PALE – PART 5
duplicate of the OCT. Once again, complainant refused
MIRANDA VS ATTY CARPIO
FACTS: Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the
owners of a parcel of land consisting of 1,890 square
meters located at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Piñas,
Metro Manila. In 1994, complainant initiated Land
Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. M-226 for the
registration of the aforesaid property. The case was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch
275. During the course of the proceedings, complainant
engaged the services of respondent Atty. Carpio as
counsel in the said case when his original counsel, Atty.
Samuel Marquez, figured in a vehicular accident. In
complainant's Affidavit,[2] complainant and respondent
agreed that complainant was to pay respondent Twenty
Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and
Two Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee.
Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him, as
evidenced by receipts duly signed by the latter. During the
last hearing of the case, respondent demanded the
additional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(PhP10,000.00) for the preparation of a memorandum,
which he said would further strengthen complainant's
position in the case, plus twenty percent (20%) of the total
area of the subject property as additional fees for his
services. Complainant did not accede to respondent's
demand for it was contrary to their agreement. Moreover,
complainant co-owned the subject property with his
siblings, and he could not have agreed to the amount being
demanded by respondent without the knowledge and
approval of his co-heirs. As a result of complainant's
refusal to satisfy respondent's demands, the latter became
furious and their relationship became sore.
On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered which
transmitted the decree of registration and the original and
owner's duplicate of the title of the property. On April 3,
2000, complainant went to the RD to get the owner's
duplicate of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to discover that the
same had already been claimed by and released to
respondent on March 29, 2000. On May 4, 2000,
complainant talked to respondent on the phone and asked
him to turn over the owner's duplicate of the OCT, which
he had claimed without complainant's knowledge,
consent and authority. Respondent insisted that
complainant first pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20%
share in the property equivalent to 378 square meters, in
exchange for which, respondent would deliver the owner's
the demand, for not having been agreed upon. On June 26,
2000, complainant learned that on April 6, 2000,
respondent registered an adverse claim on the subject
OCT wherein he claimed that the agreement on the
payment of his legal services was 20% of the property
and/or actual market value. To date, respondent has not
returned the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 to
complainant and his co-heirs despite repeated demands to
effect the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Carpio has violated Canon
20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if
the presence of the following elements concur: (1)
lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the
client's funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied
claim for attorney's fees. Further, the attorney's retaining
lien is a general lien for the balance of the account
between the attorney and his client, and applies to the
documents and funds of the client which may come into
the attorney's possession in the course of his employment.
As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof
of any agreement between the complainant and the
respondent that the latter is entitled to an additional
professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area
covered by OCT No. 0-94.
Clearly, there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees
that would entitle respondent to retain his client's
property. Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to
complainant's title with the obvious aim of forcing
complainant to agree to the amount of attorney's fees
sought is an alarming abuse by respondent of the exercise
of an attorney's retaining lien, which by no means is an
absolute right, and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in
the delivery of money and property to his client when due
or upon demand. Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his
duties as a lawyer by unlawfully withholding and failing
to deliver the title of the complainant, despite repeated
demands, in the guise of an alleged entitlement to
additional professional fees. He has breached Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Further, in collecting from
complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon
1
20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates that “a lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees.” It is highly improper for a lawyer to
impose additional professional fees upon his client which
were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the
engagement of his services.
The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is
employed without a price agreed upon for his services. In
such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits
for his services, as much as he has earned. Respondent's
further submission that he is entitled to the payment of
additional professional fees on the basis of the principle
of quantum meruit has no merit. "Quantum meruit,
meaning `as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for
determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence
of a contract but recoverable by him from his client." In
the present case, the parties had already entered into an
agreement as to the attorney's fees of the respondent, and
thus, the principle of quantum meruit does not fully find
application because the respondent is already
compensated by such agreement.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is
ordered to RETURN to the complainant the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 immediately upon receipt of
this decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely
COJUANGCO VS ATTY PALMA
FACTS:
The complainant Eduardo Cojuangco is a client of
ACCRA, w h o a s s i g n e d t h e c a s e t o A t t y .
P a l m a , t h e respondent. The former hired
the latter as his personal counsel for his
business. Atty. Palma becomes very close to the
family of Cojuangco, and he dines and goes with
them abroad. He even tutored, complainant’s 22 -
year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa).
On June 22, 1982, respondent married Lisa in
Hongkong without the knowledge of the
complainant and despite the facts that the former
is already m a r r i e d a n d w i t h t h r e e ( 3 )
children.
C o m p l a i n a n t s e n d s h i s t w o s o n s t o persuade
Lisa to go home with them, which she did.
In the celebration of respondent’s marriage with Lisa
he misrepresented himself as a bachelor.
On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of
First Instance, a petition for declaration of nullity
of the marriage.
Subsequently complainant filed a disbarment
complaint on the ground of grave abuse and betrayal
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Respondent in his answer filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of cause of action. As he contends that complaint
fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct or violation of his lawyer’s oath.
On March 23, 1983, the case was referred to the OSG
Dec 28, 1983,the 1st division of this court declared the
marriage between respondent and Lisa null and void ab
initio;
On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an
Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings[10] on the ground
that the final outcome of Civil Case No. Pq0401-P poses
a prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding. It
was denied.
Respondent sought refuge in this Court through an Urgent
Motion for Issuance of a Restraining Order.[11] In the
Resolution dated December 19, 1984, we enjoined the
OSG from continuing the investigation of the disbarment
proceedings.[12]
(1998)The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline.
Commissioner issued the following order: Considering
the length of time that this case has remained pending and
as a practical measure to ease the backlog of this
Commission, the parties shall within ten (10) days from
notice, manifest whether or not they are still interested in
prosecuting this case or supervening events have
transpired which render this case moot and academic or
otherwise, this case shall be deemed closed and
terminated.[13]
2
complainant manifested and confirmed his continuing
interest in prosecuting his complaint for disbarment
against respondent.
On the other hand, respondent sought several
postponements of hearing on the ground that he needed
more time to locate vital documents in support of his
defense. The scheduled hearing of December 4, 2001 was
reset for the last time on January 24, 2002, with a warning
that should he fail to appear or present deposition, the case
will be deemed submitted for resolution.[15] Respondent
again failed to appear on January 24, 2002; hence, the
case was considered submitted for resolution
ISSUE:
WON the civil case (validity of his marriage to Lisa)
poses a prejudicial question to the present disbarment
proceeding.
WON respondent’s acts constitute deceit, malpractice,
gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct and
violation of his oath as a lawyer that would warrant his
disbarment. YES!
RULING:
1. NO. A subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage
has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. For
it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather
an investigation by the court into the conduct of its
officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal
action is not determinative of an administrative case
against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a
disbarment case does not affect its course,[ then the
judgment of annulment of respondents marriage does not
also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually
committed. So long as the quantum of proof --- clear
preponderance of evidence --- in disciplinary proceedings
against members of the bar is met, then liability
attaches.[36]
2. YES.There is no question that respondent as a lawyer,
is well versed in the law, fully well that in marrying Maria
Luisa he was entering into a bigamous marriage defined
and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. The respondent betrayed the trust reposed in him
by complainant. He was treated as part of the family and
was allowed to tutor Maria Luisa. For the foregoing
reasons, it is submitted that respondent committed grossly
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and
it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years and which
later lessen to one (1) year. According to IBP:“At the
outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not
prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members.
There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his
private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another. Thus, not only his professional
activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may
reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of
the profession and the courts, may at any time be the
subject of inquiry on the part of the proper
authorities.”Professional competency alone does not
make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral
character is always an indispensable requirement. The
interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, is that they shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct
ANITA PENA VS ATTY PATERNO
FACTS:
Anita C. Peña personally knew Atty. Christina C. Paterno
as respondent was her lawyer in a legal separation case,
which she filed against her husband and the
aforementioned property was her share in their property
settlement. Complainant stated that she also knew
personally one Estrella D. Kraus, as she was respondent’s
trusted employee who did secretarial work for respondent.
Paterno suggested that she (complainant) apply for a loan
from a bank to construct townhouses on her property for
sale to interested buyers, and that her property be offered
as collateral. Paterno assured Peña that she would work
out the speedy processing and release of the loan. Peña
discovered that her apartment was already demolished,
and in its place, four residential houses were constructed
on her property, which she later learned was already
owned by one Ernesto D. Lampa, who bought her
property from Estrella D. Kraus.
Complainant learned that her property was sold to
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., and respondent was the
Notary Public before whom the sale was acknowledged.
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., through its Managing
3
Partner, Estrella D. Kraus, sold the same to one Ernesto
D. Lampa.
Complainant stated in her Complaint that she did not sell
her property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., and that
she neither signed any deed of sale in its favor nor
appeared before respondent to acknowledge the sale. She
alleged that respondent manipulated the sale of her
property.
Respondent alleged that complainant took hold of the
Deed of Sale. Complainant allegedly told respondent that
she would inform respondent when the transaction was
completed so that the Deed of Sale could be recorded in
the Notarial Book. Thereafter, respondent claimed that
she had no knowledge of what transpired between
complainant and the Spouses Kraus. Respondent stated
that she was never entrusted with complainant’s
certificate of title. Moreover, it was only complainant who
negotiated the sale of her property. According to
respondent, complainant’s inaction for eight years to
verify what happened to her property only meant that she
had actually sold the same, and that she concocted her
story when she saw the prospect of her property had she
held on to it. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the
case.
ISSUE:
WON Paterno should be disbarred.
HELD:
YES. Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended for any
deceit or dishonest act, thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme
Court on what grounds. – A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a
wilfull disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Given the facts of this case, wherein respondent was in
possession of complainant’s copy of the certificate of title
to the property in Marikina, and it was respondent who
admittedly prepared the Deed of Sale, which complainant
denied having executed or signed, the important evidence
of the alleged forgery of complainant’s signature on the
Deed of Sale and the validity of the sale is the Deed of
Sale itself. However, a copy of the Deed of Sale could not
be produced by the Register of Deeds of Marikina City,
as it could not be located in the general files of the
registry, and a certification was issued stating that the
Deed of Sale may be considered lost. Moreover,
respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the
RTC of Manila her Notarial Report for the month of
November 1986, including the said Deed of Sale, which
was executed on November 11, 1986.
Hence, Investigating Commissioner Sordan opined that it
appears that efforts were exerted to get rid of the copies
of the said Deed of Sale to prevent complainant from
getting hold of the document for the purpose of
handwriting verification from an expert to prove that her
alleged signature on the Deed of Sale was forged. The
failure of respondent to submit to the proper RTC Clerk
of Court her Notarial Register/Report for the month of
November 1986 and a copy of the Deed of Sale, which
was notarized by her within that month, has far-reaching
implications and grave consequences, as it in effect
suppressed evidence on the veracity of the said Deed of
Sale and showed the deceitful conduct of respondent to
withhold the truth about its authenticity. During her
testimony, it was observed by the Investigating
Commissioner and reflected in the transcript of records
that respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny
that she notarized the said Deed of Sale. For the
aforementioned deceitful conduct, respondent is disbarred
from the practice of law. As a member of the bar,
respondent failed to live up to the standards embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the
following Canons:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of theland and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
4
Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
DISPOSITION: Respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is
DISBARRED
UMAGUING VS ATTY DE VERA
FACTS: Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman
but lost to her rival. Complainants lodged an election
protest and engaged in the services of Atty. De Vera.
According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera moved at a
glacial pace; he rushed the preparation of the documents
and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these
attachments are the Affidavits of material witnesses,
which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the
time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed
by the witnesses, they were unavailable. To remedy this,
Atty. De Vera look for the nearest kin of the witnesses and
ask them to sign and he had all the documents notarized.
He hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge
that the affidavits were falsified. In further breach of his
oath, the integrity and competency of Atty. De Vera, the
complainants withdraw him and for lack of trust and
confidence in as their counsel. Complainants sought Atty.
De Vera’s disbarment.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held
administratively liable.
Whether or not a case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that, fundamental
is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the
courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with
integrity, and trustworthy. Xxx The Lawyer’s Oath
enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land
but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of
court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and
to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well
as to his clients. xxx In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
“[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.”
Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s
Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified
document before a court. Disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is
granted the privilege to practice law in this country should
remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath.
Yes. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the
facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is
premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil
action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice
from the official administration of persons unfit to
practice in them. xxx The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice.
TAN VS ATTY BELTRAN
”Before this Court is an administrative complaint against
respondent, Atty. Nestor B. Beltran. His derelictions
allegedly consisted of his belated filing of an appeal in a
criminal case and failure to relay a court directive for the
payment of docket fees in a civil case to his clients -
complainants Heirs of Sixto L. Tan, Sr. represented by
Recto A. Tan. The latter also accused him of unduly
receiving ₱200,000 as payment for legal services.”
FACTS : After agreeing to pay attorney's fees of
₱200,000, complainants engaged the services of
5
respondent counsel for the filing of cases to recover their
commercial properties valued at approximately ₱30
million. Complainants filed a criminal action for
falsification of public documents and use of falsified
documents against Spouses Melanio and Nancy Fernando
and Sixto Tan, Jr., this case was dismissed by the
provincial prosecutor of Albay.
Respondent was notified of the order of dismissal. He
filed an appeal via a Petition for Review before the
Secretary of the Department of Justice (SOJ). It was,
however, filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period to
perfect an appeal. The SOJ dismissed the belated Petition
for Review. Respondent no longer filed a motion for
reconsideration to remedy the ruling.
Complainants instituted a related civil suit to annul the
sale of their commercial properties before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City. After being given ₱7,000
by his clients, respondent tasked his secretary to pay the
docket fees computed at ₱1,722. Unfortunately, the Clerk
of Court erred in the assessment of the docket fees. To
correct the error, the RTC required the payment of
additional docket fees through an Order which respondent
received. However, two weeks earlier, he had moved to
withdraw as counsel with the conformity of his clients.
No separate copy of the Order was sent to any of the
complainants.
The balance of the docket fees remained unpaid. The RTC
dismissed the civil case, citing the nonpayment of docket
fees as one of its bases. Complainants wrote this Court a
letter-complaint asking that disciplinary actions be meted
out to respondent. They likewise contended that he had
unduly received ₱200,000 as attorney's fees, despite his
failure to render effective legal services for them. As for
the dismissal of the civil action for nonpayment of docket
fees, respondent disclaimed any fault on his part, since he
had already withdrawn as counsel in that
case.1âwphi1Anent his receipt of ₱200,000 as attorney's
fees, respondent denied collecting that amount. He only
admitted that he had received ₱30,000 to cover expenses
for "the preparation of the complaints, docket fee,
affidavits, and other papers needed for the filing of the
said cases."13 He did not deny his receipt of ₱7,000 for
fees and other sundry expenses, of which ₱l,722 had
already been paid to the Clerk of Court for docket fees. In
any event, Atty. Beltran argued that ₱200,000 as
attorney's fees was inadequate, considering that the
property under dispute was worth ₱30 million.
This Court referred the administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.IBP found respondent guilty
of neglect in handling the criminal case and recommended
his suspension from the practice of law for three months.
ISSUES:
Whether respondent neglected legal matters entrusted to
him when he belatedly filed an appeal before the SOJ,
resulting in the dismissal of LS. No. 2001-03 7
Whether respondent is guilty of violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and other ethical standards
for failing to inform complainants of the RTC Order to
pay the balance of the docket fees in Civil Case No. 2001-
0329
Whether respondent unduly received ₱200,000 as
attorney's fees
RULING:
The Court set aside the unsubstantiated recommendation
of the IBP Board of Governors. Its resolutions are only
recommendatory and always subject to this Court’s
review.
In the first issue:
The Court ruled that failure of the counsel to appeal
within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and
malpractice. The Court elucidated that per Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable." In the case at bar, respondent similarly admits
that he failed to timely file the Petition for Review before
the SOJ. As a result of his delayed action, his clients lost
the criminal case. this Court sanctions him for belatedly
filing an appeal.
In the second issue:
Respondent argues that he was no longer bound to inform
complainants of the RTC Order requiring the payment of
full docket fees, given that he had already moved to
withdraw as counsel with the conformity of the latter. We
find that argument unjustified. Taking into consideration
the attendant circumstances herein vis-à-vis the
6
aforementioned administrative cases decided by this
Court, we deem it proper to impose on Atty. Beltran a
two-month suspension from the practice of law for
belatedly filing an appeal before the SOJ. We also
admonish him to exercise greater care and diligence in the
performance of his duty to administer justice.
In the third issue:
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of
proof required is preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
adduced by one side is superior to or has greater weight
than that of the other. The Investigating Commissioner
did not explain the recommendation for the restitution of
that sum. Moreover, complainants do not contest that
respondent received this sum for fees and other sundry
expenses. Neither do the records show that they
demanded the return of this amount from respondent. In
consideration of these facts, the proper corrective action
is to order the accounting of the full sum of ₱35,278.
TULIO VS ATTY BUHANGIN
FACTS: Arthur Tulio has been acquainted with Atty.
Buhangin even prior to the latter becoming a lawyer as he
was the surveyor who prepared survey plans for the
complainant in connection with the estate left by his
mother. On June 29, 2000, by virtue of Tulio’s agreement
with his siblings, Atty. Buhangin prepared and notarized
a Deed of Waiver of Rights signed by all of Tulio’s
siblings in his favour. Thereafter, Tulio engaged the
services of Atty. Buhangin to represent him in filing a
civil case before the RTC Baguio. Through his efforts,
Tulio claims that he and the defendants in said agreed to
a settlement and that he exclusively paid the defendants.
On December 10, 2005, Atty. Buhangin represented
Tulio’s siblings and filed a complaint against him over
legal matters which he entrusted to him. The complaint
was for the rescission of the deed of waiver of rights
which the lawyer himself prepared and notarized. Tulio
claimed that Atty. Buhangin made misrepresentations in
the complaint since he know beforehand that his siblings
waived their rights over the parcel of land they inherited
and even before such recent case was filed.
Tulio filed a Motion to Disqualiy Atty. Buhangin for his
unethical conduct in gross violation of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer. The lawyer subsequently
filed a Motion to Withdraw counsel on the ground of
conflict of interest. Tulio alleged that the actions of
Buhangin were deliberate and intentional in order to serve
his own personal interesent against the interest of his
clients. Thus this complaint for disbarment was filed.
Atty. Buhangin, in his Comment, admitted that he had
been engaged as legal counsel of the Estate of Angeline
Tulio and represented the sublings. However, he asserted
that his legal representation was neither personal nor
directed in favor of Complainant Tulio alone but instead
in the latter’s capacity as an heir of Angeline. He disputed
that Tulio personally engaged his services as a counsel
and insisted that his legal representation was made for and
in behalf of all the heirs. He also alleged that Tulio abused
the confidence given by his siblings by executing the deed
of waiver of rights in his favour for the purpose of
depriving them of their lawful shares. He maintained that
there was no conflict of interest when he filed the
complaint for the declaration of nullity of the waiver of
rights as he was in fact merely protecting the interests of
the other heirs of Angeline Tulio.
ISSUE: Whether, in representing the heirs of Angeline
Tulio, Atty. Buhangin did not personally represent Tulio
alone, and thus is not precluded from representing Tulio’s
siblings in a case against him
HELD
No. Under Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, it is explicit that a lawyer is
prohibited from representing new clients whose interests
oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or
not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the
principles of public policy and good taste. It behooves
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties.
7
The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his
duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when
he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require
the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect
his first client in any matter in which he represents him
and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.
Atty. Buhangin's allegation that he represents for and in
behalf of the Heirs of Angeline Tulio and not personal or
exclusive to complainant cannot be given any
credence. First, Atty. Buhangin himself admitted in
his Motion to Withdraw that he was withdrawing his
appearance in Civil Case No. 6185 against Tulio due to
conflict of interest. Secondly, it cannot be denied that
there was an exclusive attorney-client relationship
between Tulio and Atty. Buhangin as evidenced by the
demand letters which Atty. Buhangin prepared
specifically as counsel of Tulio. Thirdly, as correctly
observed by the IBP, other than his bare assertion that he
was representing the estate and the Heirs of Angeline
Tulio, Atty. Buhangin failed to satisfactorily show any
circumstance that he was actually representing the Heirs
of Angeline Tulio and not solely for Tulio.
Also, in both Civil Case No. 4866-R (Heirs of Angeline
S. Tulio represented by Arthur S. Tulio vs. Heirs of
Artemio Patacsil) and Civil Case No. 6185-R (Deogracias
S. Tulio, et al. vs. Arthur Tulio), the subject property
under dispute, particularly TCT No. T-67145, is one and
the same. This is also the same subject property of the
Deed of Waiver of Rights which the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 6185-R have executed and signed in favor of
Tulio, which Atty. Buhangin later on used against Tulio.
Clearly, the series of Atty. Buhangin's actions in
protecting the rights and interest of Tulio over the subject
property before and after the filing of Civil Case No.
4866-R, to the preparation of the Deed of Waiver of
Rights in favor of Tulio runs counter and in conflict to his
subsequent filing of Civil Case No. 6185-R and his
imputation of fraud against Tulio. There is no question
that Atty. Buhangin took an inconsistent position when he
filed Civil Case No. 6185-R against Tulio whom he has
defended and protected as client in the past. Even if the
inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if he
has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent
conflicting interests, it is still in violation of the rule of
conflict of interest.
Atty. Buhangin was held guilty of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15
of the CPR and was suspended from the practice of law
for a period of 6 months with a warning.
RAMISCAL VS ATTY ORRO
Facts: Complainants engaged in the legal services of
respondent to handle a case in which they were defendants
seeking the declaration of nullity of title to a parcel of land
in Isabela. Respondent received P10,000 acceptance fee
from them and handled the trial of their case until RTC
decided in their favor. Plaintiffs appeals to the CA to
which the respondent requested from the complainants an
additional P30,000 for the preparation and submission of
their appellee’s brief in the CA. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC but the respondent did not inform the
complainants. They had trouble communicating with
respondent. When they finally reached him, he requested
for an additional P7,000 as fee for filing a motion for
reconsideration which he did not file. Complainants lost
their property measuring 8.479 hectares with a probable
worth of P3,391,600.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent may be suspended
from the practice of law due to his gross misconduct.
Held:
While complainants and respondent did not appear during
the mandatory conferences set by IBP, the IBP found that
the respondent violated Canon 18, Rules 18.03 of the
Code. The Court agreed with the IBP’s findings that
8
respondent did not competently and diligently discharge
his duties as the lawyer of Ramiscals. The Court believes
that the respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath which
contravenes the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Canon 17 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
Canon 18. He failed to discharge his burdens to the best
of his knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity
to his clients and his unexplained disregard of the orders
issued to him by the IBP to comment and to appear in the
administrative investigation of his conduct revealed his
irresponsibility and disrespect for the IBP.
MALABED VS ATTY DE LA PENA
Facts: In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007,
complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for
“deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood” that
“misled the Court.” First, complainant claimed that the
Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed by
respondent refers to a different complaint, that is the
complaint filed by complainant’s brother against
Fortunato Jadulco. In effect, there was no Certificate to
File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil
action, in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of
his client Fortunato Jadulco.
Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not
furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but
respondent forwarded a copy to the Court of Appeals.
Complainant claimed that she could not properly defend
herself without a copy of the title. She further claimed that
the title presented by respondent was fabricated. To
support such claim, complainant presented Certifications
from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the Registry of Deeds in Naval,
Biliran, allegedly confirming that there is no file in their
offices of OCT No. 1730.
Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of
conflict of interest when he represented the occupants of
the lot owned by complainant’s family, who previously
donated a parcel of land to the Roman Catholic Church,
which deed of donation respondent notarized.
Complainant further accused respondent of conniving
with Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naval, Biliran, Branch
16 Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in an
administrative case, to rule in his clients’ favor.
Complainant narrated the outcomes in the “cases of
Estrellers which were filed in the [Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC)] and reversed by the RTC, in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction to favor respondent and his
client/s”.
Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct
when he defied the accessory penalty of his dismissal as
a judge. Respondent worked as Associate Dean and
Professor of the Naval Institute of Technology (NIT) –
University of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which
is a government institution, and received salaries therefor,
in violation of the accessory penalty of dismissal which is
his perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any
government office.
In his Comment dated 16 December 2007, respondent
basically denied the charges against him. Respondent
alleged that “the [Certificate to File Action] he used when
he filed Civil Case No. [B-]1118 for quieting of title
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval,
Biliran was the certification of Lupon Chairman, the late
Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on May 9, 2001.”
Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was
attached to the folio of the records in Civil Case No. B-
1118 and he furnished a copy of the same to
complainant’s counsel. Assuming opposing counsel was
not furnished, respondent wondered why he raised this
matter only upon filing of the instant complaint.
Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of
donation had no relation to the case filed against the
occupants of the lot. Respondent likewise stressed that the
matter regarding Judge Asis’s rulings favorable to his
clients should be addressed to Judge Asis himself.
As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying the
accessory penalty of dismissal from the service,
respondent admitted that he accepted the positions of
Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT – University of
Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a
government institution. However, respondent countered
that he was no longer connected with the NIT College of
Law; and thus, this issue had become moot. Respondent
further claimed that his designation as Assistant Dean was
only temporary, and he had not received any salary except
honorarium. Respondent stated that he even furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) and the MCLE Office
a copy of his designation as Associate Dean, and since
there were no objections, he proceeded to perform the
functions appurtenant thereto. He likewise submitted an
affidavit from Edgardo Garcia, complainant in the
administrative case against him, who interposed no
9
objection to his petition for judicial clemency filed before
this Court.
Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January
2008. Respondent filed a Rejoinder to Reply on 20
February 2008. Complainant filed a Sur- rejoinder to the
Rejoinder to Reply on 20 February 2008. All these
submissions basically reiterated the respective arguments
of the parties and denied each other’s allegations.
The IBP Commissioner noted the foul language used by
respondent in his pleadings submitted before the IBP. The
Commissioner found the respondent guilty of dishonesty
and grave misconduct and recommended his suspension
for 1 year.
ISSUE: WON Respondent is guilty of dishonesty and
grave misconduct.
HELD: Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct
Using of foul language in pleadings
In his Comment, respondent called complainant's counsel
"silahis by nature and complexion"10 and accused
complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x
before the wife of that married man died."11 In his
Rejoinder, respondent maintained that such language is
not foul, but a "dissertation of truth designed to debunk
complainant's and her counsel's credibility in filing the
administrative case."12
We are not convinced. Aside from such language being
inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution of this case.
While respondent is entitled and very much expected to
defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using
improper language in his pleadings. In Saberon v.
Larong,13we stated:
x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with
vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the
use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds
with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating
but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of
the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even
in his pleadings must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent
violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states:
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action
Respondent misrepresented that he filed a certificate to
file action when there was none, which act violated Canon
10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead,
or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, x x x.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title
With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing
complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent title,
we find that it does not constitute dishonesty.
Conflict of interest
Notarization is different from representation. A notary
public simply performs the notarial acts authorized by the
Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments,
oaths and affirmations, jurat, signature witnessing, and
copy certifications. Legal representation, on the other
hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a
court action.
Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government
office
The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish
between permanent and temporary appointments. Hence,
that his designation was only temporary does not absolve
him from liability.
The Supreme Court suspended Atty. Dela Pena for 2
years.
10
SISON VS ATTY CAMACHO
Facts: Sison charged respondent Atty. Camacho with
violation of the CPR for dishonestly entering into a
compromise agreement without authorization and for
failure to render an accounting of funds supposed to be
paid as additional docket fees.
Atty. Camacho was the counsel of Marsman in an
insurance claim against Paramount Life and General
Insurance. He proposed to increase their claim against the
said insurance company and require additional docket
fees. The money for the payment of additional docket fees
was given to Atty. Camacho who promised to issue a
receipt. Atty. Sison discovered that RTC had rendered a
decision in favor of MDAHI granting its insurance claim
plus interests on May 26, 2011. However, on August 11,
2011, Atty. Camacho sent a letter to MDAHI
recommending a settlement with Paramount Insurance.
MDAHI refused to offer a compromise. Even without the
written conformity, Atty. Camacho, entered into a
compromise agreement.
Atty. Camacho denied all allegations against him and
stressed that he had the authority to enter into the
compromise agreement, and that the docket fees given to
him by MDAHI formed part of his atty’s fees.
Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifies a
stringent requirement with respect to compromise
agreements, to wit:
Sec. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - Attorneys
have authority to bind their clients in any case by any
agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in
taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special authority,
compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in
discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.
Glaringly, despite the lack of a written special authority,
Atty. Camacho agreed to a lower judgment award on
behalf of his client and filed a satisfaction of judgment
before the RTC. The said pleading also failed to bear the
conformity of his client.24 Although MDAHI
subsequently received the payment of P15M from
Paramount Insurance, it does not erase Atty. Camacho's
transgression in reaching the compromise agreement
without the prior consent of his client.

Issue: WON Atty. Camacho has authority to enter a

compromise agreement in behalf of his client.

Ruling:
Those in the legal profession must always conduct
themselves with honesty and integrity in all their dealings.
Members of the Bar took their oath to conduct themselves
according to the best of their knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their
clients and to delay no man for money or malice. These
mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with
their clients considering the highly fiduciary nature of
their relationship
In the practice of law, lawyers constantly formulate
compromise agreements for the benefit of their clients.
Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that " [s]pecial
powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases:
xxx (3) To compromise, to submit questions to
arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a
judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or
to abandon a prescription already acquired xxx."

In line with the fiduciary duty of the Members of the Bar,

11