The
Internet as well as toll-free numbers are designed to
communicate with people and their businesses in every
state. Advertisement on the Internet can reach as many
as 10,000 Internet users within Connecticut alone.
Further, once posted on the Internet, unlike television
and radio advertising, the advertisement is available
continuously to any Internet user. Thus, Minimum
Contact requirement is satisfied.
1. whether venue is proper? YES, VENUE IS PROPER
● ISI asserts venue should be in massachusetts.
● NOPE, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed
to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to
personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced
..." Since the defendant, ISI, a corporation, is subject to
personal jurisdiction in Connecticut, then for venue
purposes, it is deemed to reside in Connecticut.
171. Yahoo!, Inc. vs. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L’Antisemitisme United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division Case No. C-00-21275 JF
[Docket No. 170] (2001)
BACKGROUND:
● La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et l'Antisemitisme ("LICRA") and
L'Union Des Etudiants Juifs De France, citizens of France, are
non-profit organizations dedicated to eliminating
anti-Semitism.
● Yahoo!, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of
Delaware with its principal place of business in Santa Clara,
California.
● Yahoo! provides a variety of means by which people from all
over the world can communicate and interact with one
another over the Internet. One of which is auction sale.
● Yahoo!'s auction site allows anyone to post an item for sale
and solicit bids from any computer user from around the
globe. Yahoo! monitors the transaction through limited
regulation by prohibiting particular items from being sold and
by providing a rating system through which buyers and sellers
have their transactional behavior evaluated for the benefit of
future consumers. Yahoo! informs auction sellers that they
must comply with Yahoo!'s policies and may not offer items to
buyers in jurisdictions in which the sale of such item violates
the jurisdiction's applicable laws. Yahoo! does not actively
regulate the content of each posting, and individuals are able
to post, and have in fact posted, highly offensive matter on
Yahoo!'s auction sites.
FACTS:
● LICRA sent a "cease and desist" letter to Yahoo!'s Santa Clara
HQ informing Yahoo! that the sale of Nazi and Third Reich
related goods through its auction services violates French law.
● LICRA threatened to take legal action unless Yahoo! took steps
to prevent such sales within 8 days. LICRA and L’Union
subsequently utilized the US Marshal's Office to serve Yahoo!
with process in California and filed a civil complaint against
Yahoo! in the French Court.
○ The French Court found that approximately 1,000 Nazi
and Third Reich related objects, including Adolf Hitler's
Mein Kampf, The Protocol of the Elders of Zion, and
purported "evidence" that the gas chambers of the
Holocaust did not exist were being offered for sale on
Yahoo.com's auction site.
○ Since any French citizen is able to access these materials
on Yahoo.com directly or through a link on Yahoo.fr, the
French Court concluded that the Yahoo.com auction site
violates Sec. R645-1 of the French Criminal Code,
prohibiting exhibition of Nazi propaganda and artifacts
for sale.
● The French Court entered an order requiring Yahoo! to:
1. eliminate French citizens' access to any material on the
Yahoo.com auction site that offers for sale any Nazi
objects, relics, insignia, emblems, and flags
2. eliminate French citizens' access to web pages on
Yahoo.com displaying text, extracts, or quotations from
Mein Kampf and Protocol of the Elders of Zion
3. post a warning to French citizens on Yahoo.fr that any
search through Yahoo.com may lead to sites containing
material prohibited by Section R645-1 of the French
Criminal Code, and that such viewing of the prohibited
material may result in legal action against the Internet
user
4. remove from all browser directories accessible in the
French Republic index headings entitled "negationists"
and from all hypertext links the equation of
"negationists" under the heading "Holocaust."
The order subjects Yahoo! to a penalty of 100,000 Euros for each
day that it fails to comply.
● Yahoo! moved for reconsideration claiming that while it could
post the required warning on Yahoo.fr, compliance with
respect to Yahoo.com was technologically impossible.
● The French Court sought expert opinion on the matter, after
which it "reaffirmed" its order. The French Court ordered
Yahoo! to comply within 3 months or face a penalty of
100,000 Francs for each day of non-compliance.
● Yahoo! complied with the order and amended their auction
policy prohibiting individuals from auctioning items that
promotes, glorifies, or is directly associated with groups or
individuals known principally for hateful or violent positions
or acts, such as Nazis or the Ku Klux Klan.
● Notwithstanding these actions, the Yahoo.com auction site
still offers certain items for sale (such as stamps, coins, and a
copy of Mein Kampf) which appear to violate the French
Order. While Yahoo! has removed the Protocol of the Elders
of Zion from its auction site, it has not prevented access to
numerous other sites which reasonably may be construed as
constituting an apology for Nazism or a contesting of Nazi
crimes.
● Yahoo! claims that because it lacks the technology to block
French citizens from accessing the Yahoo.com auction site to
view materials which violate the French Order, it cannot
comply without banning Nazi-related material from
Yahoo.com altogether. Such a ban would infringe its rights
under the First Amendment to the US Constitution.
● Yahoo! then filed a complaint with the US Supreme Court
seeking a declaratory judgment that the French Court's orders
are neither cognizable nor enforceable under the laws of US.
● LICRA and L’Union moved to dismiss on the basis that US
Supreme Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. That
motion was denied. Their request that the Court certify its
jurisdictional determination for interlocutory appeal was
denied as well without prejudice pending the outcome of
Yahoo!'s motion for summary judgment.
ISSUE: WON the French Order is cognizable or enforceable under
the laws of the US (NO)
SUMMARY: Yahoo! seeks a declaration from this Court that the
First Amendment precludes enforcement within the United States
of a French order intended to regulate the content of its speech
over the Internet. Yahoo! has shown that the French order is valid
under the laws of France, that it may be enforced with retroactive
penalties, and that the ongoing possibility of its enforcement in the
United States chills Yahoo!'s First Amendment rights. Yahoo! also
has shown that an actual controversy exists and that the threat to
its constitutional rights is real and immediate. LICRA and L’Union
have failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact or to identify any such issue the existence of which could be
shown through further discovery. The motion for summary
judgment was granted.
HELD:
ON ACTUAL CONTROVERSY
Declaratory judgment actions are justiciable only if there is an
"actual controversy." The threshold question in any declaratory
action thus is whether there is a substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and
reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.
ARGUMENTS: ​On Status of French Order
LICRA and L’Union: "actual controversy" requirement not met.
Yahoo! appealed the French Court's initial order, and that a
successful appeal would nullify the order reaffirming the 1​st order.
They argue that even if the May 22 order is upheld on appeal, the
French court may find that Yahoo! has substantially complied with
the order. They assert that they may elect not to initiate the
complex process the French Court would use to fix an actual
penalty, and that until that process is completed, there is no order
that could be enforced against Yahoo! in US.
U.S. SC: NO.
1) No appellate proceedings pending in France: In the reaffirming
order, the French Court determined that Yahoo! is
technologically and legally capable of complying its initial
order and that Yahoo! is subject to a fine for each day of
non-compliance. That order was not appealed, and Yahoo!
withdrew its appeal of the initial order.
2) The fact that any penalty against Yahoo! is provisional and
would require further legal proceedings in France prior to any
enforcement action in US does not mean that Yahoo! does not
face a present and ongoing threat from the existing French
order.
a) If the penalty enforcement process were initiated, the
French Court could assess penalties retroactively for the
entire period of Yahoo!'s non-compliance.
3) It is not clear whether Yahoo! can rely upon the assessment
by LICRA and L’Union that it is in "substantial compliance"
with the French order. The French Court has not made such a
finding, nor have Defendants requested that such a finding be
made. The fact that the Yahoo! does not know whether its
efforts to date have met the French Court's mandate is the
precise harm against which the Declaratory Judgment Act is
designed to protect.
ARGUMENTS​:​ ​On Real and Immediate Threat
LICRA and L’Union:
1) There is no real or immediate threat to Yahoo!'s First
Amendment rights because the French order cannot be
enforced at all until after the process of petitioning the French
court to fix a penalty has been completed.
2) There is no real or immediate threat to Yahoo! because they
do not presently intend to seek enforcement of the French
order in US.
U.S. SC: NO. The assurances that they do not intend to enforce the
order at the present time do not remove the threat that they may
yet seek sanctions against Yahoo!'s present and ongoing conduct.
ARGUMENTS: ​On Abstention
LICRA and L’Union: US SC should abstain from deciding the case
because Yahoo! simply is unhappy with the outcome of the French
litigation and is trying to obtain a more favorable result here.
Abstention is an appropriate remedy for international
forum-shopping.
U.S. SC: NO.
1) FRENCH PROCEEDING: determined that Yahoo!'s auction site
and website hostings on Yahoo.com violate French law.
2) U.S. PROCEEDING: Declaratory relief not an attempt to
relitigate or disturb the French court's application of French
law or its orders with respect to Yahoo!'s conduct in France.
The purpose is to determine whether a US court may enforce
the French order without running afoul of the First
Amendment. The actions involve distinct legal issues, and US
court is best situated to determine the application of the US
Constitution to the facts presented. There is no basis for
abstention.
U.S SUPREME COURT ON COMITY
No legal judgment has any effect, of its own force, beyond the
limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived.
However, the US Constitution and implementing legislation require
that full faith and credit be given to judgments of sister states,
territories, and possessions of the US. ​The extent to which the US,
or any state, honors the judicial decrees of foreign nations is a
matter of choice, governed by "the comity of nations. ​Comity "is
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other." United States courts
generally recognize foreign judgments and decrees unless
enforcement would be prejudicial or contrary to the country's
interests.
The French order's content and viewpoint-based regulation of the
web pages and auction site on Yahoo.com, while entitled to great
deference as an articulation of French law, clearly would be
inconsistent with the First Amendment if mandated by a court in
US. What makes this case uniquely challenging is that the Internet
in effect allows one to speak in more than one place at the same
time. ​Although France has the sovereign right to regulate what
speech is permissible in France, this Court may not enforce a
foreign order that violates the protections of the United States
Constitution by chilling protected speech that occurs
simultaneously within our borders.
Absent a body of law that establishes international standards with
respect to speech on the Internet and an appropriate treaty or
legislation addressing enforcement of such standards to speech
originating within the United States, the principle of comity is
outweighed by the Court's obligation to uphold the First
Amendment.
ON APPLICATION OF RULE 56(f)
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f) permits a court either to postpone
determination of a motion for summary judgment or to deny such
motion pending further discovery.
● A court may take such action when "it appears from the
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential
to justify the party's opposition."
● To justify a continuance, the Rule 56(f) motion must
demonstrate 1) why the movant needs additional discovery
and 2) how the additional discovery likely will create a
genuine issue of material fact.

LICRA and L’Union: Asserted that:

1) further discovery may lead to the development of triable
issues of fact concerning the extent to which Yahoo!'s
modifications to its auction site have affected its potential
liability under the French order and as to Yahoo!'s
technological ability to comply with the order.
2) issues are material because the law is unsettled as to whether
the First Amendment protects speech originating within US
that is expressly targeted at a foreign market.
3) Discovery may produce additional evidence that would
preclude summary judgment on First Amendment grounds.
U.S. SC: Motion failed to demonstrate requisites.
Yahoo! seeks protection for its actions in the United States,
specifically the ways in which it configures and operates its auction
and Yahoo.com sites. Moreover, the French order requires Yahoo!
not only to render it impossible for French citizens to access the
proscribed content but also to interpret an impermissibly
overbroad and vague definition of the content that is proscribed. If
a hypothetical party were physically present in France engaging in
expression that was illegal in France but legal in the United States,
it is unlikely that a United States court would or could question the
applicability of French law to that party's conduct. However, an
entirely different case would be presented if the French court
ordered the party not to engage in the same expression in the
United States on the basis that French citizens later could read,
hear or see it.
MOTION TO POSTPONE DETERMINATION OF YAHOO!’s MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENIED.

172. America Online, Inc., v. Superior Court, 90 Cal.App.4th 1,

108 Ca. Rptr. 2d 699 (2001)