TORTS AND DAMAGES

Report on "CAUSE"

Submitted to: Atty. Susana C. Gapla-ew-Umayat

Submitted by: GROUP 5

Cabal, Jack Kevin

Comila, Alvin G.
Galian, Mark L.
Oggang, Noel B.

March 23,2019

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 V. Cause

A. Different Categories

1. Proximate Cause
It is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
And the more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of event, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result there from.
The concept of proximate cause is well defined in our corpus of jurisprudence as ‘any
cause which, in natural continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces result complaint of and without which would not have occurred and from which it
ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by person of ordinary case that the
injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable
consequence.

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA,

LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by
their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957

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FACTS:
On September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation left the town of
Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur,
ConradoSaylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and
conductor. At about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, while the bus was running within the
jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag
until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the
passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or
pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and
the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of
the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road,
heard groans and moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan
and Lara, who said they could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to
show whether or not the passengers already free from the wreck, including the driver and
the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers
trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the
neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted
torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These
men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire
started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped
inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape
from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body
of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one
of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant Medina is liable for damages.

HELD:
Yes. There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is
liable.

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 It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a
passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and
extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen
after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might
still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of
the vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do
not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the
reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of
the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that
because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with
them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not
available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach
the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words,
the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the
overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside
help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence
of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and
the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver
should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and
around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large
area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring
the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier
come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and
1763

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 PILIPINAS BANK, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FLORENCIO
REYES, respondents. G.R. No. 105410, July 25, 1994

FACTS:
As payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes, Florencio Reyes
issued postdated checks to Winner Industrial Corporation for P20,927.00 and Vicente
Tui, for P11,419.50, with due dates on October 10 and 12, 1979, respectively.
To cover the face value of the checks, plaintiff, on October 10, 1979, requested
PCIB Money Shop's manager Mike Potenciano to effect the withdrawal of P32,000.00
from his savings account therein and have it deposited with his current account with
Pilipinas Bank (then Filman Bank), Biñan Branch. Roberto Santos was requested to make
the deposit.
In depositing in the name of FLORENCIO REYES, he inquired from the teller the
current account number of Florencio Reyes to complete the deposit slip he was
accomplishing. He was informed that it was "815" and so this was the same current
account number he placed on the deposit slip below the depositor's name FLORENCIO
REYES.
Nothing that the account number coincided with the name Florencio, Efren
Alagasi, then Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, thought it was for
Florencio Amador who owned the listed account number. He, thus, posted the deposit in
the latter's account not noticing that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was
REYES.

On October 11, 1979, the October 10, check in favor of Winner Industrial
Corporation was presented for payment. Since the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated
that his account had only a balance of P4,078.43, it was dishonored and the payee was
advised to try it for next clearing.

On October 15, 1979, the October 10, 1979 check was redeposited but was again
dishonored. Likewise, the October 12, 1979 check in favor of Vicente Tui when presented
for payment on that same date met the same fate but was advised to try the next clearing.

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Two days after the October 10 check was again dishonored, the payee returned the same to
Florencio Reyes and demanded a cash payment of its face value which he did if only to save
his name. The October 12, 1979 check was redeposited on October 18, 1979, but again
dishonored for the reason that the check was drawn against insufficient fund.Furious over the
incident, he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate verification of his
account.
Upon verification, the bank noticed the error. The P32,000.00 deposit posted in the
account of Florencio Amador was immediately transferred to the account of Reyes upon
being cleared by Florencio Amador that he did not effect a deposit in the amount of
P32,000.00. The transfer having been effected, the bank then honored the October 12, 1979.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Reyes has the right to recover damage.

HELD:
Yes. It must be established that private respondent's own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury. The concept of proximate cause is well defined in our
corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which
would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been forseen or reasonably
anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury,
would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence.” In the case at bench, the
proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously
posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a
similar first name.

While the bank's negligence may not have been attended with malice and bad faith,
nevertheless, it caused serious anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation to the private
respondents for which they are entitled to recover reasonable moral damages.

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MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, Petitioner,Vs. SEBASTIAN M.
BAKING, RespondentG.R. No. 156037, May 28, 2007
FACTS:
Sebastian M. Baking, respondent, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-
up. Dr.Sy found that respondent’s blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal levels.
Dr.Sy then gave respondent two medical prescriptions – Diamicron for his blood sugar and
Benalize tablets for his triglyceride.
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation to buy the prescribed
medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription
for Dormicum. Thus, what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet.
Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong medicine, respondent took one pill of
Dormicum on three consecutive days –November 6, 1993 at 9:00 p.m., November 7 at 6:00
a.m., and November 8 at 7:30 a.m.
On November 8 or on the third day he took the medicine, respondent figured in a
vehicular accident. The car he was driving collided with the car of one Josie Peralta.
Respondent fell asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about the collision
nor felt its impact.
Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical and mental state at
the time of the collision, respondent returned to Dr.Sy’s clinic. Upon being shown the
medicine, Dr.Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to respondent was Dormicum,
instead of the prescribed Diamicron.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is negligent and such negligence is the proximate cause of the
respondent’s accident.

HELD:
Yes. Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would
not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon
a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.

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 Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner’s employee been
careful in reading Dr.Sy’s prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping
tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a
collision.

2. Concurrent

a. Rule where there are concurrent causes

Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination, the direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either of them is
responsible for the whole injury (Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 1998).

b. Solidarity liability of joint tortfeasors

There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary
since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where their concurring
negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of
the Civil Code (Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
130068, October 1, 1998).

c. Article 2194 of the Civil Code

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi –
delict is solidary.

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d. Illustrative Cases

i. Far Eastern Shipping vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998
Justice Regalado En Banc

Facts:

On June 20, 1980, MV/PAVLODAR, owned and operated by FESC, arrived at

the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7 am. The vessel
was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space.
Appellant Sene Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilot’s Association
(MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth
No. 4.
Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in
the bridge, with the master of the vessel Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a
briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the
vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila
International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers.
When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North
Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the
vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor
dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left
anchor with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold
as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between
the crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew
members. When Gavino inquired what all the commotion was about, Kavankov
assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.
After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines
half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was
approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take

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hold. Gavino thereafter gave the “full astern” code. Beofre the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron
of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The rehabilitation of the
damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of Php 1,126,132.25.
The PPA filed a complaint for actual and exemplary damages against FESC,
Gavino, and the MPA.
The trial court ordered the defendants jointly and severally do pay the PPA the
amount of Php 1,053,000.00 representing actual damages and the cost of the suit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the court a quo except that if found
no employer-employee relationship existing between MPA and Gavino. This being
so, it ruled instead that the liability of MPA is anchored not on Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, but on the provisions od Custom Administrative Order No. 15-65.

Issues:
Who should be negligent – the master of the ship, the harbor of the pilot, or both?
Who should be held responsible for the resulting damages?

Held:

Both the pilot and the master were negligent.

The Supreme Court started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object
and a moving object, there is a presumption of fault against the moving object.

Negligence of the Pilot. A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and
licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. He is an
expert who’s supposed to know the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not
know because the pilot is familiar with the port. He is charged to perform his duties
with extraordinary care because the safety of people and property on the vessel and
on the dock are at stake.

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 Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court found that his reaction time (4
minutes) to the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too
slow. As an expert he should’ve been reacting quickly to any such happenings.
As can be gleaned from the logbook, Gavino ordered the left anchor and two (2)
shackles dropped at 8:30 am. He ordered the engines of the vessel stopped at 8:31
am. By then, Gavino must have realized that the anchor did not hit a hard object and
was not clawed so as to reduce the momentum of the vessel. The vessel continued
travelling towards the pier at the same speed. Gavino failed to react. At 8:32 am,
two tugboats began to push the stern part of the vessel from the port side but the
momentum of the vessel was not contained. Still Gavino did not react. He did not
even order the other anchor and two (2) more shackles dropped to arrest the
momentum of the vessel. Neither did he order full – astern. It was only at 8:34 am,
four (4) minutes, after the anchor was dropped that Gavino reacted. But his reaction
was even haphazard because instead of arresting fully the momentum of the vessel
with the help of the tugboats, Gavino ordered merely “half – astern”. By then, it
was too late. The vessel’s momentum could no longer be arrested and, barely a
minute thereafter, the bow of the vessel hit the apron of the pier.
Negligence of the Master. In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes
the master of the vessel. The master, however may intervene or countermand the
pilot if he deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the
pilot or if the pilot is drunk. Based on Capt. Kavankov’s testimony, he never sensed
any danger even when the anchor didn’t hold and they were approaching the dock
too fast. He blindly trusted the pilot. This is negligence on his part. He was right
beside the pilot during the docking, so he could see and hear everything that the
pilot was seeing and hearing.
The master’s negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel, and in turn
means negligence on the part of the FESC.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals holding Capt.
Gavino, FESC and MPA, but only to the extent of 75% of the latter’s reserve fund,
jointly and severally liable to pay the cost of port’s rehabilitation.

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 It ruled that where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is
an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury
may be attributed to all or any of the cause and recovery may be had against any or
all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may
appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owned by them to the
injured person was not the same.

ii. Ruks Konsult and Construction vs. Adworld Sign and Advertising Corporation and
Transworld Media AdsG.R. No. 204866 January 21, 2015
Justice Perlas – Bernabe First Division

Facts:

Adworld filed for damages against Transworld when Transworld’s billboards

structure collapsed against Adworld’s billboard structure, which was misaligned
and its foundation impaired.
In its answer with counterclaim, Transworld averred that the collapse of its
billboard structure was due to extraordinary strong winds that occurred instantly
and unexpectedly and maintained that the damage caused to Adworld’s billboard
structure was hardly noticeable. Transworld likewise filed a third –party complaint
against Ruks, the company which built the collapsed billboard structure in the
former’s favor. It was alleged therein that the structure constructed by Ruks had a
weak and poor foundation not suited for billboards, thus prone to collapse, and as
such Ruks should ultimately be held liable for the damages caused to Adworld’s
billboard structure.
Ruks denied liability, it contended that when Transworld hired its services, there
was already an existing foundation for the billboard and that it merely finished the
structure according to the terms and conditions of its contract with the latter.
The Regional Trial Court declared Transworld and Ruks jointly and severally
liable to Adworld in the amount of Php 474,204.00 as actual damages. The RTC

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ruled that Transworld and Ruks knew that the foundation was weak yet they did not
do anything to remedy the situation, thereby making them both negligent.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It found that Transwrold
failed to ensure that Ruks will comply with the approved plans and specification of
the structure, and that Ruks continued to install and finish the billboard structure
despite the knowledge that there were no adequate columns to support the same.

Issue:

Whether Ruks is jointly and severally liable with Transworld for damages sustained
by Adworld.

Held:
Yes. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may
be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all
of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it appear
that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured
person was not the same. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is
liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
In this case, the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s finding that Transworld’s
initial construction of its billboard’s lower structure without the proper foundation,
and that of Ruk’s finishing its upper structure and justly merely assuming that
Transworld would reinforce the weak foundation are the two (2) successive acts
which were the direct and proximate cause of the damages sustained by Adworld.
Neither of them took positive step to reinforce the foundation. They merely rely on
each other’s word that repairs would be done.
Transworld and Ruks are guilty of negligence and as joint tortfeasors, they
are solidarily liable to Adworld. Joint tortfeasors are those who command, instigate,
promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission

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 of a tort or approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are also
wrong or whose acts, if independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury.
Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable
for the resulting damage.

3. Remote

a. Definition
In the law of negligence with respect to injury or accident, a cause
which would not according to experience of mankind, lead to the event
which happened (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition).
That cause which some independent force merely took advantage
of to accomplish something not the natural effect thereof (Aquino, Torts
and Damages, 2005 p. 251).

b. Rule in Remote Causes

A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise
to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition such subsequent act or condition
is the proximate cause (Manila electric Company vs. Remoquillo, G.R.
No. L-8328, May 18, 1956).

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c. Illustrative Cases

i. Manila Electric Company vs. Sotero Remoquillo

G.R. No. L-8328 May 18, 1956
Justice Montemayor En Banc

Facts:
Efren Magno went to the 3 – story house of Cayetano Peňaloza, his stepbrother,
located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a “media agua’ said to be in a
leaking condition. The “media agua” was just below the window of the third story.
Standing on said “Media Agua,” Magno received from his son thru that window a 3’
x 6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so
the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila
Electric Company (Company) strung parallel to the edge of the “media agua” and 2 ½
feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.
His widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the company. After
hearing, the trial court rendered judgement in their favor. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the CA affirmed the judgement. Hence, the petition.

Issue:
Whether the exposed electric wire of the company was the proximate cause of the
death of Efren Magno

Held:
No. The death of Magno was primarily cause by his own negligence and in
some measure by the too close proximity of the “media agua” or rather its edge to the
electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by
the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the “media agua”.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.

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 The principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric
wire evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in
turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution,
such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron
sheet, considering the latter’s length of 6 feet. When Magno was called by his
stepbrother to repair the media agua, it is presumed that due to his age and
experience, he was qualified to do the job. Magno could not have been entirely a
stranger to electric wires and danger lurking in them.

ii. Consolacion Gabeto vs. Agaton Araneta

G.R. No. L -15674 October 17, 1921
Justice Street En Banc

Facts:

On August 4, 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata to go to

a cockpit on Calle Ledesma, Iloilo City. When the driver of the carromata had turned
his horse and started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta stepped
out into the street, and laying his hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at the same
time protesting to the driver that he himself had called the carromata first. The driver,
Julio Pagnaya, denied having heard the call of Araneta. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of
the bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta, in order that the carromata
might pass on. Owing, however, to the looseness of the bridle on the horse’s head or
to the rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse’s
mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out, which he did, in order to
find the bridle and fix such bridle.
The horse, being free from the control of the bit, became disturbed and move
forward and pushed Pagnaya until the carromata struck a police telephone box
causing it to crash and frightened the horse to such extent that he set out at full speed
up the street causing the death of Gayetano, who did not alighted prior as the latter
jumped or fell from the rig. The widow of Gayetano filed a complaint to recover
damages from Araneta.

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 Judge Southworth awarded damages to the plaintiff in the amount of Php
3,000.00, from which judgment the defendant appealed.

Issue:

Whether the act of Araneta stopping the horse was the proximate cause of the
accident which led to the death of Proceso Gayetano.

Held:
No. The mere fact that the defendant interfered with the carromata by
stopping the horse in the manner stated would not make him liable for the death of
Gayetano; because it is admitted by Pagnaya that he afterwards got out of the
carromata and went to the horse’s head to fix the bridle. The evidence is furthermore
convincing to the effect that, after Pagnaya alighted, the horse was conducted to the
curb and that an appreciable interval of time elapsed – same witnesses say several
minutes – before the horse started on his career up the street.
It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Araneta in the middle of
the street was too remote from the accident that recently ensued to be considered the
legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the
head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of
the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident
resulting from the cation of the horse thereafter.

iii. Agusan Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO) vs. Angelita Balen and
Spouses Lariosa
G.R. No. 173146 November 25, 2009
Justice Nachura Third Division

Facts:

In 1981, ANECO installed an electric post in Purok 4, Ata-atahon, Nasipit,

Agusan Del Norte, with its main distribution line of 13,000 kilovolts traversing

17
Angelita Balens (Balens) residence. Balens father, Miguel, protested the installation
with the District Engineers Office with ANECO but his protest just fell on deaf ears.
On July 25, 1992, Balen, Hercules Lariosa and Celestino Exclamado were
electrocuted while removing the television (TV) antenna from Balens residence. The
antenna pole touched ANECOs main distribution line which resulted in their
electrocution. Exclamado died instantly, while Balen and Lariosa suffered extensive
third degree burns.
Balen and Lariosa lodged a complaint for damages against ANECO with the RTC
of Butuan City.
The RTC rendered judgement in favor of the respondents and ordering ANECO to
pay damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Ruling. It declared
that the proximate cause of the accident could not have been the act or omission of
respondents, who were not negligent in taking down the antenna. Hence, the appeal to
the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the respondents was
ANECOs negligence in installing its main distribution line over Balens residence.

Held:

Yes. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, by reason of which such other person suffers injury.
The Supreme Court quoted the Court of Appeals finding on ANECOs
negligence:
One of the test for determining the existence of proximate cause is the
foreseeability test. Where the particular harm was reasonably foreseeable at the time
of the defendant’s misconduct, his act or omission is the legal cause thereof. To be
negligent, the defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an

18
ordinary reasonable man would have failed to act in such a way that an ordinary
reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were
unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risk which made the actors
conduct negligent, it is obviously the consequence for the actor must be held legally
responsible.
Thus applying the aforecited test, ANECO should have reasonably foreseen
that even if it complied with the clearance requirements under the Philippine
Electrical Code in installing the subject high tension wires above Miguel Balen’s
house, still a potential risk existed that people would get electrocuted, considering
that the wires were not insulated.
Clearly, ANECOs act of leaving unprotected and uninsulated the main
distribution line over Balens residence was the proximate cause of the incident which
claimed Exclamados life and injured respondent Balen and Lariosa.

4. Intervening Cause

a. Definition
In tort law, that which will relieve if liability for an injury, is an
independent cause which intervenes between the original wrongful act or
omission and the injury, turns aside the natural sequence of events, and
produces a result which would not otherwise have followed and which
could not have been reasonably anticipated (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th
Edition).

b. What is an efficient intervening cause?

An efficient intervening cause is a new and independent force
which breaks the causal connection between the original wrong and injury,
and itself becomes direct and immediate cause of an injury (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 5th Edition).

19
 c. When is an intervening cause regarded as the proximate cause?
An intervening cause will be regarded as the proximate cause and
the first cause as too remote, where the chain of events is so broken that
they become independent and the result cannot be said to be the
consequence of the primary cause (Aquino, Torts and Damages, 2005, p.
290).

d. Illustrative Case

Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
Justice Feliciano First Division

Facts:

At about 1:35 AM of November 15, 1975, Leonardo Dionisio was on his way
home from a cocktails – and – dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a
marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken “a
shot or two” of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far
from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights
suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on “bright” and thereupon he saw a Ford
dump truck looming some 2 ½ meters away from his car. The dump truck owned by
Phoenix Construction was parked on the right hand side of General lacuna Street facing
the oncoming traffic. It was parked askew partly blocking the oncoming traffic. No lights
or early warning devices were installed near the dump truck. It was driven home by
Amando Carbonel with the permission of his employer, Phoenix in view of the work
scheduled to be carried out he following morning.
Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left
but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result, Dionisio suffered
physical injuries, permanent facial scars and loss of two gold bridge dentures.

20
 Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent
manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer
Phoenix.
Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of
Dionisio’s injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident,
while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without curfew pass.
The trial court rendered judgement in favor of Dionisio and ordered Phoenix and
Carbonel jointly and severally liable to pay Dionisio damages. On appeal, the IAC
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether Dionisio’s negligence was an efficient intervening or independent cause which
produces his own injury.

Held:
No. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is
reasonably to be anticipated or one who which the defendant has reason to anticipate
under particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligence among other reasons
because of the failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that
reason.
Dionisio’s negligence, although later in point of time than tha truck driver’s
negligence and therefor closer to the accident was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an “intervening cause” was no more
than a foreseeable consequent manner which the truck driver had parked the dump truck.
In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and
others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk that the truck driver had
created. Dionisio’s negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to
cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump
truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.

21
B.TEST TO DETERMINE PROXIMITY CAUSE

Proximity Cause – Is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred.

Proximate - Is defined as “being in immediate relation with something else, next “and
“near “. Hence, the impression that is being given by the word is that it is the nearest cause.

Cause - Any occasion or condition upon the occurrence of which an event takes place.
- the reason that something happens.

Three requisites of test of determining proximity cause

a. Negligence
b. Damage
c. The causal connection between the damage and the negligent act or omission.

A. But – for the test or Sine qua test

Under this test, the defendant’s conduct is the cause in fact of the injury if the damage would not
have resulted had there been negligence on the part of the defendant.

22
Vda. De Bataclan et.al VS. Medina

GR. NO. L – 10126 October 22, 1957

102 Phil 181

Jurisprudence:

Art 1733 of the NCC provides common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reason
of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
and for the safety of the passenger transported by them, according to all the circumstances of
each cause.

Facts:

On the midnight of September 13, 1952, ConradoSylon driving a bus no. 30 own and
operated by defendant Mariano Medina left the town of Amadeo, Cavite going to Pasay City.
The bus is carrying eighteen passengers including the driver and conductor. At about 2:00
o’clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite,
one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig zag until it fell into canal on the right side
of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passenger managed to leave the bus the best way they
could, others had to helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver,
named Bataclan, Lara and Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could
not get out of the over turned bus. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying
a lighted torch made of bamboo fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approached the
overturned bus and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the
bus including the four passengers trapped inside it. That same day, the charred bodies of the four
doomed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified, especially that of Juan
Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her named and in behalf of her
five minor children, brought the suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in the total amount of Php. 87,150.00. after the trial, the
CFI of Cavite awarded Php. 1,000.00 to the plaintiffs, plus Php. 600.00 as attorney’s fees plus
Php. 100.00, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and

23
which was lost in the fire. The plaintiff and the defendants appealed the decision to the CA but
the latter endorsed the appeal to the SC because of the value involved in claim of the complaint.
RTC said that the damages awarded was for the injuries he suffered not for his death.

Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Juan Bataclan is due to the overturning of the
bus.

Ruling:
Yes, SC held that the proximity cause of death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus. The
SC said that there is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as
testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of
the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up
to the canal where the bus overturned, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The driver, after
the blow out, must haveapplied the brake in order to stop the bus. The Supreme Court hold that
the proximity cause of the death of Juan Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, thus for the
reason that when the vehicle turned
not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected. All in all, there reason to believe that the driver operated and drove his
vehicle negligently, resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical injuries to others,
and the complete loss and destruction of their goods.

B. Sufficient Link Test

This means that the existence of the cause insures that its effect also exists. This is stablished by
the plaintiff between the act or the omission and the damage or injury. The link must not be
remote or far-fetched, otherwise, no liability will attach.

24
Dy Teban Trading, Inc. VS Ching
GR. No. 161803, February 4, 2008
543 SCRA 560

Jurisprudence:

Article 2176 of the Civil Codes provides that whoever by act or omission causes damages to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-
delict.
Facts:
On July 4, 1995, at around 4:45 am, Rogelio Ortiz, with helper Romeo Catamora, was
driving a Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. along the national highway in
Barangay Sumilihon, Butuan City, going to Surigao City to deliver commercial ice to nearby
barangay and municipalities. A Joana Paula passenger bus driven by TemestoclesRelova was
cruising on the oppsite lane towards the van. In between the two vehicles was a parked prime
mover with a trailer, owned by private respondent Liberty Forest Inc. The night before, at around
10:00 pm. The prime mover with a trailer suffered a tire blowout. The driver, CresilitoLimbaga,
parked the prime mover askew occupying a substantial portion of the national highway, on the
lane of the passenger bus. The prime mover was not equipped with early warning device required
under letter of instruction no. 229. As substitute, Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on
the front and the rea portion of the prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming passenger bus
swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and
glaring headlight and approaching passenger bus. He pumped his brake slowly, swerved to the
left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime mover. The
passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover. Ortiz and Catamora suffered minor injuries while
the Nissan van became inoperable as a result of the incident. On October 31, 1995, petitioner
Nissan van owner filed a complaint for damages against private respondent prime mover owner
and driver with the RTC in Butuan City. The Joana Paula passenger bus owner was not
impleaded as defendant in the complaint. RTC favored petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. on its
decision dated August 7, 2001. RTC held that the proximity cause of the three-way vehicular

25
collision was the improper parking of the prime mover on the national highway and the absence
of an early warning device on the vehicle. RTC absolved Jose Ching of any liability as there is
no showing that he is the manager or CEO of the defendant Liberty Forest Inc., Private
respondent appealed to the CA and the latter on its decision dated August 28,2003 reversed the
RTC decision partly modified by absolving defendants/appellees of any liability
To plaintiff/ appellees by reason of the incident on July4, 1995. CA held that the proximity cause
of the vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan van to give way or yield to the right of
way of the passenger bus. Disagree with the RTC that the prime mover did not have an EWD.
CA cited Baliwag Transit vs. CA decision that he Supreme Court held that the lighted tin cans on
the front and rear may acts as substitute early warning device. The petitioner filed a petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the CA to the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan van to
give way or yield to the right of way of the passenger bus.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that the RTC ruled in the affirmative holding that the proximate
cause of the vehicular collision was the negligence of Limbaga in parking the prime mover on
the national highway without an early warning device on the vehicle. SC unable to agree with the
Court of Appeals conclusion “it would had been dangerous and quite impossible to further park
the prime mover on the graveled shoulder of the road because the prime mover may tilt and the
bulldozer may fall off”. According to the Supreme Court, the photograph taken after the
incidents shows that it could have been possible for Limbaga to park the prime mover
completely on the shoulder of the national highway road without the risk to oncoming motorist.
Limbaga failed to take proper steps to minimize the risk posed by the improperly parked prime
mover. Limbaga also did not immediately informs his employer, Liberty Forest Inc. that the
prime mover suffered two tire blowout and he could not have them fixed because he had only
one spare tire. Limbaga slept on the prime mover instead of standing guard beside the vehicle.
Limbaga also admitted that it was his first time to drive the prime mover with trailer loaded with

26
D-8 Caterpillar bulldozer. Liberty Forest, Inc. was also negligent in failing to supervise Limbaga
and in ensuing that the prime mover was in proper condition.

C. Substantial Factor Test

This test determines that the causes set in motion by the defendant must continue until the
moment of the damage or at least down the setting in motion of the final active injurious force
which immediately produced or preceded the damage.

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., vs IAC

GR. Nos. 66102-04, August 30, 1990

Jurisprudence:

Art. 1756 NCC provides that in case of death of or injuries to passenger, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they proved that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Article 1733 and 1755.

Facts:

At about 11:00 o’clock in the morning on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad
Pascua, AdelaidaEstomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedez Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida
Parejas boarded a jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven
by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to
spend Christmas at their respective homes. Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San manuel, Tarlac,
the right rear wheel of the jeepney was detached, so it was running in an unbalanced position.
Manalo step on the break, as a result of which, the jeepney which was then running on the
eastern lane (its right of way) made a u-turn, invading and eventually stopping on the western
lane of the road in such a manner that the jeepney’s front faced the south (from where it came)
and its rear faced the north (towards where it’s going). The jeepney practically occupied and

27
blocked the greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicle coming from
the north, among which was bus no. 753 of the petitioner Philppine Rabbit Bus lines, Inc. driven
by Tomas delos Reyes. After the stopping (jeepney) for a couple of minutes as claimed by
Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the
jeepney. As a result of the collision, three passengers of the jeepney (Catalina, Pascua, Erlinda
Meriales, and AdelaidaEstomo) died while the other jeepney passengers sustained injuries.
Complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the CFI of Pangasinan. In all the
cases, Spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo Rabbit and de los Reyes were all impleaded as
defendants. On December 27, 1978, the trial court rendered its decision finding Manalo
negligent. On appeal, the intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision reversing the trial
court decision by finding de los Reyes negligent. The motion for reconsideration was denied.
The petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. filed petition to the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the death and injuries suffered by the jeepney
passenger

Ruling:

Supreme court find defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred and dd not
even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident. Thus, the bus driver’s conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passenger of the jeepney, not only because he
was driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was the bus
which was physical force which brought about the injury and death to the passenger of the
jeepney. The jeepney left skid mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its rear wheel
was detached up to the point of collision. De los Reyes must have noticed the perilous condition
of the jeepney from the time its right rear wheel was detached or some 90 meters away,
considering that the road was straight and points 200 meters north and south of the point of
collision, visible and unobstructed.

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D. Mixed Consideration Test

Under this test, it composes logic, common sense policy and precedent.

Dy Teban Trading, Inc Vs. Ching

GR. NO. 161803, February 4, 2008

Jurisprudence:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.

Facts:

On July 4, 1995, at around 4:45 a.m., Rogelio Ortiz, with helper Romeo Catamura, was
driving a Nissan van Owned by the petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. along the National
Highway in Barangay Sumilihan, Butuan City, going to Surigao City delivering or to deliver
commercial ice to nearby barangays and Municipalities. A Joana Paula passenger bus was
cruising on the opposite lane towards the van. To avoid hitting the parked prime mover
occupying its lane, the incoming bus swerved to the right, on the lane of the approaching Nissan
Van. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring headlights and the approaching passenger bus. He pumped
his break slowly swerved to the left to avoid the incoming bus but the van hit the front of the
stationary prime mover which suffered a tire blowout at around 10:00 p.m. Ortiz and Catamora
only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan van become inoperable as a result of the incident. On
October 31, 1995, petitioner Nissan van Owner filed a complaint for damages against private
respondent prime mover owner and the driver CresilitoLimbaya with the RTC of Butuan City.
The Joana Paula passenger bus was not impleaded as defendant in the complaint. On August 7,
2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. RTC held
that the proximate cause of the tree way vehicular collision was improper parking of the Prime
Mover on the National Highway and the absence of an early warning device on the vehicle.
Private respondent appealed to the CA and on August 28, 2003, the CA reversed the RTC

29
decision. The latter held that the prosimate cause of the vehicular collision was the failure of the
Nissan van to give way or yield to the right of way of the passenger bus. Hence the petitioner
appealed to the SC the decision of the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether Limbaga, in parking the prime mover, used that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary reasonable person would have used in the same situation.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew
on the right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of the
national highway road on the lane of the passenger bus. It was parked at the shoulder of the road
with its left wheels still on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel
shoulder of the highway. It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime mover on the
national road posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists.

It was incumbent upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent the risk, or at least minimize
it. Limbaga failed to inform immediately his employer, private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc.,
that the prime mover suffered two tires blowouts and that he could not have them fixed because
he had only one spare tire. Worse Limbaga slept on the prime mover instead of standing guard
beside the vehicle. Private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc., was utterly negligent in allowing a
novice driver, like Limbaya, to operate a vehicle, such as a truck loaded with bulldozer, which
required highly specialized driving skills. The SC note a failure of implementation of basic
safety standards, particularly the law on early warning devices. This applies even more to trucks
and big vehicles, which are prone to mechanical breakdown on the national highway. The law
requires vehicles to be equipped with triangular reflectorized plates.

30
5. Cause and Condition

Cause – any occasion or condition upon the occurrence of which an event takes place.
The reason that something happen.

-active aspect of the harm.

Condition – is the passive action that may produce the injury.

Phoenix Construction, Inc vs. IAC

GR.NO. L-65295, March 10, 1987

Jurisprudence:

Aritcle 2179 of the New Civil Code provides that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to
be awarded.

Facts:

On November 15, 1975 at about 1:30 a.m., private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on
his way home to Makati from a cocktail-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager
of the marketing corporation. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the
intersection of General Laccina and General Santos street at Bangkat, Makati, not far from his
home, and procedding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlight (in his allegation)
suddenly failed. He switched his headlight on bright and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck ,
owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix construction Inc was parked on the

31
right side of General Lacuna street at about 2 ½ meters away from his car. The dump truck was
parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There
were no lights nor any early warning reflector device set anywhere near the dump truck, front or
rear. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was
too late and his car smashed into the dump truck driven by Armando Carbonel. As a result of the
collision, Dionision suffered some physical injuries including some permanent scars. Dionisio
commenced an action for damages in the CFI of Pampanga claiming that the legal and proximate
cause of his injuries was the negligent manner n which Carbonel had parked the dump truck
entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. The trial court rendered in favor of Dionisio and
Against Phoenix and Carbonel. Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the intermediate Appellate
Court and the latter affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified award of damages.

Issue:

Whether or not the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio’s injury was the
wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked.

Ruling:

Yes. Supreme Court agree with the CFI and the IAC that the legal and proximate cause of
accident and of Dionisio’s injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked – in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a
reasonable relationship between petionerCarbonel’s negligence on the hand and the accident and
respondent’s injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in slightly different manner, the
collision Dionisio’s car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
truck driver’s negligence. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent’s car
would in all probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without
any warning lights or reflector devices. Dionisio’s negligence was only contributory, that the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury remained the truck driver’s lack of due care and
that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to

32
mitigation by the courts ( art. 2179 NCC). The circumstances that Phoenix had allowed its truck
driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done earl;y the
following morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of phoenix to
supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is
an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of phoenix

6 . Last Clear Chance

a. History and Rationale

During the advent of the nineteenth century when a defendant was liable in damages for
harm caused to a plaintiff by the defendants negligent conduct. And shortly this liability was
subjected to the qualification that a plaintiffs negligence, if contributory to harm resulting from
the defendants negligent conduct, was a complete bar to recover damages. This doctrine is the
principle of Butterfield v. Forrester (1809).Then the rule was evolved which denied the defence
if the defendants negligence was later, in point of time, than that of the plaintiff. This rule is
Davies v. Mann(1842).

Consequently text writers, courts ,stressed the time element , and provided an alternative
description of the exception to the contributory negligence bar under the name of the " Last Clear
Chance doctrine".

b. Statement of the Rule

Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts that is employed in contributory
negligence. Where a negligent plaintiff can nonetheless recover damages if he is able to show or
prove that the defendant had the last opportunity to avoid accident.

33
 In addition ,the doctrine is also called a defence to a defence because even if the
defendant can prove a defence to its contributory negligence, a plaintiff may still have a chance
to receive damages in a personal injury lawsuit by using the last clear chance doctrine.

Five (5) elements that must be proven to show that the defendant had the last clear chance.

1. The plaintiff placed themselves in the situation of danger because of their own negligence.

2. The plaintiff could not avoid the danger.

3. The defendant recognized the dangerous situation and had a duty to avoid it.

4. The defendant failed to avoid danger despite having an opportunity to avoid it.

5. As a result of the defendant not avoiding the danger, the plaintiff was injured.

Three (3) Instances where the doctrine of last clear chance cannot apply. Noted in the case of
Ong vs. Metropolitan Water Distric, 104 Phil 398.

1. Negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant.

2. Party charged is required to act instantaneously.

3. Injury cannot be avoided despite the application at all times of all the means to avoid the
injury, at least in all instances where the previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said
to have contributed to the injury at all.

In conclusion the rule cannot be used or invoked when the negligence of the plaintiff is
concurrent with the negligence of the defendant . It will be noted that the negligent acts of the
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval.

34
C. Application

1. Picart vs. Smith - G.R. no. L-12219 , March 15,1918

Facts:

- Plaintiff Picart himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in the wrong side of the road.

- Defendant Smith without slowing down his car passed closely to the horse later being
freighted , and was killed by the passing car.

Issue:

- Whether or not the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous.

Ruling:

-The negligence of smith succeeded the negligence of Picart with enough interval.

-Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do so (Smith) is chargeable with consequences, without
reference to the negligence of Picart who is the other party.

2. Glan Peoples Lumber and Hardware vs. IAC. G.R no. 70493 , May 18 ,1989

Facts:

-This is a case similar to the case of Picart v. Smith. The difference is only minimal.
Where this time two automobile are involved in an accident and where the supposed plaintiff the
driver of the jeep died.

35
 -Engr. Calibo driver of the jeep who died in the vehicular accident were represented by
surviving spouse and children who fitted a case as plaintiff and later or joined by the IAC
respondents.

-Zacarias the driver of the cargo truck was unharmed is the defendant and later as
petitioner.

-Both drivers had a full view each other vehicle from a distance of 150 meters. The truck
stopped while the jeep was still 30 meters away. The truck is deemed to be occupying the jeeps
lane.

Issue:

- Whether or not the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called last clear
chance to avoid the accident, while still at the distance of thirty meters from the truck.

Ruling:

-Engr. Calibo could have avoid the collision by stopping his jeep away from the truck,
either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at speed of 30 km/h.

- In those circumstance, his duty was seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely
or a supposed right to expect the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.

3. Canlas v. CA Gr.no. 112160 - Feb. 28,2000

Facts:

-This case shows that the applicability of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is not applied
to automobile accidents but also to contracts or quasi-contracts.

36
 -In this case Canlas as the petitioner was negligent in giving Monasa the opportunity to
perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting him the owners copy of the transfer certificates of title of
subject parcels of land."Antecedent Negligence"

-(ASB) Asian saving Bank beans the loss. Supervening Negligence when failing to
perform the simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements for banks to
ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them.

Issue:

- Whether or not it is clear that the ASB had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm but failed to do so when ASB as a bank did not have a degree of diligence more
than that of a good father of a family.

Ruling:

-not even a single identification card was exhibited by the said impostors to show their
true identity.

Applicable provisions.

Art. 1171 . Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any
waiver of an action for future fraud is void.

- refers to incidental fraud which is employed in the fulfilment of an obligation.

Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted
in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach
of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the
time the obligation was constituted.

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consist in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the

37
persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
Art.1171 and 2201, ph. 2 shall apply.

In conclusion the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of

damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had last clear chance by the
exercise of due diligence.

LAST CLEAR CHANCE CASE: When not applicable

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and L.C. DIAZ and COMPANY, CPAs, respondents.
G.R. No. 138569, September 11, 2003

FACTS:
In March 1976, L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank. On 14 August 1991,
L.C. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya, filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for
P990 and a savings (checks) deposit slip for P50. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C.
Diaz, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the
Solidbank passbook.
Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the
passbook. The teller acknowledged the receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the
duplicate copies of the two deposit slips. Teller No. 6 stamped the deposit slips with the words
“DUPLICATE” and “SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE.” Since the
transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank,
he left the passbook with Solidbank. Calapre then went to Allied Bank. When Calapre returned

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to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that “somebody got the
passbook.” Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya.
Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with a check of P200,000.
Macaraya and Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the deposit slip and
check. The teller stamped the words “DUPLICATE” and “SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK
HEAD OFFICE” on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip. When Macaraya asked for the
passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that someone got the passbook but she could not
remember to whom she gave the passbook. When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the
passbook, Teller No. 6 answered that someone shorter than Calapre got the passbook. Calapre
was then standing beside Macaraya.
The following day L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before (14
August 1991) of P300,000 from itssavings account. The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore
the signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo.
The signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received
the P300,000.
L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank refused. L.C.
Diaz filed a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank. The trial court
absolved Solidbank. L.C. Diaz appealed to the CA. CA reversed the ecision of the trial court. CA
denied the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank. But it modified its decision by deleting the
award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case.

HELD:
No."Where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than
that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the
loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable
with the loss."

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The court do not apply the doctrine .Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence
in the performance of its contractual obligation to LC Diaz. This is a case of culpa contractual,
where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the
loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability. Since LC Diaz was guilty of contributory
negligence, Solidbank's liability should be reduced.

EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE, in her own behalf as Guardian-Ad-Litem of minors:

ROSSEL, GLORIA, YOLANDA, ERIC SON and EDERIC, all surnamed
BUSTAMANTE, Spouses SALVADOR JOCSON and PATRIA BONE-JOCSON, Spouses
JOSE RAMOS and ENRIQUETA CEBU-RAMOS, Spouses NARCISO-HIMAYA and
ADORACION MARQUEZ-HIMAYA, and Spouses JOSE BERSAMINA and MA.
COMMEMORACION PEREA-BUSTAMANTE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FEDERICO DEL PILAR AND
EDILBERTO MONTESIANO,respondents.
G.R. No. 89880, February 6, 1991

FACTS:
A collision occurred between a gravel and sand truck, and a Mazda passenger bus along
the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body
of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the
driver's seat to the last rear seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown
out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained.

Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching
each other, coming from the opposite directions of the highway. While the truck was still about
30 meters away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also
observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due to his
belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in
order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the
road, in order to overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the
shoulder of the highway. While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the hand
tractor and the truck was approaching the bus, the two vehicles sideswiped each other at each

40
other's left side. After the impact, the truck skidded towards the other side of the road and landed
on a nearby residential lot, hitting a coconut tree and felling it."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the last clear chance can apply making the bus negligent in failing to
avoid the collision and his act in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate cause
of the collision making him solely liable.

HELD:
No. The principle of "last clear chance" applies "in a suit between the owners and drivers
of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier
to enforce its contractual obligations.
Furthermore, "as between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint
tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by
reason of his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as between defendants
concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that
another had negligently failed to take action which could have avoided the injury."

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ROGELIO ENGADA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former Fourteenth Division, Manila, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
G.R. No. 140698, June 20, 2003

FACTS:
Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamarawjeepney with the owner Sheila Seyan as
passenger.
The speeding Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Rogelio Engada came from the opposing direction
and swerved to its left encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw. In attempt to avoid the pick-
up, Seyan shouted at Iran to swerve to the left but the Engada also swerved to its right hitting the
Tamaraw at its right front passenger side causing its head and chassis to separate from its body.

Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. Seyan and Iran were
brought to Barotac Nuevo Medicare Hospital. Seyan suffered a fracture on the right femur,
lacerated wound on the right foot, multiple contusions, abrasions, blunt abdominal injury, and
lacerations of the upper-lower pole of the right kidney. Upon discharge, she Seyan incurred
P130,000 in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamarawjeepney ended up in the junk heap totalling
a loss of P80,000.

Engada alleged that he is not liable considering that he already relayed his intention to go
back to his lane by flashing the pick-up’s right signal light. He submits that at that moment Iran,
the driver of the Tamaraw, had no more reason to swerve to his left.

ISSUE:
Whether or not under the doctrine of last clear chance Iran is liable.

HELD:
No. For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles
abandoning their lane, petitioner must be held liable.

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 Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he swerved to his left.
Petitioner’s acts had put Iran in an emergency situation which forced him to act quickly. An
individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without
much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.

The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.But as already stated
on this point, no convincing evidence was adduced by petitioner to support his invocation of the
abovecited doctrine. Instead, what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the
proper application of the emergency rule. Petitioner’s act of swerving to the Tamaraw’s lane at a
distance of 30 meters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached the
Tamaraw, denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no clear
chance to speak of.

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