Ateneo Central Bar Operations 2018 Criminal Law Blue Tips Prayer and Criminal Intent

ATENEO CENTRAL
BAR OPERATIONS 2018 CRIMINAL LAW BLUE TIPS
PRAYER BEFORE EXAMINATIONS
Dear Jesus,
Today I will have my examinations.
You know how important they are to me.
So I am humbly asking Your gracious help and divine assistance.
I pray to You, my dear Jesus,

please never let me panic nor get nervous,
Nor just let me guess nor rely on pure luck,
but enlighten my mind and let me think clearly.
Please never let me resort to chances nor dishonesty,

But let me work to the fullest of my ability.
I pray for your guidance that as I think,

I may find the right solutions,
I may be able to correctly answer the question,
I may solve those difficult problems.
I ask O Lord, Your intercession, that as I write,

I may not be careless nor overconfident,
I may not be distracted but be more concentrated.
I may not be in a hurry not take the exam too lightly.
Today, O my Jesus,
I will take my examinations/recitations.
Let me, with Your help, give my best effort.
Let me because of You, receive the best and fruitful results.
Amen. (Fr. Ruperto Santos, STL)
THE BLUE TIPS ARE EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE USE OF ATENEO BAR TAKERS FOR THE 2018 BAR
EXAMINATIONS. UNAUTHORIZED USE AND REPRODUCTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS PROHIBITED.
ATENEO CENTRAL
When an escaped prisoner was caught

camping out in the woods,
it was a clear case of
criminal in tent.
Special thanks to Dean Giovanni F. Vallente, Judge Oscar B. Pimentel, Atty. Ronald C. Chua, Atty.
Rommel A. Abitria, Atty. Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio, and Atty. Axel Rupert M. Cruz.
ATENEO CENTRAL
CRIMINAL LAW I
Q: X, intending to kill Y, peppered the latter’s bedroom with bullets. Y was not home. X was charged
with attempted murder. X argues that Y’s absence from her room made the crime inherently
impossible. What is X liable for?
A: X is liable for committing an impossible crime. Art. 4 of the RPC makes a person criminally liable for an
act “which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment.” All circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as
an accident independent of the actor’s will (Intod v. CA, 1992)
Q: Distinguish factual impossibility from legal impossibility.
Factual impossibility Legal Impossibility
Extraneous circumstances unknown to the Intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
actor or beyond his control prevent the crime.
consummation of the intended crime.
(Example: Man puts his hand in the pocket The following must be present:
of another with the intention to steal and (1) the motive to perform an act in violation of the law;
finds the pocket empty.) (2) an intention to perform the physical act;
(3) physical act is performed; and
(4) the consequence does not amount to a crime.
(Example: killing a person already dead). (Intod v. CA,
1992)
Q: What is the crime committed when a person steals an unfunded/dishonored check?

A: The crime is an impossible crime of theft. In taking possession of the check, he had performed all the
acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment. He cannot be held
liable for theft because the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of
the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. A check that is subsequently dishonored means that it has no
value, hence there can be no theft (Jacinto v People, 2009). The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal
intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself (Intod v CA, 1992).
Q: X struck Y on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it knocked Y out. A
doctor testified that Y’s injuries were very serious but could not say that they were actually fatal.
What crime was committed?
A: Attempted homicide. Intent to kill may be inferred from the following: means used, nature, location and
number of wounds inflicted on the victim. Considering the size of his weapon, the impact produced, and the
location of the wounds that were inflicted, there was clearly intent to kill. However since it cannot be
established that the wounds inflicted were fatal and did not cause death only because of timely medical
attention, X is guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide. (Colinares v. People, 2011)
Q: A, B, C and D were charged with the crimes of Murder for the death of X, who they had previously
apprehended and detained. A, B, C boxed the victim and D said “tapusin na natin ito”. A handed the
cord to B who twisted the cord around the neck of X with the help of C. X was hung at the end
portion of the detention cell causing his death. The court found A, B, C, and D guilty of Murder. Was
conspiracy proven beyond reasonable doubt?
A: [DEL CASTILLO] Yes, it is not required for conspiracy to exist that there be an agreement for an
appreciable period prior to the occurrence. Direct proof of the agreement is not necessary. It may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused which point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. This
community of design is present among A, B, C, and D as deduced from their individual acts. It is sufficient
that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its
execution (People v. Bustamante, G.R. No. 172357, March 19, 2010). This unity in action among the co-
accused can also be considered as “ladder conspiracy”.
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Q: Can there still be conspiracy if the three accused were at different places when the crime was
committed?
A: Yes. It is not required in conspiracy that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same
purpose and were united in its execution. Direct proof of such agreement is not necessary. It may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from acts of the
accused pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. (People vs.
Bustamante, G.R. No. 172357, March 19, 2010)
Q: Y, a 55 year old farmer, was clearing a section of his farm. Subsequently, A, B, C, D, and E
surrounded Y. D suddenly pulled out a gun and shot Y in the chest, while E simultaneously shot Y
with a bow and arrow but missed. A admitted to the crime but claimed self-defense stating that Y
assaulted and shot him during the struggle. Should the justifying circumstance of self-defense
claimed by C be considered?
A: [DEL CASTILLO] No. In the justifying circumstance of self-defense, unlawful aggression is a condition
sine qua non. Self-defense, complete or incomplete, cannot be considered a justification, unless the victim
commits an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. C failed to present any evidence to
substantiate his claim that there was an actual or imminent peril to his life or limb. (People v. Florencio
Agacer, et. al; G.R. No. 177751, December 14, 2011)
Q: Police officers were on a road on the lookout for escaped rebels. The road was dark and A, B
and C, inebriated, did not see the sign and did not stop. The police, believing them to be the rebels,
opened fire and A and B died. The police officers were charged with murder. They argue that they
were justified under fulfillment of a lawful duty. They also argue that this is a case of mistake of
fact. Should the police officers be held liable?
A: Yes, the circumstance of fulfillment of lawful duty is not attendant. The police employed unnecessary
force in using the firearms as they were not confronted with the rational necessity to open fire at the moving
vehicle. The injury that resulted was not a necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their duties. As to
mistake of fact, it will only serve to exculpate the accused if he is not guilty of negligence or bad faith.
(Yapyuco v. People, 2012)
Q: X was a former Corporal of the Philippine Marines. A gunshot was heard emanating from the
bedroom of X and his wife, Y. X killed his wife using his pistol with a single gunshot fired at close
range at Y’s chest. X claimed that the shooting was accidental. He alleged that he wanted to show
his gun but it fell and in his attempt to catch the gun, he accidentally squeezed the trigger hitting Y.
X argues that prosecution failed to prove criminal intent since the shooting of Y was accidental.
Was the shooting accidental?
A: [DEL CASTILLO] No, X intentionally killed Y. Firstly, X was a former Corporal and is assumed to know
and undertake all safety precautions in storing his firearm. Second, the gun was loaded. Third, the gun is
equipped with several safety measures and yet they were not in place at the time of the shooting (People
v. George Zapata y Viana, G.R. No. 197046, July 21, 2014). For the exempting circumstance of accident
to be properly appreciated the following requisites must concur: (1) that the accused person was performing
a lawful act with due care; (2) that the injury is caused by mere accident; and (3) that there was no fault or
intent of causing the injury. (People v. Mat-an y Kutbing, G.R. No. 91115, [December 29, 1992], 290-A PHIL
643-649)
Q: X and Y went outside without the permission of their parents. Upon returning home, their father,
Z, whipped them with a stick. Z tied the hands and feet of X and Y to a tree and continued beating
them with a thick piece of wood. Shortly after, X collapsed, lost consciousness, and died. Can the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong be appreciated in this
case?
A: [DEL CASTILLO] No. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably
sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim. In this case, Z tied their wrists to a
tree to prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. (People
v. Noel T. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011)
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Q: A mayor was convicted of the crime of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under
Art. 218 of the RPC. He argues that he was not reminded to liquidate the cash advances he obtained.
Can the full restitution of the funds be appreciated as mitigating circumstance?
A: Yes. He returned the funds upon discovery without the lapse of a lengthy period. It was considered a
mitigating circumstance of return or full restitution of the funds that were previously unliquidated. (Lumauig
v. People, GR No. 166680, July 7, 2014)
Q: A police officer was killed by his colleagues. Before the incident, the victim made a phone call
to his friend telling him that he was going to be killed and asking for help. Prosecution alleged
evident premeditation. Is the prosecution correct?
A: No, the phone call and pretense by co-officers that there’s an operation is insufficient to establish
premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must concur: (1) the time accused
decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating he has clung to his determination; and
(3) sufficient lapse of time by which such determination and execution to allow accused time to reflect upon
the consequences of his act. (People vs. Alawig, G.R. 187731, September 18, 2013)
Q: X, in stabbing Z, initially came from the back but attacked Z in the front. Is there treachery since
the attack was from the front?
A: Yes. The qualifying circumstance of treachery does not require the attack to be from behind. Even a
frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who is in no position to
repel the attack or avoid it. (People vs. Amora, G.R. No. 190322, November 26, 2014)
Q: One of the accused punched the victim in the shoulder, the other accused stabbed the victim
fatally. Was there abuse of superior strength?
A: No. The fact that two persons attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed
with abuse of superior strength, absent proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim.
(People vs. Beduya, G.R. No. 175315, August 9, 2010)
Q: What are the examples of aggravating circumstances absorbed by treachery?

A:
1. Nighttime, in so far as it renders the victim defenseless (People v Hilot, 2000);
2. Abuse of superior strength (People v Gaballo, 1999);
3. Employing means to weaken the defense (People v Siaotong, 1957);
4. Craft, fraud or disguise, may be absorbed by treachery if it is deliberately adopted as the means, method
or form for the treacherous strategy. (People v. Lab-Eo, 2002);
5. Disregard of age and sex (People v Clementer, 1974); and
6. By a band (People v Ampo-an, 1990).
Q: A, B, and C were charged with the crime of attempted murder of X and the murder of X’s family.
The crime was committed at the azotea of X’s parents' house. X saw from a short distance a person
in camouflage uniform with a long firearm slung across his chest and a black bonnet over his head.
A then proceeded to shoot at the house. Were the aggravating circumstances of treachery, dwelling,
and use of disguise sufficiently established?
A: [DEL CASTILLO] Yes. (1) Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
(2) Dwelling is present as for this circumstance to be considered it is not necessary that the accused should
have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was
attacked inside his own house. (3) Disguise was correctly appreciated as A,B, C wore a bonnets to cover
their faces during the shooting incident for the purpose of concealing his identity. (People v. Tirso Sibbu,
G.R. No. 214757, March 29, 2017).
Q: Z was invited to a drinking spree by friends. After having had a drink too many, Z and B had a
heated argument, during which Z stabbed B. As a result, B suffered serious physical injuries. May
the intoxication of Z be considered aggravating or mitigating? [2002]
A: The intoxication of Z may be prima facie considered mitigating since it was merely incidental to the
commission of the crime. It may not be considered aggravating as there is no clear indication from the facts
of the case that it was habitual or intentional on the part of A. Aggravating circumstances are not to be
presumed; they should be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
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Q: Under Article 19(3), when is an accessory liable?

Harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of
the author of the crime who is guilty of treason,
Private Individual parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of
the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually
guilty of some other crime.
Harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of
Public Officer
the principals of ANY crime.
Q: Why are (1) arrest and temporary detention of accused persons, (2) commitment of a minor, (3)
Suspension and (4) Fines and other corrective measures in Art. 24 of the RPC not considered
penalties?
A: Because they are NOT imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. Par. 1, 3 and 4 are merely preventive
measures before conviction of offenders. The commitment of a minor mentioned in par. 2 is not a penalty,
because it is not imposed by the court in a judgment of conviction. The imposition of the sentence in such
case is suspended. (Reyes, Book 1)
Q: What are the rules on computation of penalties under Art. 28 RPC?
RULE 1 Duration of temporary penalties computed from the day on which judgment of
Offender in prison conviction becomes FINAL
IF accused appealed: from the date of the promulgation of the decision of the
appellate court
RULE 2 Duration of penalty consisting in deprivation of liberty computed from the day
Offender NOT in that the offender is placed at the DISPOSAL of judicial authorities for the
prison enforcement of the penalty
RULE 3 Computed from the day on which the offender COMMENCES TO SERVE his
Duration of other sentence
penalties
Q: What is the rule on deduction of the full time or 4/5 of the time during which offenders have
undergone preventive imprisonment?
GR: Preventive imprisonment can be credited in the service of the sentence IF the detention prisoner
AGREES voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel
to abide by the same disciplinary rules upon convicted prisoners. IF the detention prisoner does NOT
AGREE, he must execute a document, assisted by counsel, stating such and he shall be credited only 4/5
of the time of his preventive imprisonment. (Art. 29, RPC as amended by RA 10592)
XPN: Under Sec. 41 of RA 9344, the child in conflict of the law shall be credited in the service of his
sentence with the FULL time he spend in actual commitment and detention under the act. It is NOT
necessary that he agrees.
Q: Offenders who are not entitled to the full time or 4/5 of the time of preventive imprisonment
(1)Recidivists or those convicted previously twice or more times of any crime ; (2) Those who, upon being
summoned for the execution of their sentence, failed to surrender voluntarily. (Art. 29, RPC)
NOTE: A habitual delinquent is necessarily a recidivist or that at least he has been “convicted previously
twice or more times of any crime.”
Q: Discuss the application of Art 39 Subsidiary Liability.

A: Art. 39 of the RPC states that if the convict has no property with which to meet the fine as a penalty of
the crime committed, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each
amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate (NCR: Php 537.00) prevailing in the Philippines at
the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court subject to the exceptions provided by
the same Article. (as amended by R.A. 10159)
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Q: X, the accused, tossed/hurled a live hand grenade at the center of the dancing hall, inflicting
upon Y mortal wounds causing his death and injuries to several other people. The trial court finds
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted
Murder and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. Is the conviction of the
accused for the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder proper?
A: YES. The single act of pitching or rolling the hand grenade on the floor of the gymnasium which resulted
in the death of Y and injuries to other victims constituted a complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC which
states that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for the most
serious crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Thus,
applying Article 48, the death penalty should be imposed. However, pursuant to RA No. 9346, the proper
sentence therefore is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. (People v. Mores, G.R. No. 189846,
June 26, 2013)
Q: X, the accused, fired his sub-machine gun at several persons. The first burst of shots hit three
persons. The accused let loose a second burst of shots wounding two others. Is there complex
crime in this case?
A: No. For each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims corresponds a distinct and
separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those
resulting from every single act that produced the same. Although each burst of shots was caused by one
single act of pressing the trigger of the sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism the person firing
it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence it is not the act of
pressing the trigger which should be considered as producing the several felonies, but the number of bullets
which actually produced them. (People v Herrera , 2001 reiterating People v. Desierto, C.A., 45 O.G. 4542)
Note that in the more recent edition of REYES’ book 2, he cites the case of People v Buyco where the
Court held that the accused be convicted for a complex crime pursuant to Art.48 for the resulting death of
an individual and the injuries obtained by others due to the firing of the accused
Q: X, aiming to shoot Y, fired his gun multiple times. X hit Y, but a stray bullet also hit a bystander,
Z. Both Y and Z died. What crime/s were committed by X?
A: X is liable for two separate crimes of murder. Despite the application of the aberratio ictus rule, the
accused is liable for separate crimes, and not a compound crime if the bullet that killed that target victim is
different from the bullet that killed the third person, who was hit by reason of mistake of blow. (People v.
Adriano, 2015).
Q: The Sandiganbayan held X guilty of 8 counts of violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. The Sandiganbayan imposed a penalty totaling 65 years and 8 days of imprisonment. X claims
that this is a violation of the three-fold rule and insists that the duration of the aggregate penalties
should not exceed 40 years. Is X correct?
A: No, while this case involved a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Supreme Court
nevertheless stated that Art. 70 on the three-fold rule is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the
penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed. It merely provides that the prisoner
cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties the maximum of which
is forty years. (Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan, 1987)
Q: X, Y, and Z were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. One of the
Appellants, X, died pending resolution of the case. Does the death of Appellant X extinguish his
criminal and civil liabilities?
A: Yes. The death of Appellant X prior to the final judgment extinguished his criminal liability and civil liability
ex delicto. Article 89(1) of the RPC provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by death of the
convict when such death occurs before final judgment. It is also settled that upon the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. (People v. Florencio Agacer, G.R. No. 177751,
January 7, 2013)
Q: X, a public officer, failed to submit his SALN from 1982 to 1985. He then left the Philippines. An
information was filed against him and preliminary investigation was initiated in 2004. X argued that
the information should be quashed because the crime has prescribed. Is X correct?
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A: Yes. The prescriptive period of offenses punishable by SPL is not tolled by the absence of the accused
from the Philippines. The rule is different for felonies defined under the RPC, whose prescriptive periods
are tolled by the absence of the accused from the Philippines pursuant to Article 91 of the RPC. Although
Art. 91 applies suppletorily to SPL, Act No. 3326, which governs the prescriptive periods of offenses
punishable under SPL, is not itself an SPL. (Romualdez v. Marcelo, 2006)
Q: What are the ways of partial extinction of criminal liability?

1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances that the culprit may earn while he is undergoing preventive imprisonment
or serving his sentence (Art. 94 of the RPC, as amended by RA 10592)
Q: What is allowance for good conduct?

A: The good conduct of any offender qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29,
or of any convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail
shall entitle him to deductions from the period of his sentence. (Art. 97 of the RPC, as amended by RA
10592) Note: This now applies to detention prisoners.
Q: How is good conduct allowance applied?
Date of Number of days deducted for EVERY MONTH of good behavior during
Imprisonment detention
First 2 years 20 days
3rd-5th year 23 days
6th-10th year 25 days
11th year and above 30 days
Q: What happens if the offender appeals?

A: Appeal is not a bar to good conduct time allowance. (Art. 97 of the RPC, as amended by RA 10592)
Q: What is special time allowance for loyalty?

A: A deduction of 1/5 of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded his
preventive imprisonment or the service of his sentence under Conflagration, Earthquake, Explosion, Similar
Catastrophe, Mutiny in which the offender has not participated (CEESM), gives himself up to the authorities
within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or
catastrophe referred to in said article.
A deduction of 2/5 of the period of his sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the
place of his confinement notwithstanding the CEESM (Art. 98 of the RPC, as amended by RA 10592).
NOTE: This applies to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive suspension or serving sentence.
Q: May quasi-recidivism be appreciated in violations of special penal laws?

A: Yes, if the SPL adopts the nomenclature of the RPC for penalties. For example, the Dangerous Drugs
Act uses the nomenclature of RPC penalties for possession of illegal drugs. However, for quasi-recidivism
to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must be proven by records of the previous sentence.
(People v. Salazar, 1997)
CRIMINAL LAW II
Q: What crimes under the RPC are aggravated if committed by public officers?
A: 1. Espionage (Art. 117) 2. Inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals (Art. 118) 3. Direct Assault (Art.
148)
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Q: What is the difference between arbitrary detention in Art. 125 (delay in delivery of detained
persons) from Art. 124 (arbitrary detention)?
A: In arbitrary detention under Art. 124, the detention is illegal from the beginning; in arbitrary detention
under Art. 125, the detention is legal in the beginning but the illegality of the detention starts from the
expiration of any of the periods of time specified in Art. 125, without the detained prisoner detained having
been delivered to the proper judicial authority. (REYES)
Q: Can quasi-recidivism be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstance?

A: No. The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism cannot be offset by any ordinary mitigating
circumstance, because Art. 160 specifically provides that the offender "shall be punished by the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony." (REYES)
Q: Z, was lying on her bed when X, armed with a knife and by means of force and intimidation,
succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Z, against her will and consent. Subsequently, X
withdrew his penis and ordered Z to lie down on the floor. He inserted his penis into her vagina for
the second time Thereafter, X stood up and commanded Z to lie down near the headboard of the
bed where he inserted his penis into her vagina for the third time. Can the accused be charged with
three counts of rape defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the RPC?
A: No. The appellant should be convicted of only one count of rape. From the facts, X succeeded in inserting
his penis into the private part of Z three times. However, the three penetrations occurred during one
continuing act of rape in which X was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent. Besides X’s lustful
desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed, it cannot be inferred from the
evidence that X decided to commit three separate and distinct acts of sexual assault. (People v. Aaron,
G.R. NOS. 136300-02. September 24, 2002)
Q: In a case of rape, when the three penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of five
minutes wherein X would rest after satisfying his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his
strength, he would again rape Z, will the doctrine pronounced in People v. Aaron apply?
A: No. When X decided to commit separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon Z, he was not motivated
by a single impulse, but rather by several criminal intent. The three insertions into Z were in satisfaction of
successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, X’s conviction for three counts of rape is proper.
(People v. Lucena, G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014)
Q: Distinguish unlawful arrest (Art. 269) from other legal detention

A: 1. In the crime of delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authority (Art. 126), the
detention is for some legal ground; in unlawful arrest, the detention is not authorized by law. (2) Under Art.
125, the crime is committed by failing to deliver such person to the proper judicial authority within a certain
period of time- in unlawful arrest, it is committed by making an arrest not authorized by law. (p. 588, Reyes
II)
Q: X was convicted of murder for throwing his arm around Y and suddenly stabbing Y to death. The
court found that the act was characterized by treachery. Does this qualify the crime to murder?
A: [DEL CASTILLO] No. For treachery to qualify the crime to murder, there must be a showing that (1) the
malefactor employed such means, method, or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety from the
defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (2) the said means, method, and manner of execution were
deliberately adopted. Moreover, for treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and seen by the witness
right at the inception of the attack. (People vs. Concillado, G.R. No. 181204, November 28, 2011)
Q: Is robbery with violence or intimidation against persons complex crime?

A: No. Art. 48, defining complex crime, does not apply to the crimes covered by Art. 294. Art. 294 already
provides a specific penalty for each kind of robbery with violence against persons in the first, second, third
and fourth paragraphs thereof. There is only one penalty prescribed, even if two crimes are committed. Art.
48 applies only when a complex crime is not punished with a specific penalty. (REYES)
Q: When are robbery and homicide separate offenses?

A: Robbery and homicide are separate offenses when the homicide was not committed "on the occasion"
or "by reason" of the robbery. When the motive of the killing is not wanting and it is proved that it is only
after the killing when the accused surrounded the victim’s body and searched his pockets, two separate
offenses were committed (People v. Atanacio, et al., G.R. No. L-11844, Nov. 29, 1960)
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Q: When may homicide occur in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide?
A: Homicide may precede robbery or may occur after robbery. The phrase "by reason" covers homicide
committed before or after the taking of personal property of another, as long as the motive of the offender
(in killing a person before the robbery) is to deprive the victim of his personal property which is sought to
be accomplished by eliminating an obstacle or opposition, or (in killing a person after robbery) to do away
with a witness or to defend the possession of the stolen property. (REYES)
Q: Is there a crime of robbery with attempted rape?

A: None. Art. 294, par. 2, which punishes robbery with rape (consummated) does not cover robbery with
attempted rape. The crime cannot be a complex crime of robbery with attempted rape under Art. 48,
because a robbery cannot be a necessary means to commit attempted rape; nor attempted rape, to commit
robbery. Both crimes cannot be the result of a single act. (People v. Cariaga, C.A., 54 O.G. 4307)
Q: When does rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery?

A: When the accused committed robbery in a house, killed the head of the family there and raped his wife
in the rice field to which she had been taken, the crime is robbery with homicide and rape under paragraph
1 of Art. 294, The rape to be considered as an aggravating circumstance only. (People vs. Ganal, et al., 85
Phil. 743)
Q: X, was engaged in the business of guaranteeing purchase orders and gift checks and of
disposing, selling or transferring them for consideration. A was assigned to bill and collect from
sub-guarantors and to encash and deposit checks. A collected the money from the sub-guarantors
but did not remit nor deposit the amount to J’s account. Instead, A issued 15 personal checks and
deposited them to J’s account. All the checks were dishonored upon presentment. A absconded.
The RTC and CA found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft. Is
the theft qualified in this case?
A: [DEL CASTILLO] Yes, the circumstance of grave abuse of confidence that made the same as qualified
theft was also proven. It is beyond doubt that an employee like a cashier who comes into possession of
the monies she collected enjoys the confidence reposed in her by her employer. (People v. Mera “Joy”
Nielles, G.R. No. 200308, February 23, 2015).
Q: Accused was charged of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a public document,
but the falsification of public document was not proved. Will the charge prosper?
A: [DEL CASTILLO] No. For the charge of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a public
document to prosper, all the elements of both crimes of estafa and falsification must exist. If falsification is
not proven, the accused can only be found guilty of estafa. (Ansaldo vs. People, G.R. No 159381, March
26, 2010)
Q: A managing director was dismissed from his position. The former employer made a demand for
the funds and properties under his trust. The former managing director refused. What crime, if any,
was committed?
A: [DEL CASTILLO] Estafa was committed. Failure to return upon demand the properties which one has
the duty to return is tantamount to appropriating the same for his own personal use, regardless if such
retention is for the purpose of preserving lien over the properties. (D’Aigle vs. People, G.R. 174181, June
27, 2010)
Q: X and Y colluded to make it appear that the tax for property bought by Z was paid to the BIR
through a falsified BIR receipt. The money was actually misappropriated by them. What crime was
committed by them?
A: [DEL CASTILLO] The complex crime of estafa through falsification of a public document, the falsification
being the means to commit estafa. Here, there are two different offenses tried as one, because one offense
was committed as a necessary means to commit the other, or because a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies. (Pascual vs. People, G.R. No. 24873)
Q: If the proceeds of the loans are made payable to entities other than the alleged borrowers, is
estafa through falsification of commercial documents committed?
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A: [DEL CASTILLO] Yes. The material point is that they were encashed using bank funds, and the proceeds
thereof were deposited in defendant’s bank savings and current accounts and used to fund his personal
checks. (People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014)
Q: Can a bank officer who is liable for DOSRI Law, a special law, be made liable for estafa under the
RPC?
A: [DEL CASTILLO] Yes. The two crimes pertain to different violations. DOSRI law punishes the act of a
director of a banking institution who borrows any of the deposits of such bank while estafa punishes the act
of defrauding another person. (Soriano vs. People, G.R. No. 162336)
Q: X forged C’s signature in a check. He then used the check in a transaction wherein he
represented himself as C. What is X’s criminal liability?
A: X is liable for estafa through falsification of a commercial document.
Q: X issued a memorandum stating that Z needs psychiatric treatment to prevent further

deterioration of her mental and emotional stability. Z was charged with libel. X claims however that
it was issued in good faith to help Z. Is X liable?
A: [DEL CASTILLO] Yes. There is presumption of malice when the statement is injurious on its face. Such
good intention is not sufficient justification considering the details of the entire contents of the memorandum.
(Lagaya vs. People, G.R. 176251, July 25, 2012)
Q: What is the additional element found in the crime of Oral Defamation that is not present in the
crime of Intriguing Against Honor under the RPC?
A: The only element of grave oral defamation not found in intriguing against honor is publication (People
vs. Alcosaba, 30 April 1964).
Q: Does the act of poking a dirty finger at a person constitute grave slander by deed?
A: No. One’s act of pointing a dirty finger at another constitutes simple slander by deed.The "poking of the
finger" is, palpably, of less serious magnitude compared to the banging of chair, choking or slapping of a
face. Thus, we find that the poking of dirty finger, while it smacks of slander by deed, is of a lesser magnitude
than the acts committed in the foregoing cases. (Villanueva v. People G.R. 160351, April 10, 2006)
Q: What is the rule on overtaking in cases of reckless imprudence?

A: Drivers of automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle, are charged with a high degree of care and
diligence to avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to it that vehicles coming from the opposite
direction are not taken unaware by his presence on the side of the road upon which they have the right to
pass. Failure to observe such diligence constitutes reckless imprudence under Art. 365 of RPC (Senit v.
People, G.Rs. No. 192914, January 11, 2016)
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Q: Will the arrest of X (accused) and items seized or taken become inadmissible as evidence, if the
arresting officer in a drug bust fails to conduct a physical inventory and take photographs of the
seized/confiscated items but was able to mark the plastic sachet with X’s initials in the police
station?
A: No. The failure to conduct a physical inventory and take photographs of seized/confiscated items will not
render the arrest illegal nor the items inadmissible. What is important is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, since they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. (Tionco vs. People, G.R. No. 192284, March 11, 2015)
Q: A killed B. A few seconds after, A saw B’s car and took it. What is/are the crime/s committed?
A: Separate counts of homicide and carnapping. To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with
homicide, the offender’s original criminal design must be the crime of carnapping and that the killing was
perpetrated merely in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof. The killing of the victim cannot
qualify the carnapping into a special complex crime because the carnapping was an afterthought when the
victim’s death was already fait accompli. (People v. Aquino, 2014)
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Q: What are the punishable acts under the New Anti-Carnapping Act of 2016 (RA 10883)?
A: (1) Carnapping; (Sec. 3); (2)Concealment of Carnapping; (Sec. 4). All other prohibited acts do not have
corresponding penalties under the amended law.
Q: Will the “sweetheart defense” apply to violations of the Child Abuse Law?
A: No. It is settled that consent of the victim is immaterial in cases involving a violation of Sec 5, Art III of
RA 7610; as such, the sweetheart defense is irrelevant. (People v. Caballo, 2013)
Q: Is the laying of hands (e.g. slapping) in the spur of moment and anger punishable under RA 7610
or Child Abuse Law?
A: No. The specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being is essential in the crime of child abuse. He is only guilty of slight physical injury. (Bongalon v.
People, 2013)
Q: X, a 7-year old Grade 1 student, bumped Y, his teacher and refused to give an apology. This
caused Y to hold X’s armpits and push him to the floor. Y then proceeded to pick X up by his ears
and repeatedly slammed X down to the floor. Did Y commit child abuse under R.A. No. 7610?
A: Yes, under Sec. 3(2) of RA 7610 child abuse refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the
child which includes any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being. Y’s violent, unnecessary, and excessive infliction of physical injuries
is classified as child abuse. (Rosaldes v. People, 2014)
Q: Do you need to prove the commission of robbery or theft in order to make one liable under the
Anti-Fencing Law?
A: No. The Anti-Fencing Law creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by
the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property (Francisco v. People, 2004)
Q: May a public officer charged under Section 3(b) of RA No. 3019 concerning receiving benefits
also be simultaneously or successively charged with direct bribery under Art. 210 of the RPC?
A: Yes. Violations of Sec. 3(b) of RA 3019 and direct bribery do not have the same elements and may give
rise 2 distinct offenses. In RA 3019, mere request is already a violation while in direct bribery acceptance
is necessary. Further, RA 3019 is limited only to contracts or transactions where a public officer has the
authority to intervene, while direct bribery is broader in scope. (Merencillo v. People, 2007)
Q: Is there a conspiracy by silence and inaction under the Anti-Graft Law?

A: Yes. When the accused are all heads of their respective offices that perform interdependent functions in
the processing of cash advances and, exhibit an attitude of “buck-passing,” or the practice of shifting the
responsibility for something to someone else, in the face of the irregularities. (Jaca v. People, 2013).
Q: Is the inclusion of all the modes of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the charge sheet
equivalent to charging the accused with 3 acts?
A: No. The use of the 3 modes "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "gross inexcusable negligence"
in the same information does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses but only implies
that the offense charged may have been committed through any of the modes provided by the law.
(Fonacier et al. v. Sandiganbayan, 1994)
Q: Define partiality, bad faith, and gross negligence.

A: “(1) Partiality” means "bias" which excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for
rather than as they are. (2) “Bad faith” imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature
of fraud. (3) ”Gross negligence” conveys negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally
with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. (Fonacier et al.
v. Sandiganbayan, 1994)
Q: X, a private supplier, was charged with violation of Sec 3(g) of R.A. 3019 or the entering on behalf
of the Government into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
same, due to overpricing in a procurement contract with the government. However, the contract
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contained a guarantee to the government that in case there would be a finding of an over price by
the COA, X would refund the same. Is X liable?
A: No. Where the government was protected by the guarantee in the transaction, and the contract was not
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the element of the crime wherein the contract
or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, is conspicuously missing.
(Froilan v. Sandiganbayan, 2000)
Q: Is it required that the validity of the contract or transaction be first proved to prosecute a public
officer for entering on behalf of the government into a contract that is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government?
A: No. It is malum prohibitum in nature. It is the commission of the act punishable under the law not the
character or effect thereof that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. (Lociano v.
Estrella, 1970)
Q: What is the prescription period of offenses under R.A. 3019, as amended by R.A. 10910?
A: The prescription of offenses under R.A. 3019 is raised from 15 years to 20 years. (Sec. 1 of RA 10910)
Q: What are the elements of hazing?

A: The elements of hazing are: (1) A person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or
subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and (2) These acts were employed as a
prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry into an organization. (Sec. 1, R.A. 8049)
Q: What is the procedure in allowing hazing?

A: (1) Written notice must be given to the school authorities or head of organization 7 days prior to the
conduct of initiation; (2) The written notice must indicate the period of initiation activities will not exceed 3
days; the names of those to be subjected to such activities, and that no physical violence will be employed;
(3) Two representatives of the school or organization must be assigned to be present during the initiation;
they shall ensure that no physical harm will be inflicted (R.A. 8049).
Q: X and Y were found guilty of violating the anti-hazing law. They both claim that they did not
participate in the hazing and only came after the victim was already in a bad condition. Further, they
allege that they did not intend to kill the victim. Are they liable of violating the anti-hazing law?
A: Yes, the prosecution indubitably established the presence of X and Y during the hazing through witness
testimonies. This gave rise to the prima facie evidence of their actual participation in the hazing. Further,
this crime is malum prohibitum. The law provides that any person charged with this crime shall not be
entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong. (People v.
Dungo, 2015)
Q: X persuaded Y to be part of his fraternity. Y underwent hazing which led to his death. X claims
that he did not participate in the hazing and did not intend the death of Y. Is X liable of violating the
anti-hazing law?
A: Yes, mere persuading someone to undergo hazing is punishable. Hazing has different stages and the
perpetrators have different roles therein, not solely inflicting physical injuries to the neophyte. The roles of
X in the hazing activity was to induce Y to be present. The hazing would not have been accomplished were
it not for the acts of X that induced to be Y present. (Dungo, et al v. People, July 2015).
Q: May a person be prosecuted separately for serious physical injuries and physical torture by
systematic beating and punching under the Anti-Torture Act?
A: Yes. Sec. 15 of the Anti-Torture Act provides that torture is treated as a separate and independent crime
the penalties of which shall be imposed without prejudice to any other criminal liability under domestic or
international laws.
Q: What is the non-refoulement rule?

A: The rule states that no person shall be expelled, returned or extradited to another State where there are
substantial grounds to believe that such person shall be in danger of being subjected to torture, that the
requesting State has a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. (Sec. 17,
R.A. No. 9745)
Q: What are the elements of trafficking of persons?

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A: (1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders.”; (2) The means used which include "threat
or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another; and (3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which
includes "exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs. (People v. Casio, 2014).
Q: What is slavery in the context of Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act?

A: Slavery is defined as the extraction of work or services from any person by enticement, violence,
intimidation or threat, use of force or coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or moral
ascendancy, debt bondage or deception. (People v. Nangcas, G.R. No. 218806, June 13, 2018).
Q: Can there be a violation of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act even when the victim consented
to being recruited to travel abroad and work in bars?
A: Yes, under Section 3(a) of RA 9208, the law punishes the recruitment and transport of any person, by
any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or
apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage. Hence, the crime can exist even with the victim’s consent or
knowledge. (People v. Lalli, 2011)
Q: What is Battered Woman Syndrome?

A: It is the repeated and cyclical violence against a woman resulting in the “immobilization of the latter’s
ability to act decisively in her own interest and making her feel trapped in a relationship with no means of
escape.” Hence, when the victim-survivor inflicts an injury against her aggressor, for example, such person
may claim as a defense the Battered Woman Syndrome. (People v. Genosa 2004).
Q: What are the stages in the cycle of violence in Battered Woman Syndrome?
A: (1) Tension building phase; (2) Acute battering incident; and (3) Tranquil, loving phase (non-violent
phase) (People v. Genosa, 2004)
Q: What is the difference between self-defense under the RPC and Battered Woman Syndrome?
A:
RPC Battered Woman Syndrome
Unlawful aggression necessary to justify argument Can be invoked even without the existence of
self-defense immediate unlawful aggression as long as there is
an existence of two (2) cycles of violence against
the woman.
(Sec 26, R.A. 7610 as to distinction between RPC and BWS but the cycles see People v. Genosa, 2004)
Q: Can VAWC be committed by a woman?

A: Yes. The acts can be committed by “any person” against a woman with whom he has or had, among
others, a sexual or dating relationship. (Sec. 3(a), RA 9262)
Q: Can VAWC be committed by parents-in-law through conspiracy?

A: Yes. While the provisions of the law provide that the offender must be related or connected to the victim
by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the RPC. (Go-Tan v. Tan, 2008)
Q: X and Y married and bore a son in 1990. In 1995, X and Y’s marriage bond ended. X, the former
husband, promised to provide support to the child, but never did. X was charged with RA 9262, but
claims that the crime has prescribed. Is he correct?
A: No, the act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged has clearly not
prescribed. (Del Socorro v. Brinkman Van Wilsem, 2014)
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Q: Can a person be charged under the provisions of VAWC even though the violence occurred after
their dating relationship?
A: Yes, it is immaterial that the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing
the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical
harm was committed. While it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with
the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence of such relationship. (Dabalos v. RTC, 2013)
Q: X was charged for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. After the lapse of more than one month
from receipt of the demand letters, and after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the
Prosecutor, X issued a replacement check to pay off the amount and the check was successfully
encashed. Despite the successful encashment, the fiscal filed an information against X. Is X liable?
A: No, in the existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements of the crime or offense are
present, the conviction of the accused would prove to be abhorrent to society’s sense of justice. The spirit
of the law which, for B.P. 22, is the protection of the credibility and stability of the banking system would not
be served by penalizing people who have evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution
for damages even before charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before
the filing of the information has already attained the purpose of the law. (Lim v. People, 2014).
Q: X issued a postdated check to Y. Two days before its maturity, X called Y telling him that the
check has no funds. Y nevertheless encashed it. Upon denial of the check, may Y file a criminal
complaint of B.P. 22?
A: Yes. A violation of BP 22 is a malum prohibitum. As long as the check was issued on account or for
value, the purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to the issuance are
irrelevant to the prosecution of the offender. Thus, good faith is not a defense. (Josef v. People, 2005)
Q: Y gave a notice of dishonor to X regarding the dishonored check. The said notice was given
through registered mail to which X denies having receipt of. Y has not shown any authenticating
affidavit concerning the proof of service of the registered mail. Is X liable for BP 22?
A: No. If the service of the written notice of dishonor is by registered mail, the proof of service consists not
only in the presentation as evidence of the registry return receipt but also of the registry receipt together
with the authenticating affidavit of the person mailing the notice of dishonor. Without the authenticating
affidavit, the proof of giving the notice of dishonor is insufficient unless the mailer personally testifies in
court on the sending by registered mail. The lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal to a prosecution
under BP 22. Therefore, X is not liable. (Resterio v. People, 2012).
Q: What are the four links of a valid chain of custody?

A: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist
for laboratory examination; and, fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from
the forensic chemist to the court. (People v. Macud, G.R. No. 219175, December 14, 2017).
Q: X was arrested in a buy-bust. The police officer testified that he turned over the seized items to
the desk officer and the desk officer turned it over to the investigator, who marked the items. Was
chain of custody established?
A: No. Every person who takes possession of seized drugs must show how it was handled and preserved
while in his or her custody to prevent any switching or replacement. There was a break in the very first link
of the chain when the officer failed to mark the items immediately upon seizure from X, instead turning them
over to the desk officer. The desk officer was not presented in court and no explanation was offered for his
non-presentation or why he did not mark the items. The arresting officers also failed to show that the
marking was done in the presence of X. (People v. Salim Ismael, G.R. No. 208093, February 20, 2017).
Q: Who are required to be present in the physical inventory?

A: Accused, or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative, or counsel, AND any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof, AND a representative of the Department of Justice AND a
representative from the media. (R.A. No. 9165, Sec. 21). However, R.A. No. 9165 was amended by RA
10601 which is not part of the syllabus.
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Q: What crimes can a police officer be held liable for under R.A. No. 9165?
A: A public officer can be held liable for planting of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical, regardless of quantity and purity (R.A. No. 9165, Sec. 29). He can also be held liable
for violating any regulation issued by the Dangerous Drugs Board (Sec. 32).
Q: Illicit drugs and paraphernalia were found in A’s house. Can this fact alone be used to prosecute
A for illegal possession of drugs under R.A. No. 9165.
A: The finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by a particular
person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to
convict. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession.
(People v. Zaragoza, G.R. No. 223142, January 17, 2018).
Q: Is the mere finding of residue of dangerous drugs in the possession of a person sufficient to
charge such person with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs?
A: No. The objective of the law to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use would be frustrated if persons
can be charged of illegal possession of drugs (having the heavier penalty) based on possession of mere
residue of illegal drugs. (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010).
Q: What are the conditions to be satisfied in order to avail of the exemption from criminal liability
under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9165?
A: First, he has complied with the rules of the center and the board. Second, he has never been convicted
of any offense punishable under R.A. No. 9165, RPC, or any special penal laws. Third, he has no record
of escape from the center. Fourth, he poses no serious danger to himself, his family, or the community by
his exemption from criminal liability (R.A. No. 9165, Sec. 55).
Q: What is a Dangerous Drug?

A: A dangerous drug includes those listed in the Schedules annexed to the 1961 Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and in the Schedules annexed to the 1971 Single
Convention on Psychotropic Substances as enumerated in the attached annex (R.A. No. 9165, Sec. 3 (j)).
Q: A valid search was conducted by police officers on the vehicle driven by X as the police officers
acquired prior knowledge that X’s vehicle was suspected to be used for the transportation of
dangerous drugs. X claimed that he had no knowledge that the vehicle contained illegal drugs and
he was just asked by a person to transport it to another place. Is X liable?
A: Yes, “transport” as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means “to carry or convey from one place to
another.” The very act of transporting illegal drugs is malum prohibitum. It need not be accompanied by
proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge (People v. Morilla, 2014).
Q: X was charged with a violation of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Several personal non-drug effects were taken from him by the PDEA, including a 2004 Honda
Accord car. X filed a motion to demand for the car’s return, alleging that the car did not belong to
him but to his wife, who did not participate in the crime. The lower court released the car, while the
PDEA objected. Should it have been released?
A: No. Pursuant to Section 20 of RA 9165, proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated in favor
of the government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense. However, in this
case, the release of the car was made prematurely. The determination of whether any article confiscated
in relation to the unlawful act would be subject of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to
be rendered in the proceedings. Hence, lower courts should comply strictly with Section 20 and should not
release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the rendition of the
judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act (PDEA v. Brodett, 2011).
Q: Entrapment and instigation:

A:
Entrapment Instigation
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The idea to commit a crime originates from the Takes place when a law enforcement officer
offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to induces a person to commit a crime. The law
commit the offense. (People v. Tapere, 2013) officer conceives the commission of the crime
and suggests it to the accused, who adopts the
Example: Buy-bust operation idea and carries it into execution. (People v.
A prior surveillance is not necessary to render a buy- Tapere, 2013)
bust operation legitimate, especially when the
informant accompanies the operation to the target
area.
A police officer’s act of soliciting drugs from the

accused during a buy-bust operation, or what is
known as a "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by
law and does not render invalid the buy-bust
operations (People v Bajo, 2013)
Q: Under Sec. 15 of RA 9165 (Dangerous Drugs Act), “A person apprehended or arrested, who is
found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test,” shall be punished.
Does Sec. 15 of RA 9165 require drug testing mandatory for any person arrested for any crime?
A: No. The said drug test only covers any unlawful act under Art. II of RA 9165 such importation, sale,
trading, administration, dispensation, cultivation, delivery, distribution and transportation, manufacture and
possession of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals Otherwise, an
involuntary drug testing such as taking a urine sample of a defendant outside of the parameters of RA 9165
would constitute as a violation of his right to privacy and right against self-incrimination (Cruz v. People, GR
200748, July 23, 2014).
Q: May a barangay captain walking around his barangay carrying a licensed firearm but without a
permit to carry be held liable under the New Firearms Law?
A: No, the authority of a Barangay Captain to carry his firearm outside his residence was rooted in the
authority given to him by the Local Government Code, which states that “in the performance of his peace
and order functions, the punong barangay shall be entitled to possess and carry the necessary firearms
within his territorial jurisdiction” (Artillero v. Casimiro, 2012)
Q: Is the use of an unlicensed/loose firearm in the commission of the crime an aggravating

circumstance?
A: The use of an unlicensed/loose firearm, when inherent in the commission of a crime, is an aggravating
circumstance. If it is not inherent, the following rules must be observed:
1. If the penalty for the crime committed is higher than the penalty prescribed for illegal possession, illegal
possession shall be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance.
2. If the penalty for the crime committed is lower than the penalty prescribed for illegal possession, the
penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be imposed.
3. If the penalties for the crime committed and possession of illegal firearm are equal, the penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed in addition to the penalty of the crime committed.
4. If the violation is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or
insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat, it will be absorbed as an element of the latter crimes (Sec. 29,
R.A. 10591 amending R.A. 8294).
Q: When a child in conflict with the law does not qualify for diversion or is not submitted to diversion
by his/her parents, such child can no longer be submitted to diversion proceedings. Is this correct?
A: No. A court can still order the child in conflict with the law to be submitted to diversion measures if: (1)
The maximum penalty of the offense is not more than 12 years imprisonment; and (2) The child has not
been arraigned. (Sec. 37, R.A. No. 9344)
Q: May the child in conflict with the law avail of suspension of his sentence?
A: Suspension of sentence is automatically granted by a court to a child in conflict with the law even if at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, he/she is already 18 but not above 21 years of age. (Sec.
38 and 40 of RA 9344)
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Q: May a child found guilty of a capital offense avail of the automatic suspension of sentence?
A: Yes, the law does not distinguish. (People v Sarcia, 2009)
Q: X was 17 years old when he was charged for violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165 (illegal sale of
prohibited drug). By the time he was convicted and sentenced, he was already 23 years old. Can X
avail of suspension of sentence under R.A. 9344?
A: No, the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to X. The suspension of sentence can
only last until the perpetrator reaches the maximum age of 21 as provided by law, and thus, X could not be
a child for purposes of applying RA 9344. However, he shall be entitled to the right of restoration,
rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with the law to give him the chance to live a normal life and
become a productive member of the community. Accordingly, X may be confined in an agricultural camp
and other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of RA 9344. (People v. Jacinto, 2011)
Q: Who are persons disqualified to avail of the benefits under the Indeterminate Sentence Law?
A: Persons disqualified to avail of the benefits under this law are the following:
1. Persons convicted of offenses punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment;
2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason
3. Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage;
4. Those convicted of piracy;
5. Those who are habitual delinquents;
6. Those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;
7. Those who violated the terms of conditional pardon granted to them by the Chief Executive;
8. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year;
9. Those who, upon the approval of the law (December 5, 1933), had been sentenced by final
judgment; and
10. Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or suspension. (Act. No. 4103, Sec. 2)
Q: Does the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) apply in violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act (RA
7659)?
A: Yes. Drug offenses are not included in the exceptions to the ISL. (People v. Simon, 1994).
Q: Who are not entitled for probation?

A:
1. Sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than 6 years;
2. Convicted of Subversion or any crime against the national security
3. Previously convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of more than 6 months
and 1 day and/or a fine more than P1,000;
4. Once placed on Probation;
5. Already serving sentence at the time the Decree became applicable (Sec. 9, R.A. 10707)
6. Those who have appealed or were convicted of Drug trafficking or drug pushing; (Sec. 24, R.A. 9165)
and
7. Convicted of Election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code (Sec. 264, B.P. 881).
Q: X was guilty of frustrated homicide that imposed a penalty beyond 6 years, disqualifying him for
probation. After his appeal, the court found that he was only liable for attempted homicide with a
penalty less than 6 years. May X apply for probation?
A:Yes. When a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and
such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed
to apply for probation based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final (R.A. 10707).
Q: Can a person be charged for libel under the RPC and subsequently for online libel under the
Cybercrime Law?
A:No, identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. No. 10175 involve
essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes
the computer system as another means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would be a
blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 2014).
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Q: Does mere liking or sharing a post with libelous content amount to aiding or abetting under the
contemplation of the Cybercrime law?
A:No. Section 5 with respect to Section 4 (c) (4) was declared unconstitutional for the terms “aiding or
abetting” constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through
cyberspace posts, comments and other messages. Considering mere liking and/or sharing a post as
criminal acts would encroach upon the freedom of speech. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 2014)
Q: Does mere commenting on a post with libelous content amount to a violation of the Cybercrime
law?
A: It depends. If the comment creates an altogether new defamatory story, then it would be a violation of
the Cybercrime law. Otherwise, it is not. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 2014)
Q: What is the catch-all provision under the Anti-Cybercrime Law?

A: All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, if committed by, through and with the use
of information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act.
Provided, that the penalty to be imposed shall be 1 degree higher than that provided for by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be. (Sec. 6 of RA 10175)
Q: When does piracy, rebellion or insurrection, coup d’ etat, murder, kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, and crimes involving destruction become a crime punishable under HSA?
A: When such crime was done in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand, by
sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, (Sec.
3, HSA)
Q: What are the elements of terrorism?

1. Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following:
A. Piracy in general and Munity in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters;
B. Rebellion or Insurrection;
C. Coup d’état, including acts committed by private persons;
D. Murder; Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention;
E. Crimes Involving Destruction or under The Law on Arson;
F. Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990;
G. Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968;
H. Anti-Hijacking Law;
I. Anti-piracy and Anti-highway Robbery Law of 1974; and
J. Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in,
Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives;
2. Thereby Sowing and Creating Widespread and Extraordinary Fear and Panic among the Populace; And
To Coerce the Government to Give in to an Unlawful Demand
Q: Is there double jeopardy in HSA and RPC?

A: Prosecution under the Human Security Act shall be a bar to another prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any Special Penal Laws. The acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be
a bar to another prosecution for any offense or felony which is necessarily included in the offense charged
under this Act. (Sec. 49, R.A. 9372)
Q: X was charged with violating the Human Security Act by furnishing false testimony during an
investigation of another violation of the HSA. May X be held liable therefor?
A: Yes, the law provides that furnishing forged documents and spurious evidence in any investigation or
hearing is punishable. (Sec. 9, HSA)
Q: What are the punishable acts under the RPC that are punished as well in RA 9372?
A:
1. Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters (Art. 122);
2. Rebellion or Insurrection (Art. 134);
3. (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons (Art. 134-a);
4. Murder (Art. 248);
5. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention (Art. 267);
PAGE 17 OF 23
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6. The Law on Arson;

7. Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act;
8. Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act;
9. Anti-Hijacking Law;
10. Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law; and,
11. Firearms Law (Sec. 3, RA 9372 or the Human Security Act)
Q: Is a Mastermind still necessary to prove the crime of conspiracy to commit plunder?

A: Yes. Section 2 of the Plunder Law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several individuals
that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives
by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons. Such identification of the
main plunderer was not only necessary because the law required such identification, but also because it
was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges they
were being made answerable for. (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, 2016)
Q: In a drug case, accused X contends that the belated submission of the pre-operation report to
the PDEA after the buy-bust operation violates RA 9165; and that the non-presentation of the
unnamed civilian informant who allegedly brokered the transactions casts doubts on the operation.
Is X correct?
A: No. Coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry
out a buy-bust operation. Unless their testimony is absolutely essential to the conviction of the accused, it
may be dispensed with since they would merely be corroborative to the testimonies of the buy-bust team.
(People v. Fernando Havana, G.R. No. 198450, January 11, 2016)
Q: X was charged with violations of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs and drug
paraphernalia. During his trial, the prosecution did not present the forensic chemist. X argues that
the non-presentation of the witness was fatal to its cause since the laboratory report has no
probative value. Was the non-presentation of the forensic chemist fatal?
A: No, non-presentation of the forensic chemist in illegal drugs cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal.
The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons who had custody of the illegal drugs is not a crucial
point against the prosecution. What is important is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
drugs are properly preserved as it had been so in this case. (People v. Calexto Duque Fundales, Jr., G.R.
No. 184606, September 5, 2012).
Q: What are the elements for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under RA 8294?
A: (1) the existence of subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same
does not have the corresponding license. (Teofilo Evangelista v. People, G.R. No. 163267, May 5, 2010).
Q: While in a daze, stupor or near total unconsciousness from drinking alcohol and smoking
marijuana, Y isolated X, a 14-year-old boy, forcibly disrobed X and performed oral sex. Can Y be
convicted of lascivious conduct under RA 7610?
A: Yes. The State had satisfactorily established the following elements of a violation of Section 5(b) of RA
7610: 1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; 2) the said act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse; and 3) the child, whether male
or female, is below 18 years of age. In this case, A was 14 years old when he was subjected to sexual
abuse by the accused. (Nicanor Pinlac v. People, G.R. No. 197458, November 11, 2015)
Q: X was a rehabilitated drug addict. PDEA wanted X to act as poseur-buyer for a buy bust operation
to help capture Y (the seller of X before). When X gave the marked money to Y, the PDEA came in
and arrested both X and Y for violating R.A. No. 9165. What defense does X have under the law?
A: A may invoke Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment. According to section 33, any person who has
violated the possession of dangerous drugs, who voluntarily gives any information leading to the
whereabouts, identities and arrest of all or any of the members thereof shall be exempted from prosecution
or punishment for the offense with reference to which his/her information of testimony were given and may
plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution.
Q: Tiburcio asked Anastacio to join their group for a "session". Thinking that it was for a mahjong
session, Anastacio agreed. Upon reaching Tiburcio’s house, Anastacio discovered that it was
PAGE 18 OF 23
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actually a shabu session. At that precise time, the place was raided by the police, and Anastacio
was among those arrested. What crime can Anastacio be charged with, if any? Explain your answer.
A: Anastacio may not be charged of any crime. Sec. 7 of Rep. Act 9165 on the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs of 2002 punishes employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort where dangerous drugs are used
in any form. But for a visitor of such place to commit the crime, it is a requisite that he “is aware of the nature
of the place as such and shall knowingly visit the same.” These requisites are absent in the facts given.
Q: In a trial, the judge found Z guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and imposed on him a
straight penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor. The public prosecutor objected
to the sentence on the ground that the proper penalty should have been TWELVE (12) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal. The defense counsel chimed in, contending that application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law should lead to the imposition of a straight penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional only. Who of the three is on the right track?
Explain.
A: No one is correct. According to the indeterminate sentence for crimes under the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the maximum term should be taken from the penalty imposed by the RPC. Meanwhile, the minimum
term should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. In homicide, the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal. Therefore, the maximum period must be reclusion temporal and
the minimum period should be within the range of prison mayor. In this case, a straight penalty was
suggested by all three. When the indeterminate sentence law applies, the courts are required to pronounce
a sentence that reflects a minimum and maximum term.
Q: Chris Brown was convicted of a complex crime of direct assault with homicide aggravated by
the commission of the crime in a place where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of
their duties. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. On the other hand, the penalty for direct
assault is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. What is the correct
indeterminate penalty?
A: Twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
(People vs. Rillorta, G.R. No. 57415, December 15, 1989)
Q: In a conviction for homicide, the trial court appreciated two (2) mitigating circumstances and one
(1) aggravating circumstance. Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable
by reclusion temporal, an imprisonment term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Explain.
A: Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the sentence shall be anywhere within the range
of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years imprisonment within the maximum of the sentence shall be anywhere
within the range of Reclusion Temporal minimum i.e., not lower than 12 years and 1 day to not more than
14 years and 8 months.
Q: Can an indorser of a bouncing check be held liable for violating BP 22?

A: Generally, no, except when theirs is conspiracy.
Q: City Engr. A, is the city engineer and the Chairman of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of
the City of Kawawa. In 2009, the City of Kawawa, through an ordinance,allotted the amount of P100
million for the construction of a road leading to the poblacion. City Engr. A instead, diverted the
construction of the road leading to his farm. Investigation further showed that he accepted money
in the amount of P10 million each from three (3) contending bidders, who eventually lost in the
bidding.
Audit report likewise showed that service vehicles valued at P2 million could not be accounted for
although reports showed that these were lent to City Engr. A’s authorized drivers but the same were
never returned. Further, there were funds under City Engr. A’s custody amounting to P10 million
which were found to be missing and could not be accounted for. In another project, he was
instrumentalin awarding a contract for the construction of a city school building costing P10 million
to a close relative, although the lowest bid was P8 million. Investigation also revealed that City Engr.
A has a net worth of more than P50 million, which was way beyond his legitimate income.
PAGE 19 OF 23
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(A) If you are the Ombudsman, what charge or charges will you file against City Engr. A?
A: I will charge him with plunder. Under the provisions of Plunder Law, as amended, plunder is a crime
wherein:
1. the offender is a public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal
acts as described in the same special law; and
3. the aggregate amount or total value of the amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth is at
least fifty (50) million pesos.
Here, all the elements of the crime plunder are present. City Engr. A accumulated more than fifty (50) million
pesos, which was way beyond his legitimate income, through a combination or series of overt criminal acts
such as malversation and direct bribery. Hence, the charge of plunder.
(B) Suppose the discovered net worth of City Engr. Ais less than P50 million, will your answer still
be the same?
A: No, my answer will not be the same. Here, the requisite for plunder that “the aggregate amount or total
value of the amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth is at least fifty (50) million pesos” is absent.
Hence, a different answer (from sub-question A).
A cannot be charged with plunder but shall be proceeded against each of the crimes he committed:
1. Technical malversation
2. Violations of RA 3019
3. Malversation through abandonment or negligence; and
4. Malversation through misappropriation.
Q: Define wheel conspiracy and chain conspiracy. Is either or both kinds existent herein? Explain.
A: In the case at bar, both types of conspiracy exists. The distribution of commissions or gifts by Mr.
Gangnam and the acceptance of Governor Datu, Bokal Diva, Mayor Dolor is the type of wheel conspiracy
where a single person, Mr Gangnam, dealt individually with the public officials to commit the overt acts. The
chain conspiracy, on the other hand, is evident in the overpricing of the sports complex through the
facilitation of Bokal Diva, the conclusion of the agreements by Mayor Dolor, and the distribution of the gifts
by Mr. Gangnam.
Q: X was charged with acts of lasciviousness under RPC for the touching of his penis to AAA’s anal
orifice. It was alleged in the Information that AAA was a minor (11 years old) at the time the incident
occurred. RTC convicted X, but the CA modified the conviction from acts of lasciviousness to
Sexual Abuse under R.A. 7610. Is it valid?
A: Yes. A conviction under R.A. 7610 may be had even if the Information does not expressly allege the
violation of R.A. 7610 as long as the minority of the victim of a sexually abusive conduct is sufficiently
alleged in the Information. Hence, the naming of the offense as “acts of lasciviousness” under RPC does
not preclude the conviction of sexual abuse under R.A. 7610 because the Information sufficiently alleged
the minority of the victim and the sexually abusive conduct. (Ricalde v. People, 2014)
Q: The police investigating team found out that a stolen necklace was in the hands of W, a stone
collector. W testified that she bought the necklace with the intention to sell it to her rich mother-in-
law. W was charged with violating the Anti-fencing law for failing to obtain clearance/permit to sell
second hand articles. Will the charge prosper?
A: No. The clearance stated in PD 1612 is only required if the person or establishment is in the business of
buying and selling of any article, and that such is to be offered for sale to the public. In this case, W is not
in the business of buying and selling necklaces, or any jewelry, and there is no showing that she offered it
for sale to the public. (Lim v. People, G.R. No. 211977, [October 12, 2016])
Q: A bought an Iphone X from a peddler sitting on the footbridge along EDSA for 2,000 pesos. 30
days after, A was charged with a violation of anti-fencing law. He was told only in that moment that
the iphonex was a stolen item. will the case prosper?
A: Yes, Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject
of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing (Sec. 5). Moreover, A should have known
based on the circumstances showing that the item bought was derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft (Sec. 2) (Pamintuan v. People, G.R. 111426, July 11, 1994).
PAGE 20 OF 23
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Q. When can the Regional Trial Court of the Philippines have jurisdiction over cybercrime cases?
A: The RTC has jurisdiction over any violation under the Cybercrime Prevention Act when:
1. The violation is committed by a Filipino national regardless of the place of commission
2. Any of the elements was committed within the Philippines
3. The violation is committed with the use of any computer system wholly or partly situated in the
country, or
4. By such commission any damage is caused to a natural or juridical person who, at the time the offense
was committed, was in the Philippines. (Section 21, R.A 10175 Cybercrime Prevention Act)
Q. Define cyber-squatting
A: The acquisition of a domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation,
and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is: (1) Similar, identical, or confusingly
similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate government agency at the time of the
domain name registration: (2) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the
registrant, in case of a personal name; and (3) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests
in it. (Section 4(6), R.A. 10175 Cybercrime Prevention Act)
Q: A was convicted of a violation section 10 (a) of RA 7610 the penalty of which is prision
correccional. The trial court sentenced A to prision correccional in its maximum period as minimum
to prision mayor in its medium period as maximum. A contends that the ISLAW should be applied
such that the minimum should have been arresto mayor in any of its periods. Is A correct?
A: Yes, according to ISLaw, if the offense uses the nomenclature of the RPC for its penalty, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same (Act No. 4103, Sec. 1) (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 179090).
Q: X, a 17-year old student, committed acts of lasciviousness against his classmate. Five years
after, the trial court found X guilty and sentenced him to a maximum of prision correccional. X
contends that his sentence should be suspended for being a minor. Is he correct?
A: No. Suspension of sentence applies only until the minor reached 21 years old. Since X was already 22
years old at the time of judgment, suspension of sentence would no longer be applicable. Nonetheless, he
may be confined in an agricultural camp. (People v. Jacinto, 2011)
PAGE 21 OF 23

Ateneo Central Bar Operations 2018 Criminal Law Blue Tips Prayer and Criminal Intent

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ATENEO CENTRAL

BAR OPERATIONS 2018 CRIMINAL LAW BLUE TIPS

PRAYER BEFORE EXAMINATIONS

I pray to You, my dear Jesus,

Please never let me resort to chances nor dishonesty,

I pray for your guidance that as I think,

I ask O Lord, Your intercession, that as I write,

Amen. (Fr. Ruperto Santos, STL)

When an escaped prisoner was caught

Q: Distinguish factual impossibility from legal impossibility.

Factual impossibility Legal Impossibility

Q: What is the crime committed when a person steals an unfunded/dishonored check?

Q: What are the examples of aggravating circumstances absorbed by treachery?

Q: Under Article 19(3), when is an accessory liable?

Q: What are the rules on computation of penalties under Art. 28 RPC?

Q: Discuss the application of Art 39 Subsidiary Liability.

Q: What are the ways of partial extinction of criminal liability?

Q: What is allowance for good conduct?

Q: How is good conduct allowance applied?

First 2 years 20 days

3rd-5th year 23 days

6th-10th year 25 days

11th year and above 30 days

Q: What happens if the offender appeals?

Q: What is special time allowance for loyalty?

Q: May quasi-recidivism be appreciated in violations of special penal laws?

Q: Can quasi-recidivism be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstance?

Q: Distinguish unlawful arrest (Art. 269) from other legal detention

Q: Is robbery with violence or intimidation against persons complex crime?

Q: When are robbery and homicide separate offenses?

Q: Is there a crime of robbery with attempted rape?

Q: When does rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery?

Q: X issued a memorandum stating that Z needs psychiatric treatment to prevent further

Q: What is the rule on overtaking in cases of reckless imprudence?

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Q: Is there a conspiracy by silence and inaction under the Anti-Graft Law?

Q: Define partiality, bad faith, and gross negligence.

Q: What are the elements of hazing?

Q: What is the procedure in allowing hazing?

Q: What is the non-refoulement rule?

Q: What are the elements of trafficking of persons?

Q: What is slavery in the context of Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act?

Q: What is Battered Woman Syndrome?

Q: Can VAWC be committed by a woman?

Q: Can VAWC be committed by parents-in-law through conspiracy?

Q: What are the four links of a valid chain of custody?

Q: Who are required to be present in the physical inventory?

Q: What is a Dangerous Drug?

Q: Entrapment and instigation:

A police officer’s act of soliciting drugs from the

Q: Is the use of an unlicensed/loose firearm in the commission of the crime an aggravating

Q: Who are not entitled for probation?

Q: What is the catch-all provision under the Anti-Cybercrime Law?

Q: What are the elements of terrorism?

Q: Is there double jeopardy in HSA and RPC?

6. The Law on Arson;

Q: Is a Mastermind still necessary to prove the crime of conspiracy to commit plunder?

Q: Can an indorser of a bouncing check be held liable for violating BP 22?

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