RES IPSA LOQUITUR

Definition
In the common law of torts, res ipsa loquitur (Latin for "the thing speaks for itself") is a
doctrine that infers negligence from the very nature of an accident or injury in the absence of
direct evidence on how any defendant behaved.

In relation to negligence, the thing would be the negligent act that caused such injury. It
is a type of circumstantial evidence, which is evidence that serves as indirect proof for a fact in a
case.
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:

While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening
of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due
to negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally,
the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality
speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some
other person who is charged with negligence.

Where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained
of was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in
the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its
control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated,
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from
or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.

Statement of the Rule

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.1

Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. 2

1 Art. 2176 Civil Code of the Philippines

2
Art. 2217 Civil Code of the Philippines
Elements
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control
of the person charged with negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the person injured.

Nature of the accident

The accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent
Control over the cause the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged with negligence.

*Professional Services v Agana G.R. No. 126297

Facts:
On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital
because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical
examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from Cancer of the sigmoid. On
April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital performed an
Anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy on her sigmoid area had
spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil
obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes to
perform hysterectomy on her. After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took
over, completed the operation and closed the incision after searching for the missing 2 gauzes as
indicated by the assisting nurses but failed to locate it. After a couple of days, Natividad
complained of excruciating pains in her anal region but Dr. Ampil said it is a natural consequence
of the operation/surgery and recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the
cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. Natividad and her husband went
to the US to seek further treatment and she was declared free from cancer. A piece of gauze
portruding from Natividad’s vagina was found by her daughter which was then removed by hand
by Dr. Ampil and assured that the pains will vanished. However, it didn’t. The pains intensified
prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there,
Dr. Ramon Guttierez detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina – a foul
smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vagina. A recto-vaginal
fistula had forced stool to excrete through her vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to
remedy the damage.3

3 Professional Services v Agana G.R. No. 126297

Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Ampil and Fuentes are liable for medical malpractice and the PSI for
damages due to the negligence of the said doctors.

Held:
Yes. An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the
sponges are properly removed and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign
substances in the wound after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by
the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due care as
to raise inference of negligence. There are even legions of authorities to the effect that such act
is negligence per se.

This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. To

successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that
he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or
action caused injury to the patient. Simply puts the elements are duty, breach, injury, and
proximate causation. Dr. Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects,
such as gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it
was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused
injury to Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American doctors and another
surgery. That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the proximate cause of Natividad’s injury could be traced
from his act of closing the incision despite the information given by the attending nurses that 2
pieces of gauze were still missing. That they were later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina
established the causal link between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the injury. And what further
aggravated such injury was his deliberate concealment of this missing gauzes from the knowledge
of Natividad and her family.

The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor are:
a. Occurrence of an injury;
b. The thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the
defendant;
c. The occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not have happened
if those who had control or management used proper care, and;
d. The absence of explanation by the defendant

Of the foregoing, the most instrumental is the “Control and management of the thing
which caused the injury.” Under the “Captain of the ship” rule, the operating surgeon is the
person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation.

The knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City constitutes knowledge of PSI.
The doctrine of corporate responsibility, has the duty to see that it meets the standards of
responsibilities for the care of patients. Such duty includes the proper supervision of the
members of its medical staff. The hospital accordingly has the duty to make a reasonable effort
to monitor and oversee the treatment prescribed and administered by the physician practicing
in its premises.

*Josefa v. Manila Electric Co. G.R. No. 182705, July 18, 2014

Facts:
At around 1:45 p.m. on April 21, 1991, a dump truck, a jeepney and a car figured in a
vehicular accident along Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. As a result of the accident, a 45-foot wooden
electricity post, 3 75 KVA transformers, and other electrical line attachments were damaged.
Upon investigation, Meralco discovered that it was a truck registered in Josefa's name that hit
the electricity post. Meralco demanded from Josefa reimbursement for the replacement cost of
the electricity post and its attachments, but Josefa refused to pay. Thus, Meralco sued Josefa and
Pablo Manoco, the truck driver, for damages before the RTC of Pasig City.4

In its complaint, Meralco alleged that (Bautista) Manoco's reckless driving resulted in
damage to its properties. It also imputed primary liability on Josefa for his alleged negligence in
the selection and supervision of Manoco. The RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. The RTC held that Meralco failed to establish that it was the truck that hit the electricity
post. The RTC ruled that SPO2 Galang's account of the accident was merely hearsay since he did
not personally witness the incident. It also did not give probative value to the police blotter entry
dated January 7, 1994 since the accident had long occurred in 1991.

The CA reversed the RTC ruling and held that the RTC erred in disregarding the parties'
stipulation at the pre-trial that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The CA also found that
Bautista was Josefa's employee when the accident occurred since Josefa did not specifically deny
this material allegation in the amended complaint. It likewise noted that the sheriff's return
stated that Bautista was under Josefa's employ until 1993. The CA concluded that the fact that
the truck hit the electricity post was sufficient to hold Josefa vicariously liable regardless of
whether Bautista was negligent in driving the truck. In the same breath, the CA also stated that
the employer's presumptive liability in quasi-delicts was anchored on injuries caused by the
employee's negligence. Even assuming that Bautista was not Josefa's employee, the CA
maintained that Josefa would still be liable for damages since the law presumes that the
registered owner has control of his vehicle and its driver at the time of the accident. It thus
ordered Josefa to pay Meralco. Josefa filed the present petition after the CA denied his motion
for reconsideration.

Issue/s:

4 Josefa v. Manila Electric Co. G.R. No. 182705, July 18, 2014
(1) Whether or not Bautista exercised due diligence in driving when the truck hit the
electricity post;
(2) Whether Meralco is entitled to actual damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of
litigation.

Held:
(1) Bautista did not exercise due diligence. Bautista's negligence was the proximate cause
of the
property damage caused to Meralco. Bautista is presumed to be negligent in driving the truck
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. This fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict. Thus, for a quasi-delict case to
prosper, the complainant must establish: (1) damages to the complainant; (2) negligence, by act
or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond,
was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
With respect to the third element, the negligent act or omission must be the proximate cause of
the injury.

Contrary to the CA's finding, the parties did not stipulate that the truck hit the electricity
post. The pre-trial order shows that the parties merely agreed that the truck "was involved in an
accident on April 21, 1991. Nonetheless, Meralco has sufficiently established the direct causal
link between the truck and the electricity post through Abio's testimony. Abio categorically stated
during trial that he saw the truck hit the electricity post. We find his first-hand account of the
incident during the directexamination frank and straightforward. Even without Abio's testimony,
it does not escape this Court's attention that Josefa judicially admitted in his motions and
pleading that his truck hit the electricity post. These statements constitute deliberate, clear and
unequivocal admissions of the causation in fact between the truck and the electricity post.

Contrary to the CA's opinion, the finding that it was the truck that hit the electricity post
would not immediately result in Josefa's liability. It is a basic rule that it is essentially the wrongful
or negligent act or omission that creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations. In
turn, the employee's negligence established to be the proximate cause of the damage would give
rise to the disputable presumption that the employer did not exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of the erring employee.

The procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur in quasi-delict cases is that the defendant's
negligence is presumed. For this doctrine to apply, the complainant must show that: (1) the
accident is of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except
for the defendant's negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured. The present case satisfies all the elements of
res ipsa loquitur. It is very unusual and extraordinary for the truck to hit an electricity post, an
immovable and stationary object, unless Bautista, who had the exclusive management and
control of the truck, acted with fault or negligence.

We cannot also conclude that Meralco contributed to the injury since it safely and
permanently installed the electricity post beside the street. Thus, in Republic v. Luzon
Stevedoring Corp., we imputed vicarious responsibility to Luzon Stevedoring Corp. whose barge
rammed the bridge, also an immovable and stationary object.

(2) Meralco is only entitled to temperate damages with interest at legal rate.
Notwithstanding Josefa's vicarious liability, Meralco failed to point out the specific facts that
afford a basis for its claim for actual damages. Actual damages cannot be presumed; they must
be pleaded and proven in court in order to be recoverable. One is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for the pecuniary loss that he has adequately proved based upon competent
proof and on the best evidence obtainable by him. We cannot give weight to Exhibit "D" as to the
amount of actual damages for being hearsay. Exhibit "D" constitutes hearsay evidence since it
was derived on alleged pieces of documentary evidence that were not identified and
authenticated in court during trial.

Meralco is entitled to temperate damages because it clearly suffered pecuniary loss as a

result of Bautista and Josefa's negligence. When the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty, the
court may award temperate damages in the exercise of its sound discretion. Considering the
attendant circumstances of this case, we find the amount of P200,000.00 to be a fair and
sufficient award by way of temperate damages.

Meralco is not entitled to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. The CA likewise erred
in awarding Meralco attorney's fees and expenses of litigation without explaining its basis. In
Buan v. Camaganacan, we held that the text of the decision should state the reason why
attorney's fees are being awarded; otherwise, the award should be disallowed. Besides, no bad
faith has been imputed to Josefa that would warrant the award of attorney's fees under Article
2208 (5) of the Civil Code. It is a settled rule that attorney's fees shall not be recovered as cost
where the party's persistence in litigation is based on his mistaken belief in the righteousness of
his cause. There is also no factual, legal, or equitable justification that would justify the Court's
award of attorney's fees under Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code.

Finally, we impose an interest rate of 6% per annum on temperate damages pursuant to

the guidelines enunciated in Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA, as modified by Nacar v. Gallery Frames.
 *BJDC Construction v. Lanuzo G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014

Facts:
This case involves a claim for damages arising from the death of a motorcycle rider in a
nighttime accident due to the supposed negligence of a construction company then undertaking
re–blocking work on a national highway. The plaintiffs insisted that the accident happened
because the construction companydid not provide adequate lighting on the site, but the latter
countered that the fatal accident was caused by the negligence of the motorcycle rider himself.

Nena alleged that she was the surviving spouse of the late Balbino who figured in the
accident that transpired at the site of the re–blocking work at about 6:30 p.m. on October 30,
1997; that Balbino’s Honda motorcycle sideswiped the road barricade placed by the company in
the right lane portion of the road, causing him to lose control of his motorcycle and to crash on
the newly cemented road, resulting in his instant death; and that the company’s failure to place
illuminated warning signs on the site of the project, especially during night time, was the
proximate cause of the death of Balbino.

In its answer, BJDC denied Nena’s allegations of negligence, insisting that it had installed
warning signs and lights along the highway and on the barricades of the project; that at the time
of the incident, the lights were working and switched on; that its project was duly inspected by
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the Office of the Mayor of Pili, and the
Pili Municipal Police Station; and that it was found to have satisfactorily taken measures to ensure
the safety of motorists.5

Issue:
Whether or not heirs of Balbino were able to establish by preponderance of evidence
the negligence of BJDC.

Held:
No. The party alleging the negligence of the other as the cause of injury has the burden
to establish the allegation with competent evidence. If the action based on negligence is civil in
nature, the proof required is preponderance of evidence.

In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence
is given on either side. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual
allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court, but it may rest on
the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but
raises affirmative defense or defenses, which if proved, will exculpate him from liability.

5
BJDC Construction v. Lanuzo G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014
 The Court affirmed the findings of the RTC, and rules that the Lanuzo heirs, the parties
carrying the burden of proof, did not establish by preponderance of evidence that the negligence
on the part of the company was the proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino.

During the trial, the Lanuzo heirs attempted to prove inadequacy of illumination instead
of the total omission of illumination. In contrast, the company credibly refuted the allegation of
inadequate illumination. The Court observes, too, that SPO1 Corporal, a veteran police officer
detailed for more than 17 years at the Pili Police Station, enjoyed the presumption of regularity
in the performance of his official duties. In his report, it was mentioned that “upon arrival at the
scene of the incident it was noted that roadsign/barricade installed on the road has a light.”

No contribution to the injury from the injured the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured

Effect of direct evidence

*Layugan v. IAC G.R. No. 73998, Nov. 14, 1988

Facts:
Pedro Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, because the latter’s
driver bumped him, thereby causing his left leg to be amputated. Isidro, in his defense, utilized
res ipsa loquitur and argued that it was Layugan who was negligent and he should therefore bear
the consequences of his negligence.SC held that Layugan is entitled to actual and moral damges
plus attorney’s fees.6

Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in an absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from a want of care.

Note:
In this case res ipsa loquitur was being used as a defense, which makes the case unusual,
because the doctrine is supposed to be used for the benefit of the plaintiff.

6
Layugan v. IAC G.R. No. 73998, Nov. 14, 1988
 *Tan v. Jan Transit, G.R. No. 183198, Nov. 25, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Luz Tan sued Jam Transit, Inc. for the loss she suffered after the jitney she owns,
which contained balut and salted eggs, was bumped by a bus owned by the latter. Tan claims
that due to the bus driver’s negligence, she suffered actual damages amounting to 543K. SC
applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and awarded Tan temperate damages worth 250K.7

Note:
The following are the requisites before res ipsa loquitur may be invoked:
1. Nature of the accident - the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of someone’s negligence.
2. Control over instrumentality – if it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control
of the defendant.
3. No contributory negligence - the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the
plaintiff responsible is eliminated.

*College Assurance v. Belfranlt, G.R. No. 155604, Nov. 22, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner CAP, who was leasing 2 floors of Belfranlt, was sued for damages by the latter,
for causing the fire which destroyed the 3rd floor of the building. CAP argued that the fire was a
fortuitous event, for which it cannot be held liable. 8

Origin of Fire: Store room occupied by CAP

Cause of Fire: Accidental (overheated coffee percolator)

Issues:
Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the fire was a fortuitous event
Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to observe the due diligence
Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioners liable for certain actual damages
Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioners liable for temperate damages

Held:
The petition lacks merit. SC found that the fire was not a fortuitous event because there
were negligent acts committed by CAP. SC awarded temperate damages to Belfranlt. CA
therefore correctly affirmed the RTC in holding petitioners liable to respondent for actual
damages consisting of unpaid rentals for the units they leased.

7
Tan v. Jan Transit, G.R. No. 183198, Nov. 25, 2009
8
College Assurance v. Belfranlt, G.R. No. 155604, Nov. 22, 2007
CA deleted the award of actual damages of P2.2 million which the RTC had granted respondent
to cover costs of building repairs. In lieu of actual damages, temperate damages in the amount
of P500,000.00 were awarded by the CA.

Principles:

Article 1667:
The lessee is responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased, unless he proves
that it took place without his fault. This burden of proof on the lessee does not apply when the
destruction is due to earthquake, flood, storm or other natural calamity.9

Article 1174:
Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall
be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.10

A fortuitous event as that which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
inevitable.

Fire, which is inevitable, caused the damage. The legal presumption therefore is that
petitioners were responsible.

RTC: proximate cause of the fire was the fault and negligence of petitioners
CA concurred with the RTC: additional evidence of the negligence. No cogent reason to disturb
the finding of the RTC and CA
Temperate or moderate damages may be availed when some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty

Note:
Res ipsa loquitur applies when the following requisites concur:
1.) The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent.
2.) The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge.
3.) The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured.

9 Article 1667 Civil Code of the Philippines

10
Article 1174 Civil Code of the Philippines
Nature of the rule
Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law. It is regarded as a mode of proof or a mere
procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of the burden
of producing specific proof of negligence.