Cases Palege 1 13

1.
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1879 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 14-2719-MTJ), July 24, 2018
ANONYMOUS, Complainant, v. JUDGE BILL D. BUYUCAN, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT,

BAGABAG-DIADI, NUEVA VIZCAYA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative matter filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against
respondent Judge Bill D. Buyucan (Judge Buyucan).1
The Facts
As gathered from the records, the factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 26, 1969, Proclamation No. 573 was signed, which set aside certain lands of the public domain as
permanent forest reserves.2 Included in the said reservation was a 193-hectare parcel of land located in
Sitio Tapaya, Villaros, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, a portion of which was granted to the Department of
Agriculture (DA) for research purposes (Subject Property).3 Accordingly, the Subject Property was declared
for taxation purposes by the DA as evidenced by T.D. ARP No. 2005-03017-01174 and is now known as the
Department of Agriculture Cagayan Valley Hillyland Research Outreach Station (DA-CVHILROS).5
As there was a need to clear the Subject Property of informal settlers already residing therein, the DA filed
several criminal and civil cases before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bagabag-Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya
(MCTC), which is presided over by respondent Judge Buyucan.6
Among the cases filed before the MCTC were: (i) Civil Case No. 626 for Forcible Entry, entitled "Province of
Nueva Vizcaya v. Eling Valdez, et al.," and (ii) Criminal Cases No. 4691 and 5094 for Malicious Mischief,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Eling Valdez" and "People of the Philippines v. Amado
Valdez alias Eling," respectively.7 The said cases were eventually dismissed by respondent Judge Buyucan in
separate Decisions dated May 22, 20088 and June 16, 2008.9
A few months later, in August 2008, respondent Judge Buyucan acquired a parcel of land located within the
Subject Property for One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) from Eling Valdez, the same
respondent in the previously dismissed cases, together with Ernesto A. Bagos, Isaija Suarez, and a certain
Casmin as co-vendors.10 The purported sale was evidenced by a "Waiver of Rights and Improvements."11
Subsequently, complaints for Malicious Mischief were again filed before the MCTC against the informal
settlers, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Arsenio Apostol and John Doe" and docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 5597 and 5598.
A Motion for Voluntary Inhibition dated March 9, 2009 was then filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), seeking the inhibition of respondent Judge Buyucan as he was also residing within the very same
property involved in the said criminal cases.12 The OSG alleged that his continued presence in the Subject
Property had "emboldened" the other informal settlers to continue with their illegal occupation
therein.13 Respondent Judge Buyucan, however, refused to recuse himself from hearing the said cases.14
As a result of the foregoing, in a Letter dated March 1, 2013,15 the OMB16 informed the OCA of an
anonymous text message received by the Ombudsman Lifestyle Check Hotline on February 20, 2013, as
follows:
Gud day po, gusto ko lang iparating sa inyo itong problema namn dto sa brgy. Villaros, Bagabag Nueva
Vizcaya tungkol po sa isang naturingan Judge dto po sa aming bayan kasip nagpatayo po cia ng bahay eh
pagkaalam po naming dpo sa kanya yung lupa at wala po kamng makita na building permit tapos maluwang
pa ang kanyang sinakop na lupa para kanyang panabong na maunkan imbes n asana kami ang makinabang
san po paki imbistigahan po ito maraming salamat po!!!
Gud am po, yung tinutukoy po maimbistigahan ay si judge Bill Buyucan ng MTC Bagacg, N.V., tnx/.17
In an Indorsement dated April 4, 2013,18 the OCA referred the Letter dated March 1, 2013 to Hon. Fernando
F. Flor, Jr. (Judge Flor), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, for
investigation and report.
In his Report dated May 16, 2013,19 Judge Flor gathered the following facts:
1. Judge Buyucan is occupying an approximate area of one (1) hectare where he keeps and maintains
his fighting cock farm. A year ago, he started constructing a two-storey house made of strong
materials without securing a building permit. This is confirmed by the Municipal Engineer of
Bagabag in its Certification dated May 15, 2013.
2. The land occupied by Judge Buyucan is part of the 193 hectares given to the Department of
Agriculture (DA) by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 573 dated June 26, 1969, intended for
research purposes and for planting of various plants and trees. The land is declared for taxation
purposes in the name of the DA as evidenced by Tax Declaration ARP No. 2005-03017-0117.
xxxx
5. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office through its CENR Officer issued a
Certification that the DENR-Officer has not issued any grant, authority under a license, lease, permit
or any tenurial document to enter or occupy or possess portions of the land within the DA-
CVHILROS.20
In a Letter dated November 15, 2013,21 the OCA directed respondent Judge Buyucan to comment on the
charges contained in the Letter dated March 1, 2013.
In his Letter dated December 13, 2013,22 respondent Judge Buyucan denied knowledge of the DA's
ownership of the Subject Property and instead claimed that the land he was occupying was within the road-
right-of-way (RRW) of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) beside the Nueva Vizcaya-
Isabela National Road.23 Respondent Judge Buyucan also claimed that the alleged two (2)-storey house
actually belonged to his nephew and that what he constructed were merely a "temporary Ifugao native
house" and an adjacent shanty.24 He further stated that he is, in any case, ready to vacate the area if and
when the DPWH needs it.25
In a Resolution dated October 15, 2014,26 the Court resolved to refer the matter back to Judge Flor to
conduct a thorough determination and/or confirmation of facts and to submit a more exhaustive report
thereon, to wit:
[D]espite the Report dated May 16, 2013 of Judge Flor, there are still factual issues that need to be clarified
especially on the matter of Judge Buyucan's alleged squatting and occupation of the land supposedly
reserved for Department of Agriculture Cagayan Valley Hillyland Research Outreach Station (DA-CVHILROS),
his alleged construction of a 2-storey house without a building permit, a fighting cock farm on the said
parcel of land, and an Ifugao native house allegedly within the road right of way of the Department of Public
Works and Highways.27
Accordingly, sometime in December 2014, Judge Flor, together with a representative of this
Court,28conducted an ocular inspection of the Subject Property.29
In the meantime, respondent Judge Buyucan filed a Supplemental Answer/Comment dated December 16,
2014,30 denying once again the allegations of his squatting on the Subject Property and insisting that the
land he purchased was within the RRW of the DPWH.31 He likewise insisted that he did not own a fighting
cock farm and that the structures he built were made of light and indigenous materials and thus exempted
from the requirement of a building permit under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1096.32Further, respondent
Judge Buyucan alleged that the two (2)-storey house described in the Report dated May 16, 2013 is actually
owned by his brother, Gabriel Buyucan, who purchased the lot sometime in June 2008 from a certain Larry
Valdez, as evidenced by a Waiver of Rights and corroborated by several affidavits.33
Thereafter, in compliance with the Resolution dated October 15, 2014, Judge Flor submitted a Report dated
January 20, 2015,34 submitting additional evidence and essentially refuting respondent Judge Buyucan's
statements in his Letter dated December 13, 2013. The following facts were further established in the said
Report: (i) respondent Judge Buyucan was indeed squatting on the Subject Property; (ii) the informal
settlers in the Subject Property were mostly members of the same Ifugao tribe of respondent Judge
Buyucan;35 (iii) respondent Judge Buyucan had several confrontations with the representatives of the Office
of the Solicitor General with respect to his illegal occupation of the Subject Property;36 and (iv) respondent
Judge Buyucan erected a building of strong materials on the Subject Property without procuring the
necessary building permit.37
In a Supplemental Report dated February 16, 2015,38 Judge Flor recommended the penalty of dismissal from
the service against respondent Judge Buyucan as a result of the foregoing acts.
In a Resolution dated September 21, 2016,39 the Court referred the matter to the OCA for evaluation, report
and recommendation.
The OCA 's Report and Recommendation
In its Memorandum dated May 23, 2017 (OCA Memorandum), the OCA found respondent Judge Buyucan
liable for gross misconduct for his illegal occupation and refusal to vacate the Subject Property despite
demands from the DA-CVHILROS.40 Such conduct, the OCA opined, encouraged other illegal settlers to
continue occupying portions of the Subject Property in defiance of the orders of the DA.41 The OCA further
opined that respondent Judge Buyucan's act of acquiring a portion of the Subject Property from Eling Valdez
three (3) months after deciding a case in his favor was unethical and was indicative of a lack of
independence and impartiality.42
The OCA recommended thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court
that:
(1)
The instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter against Judge Bill
D. Buyucan, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bagabag-Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya;
(2)
Judge Buyucan be found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and be
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months from office without salary and other benefits; and
(3)
Judge Buyucan be ordered to IMMEDIATELY VACATE the land owned by the Department of Agriculture-
Cagayan Valley Hilly Land Research Outreach Station, REMOVE the structures he introduced thereon; and
SUBMIT a report on his compliance within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
Respectfully submitted.[43
Issue
Whether respondent Judge Buyucan is guilty of gross misconduct.
The Court's Ruling

Respondent Judge Buyucan is liable. After a judicious review of the records, the Court adopts the findings in
the OCA Memorandum with modification only as to the penalty recommended.
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.44Pertinently,
as with factual findings of trial courts, credence should be accorded to the findings of the investigating judge
who had the opportunity to hear witnesses and observe their demeanor.45
In this case, the liability of respondent Judge Buyucan hinges on whether he is in fact illegally occupying a
portion of the Subject Property. The Court finds in the affirmative.
The evidence on record is unequivocal. As summarized in the OCA Memorandum:
To prove that Judge Buyucan illegally occupied the land reserved for the DA-CVHILROS, Executive Judge
Flor submitted a Sworn Statement executed by Ernesto Bagos, Antonio M. Balut and Reynaldo G. Garcia, Jr.
The affidavit states that: (1) Bagos was one of the vendors who sold his occupation of the land and its
improvements to Judge Buyucan; (2) Balut was one of the carpenters who constructed the 2-storey house
and was paid by Edwin Buyucan, nephew of Judge Buyucan; and (3) Garcia, Jr. was the Barangay Captain of
Villaros who witnessed the execution of the Waiver of Rights between Bagos and Judge Buyucan. He also
submitted the Affidavit dated January 29, 2009 of Ms. Celerina T. Miranda stating that Judge Buyucan is one
of those who is occupying a portion of the area of DA-CVHILROS and built a rest house and cultivated
portions thereof and planted pineapple, mangoes and corn. The affidavit was executed to support a Motion
to Inhibit Judge Buyucan. In another affidavit, Ms. Miranda stated that Judge Buyucan up to the present is
squatting on the land reserved for the DA and his acts have emboldened others to enlarge their occupations
of the land to the detriment of the outreach projects of the DA-CVHILROS. It also stated that Assistant
Solicitor General Hector Calilung who was providing legal assistance to the DA in 2008 had several
confrontations with Judge Buyucan regarding his illegal occupation of the DA's land and that he was present
during the taking of a survey questionnaire where Judge Buyucan stated that he was a transferee of the
land. In addition, Executive Judge Flor in his Supplemental Report dated February 16, 2015 also points out
that the land occupied by Judge Buyucan is not only the land beside the national highway where he built a
native Ifugao house but also occupied about 20 to 30 meters of the DA-CVHILROS reserved land where he
built his rest house.46
In addition, respondent Judge Buyucan's claim that he was not occupying a portion of the Subject Property
is plainly belied by the verification plan prepared by the DENR, which forms part of the records of this
case.47 Proceeding therefrom, the Court so finds that respondent Judge Buyucan was indeed an illegal
occupant of the Subject Property.
In any case, even assuming that respondent Judge Buyucan did not occupy a portion of the Subject
Property, he is still liable due to his admission in his Letter dated December 13, 2013 that he was then
occupying a portion of the RRW of the DPWH Nueva Vizcaya-Isabela National Road.48 As aptly observed in
the OCA Memorandum, such act nevertheless constitutes a violation of P.O. No. 17, which makes it unlawful
for any person to "usurp any portion of a right-of-way, to convert any part of any public highway, bridge,
wharf or trail to his own private use or to obstruct the same in any manner, or to use any highway ditch for
irrigation or other private purposes x x x."49
Aside from the foregoing, the Court also notes several other acts of respondent Judge Buyucan that renders
him administratively liable.
By his own admission, respondent Judge Buyucan acquired the occupied portion of the Subject Property
(subject of Civil Case No. 626, entitled "Province of Nueva Vizcaya v. Eling Valdez, et al.") in August of 2008
– only a few months after dismissing Civil Case No. 626.50 As stated earlier, it bears stressing that one
of the vendors in the alleged transaction was Eling Valdez, one of the respondents in Civil Case No. 626 and
the accused in Criminal Case No. 4691.51
Lastly, the Court also notes that despite repeated demands from the DA, respondent Judge Buyucan refused
to cease his illegal occupation of the Subject Property.52
Persons involved in the administration of justice are expected to uphold the strictest standards of honesty
and integrity in the public service; their conduct must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility.53 In this regard, the Court has consistently admonished any act or
omission that would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the
judiciary.54
At the outset, respondent Judge Buyucan's continued illegal settlement erodes the public's confidence in its
agents of justice considering that such act amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of the DA's ownership rights
over the Subject Property. Even worse, his continued refusal to vacate instigated the continued illegal
occupation of other informal settlers residing therein. Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct55 requires that the conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary
and that their conduct must, at the least, be perceived to be above reproach in the view of a reasonable
observer. Based on the foregoing acts alone, it is clear the respondent Judge Buyucan fell short of the
required conduct of all members of the bench.
In the same vein, the Court faults respondent Judge Buyucan for his act of acquiring a portion of the Subject
Property from a respondent in a case pending before his sala. His act is further aggravated by the fact that
the respondent therein, Eling Valdez, received a favorable judgment just a few months before the purported
sale.
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office.56 Section 2 of Canon 3 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall ensure that his conduct, both in and out of court, maintains
and enhances the confidence of the public and litigants in his impartiality and that of the judiciary. In this
respect, respondent Judge Buyucan's conduct incites intrigue and puts into question his impartiality in
deciding the cases then pending before him. Such conduct unquestionably gives rise to the impression that
he was motivated by extraneous factors in ruling on the said cases.
In Agpalasin v. Agcaoili,57 the respondent Judge was found administratively liable for allowing an accused in
a robbery case pending before his sala to pay for freight charges of his personal acquisitions. Therein, the
Court held that the subsequent acquittal of the accused gave rise to the impression that the judge was
swayed by other factors than the evidence on record, thereby casting doubt on the independence and
integrity of the entire judiciary:
That the accused who indulged respondent Judge's corrupt tendencies was subsequently acquitted further
gives rise to suspicions that the judge was influenced by the favors the accused extended to him. It gives
the impression that the judge was swayed by factors other than the evidence on record, that he arrived at
the decision of acquittal other than by his own independent judgment.
A judge should, in pending or prospective litigation before him, be scrupulously careful to avoid
such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations
or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial course. He must not only render a
just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any
suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity. A decision which correctly applies the law and
jurisprudence will nevertheless be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by a magistrate or
tribunal believed to be less than impartial and honest.58(Emphasis supplied)
Guided by the foregoing standards, the Court hereby finds respondent Judge Buyucan guilty of gross
misconduct for his flagrant violation of the standard of conduct embodied in the New Judicial Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Gross misconduct is classified as a grave offense under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and is
punishable under Section 11(A) of the same rule by: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits
except accrued leave credits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office; (2)
suspension from office without salary or other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six
(6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.59
The interests of justice require no less than a penalty commensurate to the violations committed by the
person charged. In this regard, the OCA's recommendation to penalize respondent Judge Buyucan with a six
(6)-month suspension without benefits is far too light given the gravity and multiplicity of infractions
committed by respondent Judge Buyucan. Such acts betray his utter lack of integrity and impartiality, both
mandatory and continuing requirements, which renders him unfit to continue his service as an esteemed
member of the bench. Bearing the foregoing in mind, the Court hereby imposes the penalty of dismissal
from the service and forfeiture of benefits following Rule 140.
Further, the Court adopts the finding and recommendation of the OCA to order respondent Judge Buyucan
to immediately vacate the Subject Property:
[J]udge Buyucan's claim that he is not occupying the land of the DA but a portion of the road right of way of
the Nueva Vizcaya-Isabela road is inconsistent with the survey map of the entire land of the DA-CVHILROS.
The map shows that Judge Buyucan occupies lot 45 (in orange highlight) of parcel no. 1 located near the
Nueva Vizacaya-Isabel (sic) national road. As pointed out by Executive Judge Flor, Judge Buyucan does not
only occupy the land beside the national highway where he built his native Ifugao house but also about 20
to 30 meters of the DA-CVHILROS land. But even assuming that the land he occupies is not within the DA-
CVHILROS land, his possession of a portion of the road right of way of the national highway of the DPWH is
still unlawful. x x x
To prove that he legally occupies the subject land, Judge Buyucan presented the Waiver of Rights executed
by Ernesto Bagos in his favor. However, the said land transferred to him is within the land owned by the DA-
CVHILROS which has been the subject of a controversy between the DA and the occupants of the land which
was brought to his court for adjudication. Hence, Judge Buyucan's rights over the land are still questionable
as the DA has yet to take appropriate action against him and claimants of the land.60
The Court takes note of the undisputed fact that respondent Judge Buyucan is occupying public land. Thus,
while respondent Judge Buyucan denies the DA's ownership, he nevertheless admitted on record he is
encroaching on what he claims to be the RRW of the DPWH beside the Nueva Vizcaya-Isabela National
Road.61 In this regard, the Court, which is vested with disciplinary authority over its officers, finds that
respondent Judge Buyucan must likewise be ordered to immediately vacate the Subject Property.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, Judge Bill D. Buyucan of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bagabag-
Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya, is hereby found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct for violating the New Code of Judicial
Conduct and is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS,except
accrued leave credits. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement or appointment to any public office
or employment, including to one in any government-owned or government-controlled corporations.
He is likewise ordered to IMMEDIATELY VACATE the land known as the Department of Agriculture
Cagayan Valley Hillyland Research Outreach Station, REMOVE the structures he introduced thereon,
and SUBMIT a report on his compliance within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
Further, respondent Bill D. Buyucan is directed to SHOW CAUSE in writing within ten (10) days from notice
why he should not be disbarred for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the Canons of Professional Ethics as outlined herein.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for its information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
2.
EN BANC
January 16, 2018
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant
vs.
JUDGE PERLA V. CABRERAFALLER, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OPHELIA G. SULUEN and
PROCESS SERVER RIZALINO RINALDI B. PONTEJOS, all of the RTC, Branch 90, Dasmariñas,
Cavite, Respondents
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, ,

vs.
RESIDING JUDGE FERNANDO L. FELICEN, CLERK OF COURT V ATTY. ALLAN SLY M.
MARASIGAN, SHERIFF IV ANSELMO P. PAGUNSAN, JR., COURT STENOGRAPHERS
ROSALIE MARANAN and TERESITA P. REYES, COURT INTERPRETER IMELDA M. JUNTILLA,
and PROCESS SERVER HIPOLITO O. FERRER, all of the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite;
PRESIDING JUDGE NORBERTO J. QUISUMBING, JR., CLERK OF COURT ATTY. MARIA
CRISTITA A. RIVAS-SANTOS, LEGAL RESEARCHER MANUELA O. OSORIO, SHERIFF IV
FILMAR M. DE VILLA, COURT STENOGRAPHERS MARILOU CAJIGAL, WENDILYN T.
ALMEDA and HELEN B. CARALUT, COURT INTERPRETER ELENITA T. DE VILLA, and
PROCESS SERVER ELMER S. AZCUET A, all of the RTC, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite; PRESIDING
JUDGE CESAR A. MANGROBANG, CLERK OF COURT VI ATTY. REGALADO E. EUSEBIO,
CLERK OF COURT V ATTY. SETER M. DELA CRUZ-CORDEZ, LEGAL RESEARCHER DEVINA
A. REYES BERMUDEZ, COURT STENOGRAPHERS PRISCILLA P. HERNANDEZ, NORMITA Z.
FABIA, MERLY O. PARCERO, and JOYCE ANN F. SINGIAN, COURT INTERPRETER
MICHELLE A. ALARCON, and PROCESS SERVER ELMER S. AZCUET A, all of the RTC,
Branch 22, Imus, Cavite; EXECUTIVE JUDGE PERLA V. CABRERA-FALLER, CLERK OF
COURT ZENAIDA C. NOGUERA, SHERIFF IV TOMAS C. AZURIN, OIC LEGAL RESEARCHER
OPHELIA G. SULUEN, COURT STENOGRAPHERS JESUSA B. SAN JOSE, ROSALINA A. COS
TUNA, and MARIA LOURDES M. SAPINOSO, COURT INTERPRETER MERLINA S. FERMA, and
PROCESS SERVER RIZALINO RINALDI B. PONTEJOS, all of the RTC, Branch 90, Dasmariñas,
Cavite,Respondents
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. 12-9-188-RTC
RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE PERLA V. CABRERA-FALLER,

Branch 90, Regional Trial Court, Dasmariñas City, Cavite, relative to Civil Case No. 1998-08
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301 is an administrative complaint for gross irregularity in the conduct of
proceedings in annulment and declaration of nullity of marriage cases. The complaint was born of a
judicial audit conducted at the Regional Trial Court of Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 90 (RTC
Dasmariñas 90), on 15-17 September 2010.
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302 stemmed from a report on a judicial audit conducted on 3-11 February 2011
and treated as an administrative complaint against the judges and personnel of the Regional Trial
Court of Imus, Cavite, Branches 20, 21 and 22 (RTC Imus 20, 21 and 22); and RTC Dasmariñas 90.
A.M. No. 12-9-188-RTC stemmed from an anonymous complaint against Judge Perla V. Cabrera-
Faller (Judge Cabrera-Faller) of RTC Dasmariñas 90 relative to the irregularity of the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 1998-08 for declaration of nullity of marriage.
FACTS
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301
In a Report dated 23 February 2011,1 the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) narrated its
findings on the judicial audit conducted on 15-17 September 2010 at RTC Dasmariñas 90.
At the time of audit, the court had a total case load of 827 cases, 417 of which were criminal and
410, civil.
Of the criminal cases, the judicial audit team found that the court had failed to take action on three
cases for a considerable length of time. Its last action on one case was on l0 June 2008, when the
private prosecutor was given five days within which to submit a formal offer of evidence; the two
other cases had not been acted upon since the denial of the motion for judicial determination of
probable cause on 3 June 2009. Another criminal case had a pending motion to lift a warrant of
arrest since 19 August 2009. Two cases had recently been submitted for decision, and one case
was scheduled for the promulgation of judgment.
The civil cases proved more problematic. Still not acted upon from the time of their filing were 106
cases, some of which went as far back as 2008. The court had not acted on 51 cases for a
1âw phi 1
considerable length of time. In fact, the last court action on 35 of these cases was from 2003 to
2009. There were 28 civil cases with pending incidents. Their pendency was relatively recent,
because 26 of them were filed only in 2010, one was filed 2009 and another in 2008. There were 17
civil cases submitted for decision - 16 of them were recent, but one had been submitted for decision
since 8 December 2008.
The judicial audit team observed that the case records in the court were not stitched, but held
together by fasteners only, and that they were not chronologically arranged or paginated.
Nevertheless, the stitching of the records was immediately done upon advice of the audit team. It
also appeared that the court personnel were not wearing the prescribed uniform for the trial courts.
The team noted several irregularities in the petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage:
1. Improper service of summons
Process Server Rizalino Rinaldi B. Pontejos (Process Server Pontejos) had been in the habit of
making a substituted service of summons without compliance with the mandatory requirements for
validly effecting it, as enunciated in Manotoc v. CA.2 In two cases, it is indicated that the summonses
were "duly served but despite diligent efforts x x x exerted, the same proved ineffectual."3 In at least
12 cases cited, summonses were not attached to the records.
2. No appearance by the Solicitor General In nine cases, the hearing of the petition proceeded even
without the filing of a notice of appearance by the Solicitor General.
3. No categorical finding on whether collusion existed between the parties/no collusion report at all
In all his reports regarding the existence of collusion between the parties, Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Oscar R. Jarlos stated that "the undersigned Prosecutor is not in the position to tell
whether collusion exists."4 In 10 cases, the hearing of the petition proceeded even without the
submission of the collusion report by the public prosecutor.
4. No pretrial briefs
No pretrial briefs can be found in the records of 11 cases at the trial stage and three that have been
submitted for decision.
5. No formal offer of exhibits/evidence
Two cases were submitted for decision without any formal offer of exhibits/evidence.
6. Non-attachment of the minutes to the records
The minutes were not attached to the records of several cases, and the audit team had doubts
whether the psychiatrist/psychologist who had prepared the evaluation report testified in court.
7. Irregular psychological evaluation reports
Some of the Psychological Evaluation Reports attached to the records were mere photocopies. In
two cases, the affidavits of the psychiatrist/psychologist were unsubscribed. The psychological
report attached to the record of one case was unsigned and undated.
8. Absence of the public prosecutor's signature in the jurat of the judicial affidavit of the petitioner in
one case
In a Resolution dated 11 October 2011,5 the Court resolved to docket the Report as A.M. No. RTJ-
11-2301, a case for gross irregularity in the conduct of proceedings in petitions for declaration of
nullity and annulment of marriage. Judge Cabrera-Faller, Officer-in-Charge Ophelia G. Suluen (OIC
Suluen) and Process Server Pontejos were required to explain, within 30 days from notice, the
irregularities observed by the judicial audit team.
Judge Cabrera-Faller was likewise directed to take appropriate action on all cases that the court had
failed to act upon for a considerable length of time from the date of their filing. She was further
directed to act on those without further setting, with pending incidents or those submitted for
decision. She was required to submit a copy of the actions taken thereon within 10 days from notice.
During the audit, it was brought to the attention of the team that family court cases falling within the
territorial jurisdiction of RTC Dasmariñas 90 were being raffled to RTC Imus 20 and 21. Accordingly,
the Court also amended the Resolution dated 16 June 1998 in A.M. No. 92-9- 855-RTC6 to read as
follows: "[F]amily court cases originating from the municipalities of Dasmariñas shall be heard and
tried exclusively by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite."7
Judge Cabrera-Faller, OIC Suluen and Process Server Pontejos submitted their joint compliance or
explanation in a letter dated 8 December 2011.8 They also attached relevant court orders and
decisions to cases that were cited by the audit team as awaiting action by the court.9 The Court
referred these documents to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.10
In its Memorandum dated 12 August 2014,11 the OCA recommended that Judge Cabrera-Faller be
fined in the amount of ₱10,000 for her failure to comply fully with the Resolution dated 11 October
2011. According to the OCA, she did not take appropriate action on all the cases enumerated in the
Comi's Resolution, in defiance of the directive given to her. For the same reason, it also
recommended that OIC Suluen be fined in the amount of ₱20,000.
As regards Process Server Pontejos, the OCA observed that while he signed the joint compliance or
explanation dated 8 December 2011, he gave no explanation regarding his practice of making a
substituted service of summons without compliance with the mandatory requirements for validly
effecting it. Thus, it recommended that he be suspended for three months without salary and other
benefits for his utter failure to comply with the Resolution dated 11 October 2011.
The OCA recommended the foregoing penalties not for the irregularities observed by the audit team,
but for the failure of Judge Cabrera-Faller, OIC Suluen and Process Server Pontejos to comply fully,
if at all, with the Resolution dated 11 October 2011. Noting this deficiency, the Court opted to defer
the imposition of penalties and instead require complete compliance with the Resolution.12 In
addition, the irregularities discovered involved petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage, which are among the subjects of A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302 and A.M. No. 12-9- 188-RTC.
Hence, the Court consolidated the two cases with the instant administrative matter, which has a
lower, and therefore earlier, docket number.
Judge Cabrera-Faller and OIC Suluen complied through their submissions dated 8 December
2011,13 29 January 201514 and 30 September 2015.15 Process Server Pontejos submitted his
explanation in a compliance dated 30 September 2015.16
As regards several irregularities in the petitions for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriage
noted by the judicial audit team, the following explanations were offered by Judge Cabrera-Faller,
OIC Suluen and Process Server Pontejos:
1. Improper service of summons
Process Server Pontejos explained that while some summonses were made through substituted
service, they were served upon persons who were immediate relatives, had relations of confidence
with the respondent, or were residing at the given address.17 These are persons who usually know
the situation and expect that court personnel will serve summons, which they are willing to receive
and acknowledge on behalf of the respondent.18 Some of them also call or text the respondent before
receiving the summons.19 However, if the relatives refuse to receive the summons, Process Server
Pontejos sets an appointment with the respondent and makes a second or third attempt to serve the
summons. When it is not possible to make a second or third attempt due to the distance of the
respondent's address, he explains to the relatives the importance of the summons and of notifying
the respondent about the petition. In case only caretakers, security guards or minors are at the given
address, he makes several attempts to locate the respondent or submits a written report with the
notation "UNSERVED."20
Judge Cabrera-Faller, OIC Suluen and Process Server Pontejos claim that the rules and
jurisprudence on the service of summons are largely observed, although they admit that due to the
heavy work load of the process server, some of these rules may have been overlooked.21
Judge Cabrera-Faller explains that no "proforma summons"22 was attached to the records of some
cases, because summonses were made by publication. In summons by publication, the order
granting the summons already incorporates it as a form of cost-cutting.
2. No appearance by the Solicitor General
Judge Cabrera-Faller insists that there is nothing in the rules prohibiting the court from proceeding
with the case without the entry of appearance of the Solicitor General.23 She says that it is enough
that there be proof of service on the Solicitor General and the provincial prosecutor to commence
proceedings. She is aware of the mandatory period for the disposal of cases and, considering that
the Office of the Solicitor General takes ages before the latter transmits its entry of appearance, she
sees a need to speedily proceed with the hearing of the cases.24
3. No categorical finding on whether collusion exists between the parties/no collusion report at all
Judge Cabrera-Faller believes that the proceedings in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor are not
under the direct control and supervision of the judge.25 She points out that the rules do not state that
the court shall order the prosecutor to conduct the collusion investigation in a manner that the court
deems fit.26 She further points out that it is not true that in all the reports of Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Oscar R. Jarlos regarding the existence of collusion between the parties, he merely
indicated that "the undersigned Prosecutor is not in the position to tell whether collusion
exists."27 Attached to the compliance dated 8 December 2011 is a report of the prosecutor stating
that "the undersigned is of well-considered opinion that no collusion exists between the parties to
this petition."28
She also considers it highly improbable for the court to proceed with the hearing of annulment cases
when no report of collusion is attached to the record.29 While she admits that the audit team identified
10 cases in which the hearings proceeded even without the submission of the public prosecutor's
collusion report, she emphasizes that these are contested cases. The prosecutor no longer submits
any collusion report in cases where the respondent has vigorously opposed the petition by filing an
answer.30
4. No pretrial briefs
Judge Cabrera-Faller believes that pretrial briefs are simply guides for the parties on the stipulation
of facts, admissions, and the manner in which the case shall proceed.31 She allows the parties to
proceed to pretrial even without the required pretrial briefs if the parties agree, in the case of
contested proceedings; or if the prosecutor agrees, in the case of uncontested petitions. It is a
strategy she has devised in order to shorten the proceedings and lessen the costs of litigation.
5. No formal offer of exhibits/evidence
It is not true that two cases were submitted for decision without any formal offer of exhibits or
evidence. In those cases, the offer of evidence was made orally in open court, as there were only
1aw p++i1
few documentary exhibits offered.32
6. Nonattachment of minutes to the records33
Judge Cabrera-Faller states that the audit team seemed to equate the nonattachment of the
stenographic notes to the record with the non-taking of the actual testimonies of the parties.34 The
stenographic notes are kept in the stenographers' files to keep them safe. They are not attached to
the records, which are kept in a container van outside the Hall of Justice and exposed to the
elements.35
Despite repeated orders by this Court and several compliances by Judge Cabrera-Faller, OIC
Suluen and Process Server Pontejos, no explanation or comment was included with regard to the
irregularities involving the psychological evaluation reports of the psychiatrists/psychologists.
In a Resolution dated 20 October 2015,36 the Court referred this administrative case, together with
A.M. Nos. RTJ-11-2302 and 12-9-188- RTC, to the Court of Appeals (CA) for its immediate raffle
among the members thereof. The investigating CA justice was directed to evaluate the cases and
make a report and recommendation within 90 days from notice.
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302
In a Report dated 29 June 2011,37 the OCA narrated its findings on the judicial audit conducted on 3-
11 February 2011 at RTC Imus 20, 21 and 22; and RTC Dasmariñas 90. According to the OCA, the
four branches have generally violated A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC38 and specific provisions of the Rules of
Court in handling petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage, adoption, and
correction of entries.
In the Resolution dated 10 April 2012,39 the Court considered the irregularities found by the audit
team sufficient to warrant the conduct of a full investigation. Accordingly, the Report was treated as
an administrative complaint against the judges and personnel of the four branches, and they were
required to comment on the findings. The OCA was directed to submit its evaluation, report and
recommendation to the Court. Meanwhile, until the conclusion of the investigation, the presiding
judges of the four branches were prohibited from acting on all cases for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage, adoption, and correction of entries.
The investigation, conducted from 22 April to 8 May 2013, covered the decided cases for declaration
of nullity and annulment of marriage filed from the year 2008 to 2011.40 Thereafter, the OCA
submitted an Investigation Report dated 13 February 2014.41 The findings of the comprehensive
investigation were itemized per court, to wit:
The findings of the comprehensive investigation were itemized per court, to wit:
RTC Imus20
l. Improper venue
Out of 65 cases, 49 are indicative of improper venue.42 While the petitions for declaration of nullity
and annulment of marriage show that one or both of the parties reside under the territorial
jurisdiction of RTC Imus 20, most of the given addresses were vague or incomplete.43 The notices
sent to several parties were "returned to sender" because the addresses were insufficient,
incomplete, unknown or could not be located. In others, the addressees were unknown at the given
addresses, or they were abroad, or had moved out. Worse, there were four different cases in which
the parties had common addresses, leading to the suspicion that the private counsels might have
also been involved in the use of bogus addresses in order to fulfill the residence requirement.
In Civil Case No. 2785-09 for declaration of nullity of marriage, the respondent filed an Answer and
prayed for the dismissal of the petition, because the petitioner had allegedly been living in Taoyuan,
Taiwan, since 1994; and none of the parties resided in Imus, Cavite.44 In fact, the order setting the
case for pretrial and sent to the petitioner's address bore the notation "RTS-moved out."
Nevertheless, the OCA found that Judge Fernando L. Felicen (Judge Felicen) ignored the Answer
entirely when he granted the petition. He said in his Decision dated 7 June 2010 that "[d]espite the
service of summons, no responsive pleading was filed by respondent within the reglementary period.
"45 A certification from the Bureau of Immigration showed that the petitioner had no record of arrival
or departure in the country from January 1993 to 28 May 2013.46 Yet she apparently testified before
the court on 3 March 201047based on the minutes of the proceedings prepared by Interpreter Imelda
M. Juntilla (Interpreter Juntilla) and the transcript prepared by Stenographer Teresita P. Reyes
(Stenographer Reyes).48
In Civil Case No. 3141-09 for declaration of nullity of marriage, the respondent also filed an Answer
stating that the petition was filed in the wrong venue, because petitioner was in fact a resident of
Caloocan City. The petition was still given due course, despite the fact that mail matters sent to the
petitioner were returned because of the vague Cavite address.
2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons
Process Server Hipolito O. Ferrer (Process Server Ferrer) claims to have personally served
summons at the given Cavite addresses, even though subsequent notices sent to them were
"returned to sender" for the abovementioned reasons.49 Together with Sheriff Anselmo P. Pagunsan,
Jr. (Sheriff Pagunsan), Process Server Ferrer also resorts to substituted service of summons without
observing the requirements therefor.50 There was clearly a practice of leaving the summons at the
front door or resorting to a substituted service, even when the recipient refused to sign or
acknowledge receipt. Sheriff Pagunsan made a substituted service on a person named "Jose
Justino" on two separate occasions in two different addresses.51
In Civil Case No. 3222-09, Sheriff Pagunsan issued a return dated 16 November 2009 stating that
the summons was served on the respondent through a certain Gino Uson.52 However, the
respondent sent a letter dated 21 January 2010 requesting copies of the pertinent records of the
case to enable him to file an Answer. Nevertheless, initial trial proceeded on 25 January 2010, and a
decision granting the petition was rendered on 12 March 2010, stating that the respondent had
"failed to tender his responsive pleading within the reglementary period to file the same."53
3. Questionable raffling of cases
Of the 65 cases examined, 37 were filed and raffled on the same day.54 In one case, the petition had
already been assigned to RTC Imus 20 even before it was stamped "received" by the RTC Office of
the Clerk of Court and raffled to that branch. In others, there are clear indications that the court had
already acted upon the petition even before the case was assigned to it by raffle.55 This circumstance
led to a suspicion that the petitions were just stamped "received" on the day of the raffle, so that they
could be assigned to predetermined courts.56
Of the 65 case records examined, 59 contained an investigation report submitted by Prosecutor

Rosa Elmina Catacutan-Villarin stating that "she is not in a position to tell whether collusion exists or
not."57 Civil Case Nos. 2666-09 and 2916-09 proceeded to trial, and the petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage were granted even if no investigation reports were found in the records.
5. Finality of judgment despite non-service of copies of the decisions on the respondents
In four cases, the certificate of finality and the decree of absolute nullity of marriage were issued
despite the fact that the copy of the decision sent to the respondents bore the notation "returned to
sender."58
6. Issuance of the decree of nullity of marriage despite absence of proof that the entry of judgment
had been registered with the local civil registrar
In 40 cases, the certificate of finality and the decree of nullity were issued on the same day; in seven
cases, the decree of nullity was even issued ahead of the certificate of finality.59
7. Grant of petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage at the extraordinary speed of
six months or less
Of the 65 case records examined, 50 were found to have been granted in six months or less from
the date of filing to the rendition of judgment.60
RTC Imus 21
1. Improper venue
Out of the 62 cases examined, 19 have indications of improper venue.61 In the petition in Civil Case
No. 2329-08, while the body alleged that the petitioner was a resident of Damariñas, Cavite, and the
respondent of Valenzuela City, the verification expressly stated that the petition was to be filed in
Pasay City.62 In the petition in Civil Case No. 2691-09, while the body alleged that the petitioner was
a resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite, the verification stated that she was a resident of Silang, Cavite,
which was outside the jurisdiction of the court. There were eight cases in which a party had the
same address as a party in another case.63
In Civil Case No. 3026-09, the petition stated that both parties were based in Italy. Despite the fact
that the petitioner had no record of travel back to the Philippines since 18 July 2002, she was able to
execute a judicial affidavit in Makati City, and it was allowed in court by Judge Norberto J.
Quisumbing, Jr. (Judge Quisumbing).64
Improper service of summons was shown in 25 cases, mainly because Sheriff Wilmar M. De Villa
(Sheriff De Villa) resorted to a substituted service of summons without observing the requirements
therefor.65 In Civil Case No. 2963-09, the summons was returned unserved because the respondent
was in the United States, and yet the case proceeded and the petition was eventually granted.66 The
respondents in Civil Case Nos. 3208- 09 and 2733-09 had the same address, but Sheriff De Villa
was able to make both a personal and a substituted service on the two respondents in that address.
3. No collusion report
Despite the lack of answer from the respondents, no investigation report regarding collusion can be
found in 13 out of all the cases examined.67
six months or less
Of the 62 case records examined, 15 were found to have been granted in six months or less from
the date of filing to the rendition of judgment.68
RTC lmus 22
1. Improper venue
Out of 118 cases examined, 36 have clear indications of improper venue.69 Some of the addresses in
Cavite indicated in the petitions appear to be highly suspicious, if not fictitious. In Civil Case No.
3227-09, the petitioner alleged in the petition that he resided in Imus, Cavite, but likewise indicated
an "alternative" address in Quezon City where summons and other court processes may be served
on him.70 In Civil Case No. 2545-09, the petitioner stated in his petition that he resided in Imus,
Cavite, while the respondent lived in Quezon City. However, the body of the petition stated that
petitioner had earlier initiated the same proceeding before the R TC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18.
Petitioner's verification in Civil Case No. 2839-09 bears no signature of the alleged notary public.
The notices sent to several parties were "returned to sender" because the addresses were
insufficient, incomplete, vague, unknown or could not be located. In others, the addressees were
unknown at the given address, or they were abroad, or had moved out. Despite these irregularities,
Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang (Judge Mangrobang) allowed these cases to prosper.
There were eight cases in which a party had the same address as a party in another
case.71 Furthermore, the address of Process Server Elmer S. Azcueta (Process Server Azcueta)
appears to be the same as the address of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 1256-07.72
2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons In 88 cases, there were indications of

questionable jurisdiction or improper service of summons.73 Copies of orders setting the cases for
pretrial were "returned to sender" for the following reasons: unknown address; unlocated/no such
name and number of house on the given address; unknown/unlocated; or no such name. However,
Process Server Azcueta indicated in the prior returns of summons that he was able to make a
substituted service on the respondents in those addresses.74 He also made a substituted service on
a person named "Shiela G. Villanueva" on two separate occasions in two different addresses in two
different cases.75 The same irregularity is shown in the case of an individual named "Rosemarie
Magno."76
Process Server Azcueta also served summonses on persons in distant provinces outside the
jurisdiction of the court, such as Sorsogon, Isabela, and Cagayan de Oro City. There were numerous
cases in which he indicated in the returns that he was able to make a personal service of summons,
but that the respondent refused to sign or acknowledge receipt.77 He also resorted to a substituted
service without observing the requirements therefor. Worse, there are cases in which no
summonses or returns thereof were found in the records.
3. No collusion report Despite the lack of answer from the respondents, no investigation report
regarding collusion can be found in 16 out of 118 cases examined.78
4. In one case, the rendition of a decision even before the admission of exhibits
The decision in Civil Case No. 3702-10 was rendered four days ahead of the issuance of the order
admitting all documentary exhibits and submitting the case for decision.79
5. In another, the absence of a verification and certification against forum shopping
The petition in Civil Case No. 3092-09 was given due course despite the absence of a verification
and certification against forum shopping.80
6. Finality of judgment despite the non-service of copies of the decisions on the respondents
In eight cases, the certificate of finality was issued despite the fact that the copy of the decision sent
to the respondents bore the notation "returned to sender."81
7. Issuance of the decree of nullity of marriage despite the absence of proof that the entry of
judgment had been registered with the local civil registrar
In four cases, the certificate of finality and the decree of nullity were issued on the same day.82
six months or less
Out of the 118 cases examined, 46 were found to have been granted in six months or less from the
date of filing to the rendition of judgment.83 In fact, Civil Case No. 2434-08 for declaration of nullity of
marriage was granted at the record speed of 25 days from the date of filing to the rendition of
judgment granting the petition.84
RTC Dasmariñas 90
1. Improper venue
Out of 88 cases examined, 28 have clear indications of improper venue.85 Some of the addresses in
Cavite are incomplete or vague.86 The notices sent to several parties were "returned to sender"
because the addresses were insufficient, incomplete or unknown.
There were four cases in which a party had the same address as a party in another
case.87 Furthermore, the address of Social Worker Officer Alma N. Serilo (Social Worker Serilo) of
the RTC Office of the Clerk of Court was the same as the address of the petitioners in Civil Case
Nos. 2893- 09 and 3179-09.88
In 45 cases, there were indications of questionable jurisdiction or improper service of

summons.89 There were numerous cases in which Process Server Pontejos indicated in the returns
that he was able to make a personal service of summons, but that the respondent refused to sign or
acknowledge receipt.90 He also resorted to a substituted service of summons without observing the
requirements therefor.91 In Civil Case Nos. 2940-09 and 1860-08, Process Server Pontejos allegedly
served summonses personally on the respondents who resided in Camarines Norte. In Civil Case
No. 3374-09, summons for the respondent was served by the sheriff of the Office of the Clerk of
Court of RTC Iloilo City and received in Iloilo City by the sister of the petitioner. The summons in
Civil Case No. 1528-07 was returned unserved, and yet the case proceeded and the petition was
eventually granted.
3. In one case, the grant of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage even without the
appearance of any of the parties
Civil Case No. 3443-10 was a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of
the formal requisite of a marriage license. During the initial trial on 7 June 2010, petitioner's counsel
and the public prosecutor entered into a stipulation with respect to a certification from the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar that no license was issued relative to the questioned marriage.92 Thereafter,
the case was submitted for decision and eventually granted. None of the parties appeared, as they
were both nonresidents of the Philippines as alleged in the petition.
Of the 88 cases examined, 65 were filed and raffled on the same day.93 This circumstance leads to a
suspicion that the petitions were just stamped "received" on the day of the raffle, so that they could
be assigned to predetermined courts. The record of Civil Case No. 3676-10 shows that it was raffled
on 12 April 2010, yet the return of summons showed that it was personally served on the respondent
on 25 March 2010. This discrepancy indicates that the court had already acted upon the petition
even before the case was assigned to it by raffle.
In 36 cases, the certificate of finality and the decree of nullity were issued on the same day.94
six months or less
Out of the 88 cases examined, 50 were found to have been granted in six months or less from the
date of filing to the rendition of judgment.95 In the Resolution dated 12 August 2014,96 the Court
required the following to submit their comments on the findings of the OCA:
RTC Imus 20: Judge Felicen, Clerk of Court Atty. Allan Sly M. Marasigan (Clerk of Court Marasigan),
Court Interpreter Juntilla, Court Stenographer Reyes, Sheriff Pagunsan, and Process Server Ferrer;
RTC Imus 21: Judge Quisumbing and Sheriff De Villa;
RTC Imus 22: Judge Mangrobang,97 Clerk of Court Atty. Seter M. Dela Cruz-Cordez (Clerk of Court
Cordez), and Process Server Azcueta;
RTC Dasmarifias 90: Judge Cabrera-Faller and Process Server Pontejos;
Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC, Imus, Cavite: Clerk of Court Atty. Regalado E. Eusebio
(Clerk of Court Eusebio), and Social Worker Serilo.
The Court also referred a copy of the Investigation Report to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
appropriate action relative to the findings on the possible involvement of private practitioners in the
anomalies relative to the declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage cases.
The charges against all other court personnel were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
In their comments, respondents explained:
RTC Imus20
1. Improper venue
Process Server Ferrer states that his duty as process server is ministerial, and that whatever is
referred to him for service on the parties is served by him.98 He is not in a position to determine or
ascertain whether the names or addresses appearing in the court processes are genuine or bogus.
Sheriff Pagunsan echoes this argument.99 Clerk of Court Marasigan states that his duty of signing the
summons to be served is also ministerial, for it is not his duty to determine whether the addresses of
the parties are valid, existing, certain, and verifiable.100 He adds that he has no authority to question,
much less prevent, the continuation of the trial of particular cases if there is a question on the
residence of the parties.101 The matter rests upon the judicial discretion of the judge.
Judge Felicen insists that the parties who indicated that they resided in Cavite were indeed residents
of Cavite. They were able to attend the hearings in court.102 F0urthermore, the public prosecutor also
sent notices to the parties at their given addresses, and they were able to appear before her for the
collusion investigation.103 He adds that the allegation that a party has resided within the jurisdiction of
the court for six months is not part of the "complete facts constituting the cause of action" as
provided under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.104 At any rate, a falsified address as stated in the petition
constitutes extrinsic fraud and may be the subject of an appeal. In these cases, no appeal was filed
by the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General.105
As regards Civil Case No. 2785-09, Judge Felicen explains that the statement of the respondent in
the latter's Answer that the petitioner was not a resident of Imus, Cavite, was immaterial. It must be
noted that the respondent submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.106 Furthermore, he did not
submit a pretrial brief or present evidence to support his claim. Thus, Judge Felicen found that a
discussion in the decision regarding the respondent's allegation was unnecessary. Between the
petitioner's affirmative allegation that she was a resident of Imus, Cavite, and the respondent's
baseless denial, the court ruled in favor of the petitioner.
Judge Felicen also emphasizes that the petitioner appeared in all stages of the proceedings and
testified in open court.107 He does not know about the alleged certification from the Bureau of
Immigration showing that the petitioner had no record of arrival in or departure from the country from
January 1993 to 28 May 2013. But when the petitioner testified, she gave her name and personal
circumstances under oath. With her counsel, an officer of the court, assisting her, the court had no
reason to doubt her identity.108
For their part, Interpreter Juntilla and Stenographer Reyes explain that on 3 March 2010, a verbal
oath was administered to the witness, who identified herself as the petitioner in Civil Case No. 2785-
09.109 She was even asked to state her name and other personal circumstances for the record. After
her testimony, she signed the minutes of the proceedings, and a visual comparison of the signatures
therein and the verification of the petition showed a match. Interpreter Juntilla and Stenographer
Reyes argue that they were in no position to question the identity of the witness, who appeared
before the court and testified under pain of criminal prosecution. If it later turns out that the witness is
a charlatan, any falsity committed with respect to the latter's personal circumstances should not be
attributed to them.110
As regards Civil Case No. 3141-09, Judge Felicen explains that the mere allegation of the
respondent that the petitioner was not a resident of Cavite is not supported by any evidence
whatsoever.111 The court could not have ordered the outright dismissal of the petition because of
respondent's bare allegation. It does not matter that mail matters addressed to the petitioner at her
given Cavite address were returned with the notation "RTS-address is unknown and incomplete,"
because she was able to appear and fully participate in the proceedings of the case.112
Process Server Ferrer insists that he personally served summons on parties at their given addresses
in Cavite.113The fact that the notation "returned to sender" was made on the subsequent orders of the
court sent to the same addresses may be explained by the possibility that the parties no longer
resided there at the time. He laments that, considering the nature of these cases in which the parties
were at odds with each other, the respondents and their next of kin may not have been inclined to
sign or acknowledge their receipt of summons, much less entertain him as process server.114 Still, he
exerted diligent efforts to serve the summons by returning on two separate occasions. But when they
still refused to sign the summons, he had no choice but to reflect in the return that the recipient
received the summons but refused to sign or acknowledge receipt.
Sheriff Pagunsan believes that when he made a substituted service of summons on the respondents
by leaving copies thereof at the front door of their houses, he was merely doing his duties and
functions, because there was no one who would receive them.115 It was actually an act of prudence
on his part in anticipation of the actual receipt of the summons by the respondents at a later time. He
echoes the lament of Process Server Ferrer regarding the cold treatment that the latter gets from the
respondents and their next of kin.116 Sheriff Pagunsan also admitted that in Civil Case No. 3259-09,
he served summons on the respondent in Camarines Sur. His travel expenses were shouldered by
the petitioner therein.
For his part, Clerk of Court Marasigan claims that he does not possess any express authority to
reject or order the amendment of a return of summons if the service thereof was done with a
procedural lapse by the process server and the sheriff.117
With regard to Civil Case No. 3222-09, Judge Felicen states that the mere existence of the
respondent's request letter for a copy of the petition should not be construed as indicative of the
sheriffs failure to tender a copy thereof upon the respondent through Gino Uson.118 The respondent
eventually secured a copy of the petition when he went to court, but he never filed a responsive
pleading, nor did he participate in the proceedings of the case.119
Judge Felicen and Clerk of Court Marasigan point out that the raffling of cases is a process under
the direct control of the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff and under the supervision
of the executive judge.120 Clerk of Court Marasigan states that, as such, the process was beyond the
regular scope of his duty, so he had no participation therein whatsoever.121 On the other hand, Judge
Felicen emphasizes that the judges of the RTC Imus 20, 21, 22 and RTC Dasmariñas 90 have no
option or privi1ege to choose or se1ect cases to be assigned to their courts.122
They explain that with regard to Civil Case No. 1852-08 - the records of which were received by RTC
Imus 20 on 4 February 2008 - the allegation of irregularity originated from the erroneous stamp of
the Office of the Clerk of Court stating that the case was filed on 24 February 2008.123 Based on the
receipts for the payment of legal fees, the case was actually filed on 1 February 2008.
The alleged irregularity in Civil Case No. 3309-09 stems from the return stating that although an
attempt to serve the summons was made on 6 November 2009, the case was transmitted to RTC
Imus 20 only on 23 November 2009.124Again, it is claimed that there was an error in the date of the
return of the summons, caused by the use of an old return and the mistaken use of the "copy and
paste" functions of the word processor.125
Judge Felicen explains that the statement of the public prosecutor that "she is not in a position to tell
whether collusion exists or not" is always accompanied by a manifestation that she will actively
participate in the proceedings to safeguard against collusion or fabricated evidence.126 The court
relies on the regular performance of duties by the public prosecutor and proceeds to hear and try the
petition. The judge has no control over how the public prosecutor conducts the investigation.127 To
reject the latter's report would result in an unreasonable and indefinite deferment of trial.128
5. Finality of judgment despite non-service of the copies of the decisions to the respondents
Judge Felicen and Clerk of Court Marasigan explain that the certificate of finality is only given to
them for signature by the clerk in charge, who is tasked with verifying the records in order to
determine whether the decision has indeed attained finality.129 At any rate, Clerk of Court Marasigan
notes that copies of the decisions were not served on the respondents, because the returns bore the
notation "RTS-moved out/moved."130 Respondents are duty-bound to inform the court of any change
in their addresses, and the finality of the decisions cannot be held hostage by the absence of
forwarding addresses.
Judge Felicen points out that under Section 19 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the immediate issuance of
a decree of nullity of marriage upon the finality of the decision is mandated if the parties have no
properties.131 Thus, there was no need for prior registration of the entry of judgment with the civil
registrar, considering that the parties in the identified cases had no properties declared in their
petitions.132
six months or less
Judge Felicen argues that because the petitions in these cases were uncontested,133 only the
petitioners presented evidence. Furthermore, the court is tasked to render a decision within 90 days
from the time the case is submitted for decision. Thus, the early disposition of cases should not be
taken against the judge, as it is just in keeping with the mandate of speedy administration of justice.
RTC Imus21
1. Improper venue
Judge Quisumbing alleges that there is no merit in the observation of the OCA that 19 out of the 62
cases examined showed vague addresses indicating improper venue. He explains that the
addresses in Cavite and other provinces do not have house numbers.134 Some addresses are
identified only by their block and lot numbers.
In Civil Case No. 2329-08, Judge Quisumbing states that the verification of the petition expressly
stating that the petition was to be filed in Pasay City did not mean that the petitioner was a resident
of that city.135 What was controlling was her allegation in the petition that she was a resident of
Cavite, a fact she repeated when she testified in court. Judge Quisumbing explains that the same is
true regarding the verification in Civil Case No. 2691-09, in which the petitioner stated that she was a
resident of Silang, Cavite. He, however, points out that the respondent in that case was a resident of
Kawit, Cavite, which was within the jurisdiction of his sala. 136
As regards those instances when a party in one case had the same address as a party in another
case, Judge Quisumbing offers the possibility that the petitioners really lived in the same house,
because they were both separated from their respective spouses.137 Also, considering that two of
these parties had addresses that did not contain house numbers, it was possible that they only lived
in the same street.138
Finally, with regard to the observation in Civil Case No. 3026-09 that the petitioner therein had no
record of travel back to the Philippines since 18 July 2002, Judge Quisumbing only knows that on 19
July 2010, a person who introduced herself as the petitioner in the case testified under oath in open
court in his presence and that of his court staff, the public prosecutor, and the petitioner 's counsel.139
Sheriff De Villa explains that he only resorts to substituted service when he is able to talk with the
addressee over the phone.140 He confirms the identity of the addressee through the details in the
petition and its annexes. The latter usually advises him to give the summons to the person present in
the house.141 Afterwards, he also interviews the person present and verifies that person's relationship
with the addressee. He believes that this procedure fulfils the requirement that he exert all efforts to
serve the summons. He also points out that no party in the cases examined by the OCA ever
complained that there was an improper service of summons.142 He admits that he even went as far as
Nueva Ecija to serve a summons on the respondent in Civil Case No. 2908-09. As the summons
was given to him for service, he believed that he was duty-bound to obey the order of the court.143
Judge Quisumbing explains that he reminds Sheriff De Villa to be careful in the service of summons.
The judge also points out that the immediate resort to substituted service is the problem not only of
his court, but of all other courts as well. However, he believes that this practice should not be
branded as a "blatant irregularity."144
In Civil Case No. 2963-09, Sheriff De Villa says that it is not true that summons was returned
unserved. According to the sheriff's return, the summons was received by the respondent's brother
after several failed attempts to serve it on the respondent himself.145
Sheriff De Villa says it is only now that he realizes that the respondents in Civil Case Nos. 3208-09
and 2733-09 have the same address, because his main concern then was to obey the order to serve
the summons.146 Judge Quisumbing offers the possibility that one respondent lived in that address
after the other had left it.147
Judge Quisumbing explains that in the 13 cases where there was no investigation report regarding
collusion, the public prosecutor manifested that he would forego the submission of that report and
instead actively participate in the proceedings.148 At times, the nonexistence of collusion is
determined by the public prosecutor through a cross-examination of the petitioner during the latter's
court testimony or deposition. Judge Quisumbing stresses that these manifestations are clearly
stated in the records.
six months or less
Judge Quisumbing explains that it is the practice of his court to resolve cases as soon as they are
submitted for decision, especially where there is no reason to delay the resolution of uncontested
cases.149 He states that judges are always reminded to devise means for the quick disposition of
cases. At any rate, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not prescribe a period within which to decide cases
for the declaration of nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages, except that
provided in the Constitution and the Rules of Court.150
RTC Imus 22
1. Improper venue
Judge Mangrobang submits that it is not within his bounden duty to ascertain whether the parties are
truthful in their allegations as to their respective residences.151 Assuming it were so, the court may not
dismiss an action motu proprio on the mere ground of improper venue.152 He stresses that no motion
to dismiss on that ground was filed either by the respondent or the public prosecutor on behalf of the
Solicitor General.153
Clerk of Court Cordez submits that her duties to receive pleadings, motions and other court-bound
papers is purely ministerial.154While it is possible that parties feigned their addresses in their petitions,
she is not in a position to determine the veracity thereof.155
Process Server Azcueta argues that he did not allow the petitioner in Civil Case No. 1256-07 to use
his address in Cavite.156 He says that he did not serve court processes on the petitioner because
these were coursed through her counsel. Neither did he have any chance to catch a glimpse of the
address when he served the summons on the respondent; otherwise, he would have called the
attention of the court.157 At any rate, he offers the possibility that the encoding of the address may
have been due to a typographica1 error.158
Clerk of Court Cordez emphasizes that she was not remiss in her duties to constantly remind the
process server of the proper service of summons.159 She believes that the process server complied in
good faith pursuant to the doctrine of regularity in the performance of official duties. The fact that
subsequent orders sent to the addresses of the parties were returned with the notation "unknown
addressee or moved out" might only mean that the addressees had indeed moved out, or that the
postal worker had not diligently performed his duties.160
This opinion was echoed by Judge Mangrobang.161 He adds that it is not within the power of the court
to ensure that respondents remain in their residence in the course of the proceedings. They are
considered to have waived their right to present evidence if they do not participate in the
proceedings, or if they transfer to another residence without informing the court.
He also submits that the rules provide that if the respondent refuses to receive or sign the summons,
it is enough that the same is tendered to the latter.162 Indeed, if the service of summons was
questionable, the court's attention should have been called by the public prosecutor.163 The court is
not required to conduct a hearing motu proprio on the validity of the service of summons in view of
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Process Server Azcueta claims
that he normally serves a summons personally, and only when he cannot locate the person after
several attempts does he resort to substituted service.164 He also believes that he prepares the
returns for substituted service in accordance with the rules, because he indicates therein the reason
for the substituted service and the dates when he attempted personal service.165 He argues that none
of the parties in the cases before RTC Imus 22, and not even the public prosecutor or the Solicitor
General, complained about any improper service of summons.166 This argument is echoed by Clerk of
Court Cordez.167
Process Server Azcueta also points out that the format of the return of summons under the 2002
Revised Manual for Clerks of Court allows process servers or sheriffs to indicate that the recipient of
the summons refused to sign or acknowledge receipt.168 The reason for behind this format is that they
have no power to coerce the recipient to sign the summons being served. Contrary to the allegation
of the OCA, he says that he made a substituted service on a person named "Shiela G. Villanueva"
only in Civil Case No. 3170-09, because the summons in Civil Case No. 3151-09 was received by
one "Ma. Paz C. Baun."169 He made a substituted service on a person named "Rosemarie Magno"
only in Civil Case No. 2942-09, because the summons in Civil Case No. 2946-09 was received by
one "Rosan M. Aringo."170 He admits, though, that he has indeed served a summons in Cagayan de
Oro City, but that he did so in good faith. Based on his mistaken reading of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 12 dated 12 October 1985,171 he thought that the directive applies only to
the execution of writs, garnishments and attachments.172 He apologizes for the mistake and
undertakes to never again serve a summons outside the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite.
He states that attaching the returns to the records is the job of the clerk in charge of civil cases.
However, the fact that no returns of summons were attached to the records of some cases does not
mean that there was an improper service of summons on respondents. Evidence shows that they
were able to file answers or receive subsequent orders from the court.173 This statement was echoed
by Clerk of Court Cordez, who attached to her comment the summonses bearing the signature of the
respondents who received them.174 She and Judge Mangrobang add that it is not impossible for the
summonses and returns to be accidentally detached from the records, considering that the folders of
closed and terminated cases are packed and cramped in a small space inside the
courtroom.175Numerous instances of retrieval and photocopying might have damaged the folders and
their contents.
Judge Mangrobang explains that despite repeated orders from the court, the public prosecutor failed
to submit a collusion report. Nevertheless, the latter actively participated in the court proceedings. In
an effort to resolve the cases with dispatch, the court proceeded with trial despite the non-
submission of a collusion report. While this tack may be a deviation from the rules, it does not
constitute grave misconduct; it is, instead, an error of judgment that may be properly raised in a
judicial forum and not in administrative proceedings against the judge.176
4. In one case, the rendition of the decision even before the admission of exhibits
Judge Mangrobang explains that because of a typographical error, the order admitting all
documentary exhibits and submitting the case for decision bore the date 31 August 2010.177 In truth,
it was issued earlier than the decision, which was dated 27 August 2010.
5. In another, the absence of a verification and certification against forum shopping
Judge Mangrobang offers the possibility that, since the verification and certification against forum
shopping are usually on in one page, that page was accidentally detached from the records.178 The
lack of a verification and certification against forum shopping could not have escaped the notice of
the Office of the Clerk of Court and the public prosecutor, who would have filed the appropriate
pleading to inform the court of the deficiency.
6. Finality of judgment despite non-service of copies of the decisions on the respondents
Clerk of Court Cordez emphasizes that she never issued a certificate of finality unless there was
proof of receipt of the decision by the parties and the Solicitor General.179 She states that she cannot
be blamed if the copy of the decision sent to the parties were "UNSERVED" with the added notation
"unknown address or moved out," because they should have informed the court of their new
addresses.180 Nevertheless, she says that her issuance of the certificates of finality was not motivated
by any ill motive, but by an honest belief that the procedure she followed did not violate any law, rule
or administrative order.181
For his part, Judge Mangrobang states that there is nothing amiss in the issuance of a certificate of
finality when the records reveal that notices and copies of the decisions were sent to the parties at
their last known addresses.182Failure of the parties to be vigilant in monitoring their cases should not
be blamed on the court.
Judge Mangrobang submits that the requirement that the entry of judgment be registered with the
local civil registrar before the issuance of a decree of nullity is applicable only when the grounds for
the declaration of nullity are Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code.183 It is not required for marriages
declared void ab initio under Article 36.
six months or less
Judge Mangrobang explains that cases involving the declaration of nullity of marriage are not difficult
to decide. Hence, he finds no reason to delay the promulgation of the decision after the parties have
terminated the presentation of their evidence.184 He laments the possibility that judges would be
penalized for resolving cases with dispatch rather than for unreasonable delay in resolving them.
RTC Dasmariñas 90
1. Improper venue
Social Worker Serilo states that she has no knowledge as to how or why her address was used as
the address of the petitioners in Civil Case Nos. 2893-09 and 3179-09.185 She explains that she is not
acquainted with the parties or their counsels, and that she does not know how they came to know
her address. However, she points out that she testifies in open court in adoption cases, and that her
personal circumstances - including her address - have become part of the records of these cases.
Process Server Pontejos explains that the "refused to sign" annotation he makes on the summonses
just means that the recipient refused to sign the latter's name.186 He deems it best to make this
annotation in order to indicate that the summons was properly served. He even leaves his contact
number with the recipients of the summons in case they need to reach him.
He also explains that his failure to abide by the rules on substituted service of summons was due to
inadvertence, because he had in mind the immediate service of summons without going through the
tedious process provided in the rules.187 He points out, though, that he zealously seeks the
whereabouts of the addressees. He resorts to a substituted service only if they are not around, in
which case he explains to the person present the consequences of receiving the summons on behalf
of the addressee.188 As regards Civil Case Nos. 2940-09 and 1860-08, in which he served a
summons in Camarines Norte, he explains that he is a Bicolano; as such, he is familiar with the Bicol
region.189
3. In one case, the grant of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage even without the
appearance of any of the parties
Judge Cabrera-Faller narrates the entire history of the case and insists that, contrary to the
observation of the OCA, a hearing was conducted for the presentation of one witness. However, the
latter's testimony was later dispensed with pursuant to a stipulation between the public prosecutor
and the petitioner's counsel.190
Judge Cabrera-Faller claims that the raffle and distribution of cases on the same day is not a baffling
situation; rather, it is an efficient system of working out the early disposition of cases.191 In other
courts, the distribution of cases to the concerned courts is done a week after the raffle.192
With regard to Civil Case No. 3676-10, while it was indeed raffled on 12 April 2010, the return of the
summons showed that it was personally received by the respondent on 14 April 2010, and not 25
March 2010 as reported by the OCA.193
Judge Cabrera-Faller explains that the issuance of actual court processes is not always done by the
books, and that it sometimes has to give way to the convenience of the court and the requesting
persons.194
She explains the procedure in her court. After the issuance of a decision granting the declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage, they send copies to the parties, their counsels, the public
prosecutor, the Solicitor General, the National Statistics Office, and the local civil registrars of both
the place where the parties were married and the place where the court is sitting.195 Thereafter, the
winning party can return to the court to secure the entry of final judgment after the lapse of the
appeal period. Usually, the court issues the entry of final judgment and the decree of nullity of
marriage on the same day as the request therefor, so that the winning party can have the documents
registered with the local civil registrar.196 This procedure is designed precisely for facility in the
registration of these certificates.197
six months or less
Judge Cabrera-Faller sees nothing "extraordinary" about resolving cases within six months,
especially since these cases are uncontroverted even by the State.198 She explains that she did not
want to burden the court's calendar by prolonging the proceedings therein.
As regards the questionable raffling of cases in his office, Clerk of Court Eusebio submits that the
raffle of cases are held every Monday at 11:45 a.m. and are attended by the judges of RTC Imus 20,
21 and 22; and RTC Dasmariñas 90.199 All cases filed in the afternoon of every Monday up to 11:30
in the morning of the following Monday are included in the next raffle.
He and Judge Quisumbing, the executive judge, reiterate the explanation of Judge Cabrera-Faller
with regard to the regularity of the raffle of Civil Case No. 3676-10; and of Judge Felicen and Clerk
of Court Marasigan with regard to Civil Case Nos. 1852-08 and 3309-09.200 They aver that those
cases, identified to have been filed and raffled on the same day, were indeed filed in the morning of
a Monday and, hence, included in the raffle at 11:45 a.m. that day.201
For his part, Judge Quisumbing states that he does not have any control over the number of cases
filed and raffled.202 After each raffle, the clerk of court distributes the case records not later than 3:00
p.m. of the same day to the branches to which they have been raffled.
A.M. Nos. RTJ-11-2301 and 12-9-188-RTC, to the CA for immediate raffle among the members
thereof. The investigating CA justice was directed to evaluate the cases and make a report and
recommendation thereon within 90 days from notice.
A.M. No. 12-9-188-RTC
In a letter dated 1 June 2012 addressed to the OCA,204 a "concerned employee" of RTC Dasmariñas
90 claimed to have personal knowledge that the decision rendered by Judge Cabrera-Faller in Civil
Case No. 1998-08 was for a cash consideration. According to the letter writer, the petitioner therein,
Armando Tunay, was an American citizen who had never been a resident of the Philippines.
However, in his petition, he allegedly used a fictitious address in Dasmariñas, Cavite. Despite being
fully aware of this fact, Judge Cabrera-Faller granted the petition in less than six months. The letter
writer added that the judge did not deserve to be in the judiciary because of her partiality and
corruption.
At the time of the receipt of the anonymous letter, a full investigation by the OCA of the proceedings
in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302 was underway; hence, it recommended that the letter be included among
the subjects of the investigation.205 In a Resolution dated 12 November 2012,206 the Court approved
the OCA recommendation and consolidated A.M. No. 12-9-188- RTC with A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302.
Judge Cabrera-Faller was likewise required to comment on the anonymous letter.
In her comment dated 6 February 2013,207 Judge Cabrera-Faller expressed disbelief that the letter
could have been written by her staff in view of the letter writer's impeccable English. She suspected
that the real perpetrator of the evil scheme just wanted to put her in even worse light at a time when
she was already facing several other administrative complaints. She pointed out that Armando
Tunay never hid the fact of his citizenship, as he definitively alleged in his petition that he was a
naturalized American citizen. Upon an ocular inspection of the given address in the petition, Judge
Cabrera-Faller was able to verify that the address truly existed; hence, it was not true that it was
fictitious. Based on the attached affidavit of Armando Tunay,208 he stayed in that house owned by
their family friend six months before the filing of the petition and until a year after the termination of
the proceedings. Judge Cabrera-Faller emphasizes that she does not accept cash considerations for
favorable decisions in her court.
She points out that the State never questioned the address of the petitioner as stated in the petition,
nor did it file any opposition during the proceedings.209 While admitting that Civil Case No. 1998-08
was indeed decided in less than six months, she emphasizes that she has always observed the rule
on the speedy disposition of both civil and criminal cases.
A.M. Nos. RTJ-11-2301 and RTJ-11- 2302, to the CA for immediate raffle among the members
thereof. The investigating CA justice was directed to evaluate the cases and make a report and
recommendation thereon within 90 days from notice.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTIGATING JUSTICE
The instant administrative cases were raffled to CA Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes
(Justice Paredes). She submitted her Amended Report211 on 4 October 2016.212
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301
Justice Paredes agreed with the OCA finding that Judge CabreraFaller did not take appropriate
action in all the cases that had not been acted upon for a considerable length of time from the dates
of their filing, including those without further setting, with pending incidents or submitted for
decision.213 In this light, Justice Paredes recommends that the judge be fined in the amount of
₱l0,000 for failure to comply with the Court's Resolution.
On the other hand, OIC Suluen fails to satisfactorily explain why certain cases for declaration of
nullity and annulment of marriage pending with the court proceeded despite the absence of vital
documents.214 As OIC branch clerk of court, she was charged with the efficient recording, filing and
management of court records besides having administrative supervision over court personnel. For
lack of diligence in the performance of administrative functions amounting to simple neglect of duty,
Judge Paredes recommends that a fine in the amount of ₱20,000 be imposed on OIC Suluen.
Justice Paredes found the practice of Process Server Pontejos of serving summonses on the
immediate relatives of respondents unacceptable.215 Considering that it is through the service of
summons by process servers that courts acquire jurisdiction over respondents, he was duty-bound
to discharge his duties with the prudence, caution and attention that careful persons usually exercise
in the management of their affairs. His failure to comply with the requirements set in Manotoc v.
CA amounted to simple neglect of duty. For his offense, Justice Paredes recommends the imposition
of a fine in the amount of ₱5,000.
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302
On the allegation of improper venue for the declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage cases
lodged against all four judges, Justice Paredes found only Judge Felicen liable.216 Justice Paredes
recalled that while the plaintiff or the respondent must be residents of the place where the action was
instituted at the time it is commenced, improper venue as a ground to dismiss may be raised only by
the parties to the action. In this case, none of the parties, or even the State, raised this ground
during the proceedings in the audited cases. The only one who raised it was the respondent in Civil
Case No. 2785-09 filed before RTC Imus 20.217 The respondent thereon sought to dismiss the
petition on the ground that none of the parties were residents of Cavite. The complaint could have
only been filed before the court in the place where the respondent resided because the petitioner
had been living in Taiwan and had no residence in the Philippines. Thus, Justice Paredes found that
Judge Felicen erred when he failed to dismiss the case.
On the improper service of summons, Justice Paredes clears all four judges.218 She indicates that
while an improper service of summons may mean lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent, the latter may waive that defense by voluntarily appearing before the court or by failing
to seasonably object to its jurisdiction. In all the audited cases, not one of the respondents upon
whom a substituted service of summons was made filed a timely motion to dismiss the action for
lack of jurisdiction over the respondent's person.
However, Justice Paredes finds that Process Server Pontejos, Sheriff Pagunsan, Process Server
Azcueta and Sheriff De Villa had failed to comply with the guidelines of Manotoc.219 Sheriff Pagunsan
even admitted to leaving copies of the summons at the doors of the houses of respondents in
anticipation of their receipt of it at a later time. For this negligence, Justice Paredes finds them guilty
of simple neglect of duty.220 Considering that all of them admitted to serving summons outside the
territorial jurisdiction of their courts, Justice Paredes also finds them guilty of abuse of
authority.221 She recommends that Sheriff Pagunsan, Process Server Azcueta and Sheriff De Villa be
fined in the amount of ₱5,000 each for simple neglect of duty and another ₱5,000 each for abuse of
authority, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely.
For their failure to properly supervise the court personnel in their respective branches, specifically
with regard to the proper service of summons on litigants, Clerks of Court Cordez and Marasigan
were likewise found guilty of simple neglect of duty.222 Justice Paredes recommends that they be
fined in the amount of ₱20,000 each, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
As regards Process Server Pontejos, he was already found guilty of simple neglect of duty in A.M.
No. RTJ-11-2301. The circumstances in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302 further reveal his gross and palpable
neglect of duty, for which the penalty of dismissal from service should be meted out to him.223
All four judges were cleared for issuing certificates of finality simultaneously with the decree of nullity
of marriage. Justice Paredes elucidates that pursuant to Section 19(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and
as illustrated in Diño v. Diño,224 the court shall forthwith issue the decree of nullity upon the finality of
the decision, if the parties have no properties.225
On the extraordinary speed with which petitions were granted, Justice Paredes found that Judge
Felicen carried the highest percentage of petitions granted in six months or less at 77%.226 She also
considered it notoriously impossible and improbable for Judge Mangrobang to decide a case within
25 days from the date of filing, regardless of the fact that it was an uncontested petition.227 Justice
Paredes reminds Judge Cabrera-Faller that petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage are regular family court cases, and not special proceedings for which jurisdictional
requirements need to be established. Yet, despite this unnecessary layer in the conduct of
proceedings, Judge Cabrera-Faller was still able to decide 57% of the declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage cases before her in six months or less.
Justice Paredes reminds the judges that they must behave at all times in ways that would promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. They must, therefore, avoid
impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. Indeed, the judicial audit in
these cases was prompted by reports that Cavite was a haven for "paid-for annulments."228
Thus, Justice Paredes finds Judge Felicen guilty of grave abuse of authority for failing to dismiss
Civil Case No. 2785-09 for improper venue and for granting petitions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage with extraordinary speed.229 She recommends that he be fined in the amount
of ₱40,000, which is to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
Justice Paredes finds that Judge Mangrobang's cavalier attitude towards marriage - shown when he
granted a petition 25 days after its filing - does not speak well of the reverence that the Constitution,
society and Filipino culture holds for marriage as the foundation of the family.230 She finds him guilty
of grave abuse of authority and recommends that he be fined in the amount of ₱40,000, to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
Judge Cabrera-Faller was also found guilty of grave abuse of authority for granting petitions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage with extraordinary speed. It is recommended that
she be fined in the amount of ₱40,000 and permanently enjoined from handling family court cases.231
On the other hand, Justice Paredes recommends that the charges against Judge Quisumbing be
dismissed.232Likewise, she finds no sufficient, clear and convincing evidence to hold Interpreter
Juntilla and Stenographer Reyes administratively liable, because they cannot be expected or
required to go beyond the usual practice of asking for names and personal circumstances in
ascertaining the real identities of the parties appearing before them.233 At the time that the petitioner
in Civil Case No. 2785-09 testified in court, nothing had put them on guard as to the witness's
identity.
The charge against Social Worker Serilo is also recommended to be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.234There was no evidence that she was directly involved in the filing of the petitions in which
her address was used as the petitioners' own. Neither was there any clear showing that she had
consented to the use of her address in that manner.
Similarly, there was insufficient evidence to hold Process Server Ferrer administratively liable,
because a reading of his comments and returns shows that he sufficiently complied with the
guidelines in Manotoc.235 Justice Paredes holds that there is a valid tender of summons even if the
respondent or another person of suitable age and discretion refuses to sign the original copy of the
summons.
Justice Paredes recommends that charges against Clerk of Court Eusebio be dismissed. She
believes that he was able to explain that the seemingly questionable raffling of cases among the
RTC branches was only brought about by inadvertence or mistakes in the indication of dates.236
A.M. No. 12-9-188-RTC
Justice Paredes points out that the issue in this administrative matter is whether money exchanged
hands for a favorable judgment in Civil Case No. 1998-08. She holds the considered opinion that the
purported graft and corruption reported in the anonymous complaint is just a figment of the letter
writer's imagination.237
During the clarificatory hearing conducted on 12 January 2016, Mrs. Orlinda Ojeda-Tunay testified
that the letter writer was her brother. He had allegedly been against her marriage with Armando
Tunay, whose remarriage was made possible by the grant of the petition in Civil Case No. 1998-
08.238 For Justice Paredes, this testimony - as against the amorphous, undefined and unsupported
charge in the anonymous letter - should be upheld. Thus, she recommends that the charge against
Judge Cabrera-Faller be dismissed.
OUR RULING
In the present administrative disciplinary proceedings against judges and court personnel,
respondents spring the defense that no objection from the parties, the public prosecutor, the Solicitor
General, or the State was ever raised against these alleged irregularities. To our mind, the fact that
respondent judges and court personnel are using judicial arguments does not speak well of the
strength of their position in these administrative complaints. The waiver of venue of civil actions or
the waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over persons - or, for that matter, any failure to raise
an objection - is relevant only to the judicial proceedings where that waiver was made.
Court personnel are, first and foremost, public officials.239 They are held to a high standard of ethics
in public service and exhorted to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity,
competence, and loyalty, as well as to uphold public interest over personal interest.240 As
professionals, they are expected to perform their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
intelligence and skill. The presence or absence of objections cannot be the measure by which our
public officials should perform their sacred duties. First and foremost, they should be guided by their
conscience; and, in the case of those employed in the judiciary, by a sense of responsibility for
ensuring not only that the job is done, but that it is done with a view to the proper and efficient
administration of justice.
Judges and court personnel are expected to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct, but even the
mere appearance of impropriety.241 In the instant administrative cases, respondents miserably failed
in this regard. Note must be taken that what prompted the judicial audit in the four courts involved
herein are reports that they have become havens for "paid-for annulments."
Improper Venue
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages), which took effect on 15 March 2003, provides that petitions shall be filed in the
Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at
least six months prior to the date of filing.242 In the case of nonresident respondents, it shall be filed
where they may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.
In OCA v. Flores,243 this Court has ruled that a deliberate disregard of the foregoing rule may be
shown by the judge's inexplicable persistence in trying and resolving cases despite glaring
circumstances that "should have created doubt as to the veracity of the residential addresses
declared in the petitions."244
In these cases, the records are replete with glaring circumstances that should have created doubt in
the minds of the respondent judges as to the veracity of the residential addresses declared in the
petitions. In all four courts, the OCA and the judicial audit teams found that most of the given
addresses were vague or incomplete. It may be true, as explained by Judge Quisumbing, that some
residential addresses in the provinces have no house numbers. Yet, the fact that most of the court
notices sent to the parties by R TC Imus 20 and 22 and R TC Dasmariñas 90 were "returned to
sender" shows that there was something amiss in the given addresses. It is even more curious that
the notices were "returned to sender" for the reason that the addressees were unknown at the given
address or could not be located.
More important, cases where parties have the same address as those in another case cannot be
explained away. In fact, out of the four respondent judges, only Judge Quisumbing attempted to give
an explanation of this anomaly. But his statement, instead of clarifying the matter, only operated to
strengthen the cases against them. He offers the possibility that the petitioners really lived in the
same house, because they were separated from their respective spouses. If this is indeed the case,
then the fact that these parties were represented by the same counsels shines an even more
disturbing light upon the observed irregularity.
In four cases decided by RTC Imus 20, the address of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 3045-09 is the
same as that of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 3118-09, while the address of the petitioner in Civil
Case No. 3117-09 is the same as that of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 3430-10.245 The counsel for
the petitioners in Civil Case Nos. 3045-09, 3118-09 and 3117-09 was Atty. Allan Rheynier D.
Bugayong, while the counsel for the petitioner in Civil Case No. 3430-10 was Atty. J.T. Leonardo
Santos.
In RTC Imus 21, the address of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 2729- 09 is the same as that of the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 3534-10. They were represented by Atty. Ruel B. Nairo.246 The address of
the petitioner in Civil Case No. 2733-09 is the same as that of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 3208-
09, and they were represented by Atty. Norman R. Gabriel.247 The address of the petitioner in Civil
Case No. 3490-10, represented by Atty. Aimee Jean P. Leaban, is the 8ame as that of the petitioner
in Civil Case No. 3558-10, represented by Atty. Ruel B. Nairo. The address of the petitioner in Civil
Case No. 3636-10 is the same as that of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 3786-10, and they were
both represented by Atty. Allan Rheynier D. Bugayong.
In RTC Imus 22, the address of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 2781- 09 is the same as that of the
petitioners in Civil Case Nos. 3040-09 and 3370-09.248 The address of the respondent in Civil Case
No. 2781-09 is the same as that of the respondents in Civil Case Nos. 3370-09 and 3371-09. The
counsel for petitioners in all of these cases was Atty. Clarissa L. Castro. The address of the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 2994-09 is the same as that of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 3092-09,
and they were both represented by Atty. Bernard R. Paredes.249 The address of the petitioner in Civil
Case No. 2589-09 represented by Atty. Herminio Valerio, is the same as that of the petitioner in Civil
Case No. 3170-09, represented by Atty. Cesar DC Geronimo.
In RTC Dasmariñas 90, the address of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 3623-10 is the same as that of
the respondent in Civil Case No. 2815-09.250 The address of the respondent in Civil Case No. 2991-
09 is the same as that of the respondent in Civil Case No. 3456-10, and they were both represented
by Atty. Omar Francisco.
It would appear that counsels maintain residences within the jurisdiction of friendly courts for their
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage cases. Considering, however, that the notices sent
to most of these addresses were also "returned to sender," we cannot even make the kindest
assumption that the parties actually resided in those addresses just for the sole purpose of having
their marriages declared null and void or annulled by a friendly court. What is clear is that there is a
conspiracy, at least between the counsels of these parties and the four courts, in order to reflect
paper compliance with the rule on venue.
In Civil Case No. 2785-09 before RTC Imus 20, it may be true that the respondent did not present
any proof to support his allegation in his Answer that the petitioner was not a resident of Imus,
Cavite. Nonetheless, Judge Felicen still made a false statement in his decision in that case when he
stated therein that "[d]espite the service of summons, no responsive pleading was filed by
respondent."251 He thought perhaps that the addition of the phrase "within the reglementary period"
would place the statement within the purview of the truth. Such dishonesty, aggravated by the fact
that it was committed in no less than a decision of the court, cannot be countenanced.
On the other hand, the recommendation of Justice Paredes with regard to the dismissal of the
charge against Interpreter Juntilla and Stenographer Reyes is well-taken. Indeed, at the time that the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 2785-09 testified in open court, there was sufficient basis to believe that
she was indeed who she said she was. After all, the witness identified herself under oath, stated her
name and other personal circumstances for the record, and signed the minutes of the proceedings.
The evidence also shows that the signatures in the minutes of the proceedings and in the verification
of the petition are the same.252 Furthermore, we cannot rely too much on the certification issued by
the Bureau of Immigration in this case.253 While it states that the petitioner did not have any record of
arrival in the Philippines from January 1993 to 28 May 2013, it also states that she did not have any
record of departure during the same period. To recall, the respondent in the case alleged in his
Answer that the petitioner had been living in Taiwan since 1994.
In Civil Case No. 1256-07, before RTC Imus 22, the address of the court's very own Process Server
Azcueta appeared as the address of the petitioner therein. In Civil Case Nos. 2893-09 and 3179-09
before RTC Dasmariñas 90, the address of Social Worker Serilo also appeared as the address of
the petitioners therein. We cannot accept their explanation regarding the alleged unauthorized use of
their addresses. It should be noted that relative to the majority of the vague and incomplete
addresses given by the parties in the other petitions, those given by the petitioners who used the
addresses of Process Server Azcueta and Social Worker Serilo stick out in their specificity: the block
and lot number, street, subdivision and even the barangay were indicated. Furthermore, the
addresses of the respondents in these petitions were not in Cavite. Thus, the addresses of Process
Server Azcueta and Social Worker Serilo were the ones that provided the opportunity for these
petitions to be in compliance with the venue requirement. This single most important fact negates
any declaration that they did not consent to, or that they were even aware of the use of their
addresses. In A.M
In A.M. No. 12-9-188-RTC, the Court notes that the address given by Armando Tunay in his petition
was "c/o Christina B. Toh, xxx Aguinaldo Highway, Dasmariñas, Cavite."254 As we pronounced in Re:
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC Br. 60, Barili, Cebu,255 the use of the abbreviation
"c/o" connotes that that petitioner was not an actual resident of the given address. This fact, together
with the admission of the petitioner that he is a naturalized American citizen, should have
engendered suspicion on the part of Judge Cabrera-Faller that the former did not reside within the
territorial jurisdiction of RTC Dasmariñas 90. The affidavit executed by Armando Tunay stating that
he resided in that address for six months before the filing of the petition and until a year after the
termination of the case is, at best, self-serving. What he stated in his affidavit may be relevant only
to the proceedings for his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It cannot operate to excuse
the gross ignorance of the law committed by Judge Cabrera-Faller with regard to the application of
the rules on venue for petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriages.
Improper Service of Summons
Section 6 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that the service of summons shall be governed by Rule
14 of the Rules of Court. Under that Rule, the summons may be served by the sheriff, the deputy
sheriff, or other proper court officer, or, for justifiable reasons, by any suitable person authorized by
the court issuing the summons.256 Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a
copy thereof to respondents in person or, if they refuse to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to
them.257 However, if the service cannot be done personally for justifiable causes and within a
reasonable time, it may be effected by (a) leaving copies of the summons with some other person of
suitable age and discretion then residing at respondent's house; or (b) leaving copies of the
summons with some competent person in charge of the respondent's office or regular place of
business.258
Manotoc v. CA259 operationalized the provision for a valid substituted service of summons by laying
down the following requirements:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served
promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or
the sheriff is given a reasonable time to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no
specific time frame is mentioned. Reasonable time is defined as so much time as is necessary under
the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract
or duty requires that should be done. having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to
the other party. Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, when the
court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter
submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask
for an alias summons if the service of summons has failed. What then is a reasonable time for the
sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the
plaintiff: reasonable time means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a
complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, reasonable time means 15 to 30 days because at
the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a
return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return provides data to the
Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of
the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus,, one month
from the issuance of summons can be considered reasonable time with regard to personal service
on the defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost
diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation
of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service on
defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of
summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on
the defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts
by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. Several attempts [mean] at
least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why
such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or
accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the
failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal
service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged
residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on
defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriffs Return
of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the
Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally
and the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989
requires that impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the
defendant personally and the failure of such efforts, which should be made in the proof of service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence, it should be left with a
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. A person of suitable age and discretion is
one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough
discernment to understand the importance of a summons. Discretion is defined as the ability to make
decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful,
right or wise may be presupposed. Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how
to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the
need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the
person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the relation of confidence to the
defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the
summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or
residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipients relationship with the defendant is, and
whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to
immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons.
These matters must be clearly w1d specifically described in the Return of Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at [defendant's] office or regular place of business, then it
should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the
substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such
as the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the
obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from
inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.260
The return for a substituted service should state, with more particularity and detail, the facts and
circumstances such as the number of attempts at personal service, dates and times of the attempts,
inquiries made to locate the respondent, names of occupants of the alleged residence, and reasons
for failure in order to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken.261 The exertion of efforts to personally
serve the summons on respondent, and the failure of those efforts, would prove the impossibility of
prompt personal service.262
Manotoc also emphasized that while substituted service of summons is permitted, it is extraordinary
in character and a departure from the usual method of service.263 As such, it must faithfully and
strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules.264
In these cases, it was clear that no faithful and strict compliance with the requirements for
substituted service of summons was observed by Sheriffs De Villa and Pagunsan and Process
Servers Ferrer, Azcueta, and Pontejos.
Contrary to the findings of Justice Paredes, those arrived at by this Court show that the returns
made by Process Server Ferrer did not sufficiently comply with the guidelines in Manotoc. To
illustrate, he submitted the following return in Civil Case No. 2511-09:
This is to certify that on January 29, 2009, the undersigned personally served the Summons together
with the copy of a Petition and its annexes in the above-entitled case upon the respondent
thru Candy Socorro, house maid but she refuse[d] to affix by [sic] her name and signature in the
original copy of the Summons.
That all diligent efforts were exerted to serve the said Summons as the undersigned went also to the
above stated address on January 21 and 24, 2009 but the same proved ineffectual.
The original copy of the Summons is therefore respectfully returned duly served.265
Notably, this return fails to establish the impossibility of prompt personal service. Although it states
that he went to the respondent's address three times on three different dates, it does not show that
efforts were made to find the respondent personally or cite why those efforts "proved ineffectual."
Neither does it show that he ascertained whether or not the recipient comprehended the significance
of the receipt of the summons and the duty to deliver it to the respondent or at least to notify the
latter about the receipt of the summons.
In Civil Case Nos. 2216-08 and 2243-08, Process Server Ferrer indicated in his returns that he had
made a personal service of summons on the respondents at their given addresses. However,
subsequent orders sent to the same addresses were "returned to sender." Indeed, it is possible that
after personal service of summons on respondents, they moved to another residence, but it is a
different matter if the subsequent orders were returned to sender because respondents were
"unknown at given address."266 This notation overturns whatever presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties may be accorded to the prior return of Process Server Ferrer stating
that personal service on the respondent was made at that address. Furthermore, Civil Case No.
2216-08 was decided by RTC Imus 20 in three months and 10 days and Civil Case No. 2243-08 in
four months and 17 days from filing.267 It would be hard to imagine that in such a short span of time,
the respondents would be "unknown at given address," if they had really been found there just a few
months previously.
Sheriff Pagunsan was in the habit of stating in his returns that "no one was around to receive the
court process. Hence, a copy of the summons was left at the door of the defendant's place."268 The
Court cannot even begin to describe how far-off this practice is from the prescribed requirements
and circumstances authorized by the rules. It does not even fall under the category of substituted
service of summons, which, as we have said, is already a departure from the usual method of
service. The following is an example of Sheriff Pagunsan's return for a substituted service of
summons:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on November 8, 2009, the undersigned personally served the copy of
Summons together with the Petition and its annexes in the above captioned case to the defendant
VINCENT CHRISTIAN OBLENA at xxx Parañaque City thru Gino Uson [who] claims to be a relative
of the defendant of sufficient age and discretion to receive the court process as [sic] however
refused to affix his signature on the original copy of the Summons.
Earnest efforts were made by the undersigned in the morning and afternoon of the said date to serve
the summons personally upon the respondent but failed on the grounds that respondent was always
out at the time of the said service, hence, substituted service was resorted to in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
The original copy of the summons is, therefore, respectfully returned DULY SERVED.269
The foregoing return clearly shows that while there were two attempts to serve the summons
personally, they were made on the same day. He does not mention if he made any inquiry to locate
the respondent; or if the recipient, who "claims to be a relative" of the respondent, comprehended
the significance of the receipt of the summons and the duty to deliver it to the respondent or at least
to notify the latter about the receipt thereof.
The blatant nonobservance of the rule regarding personal and substituted service of summons was
shown by Sheriff De Villa in Civil Case No. 2693-09 when he resorted to substituted service of
summons on the very same day that it was issued.270 He was also found to have served summons -
one was personal and the other substituted - on two different respondents in two different cases at
the same address in Makati.271 We cannot countenance his alleged practice of resorting to
substituted service after being advised by the respondent over the phone to leave the summons with
the person present in the house. Contrary to his belief, this practice does not fulfill the requirement
that he exert all efforts to personally serve the summons. In these instances, since he had already
contacted the respondent by phone, it would have been more prudent and dutiful to have set an
appointment for another day to enable him to personally serve the summons on the respondent
himself, rather than to resort to a substituted service at the first instance.
The following is an example of a return that he submitted for a substituted service of summons:
Respectfully returned to ATTY. MARIA CRSITITA A. RIVASSANTOS, Clerk of Court V, RTC Br. 21,
Imus, Cavite the enclosed original copy of the Summons issued in the above-captioned case to
respondent, PAUL JEFFREY R. SANTOS of xxx, Pasig City with the information that copy of the
Summons together with the attached Petition and its Annexes was received by respondent's mother,
LINA R. SANTOS on March 10, 2010, as evidenced by her signature appearing at the face bottom of
said summons.272
Again, this return fails to establish the impossibility of a prompt personal service. It does not show
that Sheriff De Villa went to the respondent's address three times on at least two different dates, or
that he exerted efforts to find the respondent and serve the summons personally. Neither does the
return show that he ascertained whether the recipient comprehended the significance of receiving
the summons and the duty to deliver it to the respondent or at least to notify the latter about the
receipt of the summons.
In a number of the returns submitted by Process Server Azcueta, he claimed to have made a
substituted service of summons to recipients who refused to sign or acknowledge receipt thereof.
However, subsequent orders sent to the same addresses were "returned to sender," because "no
such defendant/name" or "unknown address;" or, worse, the address was "unlocated, no such name
and number of house on given address."273 Again, these notations overturn whatever presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties may be accorded to the prior return of Process Server
Azcueta that substituted service on respondents was made at the given addresses.
No return of summons was attached to the records of five cases before RTC Imus 22.274 Process
Server Azcueta explains that attaching the returns to the case records was not his job. On the other
hand, Judge Mangrobang and Clerk of Court Cordez offer the possibility that the returns were
accidentally detached from the records due to numerous instances of retrieval and photocopying. All
of them claim that just because no returns were attached to the records did not mean that there was
an improper service of summons. Curiously, whether it was a matter of failure to attach the returns to
the records or accidental detachment of the returns therefrom, no evidence of the actual existence of
the missing returns has been shown. If it was a matter of failure to attach the returns, their
submission to the judicial audit team would have been easy. In any event, the accidental detachment
of the returns could have been proven by a gap in the pagination of the records.
The following is an example of a return that Process Server Azcueta submitted for a substituted
service of summons:
Respectfully return[ed] to the Honorable Court the attached original copy of the summons and
petition dated September 29, 2009 issued by this Honorable Court with the following information:
1. That on October 1, 2009, the undersigned caused the service of Summons to the
respondent but said respondent was not around on the said date.
2. That earnest effort to personally serve the summons failed as the said respondent
is still not around at the given address when service was effected on October 10,
2009. To satisfy the Rules, substituted service was made by tendering a copy of the
summons with petition and its annexes thru MA. PAZ C. BAUN, a person of
competent age and discretion as evidenced by her signature appearing on the
original copy of summons.
WHEREFORE, the original copy of the summons is hereby respectfully returned DULY SERVED.275
From a reading of the return, it evidently fails to establish the impossibility of prompt personal
service. While it shows that Process Server Azcueta went to the respondent's address twice on two
different dates, it does not show that he exerted efforts to find the respondent and serve the
summons personally. Despite its use of the phrase "[t]o satisfy the Rules," it does not indicate the
relation of the recipient with the respondent or whether the former comprehended the significance of
the receipt of the summons and the duty to deliver it to the respondent or at least to notify the latter
about the receipt of the summons.
As regards Process Server Pontejos, it bears noting that there were findings of improper service of
summons in both A.M. Nos. RTJ-11-2301 and RTJ-11-2302. Out of the 32 cases in A.M. No. RTJ-
11-2301and45 in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302 in which he made a substituted service of summons without
compliance with the mandatory requirements of Manotoc, only one case overlapped-Civil Case No.
3746-10.
In A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302, the service of summons in 18 out of the 45 cases audited was made
personally. However, all the returns in these 18 cases indicate that respondents refused to sign the
original copy of the summons. Below is an example of such returns:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on February 19, 2010, the undersigned caused the service of summons
issued by the Clerk of Court of this Court together with the copy of complaint in the above-entitled
case upon respondent Aurora T. Frias at xxx Dasmariñas, Cavite, who received the summons
personally, but she refused to sign in the original copy of summons.
The original copy of summons is, therefore, respectfully returned, DULY SERVED.276
In the other cases in which substituted service of summons was made, Process Server Pontejos did
not even indicate the relation of the recipient with the respondent.277 Below is an example of a return
for a substituted service of summons:
THIS IS TO CERTTFY that on August 5, 2009, the undersigned caused the service of summons
issued by the Clerk of Court of this Court together with the copy of complaint in the above-entitled
case upon respondent Shirly Manzana-Luzarraga at xxx Camarines Norte thru Lydia
Brayus, a person residing thereat of sufficient age and discretion to receive summons, as evidenced
by her signature appearing in the original copy of summons.
That all diligent efforts were exerted to serve the said summons personally upon respondent Shirly
Manzana-Luzarraga, but the same proved ineffectual.278
Then again, even Process Server Pontejos admits that he only had in mind the immediate service of
summons "without going through the tedious process"279 provided under Administrative Circular No.
12 dated 1 October 1985.280
As borne out by the records and admitted by Sheriffs De Villa and Pagunsan and Process Servers
Ferrer, Azcueta, and Pontejos, they have all served summons outside the territorial jurisdictions of
their respective courts. Process Server Ferrer has served summons in Makati and Muntinlupa
City,281 Sheriff Pagunsan in Camarines Sur,282Process Server Pontejos in Camarines Norte,283 Sheriff
De Villa in Nueva Ecija,284 and Process Server Azcueta in Cagayan de Oro City.285
Their service of summons outside the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts is regrettable for
two reasons. First, it was contrary to Administrative Circular No. 12 dated 1 October 1985, which
provides that the service of all court processes and the execution of writs issued by the courts shall
only be made within their territorial jurisdictions. Second, the level of industry, commitment and
diligence that went into the service of summons in places very far from the territorial jurisdictions of
the courts in question unfortunately failed to find its way into the service of summons within the
territorial jurisdictions of the concerned courts or into the preparation of the corresponding returns.
The purpose of a summons is twofold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondents and to
notify them that an action has been commenced, so that they may be given an opportunity to be
heard on the claim being made against them.286 The importance of the service and receipt of
summons is precisely the reason why the Court has laid down very strict requirements for
undertaking substituted service of summons. As we said in Manotoc, to allow sheriffs and process
servers to describe the facts and circumstances of substituted service in inexact terms would
encourage routine performance of their precise duties. It would be quite easy for them to shroud or
conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad terms.287
Having administrative supervision over court personnel, Clerks of Court Marasigan and Cordez in
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302 and OIC Suluen in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301 had the responsibility to monitor
compliance with the rules and regulations governing the performance of their duties. Their
responsibility gains more significance considering that they are the ones who issue the
summons288 and receive the returns from the sheriffs and process servers.289 They should have
insisted on strict compliance with the rules and imposed a corresponding punishment for repeated
violations.
The same is true with regard to the four respondent judges in these cases. That they allowed and
tolerated noncompliance with the strict requirements of the rules for a long period of time shows their
unfitness to discharge the duties of their office. Despite the improper service of summons, they
continued with the conduct of the proceedings in the petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment
of marriage. These findings tie up with the allegation of the OCA and the judicial audit teams that a
conspiracy existed and thereby turned the courts in Cavite into havens for "paid-for annulments."
Lack of Collusion Report
Under Section 8(1) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the respondent is required to submit an Answer within
15 days from receipt of the summons. If no answer is filed, the court shall order the public prosecutor
to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.290 Within one month from receipt of the
order of the court, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties
are indeed in collusion.291 If it is found that collusion exists, the public prosecutor shall state the basis
of that conclusion in the report.292 The court shall then set the report for hearing; and if convinced that
the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition. If the public prosecutor reports that no
collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pretrial.293
Notably, the rules do not merely ask whether the public prosecutor is in a position to determine
whether collusion exists. They require that the investigating prosecutor determine whether or not
there is collusion. In A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301, Judge Cabrera-Faller tolerated the public prosecutor's
practice of submitting investigation reports stating merely that "the undersigned Prosecutor is not in
the position to tell whether collusion exists."294 Judge Cabrera-Faller still proceeded with the hearing
of the cases.
Furthermore, in declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage cases, the investigation report of the
prosecutor on whether there is collusion between the parties is a condition sine qua non for setting
the case for pretrial or further proceedings.295
Thus, it matters not that the public prosecutors manifested before Judges Felicen, Quisumbing and
Mangrobang that they would just actively participate in the proceedings to safeguard against
collusion or fabricated evidence, in lieu of an investigation report on collusion. No further
proceedings should have been held without the investigation report.
In Corpus v. Ochotorena,296 the Court found the respondent judge therein administratively liable for
failure to observe the mandatory requirement of ordering the investigating public prosecutor to
determine whether collusion existed between the parties. The Court emphasized that the active
participation of the public prosecutor in the proceedings of the case could not take the place of the
investigation report:
While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Arturo M. Paculanag had filed a Certification dated
May 04, 2001 with the respondent judge's court, stating, among others, that he appeared in behalf of
the Solicitor General during the ex-parte presentation of plaintiffs evidence, even cross-examining
the plaintiff and his witness, the psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos, and that he had no objection to the
granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, such Certification does not suffice to
comply with the mandatory requirement that the court should order the investigating public
prosecutor whether a collusion exists between the parties. Such directive must be made by the court
before trial could proceed, not after the trial on the merits of the case had already been had. Notably,
said Certification was filed after the respondent judge had ordered the termination of the case.297
There is no merit either in the contention that the active participation of the public prosecutor in the
proceedings in lieu of an investigation report facilitates the speedy disposition of the cases. In OCA
v. Aquino, 298 we enunciated that shortcuts in judicial processes cannot be countenanced, because
speed is not the principal objective of a trial.
It is the considered opinion of this Court that the reason why the public prosecutors are not in a
position to determine whether there is collusion between the parties 1s that one or both of them
cannot be summoned to appear before the public prosecutor. Presumably, the irregularity regarding
the non-submission of collusion investigation reports is likewise tied with the anomalous addresses
of the parties. Hence, the non-submission of the reports is another manifestation of the conspiracy to
reflect paper compliance with the rule on venue.
Failure to Serve Copies of the Decisions on Respondents
If a counsel or party moves to another address without informing the court of that change, the
former's failure to receive a copy of the decision sent to the last known address will not stay the
finality of the decision.299 It is a different matter, however, if from the very inception of the proceedings
there is already doubt as to the genuineness of a party's given address.
In Civil Case No. 2904-09 filed before RTC Imus 20, summons was served on the respondent
through substituted service. A copy of the order setting the pretrial was sent to respondent's
address, but was returned to sender for the reason "no such name at given address."300 A copy of the
decision granting the petition for the annulment of marriage sent to the respondent's address was
again returned to sender for the reason "unknown at given address." Nevertheless, a certificate of
finality and decree of absolute nullity was issued by the court.
In Civil Case No. 1799-08 filed before RTC Imus 22, a copy of the order setting the pretrial was sent
to the respondent's address, but was returned to sender for the reason "unlocated, no such name
and number of house on given address."301 A copy of the decision granting the petition for the
annulment of marriage sent to the respondent's address was again returned to sender for the reason
"unlocated/unknown." Nevertheless, a certificate of finality was issued by the court. In other cases
before RTC Imus 22, copies of the decision sent to the respondents' addresses were returned to
sender with the notations "unknown," "no such name," or "no such address." Yet, certificates of
finality were issued by the court.
These notations should have put Judges Felicen and Mangrobang and Clerks of Court Marasigan
and Cordez on guard regarding the propriety of issuing a certificate of finality, considering that the
notations meant that this was not just a simple matter of failure of the parties to inform the court of
their new addresses. At best their failure to be circumspect constituted neglect of duty. At worst, it
was another manifestation of the conspiracy to grant fast and easy annulments to those who needed
it.
Grant of Petitions at Extraordinary Speed
In RTC Imus 20, 50 out of the 65 cases examined were granted in six months or less from
filing.302 Sixteen cases were granted in three months, 12 in four months, 13 in five months, and nine
in six months.
filing.303 One case each was granted in two, three or four months; seven cases in five months; and
five cases in six months.
filing.304 One case was granted in record 25 days. Five cases were granted in two months, 6 in three
months, 21 in four months, 7 in five months, and 6 in six months.
In RTC Dasmariñas 90, out of the 88 cases examined, 50 were granted in six months or less from
filing.305 Three cases were granted in three months, 10 in four months, 14 in five months, and 23 in
six months.
Considering that this Court continuously reminds our judges to resolve cases with dispatch, we
cannot be so quick to reprove the practice of the four respondent judges herein. After all, as we said
in Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice: 306
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly
attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one's prompt dispatch may be another's
undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant
consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.307
However, the surrounding circumstances in these cases for the declaration of nullity and annulment
of marriage render the speed with which they were decided suspect.
More important, the findings in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301 involving Judge Cabrera-Faller include those
of the judicial audit team showing a number of criminal and civil cases pending before RTC
Dasmariñas 90 that have not been acted upon for a considerable length of time; some of them, even
as far back as the time of their filing.
During the material period when Judge Mangrobang was deciding the declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage cases with extraordinary speed, he failed to resolve two pending motions
before his sala within the 90-day reglementary period. In Castro v. Mangrobang,308 this Court found
him guilty of undue delay in resolving pending matters and fined him in the amount of ₱l0,000. In
another case, he was admonished for his failure to decide a motion on time.309
Judge Felicen had also been previously admonished to be more mindful of his duties, particularly in
the prompt disposition of cases pending and/or submitted for decision and resolution before his
sala.310
These independent findings lend weight to the conclusion of the OCA and the judicial audit teams
that the irregularities in the proceedings before the four courts were systemic and deliberate, rather
than caused by inadvertence or mere negligence. If it is true that the four judges are committed to
the speedy resolution and disposition of cases, this commitment should have been reflected in all
the cases pending before their courts, and not just in the declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage cases.
Lack of Registration with the Local Civil Registrar
Under Section 19(3) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, a decision of the court granting the petition for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage becomes final upon the expiration of 15 days from
notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or
appeal, is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General. If the parties
have no properties, the court shall forthwith issue the corresponding decree of declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage upon the finality of the decision.311Otherwise, upon the
finality of the decision, the court shall observe the procedure prescribed for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children, and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes.
In both cases, the entry of judgment shall be registered in the civil registry where the marriage was
recorded and in the civil registry where the family court granting the petition for the declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage is located.312
If the parties have properties, the decree of declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage
shall be issued only after the registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses in the proper Register of Deeds where the real properties are located; and after the
delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property, or sound securities.313 The
approved deed of partition shall be attached to the decree.314
Again, in both cases in which the parties have or do not have properties, the decree shall be
registered in the civil registry where the marriage was registered, the civil registry of the place where
the family court is situated, as well as in the National Census and Statistics Office.315
In these administrative cases, absent a finding by the OCA and the judicial audit teams that the
parties in the identified cases have properties, the Court cannot condemn the practice of the
issuance on the same day of the certificate of finality and the decree of declaration of absolute nullity
or annulment of marriage. The rule is clear that courts shall forthwith issue the corresponding decree
upon the finality of the decision if the parties have no properties. Considering further that both the
entry of judgment and the decree must be registered with the civil registry where the marriage was
registered and the civil registry of the place where the family court is situated, it is in fact easier for
the parties to secure both from the courts on the same day and have them registered at the same
time.
Questionable Raffling of Cases
The recommendation of Justice Paredes regarding the dismissal of charges against Clerk of Court
Eusebio is well taken. Records show that Civil Case No. 1852-08 was filed on 1 February 2008 and
received by RTC Imus 20 on 4 February 2008. The stamp of the Office of the Clerk of Court
indicating that it was filed on 24 February 2008 was only due to inadvertence.
The same is true with Civil Case No. 3309-09. The case was raffled and transmitted to RTC Imus 20
on 23 November 2009, and the statement in the return of summons that an attempt to serve the
summons was made on 6 November 2009 was merely due to Sheriff Pagunsan's failure to update
the old return format. With regard to Civil Case No. 3676-10, summons was personally received by
the respondent on l 4 April 2010, not 25 March 2010.
The finding that most of the cases were filed and raffled on the same day, without more, cannot
make the judges and court personnel administratively liable. Under Supreme Court Circular No. 7-74
dated 23 September 1974,316the notice of the day and hour of the raffle should be posted prominently
on the bulletin boards of the courts and at a conspicuous spot on the main door of the session hall of
the executive judge. Thus, it is not impossible for counsels to habitually choose the date of the raffle
as the date on which to file their petitions for whatever reason.
Other Irregularities
In A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301, other irregularities committed in RTC Dasmariñas 90 include the
continuation of proceedings even without the appearance of the Solicitor General, the continuation of
the pretrial despite the non-submission of pretrial briefs by the parties, the lack of formal offer of
evidence in two cases submitted for decision, the non-attachment of the minutes to the records, the
submission of unsigned and photocopied psychological evaluation reports of the
psychiatrist/psychologist, and the submission of an unsigned jurat in the judicial affidavit of the
petitioner in one case.
These irregularities speak for themselves and require no in-depth discussion. In Maquilan v.
Maquilan, 317 we enunciated that the appearances of the Solicitor General and/or the public
prosecutor in proceedings for the declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage are mandatory.
Under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the failure of the petitioner to file a pretrial brief or even comply with its
required contents has the same effect as the failure to appear at the pretrial,318 which means the
dismissal of the case.319 While an oral offer of evidence is allowed by the Rules of Court,320 the offer
should be reflected at least in the minutes of the proceedings or in the court order issued at the end
of each proceeding covering what transpired during the court session. As against the finding of the
judicial audit team that no formal offer of evidence was made in two cases submitted for decision, no
minutes of the proceedings or court order was submitted by Judge Cabrera-Faller to controvert the
finding.
In A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302, other irregularities committed in RTC Imus 22 include the rendition of
judgment ahead of the issuance of the order admitting the documentary exhibits and the giving of
due course to a petition without a verification and certification against forum shopping. We find no
merit in the explanation of Judge Mangrobang regarding the date indicated in the order admitting the
documentary exhibits. He says that the date, which shows that the order admitting the exhibits was
issued four days after the date of the decision, was a mere typographical error. As keenly observed
by the OCA and the judicial audit teams, even the stitching and the pagination of these two rulings
show that the decision is ahead of the order admitting the documentary exhibits.321 As regards the
missing page containing the verification and certification against forum shopping, its alleged
accidental detachment from the records could have been proven by a gap in the pagination of the
records. No evidence of this sort was offered by Judge Mangrobang.
Again, in RTC Dasmariñas 90, one petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage was granted
even without the appearance of the parties. Judge Cabrera-Faller merely explained that a hearing
was conducted, but she did not belie the finding that the parties had not at all appeared before her
during the entire proceedings.
LIABILITY AND APPROPRIATE PENALTIES
Judges Felicen, Quisumbing, Mangrobang and Cabrera-Faller
A blatant disregard of the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.322 This Court has ruled that for a judge to be liable for gross ignorance of the law, it is not
enough that the decision, order or actuation in the performance of official duties is contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence.323 It must also be proven that the judge was moved by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty or corruption; or committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.324
In Department of Justice v. Mislang,325 we said:
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in
the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must
also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive.
Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence
requires no less. Thus, unfamiliarity with the rules is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules must be at
the palm of his hand. When a judge displays utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he betrays the
confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges owe
it to the public to be knowledgeable, hence, they are expected to have more than just a modicum of
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules; they must know them by heart. When the
inefficiency springs from a failure to recognize such a basic and elemental rule, a law or a principle
in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position
and the prestigious title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both cases, the judge's dismissal will be
in order.
But when there is persistent disregard of well-known rules, judges not only become liable for gross
ignorance of the law, they commit gross misconduct as well.326 It is then that a mistake can no longer
be regarded as a mere error of judgment, but one purely motivated by a wrongful intent.327
The four courts herein have allowed themselves to become havens for "paid-for annulments." Their
apparent conspiracy with the counsels of the parties in order to reflect paper compliance with the
rules if not complete disregard thereof, as well as their failure to manage and monitor the regularity
in the performance of duties by their court personnel, shows not only gross ignorance of the law but
also a wrongful intention that smacks of misconduct.
Misconduct refers to any unlawful conduct on the part of a judge prejudicial to the rights of parties or
to the right determination of the cause.328 It entails wrongful or improper conduct motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or deliberate purpose.329 Simple misconduct is defined as an unacceptable
behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers.330 On the other hand,
gross misconduct connotes something "out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused;
flagrant; shameful."331
The four judges also violated the following Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary:332
CANON 2
Integrity
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived
to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Section 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court
personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
xxxx
CANON 6
Competence and Diligence
xxxx
Section 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and
personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this
purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to
judges.
xxxx
Section 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
xxxx
Section 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial
duties.
As judges, more than anyone else, they are required to uphold and apply the law. They should
maintain the same respect and reverence accorded by the Constitution to our society's institutions,
particularly marriage. Instead, their actuations relegated marriage to nothing more than an
annoyance to be eliminated. In the process, they also made a mockery of the rules promulgated by
this Court.
Gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct are serious charges under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Justices and judges
found guilty of these charges may be penalized by any of the following:
1. Dismissal from the service. forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
di8qualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations. Provided. however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding
six (6) months: or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.333
We have had occasion to impose the penalty of suspension for a period of three months on judges
found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.334 However, in a line of
cases335 where the judges found guilty of the same offenses had already compulsorily retired from
service and therefore could no longer be penalized with suspension, a fine was ordered deducted
from their retirement benefits.
In Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller,336 Judge Cabrera-Faller was ordered dismissed from the service for
gross ignorance of the law. As stated above, Judge Mangrobang was found guilty of undue delay in
resolving pending matters in Castro v. Mangrobang.337 He was also previously reprimanded
in Miranda v. Mangrobang338 for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the judiciary. In Bartolome
v. Maranan,339 Judge Felicen was also involved in an alleged pattern of corruption involving the
annulment of marriage cases in RTC Imus 20.
Considering that Judge Cabrera-Faller has already been dismissed from service, and Judges
Mangrobang and Felicen have already compulsorily retired, the penalty of suspension can no longer
be imposed on them. Thus, they are hereby ordered to pay a fine in the amount of ₱80,000 each.
Notably, Judge Mangrobang had already passed away. At any rate, the fine shall be deducted from
the retirement benefits of Judges Mangrobang and Felicen. The same fine shall be deducted from
whatever amounts may still be due Judge Cabrera-Faller.
The irregularities committed in these administrative cases took place and festered under the watch
of Judge Quisumbing. As executive judge, he performs the functions of a court administrator within
his administrative area.340He was supposed to provide leadership and coordinate the management of
the courts, as well as implement policies concerning court operations laid down by the Supreme
Court.341 Unfortunately, instead of exercising his prerogatives in order that those under his
management be kept in line, he joined in the commission of some of the reprehensible practices
described in these administrative cases.
Thus, the Court cannot adopt the recommendation of Justice Paredes to completely absolve Judge
Quisumbing of all liability. To note, the sala of Judge Quisumbing was also involved in the
irregularities regarding cases where parties had the same address as those in another case. Of the
four pairs of parties before the RTC Imus 21 who had the same addresses, three were represented
by the same counsels. Judge Quisumbing also failed to observe the mandatory requirement of
ordering the investigating public prosecutor to determine whether collusion existed between the
parties in cases for the declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage.
Nevertheless, considering that his infractions are not as grave as those of the other three judges, he
shall be liable for gross ignorance of the law and simple misconduct. In Adriano v. Villanueva,342 a
judge found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, simple misconduct, and undue delay in deciding a
case was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of ₱40,000. In the case of Judge Quisumbing, a fine in
the amount of ₱21,000 shall suffice. Considering that he had retired from judicial service, this
amount shall be deducted from his retirement benefits.
Sheriffs Pagunsan and De Villa; and Process Servers Ferrer, Azcueta and Pontejos
We have had occasion to emphasize the importance of the responsibilities of process servers in the
efficient and proper administration of justice:
A process server should be fully cognizant not only of the nature and responsibilities of his task but
also of their impact in the speedy administration of justice. It is through the process server that a
defendant learns of the action brought against him by the complainant. More importantly, it is
through the service of summons of the process server that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over
the defendant. As a public officer, the respondent is bound virtute oficii to bring to the discharge of
his duties the prudence, caution, and attention which careful men usually exercise in the
management of their affairs. Relevant in the case at bar is the salutary reminder from this Court that
the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men
and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel - hence, it
becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name
and standing as a true temple of justice.343
Sheriffs and process servers are required to exercise utmost care in seeing to it that all notices
assigned to them are duly served upon the parties.344 Their failure to perform their duties can never
be excused by a heavy work load.345
Again, in a line of cases,346 we have ruled that the failure to serve court processes promptly and
properly amounts to simple neglect of duty. It is the failure of employees to give their attention to a
task expected of them, which thereby shows a disregard of duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference.347 On the other hand, there is gross neglect of duty when, from the gravity of the case or
the frequency of instances, the neglect becomes so serious in character as to endanger or threaten
public welfare.348
Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,349 simple neglect of
duty is punishable by suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense and
dismissal from service for the second offense. Gross neglect of duty is punishable by dismissal from
service for the first offense.
We find Sheriffs Pagunsan and De Villa and Process Servers Ferrer, Azcueta, and Pontejos guilty of
simple neglect of duty.
In Holasca v. Pagunsan,350 Sheriff Pagunsan was found guilty of gross inefficiency, for which he was
suspended for a period of nine months and one day without pay. Since gross inefficiency is closely
related to gross neglect, as both involve specific acts of omission on the part of the employee,351 that
previous administrative liability shall make this instant administrative infraction a second offense that
should merit the severe penalty of dismissal from service.
In Espero v. De Villa, 352 Sheriff De Villa was found guilty of simple neglect of duty for his failure to file
a retun1 of a writ of execution and to make periodic reports to the court. The penalty of suspension
for a period of one month and one day was meted out to him. As this is already his second offense,
Sheriff De Villa should be dismissed from service.
In Tan v. Azcueta,353 Process Server Azcueta was found guilty of simple neglect of duty and was
accordingly reprimanded and warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt with
more severely. While mitigating circumstances were appreciated in that case, making the penalty
imposed lower than that prescribed by the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, there is no question that this is already his second offense. Accordingly, Process
Server Azcueta should also be dismissed from service.
In the case of Process Server Pontejos, he is hereby found guilty of two counts of simple neglect of
duty in A.M. Nos. RTJ-11-2301 and RTJ- 11-2302. Again under the Revised Unifo1m Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, if the respondent is found guilty of two charges or counts,
the penalty to be imposed shall correspond to the more serious charge or count, and the other shall
be considered as an aggravating circumstance.354 The presence of an aggravating circumstance
shall increase the penalty to the maximum provided under the rules.355 As the maximum of the
penalty for simple neglect of duty is dismissal from service, that penalty should be imposed on
Process Server Pontejos.
The foregoing notwithstanding, we have always taken advantage of every opportunity to show
compassion and leniency in the imposition of administrative penalties on erring court employees.
This is because work is as much a source of one's dignity as it is of one's income. While this Court
will never tolerate any act of wrongdoing in the performance of duties, it would not be remiss in its
mandate, should it extend just one more chance for court employees to improve their ways. That
chance shall be given to Sheriffs Pagunsan and De Villa and to Process Servers Azcueta and
Pontejos. They would do well not to waste it.
The penalty of suspension for a period of one year shall instead be imposed on Sheriff Pagunsan.
On the other hand, the penalty of suspension for a period of six months shall be imposed on Sheriff
De Villa and Process Servers Azcueta and Pontejos.
The penalty of suspension for one month and one day shall be meted out to Process Server Ferrer
for the instant first offense of simple neglect of duty.
Clerks of Court Cordez and Marasigan and OIC Suluen
Clerks of Court Marasigan and Cordez in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302 and OIC Suluen in A.M. No. RTJ-
11-2301 are likewise found guilty of simple neglect of duty. They failed to monitor compliance with
the rules and regulations governing the performance of duties by court personnel under their
administrative supervision. Also, Clerks of Court Marasigan and Cordez failed to exercise the
required circumspection prior to issuing certificates of finality in declaration of nullity and annulment
of marriage cases, considering that notices of the court's decisions had not been served at the time
upon the respondents.
The penalty of suspension for one month and one day shall be meted out to them for the instant first
offense of simple neglect of duty.
Considering that Clerk of Court Cordez has transferred to another government agency, the penalty
of suspension can no longer be imposed on her. Accordingly, in lieu of suspension, a penalty of fine
equivalent to her salary for a period of one month shall be imposed.
Process Server Azcueta and Social Worker Serilo
In Japson v. Civil Service Commission,356 the petitioner therein was a former senior member services
representative assigned at the Social Security System (SSS) branch in Baguio City. In conspiracy
with others, the petitioner enticed benefit claimants to file their claims before SSS Baguio, where he
could guarantee prompt releases because he was assigned at the claims section. As the claimants
were residing in outlying provinces, they used in their claim forms the address of the petitioner in
Baguio City. When the claims were released, the petitioner was able to secure a chunk of each
claimant's benefits.
In a case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
against the petitioner, the SSS found him guilty on all counts. It ruled that it was not necessary to
show concrete proof of the receipt of a consideration for the arrangement, following the principle
of res ipsa loquitur. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission ruled that while there was no strong
evidence showing that the petitioner received, collected, or took a share from the benefits awarded
to the claimants, he was still liable. His irregular conduct and indiscriminate judgment relative to the
handling of the claims were found to have caused a serious breach in the integrity of the system
observed by the SSS, as well as endangered the welfare of the public at large.
After the denial of his petition for review before the CA, the petitioner therein came to this Court
claiming, among others, that there was no evidence showing that he had specifically authorized any
of the claimants involved to use his address. The Court denied the petition for lack of merit. We ruled
that his acts clearly reflected his dishonesty and grave misconduct. He was less than forthright in his
dealings and led claimants to believe that he could give them undue advantage by processing their
claims faster than others without the same connection.
The surrounding facts in Japson are analogous to those in the case of Process Server Azcueta and
Social Worker Serilo. Both involve the use of a government employee's address in order for others to
comply with the residence requirement laid down by the rules. In their defense, the petitioner therein
and Process Server Azcueta and Social Worker Seri lo herein claim that they did not authorize
anyone to use their address. As in Japson, the Court's conclusion here shall be the same.
Considering, however, that the infraction committed by Process Server Azcueta and Social Worker
Serilo is not directly connected with the performance of their official duties, they are liable not for
misconduct but for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. "The word 'prejudicial'
means 'detrimental or derogatory to a party; naturally, probably or actually bringing about a wrong
result."’357 Their conduct placed the entire judiciary in a bad light;358 that our rules are easily
circumvented by our very own.
Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service is punishable by suspension for six months and one day to one year
for the first offense and dismissal from service for the second offense. Accordingly, the penalty of
suspension for six months and one day shall be meted out to Social Worker Serilo for the instant first
offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
As regards Process Server Azcueta, in addition to his suspension for six months for the second
offense of simple neglect of duty, the penalty of suspension for six months and one day shall be
meted out to him for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court has arrived at the following findings:
1. Judge Fernando L. Felicen, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch
20, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. A FINE in the amount of ₱80,000 shall be
2. Judge Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite,
Branch 21, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and simple misconduct. A FINE in
the amount of ₱21,000 shall be deducted from his retirement benefits.
3. Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite,
Branch 22, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. A FINE in the amount of ₱80,000 shall be
4. Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Dasmariñas,

Cavite, Branch 90, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct
constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering that she had been
previously dismissed from service in A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4141-
RTJ), a FINE in the amount of ₱80,000 shall be deducted from whatever amounts may still
be due her.
5. Atty. Allan Sly M. Marasigan, Clerk of Court V, Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite,
Branch 20, is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. He is ordered SUSPENDED for a
period of one month and one day.
6. Atty. Seter M. Dela Cruz-Cordez, Clerk of Court V, Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite,
Branch 22, is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. She is ordered to pay
a FINE equivalent to her salary for a period of one month to be taken from whatever sums
may be due her as retirement, leave or other benefits.
7. Ophelia G. Suluen, Officer-in-Charge and Legal Researcher, Regional Trial Court of

Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 90, is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. She is
ordered SUSPENDED for a period of one month and one day.
8. Anselmo P. Pagunsan, Jr., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, is
found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. He is ordered SUSPENDED for a period of one
year.
9. Hipolito O. Ferrer, Process Server, Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, is
found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. He is ordered SUSPENDED for a period of one
month and one day.
10. Wilmar M. De Villa, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, is found
GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. He is ordered SUSPENDED for a period of six months.
11. Elmer S. Azcueta, Process Server, Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22, is
found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. He is ordered SUSPENDEDfor a period of one year and one day.
12. Rizalino Rinaldi B. Pontejos, Process Server, Regional Trial Court of Dasmariñas,
Cavite, Branch 90, is found GUILTY of two counts of simple neglect of duty. He is
ordered SUSPENDED for a period of six months.
13. Alma N. Serilo, Social Worker Officer II, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court
of Imus, Cavite, is found GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
She is ordered SUSPENDED for a period of six months and one day.
Atty. Allan Sly M. Marasigan, Atty. Seter M. Dela Cruz-Cordez, Ophelia G. Suluen,
Anselmo P. Pagunsan, Jr., Hipolito 0. Ferrer, Wilmar M. De Villa, Elmer S. Azcueta, Rizalino Rinaldi
B. Pontejos and Alma N. Serilo are STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall warrant a more severe penalty.
The complaints against Atty. Regalado E. Eusebio, Clerk of Court VI, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite; Imelda M. Juntilla, Court Interpreter; and Teresita P. Reyes,
Court Stenographer, both of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, are DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
The Court hereby ORDERS the Office of the Bar Confidant to submit, within 30 days from notice, its
compliance with the Resolution dated 12 August 2014, which required its appropriate action relative
to the findings on the possible involvement of private practitioners in the anomalies in the declaration
of nullity and annulment of marriage cases.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General, and the
Prosecutor-General for their information and possible remedial action to prevent farther irregularities,
including possibly by persons under their supervision. The Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc shall
prepare the appropriate cover letter therefor.
SO ORDERED.
3.
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2514 (Formerly A.M. No. 16-10-387-RTC), January 30, 2018
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JUDGE HECTOR B. SALISE, PRESIDING

JUDGE, BRANCH 7, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BAYUGAN CITY, AGUSAN DEL SUR, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case is pursuant to the judicial audit conducted in the Regional Trial Courts (RTC), Branch 6,
Prosperidad and Branch 7, Bayugan City, both in the Province of Agusan del Sur. At that time, respondent
Judge Hector B. Salise was the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 6 and the Executive Judge of Branch 7.
The following are the factual and procedural antecedents of the instant case:
For Branch 6, RTC, Prosperidad, the judicial audit team found that the court allowed substituted service of
summons when, under Section 61 of the Rule on Declaration of Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, the modes of service of summons are only: a) personal service or service in person on
defendant; and b) service by publication. In Criminal Case No. 8172, entitled People v. Peter, for Qualified
Theft, in which no bail was recommended, the court granted the Urgent Petition for Bail without first
conducting a hearing to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong despite the offense
charged being a capital offense, in violation of Sections 72 and 8,3 Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. In Criminal Case No. 8155, entitled People v. Lopez, Jr., for Illegal Possession of an Explosive, in
which no bail was again recommended as the offense charged is considered a capital offense under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1866,4 as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) 9516,5 the court once again granted
the reduction of bail in the amount of P20,000,00 even if there was no showing that a bail hearing was
conducted.
In Civil Case No. 1639, a case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Judge Salise prematurely rendered a
decision granting the petition, without ruling on the petitioner's motions to dispense with the presentation of
her last witness and to admit her Formal Offer of Exhibits, and even though the case was still set for hearing
in a month's time.
The manner by which Judge Salise dismissed several cases before this court would suggest impropriety,
manifest bias and partiality, grave abuse of discretion, and gross ignorance of the law and procedure.
Notably, Judge Salise ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 7912, 7999, and 8000 before the
scheduled day of arraignment, while Criminal Case No. 8028 was dismissed prior to the scheduled hearing
on the Motion to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence and without the accused filing a motion for said
dismissal. The court personnel of Branch 6 likewise testified that Judge Salise would call cases, although
they were not included in the calendar of cases for hearing, even to the point of dismissing these cases.
Judge Salise also issued a Resolution dated September 5, 2014 in a case which was never docketed in
Branch 6 for failure to pay the required docket fee. The court staff only came to know about this when
someone filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution sometime m September 2014.
For Branch 7, RTC, Bayugan City, Judge Salise may be considered to have railroaded the proceedings for a
number of cases for declaration of nullity of marriage. In Civil Case No. 1887, Judge Salise rendered a
decision granting the petition barely eight (8) months since the case was filed on July 14, 2014, without
conducting the mandatory pre-trial, and worse, without petitioner presenting his evidence before the court.
In Civil Case No. 1770, he proceeded with the hearing of the case and later penned a decision granting the
petition although the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent as the summons
was returned to the court unserved. Similarly, in Civil Case No. 1888, he proceeded to hear the case until
the same was submitted for decision even if there was a serious question on the courts jurisdiction over the
case. In Civil Case No. 1806, he proceeded with and decided the case without complying with the mandatory
requirements under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages such as the investigation report of no collusion between the parties from the public prosecutor,
the pre-trial, and the notice to the respondent. In other cases, he proceeded with and decided the case
without due notice to the respondents. In Civil Case No. 1506, he again decided the case in favor of the
petitioner without the mandatory investigation report of no collusion between the parties from the public
prosecutor. And lastly, Judge Salise would allow substituted service of summons in most cases for
declaration of nullity of marriage and annulment of voidable marriage before the court in violation of Section
6 of the Rule on Declaration of Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
In Special Proceeding No. 1741 for Cancellation of Affidavit of Legitimation, Judge Salise issued an Order
directing the then OIC-Clerk of Court of Branch 7, a non-lawyer, to receive evidence ex parte, in violation of
the rule6 that the court may delegate the reception of evidence to its clerk of court, who is a member of the
bar. Also, in several criminal cases, the issuance of warrants of arrest was extremely delayed, taking four
(4) to eight (8) months from the time the case was filed.7
For his part, Judge Salise apologized for whatever procedural lapses he has committed. He explained that
his actions were all done in good faith and judges would sometimes deviate from the rules on a case-to-case
basis. He, likewise, claimed that the reported irregularities were mostly due to inadvertence, but he did
them in good faith and without malice. He fervently asked for the kind indulgence and consideration of the
Court for the lapses, delays, negligence, and inadvertence, and promised to be more circumspect in the
future.
On October 21, 2016, after an extensive review and evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended the imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend for the consideration of the Court that:
1. the Joint Judicial Audit Report by way of a Memorandum dated 10 September 2015
be TREATED as an administrative complaint against Judge Hector B. Salise, Executive
Judge, Branch 7, Regional Trial Court, Bayugan City, and formerly Acting Presiding Judge,
Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, Prosperidad, both in the Province of Agusan del Sur;
2. the letter dated 13 November 2015 and the twin compliance letters, both dated 16
November 2015, all of Judge Salise be NOTED; and
3. Judge Salise be ADJUDGED GUILTY of serious misconduct prejudicial to the integrity and
dignity of the judiciary, and be DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all or part
of the benefits as the Court may determine, except accrued leave credits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.
Respectfully submitted.8
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no logical reason to depart from the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
At the outset, the Court stresses that Judge Salise never refuted, much less denied the aforementioned
judicial audit findings and observations. In fact, he even admitted that:
a. he granted bail to some accused charged with capital offenses in criminal cases in which no bail was
recommended, without conducting the mandatory bail hearing. He merely mentioned excuses such
as "there is an ongoing settlement," "private complainant is open to settlement," the prosecution
did not object to the motion for bail," "to decongest jail," "upon agreement of the parties," or "it
was done without malice or bad faith";
b. with his permission, the court interpreter drafted the Decision in Civil Case No. 1887, granting the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based solely on the petition and the psychological
report, and there were no copies of the Pre-trial Order, the Order showing that petitioner had been
presented, and the minutes. No transcript of stenographic notes could likewise be seen in the
records at the time of the judicial audit;
c. he erred in proceeding to hear the case in Civil Case No. 1770 (for declaration of nullity of
marriage) when the return of the summons states that it is unserved. He decided the case in favor
of the petitioner despite the court's lack of jurisdiction over the defendant;
d. his act of proceeding to hear the case in Civil Case No. 1888 (for declaration of nullity of marriage)
despite the question on the court's jurisdiction was due to the words of the petitioner's lawyer that
his client was able to find a job in Bayugan and that he was renting a house in Purok II, Poblacion,
Bayugan City;
e. he failed to issue an Order directing the public prosecutor to conduct a background check in Civil
Case Nos. 1506 and 1806, both for declaration of nullity of marriage, due to a mere oversight and
the same was without malice; and
f. he allowed plea-bargaining in cases for violation of R.A. 9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
with the consent of the prosecution in order to decongest the jails.
Furthermore, Judge Salise failed to refute several factual circumstances, showing an implied admission of
their truthfulness and accuracy. It was established that he rendered a premature decision in Civil Case No.
1639 (for declaration of nullity of marriage) granting the petition without first ruling on the pending motions
filed by the petitioner. He likewise dismissed criminal cases on his own initiative, supposedly "for paucity of
proof arid dearth of evidence," even after he had already determined, expressly or impliedly, that there was
probable cause against the accused. He ordered the dismissal of these cases after either the accused had
been arraigned or after the cases had been set for arraignment.
Judge Salise also dismissed cases based on fabricated grounds. For instance, he issued an Order in Criminal
Case No. 7994, for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, dismissing the case on the ground that
"this case has not been moving for almost three (3) years," when in reality, said case was dismissed on May
17, 2013 or less than two (2) months after the same had been filed on March 26, 2013. In Criminal Case
No. 8011 for acts of lasciviousness, he dismissed the case motu proprio "considering that private
complainant x x x has not been appearing in this court since the scheduled hearing of this case." However,
an examination of the records of the case would reveal that following the filing of the Information on July
13, 2013, there had only been four (4) settings of the case before it was ordered dismissed on March 24,
2014. Out of those four (4) settings, three (3) were cancelled due to the absence of the defense counsel,
ongoing plea-bargaining, and "as there was no showing that private complainant x x x has been notified of
the day's setting." Verily, those cancellations could not reasonably be attributed to the private complainant.
Moreover, there were also irregularities in the manner by which Judge Salise disposed of or dismissed
criminal cases for violation of R.A. 9165. Supposedly to "decongest the jail," he allowed plea-bargaining as
early as 2012, which was still prohibited then under Section 23,9 Article II of R.A. 9165. In Criminal Case
No. 3441 for possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, with an imposable penalty of twelve (12)
years to life imprisonment and a fine of P300,000.00 to P500,000.00, he allowed the accused to plead guilty
to possession of drug paraphernalia and sentenced him to suffer a straight penalty of one (1) year of
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000.00. In Criminal Case No. 3488 for violation of Section 5, he
allowed the two (2) accused to plead guilty to the lesser offense of use of shabu and sentenced them to a
straight penalty of six (6) months of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000.00. In Criminal Case No.
4450 for possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, he again allowed the accused to plead guilty to
possession of drug paraphernalia and sentenced him to suffer a straight penalty of one (1) year of
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P5,000.00.
Judge Salise also dismissed similar cases under highly questionable circumstances and without due regard to
the applicable procedural rules, to wit:
1. Criminal Case No. 3833 for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 was ordered dismissed "for
paucity of proof" even after he had earlier issued an Order finding probable cause against the
accused.
2. Criminal Case No. 3882 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 was ordered dismissed
"for lack of probable cause" even after he had earlier issued an Order finding probable cause against
the accused.
3. He ordered motu proprio the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 4033 for violation of Section 11, Article
II of R.A. 9165 against one of the accused "for insufficiency of evidence" even if said accused had
already been arraigned and the case was awaiting pre-trial.
II of R.A. 9165 "in chambers" on the ground that the accused "were arrested without a search
warrant or warrant of arrest," even if both of them had already been arraigned and the case had
been set for pre-trial conference.
II of R.A. 9165 on the ground that "the arresting officer dipped into the left pocket of the accused
and allegedly found shabu worth P1,000.00, which is illegal and inadmissible in evidence," even if
the accused had already been arraigned and the pre-trial had been terminated.
II of R.A. 9165 on the ground that "a review of the records shows that SPO1 Juliano M. Ano did not
specify how the shabu was found at the right hand pocket of the accused and that the latter was not
committing a crime in the presence of the police," even if the case was already at the trial stage.
II of R.A. 9165 after almost nine (9) months since the filing of the case, even if the case had
already been set for arraignment. Interestingly, when the accused filed a motion for reduction of
bail, Judge Salise dismissed the case motu proprio instead of acting on the motion.
II of R.A. 9165 "in chambers" citing the discrepancy between the residential addresses of the
accused as appearing in the Information and in the search warrant, even if the accused had already
been arraigned and the case had been set for pre-trial conference.
II of R.A. 9165 on the ground that there was a discrepancy between the time of apprehension of the
accused as alleged in the Information (9:30 p.m. of June 18, 2014) and that stated in the affidavit
of the arresting officer (10:30 p.m. of June 18, 2014). One of the accused had already been
arraigned and the pre-trial conference had been scheduled. Upon motion of one of the accused,
Judge Salise also ordered the prosecution to conduct a re-investigation and to submit a report on
the same. Strangely, however, Judge Sa1ise ordered the dismissal of the case motu proprio without
waiting for the re-investigation report.
II of R.A. 9165 "for paucity of proof” even if the accused had already been arraigned and the case
had been set for pre-trial.
Judge Salise also never refuted or denied the testimonies of his court personnel affirming his breaches and
even saying that litigants and lawyers would frequent his chamber to personally verify their cases. He would
call cases, although not included in the court's calendar, "to the point of dismissing" the same. Worse, he
was also reported to have issued and signed a Resolution in a case that was not in the court's docket.
The aforementioned circumstances surrounding the proceedings and disposition of cases are far too flagrant
to simply be ignored and their totality strongly indicates Judge Salise's corrupt tendencies. His assertions
that his procedural lapses were committed in good faith and without any monetary consideration simply do
not hold water. The number of cases involved and the manner by which he disposed of said cases clearly
show a pattern of misdeeds and a propensity to violate the law and established procedural rules, particularly
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, R.A.
9165, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the Court finds Judge Salise guilty of serious misconduct.
Indeed, it is settled that, unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill
will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, the respondent judge may not be administratively
liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial
functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases.10 However, when the inefficiency springs from
a failure to recognize such a basic and fundamental rule, law, or principle, the judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title vested upon him, or he is too vicious that he
deliberately committed the oversight or omission in bad faith and in grave abuse of authority.11 Here, the
attendant circumstances would reveal that Judge Salise's acts contradict any claim of good faith.
Although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary actions for every erroneous order or decision
he issues, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his
adjudicatory prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse the powers granted to them by the law, there will be,
not only confusion in the administration of justice, but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements
under the law and established rules. For repeatedly and deliberately committing irregularities in the
disposition of his cases, thereby manifesting corrupt inclinations, Judge Salise can be said to have misused
said powers.
Indubitably, Judge Salise violated the Code of Judicial Conduct ordering judges to ensure that his or her
conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession
and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.12 He simply used oversight, inadvertence,
and honest mistake as convenient excuses. He acted with conscious indifference to the possible undesirable
consequences to the parties involved.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must
be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with
the performance of the public officer's official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest in the former.13
To hold a judge administratively liable for serious misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of
official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, it must be shown that his acts were committed
with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice.14 The
Court has repeatedly and consistently held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear
to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled
to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who
shall give them impartial justice. They must trust the judge; otherwise, they will not go to him at all. They
must believe in his sense of fairness; otherwise, they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence,
there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.15 Judge Salise's acts indubitably
violated said trust and confidence, seriously impairing the image of the judiciary to which he owes the duty
of loyalty and obligation to keep it at all times above reproach and worthy of the people's trust. 16
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS Judge Hector B. Salise, Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 6, Regional Trial
Court, Prosperidad and Executive Judge of Branch 7, Regional Trial Court, Bayugan City, both in the
Province of Agusan del Sur, GUILTY of serious misconduct and hereby DISMISSES him from the service
with FORFEITURE of retirement benefits, except leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
4.
EN BANC
January 30, 2018
A.M. No. p-09-2633

vs.
ROLANDO C. TOMAS and ANGELINA C. RILLORTA, former Officers-in-Charge, Regional Trial
Court, Santiago City, Isabela, Respondents
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2338
ANGELINA C. RILLORTA, Complainant

vs.
JUDGE FE A. MADRID, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Santiago City, Isabela, Respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
A.M. No. P-09-2633 stems from the result of the financial audit conducted in the Regional Trial
Court, Santiago City, Isabela while A.M. No. RTJ-12-23381 is an offshoot of A.M. No. P-09-2633. The
Financial Audit Team found, among others, shortages in the judiciary funds, tampering of official
receipts, and overwithdrawal of cash bonds allegedly committed by Angelina C. Rillorta (Rillorta),
Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Trial Court, Santiago City, Isabela (now retired). The
administrative complaint in A.M. No. RTJ-12-2338 was filed by Rillorta against Judge Fe Albano
Madrid (Judge Madrid), formerly Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Santiago City,
Isabela (now retired), for dishonesty, involving the same audit findings in A.M. No. P-09-2633.
The facts, as narrated by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), are as follows:
In OCA Memorandum dated March 12, 2009, the Financial Audit Team repo1ied shortages in the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF), General Fund (GF) and Sheriff's General Fund (SGF) of the
former Officers in Charge as follows:
a) Rolando C. Tomas – ₱18,639.50 (JDF) and ₱14,538.45 (GF)
b) Angelina Rillorta – ₱23,839.67 (JDF); ₱7,884.65 (GF) and ₱12.00 (SGF)
A review of the court orders and acknowledgment receipts of the withdrawn cashbonds to determine
the Fiduciary Funds also revealed a shortage amounting to Six Million Five Hundred Fifty-Seven
Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-Nine Pesos and 70/100 (₱6,557,959.70).
Balance per LBP SA # 1361-0025-27 as of 4/30/04 ₱5,969,5l1.40

Add: Deposit on 5/26/04 based on the initial
findings of the Audit Team 936,000.00
Total ₱6,905,5l1.40
Less: Net Interest (withdrawn on 4/26/05 ₱3,516.18
Unwithdrawn interest 50.00 3,566.18
Adjusted Bank Balance as of 4/30/04 ₱6,901,945.22
Beginning Balance ₱32,539.30

Collections for the period 10/18/91 to 4/30/04 16,419,498.96
Balance ₱16,452,038.26
Less: Valid Withdrawals (same period) 2,993,533.34
Unwithdrawn Fiduciary Fund as of 4/30/04 ₱13,458,504.92
Unwithdrawn Fiduciary Fund as of 4/30/04 ₱13,458,504.92

Less: Adjusted Bank Balance as of 4/30/04 6,901,945.22
Balance of Accountabilities/Shortage ₱6,556,559.70
The shortage referred to above represents the cash bonds which were withdrawn but with
incomplete documents such as court orders and acknowledgment receipts. However, according 'to
the Financial Audit Team, if the supporting documents of the withdrawn cash bonds would be
submitted, the shortages would be reduced to One Hundred Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred
Eighty-Six Pesos and 16/100 (₱136,886.16).
On April 22, 2009, the Court, through the First Division, issued a Resolution, the decretal portion of
which reads:
xxxx
(2) to DIRECT Mr. Rolando C. Tomas, former Officer-in-Charge, Regional Trial Court, Santiago City,
Isabela to RESTITUTE within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice, the shortages incurred in the
JDF and General Fund Amounting to Eighteen Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos and
50/100 (₱18,639.50) and Fourteen Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-Eight Pesos and 45/100
(₱14,538.45) respectively, in order to finalize the audit on said accounts x x x
xxxx
(4) to DIRECT Mrs. Angelina C. Rillorta, Officer-in-Charge, Regional Trial Court, Santiago, Isabela to
RESTITUTE within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice, the shortages incurred in the JDF,
General Fund and Sheriff's General Fund amounting to Twenty-Three Thousand Eight Hundred
Thirty-Nine Pesos and 67/100 (₱23,839.67), Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-Four Pesos and
65/100 (₱7,884.65) and Twelve Pesos (₱12.00), respectively, in order to finalize the audit on the
said accounts, x x x
(5) to require Mrs. Rillorta to SUBMIT to the Fiscal Monitoring Division, CMO, OCA the machine-
validated deposit slip(s) as proof of compliance;
(6) to require Mrs. Rillorta to SUBMIT to the Fiscal Monitoring Division, Court Management Office,
Office of the Court Administrator, the Court orders and acknowledgment receipts of the withdrawn
cashbonds (Annexes A, B & C) to finalize the audit on the Fiduciary Fund account within thirty (30)
days from receipt of notice with information that non-submission of the supporting documents will
incur a shortage amounting to Six Million Five Hundred Fifty-Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-
Nine Pesos and 70/100 (₱6,557,959.70) for the Fiduciary Fund, x x x
However, in case the following supporting documents of the cash bonds will be submitted, the
shortage shall be reduced to One Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Six Pesos and
16/100 (₱113,286.16) x x x
xxxx
Complying with the above directives, Mrs. Angelina Rillorta, in her undated letter, informed the Court
that she has already deposited the shortages incurred in the JDF, GF and the SGF. She argued that
she did not misappropriate any money and explained that she committed a mistake in depositing her
collections in the proper account for which the Commission o[n] Audit (COA) had called her
attention. With regards to the submission of the orders and acknowledgment receipts in support of
the withdrawn cash bonds, she claimed that she only secured copies of some orders and
acknowledgment receipts because some case records were not made available to her. She also
explained that she has submitted her monthly financial report from December 1994 to April 2005
together with copies of the orders and acknowledgment receipts to the Accounting Division,
Financial Management Office (FMO), OCA and if there was anything wrong or irregular in her
reports, the Accounting Division should have called her attention or asked her to explain. Further,
she argued that if the amount of the cash bonds was not given to the persons who requested the
withdrawal thereof, a lot of complaints could have been filed against her in Court. She added that in
order to comply with the directive of the Court, the Accounting Division, FMO, OCA, be directed to
produce the financial reports and that she be given time to follow-up the said records with the said
office.
In her Supplemental Explanation dated September 3, 2009, Mrs. Rillorta narrated that when she
assumed as Officer-In-Charge, OCC, on March 10, 1995, the court's financial records were not
formally turned over to her. She had to figure out by herself what to do. She explained that the
monthly financial reports were submitted to Executive Judge Fe Albano Madrid for approval and
signature and every time the latter went over the reports, she would change or correct the entries to
conform with the entries in the passbook for the fiduciary account. After the corrections were
incorporated in the report, Judge Madrid would sign it.
Mrs. Rillorta further narrated that sometime in January 2003, she reviewed the financial records and
discovered that the monthly report did not jibe with the bank book entries. Hence, she requested the
COA, Tuguegarao City, to audit her books of account and after a preliminary audit, she was
instructed to inform Judge Madrid of the discrepancies. She immediately informed Judge Madrid and
the latter made some adjustments to the report. She alleged that on May 24, 2004, a team from the
OCA came to conduct a financial audit. When the audit was about to be completed, an exit
conference was held. She was expecting to be called to attend the conference, hence, she asked
the team leaders if her presence was needed and was told "Di ka naman pinatawag ni Judge." She
was never required to respond to any findings and was therefore under the impression that Judge
Madrid had sufficiently explained the discrepancies. It was only when she was going over the
records of the court that she discovered that an Observation Memorandum dated May 17, 2004
prepared by the audit team was given to Judge Madrid. Thus, she requested the Court for a
reinvestigation and hearing on the complaint which was referred to the OCA on December 16, 2009.
Complying with the directive of the Court, the OCA, in its Memorandum dated May 20, 2010,
recommended that the motion to conduct another investigation be denied because it was no longer
necessary considering that Angelina Rillorta has already remitted her shortages and that she was
directed to explain in writing why she should not be dismissed from the service for violation of OCA
Circular No. 22-94 dated April 8, 1994 (Re: Guidelines in the Proper Handling and Use of Official
Receipts), it appearing that official receipts were tampered:
xxxx
The OCA added that only the supporting documents such as court orders and acknowledgment
receipts of the withdrawn cash bonds with incomplete documents should be submitted in order to
finalize the accountabilities of Mrs. Rillorta in the Fiduciary fund.
On June 1, 2011, the Court adopted the OCA's recommendation and noted the Ex Parte
Manifestation dated February 22, 2010 of Executive Judge Anastacio D. Anghad and Clerk of Court,
Norbert Bong S. Obedoza, both of the RTC Santiago City, praying that respondent Rolando C.
Tomas' death on February 10, 2010 be considered with humanitarian consideration in the resolution
of this case
In another Memorandum dated June 13, 2011, the OCA requested that (a) the recommendation in
its Memorandum of May 20, 2010 denying the motion of Mrs. Rillorta for the conduct of another
investigation be set aside; (b) the Land Bank of the Philippines, Santiago City, Isabela Branch, be
directed to submit a certification as to the authorized signatory from August 1991 to April 30, 2004,
for Savings Account No. 1361-0025-27 of the Fiduciary Fund of the RTC, Santiago City; (c) Judge
Madrid be required to submit her comments on the unsigned letter and additional Supplement to the
Motion for the Conduct of Another and/or Additional Investigation both dated September 28, 2010
filed by Mrs. Rillorta; and (d) the motion to conduct another investigation as well as the manifestation
of the heirs of respondent Rolando Tomas be held in abeyance pending the submission of Judge
Madrid's comment. OCA's recommendations were adopted by the Court in its Resolution of August
03, 2011.
In compliance with the June 1, 2011 Resolution, Mrs. Rillorta filed her Explanation with Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 24, 2011 alleging that she was denied her right to due process when she
was not allowed to participate in the exit conference with the Financial Audit Team. She also
informed the Court that she filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Judge Madrid before the OCA x x x.
For her part, Judge Madrid, in her undated Compliance which was received by the OCA on October
20, 2011, stated that she was not aware of the unsigned letter dated September 27, 2010 and
additional supplement to the motion for the conduct of another and/or additional investigation filed by
Mrs. Rillorta. She claimed that the latter executed an Affidavit dated March 3, 2011 and two
Supplemental Affidavits which were the basis of OCA IPI No. 11-3614-RTJ pending in the OCA, and
requested a copy thereof if the said letter referred to a different matter for her to comment thereon.
On the other hand, the Land Bank of the Philippines, Santiago Branch, Isabela, issued a Certification
dated October 24, 2011 stating that Account No. 1361-0025-27 RTC, Branch 21 (Fiduciary Fund)
was opened on March 29, 1993 by Judge Madrid who was the authorized signatory.
On December 3, 2012, the Court granted the request of Mrs. Rillorta for the conduct of another
and/or additional investigation and referred the matter to the Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals who was designated to investigate A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-3614-RT[J] (Re:
Angelina C. Rillorta vs. Honorable Fe A. Madrid, Presiding Judge, Branch 21, RTC, Santiago
City) [now A.M. No. RTJ-12-2338] for a joint investigation. The Court also directed the Financial
Management Office, OCA, to deduct the amount of ₱33,177.95 from the equivalent money value of
the total earned leave credits of the late Rolando Tomas who was dismissed from the service
pursuant to the Resolution of the Court in A.M. No. P-09-2660 (Francisco C.Taguinod vs. Deputy
Sheriff Rolando Tomas, Branch 21, RTC, Santiago City).
OCA IPI No. 11-3614-RTJ

This is an offshoot of A.M. No. P-09-2633. On March 3, 2011, Mrs. Rillorta filed the instant
administrative complaint against Judge Madrid praying that an investigation be conducted and that
Judge Madrid be directed to answer or explain the charges against her. In her Affidavit-Complaint,
Mrs. Rillorta reiterated the allegations in her Supplemental Explanation in A.M. No. P-09-2633. She
averred that the monthly reports did not dovetail with the bank book entries, that is, the amount
collected appearing in the monthly report was only ₱700,000.00 while the amount appearing in the
bank account was more or less ₱6,000,000.00. This discrepancy alarmed her, so she voluntarily
submitted herself to an audit by the COA in Tuguegarao City. She informed Judge Madrid about the
COA findings and in order to balance the discrepancies found, Judge Madrid instructed her and
Susan[a] Liggayu to make some adjustments in the official receipts issued by the court. For
instance, in the bail bond posted by then retired Judge Alivia of the RTC, Cauayan City for his client,
Judge Madrid asked for the General Fund receipts and instructed her to write in the original receipt
the true amount of the bail bond but to reflect the amount of ₱20.00 or ₱30.00 (clearance fee) in the
duplicate and triplicate copies. She then asked Judge Madrid "Ma 'am, why not issue na fang Court
Order para minsanan na ma-withdraw yung bina-balance mo" to which she replied "No, this is
better." She claimed that every time Judge Madrid instructed her to do it, she asked Susan[a]
Liggayu to make a list so that they would have a record of the amounts collected for the Fiduciary
Fund. She also narrated that Judge Madrid instructed her to alter the amounts of the cash bond
withdrawn. For instance, if the amount of the bail bond deposited was ₱10,000.00, the amount to be
withdrawn would be ₱110,000.00. This happened on several occasions. Likewise, in Criminal Case
Nos. 4161 and 4162 (People vs. Pua) and Criminal Case No. 21-4225 (People vs. Alejandro
Ramos), the release orders did not indicate the Official Receipt (O.R.) number which is the usual
practice of the court.
Again, in her Second Supplemental Affidavit dated April 6, 2011, Mrs. Rillorta described how Judge
Madrid effected the adjustments in the official receipts issued by the court. In Criminal Case No.
3423, Judge Madrid added zero "0" in 0.R. No. 10706949 in between the digits three "3" and zero to
make it appear that the amount received was Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) and
superimposed the letter "y" at the end of the word three (in the box amount in words to jibe with
Thirty Thousand Pesos). She also alleged that every time there was an excess in the amount
withdrawn, she or Susan[a] Liggayu delivered the same to Judge Madrid by leaving the money on
her table. The amounts were always put inside an envelope which was labelled by Susan[a] Liggayu
by writing the corresponding case number. There were times when the withdrawals were done in the
afternoon and in those instances, the excess amounts were delivered to Judge Madrid's house. She
further alleged that Judge Madrid drafted her answer in A.M. No. P-09-2633 but did not submit the
same because said comment made her admit the charges. Judge Madrid even insisted that she
submit the same to avoid dismissal from the service since the argument raised was that she acted in
good faith. She thus suspected that she was made a sacrificial lamb. She admitted that she was not
knowledgeable in accounting procedures which was why she never questioned the acts of Judge
Madrid and followed her orders and instructions.
For her part, Judge Madrid, in her Comment dated April 6, 2011, alleged that Mrs. Rillorta is a
stenographer but could not take stenographic notes in open court. Her work then was to assist Clerk
of Court Teofilo Juguilon and to type decisions. After the retirement of Atty. Juguilon, she thought it
wise to designate her as OIC-Clerk of Court because she was already familiar with the workings of
the office. In the beginning, she strictly monitored the collections and disbursements until Mrs.
Rillorta gained her complete trust and confidence. So she just let Mrs. Rillorta do her work with little
supervision. At that time, the court was a single sala court and had many cases to attend to which
left her little time for financial management. She added that she could not remember if there was a
formal turnover of the court's financial reports to Mrs. Rillorta, but an inventory of the records was
received by the latter. Mrs. Rillorta prepared the monthly reports which she would note and sign after
a review of the attached official receipts, order and acknowledgment receipts, as well as deposit
slips and withdrawal slips. Corrections were made to conform to the supporting documents or to
correct wrong computations. She does not have her own separate records as alleged by Mrs.
Rillorta. A separate record would be an extra work which she would not like to do. She admitted that
the monthly reports did not jibe with the bank book in that, the money in the bank is more than what
is stated in the monthly reports. However, this did not alarm her because there was more money
which meant there was no shortage.
Judge Madrid further claimed that she did not know that Mrs. Rillorta had voluntarily submitted
herself for audit to the COA but knew that the COA has always been auditing the financial records of
the court because Mrs. Rillorta has been regularly submitting the monthly reports to the COA Office
in Ilagan, Isabela. She was then informed by Mrs. Rillorta about the discrepancy between the
monthly reports and the money in the bank but denied instructing Mrs. Rillorta and Susan[a] Liggayu
to make some adjustments on the official receipts. She could not remember asking Mrs. Rillorta to
give her the GF receipts in connection with the bail bond posted by retired Judge Alivia. She could
have asked for the GF receipts to check on something but not to show how to tamper the bail bond
receipts. Also, after the financial audit, the audit team informed her of the ₱900,000.00 shortage in
the court's collection. She told the audit team to call Mrs. Rillorta so that she could be given a
chance to produce the money and conduct a cash count. However, the audit team said that no cash
count could be done because some receipts were tampered. She immediately talked to Mrs. Rillorta
about the audit team's observations and told her to deposit the shortage right away. In addition, she
could not remember if she was given an Observation Memorandum by the audit team except for a
piece of paper that was shown to her by the audit team. She also confirmed that she is the signatory
of the LBP account and that the withdrawals she signed were supported by official receipts and court
orders. She also confirmed that she helped Mrs. Rillorta prepare her answer to the administrative
charge against her but did so only upon her request and that she only included those statements
which Mrs. Rillorta told her and of her fear of dismissal because of the charge of dishonesty and told
her that she could plead good faith because there was no intention on her part to be dishonest.
Judge Madrid also argued that all instructions given to Mrs. Rillorta and the other court employees
were lawful and proper and expected that the instructions be carried out. The corrections she made
in the monthly reports were all proper and did not make any alterations or adjustments on any official
receipts, deposit slips, withdrawal slips or acknowledgment receipts.
In her Comment on the Supplemental Complaint dated April 28, 2011, Judge Madrid maintained that
the same is a repetition of her original affidavit to which a comment had already been made. She
claimed that she only signs the orders of release and it was Mrs. Rillorta who processed the
documents which presented to her for signature. The order of release is a standard form and it was
the duty of the OIC to check that the documents are complete before they are brought to her for
signature. With regards to the undertaking attached to the complaint, she claimed that she did not
know who prepared it but the blanks were filled up with the use of Mrs. Rillorta's typewriter. She
does not usually scrutinize the word and every document presented in connection with the bail bond
and if she noticed the typewritten insertions, she could have asked what they meant considering that
the typewritten insertions are alien to the documents.
Refuting the allegations in the Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint, Judge Madrid, in her Comment
dated June 6, 2011, denied that she inserted the letter "O" and superimposed the letter "Y" in Official
Receipt No. 10706946. She claimed that she had no access to the documents which were in the
custody of the monitoring team as they did not show her any documents when they talked to her
after the audit. She also vehemently denied that the alleged excess in the withdrawn amount was
delivered to her by Mrs. Rillorta or Susan[a] Liggayu either in the officeor in her house. The only
money she received were those withdrawn from the bank when she requested Mrs. Rillorta to
encash her salary checks. When she confronted Susan[a] Liggayu about the tampering and
withdrawals, the latter denied any knowledge about them and even executed an affidavit to that
effect. In addition, she admitted to be the lone signatory of withdrawals but this was not by any
sinister design as alluded to by Mrs. Rillorta. When the Clerk of Court retired from the service, the
money was transferred to the RTC which is represented by her being then the Executive Judge.
However, she did not personally make withdrawals and has always authorized Mrs. Rillorta to do the
withdrawals instead.
In her Reply Affidavit dated June 13, 2011, Mrs. Rillorta narrated that Judge Madrid called her in her
chambers on May 26, 2004, at around 1 :30 [p.m.] to 2:00 p.m. Judge Madrid told her to go to the
bank and deposit the money wrapped in a newspaper and ·placed inside a plastic bag. She also
handed her a piece of paper indicating the amount of ₱947,000.00 – ₱11,200.00 = ₱936,000.00 in
her own handwriting. When she went out of Judge Madrid's room, Susan[a] Liggayu was waiting and
handed her the piece of paper which Judge Madrid gave and they both counted the money.
Susan[a] Liggayu then prepared the deposit slip based on the amount they counted and what was
written on the piece of paper, after which she gave the prepared deposit slip to Judge Madrid who
affixed her signature. This incident proved that monies were delivered to Judge Madrid and when the
amount was needed to be deposited, it was readily and immediately produced by Judge Madrid for
deposit and return.2
In his Report, Investigating Justice Elihu Ybañez detailed how Judge Madrid manipulated the
Fiduciary Fund, to wit:
First. In Criminal Case No. 21-4225, entitled People vs. Alejandro Ramos, for Violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 6076, the Undertaking executed by the accused and his Bondsman, appears that the
cash bail posted is only ₱20,000.00 without the Official Receipt issued was stated in the Undertaking
but a marginal note 'NO RECEIPT ISSUED' admitted by respondent Judge as her own handwriting.
Despite the fact that the bailbond posted was only ₱20,000.00 and respondent Judge [wrote a]
marginal note that no proper receipt was issued for the cash bond of ₱20,000.00, respondent Judge
still authorized the withdrawal and release of ₱120,000.00 which is over and above the actual
amount of the cash bail posted of ₱20,000.00. How could respondent Judge in good faith sign the
withdrawal slip after checking on the Undertaking which stated that cash bail posted was only
₱20,000.00 and by her own handwriting even noted in the same Undertaking that there was no
Official Receipt issued for the cash bond posted. Per admission of respondent-complainant, she
tampered with Official Receipt No. 1721363 dated 2 June 2003 to make the ₱120,000.00 upon the
instruction of respondent Judge. Repondent-complainant testified further that from the withdrawn
amount of ₱120,000.00, ₱100,000.00 went to respondent Judge and ₱20,000.00 was released to
the Bondsman.
Second. Respondent Judge signed the withdrawal slip despite the fact that the original Official
Receipt which is being presented by the Bondsman/Party and attached to the documents for the
release of the cash bonds provides for a much smaller amount or different in amount than the
amount for withdrawal for the refund/release of the cash bond posted.
Third. Respondent Judge transferred the RTC Santiago City Bank Accounts by her as the lone
signatory. This, without following the guidelines set by the Supreme [C]ourt requiring a co-signatory
to the account who are the Executive Judge and the Clerk of Court/OIC. Being the lone signatory to
the RTC Santiago City General Fund, Fiduciary Fund and JDF Bank Accounts, respondent Judge
had full control of the amount[ s] deposited to and withdrawn from the RTC Bank Accounts. It would
be far[-]fetched that funds of the court would be dissipated without respondent Judge knowing what
is happening because she is the sole signatory to the bank deposits of the Fiduciary Funds of the
RTC, Santiago City. In fact, respondent Judge on cross examination acknowledged full responsibility
of the deposits to and withdrawals from the accounts.
Fourth. Respondent Judge had the final say on what should be stated in the Monthly Report of
Collections/Deposits/Withdrawals and Disbursements such that she had full knowledge early on if
and when any amounts have been receipted, deposited, and/or withdrawn. Respondent-complainant
Angelina Rillorta, witnesses Jaime Gumpal, Virginia Manuel and Susan[a] Liggayu all confirmed that
respondent Judge would change the data contained in the Monthly Report before she signed it.
Fifth. The evidence points to the fact that after the OCA Audit Team completed the court financial
audit, respondent Judge returned the amount of P936,000.00 which respondent-complainant Rillorta
and witness Susan[a] Liggayu deposited to the Landbank. Respondent-complainant testified on
cross-examination that respondent Judge called her in the Judge's Chamber and gave her the blue
SM plastic bag containing the ₱900,000.00 plus money. Respondent Judge also wrote in a piece of
paper ₱947,200.00 minus ₱11,200[.00] = ₱936,000.00, which is the amount to be deposited
representing the missing funds. The testimony of respondent-complainant is corroborated by witness
Susan[a] Liggayu who testified on cross examination that she saw Judge Albano Madrid hand to
Angelina Rillorta a blue plastic bag containing money which she and Angelina Rillorta counted. She
further testified that she prepared the corresponding deposit slip and handed it to Angelina Rillorta
which the latter in tum gave to Judge Madrid for the Judge's signature. Afterwards, she and Angelina
Rillorta deposited the money to Landbank. While respondent Judge claims that it was respondent-
complainant who returned the ₱936,000.00 money, however, respondent-complainant could not
have returned the amount as she was not the one informed by the OCA Audit Team but respondent
Judge who in return did not tell respondent-complainant of the amount. x x x.
Sixth. Respondent Judge took undue interest in preparing the pleadings for respondent-complainant
or even went the extra mile to control what will be written in the pleadings. The first draft answer
made by respondent Judge for respondent-complainant was that the latter kept the money which
was not agreed to by respondent-complainant. Respondent Judge forced respondent-complainant to
submit to the Supreme Court the answer (Exhibit 14) she made for her but respondent-complainant
refused, and submitted a different answer without saying that she kept the money.
While respondent Judge claims that she only took pity on respondent-complainant, so she prepared
the pleadings for her, the draft pleadings tell that respondent Judge wanted to make it appear that it
was respondent-complainant who took the missing funds. She was also discouraged by [respondent
Judge] in approaching DCA Villanueva when the latter was in Tuguegarao City; also prevented
respondent-complainant from telling anyone about the shortages. Withal, respondent Judge also
encouraged if not stopped respondent-complainant from consulting a lawyer after she received the
notice from the OCA re the missing Judiciary Funds.
Seventh. The assurances of respondent Judge on respondent-complainant that the latter won't be
accused of malversation because respondent Judge already returned the money, referring to the
₱936,000.00 deposited after the audit conducted by the SC, is also indicative of her hand in the loss
and return/deposit of the fiduciary funds.
Eighth. The testimony of respondent Judge's witness Arcelio F. [De] Castillo, former Legal
Researcher of RTC Branch 21, Santiago City, who testified on the strict and meticulous character of
respondent Judge only bolstered the fact that the incidents of tampering, non-deposit and
overwithdrawal could not have passed respondent Judge without her knowledge and understanding.
x x x x3
The same Report highlighted Judge Madrid's telling admissions:

x x x [R]espondent Judge admitted that: (1) General Fund, Fiduciary Fund and JDF Accounts are by
the Judge only; (2) she was the lone signatory to the Fiduciary Funds and the General Fund
Accounts explaining that the decision was made at the time when the Clerk of Court retired and the
latter had to transfer to her the account; (3) she was also the lone signatory not only to the bank
accounts and likewise to the reports; (4) she did not bother to change the signatory to the accounts
after COC Atty. Suguilon retired because the RTC only had an OIC not a Clerk of Court; (5)
respondent Judge knew and was aware of the SC Circular re the required signatories to the court
funds; (6) notwithstanding the guidelines set by the Supreme Court requiring a co-signatory for the
account saying that the said circular was only issued after [the] RTC Santiago City became a
multiple sala court emphasizing that the OIC was not a Clerk of Court; (7) respondent Judge being
the only signatory, acknowledged full responsibility of the deposits and withdrawals thereon[.]4
The Investigating Justice recommended the following:
(1) Judge Fe Albano Madrid be held liable for SERIOUS DISHONESTY and GROSS
MISCONDUCT. All her retirement benefits, except her accrued leave benefits be ordered forfeited in
favor of the government, if any, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Any computed shortages of the Fiduciary
Fund yet to be restituted be charged against said accrued leave benefits.
Judge Albano Madrid be likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canon[s] 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and her name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys; and
(2) Angelina C. Rillorta be liable for SIMPLENEGLECT OF DUTY and be meted a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely.5
The OCA recommended the following:
1. Judge Fe Albano Madrid (formerly Presiding Judge, Branch 21, Regional Trial Court, Santiago
City, Isabela, now retired) be found GUILTY of serious dishonesty and gross misconduct and that all
her retirement benefits, except her accrued leave benefits, be ordered FORFEITED, with prejudice
to re-employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations;
2. Judge Fe Albano Madrid be DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE why she should not be DISBARRED
for violation of Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
3. Angelina C. Rillorta, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Santiago
City, Isabela, now retired, be found GUILTY of gross misconduct and that all her retirement benefits
and accrued leave benefits be FORFEITED, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations;
4. The Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court
Administrator be DIRECTED to compute the balance of the earned leave credits of Angelina Rillorta
and forward the same to the Finance Division, Financial Management Office, Office of the Court
Administrator, for the computation of the monetary value of her earned leave credits. The an10unt as
well as other benefits Angelina Rillorta may be entitled to shall be applied as partial restitution of the
computed shortages in the amount of ₱6,555,559.70;
5. Angelina C. Rillorta be DIRECTED to RESTITUTE her shortages in the Fiduciary Fund after
deducting the money value of her accrued leave credits and other benefits; and
6. [T]he Legal Office, Office of the Court Administrator be DIRECTED to initiate appropriate criminal
proceedings against Judge Fe Albano Madrid and Angelina C. Rillorta in light of the above findings.6
The issues in this case are whether Judge Madrid is guilty of grave misconduct and serious
dishonesty and whether Rillorta is guilty of grave misconduct.
The Court adopts the findings of the OCA and agrees in its recommendations, except as to the
computation of the amount to be restituted by Rillorta.
Judge Madrid is Guilty of Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty
Public office is a public trust. This constitutional principle requires a judge, like any other public
servant and more so because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the
highest degree of honesty and integrity. As the visible representation of the law tasked with
dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the
respect and confidence of the people.7
Judge Madrid failed to live up to these exacting standards. In this case, the Court agrees with the
findings of the OCA, which affirmed the evaluations of the Investigating Justice, "that official receipts
were tampered and that there were overwithdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account amounting to
Nine Hundred Thirty Six [Thousand] (₱936,000.00) Pesos. The Audit Team's findings were not
refuted by Judge Madrid and Mrs. Rillorta during the investigation."8 These acts of tampering of
official receipts and overwithdrawals from court funds clearly constitute grave misconduct and
serious dishonesty.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior.9 The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate
the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.10
Dishonesty, on the other hand, is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.11
The Court agrees with the OCA in rejecting Judge Madrid's contention that she did not include
Rillorta as co-signatory because the latter is only an OIC. Being designated as acting Clerk of Court
or OIC, Rillorta had the same duties and responsibilities of a regular clerk of court.12 Indeed, if Judge
Madrid were uncomfortable that only an OIC was assigned to the Office of the Clerk of Court, she,
as then Executive Judge, should have declared the position open so that a regular clerk of court
could be appointed. However, Judge Madrid did not do so.
The Court likewise sustains the OCA's finding that Judge Madrid's only witness, Arcelia F. De
Castillo (De Castillo), then Court Legal Researcher, did not help her case as the latter had no
knowledge of the tampering of official receipts. In his Judicial Affidavit,13 De Castillo stated that
payments of bailbonds were made in the office of the OIC-Clerk of Court; that he had not seen
payments of bail bonds made inside the office or chambers of Judge Madrid; that he had not
participated in any transactions involving the payment of bailbond; and that it was the criminal docket
clerk Jaime U. Gumpal (Gumpal) who attended to the posting of bonds and his only participation
was the review of documents after the requirements were completed.
On the other hand, the Judicial Affidavits14 of Gumpal, Court Interpreter, and Susana B. Liggayu
(Liggayu), Clerk III, both of Branch 21, Regional Trial Court, Santiago City, bolstered the fact that
Judge Madrid manipulated the Fiduciary Fund collections and reports submitted to the OCA. Liggayu
testified, among others, that Judge Madrid ordered the tampering of official receipts; and that she
and Rillorta made a list to monitor Judge Madrid's overwithdrawals and undeposited amounts
because Rillorta was already worried how much Judge Madrid would still order withdrawn.
As recommended by the OCA, this administrative case against Judge Madrid for grave misconduct
and serious dishonesty shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against her as a
member of the Bar,15 in accordance with A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which provides:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges
of regular and special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are
likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other
forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of
lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary
action against the respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The
respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should
not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the Bar.
Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Accordingly, Judge Madrid is directed to show cause why she should not be disbarred for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canons 116 and 717 and Rule 1.0118 thereof.
Rillorta is Guilty of Grave Misconduct
Rillorta is liable for grave misconduct for her participation in the tampering of receipts, non-deposit to
and overwithdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund.
Rillorta admitted having tampered some official receipts. However, she claims that the tamperings
were upon the instructions of Judge Madrid. This does not excuse her from any liability because
1avvphi1
obviously tampering of such official documents is unlawful which should never be countenanced.
The Court sustains the OCA's statement that "as a public officer, her duty was not only to perform
her assigned tasks, but to prevent the commission of acts inimical to the judiciary and to the public,
in general."19 It is grave misconduct when Rillorta participated or consented to the commission of the
unlawful acts of tampering receipts and overwithdrawals from court funds simply because of
following the orders or instructions of her superior, Judge Madrid.
As correctly found by the OCA, "[w]hen Judge Madrid ordered [Rillorta] to alter an official receipt at
the first instance, Mrs. Rillorta should have reported the matter to the OCA who has supervision over
all judges and court personnel of the lower court[s]. Rather, she kept silent and allowed herself to be
used by Judge Madrid and even facilitated the tampering of official receipts and overwithdrawals on
several occasions. She knew the repercussions of her acts because she kept a record of the
transactions on the tampering of bail bond receipts which, according to her, was a precautionary
move and to keep track of the balances in the Fiduciary Fund account. She also failed to prove
during the investigation that she was threatened, coerced or terrorized by Judge Madrid into doing
such unlawful acts."20
The Court likewise rejects Rillorta's claim that when she assumed the position of OIC, the court's
financial records were not formally turned over to her and she was not knowledgeable in accounting
procedures. Unfamiliarity with procedures will not exempt Rillorta from liability. As a Clerk of Court,
she is expected to keep abreast of all applicable laws, jurisprudence and administrative circulars
pertinent to her office.21 Further, Rillorta had been the OIC for nine years when the financial audit
was conducted, and therefore, she was presumed to know her functions and responsibilities.22
Penalties on Judge Madrid and Rillorta
As this Court has repeatedly stated, the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.23 The Court has not hesitated to impose the
ultimate penalty on those who have fallen short of their accountabilities. Any conduct that violates
the norms of public accountability and diminishes, or even tends to diminish, the faith of the people
in the justice system has never been and will never be tolerated or condoned by this Court.24
Since Judge Madrid is found guilty of the grave offenses of grave misconduct and serious
dishonesty, the penalty of dismissal from the service is proper even for the first offense in
accordance _with Section 46A(l), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. However, since Judge Madrid has already retired from the service, the penalty of dismissal
can no longer be imposed. Instead, all of her retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, are
forfeited, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
With regard to Rillorta's offense and penalty, the OCA's recommendation differed from that of the
Investigating Justice's. The Investigating Justice found Rillorta guilty of simple neglect of duty25 while
the OCA found Rillorta guilty of gross misconduct. The Investigating Justice noted that there were
mitigating circumstances favoring Rillorta. These were "(1) making a list noting the non-deposit of
cash bonds, underdeposit to and overwithdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund made at the instance of
Judge Albano Madrid, (2) in going regularly to the COA Regional Office for Audit, (3) immediate
restitution of the missing funds as ordered by the Supreme Court, (4) her previous administrative
sanctions notwithstanding because as admitted by Judge Albano Madrid, she actually directed
[Rillorta] to continue to function as Officer-in-Charge x x x despite the resolution of the Supreme
Court suspending [Rillorta] x x x, (5) the moral ascendancy and control exercised over her by Judge
Albano Madrid x x x, and (6) her staunch and determined efforts in pursuing the administrative
complaint against Judge Albano Madrid x x x."26
On the other hand, the OCA found that this is not the first time Rillorta has been administratively
sanctioned by this Court. In Antonio T. Quebral v. Angelina C. Rillorta, Officer-in-Charge/Clerk of
Court, and Minerva B. Alvarez, Clerk IV, both of RTC, Branch 21, Santiago City, lsabela, 27 she was
found guilty of neglect of duty for violation of Administrative Circular No. 3-2000 which requires fees
to be duly collected and receipted in case clearances are issued by the trial court and was
suspended for three months without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same would
warrant a more severe penalty. In that case, Rillorta issued court clearances free of charge to people
who are "friends of court employees" which the Court found to be highly irregular as she had no
power, authority, or discretion to dispense with the payment of the said fees. Also, in Re:
Anonymous Complaint against Angelina Casareno-Rillorta,Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk of
Court, 28 Rillorta was found guilty of gross misconduct for performing her duties/reporting for work
while under preventive suspension by the Court.
Since Rillorta's grave misconduct, aside from her previous infractions, undermined the people's faith
in the courts and, ultimately, in the administration of justice, the OCA's recommended penalty of
dismissal is proper.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Pacheco,29 the Court found Pacheco guilty of dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and gross neglect of duty and consequently dismissed her from the service when she
tampered with receipts and incurred cash shortages.
Similarly, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Recio,30 Recio was found guilty of gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and gross neglect of duty for failing to remit cash collections and misappropriating the
same. She was also found to have tampered with receipts and the cash book and failed to submit
the required monthly reports which the Court considered as acts which "evince a malicious and
immoral propensity."31
The circumstances which the Investigating Justice considered mitigating do not overcome the fact
that Rillorta repeatedly committed offenses which aggravated the grave offense she committed in
this case. However, since Rillorta has already retired from the service, the penalty of dismissal can
no longer be imposed. Instead, all of her retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, are
forfeited, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
The Court notes that there is a finding in the report of the Financial Audit Team that "in case the
following supporting documents of the cashbonds will be submitted, the shortages would be reduced
to One Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Six Pesos and 16/100
(₱113,286.16)."32 Rillorta insists that with regard to the submission of the orders and
acknowledgment receipts in support of the withdrawn cash bonds, she only secured copies of some
orders and acknowledgment receipts because some case records were not made available to her.
She also explained that she had submitted her monthly financial report from December 1994 to April
2005 together with copies of the orders and acknowledgment receipts to the Accounting Division,
Financial Management Office, OCA.33
If the copies of the orders and acknowledgment receipts are indeed in the custody of the Accounting
Division, Financial Management Office of the OCA, then the amount of the shortages Rillorta
incurred will certainly be reduced. There is no doubt that Rillorta has been remiss in her duty to
retain copies of the supporting documents of the withdrawn cash bonds; however, this does not
automatically carry with it the restitution of ₱6,557,959. 7034 if this is not the exact amount of the
shortages. It appears that there are means to reconcile the records available to Rillorta with the
records available to the Financial Audit Team and the Accounting Division, Financial Management
Office of the OCA and to compute the exact amount of the shortages. The finding that the shortages
would be reduced to ₱113,286.16 ifthe supporting documents of the withdrawn cash bonds would be
submitted clearly means that the Financial Audit Team was able to compute a much reduced
amount of shortages based on available records. To order Rillorta to restitute the amount of
₱6,557,959.70 as shortages when in fact this amount is incorrect is without basis. Therefore, in the
interest of justice, Rillorta should be given the opportunity to reconcile the records available to her,
including the supporting documents already submitted to this Court, and the monthly reports
allegedly containing the orders and acknowledgment receipts supposedly in the custody of the
Accounting Division, Financial Management Office of the OCA for the computation of the exact
amount of the shortages that should be restituted.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Fe Albano Madrid, formerly Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 21, Santiago City, Isabela, now retired, GUILTY of grave misconduct and serious
dishonesty and all her retirement benefits, except her accrued leave benefits, are FORFEITED, with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Judge Fe Albano Madrid is further DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE why she
should not be DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Court finds Angelina C. Rillorta, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Santiago City, Isabela, now retired, GUILTY of grave misconduct and all her retirement
benefits, except her accrued leave benefits, are FORFEITED, with prejudice to re-employment in
any branch of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Angelina C.
Rillorta is DIRECTED to RESTITUTE her shortages in the Fiduciary Fund after the computation of
the exact amount of the shortages.
The Accounting Division, Financial Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator is
DIRECTED to produce the orders and acknowledgment receipts in its custody, if there are any,
related to these consolidated cases and forward the same to the Office of the Court Administrator for
reconciliation and computation of the exact amount of the shortages within ten (10) days from receipt
of this Decision.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to recompute the amount of the shortages
incurred by Angelina C. Rillorta after the submission of the orders, acknowledgment receipts and
other supporting documents for reconciliation and to submit its findings within ten (10) days from
receipt of the documents, if any, from the Financial Management Office, Office of the Court
Administrator.
The Legal Office, Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to initiate the appropriate criminal
proceedings against Judge Fe Albano Madrid and Angelina C. Rillorta in view of the foregoing
findings.
SO ORDERED.
5.
EN BANC
March 7, 2017
A.M. No. 14-10-339-RTC
RE: FINDINGS ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
8, LA TRINIDAD, BENGUET,
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
[Formerly A.M. No. 14-3-53-RTC]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MARYBELLE L. DEMOTMARINAS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 8, LA
TRINIDAD, BENGUET,Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a consolidated administrative complaint against Judge Marybelle L. Demot-Mariñas (Judge

Demot-Mariiias), Presiding Judge, Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, which
stemmed from (1) the judicial audit of the RTC- Branch 8 from March 30 to April 12, 2014, conducted
by the Audit Team of the Court Management Office (Team); and (2) the Indorsement from the Office
of the Chief Justice regarding the Letter from Ms. Lilia Nugal-Koh wherein the latter sought the
intercession of the Court for the speedy disposition of her case.
A.M No.14-10-339-RTC
Pursuant to Travel Order No. 32-2014 dated March 20, 2014, the judicial audit team conducted a
judicial audit in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, La Trinidad, Benguet, from March 30 to
April 12, 2014. The Court is presided by herein respondent Judge Marybelle Demot-Mariñas.
On the basis of the records presented and actually audited by the Team, the subject court had a
total caseload of309 cases (135 criminal cases and 174 civil cases), with 157 cases submitted for
decision (47 criminal cases and 110 civil cases) which are already beyond the reglementary period
to decide.
In a Memoradum dated October 3, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended
to the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno the following, to wit:
A. Hon. Marybelle Demot-Marifias, Presiding Judge, Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad,
Benguet, be DIRECTED to:
(1) CEASE arid DESIST from trying/hearing cases in her court, and to DEVOTE her time to (la)
DECIDE the one hundred fifty (150) cases [45 criminal cases and 105 civil cases] submitted for
decision, which are beyond the period to decide as provided by law, to wit:
CRIMINAL CASES
CASE COUNT CASE NUMBER ACCUSED NATURE DATE

1 09-CR-7795 Maria Gloria Grave Coercion 09/27/09
Angelica Sabado
2 09-CR-7794 Maria Gloria Malicious 09/27/09
Angelica Sabado Mischief
3 10-CR-8135 Flor Raposas, et Malicious 01/04/10
al. Mischief
4 03-CR-4932 Wilfredo Pio Alan Homicide 09/12/07
5 08-CR-7495 John Miguel Frustrated 04/27/10
Ananayo Homicide
6 08-CR-7235 Laruan Quilito Murder 03/09/10
Rogelio Andres
(AL)
7 2K-CR-3934 Sunny Aglibot Theft 02/08/13
Lorenzo Adato,
Jr. Michael
Ramirez
8 09-CR-7764 Arleth Illegal 02/08/13
Buenconsejo, et Recruitment
al.
al.
al.
al.
12 10-CR-8175 Narda Balinag PD 1602 as 03/20/13
Albert Coliado amended by RA
9287
13 11-CR-8689 Christopher RA 9165 09/17/13
Patiag
14 05-CR-5991 Avalon Allan Murder 08/09/09
15 05-CR-5989 Avalon Allan Frustrated 08/09/09
Murder
16 10-CR-8098 James Bagtang Sec. 5. Art. II, RA 02/09/12
9165
17 07-CR-6715 Dorico Y eno Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 07/22/10
Endeniro 9165
18 06-CR-6117 Santos Balabal Sec. 5 Art. II, RA 11/19/07
9165
19 09-CR-7599 Walden Revelar Grave Threats 04/17/09
(appealed case)
20 11-CR-8690 Christopher RA 9165 09/17/13
Patiag
21 07-CR-6791 Roel Nabus PD 1602 as 01/26/09
amended by RA
9287
22 08-CR-7259 Jay Boteng Murder 01/21/13
23 10-CR-8091 Jack Bahingawan Frustrated 12/06/11
Murder
24 11-CR-8475 Antonio Coyupan Malicious 07/14/11
(appealed case) Rey Coyupan Mischief
Joker Miranda
25 05-CR-6074 Fred Bilog Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 11/10/08
9165
26 05-CR-5781 Hilton Pulacan Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 08/07/07
9165
27 05-CR-5782 Hilton Pulacan Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 08/07/07
9165
28 02-CR-4400 Sps. Florendo Estafa thru 09/19/05
and Josephine Falisification of
Lupante Public
Documents
29 05-CR-5780 A. Empil Qualified Theft 12/05/06
30 11-CR-8284 H. Soriano Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 08/27/13
9165
31 09-CR-7738 Rowela Delfin Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 07/25111
9165
32 10-CR-8226 Sonny Dolinen Estafa 03/13/12
33 08-CR-7209 John Naboye PD 1602 as 12/17/13
E.Malicdan E. Amended by RA
Daniel E. Rones 9287
34 11-CR-8286 Eleanor Sebiano, Qualified 02/22/11
(appealed case) et al. Trespass to
Dwelling
35 09-CR-7801 Uriel Delos Serious Physical 01/18/10
(appealed case) Reyes Injuries
36 09-CR-7802 Uriel Delos Serious Physical 01/18/37
(appealed case) Reyes Injuries
37 09-CR-7747 Alex Abinon Frustrated 06/18/13
Romel Balarote Murder
Dan Moria! Juli
us Casaalan
38 11-CR-8641 Jessie Bernal Estafa 12/10/13
39 13-CR-9459 Regina Samidan BP22 07/24/13
(appealed case)
(appealed case)
(appealed case)
(appealed case)
44 13-CR-9517 Fernando BP22 08/07/13
(appealed case) Asunsion
45 13-CR-9516 Fernando BP22 08/07/13
(appealed Case) Asunsion
CIVIL CASES
CASE COUNT CASE NUMBER TITLE NATURE DATE

SUBMITTED
FOR DECISION
1 01-CV-1509 Joseph Tanacio, Damages 04/16/04
et al. v. Angelito
Narzabal, et al.
2 06-CV-2293 Loma Aquino v. Specific 01/22111
Sps. Antonio Performance,
Abyado, et al. Injunction and
Reconveyance
3 07-CV-2390 Belino Tam v. Reconveyance 02/12/08
(appealed case) Milagros Vidal and Damages
and George Vidal
4 12-AD-1393 Aniceto A cop & Petition under 01/07/13
Shirley A cop v. Section 108 of
Register of PD 1529 for
Deeds, Benguet amendment of
entries m the
Registration
Book
5 10-CV-2671 Sps. Marcial Recovery of 01/03/11
(appealed case) Florida v. Mario Possession with
Otto & Delio Otto Damages
6 07-CV-2380 Elvira Laoyan v. Recovery of 07/10/11
Mike Leo, Jr. Possession with
Damages
7 07-CV-2379 Catalina Villena Annulment of 09/14/11
v. Sps. Marcos Deed of Sale,
Gayaso, et al. Extrajudicial
Settlement of
Estate
8 10-CV-2601 Emilia Buyagoa Rescission of 01/27/11
v. Minda Contract with
Colansong Prayer for
Preliminary
Injunction
9 10-CV-2666 Macaria Molitas, Forcible Entry 01/17/11
(appealed case) et al. v. Cordillera and Damages
Homeowners
Cooperative
10 10-CV-2594 Anthony Annulment of 08/19/11
Wakefiled v. Documents
Rafael Tenenan,
et al.
11 CV-1645 Placido Carantes Recovery of 10/08/10
v. Benguet Possession with
Corporation Preliminary
Injunction
12 LRC-N-221 Placido Carantes Application for 03/09/11
Registration of
Title
13 03-CV-1820 George Sanchez Annulment of 12/01/05
v. Edith Batore Affidavit of
Walker, et al. Adjudication
14 05-CV-2185 Heirs of Empiso Cancelllation of 01/23/09
Caiso, etal. v. Tax Declartion
The Barangay
Government of
Poblacion, La
Trinidad,
Benguet, et al.
15 08-CV-2455 Mario Nishiyama Rescission of 07112/13

v. Megalopolis Contracts with
Properties Inc. Damages
16 03-CV-1884 Manuel Cuilan v. Violation of 12/07/05
Mauricio Section 194 and
Ambanloc 195 of the Local
Code/Injunction
with Damages
17 02-CV-1714 Feliciano Judicial 05/10/06
Balakwid v. Foreclosure of
Victoria Leano Mortgage
18 1 O-CV-2679 Dionisia Palaci v. Recovery of 05/18/11
(appealed case) Simeon and Possession with
Manuel Basilio Prayer for
Issuance of
Preliminary
Mandatory
Injunction and
TRO
19 03-CV-1865 Angela Begnaen, Reconveryance 09/24/09
et al. v. The Heirs and Damages
of Angelita
Begnaen
Ananayo, et al.
20 08-CV-2444 Saturnine Diaz v. Recovery of 02/24/12
Manuel Liu Possession with
Damages
21 05-CV-2181 Sps. Marcial & Injunction and 10/03/11
Imelda Tayab v. Damages with
Henry Longay Jr. application for
in his capacity as TRO with Writ of
Deputy Sheriff IV, Preliminary
Cesar Macagne Injunction
and Stephen
Tolding
22 08-CV-2449 Cesar Macagne Indirect 10/03/11
and Stephen Contempt
Tolding v. Sps.
Marcial & Imelda
Tayab & Atty.
Inglay Fokno
23 02-CV-1701 Jeffrey Garoy v. Annulment of 08/17/05
Cecilia Morales, Title; Affidavit of
et al. Loss & Affidavit
of Self
Adjudication with
Simultaneous
Sale with
Damages
24 02-CV-1701 Maximo Macli-ing Damages 09/02/04
v. Pedro Isican
25 2K-CV-1491 Fibertex Corp. v. Recovery of 06/17/06
Elizabeth Lagyop Possession with
and Darwin Damages
Dominong
26 2K-CV-1527 Constancio Olsim Specific 09/10/03
and Gregorio Performance
Afidchao v. La
Trinidad
Balikatan
Homeowners
Assn., et al.
27 08-CV-2452 Teresita Annulment of 09/28/08
Banggao, rep. by Judgment with
Francis Salis v. Prayer for the
Sps. Marcelo & Issuance of Writ
Lolita Geston & of Preliminary
the Municipal Injunction
Trial Court of La
Trinidad
28 05-CV-2151 Sps. Alejandro Injunction with 03/04/08
and Feliza Payer for TRO &
Carbonell v. Preliminary
Ricky Alangsab, htjunction,
et al. Reduction of
Interest Rate of
Loan & Damages
29 03-CV-1921 Rural Bank of La Collection of Sum 11/13/04
Trinidad, of Money with
represented by Damages
Ricardo Salis v.
Sps. Candido &
Florence Radion
30 2K-CV-1500 Eugenia Zafra Annulment of 08/09/05
Edapes, et al. v. Deeds of
Solomon Alilao, Absolute Sale,
et al. TCT, Sheriffs
Certificates of
Sale,
Reconveyance
and Damages
31 97-CV-1203 Heirs of Larry Annulment of 05/27/03
Ogas v. Benguet Sale & TCT with
State University, Damages
et al.
32 11-CV-2709 Sps. Cobulan v. Forcible Entry 06/21/11
Josephine Alasio
33 12-CV-2890 Heirs of Dagiw-a Recovery of 06/10/13
(appealed case) Baca, et al. v. Ownership, et al.
Heirs of Bahanio
Atelba, et al.
34 12-CV-2831 Heirs of Alipio Forcible Entry 10/24/12
(appealed case) Ballesteros, et al.
v. Cristina Gorio
35 92-CV-0666 Camilo Quinio v. Recovery of 09/27/02
Duray Veloso de Possession and
Erasmo, et al. Ownership
36 94-CV-0887 Itogon-Suyoc Recovery of 07/22/04
Mines, Inc. v. Personal
James Brett Property, etc.
37 LRC-N-153 Abanga Cossel, Land Registration 05/20/08
et al. v. Director
of Lands
38 97-CV-1238 Vicente Lubos v. Breach of 11/27/03
Smart Contract with
Communications Damages
Inc.
39 01-CV-1666 Gudelia Domingo Damages 08/07/03
V. Emmanuel
Mariano
40 12-CV-2830 Heirs of Toato Forcible Entry 09117/12
(appealed case) Bugnay, et al. v. with Damages
Cristina Gorio
41 13-CV-2946 Heirs of Cuidno Accion 11/15/13
(appealed case) Tapio v. Camilo Publiciana, et al.
Madadsic
42 11-CV-2715 Aurea Benito, et Reconveyance, 08/09111
(appealed case) al. v. Joseph Cancelllation of
Aquilet, et al. Bad Title, Tax
Declaration
43 08-CV-2408 Samuel Bordon Collection of Sum 05/08/08
(appealed case) v. Lin Ling Sheng of Money
44 03-CV-1831 Frankie Domingo Quieting of Title, 08/03/10
v. Michael Sy Damages with
Issuance of Writ
of Preliminary
Injunction
45 02-CV-1764 Sonia Catarroja, Reconveyance, 12/15/10
et al. v. Damian et al.
Jimenez, et al.
46 0l-CV-1645 Sps. Gerald and Annulment of 06/23/05
Josephine Alejo Deeds, Damages
v. Samahan ng et al.
Buong Lahing
Pilipino & Nelia
Bulahaw
47 12-CV-2841 Amada Erafi.a v. Recovery of 02/08/13
Jane Ferrer & Possession of a
Registry of parcel of land
Deeds and Damages
48 95-SP-0086 Pedro Nugal, et In the Matter of 05/12/03
al. (Petitioners) the Settlement of
the Intestate
Estate of the late
Basilio Nugal
49 12-AD-1423 Heirs of Rosalia Petition for the 05/16/13
Quintino v. Surrender of the
Arlene Lubos, et Owner's
al. Duplicate Copies
of Title
50 0l-CV-1659 Belen Tacay, et Injunction, 04/01/04
al. v. Ponciano Damages with
So and Val Prayer for TRO
Nolasco
51 99-CV-1387 Heirs of Jose Recovery of 04/01/04
Turnpao v. Sps. Possession
Noel and Jessie
Alos
52 03-CV-1888 Heirs of Bido Quieting of Title 08/11/11
Sabado v. & Ownership
Domingo Bestre
and Miller Bestre
53 03-CV-1814 Jimmy Mateo, et Annulment of 09/24/09
al. v. Miguel Deed of Sale,
Bato, et al. etc.
54 02-CV-1765 Mary Jane Alican Quo Warranto, 08/23/04
v. Alvin Soriano Application for
Writ of
Preliminary
Injunction and
TRO
55 Ol-CV-1662 Lolita Velasco v. Quieting of Title; 10/22/04
Charlie Annulment of
Lingbanan, et al. Title; Specific
Performance or
Reconveyance
56 92-CV-0748 Patricio Ciano v. Quieting of Title 07/30/04
Lutheran Church with Prayer for
of the the Issuance of
Philippines, et al. Writ of
Preliminary
Injunction
57 04-CV-1995 Telesforo Amiao Unlawful 06/07/04
(appealed case) & Angela Angon Detainer
v. Heirs of
Patricio Gabao
58 2K-CV-1565 Heirs of Rufo Injunction 01/13/05
Sotelo, Jr. v.
Melchor Tican, et
al.
59 01-CV-1681 Ricardo Acop, et Cancellation of 06/14/07
al. v. Sps. Title with
Ricardo & Juliet Damages
Galvez
60 06-CV-2217 Sps. Jaime & Annulment of 11/16/11
Mary Leo v. Documents,
Arlene Leo, et al. Injunction &
Damages
61 93-CV-0799 Lourdes Maglaya Annulment of 06/14/02
& Feliza Pil-o v. Contracts
Ruben Guzman
& Hydro Electric
Dev't. Corp.
62 09-CV-1578 Marek Floyd Petition for 01129/13
Ambos & Eden Correction of
Ambos v. LCR of Entries m the
Bokod, Benguet Certificate of Live
Birth of Mark
Floyd Ambos
63 99-CV-1334 Ismael Paatan v. Damages 11/10/03
Amado Cortez
64 03-CV-1812 Trinibank-Rural Recovery of 09/25/08
Bank of La Possession and
Trinidad, Ownership with
Benguet v. Sps. Damages
Juanito &
Zenaida Co, et
al.
65 02-CV-1704 Leonardo del Reconveyance, 06/28/06
Rosario, et al. v. Accounting and
Conchita Lucero Damages
66 06-CV-2208 Benjamin Abatement of 08/29/08
Dampac v. Sps. Nuisance &
Victor & Frances Damages
Laoyan
67 2K-CV-1559 Heirs of Victor Declaration of 05/06/02
Alejandro Sr., et Nullity of Deed of
al. v. Andrea Donation
Balictan
68 2K-CV-1573 Pilando Enforcement of 02/28/03
Fernandez, et al. Contract
v. Philex Mining
Corp.
69 07-CV-2347 Carmen Amboy Forcible Entry 07/09/07
(appealed case) & Florencio
Amboy v. Sps.
Antonio & Rosita
Calado
70 96-CV-1113 Albert Caoili v. Quieting of Tile 05/10/02
Congyu
Marcelino, et al.
71 2K-CV-1473 Heirs of Gregorio Recovery of 02/27/03
Abalos v. Peter Possession
Sukilap, et al.
72 04-CV-2020 Benguet Electric Injunction 07/28/09
Cooperative v.
National
Transmission
Corp. et al.
73 06-CV-2195 Heirs of Violeta Annulment of 08/09/12
Baccay, et al. V. Deed of
Erasmo Extrajudicial
Aquiapao, et al. Settlement of
Estate
74 04-CV-2057 Patricia Buenafe Annulment of 09/28/05
v. Sps. Mario Real Estate
Bastian, et al. Mortgage
75 10-CV-2649 Heirs of Carlos Annulment of 12/03/10
Amos et al. v. Judgment
Delilah Asuncion
& Sps. Basilio
David, et al.
76 04-CV-2024 Alma Contada v. Damages 04/22/08
Allan Mali ones
77 08-CV-2420 David Dominang Certiorari 09/10/08
v. Hon. Jose
Encarnacion et
al.
78 13-CV-2919 Agosto Domerez Certiorari 06/06/13
V. Hon. Adolfo
Malingan and
Marcela Torren
79 98-CV-1290 Esteban v. Annulment 11/27/03
Gardose and/or
Cancellation of
Deed of
Assignment
80 2K-CV-1492 Cosme v. Piay, et Cancellation of 02/24/04
al. Real Estate
81 04-CV-2023 Estate of De Reconveyance of 03/03/09
Guia v. Sps. Property,
Fernandez Damages
82 03-CV-1892 Benguet Electric Collection of Sum 06/28/12
Coop. v. Tacio of Money
83 02-CV-1791 M. Cadiogan v. Settlement of 10/14/05
A. Cadiogan Estate with
Prayer for
Issuance of a
Restraining
Order
84 10-CV-2229 Cestona v. Tulio Reformation of 08/18/11
Instrument and
Damages
85 10-CV-2645 Calawa, et al. v. Certiorari 11/26/10
Mayor Abalos
86 99-CV-1345 Donato v. Declaration of 08/17/05
Balingan Nullity of
Documents
87 13-CV-2906 Esnara v. Declaration of 08/16/13
Tenefrancia, et Nullity of
al. Documents
88 03-CV-1877 Sps. Og-oget v. Annulment of 10/08/06
Luis Compromise
Settlement
89 04-CV-2060 Kidweng v. Damages 11/16/06
Aguilar
90 10-CV-2599 Acop v. Recovery of 03/30/10
(appealed case) Municipality of Possession and
Tublay, Benguet Damages
91 99-CV-1420 Ambros v. Matias Annulment of Tax 11/04/03
Declaration
92 03-CV-1815 Sps. De Leon v. Constitution of 03/08/06
Dulay Easement of
Right of Way
93 2K-CV-1472 Ackiapat v. Berto Cancellation of 07/29/04
Tax Declaration
and Damages
94 02-CV-1519 Nixon Guzman, Judicial Partition 08/23/12
et al. v. Helen
Abilao and Feliza
Pilo-o
95 12-CV-2877 Apolonio, Sr. v. Accion 01/30/14
Benguet State Publiciana and
University Quieting of Tile
96 08-CV-2467 Yolanda Dali Conveyance and 09/16/13
ones v. Sps. Damages
Marcelo Agdasi
and Ana Agdasi
97 11-CV-2773 Heirs of Rosalina Ejectment and 04/18/12
Lacamen, et al. Damages
v. Erlinda
Lacamen and
Abdel Lacamen
98 13-CV-2947 Saturnino Ciano Forcible Entry 10/07/13
(appealed case) v. Francisco
Kiwang, Jr.
99 12-CV-2829 Maria Usana v. Collection of Sum 10/18/13
Severo Alvarez of Money
Jr. and Estrella
Alavarez
100 08-CV-2459 Edwin Zamora v. Damages 12/05/13
Rainbow Mission
Church
101 13-CV-2922 Heirs of Patricia Forcible Entry 09/13/13
(appealed case) Teofilo v. Sps.
Cesar and
Virginia Singao,
et al.
102 07-CV-2382 Province of Collection of 03/08/13
Benguet v. Franchise Tax
National Power
corporation
103 08-CV-2481 Phil ex Mining Petition under 05/06/10
Corporation v. Section 195 of
The Province of the Local Gov't.
Benguet Code with Prayer
for the Issuance
of a Writ of
Preliminary
Injunction or TRO
104 12-CV-1745 Desiree Dolin- Petition for 01/07/13
Sawac v. LCR of Correction & to
Kapangan, Supply the
Benguet entries in the
Certificate of Live
Birth of Desiree
Dolin
105 02-CV-1776 Toquero, et al. Judicial Partition 02/04/13
Heirs of Santiago
Lictag, et al.
(1-b) DECIDE the eight (8) cases submitted for decision although still within the reglementary period
to resolve, as of audit, to wit:
CRIMINAL CASES

SUBMITTED
FOR DECISION
1 10-CR-7978 Efren Andiso Violation of Sec. 02/12/14
261 (a) BP 881
2 10-CR-7979 Efren Andiso Violation of Sec. 02/12/14
261 (a) BP 881
CIVIL CASES

SUBMITTED
FOR DECISION
1 13-AD-1487 Domingo v. Issuance of New 01/24/14
Registry of Owner's
Deeds-Benguet Duplicate
Certificate of Title
2 12-CV-2858 Heirs of Mendoza Annulment of 01/24/14
v. Sps.Mendoza Judgment
3 2K-CV-1492 Cosme v. Piay, et Cancellation of 02/24/04
al. Real Estate
4 12-CV-2877 Apolonio, Sr. v. Accion 01/30/14
Benguet State Publiciana and
University Quieting of Title
5 03-CV-1810 Heirs of Busco v. Annulment of 02/27/14
Bulso, et al. Affidavit of
Adjudication
6 13-CV-2935 Tiongsan Realty Unlawful 04/03/14
(appealed case) Development v. Detainer
Jimmy Yu, et al.
(1-c) RESOLVE the pending motions/incidents in the following seventeen (17) cases [2 criminal
cases and 15 civil cases], to wit:
CRIMINAL CASES
CASE COUNT CASE NUMBER TITLE NATURE LAST COURT

ACTION/REMARKS
1 12-CR-8795 D. Oblero Estafa Demurrer to
Evidence filed on
10-10-13 No
comment/opposition
filed by prosecution
despite directive in
Order dated 9-17-
13
2 13-CR-9683 J ackellene Estafa Motion to Quash
Menzi filed on 3-11-14
Prosecution's
comment
CIVIL CASES
CASE COUNT CASE NUMBER TITLE NATURE DATE SUBMITTED

FOR RESOLUTION
1 13-CV-2967 Bangonan Prohibition with Order dtd 11-15-13
Livelihood Preliminary Atty. De Guzman is
Association Inc. Injunction and given 15 days from
v. Benedict TRO receipt of a copy of
Pineda this order to file his
comment to the
affirmative defenses
contained m the
answer of the
respondents, after
which the incident
shall be deemed
submitted for
resolution
2 03-CV-1847 Rosenia Specific Order dtd. 09-15-05
Langbis, et al. v. Performance after the filing of the
Sps. Juliana and manifested demurrer
Bosleng Arcita to evidence within 5
days and within 10
days to comment
thereto, the incident
shall be deemed
submitted for
resolution -Demurrer
to Evidence- 09-20-
05
3 13-CV-2958 Virginia Annulment of Order dated 08-01-
Dompiles v. the Orders of 13 supplemental
Hon. Jose the MTC with petition shall be
Encarnacion, Prayer for TRO deemed submitted
MTC of Itogon and Writ of for resolution
and Atok Big Preliminary
Wedge Injunction
Corporation
4 13-CV-2949 Gregorio Sum of Money & Order dated 01-24-
Abalos, Jr. v. Damages 14 court given the
chance to submit
comment on the
Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings
dated 10-10-13
within 10 days from
receipt of the copy of
the order after which
the incident will
deemed submitted to
resolution -comment
attached 02- 27-14
5 13-CV-2969 The Province of Cancellation of Motion for Extension
Benguet rep. by ARP No. 99- of Time to file
Gov. Nestor 016-03588 and comment filed on 01-
Fongwan v. Sps. Annulment of 02-14 Comments/
Maray & Brado Deed of Sale objections to the
Moltio with Damages affirmative defense
on 01- 16-14
6 13-CV-2959 Fermin Semal v. Annulment of Order dated 11-15-
Sps. Esteban Foreclosure 13 the motion to
Gayados, Jr., et Sale, Sheriffs dismiss shall be
al. Certificate of deemed submitted
Sale, and for resolution -
Certificate of Supplemental Motion
Title to Dismiss filed by
defendants on 02-
12-14
7 08-CV-2442 Heirs of Nuepe Injunction, et al. Order dated 02-21-
Lamsis, et al. v. 14 upon receipt of
Pelagia Velasco, the ruling of this
et al. court on plaintiffs
evidence on rebuttal,
the parties are given
a period of 30 days
to file their
memoranda after
which this case shall
be submitted for
decision with or
without such
memoranda
8 14-CV-3012 Sps. Bandola v. Declaration of Motion to take
Rural Bank of Nullity of Real Disposition-03-19-14
San Luis, Estate Mortgage
Pampanga, et
al.
9 09-CV-2550 Heirs of the Late Annulment of Comment/Opposition
Olecio v. Sps. Documents to defendants'
Bugtong affirmative defenses/
Motion to Dismiss
05-14-10
10 04-CV-2052 Semon v. Rescission of Urgent ex-parte
Carmak Motors Contract motion for an earlier
Corp. resolution- 01-10-08
11 13-CV-2992 Benguet Electric ,Reformation of Motion for leave to
Coop. v. Instrument file attached reply
Equitable PCI (for defendant BDO)
Bank, et al. filed on 03-31-14
12 11-CV-2707 Hermenegildo Specific Comment to Formal
Heiras, Jr. v. Performance Offer of Evidence
Sps. William and and Damages filed by defendants
Jennifer Gan- on 03-11-14
gan, et al.
13 13-CV-2936 Cristina Noepe Declaration of Reply to the
and Lester Nullity of Public amended answer -
Noepe v. Instrument 03-25-14 Motion for
Christian Extension was filed
Spiritista of the on 03-27-14
Philippines
14 11-CV-2769 Christian Declaration of Comment/
Chuang v. Nullity of Deed Opposition to the
Celevina Baylon of Absolute Sale admissibility of
et al. plaintiffs rebuttal
evidence dated 02-
20-14 filed by
defendant
15 10-SP-0121 Petition for Probate of Will Motion to issue and
Probate/ an order authorizing
Allowance of the Atty. Calonge to
Holographic will withdraw from BCF
of Satumino Credit Coop. filed on
Ebusca v. 03-02-14
Rafael Ebusca,
et al.
(2) FURNISH this Court copies of the decisions and/or resolutions related to the enumerated cases.
This Cease-and-Desist directive shall continue until the aforementioned 157 cases submitted for
decision and pending motions/incidents in the 17 cases shall have been finally decided/resolved by
Judge Marinas;
(3) EXPLAIN in writing, within fifteen (15) dqays from notice, why no administrative sanction should
be taken against her for her failure to decide the aforementioned one hundred fifty (150) cases within
the mandatory period to decide.
B) The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator be directed to WITHHOLD
the salaries, allowances and other benefits of Judge Marybelle Demot Marinas, pending full
compliance with these directives; and
C) The Court Management Office be DIRECTED to prepare the necessary Administrative Order for
approval relative to the designation of an assisting judge in Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, La
Trinidad, Benguet, to specifically conduct hearings on all cases and attend to all interlocutory
matters thereat, but without prejudice to disposing of the same when circumstance/s warrant, such
designation to continue until further orders from this Court.
On April 7, 2015, as per recommendation of the OCA, the Court resolved to adopt the findings and
recommendations of the OCA.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution, in a Letter Transmittal dated June 4, 2015, Judge Demot-
Mariñas apologized to the Court for her failure to decide the cases within the reglementary period.
She, however, offered no explanation to such delay but nevertheless admitted her fault in the said
delay. She signified her intention to resign as she felt that she was no longer an effective member of
the judiciary. Attached with the Letter-Compliance is the Letter of Atty. Maribel Brillantes Macario
Pedro (Atty. Macario Pedro), Clerk of Court V, Branch 8, RTC, La Trinidad, Benguet showing the
partial compliance to the court directives, to wit:
CRIMINAL CASES
CASE NUMBER TITLE NATURE LAST COURT DATE

ACTION/REMARKS RESOLVE
12-CR-8795 Dominga D. Estafa Demurrer to 07/31/14
Oblero Evidence filed on
10-10-13 No
comment/
opposition filed by
prosecution despite
directive in Order
dated 9-1 7-13
13-CR-9683 Jackellene K. Estafa Motion to Quash 05/12/14
Menzi filed on 3-11-14
Prosecution's
comment filed on 3-
11-14
CIVIL CASES
CASE NUMBER TITLE NATURE LAST COURT DATE

ACTION/REMARKS RESOLVE
08-CV-2442 Heirs of Nuepe Recovery of Order dated 02- 21- 06/09/14
Lamsis, et al. v. Possession, etc. 14 upon receipt of
Heirs of Pelagia the ruling of this
Lamsis court on plaintiffs
evidence on
rebuttal, the parties
are given a period
of 30 days to file
their memoranda
after which this
case shall be
submitted for
decision with or
without such
memoranda
09-CV-2550 Heirs of the Late Annulment of Comment/ 08/15/14
Gloria Luis Documents, Opposition to
Olecio v. Sps. Cancellation of defendants'
Rosalino Luis TCT, affirmative
Bugtong Reconveyance, defenses/Motion to
Damages with Dismiss 05-14-10
Prayer for a
TRO and WPI
11-CV-2707 Hermenigildo Specific Comment to Formal 04/03/14
Hieras, Jr. v. Performance Offer of Evidence
Sps. Wiliiam and with Damages filed by defendants
Jennifer on 03-11-14
Gangan, et al.
13-CV-2958 Virginia Orders of the 13 supplemental 05/12/14
Dompiles V. MTC with Prayer petition shall be
Hon. Jose S. for TRO and Writ deemed submitted
Encarnacion, of Preliminary for resolution
Presiding Judge, Injunction
MTC of Itogon,
Benguet and
Atok Big Wedge
Corporation
13-CV-2959 Fermina O. Annulment of Order dated 11-15- 01/30/15
Bernal v. Sps. Foreclosure 13 the motion to
Esteban T. Sale, Sheriffs dismiss shall be
Gayados, Jr., et Certificate of deemed submitted
al. Sale, and for resolution -
Certificate of Supplemental
Title Motion to Dismiss
filed by defendants
on 02-12-14
13-CV-2992 Benguet Electric Reformation of Motion for leave to 04/11/14
Coop. v. Instrument with file attached reply
Equitable PCI Prayer for (for defendant BDO)
Bank, et al. Payment of Sum filed on 03-31-14
of Money and
Damages
14-CV-3012 Sps. Freddie H. Declaration of Motion to take 03/24/14
Bandola and Nullity of Real Disposition- 03-19-
Celia Bandola v. Estate 14
Rural Bank of Mortgage, etc.
San Luis,
Pampanga, et al.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE
CASE ACCUSED NATURE LAST COURT DATE

NUMBER ACTION/REMARKS RESOLVE
10-SP-0121 Petition for Probate of Will Motion to issue an 04/16/14
Probate/Allowance order authorizing
of the Holographic Atty. Calonge to
will of Saturnine withdraw from BCF
Ebusca v. Rafael Credit Coop. Filed
Ebusca et al. on 03-02-14
In a Resolution dated August 4, 2015, the Court referred the Letter dated June 4, 2015 of Presiding
Judge Demot-Mariñas to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
A.M. RTJ-16-2446
On February 27, 2013, the Office of the Deputy Court Administrator Raul Villanueva (DCA
Villanueva) received an indorsement from the Office of the Chief Justice regarding the letter of Ms.
Nugal-Koh wherein the latter sought the intercession of the Court for the speedy disposition of her
case docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 95-SP-0086 entitled "Pedro Nugal, et al. v. Lilia
Nugal-Koh, et al.," which allegedly had been submitted for resolution for more than ten (10) years
already at the time of the complaint.
Acting on the said Letter, a 1st Indorsement dated March 4, 2013 was sent directing Judge Demot-
Mariñas to comment thereon. On June 5, 2013, another Letter from Ms. Nugal-Koh, addressed to
the Office of the Chief Justice, was received by DCA Villanueva's office again seeking assistance for
the immediate resolution of her case. Attached to the said Letter were the (1) Certification dated
April 23, 2013 from Atty. Maribel B. Macario, Clerk of Court V, Branch 8, RTC, La Trinidad, Benguet,
attesting that no decision was rendered yet in the subject case; and (2) another Letter from the
Office of the Chief Justice dated April 12, 2013, referring the letter dated February 13, 2013 of Ms.
Nugal-Koh to Judge Demot-Mariñas wherein the latter was requested to submit a feedback on the
matter within fifteen (15) days from the receipt thereof.
Consequently, a 2nd Indorsement dated June 5, 2013 was sent to Judge Demot-Mariñas, reiterating
the earlier directive for her to comment on the status of Ms. Nugal-Koh's case, with a stem warning
that appropriate proceedings may be initiated against her for her inaction.
On September 17, 2013, the Office of DCA Villanueva again received a Letter dated September 11,
2013 from Ms. Nugal-Koh repeating her request regarding her case and appending a new
certification dated September 2, 2013 attesting that her case remained undecided. Thus, a 3rd
Indorsement was sent to respondent judge regarding the matter with the information that initiation of
administrative proceedings against her was already being considered for her apparent delay in
deciding the subject case and her blatant disregard of directives relative thereto despite repeated
orders.
In an Agenda Report dated February 18, 2014, the OCA found that Judge Demot-Mariñas indeed
failed to comply with the repeated directives from the Office of DCA Villanueva, and with the letter
from the Office of the Chief Justice requiring her to comment on the status of the subject case. Thus,
the OCA recommended that the report be treated as a formal administrative complaint against Judge
Demot-Mariñas for insubordination, inefficiency and neglect of duty.
In a Resolution dated June 2, 2014, the Court resolved to treat the OCA's Agenda Report dated
February 18, 2014 as a formal administrtive complaint against Judge Demot-Marifias for Inefficiency
and Neglect of Duty. In addition, the Court also required respondent to explain why she should not
be held administratively liable for her failure to comply with the repeated directives to comment on
the status of Special Proceedings Case No. 95-SP-0086. The Court, likewise, directed respondent to
comment and submit a report on the status of the above-mentioned case.
In a Resolution dated November 26, 2014, the Court referred the Letter dated September 11, 2014
of Ms. Nugal-Koh to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. As contained therein, Ms.
Nugal-Koh said that as of July 9, 2014, no decision has been rendered by respondent Judge Demot-
Mariñas in her case as certified by Atty. Macario Pedro, Branch Clerk of Court.
In a Memorandum dated December 1, 2015, the OCA recommended that: (1) the two (2) instant
administrative matters be consolidated; and (2) respondent Judge Marybelle L. Demot-Mariñas be
found guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and gross inefficiency and be dismissed from
service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits.
On February 17, 2016, as per recommendation of the OCA, considering the similarity of the issues
of both cases, the Court resolved to consolidate the instant administrative complaints against
respondent Judge Demot-Mariñas.
RULING
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge
should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the
performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of
our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case
within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the
imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.1
Here, there is no question as to the guilt of Judge Demot-Mariñas. As shown by the records, she has
been remiss in the performance of her responsibilities. She failed to decide cases and resolve
pending incidents within the reglementary period, without any authorized extension from this Court.
Respondent judge failed to: (1) decide 150 cases submitted for decision [45 criminal cases and 105
civil case] which are beyond the period to decide, and to (2) resolve the pending motions/incidents in
17 cases [2 criminal cases and 15 civil cases].2Some of the cases were already submitted for
decision since 2002, particularly Civil Case No. 2831 and Civil Case No. 2217.3More appalling is that
she did not give any reason/explanation for her failure to comply with the reglementary period for
deciding cases. There were, likewise, no previous requests by her for extension of time to decide
said cases. Thus, in the instant case, Judge Demot-Mariñas' gross inefficiency is, therefore, evident
in her undue delay deciding 150 cases within the reglementary period and her failure to resolve
pending motions/incidents in 17 cases.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that lower courts have three months
within which to decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover, Canon
3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly
and decide cases within the required period. In addition, this Court laid down the guidelines in SC
Administrative Circular No. 134which provides, inter alia, that "[j]udges shall observe scrupulously the
periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution
of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or
resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts, while all other
lower courts are given a period of three months to do so." The Court has reiterated this admonition in
SC Administrative Circular No. 3-995which requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods
prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases and the failure to comply therewith is considered a
serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of their cases.6
This Court has consistently held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction against the erring magistrate. Respondent judge failed to live up to the exacting standards
of duty and responsibility that her position required. As a trial judge, Judge Demot-Mariñas is a
frontline official of the judiciary and should have at all times acted with efficiency and with probity.7
A.M. RTJ-16-2446
We likewise find similarly concerning is Judge Demot-Mariñas' indifference to the indorsements

requiring her to comment on the accusations against her. In all three (3) indorsements issued by the
OCA, as well as one (1) Letter from the Office of the Chief Justice, Judge Demot-Mariñas ignored
the directives for her to file the required comment since no comment or compliance has been
submitted despite several opportunities given to her which ran in a span of more than three (3)
years. Also, as per verification by the OCA of the status of Special Proceedings No. 95-SP-0086, as
of December 2015, Judge Demot-Mariñas has yet to decide the case which was already submitted
for decision since May 12, 2003. It is then apparent that failure to comment despite several
directives, as well as the failure to comply with the immediate resolution of Ms. Nugal-Koh's letter,
show her propensity to disregard and disobey lawful orders of her superior.
We would like to further stress that all directives coming from the Court Administrator and his
deputies are issued in the exercise of this Court's administrative supervision of trial courts and their
personnel, hence, should be respected. These directives are not mere requests, but should be
complied with promptly and completely. Clearly, Judge Demot-Mariñas' unexplained disregard of the
orders of the OCA for her to comment on the complaint shows her disrespect for and contempt, not
just for the OCA, but also for the Court, which exercises direct administrative supervision over trial
court officers and employees through the OCA. Her indifference to, and disregard of, the directives
issued to her clearly constituted insubordination which this Court will not tolerate.8
We cannot overemphasize that compliance with the rules, directives and circulars issued by the
Court is one of the foremost duties that a judge accepts upon assumption to office. This duty is
verbalized in Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:9
SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in
order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the Judiciary.
SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce
public confidence in the Judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial
independence.
The obligation to uphold the dignity of her office and the institution which she belongs to is also
found in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 2.01, which mandates a judge to
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Under the circumstances, We can thus conclude that the conduct exhibited by Judge Demot-
Mariñas constitutes no less than clear acts of defiance against the Court's authority. Her conduct
also reveals her deliberate disrespect and indifference to the authority of the Court, shown by her
failure to heed our warnings and directives.
We cannot tolerate this type of behavior especially on a judge. Public confidence in the judiciary can
only be achieved when the court personnel conduct themselves in a dignified manner befitting the
public office they are holding. Judges should avoid conduct or any demeanor that may tarnish or
diminish the authority of the Supreme Court.10Clearly, Judge Demot-Mariñas' attitude, as shown by
her unexplained failure to decide 150 cases as well as motions and incidents, and her failure to
respond to any of the court's directives despite several reminders, betray her lack of concern for her
office. In sum, Judge Demot-Mariñas has been remiss in the performance of her official duties
exacerbated by her audacious stance in defying this Court's orders. We cannot tolerate the attitude
of respondent judge in defying this Court's authority and undermining its integrity.
Penalty
The rules and jurisprudence are clear on the matter of delay. Failure to decide cases and other
matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction against the erring magistrate.11Further, Judge Demot-Mariñas' deliberate and
repeated failure to comply with the directives of the OCA constitutes Gross Misconduct which is a
serious offense under Section 8,12Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
In Re: Audit Report in Attendance of Court Personnel of RTC, Branch 32, Manila,13We held that it
is gross misconduct, even outright disrespect for the Court, for respondent judge to exhibit
indifference to the resolution requiring him to comment on the accusations in the complaint
thoroughly and substantially. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak
in character, but also disrespect for the Court's lawful order and directive.
Likewise, in Alonto-Frayna v. Astih,14a judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to
comply with the resolution of this Court is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination, and was
dismissed from service. 1âwphi1
Judging by the foregoing circumstances, the Court can only conclude that Judge Demot-Mariñas is
guilty of gross inefficiency resulting in her unexplained failure to resolve pending cases and motions
within the reglementary period despite several reminders and follow-ups, and gross misconduct for
her non-compliance with the directives/orders of the OCA and this Court.
In this scenario, Section 17 of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Civil Service Law states that if
the respondent judge is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty imposed should
be that corresponding to the most serious charge or counts and the rest may be considered
aggravating circumstances.15The most serious of the charges against respondent judge is her gross
misconduct, and her gross inefficiency is considered an aggravating circumstance.
We would have imposed the penalty of dismissal from service on Judge Demot-Mariñas, however,
considering that on December 10, 2015, she has filed her certificate of candidacy to run for public
office, she is now deemed resigned from judicial office. Nevertheless, cessation from office by
reason of resignation, death or retirement is not a ground to dismiss the case filed against her at the
time that she was still in the public service.16Thus, in lieu of the penalty of dismissal for her unethical
conduct and gross inefficiency in performing her duties as a member of the bench, We, however,
impose instead the accessory penalty of forfeiture of all her retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits. Furthermore, she is barred from re-employment in any branch or service of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Marybelle L. Demot-Mariñas, former Presiding Judge of

Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet is found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct and
Gross Inefficiency. Her retirement benefits, if any, are declared FORFEITED as penalty for her
offenses, except accrued leave credits, in lieu of dismissal from service which the Court can no
longer impose. She is likewise barred from re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
6.
SECOND DIVISION
November 8, 2017
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2478
DOMINADOR I. FERRER, JR., Complainant

vs.
JUDGE ARNIEL A. DATING, Regional Trial Court, Bra.ncb 41, Daet, Camarines Norte,
Respondent
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
For resolution is the Administrative Complaint1 dated April 18, 2011 filed by Atty. Dominador I.
Ferrer, Jr. against Judge Arniel A. Dating, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Daet, Camarines
Norte, for "abuse of authority, judicial oppression and unreasonable/malicious acts to delay raffle of
cases," relative to Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 77882 (subject case), entitled, "Cesar E. Barcelona
and Jose Vargas vs. Atty. Freddie A. Venida and Atty. Dominador Ferrer, Jr." for Quo Warranto with
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunction.3
The subject case, where complainant Atty. Ferrer, Jr. is one of the respondents, was first raffled to
respondent Judge Dating's sala, RTC, Branch 41, Daet, Camarines Norte.4 In an Order5 dated
January 14, 2011, Judge Dating granted petitioners Barcelona and Vargas' prayer for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and set the hearing of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on
January 24, 2011.6
Aggrieved by the said Order, Atty. Venida and Atty. Ferrer, Jr. filed the following: (a) Motion for
Inhibition/Disqualification dated January 14, 2011; (b) Joint Omnibus Motion dated January 17,
2011; and (c) Second Amended Joint Omnibus Motion dated January 20, 2011.7
In an Order8 dated January 25, 2011, Judge Dating denied the Motion for Inhibition/Disqualification
due to absence of valid or just cause.9 Moreover, in an Order10 dated January 26, 2011, Judge Dating
cited Atty. Ferrer, Jr., Atty. Venida, and two (2) other lawyers for direct contempt of court, and
imposed a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) upon each of them, and then voluntarily
inhibited himself from hearing the subject case.11
The subject case was re-raffled to the sala of Judge Winston S. Racoma, RTC, Branch 39, Daet,
Camarines Norte.12 The respondents in the subject case, through their counsel, filed motions for
inhibition which Judge Racoma granted in an Order13 dated March 9, 2011.14 The case records were
then transmitted to the Office of the Executive Judge on March 15, 2011 for re-raffle.15
As mentioned above, Atty. Ferrer, Jr., filed an Administrative Complaint dated April 18, 2011 against
Judge Dating, then the Executive Judge, alleging that the latter deliberately caused the delay of the
re-raffle of the subject case for more than a month because he was always unavailable, either on a
leave of absence or in a seminar.16 Atty. Ferrer, Jr. alleged that while Judge Dating has the right to
attend seminars or take a leave of absence, the same should not cause unreasonable delay in the
re-raffle of the subject case.17
Atty. Ferrer, Jr. also alleged that Judge Dating favored the petitioners in the subject case since the
latter immediately conducted hearings thereon and issued the TRO after only four (4) days from the
filing of the subject case.18 Hence, Atty. Ferrer, Jr. prayed that the appropriate sanction be imposed
upon Judge Dating.19
In the 1st Indorsement20 dated May 9, 2011, signed by then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) and
Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Nimfa C. Vilches, and OCA Chief of
Legal Office, Wilhelmina D. Geronga, the said Administrative Complaint was referred to Judge
Dating for his comment.
Meanwhile, in a Manifestation on the Continuing Delay and Non-Raffle of the Case of Respondent
Honorable Judge Arniel A. Dating21 dated May 10, 2011, Atty. Ferrer, Jr., reiterated the allegations in
the Administrative Complaint, and added that, as of that date, the subject case had not yet been re-
raffled.22
Upon receipt of the above Manifestation, Judge Dating submitted a letter23 dated May 19, 2011 to
DCA Vilches stating that the subject case was included in the raffle on April 28, 2011, but that the
Raffle Committee unanimously decided to return the subject case to Branch 39 since the
petitioners (i.e., Barcelona and Vargas) in the subject case had filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order of inhibition issued by Judge Racoma.24
Moreover, in compliance with the above 1st Indorsement, Judge Dating submitted his
Comment25 dated June 3, 2011 stating that the case raffle is conducted every Thursday.26 Judge
Dating also stated therein that, while the records of the subject case were received by the Office of
the Executive Judge on March 15, 2011 (Tuesday), no raffle was done on March 17, 2011
(Thursday), since there was no urgent case and the number of cases was not sufficient for a raffle.27
Judge Dating also alleged that the judges of RTC, Daet, Camarines Norte were scheduled to travel
to Manila on that day, March 17, 2011 to attend the 1st General Assembly of Judges the following
day.28 Judge Dating also stated that, in the morning of March 17, 2011, he even heard cases in
Branch 40 (a Family Court), where he was a concurrent assisting judge, before he left for Manila in
the afternoon of that day.29
Judge Dating also explained that he used his forfeitable leave credits on March 21-31, 2011.30 On
April 7-9, 2011, he attended the IBP National Convention in Subic, Zambales and, on April 14-15,
2011, he attended the Land Valuation and Just Compensation Seminar sponsored by the Philippine
Judicial Academy in Tagaytay City.31 He also denied that the delay was deliberate.32
In a Report33 dated March 4, 2016, the OCA recommended that the Administrative Complaint against
Judge Dating be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, and that he be found guilty of
simple neglect of duty and fined in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) with a stem
warning that a repetition of the same or any similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.34
After considering the allegations in the Administrative Complaint and Judge Dating's explanation, the
OCA found as follows:
This Office finds such explanation to be unacceptable. A careful perusal of Chapter V of A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC,35 specifically the provisions on the conduct of raffle of cases, would reveal that it was
never intended as an indispensable requirement that a substantial number of cases must have been
filed in court before raffle of cases could be conducted. On the contrary, Section 2 thereof explicitly
mandates that "[r]affling of cases shall be regularly conducted at two o'clock in the afternoon every
Monday and/or Thursday as warranted by the number of cases to be raffled." Clearly, as can be
easily inferred from the use of the words "shall" and "regularly," the raffle of cases should be
mandatorily done on a regular basis and, much more, not only once but even twice a week
depending on the number of cases to be raffled. Clearly, if the supposed substantial number of
cases to be raffled affects the conduct of raffle as what respondent Judge Dating is trying to impress
upon us, it is more of the fact that the conduct of raffle of cases in a week could be done twice if
necessary, but never to altogether dispense with the raffle.
Respondent Judge Dating averred that there was no urgency to conduct a raffle (as there was no
case [presumably including the Special Civil Action No. 7788] which applied for a TRO, a special
raffle, and the like). Again, respondent Judge Dating missed a substantial point on the matter.
Assuming that, save for Special Civil Action No. 7788, there were no cases scheduled to be raffled
on 17 March 2011, respondent Judge Dating was still obligated to cause the re-raffle of the quo
warranto petition for that particular day. As provided under Section 8 of the same guidelines,
"[w]here a judge in a multiple-branch court is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself/herself [as
what Judge Racoma did], the records shall be returned to the Executive Judge and the latter shall
cause the inclusion of the said case in the next regular raffle for re-assignment." The rule is so
worded in a mandatory tenor for Executive Judges to require the inclusion of cases [inhibited by
judges] in the next regular raffle for a re-assignment. Unfortunately, respondent Judge Dating
apparently failed to grasp the true intent of that particular guideline.
Respondent Judge Dating rationalized the failure to immediately raffle the quo warranto petition on
17 March 2011 by pointing out that on that day, the judges would be travelling to attend the 1st
General Assembly of Judges in Manila on 18 March 2011. Curiously though, he also averred that he
conducted trial in the morning of 17 March 2011 for cases pending before Branch 40 (a Family
Court) where he also serves as the Acting/ Assisting Judge, and left his station for Manila in the
afternoon. While it is commendable for respondent Judge Dating to still perform his duties as a
Presiding Judge by holding trial in the morning, his exemplary action was virtually negated by the
fact that he failed to perform his duties as an Executive Judge. This Office understands that
respondent Judge Dating, together with the other judges of the RTC, Daet, Camarines Norte, would
have to leave much earlier than the others due to the considerable distance of their stations from
Manila. Still, this Office believes that respondent Judge Dating [and the other members of the Raffle
Committee as well] could still have set aside even a few minutes of their precious time to conduct a
raffle before leaving their station. Truth be told, the raffling of cases (minus the usual chats and
exchange of pleasantries) could be accomplished in less than an hour, unlike court trials that
invariably consume much of the time of the judges. As Executive Judge, it is the personal duty and
responsibility of respondent Judge Dating to exercise supervision over the raffling of cases. Hence,
he should have been prudent enough to find ways to minimize, if not totally avoid, delays in the raffle
of cases.
This ideal condition of avoiding or minimizing delays in the raffle of cases all the more applies to
respondent Judge Dating's situation in light of his admission that it is his "custom" to avail of his
forfeitable leaves during the month of March. While attending seminars and conventions sanctioned
by the Court may excuse the non-raffle of cases in courts on specific dates, the same could not be
said when the non-raffle of cases was occasioned by the trial judges' forfeitable leave of absences.
Unlike seminars and conventions which are sponsored and evidently scheduled by the Court
[usually through the PHILJA], availing of forfeitable leaves is a personal act on the part of judges
especially on choosing the dates which they usually prefer. While they are indeed entitled to such
leaves, judges should so schedule the same in the most careful manner so as to prevent a hiatus in
court proceedings. Speedy administration of justice should never play second fiddle to the personal
comfort and caprice of those working in the judiciary, judges and/or personnel alike. In the case at
bar, respondent Judge Dating scheduled his forfeitable leaves from 21 March 2011 to 31 March
2011. Knowing fully well that he would not be able to attend to his functions as chairperson of the
Raffle Committee for the raffle dates of 24 March 2011 and 31 March 2011, and aware of the fact of
the incoming seminar and convention that would coincide with the succeeding raffle dates (7 April
2011 and 14 April 2011) as well as of the observance by the nation of the Holy Week (21 April 2011
being a Maundy Thursday), respondent Judge Dating should have endeavored to wrap up all his
pending work before going on a sabbatical. Unfortunately, instead of allotting just a few minutes in
the afternoon of 17 March 2011 to re-raffle Special Civil Action No. 7788, he opted to forthwith leave
his post to attend the General Assembly of Judges, then proceeded with his "customary" forfeitable
leave of absences during the month of March, then attended the IBP National Convention in Subic,
Zambales (7 to 9 of April 2011) and the Just Compensation Seminar sponsored by PHILJA in
Tagaytay City, Cavite (14 to 15 April 2011 ), and then took a break during the Holy Week, before
including on 28 April 2011 the quo warranto petition in the list of cases to be raffled, only to have it
referred back to the court of origin in view of the pending motion for reconsideration of the inhibition
order. What could have been done by respondent Judge Dating in less than an hour was
apathetically delayed for six (6) long weeks.
Apropos his letter dated 17 March 2011 to then DCA Jesus Edwin Villasor and another letter
addressed to then DCA Vilches expressing his supposed dilemma in the conduct of raffle of cases
during his forfeitable leaves of absence and asking if the Vice-Executive Judge could conduct the
same during such time, respondent Judge Dating seemed to flip-flop and contradict himself when he
subsequently explained [in the instant matter] that during his absence, the Clerk of Court and the
Vice-Executive Judge are fully knowledgeable of what to do pursuant to existing circulars and
directives. These vacillations do not augur well for respondent Judge Dating for they only serve to
highlight either his inconsistency in making a sound justification for his inefficiency to supervise the
conduct of raffle of cases, or his tendency to put the blame on the other members of the Raffle
Committee.
xxxx
For his failure to strictly adhere to the provisions of A.M. No. 03- 8-02-SC, specifically the provisions
on the raffle of cases, this Office finds respondent Judge Dating guilty of simple neglect of duty.
Simple neglect of duty signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference. The Court has consistently held that mere delay in the performance of one's functions
1âw phi 1
is considered as simple neglect of duty. Under Rule IV, Section 52 (B) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, it is a less grave offense punishable by suspension without
pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. In order, however, not to disrupt the
conduct of court proceedings, the imposition of a fine against respondent Judge Dating is
appropriate under the circumstances.36
The Court hereby adopts the above well-reasoned OCA recommendation.
For failure to observe the procedure on the raffle of cases pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, Judge
Dating is guilty of simple neglect of duty which is defined as the "failure to give attention to a task, or
the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference."37 Simple neglect of duty is listed as one
of the less grave offenses punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the second offense under Rule IV,
Section 52(B)(l) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.38 In lieu of
suspension, the Court agrees with the OCA recommendation for the imposition of a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱l0,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ami el A. Dating GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and
imposes upon him a FINE in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱l0,000.00), with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or any similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
7.
EN BANC
November 7, 2017
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1574

vs.
JUDGE CONRADO O. ALINEA, JR., MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, IBA, ZAMBALES, Respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative matter filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stemmed from a news
report in the June 19, 2004 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer1 regarding an entrapment operation
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against Respondent Judge Conrado O.
Alinea, Jr. (Judge Alinea) of the Municipal Trial Court of Iba, Zambales (MTC), for demanding and
receiving the amount of ₱15,000.00 from the plaintiffs in a land dispute case pending in the said
court.
The undisputed facts, as borne by the records, are as follows:
Raul A. Neria (Neria) and his uncle, Cesar Abadam (Abadam), were among the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 7852(subject case). The MTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, which ruling was affirmed by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales (RTC) on appeal by the defendants therein.3 On
August 24, 2001, the RTC issued a Notice to Vacate,4 ordering the defendants to vacate the
premises subject of the case. However, defendants refused to do so,5 prompting the RTC to issue an
Order6 dated September 15, 2003 for the issuance of a Writ of Demolition (Writ). Thereafter, in
another Order7 dated October 6, 2003, the RTC remanded the subject case to the MTC for execution
of the Writ.
Judge Alinea issued an Order8 dated November 7, 2003, directing the sheriff to enforce the Writ. On
December 23, 2003, defendants filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Demolition,9 but this was
denied in a Resolution dated May 3, 2004.10 On Motion for Reconsideration11 by the defendants,
Judge Alinea, in an Order12 dated June 3, 2004, recalled the Writ and set the motion for hearing on
June 11, 2004. Immediately after the hearing on the said date, Neria and Abadam asked Judge
Alinea why he recalled the Writ. However, instead of giving any satisfactory answer, Judge Alinea
told them to give him ₱15,000.00 in exchange for a favorable resolution.13
Surprised by Judge Alinea's directive, Neria and Abadam filed on June 15, 2004 with the NBI a
complaint14 for Direct Bribery, and an entrapment operation was arranged. On June 17, 2004, Neria
and Jose Abadam, together with NBI agents and Simeon Soriaga of the television
program Magandang Gabi Bayan, proceeded to Iba, Zambales for the operation. Judge Alinea sent
a text message to Neria, directing them to proceed to Bon's Restaurant. Upon reaching the
restaurant, Neria and Jose Abadam handed over an envelope containing the marked money in the
amount of ₱15,000.00 to Judge Alinea. After Judge Alinea acknowledged receipt of the money and
placed them on the table, the NBI agents immediately arrested him and thereafter subjected him to
an ultraviolet light examination by the NBI forensic chemist. Per the NBI's Report15 dated June 21,
2004, Judge Alinea was tested positive for specks of fluorescent powder from the marked money.16
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information17 for Direct Bribery18 against Judge Alinea with the
Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27994, thus:
That on or about 17 June 2004 at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Iba, Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused CONRADO ALINEA y OBISPO, a public officer, being then the Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, taking advantage of his official position and with
grave abuse of authority, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand FIFTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS ([₱]15,000.00) but received only the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
[₱l0,000.00] consisting of Three (3) pieces [P]l,000 bills, six (6) pieces of [₱]500 bills and forty (40)
pieces [₱]l00 bills, dusted with fluorescent powder and invisible ink, from Raul A. Neria in exchange
for a favorable resolution that he will render in connection with Civil Case No. 785 entitled Heirs of
Agueda Giron, et al. vs. Heirs of Roque Edejer, et al. to the damage and prejudice of said private
complainant and the public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.19
Meanwhile, the OCA instituted the instant administrative matter against him for the same offense. In
its Resolution20dated January 17, 2005, the Court ordered Judge Alinea to: (1) comment on the NBI
report dated June 21, 2004,21the Information filed with the Sandiganbayan against him,22 and
the sinumpaang salaysay of Neria;23 and (2) show cause why he should not be suspended,
disbarred, or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the Bar for Violation of Rule
1.01,24 Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) within ten (10) days from notice.
In his Comment,25 Judge Alinea denied having demanded any amount of money from Neria and
having taken the marked money, and even accused Neria of attempting to bribe him. He alleged that
he refused to accept the said envelope and simply left it at the table before walking away. In its
Resolution26 dated June 20, 2005, this Court held in abeyance the administrative proceedings
pending resolution of the criminal case against Judge Alinea.
Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Decision27 dated January 25, 2010, finding Judge
Alinea guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Direct Bribery, finding that the series of circumstances
established Judge Alinea's intent to extort money from Neria and Abadam in exchange for a ruling in
their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Conrado O. Alinea,

Jr. GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Bribery, defined and penalized under the
second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the accused is sentenced to an

indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 1 year, 1 month and 11 days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days of prision correccional, as maximum, and a fine of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00).
The accused shall also suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
SO ORDERED.28
On petition for review on certiorari,29 the Court's Third Division affirmed Judge Alinea's conviction in
its Resolutions dated July 19, 201030 and November 17, 2010,31 finding no reversible error on the part
of the Sandiganbayan in convicting him of the said offense. An Entry of Judgment was subsequently
issued on January 24, 2011.32Thereafter, in its Resolution33 dated January 13, 2016, the Court
ordered the resumption of the administrative proceedings against him. However, Judge Alinea had
reached the compulsory retirement age of 70 on August 16, 2013,34 three (3) years before the
resumption of the said proceedings.
The OCA's Report and Recommendation
In its Memorandum35 dated August 8, 2016, the OCA found Judge Alinea guilty of gross misconduct
for Violation of Republic Act No. 3019,36 (R.A. No. 3019) and Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as well as Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR, and recommended that he be disbarred, citing his
conviction by the Sandiganbayan for Direct Bribery, which was affirmed by the Court. It opined that
allowing Judge Alinea to continue serving as a judge after his conviction would unduly tarnish the
image of, and the people's confidence in, the judicial system, and would be an insult to the legal
profession. Moreover, it cited Section 2 7, Rule 13 8 of the Rules of Court in relation to A.M. No. 02-
9-02-SC,37 which provides that administrative cases against a judge of a regular court based on
grounds which are identical to those for disciplinary action against a member of the bar, shall be also
considered as a disciplinary case against him as such member of the Bar, and that judgment in both
respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. However, the OCA anchored its finding
of gross misconduct on the violation of R.A. No. 3019 instead of Direct Bribery under the Revised
Penal Code despite Judge Alinea's conviction on the latter offense.
The OCA also took into account that Judge Alinea had already reached the compulsory retirement
age of 70, hence dismissal from the service would be impossible to impose. Thus, it recommended
the following:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court

that:
a) respondent Judge Conrado O. Alinea, Jr., Municipal Trial Court, Iba, Zambales, be found GUILTY
of gross misconduct for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019), the
Code of Judicial Conduct under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under Rule 1.01, Canon I. In lieu of dismissal from the service, which
may no longer be imposed owing to his retirement, as penalty for his offense, all his retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, be FORFEITED, and with prejudice to reemployment in the
Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies including government-owned
and -controlled corporations; and,
b) respondent Judge Alinea be likewise DISBARRED and his name be STRICKEN from the roll of
attomeys.38
The Court's Ruling
After a judicious review of the records, the Court has no cogent reason to diverge from the findings
and recommendations of the OCA.
Direct Bribery involves, among others, the act of a public officer in accepting an offer or promise, or
receiving a gift, by himself or another, with a view to perform a crime or an unjust act, or commit an
omission, which is connected to his official duties.39 It is a crime involving moral turpitude, an act
which is "done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals," and involves "an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society
in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman,
or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals,"40 and which renders any person
convicted of the said offense unfit to continue discharging his duties as a public official or a
lawyer.41 It is also among the serious charges enumerated in Section 8,42 Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, which may be punished by, among others, dismissal from the service and forfeiture of
benefits.43 Moreover, it is a violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR, and a ground to disbar or
suspend a lawyer as gross misconduct under Section 27,44 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
In this matter, the OCA observed that the Sandiganbayan and the Court had held Judge Alinea guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Bribery, finding that: (1) Judge Alinea demanded
₱15,000.00 from Neria in exchange for a favorable resolution of the latter's case; (2) while at Bon's
Restaurant in Iba, Zambales, Judge Alinea had indeed accepted the said amount from Neria, after
which the NBI agents arrested him; and (3) the NBI forensic chemist subjected Judge Alinea to an
ultraviolet light examination, which tested him positive for fluorescent specks from the money he
received from Neria. Hence, it concluded that the foregoing are more than sufficient evidence to find
Judge Alinea administratively liable for the said offense as a member of both the Bench and the Bar.
The Court agrees with the OCA. It cannot emphasize enough how bribery, whether direct or indirect,
can seriously affect the public's trust in every subdivision and agency of government, more so in the
judiciary. As the branch of government responsible for interpreting laws and settling controversies
brought to it by any person, it has the duty to observe fairness and neutrality in hearing the sides of
all the parties to a case,45 and make a resolution thereon based solely on the merits of the evidence
presented by the parties and the laws and jurisprudence applicable thereon.46
As gleaned above, the evidence had fully established Judge Alinea' s criminal intent to extort money
from Neria and Abadam, from demanding ₱l5,000.00 in exchange for a favorable decision, to
actually accepting the said amount when they met at Bon's Restaurant. Thus, Judge Alinea not only
gravely violated his duty to dispense justice solely in accordance with the merits of the case, but also
put the trust and confidence of the people in the judiciary and the rule of law into serious peril, hence
rendering him utterly unfit to continue dispensing his duties as a public official and a member of the
Bar.47
As for the imposable penalty, the Court agrees with the OCA that Judge Alinea should be disbarred
and the benefits he received as a judge be forfeited. It is important to stress anew that Direct
1âwphi 1
Bribery is not only a serious charge which would merit the dismissal from the service of a judge and
the forfeiture of his benefits, but also a crime involving moral turpitude which is a ground for the
disbarment of a lawyer.
In this regard, it is relevant to note that the Court has, in the past, dismissed erring judges from the
service and disbarred them in a single decision on the ground of conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude,48 and forfeited the benefits of other judges similarly situated, who had already retired
prior to the resolution of the administrative matters against them,49 all in accordance with Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court in relation to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC. In view of the seriousness of the
offense, and considering that Judge Alinea had already reached the compulsory retirement age of
70 on August 16, 2013, the Court hereby imposes the forfeiture of benefits as a former judge.
In addition, the Court hereby disbars him. In imposing the supreme penalty of disbarment, the Court
is also aware of its recent decision in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Eliza B. Yu.50 In the
said case, the Court dismissed Judge Eliza B. Yu from the service for gross insubordination, gross
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, oppression, and conduct
unbecoming of a judicial official in, among others: (1) resisting the implementation of the Court's
Administrative Order No. 19- 2011 in designating her to render night court duties; (2) refusing to
honor the appointment of court personnel; (3) issuing show-cause orders against fellow judges and
court personnel; and (4) sending e-mails, and Yahoo and Facebook messages, which contained
sexual innuendos to a fellow female judge. However, while the offenses charged against her were
also considered as violations of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, it was shown that she was not yet given an opportunity to explain
why she should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined as a member of the Bar. Thus, in its
decision dated November 22, 2016, the Court, in dismissing Judge Yu from the service, and as part
of due process, directed her, among others, to show cause in writing why she should not be
disbarred for her acts, and it was only after she submitted her written explanation, and after
judiciously studying the merits thereof, that the Court disbarred her in its Resolution dated March 14,
2017.
Here, on the other hand, the Court, in its January 17, 2005 Resolution, explicitly directed Judge
Alinea to show cause why he should not be suspended, disbarred, or otherwise disciplinarily
sanctioned as a member of the Bar for Violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, to which he
complied. Hence, he was undeniably accorded due process insofar as the disbarment matter against
him is concerned. Finally, considering that the offenses charged against him were also grounds to
disbar him, the supreme penalty of disbarment, as recommended by the OCA, should be, as it is
hereby, imposed against Judge Alinea, aside from forfeiture of all of his benefits, except his accrued
leave credits, as a former member of the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, Judge Conrado O. Alinea, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of Iba, Zambales is
found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct for Direct Bribery under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. All of his
benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, are hereby FORFEITED, and he is PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement or appointment to any public office or employment, including to
one in any government-owned or government-controlled corporations. Moreover, he is
hereby DISBARRED pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, and his name is ordered STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately upon the date of his receipt of this Decision.
Judge Alinea is hereby DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his
disbarment has commenced, copy furnished to all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has
entered his appearance as counsel.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination
to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Judge Alinea's personal record
as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
8.
FIRST DIVISION
December 13, 2017
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2479[Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3567-RTJ]
DANIEL G. FAJARDO, Complaint

vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO M. NATINO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26, ILOILO CITY,
Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
For Our resolution is an Amended Letter Complaint1 dated November 27, 2010, filed by Daniel G.
Fajardo (Fajardo) of Panay News, Inc. against. Judge Antonio M. Natino (Judge Natino), Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 26.
Fajardo charged Judge Natino with the violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court relative to
the latter's dispositions in Civil Case No. 202252 entitled Letecia Jaroda V da. De Lacson, et al. v.
Leonardo E. Jiz, et al., a case for annulment of title and declaration of nullity of documents of sale
with damages, and in Civil Case No. 07-292983 entitled Panay News, Inc. v. Renato Magbutay and
Rosendo Mejica, an action for damages and injunction.
Specifically, as summarized by Investigating Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino (Justice Maxino) in
her Report and Recommendation4 dated June 4, 2015, Judge Natino was charged of the following,
to wit:
l. Violation of the 90-day period within which a case is to be resolved, counted from the date it is
submitted for decision, in relation to Civil Case No. 20225 x x x. Fajardo said that the case was
submitted for decision on January 23, 2007, but a decision thereon was only issued on April 21,
2010. In effect, the decision was only rendered more than three years after the case was submitted
for decision.
2. Delay in the release of the Decision. The decision in x x x Civil Case No. 20225 was dated April
21, 2010 but according to Fajardo, the decision was released only four months after, or on August
17, 2010.
3. Falsification of Certificate of Service, in that, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Natino failed to
resolve the aforementioned case within 90 days, he continued to receive his salary.
4. failure to resolve the matters covered in the Motion to Show Cause (Contempt), in relation to Civil
Case No. 07-29298, x x x.
Fajardo stressed that in said case, Panay News filed on January 6, 20 l 0, a motion to show cause
for contempt against Mejica, for the latter's failure to comply with the Order dated October 23, 2009,
ordering him to deposit ₱572,000.00.
The motion to show cause for contempt, according to Fajardo, was never acted upon by the RTC.
5. Entertaining a second motion for reconsideration, in relation to x x x Civil Case No. 07-29298.
Fajardo said that while the Order dated October 23, 2009 was already final, Judge Natino
entertained a second motion for reconsideration of said Order filed by Mejica, for him to deposit a
lesser amount than ₱572,000.00, or only ₱428,000.00. Judge Natino supposedly entertained a
second motion for reconsideration so as to gain leverage in his request for a certain amount.5
Essentially, it is Fajardo’s theory that the delay in the resolution and release of the decision in' Civil
Case No. 20225, and the order giving due course to a second motion for reconsideration in Civil
Case No. 07-29298, were all due to Judge Natino’s maneuver to obtain a part of the amount to be
deposited in Civil Case No. 07-29298 from Panay News, Inc., whose counsel was Atty. Leonardo
Jiz, a defendant in Civil Case No. 20225.
In his Comment6 to the complaint, Judge Natino explained· that the delay in the resolution of Civil
Case · No. 20225 was caused by circumstances beyond his control. He averred that he started
drafting the decision in the said case sometime in April 2007 but the stenographer to whom he
started dictating the same and who was to transcribe the stenographic notes of the case resigned
and left for Manila. Then, his assumption as Acting Executive Judge in the same year and as a full-
fledged Executive Judge in 2008 up to 2010, hampered his case disposal during the period as his
tasks included hearing and deciding, not only regular cases, but also urgent administrative cases
referred by the court administrator. Judge Natino also cited the renovation of the Iloilo City Hall from
April 2010 to May 2010 and some bomb threats that the city hall experienced which led to the
suspensions of work causing his case backlog. In addition, according to Judge Natino, power
outrages which frequented the city caused the loss of some changes made in the draft decision of
Civil Case No. 20225 in that, while the same was finalized sometime in August 2010, the date
appearing in the draft (April 21, 2010) remained unchanged.7
Judge Natino further justified the extended period of deciding Civil Case No. 20225 by averring that
he was just being judicious in his actions, hence, he leaned more towards "quality of administration
of justice" than mere "speedy disposition of cases."8 Hence, it was Judge Natino's submission that
the 90-day rule in deciding cases may be considered as directory and shall be considered
mandatory only when the delay was attended by vexations, capricious, and oppressive delay.9
Judge Natino also denied the allegation on falsification of certificates of service, arguing that the
circumstantial delay in rendering the decision in Civil Case No. 20225 did not necessarily mean that
he falsified his certificates of service.10
As to the charges relating to Civil Case No. 07-29298, i.e., failure to resolve matter on the Motion to
Show Cause (for contempt) and giving due course to a second motion for reconsideration to gain
leverage in his request for a certain amount from a party in that case, Judge Natino refuted the same
by citing in full his Order dated October 18, 2010 in the said case. The said order stated the
circumstances which led to the postponements of the subject motions' hearings, as well as the
court's actions thereafter.11
In Our Resolution dated April 3, 2013, the complaint was then referred to the Executive justice of the
Court of Appeals, Cebu to be raffled to the Associate Justices therein for investigation, report, and
recommendation.12
The case was eventually raffled to Justice Maxino. In the scheduled hearing during the investigation,
only Judge Natino and his counsel appeared. Fajardo failed to attend hearings despite notice. Thus,
Judge Natino was allowed to testify and present documentary evidence in his defense during the
hearings, which comprised of: (1) his medical records to show that he had health problems since
1990 and a medical certificate to show that he was admitted in the hospital from December 6 to 8,
2010~ (2) evidence of his appointment as Executive Judge from 2008 to 2010 with indorsements
and reports on the administrative cases that he heard as Executive Judge in addition to his regular
case loads; (3) certification that the Iloilo City Hall was renovated from August 2009 to July 2010; (4)
certification from the Panay Electric Company, stating that the area where Iloilo Hall of Justice was
situated experienced a total of 201 power outrages from January 2007 to August 2010; (5) his
approved leave applications from 2007 to 2010 to prove that he followed all the civil service rules
insofar as his attendance is concerned; (6) certification from the Office of the Court· Administrator
(OCA) dated January 30, 2015, stating that he had been filing his certificates of service since 2006;
and (7) a copy of the Order dated October 18, 2010 in Civil Case No. 07-29298 to refute the charge
that he did not act on Panay News, Inc.’s Motion to Show Cause, as well as the charge that he
entertained a second motion for reconsideration.13
In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Maxino noted Fajardo’s failure to appear in the
hearings and to present evidence to suppmt his allegations against Judge Natino. With that, the
Investigating Justice found no merit in all charges against Judge Natino, except as regards the long
overdue action in the resolution of Civil Case No. 20225, for want of evidence.14
As regards the charge that Judge Natino delayed the release of the decision in Civil Case No.
20225, the Investigating Justice found no proof to support the same and noted that there was no
pattern in Judge Natino’s actuation that says that he has been known and shown to have adhered to
a practice of delaying release of decisions. What was clear, as shown in the subject decision, was
that Judge Natino finished drafting the same on April 21, 2010. The Investigating Justice was
convinced that the power outages which frequented the area had caused the confusion in the date of
the subject decision and ruled that such inadvertence did not necessarily militate punishment or
sanction but reminded judges to exercise prudence in writing every aspect of their decision.15
There was also no proof as to the alleged falsification of certificates of service as the questioned
certificates were not presented in evidence.16
The allegation on the failure to act upon the Motion to Show Cause, as well as the imputation of
corruption in entertaining a second motio11 for reconsideration in Civil Case No. 07-29298 were also
unsubstantiated. According to the Investigating Justice, Judge Natino’s October 18, 2010 Order in
the said case showed the downright falsity of such charges.17
The Investigating Justice, however, found Judge Natino guilty of undue delay in rendering the
decision in Civil Case No. 20225 despite consideration of Judge Natino’s justifications and/or
explanations on such delay. Hence, Justice Maxino recommended the imposition of a fine
amounting to ₱20,000, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future
would be dealt with more severely.18
In its Memorandum dated July 12, 2016, the OCA adopted the Investigating Justice's findings and
recommendations.19
The Issue
This Court is now burdened for its final action to resolve the matter, the only issue being: whether or
not Judge Natino is guilty of the charges against him.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Justice, as adopted by
the OCA except for the penalty charged.
Indeed, aside from Fajardo’s uncorroborated allegations, the records are bereft of any proof to
support the allegation on the intentional delay on the release of the Civil Case No. 20225, much less
the charge of corruption against Judge Natino.
Likewise, the alleged falsification of certificates of service was never proven. There is no clear
evidence that Judge Natino intentionally, if at all, falsified his monthly certificate of service.
Admittedly, there may have been a delay in the rendition of a decision in this case but, as it appears,
this is an isolated case, which cannot be the basis to sweepingly conclude that Judge Natino has
been falsifying his certificates of service to continuously receive his salary.20
As to the charges on the alleged failure to act upon Panay News, Inc.’s motion, as well as, again, the
imputation of corruption against Judge Natino in Civil Case No. 07-29298, the October 18, 2010
Order indeed comprehensively refuted said charges as it states in details the court's actions on the
said motion.
On the undue delay in the resolution of Civil Case No. 20225, however, We agree with the finding of
guilt against Judge Natino.
The pronouncement of this Court in Re: Cases Submitted for Decision Before Hon. Baluma, 21 is
relevant, thus:
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that lower courts have three months
within which to decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover, Canon
3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly
and decide cases within the required period. In addition, this Court laid down guidelines in SC
Administrative Circular No. 13 which provides, inter alia, that "[J]udges shall observe scrupulously
the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and
resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be
1âw phi 1
decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while
all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so." The Court has reiterated this
admonition in SC Administrative Circular No. 3-99 which requires all judges to scrupulously observe
the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases and the failure to comply therewith is
considered a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of their
cases.
This Court has constantly emphasized that the office of a judge exacts nothing less than faithful
observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of official duties.23
It is undisputed in this case that Judge Natino failed to decide Civil Case No. 20225 within the 90-
day period provided in the Constitution. Records show that the said case was filed on January 30,
1992, submitted for decision on January 23, 2007, and decided only in August 2010 or after more
than three years from the time it was submitted for decision.
We have previously ruled that the 90-day period within which to decide cases is
mandatory.24 Consequently, failure of a judge to decide a case within the prescribed period is
inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a disciplinary sanction.25
Certainly, We have considered the justifications and explanations on such delay, proffered by Judge
Natino, which, while may be recognized as true and reasonable, are not sufficient to exonerate him
from liability. To be sure, the mandatory nature of the period to decide cases provided under the
Constitution cannot be considered as beyond the limits of acceptability or fairness. We are also
aware of the heavy case load of trial courts,26 as well as the different circumstances or situations that
judges may encounter during trial such as those averred by Judge Natino in this case. Thus, the
Court has allowed reasonable extensions of time needed to decide cases, but such extensions must
first be requested from the Court.27 Whenever a judge cannot decide a case promptly, all he has to
do is to ask the Court for a reasonable extension of time to resolve it.28 Unfortunately for Judge
Natino, he did not avail of such remedy. A judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for
deciding cases beyond that authorized by law.29
Under Section 9(1),30 Rule 140, as amended by Administrative Matter No. 01-8-10-SC,31 undue delay
in rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge, which is penalized with suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months or a fine of
more than ₱10,000 but not not more than ₱20,000.
However, depending on the circumstances of each case, the fine to be imposed may vary.32 In one
case, We imposed a fine of ₱10,000 against a judge who rendered a decision beyond the 90-day
period, considering that it was his first offense.33 In another case, the Court imposed a fine of only
₱2,000 on the same offense, considering the good record of the respondentjudge therein as regards
case disposal, his length of service, and that it was his first infraction.34 Hence, for this case, taking
into account that this is Judge Natino’s first infraction and that he already retired last June 30, 2016
after serving the Judiciary for more than 33 years, We find that the imposition of a fine amounting to
₱10,000 is commensurate to the offense that he committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Judge Antonio M. Natino, former judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, GUILTY of undue delay in rendering a decision, for
which he is FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000), to be deducted from his·
retirement benefits withheld by the Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator.
Thereafter, the balance of his retirement benefits shall be released without unnecessary delay.
SO ORDERED.
9.
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1370 April 25, 2003

(Formerly A.M. No. 00-11-238-MTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE AGUSTIN T. SARDIDO, Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South
Cotabato, respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative case against respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido ("Judge Sardido")
formerly presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, for gross
ignorance of the law. Judge Sardido issued an Order dated 20 October 1998 excluding Judge
Braulio Hurtado, Jr. ("Judge Hurtado") of the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, North Cotabato as
one of the accused in an Amended Information.1 Judge Sardido ruled that Supreme Court Circular
No. 3-89 requires that Judge Hurtado be dropped from the Amended Information and his case be
forwarded to the Court.
The Facts
Private complainant Teresita Aguirre Magbanua accused Oscar Pagunsan and Danilo Ong of the
crime of "Falsification by Private Individual and Use of Falsified Document."2 The Amended
Information included Judge Hurtado. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 14071, was raffled to
Judge Sardido, then presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato
("MTC-Koronadal").
In a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8 August 1993, private complainant Magbanua and six other
vendors allegedly sold two parcels of land, covered by TCT Nos. 47873 and 33633 and located at
the commercial district of Koronadal, to Davao Realty Development Corporation, represented by
accused Ong, with co-accused Pagunsan, as broker. Judge Hurtado, who at that time was the Clerk
of Court of RTC-Koronadal and ex-officio notary public, notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale.
However, private complainant Magbanua denies signing the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8 August
1993 which states that the consideration for the sale was only P600,000.00. Private complainant
asserts that what she and the other vendors signed was a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 6 August
1996 for a consideration of P16,000,000.00. Under the terms of the sale, the vendee agreed to pay
for the capital gains tax. The consideration in the 8 August 1993 Deed of Absolute Sale was
apparently undervalued. Subsequently, the Bureau of Internal Revenue assessed the vendors a
deficiency capital gains tax of P1,023,375.00.
Judge Hurtado filed a motion praying that the criminal complaint against him be forwarded to the
Supreme Court. Judge Hurtado claimed that Circular No. 3-89 dated 6 February 1989 requires "all
cases involving justices and judges of the lower courts, whether or not such complaints deal with
acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of their official functions, such as acts of immorality,
estafa, crimes against persons and property, etc." to be forwarded to the Supreme Court. Judge
Hurtado asserted that since the case against him is one involving a judge of a lower court, the same
should be forwarded to the Supreme Court pursuant to Circular No. 3-89.
The Provincial Prosecutor opposed Judge Hurtado’s motion, arguing that the case against Judge
Hurtado is not within the scope of Circular No. 3-89 since it is not an IBP-initiated case. Moreover,
the offense charged was committed in 1993 when Judge Hurtado was still a clerk of court and ex-
officio notary public.
On 20 October 1998, Judge Sardido issued an Order, the pertinent portions of which read:
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is, whether the case of Judge Hurtado, who is
charged for acts committed prior to his appointment as an RTC Judge, falls within the
purview of the afore-said Circular No. 3-89.
It is the humble submission of the Court that the case of Judge Hurtado, an RTC Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, North Cotabato, falls within the meaning and intent of
the said circular.
For reasons being, firstly, the said circular provides that all cases involving justices and
judges of lower courts shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for appropriate action,
whether or not such complaints deal with acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of their
official functions, and regardless of the nature of the crime, without any qualification whether
the crime was committed before or during his tenure of office. Under the law on Legal
Hermeneutics, if the law does not qualify we must not qualify. Secondly, it would sound, to
the mind of the Court, awkward for a first level court to be trying an incumbent judge of a
second level court.
For reasons afore-stated, this Court can not and shall not try this case as against Judge
Hurtado, unless the Honorable Supreme Court would order otherwise.
Wherefore, the foregoing premises duly considered, the name of Judge Braulio L. Hurtado,
Jr. is ordered excluded from the amended information and the case against him is ordered
forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court, pursuant to the afore-said Circular No. 3-89 of
the Supreme Court, dated February 9, 1989.
Accordingly, Maxima S. Borja ("Borja"), Stenographer I and Acting Clerk of Court II of the MTC-
Koronadal, South Cotabato, wrote a letter dated 21 July 1999 forwarding the criminal case against
Judge Hurtado to the Court Administrator for appropriate action.
Then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated 25 October 2000
pointing out that Circular No. 3-89 refers only to administrative complaints filed with the IBP against
justices and judges of lower courts. The Circular does not apply to criminal cases filed before trial
courts against such justices and judges.
Thus, in the Resolution of 6 December 2000, the Court directed that the letter of Acting Clerk of
Court Borja be returned to the MTC-Koronadal together with the records of the criminal case. The
Court directed Judge Sardido to explain in writing why he should not be held liable for gross
ignorance of the law for excluding Judge Hurtado from the Amended Information and for transmitting
the records of Judge Hurtado’s case to the Court.
In his Explanation dated 26 January 2001, Judge Sardido reasoned out that he excluded Judge
Hurtado because Circular No. 3-89 directs the IBP to "forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate
action all cases involving justices and judges of lower courts x x x." Judge Sardido claims that the
Circular likewise "applies to courts in cases involving justices or judges of the lower courts,"
especially so in this case where "Judge Hurtado was charged with falsification of public document as
a notary public while he was still the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of the 11th Judicial
Region in Koronadal, South Cotabato."
In the Resolution of 28 March 2001, the Court referred this case to the Office of the Court
Administrator ("OCA") for evaluation, report and recommendation. On 10 July 2001, the OCA
submitted a Memorandum recommending that this case be re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter.
Judge Sardido filed his Manifestation dated 20 September 2001 stating that he is submitting the
case for decision based on the pleadings and records already filed. Judge Sardido insisted that he
did "what he had done in all honesty and good faith."
OCA’s Findings and Conclusions
The OCA found that Judge Sardido erred in excluding Judge Hurtado as one of the accused in the
Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 14071. The OCA held that Circular No. 3-89, which is
Judge Sardido’s basis in issuing the Order of 20 October 1998, refers to administrative complaints
filed with the IBP against justices and judges of lower courts. The Circular does not apply to criminal
cases filed against justices and judges of lower courts. The OCA recommended that a fine
of P5,000.00 be imposed on Judge Sardido for gross ignorance of the law.
The Court issued Circular No. 3-89 in response to a letter dated 19 December 1988 by then IBP
President Leon M. Garcia, seeking clarification of the Court’s En Banc Resolution of 29 November
1998 in RE: Letter of then Acting Presiding Justice Rodolfo A. Nocon3 and Associate Justices
Reynato Puno4 and Alfredo Marigomen5 of the Court of Appeals.
A certain Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing had filed a complaint against Court of Appeals Justices Nocon,
Puno and Marigomen relating to a petition filed before their division. In its En Banc Resolution of 29
November 1988, the Court required the IBP to refer to the Supreme Court for appropriate action the
complaint6 filed by Atty. Balaoing with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The Court stated that
the power to discipline justices and judges of the lower courts is within the Court’s exclusive power
and authority as provided in Section 11, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.7 The Court Administrator
publicized the En Banc Resolution of 29 November 1988 by issuing Circular No. 17 dated 20
December 1988.
The Court issued Circular No. 3-89 on 6 February 1989 clarifying the En Banc Resolution of 29
November 1988. Circular No. 3-89 provides in part as follows:
(1) The IBP (Board of Governors and Commission on Bar Discipline) shall forward to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action all cases involving justices and judges of lower courts,
whether or not such complaints deal with acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of their
official functions, such as acts of immorality, estafa, crimes against persons and property,
etc. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Circular No. 3-89 clarified the second paragraph, Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
which states that:
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by
a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper
charges against erring attorneys including those in the government service. (Emphasis
supplied).
As clarified, the phrase "attorneys x x x in the government service" in Section 1 of Rule 139-B does
not include justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts who are not subject to the
disciplining authority of the IBP. All administrative cases against justices of appellate courts and
judges of lower courts fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
However, Rule 139-B refers to Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys which is administrative and
not criminal in nature. The cases referred to in Circular No. 3-89 are administrative cases for
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys, including justices of appellate courts and judges of
the lower courts. The Court has vested the IBP with the power to initiate and prosecute
administrative cases against erring lawyers.8 However, under Circular No. 3-89, the Court has
directed the IBP to refer to the Supreme Court for appropriate action all administrative cases filed
with IBP against justices of appellate courts and judges of the lower courts. As mandated by the
Constitution, the Court exercises the exclusive power to discipline administratively justices of
appellate courts and judges of lower courts.
Circular No. 3-89 does not refer to criminal cases against erring justices of appellate courts or judges
of lower courts. Trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by
justices of appellate courts9and judges of lower courts. This is clear from the Circular directing the
IBP, and not the trial courts, to refer all administrative cases filed against justices of appellate courts
and judges of lower courts to the Supreme Court. The case filed against Judge Hurtado is not an
administrative case filed with the IBP. It is a criminal case filed with the trial court under its
jurisdiction as prescribed by law.
The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the same time both a criminal act and an
administrative offense. Whether the criminal case against Judge Hurtado relates to an act committed
before or after he became a judge is of no moment. Neither is it material that an MTC judge will be
trying an RTC judge in the criminal case. A criminal case against an attorney or judge is distinct and
separate from an administrative case against him. The dismissal of the criminal case does not
warrant the dismissal of an administrative case arising from the same set of facts. The quantum of
evidence that is required in the latter is only preponderance of evidence, and not proof beyond
reasonable doubt which is required in criminal cases.10 As held in Gatchalian Promotions Talents
Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza:11
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from
and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension,
‘clearly preponderant evidence’ is all that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not
constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in
the administrative proceedings.
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result
in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil
liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the
administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action
absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil
cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the
first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it would be well to
remember the Court’s ruling in In re Almacen, which we quote:
"x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x"
A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules. He must be conversant with basic legal principles and well-settled doctrines. He should strive
for excellence and seek the truth with passion.12 Judge Sardido failed in this regard. He erred in
excluding Judge Hurtado as one of the accused in the Amended Information and in forwarding the
criminal case against Judge Hurtado to the Court.
One last point. This administrative case against Judge Sardido started before the amendment13 of
Rule 140 classifying gross ignorance of the law a serious offense punishable by a fine of more
than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. The amendment cannot apply retroactively to Judge
Sardido’s case. However, the fine of P5,000.00 recommended by the OCA is too light a penalty
considering that this is not the first offense of Judge Sardido.
In RE: Hold Departure Order Issued by Judge Agustin T. Sardido,14 the Court reprimanded Judge
Sardido for issuing a hold-departure order contrary to Circular No. 39-97. In Cabilao v. Judge
Sardido,15 the Court fined Judge Sardido P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion and gross misconduct. The Court gave a stern warning to Judge Sardido that a
commission of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely. In Almeron v. Judge
Sardido,16 the Court imposed on Judge Sardido a stiffer fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the
law. He was again sternly warned that the commission of the same or similar act in the future would
be dealt with more severely including, if warranted, his dismissal from the service.
In a more recent administrative case, Torcende v. Judge Sardido,17 the Court found Judge Sardido
again guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of gross misconduct. This time the
Court dismissed Judge Sardido from the service with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits. The dismissal was with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
The records of the OCA further disclose that Judge Sardido has other similar administrative
complaints18 still pending against him. Such an unflattering service record erodes the people’s faith
and confidence in the judiciary. It is the duty of every member of the bench to avoid any impression
of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.19 The Court may still impose a fine
on Judge Sardido in the instant case despite his dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido is FINED Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
for gross ignorance of the law. The fine may be deducted from his accrued leave credits.
SO ORDERED.
10.
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 March 12, 2013

(Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-MTCC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.
HON. ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 4, Cebu City and MR. REYNALDO S. TEVES, Branch Clerk of Court, same
court, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The administrative matter stemmed from the Report of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
Audit Team which conducted the judicial audit on June 16 to 28, 2008 in the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City, pursuant to Travel Order No. 45-2008 dated May 28, 2008,
series of 2008.1
The team examined the records of 5,120 cases consisting of 4,466 criminal and 654 civil cases. The
examination yielded the following results:2
STATUS/STAGES OF PROCEEDINGS CRIMINAL CIVIL TOTAL

CASES CASES
For Promulgation 12 0 12
Submitted/Due for Decision 120 89 209
With Pending Incidents for Resolution 172 63 235
No Initial Action since Filing of Case 220 3 223
No Further Action for Considerable Length of 3,179 312 3,491

Time
With Warrant of Arrest/Summons 33 70 103
For Arraignment 82 - 82
For Setting 5 - 5
For Preliminary Conference/Pre-trial 58 18 76
For Compliance 38 8 46
With Pending Motions 5 2 7
On Trial/For Initial Trial 288 23 311
Suspended Proceedings 24 3 27
Archived 131 1 132
Decided/Dismissed/Disposed 99 62 161
TOTAL 4,466 654 5,120
The Presiding Judge of the subject court is Judge Rosabella M. Tormis (Judge Tormis), while the
Clerk of Court is Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves (Mr. Teves).3 Judge Tormis took her oath and assumed
office on June 22, 1999. Her service was, however, interrupted because of the following
administrative cases wherein she was either suspended or preventively suspended, to wit:
1. Decision dated September 20, 2005 in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 (Abuse of Authority)
wherein Judge Tormis was suspended from service for six (6) months. In a subsequent
resolution dated July 12, 2006, she was directed to resume office immediately upon receipt
of notice;
2. Resolution dated July 10, 2007 in A.M. No. 07-1691 (Judicial Audit on Solemnization of
Marriages) wherein she was placed under preventive suspension effective immediately. The
suspension was lifted per Resolution dated December 11, 2007; and
3. Resolution dated November 28, 2007 in A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692 (Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct) wherein she was suspended for six (6) months.4
During the absence of Judge Tormis, Judge Carlos C. Fernando (Judge Fernando) of the MTCC,
Branch 2, Mandaue City was designated as Acting Presiding Judge pursuant to Administrative Order
Nos. 110-2007 and 2-2008 dated July 9, 2007 and January 7, 2008, respectively.5
The report revealed that Branch 4 does not maintain a docket book or any similar system of record-
keeping and monitoring.6 Specifically, the Audit Team found the following irregularities committed by
Branch 4:
(1) There were decisions/judgments in eleven (11) criminal cases rendered by Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis which have not been promulgated despite the lapse of considerable
length of time;
(2) There were two (2) inherited cases which remained undecided for about ten (10) years or
more;
(3) There were one hundred twelve (112) criminal and eighty-three (83) civil cases submitted
for decision before Judge Tormis which have remained undecided beyond the reglementary
period to decide the same;
(4) There are six (6) criminal and six (6) civil undecided cases submitted for decision before
then Acting Presiding Judge Carlos C. Fernando;
(5) There are one hundred seventy-two (172) criminal and sixty-three (63) civil cases that are
with pending incidents for resolution;
(6) Of the 172 criminal cases referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph, one
hundred forty-five (145) cases involve violation of city ordinances/traffic rules with pending
motions to archive. The court therefore failed to comply with Administrative Circular No. 7-A-
92 dated June 21, 1993 relative to the guidelines in the Archiving of Cases;
(7) There are two hundred twenty (220) criminal and three (3) civil cases that have no initial
action/proceeding since their filing in court;
(8) There are three thousand one hundred seventy-nine (3,179) criminal and three hundred
twelve (312) civil cases without further action or proceedings for a considerable length of
time;
(9) There was an unreasonable delay in deciding Criminal Case No. 111373-R entitled
People vs. Roel Ricardel [Ricardel case] for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Double
Homicide, since the trial ended on August 29, 2003 and yet it was decided only on April 18,
2008 not by Judge Tormis but by Acting Presiding Judge Fernando;
(10) It has been the practice of MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City not to promulgate judgments in
criminal cases in blatant violation of Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure;
(11) It appears that the Decision dated June 4, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 72880-R to 83-R
and 85346-R to 53-R entitled People vs. Evangeline Datan [Datan case] for Violation of BP
22, was actually rendered by Judge Tormis at the time when she was already suspended by
the Court sometime in July 2007 and said decision has not been promulgated; and
(12) In Criminal Case No. 126542R to 49-R entitled People vs. Jasmin L. Librando [Librando
case] for Violation of BP 22 which is a case falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure,
Judge Tormis ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest in violation of Section 16 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.7
In a Resolution dated March 18, 2009, the Court directed Judge Tormis to promulgate the
decisions/judgments that have not been promulgated; decide with dispatch the two (2) inherited
cases that have remained undecided for ten years or more; decide within a non-extendible period of
four (4) months criminal and civil cases which are already beyond the reglementary period to decide
cases; to resolve within a non-extendible period of four (4) months the pending incidents/motions in
criminal and civil cases which are beyond the reglementary period within which to resolve the
incidents; to immediately take appropriate action on 145 criminal cases pursuant to Administrative
Circular No. 7-92-A; to immediately take appropriate action on criminal and civil cases which have
no initial action since their filing in court and those which have no further action for a considerable
length of time; explain why she failed to comply with her duty to conduct actual semestral physical
inventory of case records thereby submitting to the Court inaccurate reports; explain the delay in
deciding the Ricardel case; explain why she allowed the practice of not promulgating
decisions/judgments in criminal cases in violation of Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and Section 17 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure; explain why she
rendered the decision dated June 4, 2007 in the Datan case at the time when she was already
suspended by the Court; explain why in Librando case, she ordered the issuance of a warrant of
arrest in violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure; and submit to the
Court her compliance with the foregoing directives.8
In the same resolution, the Court directed Mr. Teves to explain why he failed to comply with his duty
to conduct actual semestral physical inventory of case records thereby submitting inaccurate reports
of cases; explain why he failed to keep a General Docket Book pursuant to Section 8, Rule 136 of
the Rules of Court; to explain why he allowed the practice in their court of not promulgating
decisions/judgments in criminal cases in violation of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure; and to submit to the Court a report of compliance of the foregoing
directives.9
In compliance with the Court’s directive, Judge Tormis explained the irregularities that she allegedly
committed. She claimed that she faithfully conducted semestral physical inventory of case records
except during the period comprising her three suspensions as she was then denied access to her
courtroom and case records.10 She likewise cited the foregoing suspensions as the causes of the
delay in the disposition of cases then pending in her court.11 She also alleged that the delay in the
disposition of the Ricardel case was brought about by the parties’ request for time to negotiate on
the civil aspect of the case.12 She also denied the alleged practice of her court of not promulgating
judgments in criminal cases. She specifically cited the Datan case and explained that she rendered
the decision prior to her preventive suspension and she filed it with Mr. Teves for the latter to
calendar it for promulgation, but instead of following her directive, Mr. Teves sent copies of the
decision to the parties of the case.13 Insofar as the Librando case is concerned, while admitting
having issued the warrant of arrest, she supposedly did so only because the accused failed to
appear during the arraignment despite notice.14 Finally, she claimed that she had satisfactorily
complied with the directive to decide the cases submitted for decision although beyond the period to
decide; she had resolved the incidents due for resolution and had archived all the cases due for
archiving; and, she had either disposed of or archived the inactive cases.151âwphi 1
For his part, Mr. Teves explained that the alleged error in his reports can be attributed to the
discrepancy in procedure or appreciation in the preparation of the reports.16 He claimed that their
court indeed does not maintain a general docket book, because they have not been provided by the
Court with the needed supplies.17 Lastly, on the alleged practice of non-promulgation of judgments,
he claimed that the Rules are not applicable because most of their cases were resolved based on
compromise agreement, plea of guilt and dismissal by reason of affidavit of desistance, failure to
prosecute, or violation of the right to speedy trial.18
Conclusions and Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator
While recognizing the suspensions of Judge Tormis as one of the reasons for the delay in the
disposition of cases, the OCA observed that several of the cases had been overdue for decision or
resolution even prior to her suspension. As such, she should be held liable for undue delay in
rendering a decision or order, a violation of Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Considering
that said offense is a less serious charge, and taking into account the number of unresolved cases
pending in her sala, the OCA recommended that Judge Tormis be meted the penalty of fine of
₱80,000.00.19 For failure to comply with her duty to provide efficient court management system in her
court, which includes the preparation and use of docket inventory and monthly report of cases as
tools thereof, the OCA also found Judge Tormis guilty of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives
and circulars, another less serious charge, warranting the penalty of fine of ₱20,000.00.20 The OCA,
however, exonerated Judge Tormis of the alleged practice of non-promulgation of
decisions/judgments as the same was just misunderstood.21Finally, in ordering the arrest of the
accused even before the latter was apprised of the charges against her, the OCA found Judge
Tormis liable for gross ignorance of the law, a serious charge warranting the imposition of the
penalty of fine of ₱20,000.00.22
As to Mr. Teves, the OCA found him guilty of mismanagement of the case records leading to the
court’s failure to dispose of many pending cases to the prejudice of the litigants concerned. As such,
he was found to be liable for simple neglect of duty.23 Mr. Teves is likewise guilty of another simple
neglect of duty in failing to set for promulgation the decision in the Datan case.24 As such, the OCA
recommended that he be ordered to pay a fine in the amount equivalent to two (2) months of his
salary.25
The OCA’s recommendation is quoted hereunder for easy reference:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. The instant matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter against Hon.

Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S.
Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court;
2. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis be found GUILTY OF (a) undue delay in rendering a decision
or order; (b) violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars resulting in the
mismanagement of the court; and (c) gross ignorance of the law for ordering the arrest of the
accused in Criminal Case Nos. 126542R to 49-R entitled People vs. Jasmin L. Librando
without the accused having been informed yet of the charge against her and accordingly be
FINED in the amounts of Eighty Thousand Pesos (₱80,000.00), Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00) and Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00), respectively, with the warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely;
3. Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves be found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and be FINED in the
amount equivalent to his two (2) months salary with the warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act will be dealt with more severely; and
4. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves be DIRECTED to hereceforth (a)
submit accurate monthly reports of cases and docket inventory reports; (b) strictly monitor
the movement of all pending cases that are active, being tried and until decided, dismissed
or archived, as may be warranted; (c) improve the system of serving court processes
including the return or proof of service; and (d) maintain a general docket book pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court.26

1âw phi1
The present administrative case refers to not just one but several acts allegedly committed by Judge
Tormis and Mr. Teves said to be violative of the Rules of Court and Supreme Court rules,
regulations and directives. Judge Tormis is hereby accused of committing the following irregularities:
(1) undue delay in the disposition of cases; (2) mismanagement of the court and case records; (3)
non-promulgation of decisions; and (4) issuing a warrant of arrest without first apprising the accused
of the charge against him. For his part, Mr. Teves is here charged with (1) mismanagement of case
records; and (2) failure to set case for promulgation.
Undue Delay in the Disposition of Cases
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case
within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days.
In this case, Judge Tormis had been remiss in her duty to dispose of cases within the mandatory
period to do so. Two of such cases had in fact remained undecided for ten (10) years; a total of one
hundred ninety-five (195) cases had yet to be decided despite having been submitted for decision for
more than ninety (90) days; ninety (90) cases had been submitted for resolution beyond the
mandatory period but were yet to be resolved; two hundred twenty-three (223) cases had been filed
in court, but Judge Tormis failed to make even just the initial action for a considerable period; and
three thousand four hundred ninety-one (3,491) cases had no further action for a considerable
length of time. When asked to explain such delay, Judge Tormis claimed that it was the
consequence of the three suspension orders issued against her as she was suspended for an
aggregate period of almost one year and six months. Records reveal, however, that Judge Tormis
was repeatedly suspended in cases (that will be discussed below) wherein she committed a breach
of her duty as a member of the Bench. She cannot, therefore, be allowed to use the same to justify
another violation of her solemn oath to dispense justice. Even if we allow her to use such an excuse,
as aptly observed by the OCA, several of the cases that she failed to dispose of had been overdue
for decision or resolution even prior to her suspension. Hence, she cannot be absolved from liability
for her inaction. This notwithstanding her later compliance with the Court’s resolution thereby making
the appropriate action on said cases.
The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by the fairness and correctness
of decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved.28 The delay in
deciding a case within the reglementary period constitutes a violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates judges to perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with promptness.29 Judge Tormis is thus liable for
gross inefficiency for his failure to decide cases within the reglementary period.
Mismanagement of Court
As held by the Court in In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Br.
45, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan:30
An orderly and efficient case management system is no doubt essential in the expeditious
disposition of judicial caseloads, because only thereby can the judges, branch clerks of courts, and
the clerks-in-charge of the civil and criminal dockets ensure that the court records, which will be the
bases for rendering the judgments and dispositions, and the review of the judgments and
dispositions on appeal, if any, are intact, complete, updated, and current. Such a system necessarily
includes the regular and continuing physical inventory of cases to enable the judge to keep abreast
of the status of the pending cases and to be informed that everything in the court is in proper order.
In contrast, mismanaged or incomplete records, and the lack of periodic inventory definitely cause
unwanted delays in litigations and inflict unnecessary expenses on the parties and the State.31
Here, the OCA found the court’s failure to maintain a general docket book. Although the duty is
vested with Mr. Teves, it is the duty of Judge Tormis to make sure that the members of her staff
perform their duties. This failure contributed to their inability to keep track of the number of cases
assigned as well as to account for all the cases and records assigned to the court. The OCA likewise
found that Mr. Teves repeatedly submitted inaccurate reports as to the actual number of cases
pending with their court. This is brought about by their failure to adopt an efficient system of
monitoring their cases. Again, this is the primary responsibility of Judge Tormis. Finally, the OCA
noted that Judge Tormis failed to conduct an actual physical inventory of cases to keep abreast of
the status of the pending cases and to be informed that every case is in proper order. If the same
was conducted, she would have discovered that Mr. Teves had been committing a mistake in the
inventory of cases. As found by the OCA, Judge Tormis is guilty of violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives, and circulars for her failure to comply with her duty of providing an efficient court
management system in her court which includes the preparation and use of docket inventory and
monthly report of cases as tools thereof.
As for Mr. Teves, he admitted that:
He kept the records of dormant cases inside the storage room. Most of these cases are violations of
city ordinances, resisting arrest, vagrancy and collection of sum of money with replevin filed by
lending institutions and covered by the Rule on Summary Proceudre. If there are no returns, or the
returns were not duly served as when the accused could not be found in the given address, and no
party makes any follow-up, they remain in the storage room. According to him, "(they) cannot
immediately act on these records unless a motion was filed either by the public prosecutor or
interested complainants, confer to this court and make a follow-up on their cases." Thus, unless
there is a follow up, he will not act on the case. Further, he admitted that "except those with proper
returns, hundreds of these returns were not attached to the records because the respective clerk-in-
charge cannot cope up with over laden work."32
Moreover, Mr. Teves himself admitted that he failed to comply with Section 8, Rule 136 of the Rules
of Court wherein he is mandated to keep a general docket, each page of which shall be numbered
and prepared for receiving all the entries in a single case, and shall enter therein all cases,
numbered consecutively in the order in which they were received, and, under the heading of each
case and a complete title thereof, the date of each paper filed or issued, of each order or judgment
entered, and of each other step taken in the case so that by reference to a single page the history of
the case may be seen.
With these infractions, Mr. Teves shall be liable for simple neglect of duty.
Non-promulgation of Judgment
The alleged practice of Branch 4, Cebu City of not promulgating judgments in criminal cases was not
substantiated except for the Datan case wherein Mr. Teves, instead of scheduling the case for
promulgation, just gave the accused a copy of the unpromulgated decision at the time when
Judge Tormis was serving her suspension. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states that:
Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment. – The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of

the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a
light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.
When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the
clerk of court x x x.
Clearly, as found by the OCA, Mr. Teves is guilty of simple neglect of duty. It is his duty to calendar
1âw phi 1
the case for promulgation in accordance with the Rules of Court. He did not only fail to do so.
Rather, he, in fact, served copies of the decision to the accused without the judgment having been
promulgated first and at the time when the judge who rendered the decision was serving her
suspension. This negligence on the part of Mr. Teves, does not, however, wholly exempt Judge
Tormis from administrative liability even if the same took place at the time when she was prohibited
access to her court. The Court cannot fathom how she failed to find out Mr. Teves’ negligence.
When she resumed her position, it was incumbent upon her to check the status of the cases she left
prior to her suspension. A judge cannot simply take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of her court personnel, for the latter are not the guardians of the former’s
responsibility.33
Unless the reins of control and supervision over the administrative aspect of the adjudicatory
process are tightened, the swift and efficient delivery of justice will be impeded and rendered
illusory.34
Issuing a Warrant of Arrest Without

Apprising the Accused of the Charge
Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure,35 the general rule is that the court
shall not order the arrest of the accused unless he fails to appear whenever required.36 In this case,
Judge Tormis claimed that the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused in the Librando
case was justified because of the accused’s failure to appear during her arraignment despite notice.
However, as clearly found by the OCA, Judge Tormis’ order requiring the accused to appear and
submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses within ten days from receipt of the order was
not yet served upon the accused when she issued the warrant. In doing so, Judge Tormis issued the
warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on Summary Procedure that the accused should first be
notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and other
countervailing evidence.37
As held in Tan v. Casuga-Tabin:38
While judges may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or
decision they render, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent, abusive and arbitrary in
their prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by law, there will not only be
confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of
due process. While there appears to be no malicious intent on the part of respondent, such lack of
intent, however, cannot completely free her from liability. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge
owes it to her office to know and simply apply it.39
The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November 15, 1991. It finds
application in a substantial number of civil and criminal cases. Judge Tormis cannot claim to be
unfamiliar with the same. Every judge is required to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently
basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; and anything less than that would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of
it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.40
Proper Penalty
on Judge Tormis
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11,
2001, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, and gross inefficiency are
categorized as less serious charges with the following sanctions: (a) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than
₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.41
Moreover, gross ignorance of the law is classified as serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of
the Revised Rules of Court, and penalized under Section 11 (a), Rule 140 of the same Rules by: (1)
Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall, in no case, include
accrued leave credits; (2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding
₱40,000.00.
In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Tormis’ work history which
reflects how she performed her judicial functions.42 We find that there are several administrative
cases already filed against her, most of the cases have been decided against her, the others have
been dismissed and some are still pending in Court. These cases show her inability to properly
discharge her judicial duties.43 Her suspensions had in fact been used by her as a defense in her
failure to resolve and decide cases and incidents pending in her court.
In Judge Navarro v. Judge Tormis,44 Judge Tormis was found guilty of improper conduct for trying to
influence the course of litigation in
Criminal case No. 99796-12 pending with another court and was thus reprimanded for the same with
a warning that a repetition thereof shall be dealt with more severely. She was, likewise, admonished
for conduct unbecoming of a judge.
In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu,45 Judge Tormis
was found guilty of gross violation of Section 17, Rule 114 for having approved the bail posted by the
accused in Criminal Cases No. CEB-BRL-783 and 922 pending before RTC Branch 60, Barili, Cebu,
considering that there was no showing of the unavailability of all twenty-two RTC judges in Cebu
City. With this infraction, she was fined in the amount of ₱5,000.00, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.
In Lachica v. Judge Tormis,46 Judge Tormis was found guilty of gross misconduct for (1) having
abused her judicial authority when she personally accepted the cash bail bond of the accused; and
(2) for deliberately making untruthful statements in her comment and during the investigation of the
instant administrative case with intent to mislead the Court. Here, it was established that the
accused was released from confinement after Judge Tormis called the police station informing the
officer of the receipt of the cash bail bond but without the issuance of the Release Order. In
determining the proper penalty, the Court took into account Judge Tormis’ past infractions and
concluded that she was not reformed despite being chastised thrice. She was thus suspended from
office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits, and sternly warned that a repetition of the
same and similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. On motion of Judge Tormis, the
Court47 ordered a reinvestigation of the case and to allow her to present additional evidence. Said
order was later clarified in a Resolution dated July 12, 2006 wherein she was directed to resume
office immediately upon receipt of the resolution and directed the Financial Management Office of
the OCA to immediately release all the salaries and benefits which were withheld from her. However,
after reinvestigation, on August 13, 2008, she was severely reprimanded for the unauthorized receipt
of cash bond and keeping the same in her house.
In Antonina Y. Luib v. Hon. Rosabella Tormis,48 Judge Tormis was admonished and reminded to be
more circumspect in granting postponements.
In Visbal v. Tormis,49 Judge Tormis was found liable for gross misconduct for her repeated defiance
of the Court’s Order to furnish complainant (in another administrative case) of her comment and/or to
submit to the Court proof of such service. She was thus suspended for six (6) months without salary,
with a stern warning that another repetition of a similar act will be dealt with most severely. In
imposing the penalty, the Court took into consideration eight other administrative cases filed against
her.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judges Anatalio S. Necesario, Br. 2, et al.,50 Judge Tormis was
one of the judges investigated, relative to the irregularities in the solemnization of marriages. For
this, she was preventively suspended. Although the same was lifted in a Resolution dated December
11, 2007, she was prohibited from solemnizing marriages until further orders from the Court.
The Court also notes that although dismissed by the Court, Judge Tormis was involved in four other
administrative cases. At present, there are still two pending cases against her. Judge Tormis’
conduct as a repeat offender exhibits her unworthiness to don the judicial robes and merits a
sanction heavier than what is provided by our rules and jurisprudence.51
Considering her past infractions and taking into account the number of irregularities she committed
in this present case and as held by the Court in Inoturan v. Limsiaco, Jr.,52 Judge Tormis should be
dismissed from the service.
On Mr. Teves
As discussed above, Mr. Teves is here guilty of two counts of simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect
of duty is defined as the "failure of an employee to give one's attention to a task expected of him,
and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.53 Under the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave
offense penalized with suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense, and
dismissal for the second.54
In the determination of the proper penalty, we look into Mr. Teves’ past administrative cases. In
Ramos v. Teves,55Mr. Teves was charged with arrogance and discourtesy in refusing to receive a
motion that allegedly does not conform with the requirements of the Rules of Court. In deciding the
case against Mr. Teves, the Court pointed out that clerks of court have no authority to pass upon the
substantive or formal correctness of pleadings and motions that parties file with the court. Thus, in
refusing to receive the motion filed by complainant, the Court found Mr. Teves discourteous, and in
view of his past administrative cases, he was meted the penalty of a thirty-day suspension, with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. In the same
case, the Court noted Mr. Teves’ past infractions:
The record shows that Teves had previously been administratively charged with grave abuse of
authority and gross discourtesy in OCA-IPI 08-2981-P. Although the Court dismissed the charge for
lack of merit on November 18, 2009, it reminded him to be more circumspect in dealing with litigants
and their counsel.
In two consolidated administrative cases, one for grave misconduct and immorality and the other for
insubordination, the Court meted out on Teves the penalty of suspension for six months in its
resolution of October 5, 2011. x x x.56
Obviously, with his past infractions and having been warned that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely, Mr. Teves has not reformed. It seems that he has remained
undeterred in disregarding the law and he appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and
warnings he received.57 Mr. Teves’ repeated infractions seriously compromise efficiency and hamper
public service58 which the Court can no longer tolerate. Thus, the penalty of dismissal from the
service is proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find respondent Judge Rosabella M. Tormis GUILTY of

Gross Inefficiency, Violation of Supreme Court Rules, Directives and Circulars and Gross Ignorance
of the Law. She is ordered DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges,
except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality
of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves is likewise found GUILTY of two counts of Simple Neglect of Duty, and in
view of his past infractions, he is meted the supreme penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
11.
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 March 6, 2013

(Formerly: A.M. No. 11-8-152-RTC Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 49, Tagbilaran City, Bohol)
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR COURT

vs.
JUDGE FERNANDO G. FUENTES III Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Tagbilaran City
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318

(Formerly: OCA IPI No. 11-3755-RTJ)
PAULINO BUTAL, SR. Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE FERNANDO G. FUENTES III Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Tagbilaran
City, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
On 13 June 2011, a judicial audit was conducted at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 49,
Tagbilaran City, Bohol, presided over by Judge (}.) Fernando G. Fuentes III (Judge Fuentes III).
The judicial audit report1 of the team from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) revealed that
as of 13 June 2011, the aforementioned court had 272 (138 criminal and 134 civil) pending cases in
its docket. Of these cases, 83 (24 criminal and 59 civil) were deemed submitted for decision. The
report also revealed that of the cases submitted for decision, 70 were already beyond the
reglementary period to decide, with some cases submitted for decision as far back as 2003. Further,
31 of these 70 cases were appealed from the first level courts, with two criminal cases involving
detention prisoners.
On 22 August 2011, the Court resolved, among others, to direct Presiding Judge Fuentes III, to:
a) CEASE and DESIST from hearing cases in his court and devote his time in deciding
cases and resolving pending incidents/motions listed in matrices I and II of this Report, giving
priority to Criminal Case Nos. 14116 (PP v. Sarabia) and 14299 (PP v. Formentera, Jr.)
which involved detention prisoners, to continue until the above shall have all been finally
disposed of, and to furnish the Court, through the OCA, copies of such decisions/orders
related thereto; and that his salaries, allowances and other benefits be ordered WITHHELD
pending full compliance with this directive;
b) RESOLVE the twenty-seven (27) pending incidents/motions in matrix number III; and
c) EXPLAIN in writing, within fifteen (15) days from notice, why no administrative sanction
should be taken against him for his failure to decide/resolve the 83 cases enumerated in
Nos. I and II and the 27 cases with pending motions enumerated in No. III;
x x x x2
In the same resolution, the Court designated Presiding Judge Suceso A. Arcamo, RTC, Branch 47,
Tagbilaran City as assisting judge of RTC, Branch 49, same station, specifically to conduct hearings
on all cases and attend to all interlocutory matters pending thereat. Such designation shall continue
until full compliance by Judge Fuentes III of what he has been directed to do.3
Atty. Fara Ricarda Paras-Matuod (Atty. Paras-Matuod), Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 49,
Tagbilaran City was also directed to apprise the judge concerned of the three cases where no further
action was taken and to take appropriate action and/or include in the court calendar 64 cases with
no further proceedings/resettings.
In his letter dated 7 October 2011, Judge Fuentes III explained that he is offering no justification for
the adverse findings of the audit team. He alleged that the cases submitted for decision have always
been reflected in the monthly reports of cases he is submitting to the Court. He averred that he is not
a resident of Bohol but of Ozamis City. Thus, he had to go home from time to time upon proper leave
to visit his family which process has affected his health and has greatly hampered his case
disposition.
He considered the opportunity accorded to him by the Court to resolve his backlog of cases as a
breath of life to his function as a judge. He expressed his sincerest gratitude with a commitment to
comply with what the resolution mandates him to do.4
On 13 March 2012, Judge Fuentes III partially complied by submitting copies of his decisions/orders
in 39 civil and 21 criminal cases mentioned in paragraph (a) of the resolution. He requested for an
extension of time or until 16 April 2012 to fully comply with the directives of the Court.
In a resolution dated 11 April 2012, the Court noted the partial compliance of Judge Fuentes III and
granted his prayer for extension of time to submit his full compliance.
On 9 July 2012, Judge Fuentes III submitted anew copies of his decisions in 23 civil and five criminal
cases. He likewise submitted 20 orders relative to the cases included in paragraphs (a) and (b) of
the resolution.
In a letter dated 16 July 2012, Judge Fuentes III made another request for extension of time from the
given 16 April 2012 deadline to fully comply with the directive to submit copies of the remaining
decisions and resolutions. He explained that his failure to decide the cases within the extended
period was for the reason that his youngest son, Michael Philip Fuentes, an autistic child, became
sick and had to be hospitalized for almost the whole month of March in Ozamis City. He, thereafter,
had to go on leave for several days in March and June 2012 to bring his son to Manila for further
treatment.
For her part, Atty. Paras-Matuod submitted copies of: (1) her letter to Judge Fuentes III
apprising/informing him of the cases which have no further action; and (2) the notice of hearings of
cases with no further proceedings/settings, in compliance with paragraphs 3(a) and (b) of the 22
August 2011 resolution.
The OCA reported that since Atty. Paras-Matuod has fully complied with what was required from her,
as stated in the 22 August 2011 resolution, the matter, insofar as she is concerned, may now be
considered closed and terminated.
Meanwhile, on 21 September 2011, the OCA received a verified complaint from Paulino Butal, Sr.
(complainant), charging Judge Fuentes III with delay in rendering a decision in Civil Case No. 7028,
entitled "Spouses Paulino Pombo Butal, Jr., et al. v. China Road and Bridge Corporation, et al." for
damages and attorney’s fees.
Complainant alleged that he is one of the plaintiffs in the aforesaid civil case pending before RTC,
Branch 49, Tagbilaran City. He claimed that the trial of the case was terminated on 28 January 2008
and the parties were given 30 days within which to submit their respective memorandum.
Complainant filed his memorandum on 29 February 2008 while defendants submitted their
respective memoranda on 28 February 2008 and 6 March 2008.
On 27 August 2009, the plaintiffs filed a Manifestation and Motion to Render Decision alleging
therein that it had been 17 months since the case was submitted for decision. They prayed that
judgment be rendered by the court.5
In his comment6 dated 28 October 2011, Judge Fuentes III admitted that there was delay in
rendering judgment in Civil Case No. 7028. He, however, alleged that the subject case was among
the cases submitted for decision stated in the resolution dated 22 August 2011 in A.M. No. 11-8-152-
RTC. He attached to his comment a copy of the 20 October 2011 decision he rendered in Civil Case
No. 7028.
In the resolution dated 23 April 2012,7 the Court adopted and approved the findings of fact and
recommendations of the OCA and accordingly OCA IPI No. 11-3755-RTJ was re-docketed as A.M.
No. RTJ-12-2318 and consolidated with A.M. No. 11-8-152-RTC.
In its report8 dated 19 November 2012, the OCA recommended that Judge Fuentes III be: a) found
guilty of gross inefficiency for his failure to decide 70 cases within the reglementary period, which
includes Civil Case No. 7028 subject of A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318, and resolve 27 incidents submitted
for resolution; b) fined in the amount of ₱50,000.00 to be deducted from his salaries; and c) sternly
warned that the commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. The OCA stated
that:
x x x The duty of a judge is not only confined to hearing and trying cases. It is equally important to
decide the same within the period mandated by law. Judge Fuentes III who, at the time of the judicial
audit, is the Executive Judge, should have been the role model of a diligent, efficient, and
hardworking judge. But on the contrary, he was the opposite thereof. If for some reason he could not
dispose of cases within the reglementary period, all he had to do was to ask for a reasonable
extension of time. x x x9
Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90 days
from submission for decision or resolution. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon
6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all
judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. The mandate to promptly dispose
of cases or matters also applies to motions or interlocutory matters or incidents pending before the
magistrate. Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms
of judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants the imposition of an administrative
sanction against the defaulting magistrate.10
Judge Fuentes III concedes that there is no valid justification for the delay in resolving the cases
pending in his court. Indeed, his frequent travels to his residence in Ozamis City, which led to travel
fatigue and poor health, will not absolve him from liability. We have always reminded judges that the
Court is not unmindful of the circumstances that may delay the disposition of the cases assigned to
them. Thus, the Court remains sympathetic to seasonably filed requests for extension of time to
decide cases. Unfortunately, no such requests were made by Judge Fuentes III until the judicial
audit was conducted by the OCA and a directive was issued to him by the Court.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana,11 the Court held that a judge cannot choose his
deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension granted by the Court, the
failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that
merits administrative sanction. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or
matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension. 1âwphi 1
An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross
inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions such as suspension from office
without pay or fine12 on the defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly
on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other factors, such as the
presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the damage suffered by the parties as a result
of the delay, the health and age of the judge, and other analogous circumstances. 1âwphi 1
In the instant administrative matters, we deem the reduction of the fine proper considering that this is
the first infraction of Judge Fuentes III in his more than 15 years in the service. We also take into
consideration the fact that Judge Fuentes III exerted earnest effort to fully comply with the directives
of the Court as contained in the resolution.
With regard to his delay in rendering judgment in Civil Case No. 7028, we deem the same included
in the penalty to be imposed in A.M No. RTJ-12-2318. Otherwise, we will be penalizing Judge
Fuentes III twice for the same offense or omission.
In conclusion, we exhort all judges to perform their judicial duties with reasonable promptness
because the honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by the fairness and
correctness of the decisions rendered, but also by the expediency with which disputes are
resolved.13
WHEREFORE, we resolve to RE-DOCKET A.M. No. 11-8-152-RTC as a regular administrative

matter against Judge Fernando G. Fuentes III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Tagbilaran City,
Bohol for gross inefficiency and impose upon him a FINE in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(₱40,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely. The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to
release to Judge Fuentes III the salaries, allowances and other benefits that were withheld from him,
after deducting the fine hereby imposed. The matter with respect to Atty. Fara Ricarda Paras-
Matuod, branch clerk of court, same court, is considered CLOSED and TERMINATED.
The designation of Judge Suceso A. Arcamo, RTC, Branch 47, Tagbilaran City, Bohol as assisting
judge of RTC, Branch 49, same station, is hereby REVOKED.
SO ORDERED.
12.
EN BANC
[A.M. No. RTJ-02-1708. July 23, 2002]
CYNTHIA RESNGIT-MARQUEZ, SHIELAH J. RAMOS, ROSALINDA L.

ROQUILLAS and VICKY F. RAMOS, complainants, vs. JUDGE
VICTOR T. LLAMAS, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, San
Carlos City, Pangasinan, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
A magistrate has to live by the example of his precepts. He cannot judge the
conduct of others when his own needs judgment. It should not be do as I say and not
what I do. For then the court over which he is called to preside will be a mockery, one
devoid of respect.[1]
We are called upon to reiterate this dictum in the administrative matter before us.
In an affidavit-complaint[2] dated March 27, 1998, complainants court employees
Cynthia Resngit-Marquez, Shielah J. Ramos, Rosalinda L. Roquillas and Vicky F.
Ramos charged respondent Victor T. Llamas, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 56, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, with immorality and gross misconduct.
They alleged that respondent judge, though married, maintains an illicit relationship with
a married woman, Lourdes Muoz-Garcia, and both are living together as husband and
wife under one roof; that the court sala of respondent Judge, as well as the office of his
personnel, have been utilized as dancing halls and drinking wine rooms on office hours;
that respondent Judge is drunk almost everyday; that respondent Judge is living a
highly immoral and disgraceful life, and this is of open and public knowledge, and his
mistress fondly calls him Daddy, thereby trumpeting their affair in open view; that the
complainant have been subjected to the intimidation and harassment by respondent
Judge.
In his Answer[3], dated July 30, 1998, respondent Judge emphatically denied the
accusations against him.
In a Resolution dated June 16, 1999, the affidavit-complaint was referred to
Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report
and recommendation.
Justice Brawner, after conducting the necessary investigation, submitted his Report
and Recommendation dated September 14, 2001. Lengthy hearings were conducted on
the case. Complainants Cynthia Resngit Marquez and Shielah J. Ramos and their
witnesses Angelito Dixon Dispo, Engr. Librado C. Moises, Manuel Marquez, Atty.
Leopoldo C. Tulagan, Sr., Atty. Omega Lacandola Moises and Mario Resultan testified
in support of the complaint. On the other hand, respondent Judge himself testified as
well as Lourdes Garcia, Angelica Muoz, Joseph Muoz, Gaudencio Sabangan, Benigno
Abalos, Jr., Dolores Daligdig, Maura Doctolera, Andrew Mapanao and Rica Cabaccan.
We reproduce the following findings of fact and conclusions of the Investigating
Justice:
Complainant Cynthia Resngit-Marquez is the Court Interpreter of the

Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57 until she
requested for a transfer sometime in 1994. The presiding judge of Branch 56
at the time she was the Interpreter was respondent Judge. During that time,
respondent Judge already had a drinking habit that started sometime in 1991.
In February 1997, after his assignment in Dagupan City respondent Judge

went back to San Carlos City. In March 1997, she saw respondent Judge
again resume his drinking habits and he was always seen with a glass of wine
in his hands roaming the Justice Hall premises even during office hours. He
usually drank with lawyers and litigants and he would force his staff to drink
with them. Should his staff refuse to join him, he would harass them. He loved
drinking Carlsberg beer as he claims that it made him feel his young urges
again.
When complainants husband was in Saudi Arabia, respondent Judge would

insinuate that it was better for her to have an old car she could use everyday
rather than a new car that she could not use. Aside from the drinking,
respondent Judge would also engage in singing and dancing in the courtroom
even during office hours. The complainant identified the pictures (Exhibits D,
E, F and G) showing the recreation area behind the Justice Hall and the
corridor leading to the courtroom where respondent Judge conducted his
drinking sessions.
After respondent Judges return to San Carlos City, complainant saw Lourdes
Muoz Garcia almost everyday, as respondent Judge would drop her at her
place of work at City Hall every morning. Lourdes Muoz Garcia would usually
appear again every lunchtime to join respondent Judge and would come back
again in the afternoon after office hours and they would leave walking side by
side with their arms sometimes touching each other. During the occasions that
Lourdes Muoz Garcia was in the office of respondent Judge, she would
address him as Daddy or Masiken (Pangasinense for old man).
All the time that respondent Judge had been assigned in San Carlos City, he
resided near the cemetery in Karaengan, San Carlos City then near the
school in Bulingit, San Carlos City and after his stint in Dagupan City, he
stayed at Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan. In all these places, respondent
Judge lived with Lourdes Muoz Garcia.
During her cross-examination, she admitted that a previous case was filed
against respondent Judge charging him for the same offenses as this present
case. Although she states that she had nothing to do with the case it appears
that the Motion to Dismiss said case (Exhibit 14) was signed by her and her
father, which motion paved the way for the dismissal of Administrative Matter
No. 95-3-88 (Exhibit 15).
Angelito Dixon Dispo is employed as Clerk III in the Office of the Clerk of the
Regional Trial Court in San Carlos City, Pangasinan since October 3, 1993.
Almost everyday, part of his duties included buying liquor for respondent
Judge at the nearby grocery that the judge and some lawyers partook of in the
courtroom. Aside from his drinking, there was singing with the use of the sing-
along machine in the courtroom of RTC Branch 56 where the respondent
Judge was presiding. Some private practitioners and prosecutors would join in
the merrymaking that happened as often as thrice a week in the courtroom of
respondent Judge. During these times, the noise emanating from his
courtroom could be heard downstairs.
At that time, respondent Judge was residing at Barangay Kariinan, San Carlos
City. There was a time that the house of respondent Judge was flooded and
Angelito Dispo was ordered to go there to pile sandbags. At respondent
Judges residence, he came upon Lourdes Muoz Garcia attired in shorts and
undershirt (sando) supervising the piling of sandbags.
On December 1, 1994, he was again at the house of respondent Judge

butchering a goat in preparation for the birthday celebration of Lourdes Muoz
Garcia the following day. That afternoon, while he was washing the dishes,
respondent Judge and Lourdes Muoz Garcia were embracing and kissing
each other on the lips.
It was March 28, 1995 or a day before respondent Judges birthday party that
found Angelito Dispo again at his (Judge) residence where he was helping in
the preparations for the birthday celebration. Again, Lourdes Muoz Garcia was
present and again she was attired in her shorts and undershirt without
anything beneath her shirt. He noticed that the respondent Judge and this
woman were very sweet with one another.
He would always see Lourdes Muoz Garcia in the office of respondent Judge
at RTC Branch 56 almost four times every week and they would intimately
refer to each other as Daddy and Mommy.
At the time he testified in this investigation on September 14, 1999, Angelito

Dispo stated that respondent Judge lives in Barangay Gabon, Calasiao,
Pangasinan with Lourdes Muoz Garcia and the latters daughter.
On September 3, 1999, respondent Judge went to Angelito Dispos house and

told him not to testify against him (Judge) in this case. Angelito had this
incident recorded in the police blotter (Exhibit B).
Engr. Librado C. Moises took up the tale and testified that sometime in
December 1997, he went to the house of respondent Judge in Gabon,
Calasiao, Pangasinan to attend a party held there in honor of some sisters of
respondent Judge who had just arrived from the United States. He was with
some court personnel as Clerk of Court Atty. Omega Lacandola Moises is his
wife. At the party, it was Lourdes Muoz Garcia, attired in a housedress, who
was attending to their needs and serving as hostess for respondent Judge.
When they left, Lourdes Muoz Garcia stayed behind.
Manuel Marquez testified that while he was in the employ of the Central
Pangasinan Electric Company from 1995 to 1998, he would often visit his
wife, complainant Cynthia Marquez, in the court where she was working and
he would see respondent Judge singing and dancing with some of his female
staff as early as 3:00 or 4:00 oclock in the afternoon for as many as 4 times a
month. Pointing to the picture marked Exhibit A and Exhibit 1, he described
that the benches were moved towards the table of the Presiding Judge in the
courtroom thus creating more space for their dancing.
As stenographer of RTC Branch 57 in San Carlos City, complainant Shielah

Ramos stated that she has known respondent Judge since 1989 when she
first entered the courts employ. Since 1996 she has seen respondent Judge
and Lourdes Muoz Garcia together both in the old building housing the
courtrooms as well as in the new Justice Hall. She would see them eat their
meals together at lunchtime and go home together after office hours. During
the singing and dancing sessions conducted by respondent Judge in the
courtrooms almost everyday and during special occasions, Lourdes Garcia
would always be with respondent Judge.
Sometime in January 1998, she saw them together at respondent Judges

rented house in Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Respondent Judge was with
his dog while Lourdes Garcia was dusting his car. Confronted with pictures of
the rented house, the two cars and the dog (Exhibits 3-A to 3-C), Shielah
Ramos pointed to the new car as the one being dusted by Lourdes Garcia
when she happened to pass by.
Atty. Leopoldo C. Tulagan, Sr. took the witness stand and manifested that
as law practitioner with an office in San Carlos City, he knows respondent
Judge ever since he came to preside over RTC Branch 56. Sometime in 1995,
there was what he called a happy hour every Thursday in the courtroom of
respondent Judge. Proceedings would be suspended and all lawyers then
appearing would be invited to a drinking spree right in the courtroom. The
lawyers would contribute to buy wine and finger food. There would be singing
with even the court personnel participating. This practice stopped when
respondent Judge was transferred to Dagupan City. However, when he
returned to San Carlos City in 1997, the drinking and singing sessions
resumed. This time there was even dancing and these all happened
sometimes once or twice a week.
On one birthday occasion of respondent Judge, a Vice-Governor Llamas of

Tarlac was present. Two ladies were requested to give a number and they
were both introduced as Mrs. Llamas and Mrs. Llamas, one of them was the
lady companion of Vice-Governor Llamas and the other was Lourdes Garcia.
When respondent Judge went back to San Carlos City in 1997, Atty. Tulagan
often saw Lourdes Garcia going to his courtroom for as many as five or six
times a week. Further, on several occasions, he saw them together in
respondent Judges car as the Judge would bring her to City Hall where she
was employed and fetch her again in the afternoon.
In an earlier case filed by Atty. Antonio Resngit and complainant Cynthia

Marquez, Atty. Tulagan executed an affidavit (Exhibit C) before the National
Bureau of Investigation supporting the allegations of the complainants.
Atty. Omega Lacandola Moises, another witness for the complainants

testified that sometime in November 1993, Lourdes Muoz Garcia fetched her
and together they went to respondent Judges house in Karaenan, San Carlos
City. Again, during an office day in May 1994, she went to respondent Judges
rented house as there was a celebration of some sort and that was where she
had lunch. Respondent Judge had just arrived from the United States and
Lourdes Muoz Garcia who was also there gave her pasalubong.
On December 2, 1994, she again went to respondent Judges house and had
lunch there, as it was the birthday celebration of Lourdes Muoz Garcia.
Present during the occasion were the relatives of Lourdes Garcia as well as
her officemates and wife of former San Carlos City Mayor Douglas Soriano.
Sometime in June 1997, she, her husband and her brother went to
respondent Judges house in Gabon, Calasiao as the latter had just arrived
from another trip to the United States and Lourdes Muoz Garcia was again at
the house.
In December 1997, she was invited to respondent Judges house, as it was the
birthday celebration of Lourdes Muoz Garcia as well as a welcome for
respondent Judges brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces who had just
arrived from the United States for a visit. As they arrived early, Lourdes Muoz
Garcia was still in her housedress but she eventually changed into something
suitable for the occasion. Pictures (Exhibits N and O also Exhibits 18 and 19)
of the persons present at the occasion were presented to her and she
identified them.
Another birthday party for Lourdes Muoz Garcia took place in an apartment
rented by respondent Judge and Lourdes Garcia in Bonoan, Dagupan City.
Atty. Moises together with Atty. Geraldine Baniqued and Geraldines husband
were in attendance but as it was a workday, they only stayed long enough to
finish their lunch.
On the occasion of respondent Judges birthday on March 29, Lourdes Muoz

Garcia fetched her at lunchtime and brought her to that same rented
apartment in Bonoan. She soon left after lunch but she went back alone,
Lourdes remaining behind to attend to the guests of respondent Judge.
Mario Resultan testified that as sheriff of RTC Branch 56 at San Carlos City
presided by respondent Judge, he is aware and knows that Judge Llamas and
Lourdes Garcia have been living together as husband and wife since 1990 up
to the present. They first stayed at Valerio Hall, Mabini Street then they
transferred to Balingit Street, followed by Kareanan Street, all in San Carlos
City. They also stayed together in Calasiao, Pangasinan and Dagupan City.
In all these places of residence, Mario Resultan was usually invited by

respondent Judge and they would drink and sing. During these sessions,
Lourdes Garcia would always attend to their needs, sometimes in her street
clothes but oftentimes in her house clothes.
On February 19, 1994, Mario Resultan went along with respondent Judge to
Manila to confirm his flight as Judge Llamas was leaving for the United States
the following day. With them on this trip were Lourdes Garcia and respondent
Judges sister, Evelyn Llamas. They spent the night in the house of the brother
of respondent Judges sister-in-law. He slept in the living room while
respondent Judge and Lourdes Garcia shared one room.
As he would be out of the country, respondent Judge executed a Special

Power of Attorney in favor of Mario Resultan authorizing him to receive all his
checks covering his salaries and allowances, encashing these and delivering
the money to Lourdes Garcia. He did what was asked of him and each time
he would deliver the money to Lourdes Garcia, he would indicate the dates
and the amounts in his diary (Exhibit P).
Against all these evidence, respondent Judge denies the charge.
Judge Llamas claims that complainant Cynthia Resngit Marquez has an ax to

grind against him for objecting to her application as Legal Researcher of his
court, RTC Branch 56, and instead endorsing Aldrin Lee who was eventually
appointed to the position. Because he did not accede to her request,
complainant and his father filed several charges against him ranging from
immorality to harassment of court employees to high-handedness and
arrogance. However, these cases were eventually dismissed by the Supreme
Court (Exhibit 15) on motion of complainant Cynthia Marquez and her father,
Atty. Antonio Resngit (Exhibit 14). But the trouble between respondent Judge
and complainant did not stop there as could be seen in several cases filed by
complainant against him before the Office of the Ombudsman. These cases
were again dismissed (Exhibit 20-A). He therefore considers this present
charge as another form of harassment employed by complainant in her avid
desire to oust him from his present position.
Further, he denies ever drinking and dancing in his courtroom as he claims

there are several restaurants outside the office equipped with the necessary
facilities for his pleasure. Besides if ever he drinks with a visitor, it was part of
his hospitable nature and it was always done after office hours.
As to the charge of immorality, he emphatically denied that he has an

amorous relationship with Lourdes Garcia. He is a married man and his family
lives in Dagupan City. However, he is estranged from his wife due to
irreconcilable differences in the rearing of their children. This does not mean
however that he maintains an illicit relationship with Lourdes Garcia. He does
admit that he knows the woman as she is an employee at the City Legal
Office and it is her responsibility to look into the status of cases filed by San
Carlos City pending in the courts.
Respondent Judge claims that all the testimonies of the complainants and
their witnesses in so far as they saw him and Lourdes Garcia always together
on several occasions, either walking side by side or riding in his car together
or him dropping and fetching her at her place of work are all impossible and
figments of their fertile imagination. They did not live together in all the places
mentioned and definitely he would not be celebrating Lourdes Garcias
birthdays for her in his own residence. If ever he was seen in the company of
the woman, it was on social occasions when they would either be guests or
she was a guest at a party he tenders.
His emphatic denial is supported by his witnesses, Lourdes Garcia, Angelica

Muoz, Joseph Muoz, Gaudencio Sabangan, Benigno Abalos, Jr., Dolores
Daligdig, Maura Doctolera, Andrew Mapanao and Rica Cabaccan.
Lourdes Garcia states that she first knew respondent Judge when she was
detailed at the City Prosecutors Office and it was her responsibility to get the
court calendars for the guidance of the Court Prosecutors.
It was Gaudencio Sabangan who introduced respondent Judge to her formally

on November 30, 1990 during the occasion of the birthday of Normida
Sabangan, Lourdess niece and Gaudencio Sabangans granddaughter. They
were both guests at the party and from then on whenever they would see
each other they would engage in casual conversations.
Aside from this, it was respondent Judge who helped her get her permanent
appointment as Administrative Officer in the City Legal Office at San Carlos
City. Respondent Judge being close with then Mayor Soriano, he paved the
way for her being detailed at that office where she was given a permanent
position.
In 1993 respondent Judge asked her whether she could recommend

somebody to do his laundry. She volunteered her mother and thus the
relationship between her family and respondent Judge became closer. When
her mother became sick and could not do the laundry anymore, her younger
sister and brother stayed with respondent Judge and did the household
chores for him in exchange for allowances and tuition fee.
Lourdes Garcia further stated that she is a married woman who has stayed all
her life in Barangay Roxas, San Carlos City except for that year in 1982 when
she went to live in Victoria, Tarlac, her husbands place but when she was
about to give birth, she went back to San Carlos City and has remained there.
She absolutely denies living with respondent Judge and states that the only
time she went to respondent Judges place was when she tagged along with
her superior to attend the party given by the Judge in honor of his nephews
and nieces who arrived from the United States.
As for her presence at the Justice Hall, she admits going there but her visits
are all in connection with her work and since she has a lot of friends there,
she drops on them for a chat before going back to the City Hall where she has
her office.
She states that she was likewise charged with immorality at the Civil Service
Commission in May 1998 but the case was dismissed in April 1999.
Her mother Angelica Muoz confirms her story and states that she did the
laundry of respondent Judge but subsequently turned it over to her younger
daughter. Also, she says that indeed her daughter Lourdes always stayed at
their house and never lived with respondent Judge. She claims that her
daughter is married to a soldier but admits that her son-in-law does not stay
with his family as in fact she has not seen him for a long time now.
Amidst all these conflicting testimonies given by all those who took part in
these very lengthy proceedings, it behooves upon the Investigating Justice to
determine whether or not the complainants have been able to prove their
charges against respondent Judge.
Respondent Judge is charged with Immorality and Gross Misconduct.
According to the complainants and their witnesses, his misconduct consists in
his drinking, singing and dancing with lawyers and court personnel in his
courtroom during office hours almost everyday.
The Investigating Justice believes that indeed respondent Judge used his
court to indulge his drinking, singing and dancing habits to the detriment of the
other courts within the building who were disturbed by all the noise coming
from his courtroom. This conduct unbecoming of a Judge deserves a
reprimand but this administrative misdemeanor may be relegated to the
background in the face of the more serious charge of Immorality.
The complainants and their witnesses all gave positive testimonies of how
respondent Judge flaunted his mistress in the eyes of the public. Bringing and
picking her up from work, dancing and singing with her in public, living with
her in different places, celebrating her birthdays with parties in her honor,
authorizing her to receive his salaries and being seen around with her and
behaving as if they were husband and wife are all manifestations of how
respondent Judge acted towards Lourdes Garcia as seen in the eyes of the
complainants and their witnesses.
What more proof would one need to show an immoral relationship other than
these straightforward statements of the complainants and their witnesses?
Both respondent Judge and Lourdes Garcia admit being married to other
persons but the way they behaved in front of the public is as if they were
married to one another.
Against these positive testimonies is respondent Judges denial. But it is

axiomatic in the law of evidence that positive statements prevail over negative
statements.
A look at the denials of respondent Judge and his witnesses remain denials.
Although they would attempt to explain that the presence of respondent Judge
and Lourdes Garcia together on several occasions were due to circumstances
or plain coincidences, it would appear to the Investigating Justice that these
coincidences are one too many.
In his Memorandum, respondent Judge questions the motives of the

complainants and their witnesses stating that all of them had something
against him and would lie through their teeth just to oust him out of his
position.
Respondent Judge claims that the testimony of Atty. Omega Moises
Lacandola is biased and fraught with exaggerations and distortions. He traces
Atty. Lacandolas prejudice against him to the fact that she was getting back at
him for his act of filing an administrative case against Judge Bienvenido R.
Estrada.
Judge Estrada was her Presiding Judge when she was a Branch Clerk of
Court. Now that Atty. Lacandola is the Clerk of Court, Judge Estrada is the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in San Carlos City.
Respondent Judge claims that as Judge Estrada and Atty. Lacandola have a
very close working relationship, the latter would go to all lengths to destroy
him (respondent Judge) including fabricating stories against him just because
he filed an administrative case against Judge Estrada.
This theory is too far-fetched to be believed. First, the case filed by

respondent Judge against Judge Estrada came after this case had already
been filed. If at all, it appears that respondent Judge in filing the case against
Judge Estrada after this case was filed was the one who was trying to even
the score between him and the latter.
Second, the testimony of Atty. Lacandola does not appear to be improbable or

impossible despite what respondent Judge believes. She testified on what she
saw and observed and she may have been hostile and stubborn at times but
this does not mean that she was making up a story.
As far as the testimony of complainant Cynthia Marquez is concerned,

respondent Judge in his Memorandum claims that it was polluted by hate,
desire for revenge, and for personal gain.
It appears that respondent Judge filed an administrative case against her for
dishonesty and falsification of daily time record in 1994 but he himself had it
dismissed in 1995. Not only that.
Respondent Judge did not indorse Cynthia Marquez for the position of Legal
Researcher of his court and instead recommended somebody else. Her
displeasure at respondent Judges actions and her desire to get back at him
motivated Cynthia Marquez to weave an incredible story against him.
But respondent Judges conclusion seems to be illogical. Since respondent

Judge himself had the case dismissed, why would Cynthia Marquez still be
bent on getting back at him?
In fact, it is respondent Judge himself who got back at Cynthia Marquez by
filing another administrative case against her while this case was being heard.
That case stemmed from the earlier case and this time respondent Judge was
charging Cynthia Marquez with falsification of her personal data sheet and
procuring her appointment as Interpreter under false pretenses.
As far as her non-endorsement is concerned, the Investigating Justice

believes that this is not sufficient ground to doubt the testimony of Cynthia
Marquez. She gave her story replete with details and events that showed the
immoral acts of respondent Judge. If her testimony were contrived, she would
be one great storyteller.
Respondent Judge also states in his Memorandum that the reason why Atty.
Leopoldo C. Tulagan testified against him is because said lawyer wanted his
pound of flesh as he lost several cases in respondent Judges court. This is
incredible. Following this reasoning we will come to the conclusion that all
lawyers who lost their cases before judges would readily testify against them
at the expense of committing perjury. The Supreme Court would be clogged
with administrative cases against judges filed by lawyers who take offense for
the defeat of their cases.
All told, respondent Judge attacks all the testimonies of the complainants and
their witnesses as improbable and motivated by ill will and desire for revenge.
He states that they could not have seen what they claim to have seen
because it was impossible to see through a closed window, the parking
spaces for jeeps was not located at a place where the Justice Hall or the City
Hall could be seen, or that goats are not butchered nor fishes cleaned a day
before cooking.
But if we look closely at what respondent Judge calls impossible stories, these
are minor, even inconsequential details that do not detract from the truth of
what the complainants and their witnesses saw and testified on.
Not contented with accusing complainants and their witnesses as telling

improbable stories, respondent Judge states that all of them were prejudiced
against him as they all had their respective reasons for wanting to get back at
him. This encompassing conclusion is more imagined than real. Respondent
Judge would like to portray that he is the victim of an elaborate plot concocted
by the complainants to get him out of office. But using as defense this
delusion of persecution is not enough to overthrow the persuasive and
convincing evidence mounted against respondent Judge.
Respondent Judge readily concludes the motives of complainants and their
witnesses as suspect. But could not their motives also be the desire to tell the
truth? Much as respondent Judge would like to portray them all as
pathological liars, their lies border more on the truth and appear to be more
convincing than respondent Judges bare-faced denials.
As the Investigating Justice heard this case personally from the beginning to
its conclusion, he has observed the demeanor of all those who swore to tell
the truth and nothing but the whole truth. And while this oath may have
appeared to be meaningless for some, it was clearly noticeable that the
complainants and their witnesses were the ones who valued its meaning and
honored their oath to tell the truth.
From the evidence presented, there can be no denying that indeed

respondent Judge and Lourdes Muoz Garcia are maintaining an illicit
relationship. The details of such relationship are clearly and unequivocally
outlined by the complainants and their witnesses, who have nothing to gain by
pitting themselves against a powerful figure.
Moreover, Lourdes Garcia admitted herself that she owes her present position
to respondent Judge who helped her secure a permanent appointment at the
City Legal Office in San Carlos City. Why would respondent Judge do that for
her if according to both of them they were merely casual acquaintances?
What motive would respondent Judge have in helping her get that position
were it not for the fact that they had an intimate relationship?
Admitting that he is estranged from his wife, respondent Judge himself has
made possible the circumstances that could have led to his present situation.
He may be a judge but he is still a man with the same feelings and urges as
any other man. Lourdes Garcia is a married woman who appears to be also
estranged from her husband as nowhere in her testimony can be seen what
happened to her husband except for the testimony of her own mother who
stated that she never saw her son-in-law for a long time now.
Hence, we have here a man and a woman both living away from their
respective spouses and being thrown together has brought out in them the
fulfillment of their desires not to be alone. True it may be human nature to feel
needed and not be alone but in this case the man happens to be a Judge.
A judge is expected to be above himself, to transcend basic human urges if it

is in conflict with the responsibility he swore to uphold when he took his oath.
xxx xxx xxx
In his Memorandum, respondent Judge states that he has been previously

charged with Immorality by complainant Cynthia Marquez but she herself had
it dismissed. Also, Lourdes Muoz Garcia had already been charged with
immorality before the Civil Service Commission in 1998 but the charges were
dismissed in 1999. Citing the case of Felicisimo San Luis, et. al. vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-80160, June 26, 1989, respondent Judge now claims that
the dismissal of the first case against him operated as a bar to this instant
case because of res judicata and that he would be twice in jeopardy of being
convicted of the same offense.
The case cited by respondent Judge finds no application to his case. The fact
that the previous charges were dismissed against both him and Lourdes
Garcia should not be taken to mean that they have been exonerated entirely.
Immorality is a continuing offense and the first charge should have at least
warned him to mend his ways. But he failed to do so and now that there is
another charge he labels it an act of persecution. Further, the complainants
and their witnesses testified on acts of immorality of respondent Judge from
1991 until this present charge was filed in 1998. Angelito Dispo even went to
the extent of stating that at the time he testified in this case on September 14,
1999, respondent Judge and Lourdes Muoz Garcia were living together under
one roof in Barangay Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Thus, granting that there was a previous charge of immorality in 1994 but was
dismissed in 1995, this dismissal would only operate to absolve him of
immoral acts until 1995. As this case was filed in 1998, it shows that despite
the dismissal in 1995, respondent Judge continued his illicit relations with
Lourdes Muoz Garcia for which he faces this present charge of Immorality.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Judge has shown that he is not worthy to don the robe of justice
much less dispense justice when he himself transgresses the law which he
has sworn to uphold. His blanket denial of the charges has not served to
cause a dent in the positive evidence against him, neither has it portrayed him
an innocent victim of malicious persecution, as he would want the
Investigating Justice to believe.
As the evidence presented definitely shows a lack of circumspection and

delicadeza on the part of the respondent judge in displaying before the public
his immoral relationship, the extreme penalty of dismissal is believed to be in
order.
Immorality is a very serious charge that cannot be penalized by a mere fine or

even suspension, as these light penalties would be tantamount to a tacit
approval of the immoral act.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Judge has failed to live up to these exacting magnitude of how a

judge should behave. His disregard for common decency and morality has
made him unfit to discharge his present position and thus his dismissal is in
order. His retirement benefits should likewise be forfeited but his wife who has
never appeared on the scene should now be his saving grace against such
forfeiture.
Indeed it is the wife of Judge Llamas who is the aggrieved party in the
infidelity of her husband but she was not the one who initiated this complaint
nor did she participate in its prosecution. This factor should be considered in
respondent Judges favor and therefore he should be spared the forfeiture of
his earned benefits. [emphasis supplied]
[4]
Justice Brawner thus recommended that respondent Judge be dismissed from

service but without forfeiture of his earned benefits.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, is required. We find no room to accommodate doubts on Justice Brawners
findings of facts, which we find to be a result of a meticulous and dispassionate analysis
of the testimonies of the complainants and the respondent as well as their respective
witnesses. Thus, we adopt Justice Brawners recommendation of dismissal.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence.[5] He should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, [6] and avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. [7] His personal behavior,
not only while in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be
beyond reproach, for he is, as he so aptly is perceived to be, the visible personification
of law and of justice.[8]
Regrettably, respondent Judge failed to live up to these standards. He brazenly
flouted judicial ethics and betrayed judicial standards by using his court to indulge his
drinking, singing and dancing habits to the detriment of the other courts within the
building who were disturbed by all the noise coming from his courtroom; and, especially,
by maintaining an illicit relationship with Lourdes Muoz Garcia, a married woman. A
judge suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality in public office
when he labors under the delusion that he can be a judge and at the same time have a
mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. [9]
A judge traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has
to pay for occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely
venture.[10] No position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and
uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench. [11] Thus, a judge ought to live up
to the strictest standard of honesty, integrity and uprightness. Certainly, keeping a
mistress is not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected to posses the
highest standard of morality and decency.[12]
Respondent Judge shamelessly mocked the dignity of his office and tainted the
image of the entire judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it at all
time unsullied and worthy of the peoples trust. Respondent Judge has shown himself
unworthy of the judicial robe and the place of honor reserved for the guardian of justice
in a civilized community. On this occasion, therefore, the Court metes upon respondent
Judge the severest of administrative penalties. He is hereby stripped of his judicial robe.
However, we are unable to agree with the reservation of Justice Brawner on the
forfeiture of earned benefits due respondent Judge based on the fact that respondent
Judges wife was not the one who initiated this complaint nor did she participate in its
prosecution. The non-participation or non-appearance of the wife in the administrative
proceedings for immorality is not a factor in the imposition of penalty. Neither should it
be beneficial to respondent Judge.
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross
misconduct and immorality are classified as serious charges, each of which carry with it
a penalty of either (a) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (b)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.
In Carina Agarao vs. Judge Jose J. Parentela, Jr., [13] we dismissed respondent
judge on ground of immorality and we ordered the forfeiture of one-half of all the
retirement benefits of respondent Judge, excluding the monthly equivalent of his
accrued leave credits.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge Victor T. Llamas, Jr. guilty of the charge
of immorality, he is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of 50% of all his
retirement benefits excluding any earned leave credits; and, with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or agency of the government, including government-owned
and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
13.
A.M. OCA-IPI No. 06-2429-RTJ. September 4, 2006]
ATTY. REX G. RICO v. JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 275,
LAS PIÑAS CITY
First Division
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated SEPT. 4, 2006
A.M. OCA-IPI No. 06-2429-RTJ (Atty. Rex G. Rico v. Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 275, Las Piñas City)
Acting on the Report[1] of the Office of the Court Administrator dated July 20, 2006, to wit:
cralaw
1. VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated 16 January 2006 (with Annexes) of Atty. Rex G. Rico charging Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC, Br. 275, Las Piñas City with Gross Ignorance of the Law; Incompetence;
Manifest Bias and Partiality relative to Criminal Case No. 02-0710 entitled, "People of the Philippines vs.
Conrado Jocson, et al." for Kidnapping for Ransom.
Complainant alleges that on 09 December 2003, private complainant, through counsel, filed an Urgent
Motion to Cancel Hearing scheduled on 10 December 2003, because the hanging witness, Jan Arad
Fernandez, the kidnap victim himself, had to take his final examination in his school, AMA Computer College
in Makati City. This fact was made known to the private prosecutor (herein complainant) by Jan Arad's
mother, Daisy Fernandez, on 09 December 2003, hence, the former immediately filed a motion for
postponement on that same day, or a day before the scheduled hearing (December 10, 2003). Despite the
clear and obvious validity of the ground for postponement, the respondent outrightly denied the motion,
solely on the basis of unfounded, nay, irrationalized doubts over the truthfulness of the said ground for
postponement, and despite the fact that no evidence or contrary assertion proving the falsity of the reason
for the postponement was proffered either by respondent Judge himself or counsel for the accused. In his
Order dated 10 December 2003, respondent Judge issued the assailed order the pertinent portion of which
reads:
"The Court really doubts there is a valid reason for the postponement because of this the request for
postponement is DENIED.
The prosecutor is directed to make formal offer of evidence furnishing copy thereof to the defense counsel
who in turn are given ten (10) days to comment. As a consequence, the redirect examination on the witness
Jan Arad Fernandez is hereby stricken off from the record.
Set the reception of the defense evidence on February 25, March 31, May 19, June 15, August 13,
September 8, October 5, 2004 all at 2:00 in the afternoon.
Set the promulgation of the Decision on December 15, 2004 at 2:00 in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open court this 10th day of December 2003 at Las Piñas City." (Emphasis supplied)
The respondent Judge did proffer reason or basis why he doubted the truthfulness of the cause for the
postponement. Worse, he ordered the direct testimony of Jan Arad Fernandez, the kidnap victim, stricken-
off the record. Resultantly, the prosecution's right to further adduce evidence was forfeited in view of the
abusive and dogmatic conduct of the respondent Judge, this despite the fact that the prosecution had other
witnesses to present documentary and object evidence to adduce.
On 10 February 2004, the prosecution filed its Motion for Reconsideration over the respondent's Order
dated 10 December 2003, attaching therein the original copy of the Certification dated 02 February 2004,
issued by Ms. Ma. Dolores Grutas, professor who gave the final examination to Jan Arad Fernandez, attested
by Dr. Dante Silva, Dean, College of Business Administration and Accountancy, AMA Computer College. To
his dismay, the said Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the respondent Judge in his Order dated 30
March 2004, stating that:
"Pursuant to Resolution No. 02-001 by the Las Piñas RTC Judges and conformably with the Covenant signed
by the Representatives of the Criminal Justice System in Las Piñas City on February 18, 2004 and there
being no injunction received from the Supreme Court enjoining the implementation of the Covenant or the
Resolution despite receipt of the copies thereof, the above-captioned case/s is/are hereby declared covered
by the project "EXPRESS COURT: A 180-DAY JUSTICE SYSTEM" designed to dispose, to wit: (1)
ordinary cases within 180 days from their filing; (2) extraordinary cases 360 days from their filing; (3)
exceptional cases within 720 days." (Emphasis provided)
Complainant argues that respondent Judge arrogated unto himself the authority to promulgate rules of
procedure exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court. Based on the above-cited order, the
prosecution, in conformity with the public prosecutor filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) directed against the assailed irregular and oppressive
Orders of the respondent Judge dated 10 December 2003 and 30 March 2004. Thus, on 19 May 2004, the
prosecution also moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the trial court in view of the said petition,
but to no avail. On 25 May 2004, the prosecution once again filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the proceedings in the case handled by the respondent
Judge, but the Court of Appeals in its Order dated 19 July 2004, denied the same.
However, on 08 August 2005, private prosecutor received copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals
granting the prosecution's Petition for Certiorari, finding that respondent Judge acted abusively, oppressively
and with grave abuse of discretion, thus, setting aside his Orders dated 10 December 2003and 30 March
2004. The pertinent portions of the appellate court's decision reads as follows:
"Consequently, in view of the foregoing, we find the public respondent to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed orders in a manner that is capricious, whimsical and arbitrary or despotic in
the exercise of his judgment." (Emphasis ours)
Complainant said that respondent Judge's acts of issuing the said assailed orders should not be
countenanced as it amounted to deprivation of the prosecution's right to adduce evidence. The alleged
Resolution No. 02-001 by the Las Piñas RTC Judges and the supposed covenant signed by the
Representative of the Criminal Justice System in Las Piñas City on 18 February 2004, stated in respondent's
Order dated 30 March 2004, cannot arrogate or bestow unto said bodies, with more reason to respondent
Judge of the authority to promulgate rules of procedure. It should be emphasized that said authority is
vested exclusively by the Constitution only to the Supreme Court and no other court. Therefore, the act of
the respondent Judge in denying the said Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing as well as the denial of the
prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration are clear indications of the latter's blatant disregard of the Rules of
Court which must be acted upon accordingly in order to set a precedent against abusive and whimsical
magistrate like the respondent.
2. COMMENT (with Annexes) dated 28 April 2006 of respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda.
In his comment, respondent Judge vehemently denies the allegations of the complaint. He maintains that
his actuations falls squarely within the reasonable latitude where every magistrate is authorized to do based
on his appreciation of the facts of the case.
Anent the allegation that he acted with abuse and oppression relative to the Order dated 10 December
2003, denying the prosecution's Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing, respondent Judge explained that he did
not oppress the prosecution's right to adduce evidence. The Order he issued may have been too harsh yet,
the same does not outrightly mean oppression or despotism. Complainant harps on the fact that his case
involves a heinous crime, but on the contrary respondent believes that rules are made to apply uniformly for
both big and small cases.
Respondent Judge narrated that the hearing of 10 December 2003 was pre-set in accord with continuous
trial. The said date was for the cross-examination of the prosecution's witness Jan Arad Fernandez after his
direct examination, which is in addition to his testimony given during the application for bail proceedings.
The motion to cancel was filed on 09 December 2003. Records show that no affidavit was attached to the
motion except the private prosecutor's assertion that witness Fernandez could not appear on 10 December
2003 as it allegedly coincided with a school examination. Respondent contended that the fact that
complainant himself did not appear on 10 December 2003 lead him to assume that his motion to cancel
hearing will be granted is to respondent's opinion merely an absurd assumption and which will not sit well in
any court. In the first place, said motion is a litigious one and will require comment or opposition on the
adverse party. Truly, respondent argued, the defense lawyers vigorously objected to the cancellation of the
hearing by contending that the absence of an affidavit violated the Rules of Court as well as the violation of
the three-day notice rule. Not amiss to mention is the fact that the defense was then invoking the right to
speedy trial. Thus, had the private prosecutor appeared, the scheduled date would not have been wasted;
trial could have continued by presenting another witness.
Respondent said that his assailed Order dated 10 December 2003 should be analyzed with utmost dispatch
when he declared that:
"When this case was called this afternoon for cross-examination of prosecution's witness Jan Arad
Fernandez, the same witness failed to appear. There is an Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing filed by private
prosecutor, Atty. Rex G. Rico, seeking cancellation of today's cross-examination of said witness on the
ground that the witness is still a student pursuing a College Degree at AMA Computer College and has a final
examination today, which explains his absence this afternoon. Atty. Luis Paredes, counsel for the accused
Conrado de Guzman Jocson, opposed the motion to cancel and interposed vigorous objection to the
requested postponement on the ground that the Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing failed to comply with the
three-day notice required by the Rules and that the schedule of the Final Examination according to the
semestral schedule of schools will not be in December but sometime in March. That he doubts the reason
given by Atty. Rico especially considering that the motion itself is not verified and there was no document
attached to support the reason given by Atty. Rico. Atty. Paredes informed the Court that such examination
of the witness has been postponed earlier on account of the absence of the witness. Atty. Clarence R. Gaite,
counsel for all the other accused except Jocson, adopted the objections of Atty. Paredes and on the ground
that his clients has been detained for more than a year and the testimony of the complaining witness has
not yet been terminated. Pros. Aurelio H. Castillo asked that the prosecution be given another chance to
present the witness Jan Arad Fernandez as the earlier postponements of the hearing were not directly
attributed to the absence of the witness but some other circumstances. Atty. Paredes informed the Court
that there is no other witness present in the Court to testify for the prosecution contrary to the earlier
situation when all the other police officers were always in Court when this case was called. The record
however, shows that the police officers referred to by Atty. Paredes were not notified for today's hearing
except SPO2 Danilo Noveno.
The question is whether the reason for the postponement is meritorious or not. The Court has no way of
knowing at this time whether the reason given will merit the requested postponement because there is no
document showing that the alleged Final Examination to be taken by the witness. Verification shows that the
Minutes of the proceeding last October 28 does not bear the signature of Jan Arad Fernandez. But, private
prosecutor, Atty. Rex G. Rico signed the same, indicating that he was present on October 28 wherein the
witness Jan Arad Fernandez' cross-examination was scheduled for today. Clearly, Atty. Rico had all the time
from October 28 to inform of his cross-examination today. The filing today by Atty. Rico of the motion to
postpone the cross-examination indeed gave rise to some doubt as to motive thereof. If the reason is truly
the final examination, then Atty. Rico could have prepared other witness even SPO2 Danilo Noveno was
notified of today's hearing.
The Court is inclined to believe Atty. Paredes' submission that Atty. Rico presumed his motion to postpone
will be granted. That is why he is not present in court today. The Court could not allow such frame of mind
to harden into belief that he can make such presumption. x x x (Emphasis provided).
Respondent Judge further argued that a judge could not take judicial notice of either illness or a school
examination, hence, the rule requires affidavits and other supporting papers. Although he believes that his
order may have been too harsh, yet the same cannot in any way be considered oppressive or despotic. On
this aspect, respondent pointed out that contrary to complainant's view, he is of the belief that his actuation
is in accordance with the strict mandate of the requirements under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. In fine,
what the complainant really dislikes is the strictness he manifested when the latter violated the rules.
Anent the expunction of testimony of the prosecution's witness, respondent countered it is but the necessary
consequence thereof considering that there was an incomplete testimony and no cross-examination was
conducted on the part of the prosecution's witness. Likewise, respondent Judge believes that that is a valid
consequence of the Order, thus, the prosecution must rest its case, after its failure or unwillingness to
adduce additional evidence. The absence of other witnesses and further evidence has paved the way for him
to sustain the defense invocation for speedy trial.
It bears stressing that the alleged partiality and bias raised against him by the complainant were
unsubstantiated. Simply put, there was no evidence to prove such allegations of the complainant. At the
outset, respondent submits that in order for administrative liability to attach, complainant must establish
that respondent was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other evil motive. Contrary to what the
complainant contemplates is the fact that no evidence which will merit administrative liability on his part has
been established in the case at hand.
EVALUATION. This case stemmed from the issuance of the assailed Orders dated 10 December
2003and 30 March 2004 by the respondent Judge relative to the aforementioned criminal cases wherein the
latter denied the presentation of the prosecution's witness in the person of the victim himself, Jan Arad
Fernandez. Moreover, complainant assailed the respondent's Order by which the testimony of the said
prosecution witness was stricken-off from the record, arguing that the said Order amounts to oppression and
abuse of authority. Allegations of bias and partiality were likewise pleaded by the complainant. However,
after a careful perusal of the records of the case at hand, it is the considered view of this Office that the
complainant is clearly assailing the alleged errors committed by the respondent Judge in the latter's exercise
of judicial discretion.
Time and again, the Supreme Court in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1581, Re: Peter Sesbreño vs. Judge Gloria B.
Aglugub, February 28, 2005 enunciated that: "In sum, for liability to attach for gross ignorance of the law,
the assailed order, decision, or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be
found to be erroneous but most importantly, it must be established that he was moved by bad faith,
dishonesty or some other like motive." (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Judge's actuations are hardly indicative of bad faith or any motive of the same nature which
characterizes the offense of gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, bias and partiality. The appreciation
of the factual settings of the above-cited criminal case by the respondent Judge is based on the
chronological set-up during the trial on the merits of the said case. The fact is that the respondent Judge's
denial of the Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing dated 10 December 2003 resulting in the expunction of the
prosecution witness' testimony is by its nature neither despotic nor oppressive in the absence of a clear and
convincing proof to the contrary.
It is noteworthy to mention that there was negligence on the part of the movant (herein complainant) when
he filed the motion to postpone a day before the scheduled hearing. He did not even bother to appear on the
scheduled date of hearing, which made the respondent Judge rule to deny the same. Indeed, complainant
had the belief that his Urgent Motion to Cancel Hearing would be granted, but to his dismay, the respondent
Judge did otherwise which prompted him to file this administrative complaint.
Settled in this case is the fact that the respondent Judge strictly applied the provisions of the Rules of Court
pertaining to three-day notice requirement in filing motions and other similarly applicable rules under the
premises. Such being the case, respondent merely exercised his judicial discretion on the basis of the
respective contentions of the parties in the criminal proceedings vis-à-vis the factual antecedents in the said
proceedings which became the subject matter of this administrative complaint. In the same vein, absence of
any evidence to prove that the respondent Judge acted in a malevolent manner relative to the issuance of
the assailed Orders will make him administratively liable.
Moreover, it should be noted that although the Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari filed by
the prosecution, no evidence of bad faith was established against the respondent Judge in relation to the
issuance of the assailed Orders. Therefore, the administrative complaint filed by the complainant is not an
appropriate remedy in order to vindicate their alleged damaged and prejudice. The Court reiterates its
settled ruling that: administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still
available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the issuance of
the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. Complainant could not be allowed
to indirectly secure from this Court a ruling thereon in violation of the principle on hierarchy of courts. (A.M.
No. RTJ-05-1905, Re: Charito L. Planas vs. Judge Ernesto A. Reyes, etc., February 23, 2005).
RECOMMENDATION. Culled from the foregoing discussions, respectfully submitted for the consideration of
the Honorable Court is our recommendation that the instant administrative complaint be DISMISSEDfor
lack of merit and for being judicial in nature.
The Court agrees with the foregoing recommendation.
The filing of an administrative complaint against a judge is not the appropriate remedy where judicial
recourse is still available. Indeed, as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty and corruption,
the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.[2] Moreover, in the absence
cralaw
of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action even.[3] The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
cralaw
prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial.[4] As against the bare
cralaw
allegations of misconduct with no cogent proof thereon, and the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions, the latter shall prevail.[5]
cralaw
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to DISMISS the instant administrative matter against Judge Bonifacio
Sanz Maceda for lack of merit and for being judicial in nature.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL

Clerk of Court
First Division

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1.

ANONYMOUS, Complainant, v. JUDGE BILL D. BUYUCAN, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT,

As gathered from the records, the factual antecedents are as follows:

The OCA 's Report and Recommendation

The OCA recommended thus:

Whether respondent Judge Buyucan is guilty of gross misconduct.

The Court's Ruling

The evidence on record is unequivocal. As summarized in the OCA Memorandum:

January 16, 2018

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, ,

A.M. No. 12-9-188-RTC

RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE PERLA V. CABRERA-FALLER,

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301

1. Improper service of summons

5. No formal offer of exhibits/evidence

6. Non-attachment of the minutes to the records

7. Irregular psychological evaluation reports

1. Improper service of summons

5. No formal offer of exhibits/evidence

few documentary exhibits offered.32

6. Nonattachment of minutes to the records33

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302

2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons

3. Questionable raffling of cases

Of the 65 case records examined, 59 contained an investigation report submitted by Prosecutor

5. Finality of judgment despite non-service of copies of the decisions on the respondents

2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons

2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons In 88 cases, there were indications of

5. In another, the absence of a verification and certification against forum shopping

2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons

In 45 cases, there were indications of questionable jurisdiction or improper service of

RTC Imus 21: Judge Quisumbing and Sheriff De Villa;

RTC Dasmarifias 90: Judge Cabrera-Faller and Process Server Pontejos;

In their comments, respondents explained:

2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons

3. Questionable raffling of cases

2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons

2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons

5. In another, the absence of a verification and certification against forum shopping

6. Finality of judgment despite non-service of copies of the decisions on the respondents

2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons

4. Questionable raffling of cases

A.M. No. 12-9-188-RTC

RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTIGATING JUSTICE

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302

A.M. No. 12-9-188-RTC

Improper Service of Summons

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

(2) Specific Details in the Return

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

(4) A Competent Person in Charge

Lack of Collusion Report

Failure to Serve Copies of the Decisions on Respondents

Questionable Raffling of Cases

LIABILITY AND APPROPRIATE PENALTIES

Judges Felicen, Quisumbing, Mangrobang and Cabrera-Faller

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.333

Clerks of Court Cordez and Marasigan and OIC Suluen

Process Server Azcueta and Social Worker Serilo

4. Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Dasmariñas,

7. Ophelia G. Suluen, Officer-in-Charge and Legal Researcher, Regional Trial Court of