ALVAREZ vs RAMIREZ (Art 150 & 151)
159)
Prior to the commission of the offense, relationship between petitioner and his wife was already
strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed,
the evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between
petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the
courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to
offer the direct testimony of the wife, even against the objection of the accused, because it was
the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity.
MARTINEZ vs MARTINEZ (Art. 150 & 151)
Under Article 150 of the Family Code, petitioner had no familial relations with the respondent,
being a mere sister-in-law. She was a stranger to the respondent; hence, there was no need for
the petitioners to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code.
HIYAS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs ACUNA (Art. 151)
Earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required before the filing of the instant case
considering the case involves parties who are strangers to the family.
If one of the parties is a stranger, failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a
compromise had been made by plaintiff before filing the complaint, is not a ground for motion to
dismiss.
Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no
longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise
before the action can prosper.
PATRICIO vs DARIO III (Art. 154 & 159)
To be a beneficiary of the family home or a minor beneficiary entitled to the benefits of Art. 159,
three requisites must concur:
(1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code;
(2) they live in the family home
(3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
As a general rule, the family home may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years following the
death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the
spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as family home. After
10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall be preserved only until
that minor beneficiary reaches the age of majority.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from
his father. Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V.
Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under
Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother
for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now
establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.
ARRIOLA vs ARRIOLA (Art.
Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive property.
Petitioners add that said house has been their residence for 20 years. Taken together, these
averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home within the contemplation
of the provisions of The Family Code.
If the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been
willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary
property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-
owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the
beneficiaries of the family home.
The family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be
partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties herein.
Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March 10,
2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home
he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court
to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the property.
DE MESA vs SPS ACERO (ART. 155)
It is without dispute that the family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of
its beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment.
However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the
status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family
Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not
by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction.
It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a
family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
Petitioners’ negligence or omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the
presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it.
Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent
upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the
sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home.
EQUITABLE PCIB, INC. vs OJ-MACK TRADING, INC. et al (ART. 155)
Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged condominium unit constitutes respondents family home,
the same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the same Code allows the
execution or forced sale of a family home for debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution.
GRANDE vs ANTONIO (ART. 176)
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The
exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the
illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
An acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate
father and are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.
The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the
father, or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity
of the husband can be rejected.
DOLINA vs GLENN VALLECERA (ART. 166)

GERARDO CONCEPCION vs CA (ART. 167)
A minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on a declaration of the mother and/or
even the supposed father. Only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate
children for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth
certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein are merely
supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what
a parent says it is.
The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action for compulsory recognition. If
filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. Illegitimate children are
entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the
child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her
son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him.

CABATANIA vs CA (ART. 164 & 172) VERCELES vs POSADA (ART. 172)

Baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with
respect to the childs paternity.
Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se
inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to
prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
DE JESUS vs ESTATE OF DIZON (ART. 166 & 171)
They reiterate that Clarissa’s clear narration of the circumstances on "how she was deflowered"
by petitioner, the love letters and pictures given by petitioner to Clarissa, the corroborating
testimony of Clarissa’s mother, the fact that petitioner proffered no countervailing evidence, are
preponderant evidence of paternity.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten instruments of petitioner
which establish Verna Aiza’s filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the
array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us,
are convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate child.
Although petitioner used an alias in these letters, the similarity of the penmanship in these
letters vis the annotation at the back of petitioner’s fading photograph as a youth is
unmistakable. Even an inexperienced eye will come to the conclusion that they were all written
by one and the same person.

An attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect,
would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus. This step cannot be done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents.

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child, and no further court action is required.

Any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to
establish the child’s acknowledgment.