Proceedings of the 2017 25th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering
ICONE25
CONSIDERATIONS ON A VALIDATION MATRIX FOR SYSTEM ANALYSIS CODES
OF PEBBLE BED MODULAR HTRS
Feng GOU, Fubing CHEN, Yujie DONG
Institute of Nuclear and New Energy Technology, Tsinghua University, Collaborative Innovation Center
of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technology, Key Laboratory of Advanced Reactor Engineering and Safety,
Ministry of Education
Beijing, China
ABSTRACT
The modular High Temperature Reactor (HTR)
experienced substantial development over the past two decades
in China. At present, the 10 MWth experimental reactor HTR-
10 is under operation and the 200 MWe demonstration power
plant HTR-PM is in its commissioning phase. Both of the
HTR-10 and the HTR-PM are pebble bed HTRs designed by
the institute of nuclear and new energy technology (INET) of
Tsinghua University.
In the design and analysis of modular HTRs, system
analysis codes play an important role in predicting the reactor
behaviour under both normal operation and accident
conditions. According to China’s nuclear safety regulations,
codes and models employed in the HTR system analysis must
be verified and validated in conformance with a specified
procedure. Thus, a flowchart is recommended in this paper for
the validation of system analysis codes. As the first step of the
flowchart, a phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT)
process has been performed on the subject of the HTR-PM
thermal hydraulics and accident analysis. In this paper, the
PIRT process is introduced and the PIRT results are presented.
With the purpose of developing a validation matrix, test data
have been collected mainly from the operation history and
various tests of the HTR-10. On such basis, some
considerations on developing a validation matrix are discussed
to benefit the code validation work.
1. INTRODUCTION
The modular High Temperature Reactor (HTR) is
characterized by its inherent safety features and passive safety
means. Considered as a safe, efficient, economic and
environment-friendly high temperature energy source for the
industrial cogeneration of electricity and process heat, the
modular HTR experienced substantial development in several
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July 2-6, 2017, Shanghai, China
ICONE25-67492
countries over the past two decades. In China, this advanced
reactor type now has two most representative cases, i.e., the 10
MWth experimental reactor HTR-10 under operation[1] and the
200 MWe demonstration power plant HTR-PM at the
commissioning stage[2], both of which are pebble bed HTRs
designed by the institute of nuclear and new energy technology
(INET) of Tsinghua University.
Regarding the safety-related properties of a modular HTR,
system analysis codes play an important role in predicting the
reactor behaviour under both normal operation and accident
conditions. According to the nuclear safety regulations issued
by China’s National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA),
codes and models employed in the HTR system analysis must
be verified and validated; moreover, calculation uncertainties
must be qualified. Furthermore, NNSA drafted a specific
nuclear safety guide in 2013, which is related to the
development, assessment, application and quality assurance of
computer software used in the safety analysis of nuclear power
plants. Previously, a regulatory guide focusing on the similar
issues was also officially published by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 2005[3]. This regulatory
guide provides principles to the developers of an NPP
evaluation model that may include one or more computer
programs, special models and all other information necessary
for the calculation of a specific event sequence. Meanwhile,
guidance provided to the NRC reviewers was further issued in
2007 as Section 15.0.2 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP)[4].
In addition, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) has established a specific committee to develop
internationally recognized standards for the verification and
validation (V&V) of software used to calculate the thermal–
hydraulic behavior of advanced reactor designs, including
modular HTRs[5]. The methodology recommended in the above
mentioned safety regulations and standards can be summarized
 as follows if it is applied for the validation of existing codes
adopted by modular HTRs:
1) Identification of important phenomena relevant to the
normal operation and accident conditions of modular HTRs.
2) Characterization of phenomena, in terms of a short
description of each phenomenon, its relevance to reactor safety
and existing experimental data base. In addition to these points,
the present state of knowledge and the predictive capability of
the codes are included in the characterization of each
phenomenon.
3) Development of a test matrix suitable for the assessment
of system analysis codes, by selecting individual tests from the
selected facilities relevant to each phenomenon.
4) Performing the validation process carried out by
comparing code predictions with experimental measurements
or measurements from a reactor if available.
Scenario identification
(normal operation and
accident conditions)
Phenomena identification
and ranking tables
（PIRT）
NO
Adequate data
available for Collect new data
validation?
YES
Code has
capability for
NO Further development of
codes and models
simulating key
phenomena?
YES
Code can be applied to
accident analysis
reliably
Fig. 1 Flowchart for code validation
In conformance with the above-mentioned safety
regulations and safety standards, a flowchart is recommended
for the validation of system analysis codes used in the design
and analysis of modular HTRs in China, as shown in Fig. 1. As
the first step of the flowchart, a phenomena identification and
ranking table (PIRT) process has been conducted on the subject
of the HTR-PM thermal hydraulics and accident analysis.
Issues addressed by the PIRT are the importance of different
phenomena in representative accident scenarios and the
prediction capability for these phenomena based on existing
analysis techniques and test data.
The PIRT results provide the basis for evaluating the
adequacy of test data used for the code validation. With the
purpose of developing a validation matrix, test data have been
collected mainly from the operation history and tests of the
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HTR-10. Besides, it is also planned to get data by literature
review. Though the methodology of code validation for
modular HTRs could be the same as that used for light water
reactors (LWRs), the maturity of the methodology for these two
reactor types is very different. Therefore, there should be some
considerations in the process of developing the validation
matrix for software used in modular HTRs so that a solid basis
for the code validation could be formed.
2. PIRT OF THE HTR-PM
Originating from the CSAU methodology, the PIRT
process was widely applied to various accidents of light water
reactors (LWRs), e.g., loss of coolant accident, main steam line
break and rod ejection accident. Through the further
development, PIRT has become a powerful tool to establish
phenomena-based modeling requirements for safety analysis
computer codes and to define test data needs for the validation
of such analytical tools. All PIRTs have a common goal:
understanding the plant behavior in the context of identifying
significant phenomena, processes, parameters and so on. A
generic PIRT procedure was conceptually illustrated by Wilson
and Boyack, and its typical application was also described in
detail[6]. However, the details of each PIRT study may vary
depending on the specific problem to be resolved, bringing
some modifications to the basic PIRT approach. For example, a
nine-step PIRT process was developed by NRC to conduct the
PIRT work for the next generation nuclear plant (NGNP)[7],
which is a very high temperature reactor (VHTR) under
concept design. Containing the main elements recommended by
the generic PIRT procedure, this process has been successfully
applied in different research fields of the NGNP. Because of
this, the nine-step PIRT process was utilized by the INET
experts as a standard procedure to perform the HTR-PM PIRT.
The application of the PIRT steps is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Scenarios considered by the PIRT experts are: 1) normal
operation (NO); 2) pressurized loss of forced cooling
(PLOFC); 3) depressurized loss of forced cooling (DLOFC); 4)
air ingress following the DLOFC; 5) anticipated transients
without scram (ATWS); 6) steam/water ingress. Using the nine-
step process, the PIRT expert panel established tables for these
scenarios. The PIRT experts identified all the plausible
phenomena for each scenario. Before the identification, the
term “phenomena” was expanded by the expert panel. In this
way, the HTR-PM PIRT process focused on not only
phenomena but also processes, parameters, factors and
characteristics that may influence the plant response to the
postulated initiating events and their subsequent event
sequences. Through the key phenomena listed by the experts, a
comparison can be made between the phenomenological
requirements imposed on analytical tools used to simulate
accident scenarios and existing analysis capabilities in INET.
These two aspects point out the direction of code development
and assessment, and also determine the data needs which
support the validation activities including both code-to-code
 and code-to-test benchmarks. Detailed information of the HTR- types for the scenarios identified by the PIRT, i.e., normal
PM PIRT can be referred to elsewhere[8]. operation, PLOFC, DLOFC, air ingress, ATWS and water
ingress.
1 PIRT issue

2 PIRT objectives

3 Hardware and scenarios 4. TESTS OF THE HTR-10

4 Evaluation criteria As China’s first HTR, the HTR-10 stepped into the
5 Knowledge base
commissioning phase in April, 2000, attained the first criticality
6 Phenomena identification
in December, 2000 and achieved its full power operation in
January, 2003. Up to now, the HTR-10 has been successfully
7 Importance ranking
operated for more than ten years with different power levels.
8 Knowledge level
During the relatively long period of commissioning and
9 PIRT documentation operation, various kinds of tests were carried out on this
Fig. 2 Nine PIRT procedure for the HTR-PM accident analysis reactor. Main operational parameters as well as the
corresponding design values of the HTR-10 are listed in Table
1, which shows that the basic technical specifications meet the
3. CONSIDERATIONS ON THE VALIDATION MATRIX design requirements very well.
The construction of the PIRT guides the creation of the
validation matrix. The ensemble of key phenomena forms the Table 1 Design parameters of the HTR-10
basis for the validation matrix. The process identified in Fig. 1 Uni Design Operational
Parameter
will be used to define and prioritize the tests and experiments t Value Value
which are needed to adequately address phenomena which have Reactor thermal power MW 10 10.3
a high impact upon safety (important) or for which knowledge Primary helium inlet o
is lacking. In the past, the construction of validation matrices C 250/700 236/700
/outlet temperature
was sponsored by the OECD/NEA for thermal-hydraulic codes Primary helium
used in the transient and LOCA analysis for LWRs[9]. MPa 3.0 2.94
pressure
Following the approach from the OECD/NEA, the Secondary water inlet
construction of a validation matrix for modular HTRs should at /steam outlet o
C 104/440 99/430
least consider information on the test facility, test procedure, temperature
instrumentation (measuring devices), and major results. The Feed water mass flow
matrix shall include experiments already conducted, under kg/s 3.49 3.56
rate
construction, and to be designed. Since the application of the Steam outlet pressure MPa 4.0 3.45
validation matrix in modular HTRs is not as mature as that in
LWRs, the matrix needs not be a comprehensive list of all of At the commissioning stage, a large number of
the experiments that are needed to fully understand the commissioning tests were performed[10], including:
phenomena and validate computer simulations. Instead, the z Loss of forced cooling (LOFC) test,
list might only include those experiments that are needed to z Loss of offsite power test,
capture phenomena of significant licensing concerns that z Load rejection test,
cannot be bounded by reasonably conservative analyses or z Dynamic characteristic test,
known design features. z Scram characteristic test,
In the cross-reference matrix the important physical z Power raising test,
phenomena which are believed to occur during a certain z Steady-state full power operation test.
scenario, the test facilities suitable for reproducing these After the commissioning phase of the HTR-10, safety
effects, and the test types of interest should be listed. The demonstration tests were performed to simulate the HTR-10
relationship of the phenomena, the test facilities and the test extreme accident conditions, e.g., anticipated transient without
types are listed as follows. scram (ATWS)[11][12]. The accomplished tests are:
1) Phenomenon versus test type indicates which z LOFC ATWS test,
phenomena are occurring in which test types; z Reactivity insertion ATWS test.
2) Test facility versus phenomenon indicates the suitability During a specific test, key parameters were monitored and
of the test facilities for benchmarking the code capability of the recorded mainly by the nuclear measurement system and the
different phenomena; thermal measurement system. There are a number of
3) Test type versus test facility indicates which test types thermocouples installed in the ceramic internals of the HTR-10,
are performed in which test facilities. such as the top, the side, and the bottom reflectors, the bottom
For the HTR-PM, the validation matrix should contain the carbon brick and the fuel discharging tube[13]. Accordingly,
information of important phenomena, test facilities and test transient test data of the reactor core and other components can

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 be obtained for validation of the codes and models employed in
the HTR design process and accident analysis.
Through the comparison of the PIRT and the HTR-10 tests,
the scenarios of modular HTRs, e.g., normal operation, PLOFC
and ATWS, could be reflected by the existing HTR-10 tests. So
the HTR-10 provided a good platform for collecting test data to
address the phenomena of these scenarios. For other scenarios,
i.e., DLOFC, air ingress and water ingress, test data still need
to be collected from other experimental reactors or test
facilities, including the AVR, the VELUNA facility, the
NACOCK facility, and so on, through the way of literature
review.
5. CONCLUSIONS
System analysis codes play an important role in predicting
the modular HTR behaviour under both normal operation and
accident conditions. A flowchart is established and
recommended for the validation of system analysis codes used
in the design and analysis of modular HTRs. As the first step of
the flowchart, a phenomena identification and ranking table
(PIRT) process has been conducted on the subject of the HTR-
PM thermal hydraulics and accident analysis. For the HTR-PM,
the validation matrix should contain the information of
important phenomena, test facilities and test types for the
scenarios identified by the PIRT, i.e., normal operation,
PLOFC, DLOFC, air ingress, ATWS and water ingress. At
present, the HTR-10 could provide test data reflecting the
scenarios of normal operation, PLOFC and ATWS.
Additionally, test data addressed phenomena in DLOFC, air
ingress and water ingress should be collected from other
experimental reactors or test facilities through the way of
literature review.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work has been supported by the Chinese National
S&T Major Project (Grant No. ZX069).
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