G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the
political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners

who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a

legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out
 to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated,
one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to
the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion
of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in
the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment
such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of
the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who
are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work
within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in
the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
 MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore,
the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice
of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and
two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law
is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to
an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which
the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in

corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and
the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a
master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the
legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services
of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and
every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado

de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele
composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is
that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal
research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or
not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a
corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running
of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in
a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country
is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys
do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow
the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who
fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to
the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-
state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously
with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public
entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in
some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises
a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for
new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users
to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles
more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly
by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part
of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities
of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this
nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a
global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today
to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or
by decisions.
 This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain
a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic
legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central
Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far
as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and
in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,
1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they
beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet
genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and
Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in

which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do
so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. (
Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what
was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
 times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the
phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming
with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying
on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00
pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.
 DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-

quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC,
INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed
and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore
quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required
the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The
said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in
this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish

the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense
would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For
who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in
need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies
like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act
of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through
newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities
in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all,
to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name,
it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal
problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems.
More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic
connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of

the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces
the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name
of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support

services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have
it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts
contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question

are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce
is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a

man and woman entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message

being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is
not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law.
At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at

defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with
the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the
Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded
that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged
or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers
do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the
bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the

publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least,
from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic
data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can
be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed
by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their
having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the
legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar
but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its

services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be

prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad
of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law.
While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may
be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal
opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action
to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself
to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at

members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized
to practice law or perform legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should
be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being
clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means
of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court.5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals,
with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to
the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment
for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself
to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be
handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the
latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed.,
p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and
such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to
practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal
services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot
ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of
the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name,
the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice
of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned
to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law
practice.6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein,
are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See
pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated
above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit
outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly
on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the
legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and
which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities
of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally
term as "the practice of law."7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should
be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of
study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the

administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the
general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers
which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not
by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give

the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of
its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help
matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely
by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved
in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President
and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article."9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and
against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and
pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in
the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law.
And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use
of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot)
justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet
to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so,
are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our
laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses
of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent
guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render

effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute
the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the
law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance
with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law —
accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are
acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of
the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good
example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building
and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and
who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is
not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to

engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations
field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer
always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case.
The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the
officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge
and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of
it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the same
service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized

profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that]
a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical
education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in
their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider

his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can
imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's
obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But
such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning
code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice
of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to members of
the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a
welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the

employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining,
 with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law.
Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent
particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person
appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where
the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the
land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that
only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between
an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not
handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before

administrative agencies of the federal government, especially before
trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of
the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the
Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such
agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with
such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by
one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor
Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of
his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board
allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53
A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
(which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation

concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-
Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a
non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a
bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the
subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and
give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which

publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules
stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution
to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the
conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as
to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice
of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted
texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there
exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status
of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most
the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person
in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits,
such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of
law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the
sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement
any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment
against defendant having an interest in any publishing house
publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does
fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100
for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal
contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the
preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial
 cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in
the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore
sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly
with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection
with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement
sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270
[1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal
advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It
is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the
judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code),
no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or
render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to
assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business
to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving
advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with
respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,

associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
 business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.],
pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in
Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice
of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services
it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained

paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information
about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage
or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign
country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities
engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law.
That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and
be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No
matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-
Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation,
and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the
big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for
the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has
been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If
you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to
inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation.
There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order,
and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and
only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now,
if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a
litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which
it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar
who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities
of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the
protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control.27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there
are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the
United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major
standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for
the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to
certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the
American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice
law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services,
but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from
persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value
to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services
or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is
a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was
held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the

respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus
to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-
product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in
a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent
is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees
for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate
of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such
an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what
is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice
of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will
be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to
refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or
engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of
the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code
of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of
the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the
integrity of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are
given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote
being unanimous with the late.

Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated.
The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it
"is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2

Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not
be amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29.
1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP
since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its
then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and
approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ...
Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire
into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be submit by registered
mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court
required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his
comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On
March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for
hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3

Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in
Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership
in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4

The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled,
as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP
and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal
force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous case
before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively
considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6 The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was
that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally
unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become
an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively." 7

As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered,
there were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for
reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine
refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it would
be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic
juridical concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of intellect. Since
respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other
cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with
invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance
arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was
more than justified.

Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on his
part was discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character
invoked — the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former
clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his
career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.

This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the
resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the
competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and
can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years
had elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into
account. It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and
paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline,
especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. 11

One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as
admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be
borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations
evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be
considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.

The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.

Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of
the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the
integrity of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are
given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote
being unanimous with the late.

Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated.
The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it
"is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2

Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not
be amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29.
1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP
since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its
then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and
approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ...
Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire
into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be submit by registered
mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court
required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his
comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On
March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for
hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3

Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in
Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership
in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4

The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled,
as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP
and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal
force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous case
before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively
considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6 The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was
that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally
unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become
an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively." 7

As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered,
there were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for
reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine
refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it would
be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic
juridical concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of intellect. Since
respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other
cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with
invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance
arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was
more than justified.

Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on his
part was discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character
invoked — the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former
clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his
career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the
resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the
competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and
can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years
had elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into
account. It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and
paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline,
especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. 11

One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as
admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be
borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations
evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be
considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.

The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.

Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court
governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed
to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per
cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of
Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since
1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court
passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent
in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74
per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No.
972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those
admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12
which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent
effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that
request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it
approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the
members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill
to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in
an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM

NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one

hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and
forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member
of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half
or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in
any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to
have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers
were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are
also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking
the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the
bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally
to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly
classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act
No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of
the law, the following statistical data are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972
total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953 2,555
968 284
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed
either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to
obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different
subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the
passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which
only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually
presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of
1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending because they could be
favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated, this tribunal
finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to
its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of
the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question
may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente
Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's
Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad
Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and
Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M.
Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera,
Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the
court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question
has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the
voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as
humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion
of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David
stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap
which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome
such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of
students who took up law soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is
claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they
suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was
exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal
profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the
times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the
practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is
entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those
inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a
serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading
materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and private enterprises
had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been
published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction
since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed
locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946,
which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public
knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles,
but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar
background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the
long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system established
here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and
attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From
the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law
had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day,
54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the
President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the
contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated,
the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to
us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of
New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to
be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of
Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be
consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of
them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or
the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office.
Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to
practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed.
The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been
exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to
practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this
power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this
particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of
this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme
Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action
referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit
means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of
refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor
of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for
admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find
in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the
Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution
of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors,
the students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a
test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the
latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential,
unnecessary and burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and
for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for
that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be
given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense
with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing
whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the
age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational
interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this
extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the
present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)

xxx xxx xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission,
that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that
question. (p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly
seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the
bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.

(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the
matter of admission of the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six
centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to
Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court
regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and
principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3)
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial
function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if
previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked
or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in
the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment
providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this
decision we quote the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute
Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of
legislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1,
art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve
the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and
further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty
which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass
the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of
the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10
Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the
judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an
attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small
 degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach
to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at
least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the
adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament
since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted
to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's
New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be
regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a
constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with
assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of
the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity
and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and
coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power
traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no
express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of
the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the
dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments
of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might
embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at
law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the
legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express
constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications
of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the
public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of
attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not
constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its
selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond
which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course
of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel
courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an
attorney at law. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely

true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to
admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New
Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys
receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the
court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285;
Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43,
119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the
courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to
practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to
 confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the
licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where
the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the
Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there
be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character.
This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority
over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from
incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was
said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E.
487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One
is admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the
court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His
cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was
withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be
hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the
common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is
almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish
and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The
establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary to
the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power
of such a department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be
admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect
from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19
How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law
courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of
its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed."
(p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath
for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows:
"They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their
possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general
practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court
the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they,
respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient
evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel
moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is
fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite
qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct
causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible
to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only
be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is
not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has
 been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the
matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and
Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties
relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment
may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very
justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-
651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the

exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent
powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent
power of the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it
is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines
rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at
the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to
alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial
inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the
practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so.
Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as
is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
 Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility
which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this
Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the
power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court,
but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal,
alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place
of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor
mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a
determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or
supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service
of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to
admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal
profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may
and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to
the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together
for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up
any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a
good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession,
should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and
see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty
of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers
which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary
to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and
exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed
by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had
been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous
examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote
province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:

Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds
the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
 Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled
"An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the
Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of
the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the
Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General,
Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney
General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city
attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for
the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands
without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to
the satisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to
pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal
learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to
the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the
required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former
application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts
of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning
and ability."

But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled
as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion
before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now
holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind
the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited
amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the
fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which
specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is
contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to
the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the
power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16
and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed
to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting
 the power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending
its rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated,
and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of
this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant.
But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not
and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in
the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that
his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession
of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this
application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short
of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that
since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of
Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the
duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine
Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office
of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No.
1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he
offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given
him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if
he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by
general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character,
or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from
the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is
arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began
studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued
by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to
those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned
date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class
legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas
from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899,
under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled
"An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884,
in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists
in the addition to the section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall
comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the
time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or
college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in
said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to
December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of
every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this
state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the
student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the
study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good
moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for
two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law
school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted
upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board in the branches now required by the
rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it
is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and
establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,

prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit
attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could
prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of
the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a
general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law
is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and
confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees
therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil
process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be general in its
operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify
persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable
relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable
basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal
Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad
Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may
furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place
where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis,
and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs.
Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve
as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have
some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is
limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897.
This class is subdivided into two classes — First, those presenting diplomas issued by any
law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for
the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law
 office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules
of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with,
and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is
prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of
course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation
to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of
November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began
the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as
those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in
study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they
would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If
possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899,
and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must
be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any
natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The
proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp.
647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature
attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its
aspect of being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and
license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner
here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all
alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact
qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case
of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling,
business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon
all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many respects be considered
as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to
every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring
years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is
sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them — that is, the right to continue their
prosecution — is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from
them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental
under our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of
medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of
his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and
courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those
practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call,
121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172,
76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law
and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It
is not material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he
possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact
 in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an
individual upon whom it would confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to
admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval
forces of the United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge
therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of
Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose
disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This
Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the
constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W.
179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153

as follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded
and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes
avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences,
as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made
applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference
between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must
rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a
difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the
situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their
liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it
operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate
on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have
obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent
in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in
1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the
Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has
been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the
abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then
the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of
those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by
years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before
said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of
examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means
his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is
argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the
bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained
only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in
1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by
the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances
deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years
were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done —
cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly
not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been
done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent
obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law.
Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the
cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954
and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said
candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what
the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the
Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done
during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was
not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or
suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress,
because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which
such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The
grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are
not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing
laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The
system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was
abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article
is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of
the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from
article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional
and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of
1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly
found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates,
depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to
become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in
an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these
810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is
admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this
Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972
violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement
the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be,
intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the
practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good
bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to
render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law
students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of
1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall
continue in force.

RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the
debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our
beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in
voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved,
and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to
1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force
and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and
shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations
of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953
obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in
any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not.
After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ANNEX I

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:

August, 19461
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo
Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin
Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez
Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.
Number of candidates 206
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12
73'S 6
72'S 6
Number of candidates who passed 85
Number of candidates who failed 121
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18
Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62
Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74
Passing grade (per cent) 72
November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose
Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
Number of candidates 481
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 19
(72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---
Minutes of March 31, 1947)
Number of candidates who passed 249
Number of candidates who failed 228
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 43
Percentage of success (per cent) 52.20
Percentage of failure (per cent) 47.80
Passing grade (per cent) 72
(By resolution of the Court).
October, 1947
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.
Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa,
Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty.
Carlos B. Hilado, Members.
Number of candidates 749
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 43
70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per 1
cent
69 per cent 40
68 per cent 2
Number of candidates who passed 409
Number of candidates who failed 340
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 972
Percentage of success (per cent) 54.59
Percentage of failure (per cent) 45.41
Passing grade (per cent) 69
(by resolution of the Court).

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1
per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were not
benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in
Civil Law.
August, 1948
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis
P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico
Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael
Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
Number of candidates 899
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 64
71's 29
70's 35
Number of candidates who passed 490
Number of candidates who failed 409
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 11
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.40
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.60
Passing grade (per cent) 70
(by resolution of the Court).
August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo,
Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia,
Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Number of candidates 1,218
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 55
(74's)
Number of candidates who passed 686
Number of candidates who failed 532
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 164
Percentage of success (per cent) 56.28
Percentage of failure (per cent) 43.72
Passing grade (per cent) 74
(by resolution of the Court).
August, 1950
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.
Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B.
Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco
A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.
Number of candidates 1,316
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 38
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and
authority
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
Number of candidates who passed 432
Number of candidates who failed 894
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 26
Percentage of success (per cent) 32.14
Percentage of failure (per cent) 67.86
Passing grade (per cent) 75
August, 1951
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon.
Alfonso Felix, Members.
Number of candidates 2,068
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 112
(74's)
Number of candidates who passed 1,189
Number of candidates who failed 879
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 196
Percentage of success (per cent) 57.49
Percentage of failure (per cent) 42.51
Passing grade (per cent) 75
August, 1952
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio
Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty.
 Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
Number of candidates 2,738
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 163
(74's)
Number of candidates who passed 1,705
Number of candidates who failed 1,033
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 426
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.27
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.73
Passing grade (per cent) 75
August, 1953
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio
Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
Number of candidates 2,555
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 100
(74's)
Number of candidates who passed 1,570
Number of candidates who failed 986
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 284
Percentage of success (per cent) 61.04
Percentage of failure (per cent) 38.96
Passing grade (per cent) 75

A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in
which they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for
reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration without
invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:

PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
Av.
MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L. 66 71 61 76 80 83 73 75 71.4
MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74 75 70 70 65 72 71.45
MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65 68 83 74 68 80 69.85
1948
MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66 75 63 75 70 88 69.9
MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73 65 63 66 65 80 69.95
MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71 75 78 68 65 50 69.65
1949
7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 75 71 89 55 75 70.8
 MRD- 8. Advincula, David D. 76 80 62 86 81 72 60 65 70.5
9. Agraviador, Alfredo L. 63 85 70 77 80 81 65 80 71.8
10. Alacar, Pascual C. 61 63 83 79 71 85 65 80 72.05
11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 66 76 78 81 74 55 85 72.2
12. Apolinario, Miguel S. 75 84 78 78 70 70 60 75 71.95
13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 77 71 77 76 77 60 75 73.15
14. Asinas, Candido D. 75 83 69 80 81 83 55 85 72.65
15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 65 72 82 82 69 60 80 71.95
16. Balintona, Bernardo 75 80 64 78 74 67 65 70 70
17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70 75 81 83 60 60 72.3
18. Bandala, Anacleto A. 66 80 66 71 93 72 55 70 69.6
19. Bandon, Alawadin L. 74 79 69 77 91 73 60 80 73.35
20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 79 64 77 85 72 65 75 72.5
21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.5
22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T. 75 71 72 78 67 82 60 75 70.85
23. Canda, Benjamin S. 75 72 75 82 76 77 65 75 73.55
24. Canon, Guillermo 77 86 67 88 75 69 70 85 73.9
25. Carlos, Estela S. 75 81 81 79 72 73 65 70 73.8
26. Cerezo, Gregorio O. 69 76 76 79 71 80 55 80 70.4
27. Clarin, Manuel L. 75 82 76 81 73 69 70 75 73.95
28. Claudo, Conrado O. 76 62 78 77 73 72 60 70 71.4
29. Condevillamar, Antonio 68 65 74 80 85 75 60 75 71.65
V.
MRD- 30. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 72 75 69 82 83 79 65 80 73.4
31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 76 73 81 81 72 60 75 71.15
32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 86 69 83 75 74 65 80 73.1
33. Enriquez, Agustin P. 75 77 70 81 81 77 65 80 73.75
34. Espiritu, Irineo E. 80 88 69 75 76 77 65 75 73.8
35. Fernandez, Macario J. 63 82 76 75 81 84 65 75 72.95
36. Gallardo, Amando C. 78 79 67 77 76 75 60 65 70.95
37. Garcia, Freidrich M. 76 80 66 75 72 70 60 75 69.7
38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 77 68 82 89 77 65 75 72.15
39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71 80 60 82 65 75 71.85
40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73 81 74 83 60 85 73.6
41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 91 79 75 72 75 65 80 71.8
42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70 78 87 76 55 80 72.7
43. Gonzales, Amado P. 75 71 71 75 86 75 60 75 72.65
44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66 81 74 76 60 75 70.9
45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 68 71 80 74 90 65 75 70.85
 46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 83 73 82 61 87 65 70 73.6
47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 83 67 79 78 85 60 75 72.45
48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74 77 74 64 55 85 70.65
49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 76 73 82 60 85 70
50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74 80 70 70 65 85 70.3
51. Layumas, Vicente L. 67 84 65 75 89 66 60 80 70.3
52. Leyson, Amancio F. 69 83 75 76 81 75 65 75 73.15
53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61 77 80 81 65 85 71.75
54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 65 70 71.15
55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71 65 80 70.4
56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75
57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 72 79 81 55 80 71
58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60 75 77 85 60 75 70.7
59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70 78 77 84 60 75 71.55
60. Manoleto, Proceso D. 72 70 65 78 81 90 60 80 71.95
61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75 75 68 79 60 65 71
63. Mercado, Arsenio N. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
64. Miranda, Benjamin G. 76 81 67 82 74 77 65 80 72.55
65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 82 69 72 65 75 71.15
1948
66. Orosco, Casimiro P. 72 84 69 81 70 82 65 75 71.9
67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68 80 79 79 50 75 70.1
68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82 71 55 87 55 75 69.6
69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69 93 80 79 55 80 69.5
70. Pañganiban, Jose V. 67 83 61 81 91 74 60 75 70.6
71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81 67 74 60 70 68.75
72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78 73 78 71 55 75 71.25
73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71 77 83 82 65 75 72.1
74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63 80 71 85 70 80 72.05
75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 81 76 68 55 80 71.6
76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C. 72 78 68 89 79 81 65 85 73.55
77. Regalario, Benito B. 72 80 64 80 75 81 55 80 69.55
78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 73 68 80 70 80 70.9
79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70 81 76 75 65 75 70.75
80. Rodriguez, Mariano I. 80 75 69 80 72 80 65 80 73.35
81. Romero, Crispulo P. 78 75 66 77 76 83 65 75 72.85
82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 81 69 77 60 75 71
83. Saliguma, Crisogono D. 79 79 74 78 69 65 65 70 71.8
 84. Samano, Fortunato A. 75 84 72 77 70 82 60 75 71.9
85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68 76 75 85 55 75 69.5
86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76 71 77 82 65 75 72.3
87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69 79 77 82 65 75 73.25
88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 85 55 83 89 79 65 80 71.25
89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 75 70 75 60 75 70.85
90. Tesorero, Leocadio T. 75 71 63 75 82 62 65 63 69.65
91. Torre, Valentin S. de la 85 81 71 76 69 65 55 70 70.4
92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 71 72 81 61 84 55 85 70.4
93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de 70 75 71 79 65 80 65 80 70.65
94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 55 80 70.7
95. Villacarlos, Delfin A. 73 87 71 82 69 70 75 85 73.85
96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 81 76 86 86 73 55 85 73.6
97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67 75 76 76 60 75 70.6
1950
MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de la 70 71 78 81 76 72 64 96 73.4
99. Española, Pablo S. 71 78 55 76 85 69 65 93 70.2
100. Foronda, Clarencio J. 60 78 68 79 84 88 62 93 71.9
101. Hechanova, Vicente 59 76 75 75 69 68 75 96 71.3
MRD- Peñalosa, Osias R. 80 78 61 76 61 77 66 85 70.2
102.
103. Sarmiento, Floro A. 65 86 63 82 89 72 60 72 70.15
MRD- Torre, Catalino P. 75 85 68 78 69 67 65 69 70.25
104.
105. Ungson, Fernando S. 61 87 75 70 57 85 83 82 72.8
1951
106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 70 64 65 76 70 76 64 71.7
107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74 65 69 51 78 67 70.4
108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 63 68 75 70 69 75 75 71.25
109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66 75 76 60 77 76 72.35
MRD- Añosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63 75 74 61 75 79 71.6
110.
111. Antiola, Anastacio R. 68 76 75 70 71 70 81 66 73.05
112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 71 71 60 74 62 76 77 71.1
113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 78 68 80 86 51 82 75 73.85
114. Avanceña, Alfonso 71 71 65 75 70 72 78 80 71.8
MRD- Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 73 75 70 72 65 75 76 73.25
115.
116. Barinaga, Jeremias L. 68 69 73 70 74 50 80 79 71.2
MRD- Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 60 67 55 74 63 77 62 70.25
 117.
MRD- Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 75 60 73 72 75 78 72.2
118.
119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67 65 66 72 77 68 71.25
MRD- Briñas, Isagani A. 71 69 74 70 76 52 79 72 71.95
120.
121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 77 61 70 71 58 79 71 69.75
122. Cabilao, Leonardo S. 73 50 75 75 75 60 71 79 71.25
123. Cabrera, Ireneo M. 75 66 70 65 72 81 70 79 72.4
124. Cacacho, Emilio V.
125. Calilung, Soledad C. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
MRD- Calimlim, Jose B. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
126.
127. Calimlim, Pedro B. 66 82 69 60 69 52 83 75 70
128. Camello, Sotero H. 70 77 63 65 75 66 84 64 71.55
129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70 75 64 69 71 62 70.15
130. Castillo, Antonio del 78 78 70 60 79 67 69 76 72.65
MRD- Castillo, Dominador Ad. 75 61 72 75 74 71 67 66 71.1
131.
MRD- Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72 75 65 75 76 71 72.85
132.
133. Casuga, Bienvenido B. 75 72 72 70 69 61 75 60 70.95
134. Cabangbang, Santiago 77 67 61 80 73 59 83 76 72.2
B.
135. Cruz, Federico S. 69 74 75 75 68 65 76 70 71.65
136. Dacanay, Eufemio P. 70 73 62 75 72 69 85 71 72.05
137. Deysolong, Felisberto 66 62 72 75 70 62 83 62 70.85
MRD- Dimaano, Jr., Jose N. 78 79 63 75 73 75 81 59 73.5
138.
139. Espinosa, Domingo L. 78 63 58 70 70 67 87 63 71.6
MRD- Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66 75 81 72 62 73 72.25
140.
141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 65 70 58 75 69 70.75
142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 85 73 68 78 75 72.35
143. Gandioco, Salvador G. 64 58 66 65 76 70 89 75 72.1
144. Gastardo, Crispin B. 70 69 68 75 78 66 86 72 73.9
145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 65 67 54 78 56 69.55
146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75 65 74 67 75 77 71.5
147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67 60 78 52 83 61 69.6
MRD- Homeres, Praxedes P. 74 74 75 75 71 69 75 71 73.35
148.
 149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74 70 74 70 80 75 71.9
150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75 75 72 56 82 77 73.7
MRD- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 71 70 63 85 71 60 85 53 70.85
151.
152. Inandan, Fortunato C. 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 72.5
153. Jimenez, Florencio C. 75 70 70 75 72 61 75 78 72.05
154. Kintanar, Woodrow M. 70 83 72 65 76 73 75 69 72.95
155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63 85 70 61 85 79 70.55
156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75 55 73 63 75 78 70.55
157. Llenos, Francisco U. 64 70 65 60 72 65 92 75 71.75
158. Leon, Marcelo D. de 63 73 60 85 75 75 90 70 72.75
159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60 65 76 67 84 68 71.35
160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 70 67 57 75 75 70.15
MRD- Magsino, Encarnacion 77 66 70 70 76 71 75 61 72.75
161.
MRD- Maligaya, Demetrio M. 70 61 75 65 75 50 91 51 72.3
162.
163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 80 71 67 75 75 70.65
164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60 60 69 70 68 72 62.05
MRD- Marcial, Meynardo R. 66 75 74 70 75 67 81 75 73.15
165.
166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63 75 69 63 84 62 70.1
MRD- Monterroyo, Catalina S. 70 80 75 80 76 66 82 51 73.95
167.
MRD- Montero, Leodegario C. 73 67 66 80 81 65 81 75 73.75
168.
169. Monzon, Candido T. 70 72 74 75 67 70 77 69 72.05
170. Natividad, Alberto M. 73 79 68 65 73 69 75 79 72.2
MRD- Navallo, Capistrano C. 70 72 68 85 81 66 71 74 72.1
171.
172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 65 79 68 85 62 73.5
MRD- Ocampo, Antonio F. de 75 81 76 65 74 67 75 69 73.75
173.
174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 55 66 70 77 75 70.5
MRD- Perez, Cesario Z. 75 76 66 80 72 63 82 69 72.95
175.
176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65 70 75 64 75 70 69.95
177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 75 73 62 65 78 59 75 66 70.2
178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 76 68 75 74 68 80 53 72.3
MRD- Redor, Francisco K. 62 77 73 75 69 64 76 69 70
179.
 MRD- Regis, Deogracias A. 76 74 68 65 65 65 88 75 73.35
180.
181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 78 61 80 71 77 79 65 70.9
MRD- Rimorin-Gordo, Estela 70 72 62 60 88 66 67 79 70.15
182.
183. Rosario, Prisco del 70 64 70 70 72 73 85 57 72.65
184. Rosario, Vicente D. del 75 91 65 75 68 68 79 62 72.2
185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 80 63 75 76 73 68 62 70.35
186. Salazar, Alfredo N. 66 72 73 75 67 68 77 69 70.85
187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 81 72 65 73 60 76 75 73
188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 65 70 76 64 72.5
189. Santa Ana, Candido T. 77 69 65 75 81 75 70 75 73
190. Santos, Aquilino 72 66 69 65 68 70 81 71 71.7
191. Santos, Valeriano V. 76 72 75 75 68 62 76 79 73.1
192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 75 71 59 84 65 73.3
193. Suson, Teodorico 74 68 66 80 66 59 79 67 70.35
194. Tado, Florentino P. 64 76 67 65 76 72 76 53 69.7
195. Tapayan, Domingo A. 69 72 69 70 76 73 82 79 73.75
MRD- 67 60 71 75 79 67 84 60 72.7
Tiausas, Miguel V.
196.
197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 71 71 70 70 63 82 71 71.6
198. Tria, Hipolito 69 72 75 60 69 54 78 66 70.05
199. Velasco, Avelino A. 65 72 75 75 71 67 78 76 72.1
200. Villa, Francisco C. 65 80 73 75 68 79 65 75 70.2
201. Villagonzalo, Job R. 78 67 74 65 72 51 69 71 70.25
202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro 75 74 75 55 75 66 67 75 71.45
1952
203. Abacon, Pablo 75 72 78 81 78 72 64 55 72.7
MRP- Abad, Agapito 73 76 73 85 75 63 62 75 70.95
204.
MRP- Abella, Ludovico B. 70 81 76 81 70 66 77 58 72.7
205.
MRP- Abellera, Geronimo F. 75 79 79 87 76 51 63 70 71.7
206.
MRP- Abenojar, Agapito N. 71 72 78 84 70 75 69 70 72.9
207.
208. Alandy, Doroteo R. 64 83 93 91 68 59 60 60 71.2
209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61 83 72 87 72 70 71.9
MRP- Alcantara, Pablo V. 71 79 80 81 73 70 72 62 73.65
210.
211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag. 75 85 71 73 76 65 68 65 71.85
 212. Acosta, Dionisio N. 75 81 78 87 56 65 77 70 72.8
MRP- Abinguna, Agapito C. 66 85 80 84 75 58 76 75 73.65
213.
214. Adove, Nehemias C. 76 86 78 77 66 78 69 62 73.55
215. Adrias, Inocencio C. 75 83 61 88 76 67 79 75 73.4
216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73 88 72 62 72 62 72.65
217. Andrada, Mariano L. 76 85 66 87 63 77 75 77 73.
MRP- Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72 75 81 61 67 73 65 70.75
218.
219. Almonte-Peralta, 73 71 72 91 75 67 65 53 70.7
Felicidad
MRP- Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68 85 62 64 75 78 71.4
220.
MRP- Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81 83 79 52 72 70 73.3
221.
MRP- Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90 68 65 64 68 60 73.75
222.
223. Añonuevo, Ramos B. 71 87 78 81 64 63 74 76 72.7
224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 78 69 70 69 80 67.7
225. Arteche, Filomeno D. 78 83 50 89 76 77 70 70 70.8
MRP- Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 81 73 70 67 78 72.2
226.
MRP- Azucena, Ceferino D. 72 67 78 89 72 67 77 65 73.95
227.
228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 79 66 55 75 75 70.85
229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 73.3
MRP- Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 83 80 69 70 61 65 73
230.
231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 90 64 60 67 50 70.65
232. Barilea, Dominador Z. 71 67 82 77 64 61 65 80 70.5
MRP- Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77 81 75 63 71 75 73.95
233.
MRP- Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 70 67 80 67 65 70 81 70.7
234.
235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 88 62 76 67 78 71.2
236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84 85 58 61 71 62 71.25
237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63 87 80 67 80 70 72.75
238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 92 70 66 67 62 72.65
MRP- Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 73 75 71 76 76 72.85
239.
MRP- Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80 73 82 63 77 75 50 73.15
240.
MRP- Beltran, Gervasio M. 72 75 81 73 75 57 75 80 73.95
241.
MRP- Benaojan, Robustiano O. 74 84 77 84 75 63 68 62 72.85
242.
MRP- Beriña, Roger C. 70 80 79 79 68 72 64 78 71.85
243.
MRP- Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65 92 64 64 84 75 73.45
244.
MRP- Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69 78 83 73 59 70 82 72.75
245.
MRP- Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76 83 68 59 71 78 73.05
246.
247. Buenafe, Avelina R. 78 80 75 75 70 55 72 80 72.75
248. Bueno, Anastacio F. 73 78 71 78 71 67 71 60 71.15
249. Borres, Maximino L. 67 85 62 91 72 63 76 80 70.9
MRP- Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71 76 75 74 70 71 60 72.2
250.
MRP- Cabello, Melecio F. 72 78 78 89 58 70 67 71 70.5
251.
MRP- Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 88 53 91 71 85 75 76 73.3
252.
253. Cabreros, Paulino N. 71 79 83 84 60 62 71 50 70.85
254. Calayag, Florentino R. 69 79 66 88 69 75 68 76 70.6
MRP- Calzada, Cesar de la 76 72 80 67 62 71 66 62 70.85
255.
256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 77 78 51 75 75 73.7
MRP- Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87 69 80 58 64 78 75 71.8
257.
258. Calañgi, Mateo C. 73 93 71 87 70 66 69 62 71.8
259. Canda, Benjamin S. 72 71 77 90 62 75 66 82 71.95
260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 80 71 89 70 55 72 75 71
261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado 67 78 71 90 65 75 72 60 70.65
262. Capitulo, Alejandro P. 75 70 53 87 78 63 76 91 71.2
MRP- Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 75 93 81 76 64 75 68 56 73.15
263.
MRP- Caluya, Arsenio V. 75 86 70 87 77 52 77 82 73.9
264.
MRP- Campanilla, Mariano B. 80 75 78 77 73 71 63 76 73.65
265.
MRP- Campos, Juan A. 66 85 83 84 67 61 80 57 73.25
266.
267. Cardoso, Angelita G. 78 71 73 76 79 56 69 60 71.8
268. Cartagena, Herminio R. 71 72 65 89 64 73 80 70 71.65
MRP- Castro, Daniel T. 65 75 77 76 85 60 75 69 73.15
269.
270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V. 70 78 72 73 77 69 64 80 71.2
271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 68 69 87 76 75 72 70 73.35
272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 86 60 54 76 75 71.75
273. Colorado, Alfonso R. 68 75 80 74 77 66 67 80 72.6
274. Chavez, Doroteo M. 73 65 79 84 73 69 66 84 73.1
275. Chavez, Honorato A. 77 76 79 86 74 53 71 75 73.65
MRP- Cobangbang, Orlando B. 69 81 74 82 76 61 78 80 73.85
276.
277. Cortez, Armando R. 78 60 88 86 60 66 69 64 73.1
278. Crisostomo, Jesus L. 76 87 74 76 62 55 76 66 71.45
MRP- Cornejo, Crisanto R. 68 87 78 86 79 50 80 60 73.7
279.
MRP- Cruz, Raymundo 75 81 79 85 72 57 68 75 72.95
280.
MRP- Cunanan, Jose C. 78 92 63 83 76 72 68 65 72.4
281.
282. Cunanan, Salvador F. 70 82 64 92 67 75 73 76 71.45
283. Cimafranca, Agustin B. 71 76 76 80 70 71 75 71 73.35
284. Crisol, Getulio R. 70 91 78 85 68 55 71 50 70.8
MRP- Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 82 69 82 66 62 80 71 72.85
285.
MRP- Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72 86 80 55 68 79 71.5
286.
287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87 83 71 50 65 70 71.25
MRP- Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80 82 74 80 67 67 57 73.65
288.
289. Delgado, Vicente N. 70 84 82 84 77 52 73 50 72.65
MRP- Diolazo, Ernesto A. 75 83 86 73 54 54 75 75 72.25
290.
291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo 73 84 64 89 71 78 75 66 72.8
MRP- Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77 71 81 69 75 80 70 73.65
292.
MRP- Dipasupil, Claudio R. 70 76 82 73 79 70 72 56 73.9
293.
MRP- Delgado, Abner 75 84 63 67 64 60 70 72 68.35
294.
MRP- Domingo, Dominador T. 70 69 81 82 68 63 71 75 72.2
295.
296. Ducusin, Agapito B. 70 78 53 88 75 77 62 76 68.05
MRP- Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78 86 76 72 64 75 73.9
 297.
298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73 83 66 67 65 66 70.65
299. Ebbah, Percival B. 70 80 85 76 66 63 76 75 73.95
300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 89 75 62 75 65 72
301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84 84 71 59 69 86 73.4
MRP- Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 93 72 67 65 75 73.2
302.
MRP- Encarnacion, Alfonso B. 75 86 73 81 63 77 69 75 72.65
303.
304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58 68 66 64 75 78 67.1
305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74 86 58 67 70 76 71.7
MRP- Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80 82 80 71 67 70 73.05
306.
MRP- Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69 82 83 65 60 75 75 73.9
307.
308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77 79 79 50 73 75 72.5
309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75 75 72 87 63 63 77 70 72.15
310. Familara, Raymundo Z. 68 75 87 83 64 65 68 65 71.85
311. Fariñas, Dionisio 70 78 89 66 65 75 70 50 72.75
312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74 70 75 67 73 59 72.2
MRP- Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 70 85 69 81 72 70 72.25
313.
MRP- Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86 79 70 76 64 50 73
314.
MRP- Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72 77 83 67 60 68 73 72.05
315.
MRP- Fortich, Benjamin B. 70 82 70 70 78 65 64 75 70.35
316.
MRP- Fuente, Jose S. de la 76 88 72 74 60 71 79 79 73.55
317.
318. Fohmantes, Nazario S. 72 79 71 77 68 61 76 60 70.9
MRP- Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81 74 69 71 71 73 60 72.85
319.
320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 83 70 63 75 65 73.75
321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 76 70 57 71 60 71.95
322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77 90 67 61 72 75 73.15
323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B. 75 88 75 75 63 70 70 65 71.85
MRP- Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 72.85
325.
326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87 65 78 71 62 62 73.4
327. Galman, Patrocinio G. 72 72 80 85 71 56 70 53 71.15
 328. Gamalinda, Carlos S. 76 79 81 86 67 63 69 55 72.55
329. Gamboa, Antonio G. 71 67 70 72 76 60 75 68 70.95
330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 81 68 62 73 68 71.25
MRP- Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74 90 79 59 76 65 72.8
331.
MRP- Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77 82 74 57 68 81 73.3
332.
333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R. 75 67 80 82 67 57 64 70 70.5
334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 86 78 52 70 76 70.9
335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 81 76 63 69 62 70.85
MRP- Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. 68 93 85 78 64 69 70 54 72.35
336.
MRP- Gonzales, Rafael C. 77 75 71 89 55 70 70 60 70.05
337.
MRP- Gracia, Eulalia L. de 66 68 90 84 77 59 69 65 73.3
338.
339. Grageda, Jose M. A. 70 85 72 67 70 60 73 73 70.75
340. Guzman, Juan de 75 86 69 84 64 79 75 76 73.6
MRP- Guzman, Mateo de 76 79 79 73 72 69 68 80 73.9
341.
342. Guzman, Salvador B. 71 61 74 72 61 66 78 75 70.75
343. Guzman, Salvador T. de 75 84 64 81 74 61 78 58 71.75
344. Habelito, Geronimo E. 71 76 71 87 73 60 67 55 69.65
345. Hedriana, Naterno G. 75 68 84 76 66 58 76 60 72.9
346. Hernandez, Quintin B. 67 75 72 81 72 72 66 76 70.6
1952
347. Homeres, Agustin R. 73 84 65 86 70 77 63 76 70.7
348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 88 71 88 77 73 61 70 70.55
349. Jamer, Alipio S. 68 75 83 89 80 61 65 50 72
MRP- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 75 65 68 85 76 70 83 54 73.8
350.
MRP- Jardinico, Jr., Emilio 73 86 72 78 82 67 67 64 72.8
351.
MRP- Jaen, Justiniano F. 76 75 78 84 71 66 70 77 73.85
352.
353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 77 79 70 72 57 71 50 70.75
MRP- Javier, Aquilino M. 75 84 79 78 77 61 66 66 73.05
354.
355. Jomuad, Francisco 75 75 72 88 78 58 76 43 72.4
MRP- Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64 73 68 76 64 80 69.7
356.
357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 72 70 67 81 59 73.5
 358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 75 78 91 78 51 72 80 72.55
359. Leones, Constante B. 68 81 79 84 73 60 77 60 73
360. Liboro, Horacio T. 72 69 80 87 73 62 70 61 72.4
361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80 78 64 59 75 63 73
362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 76 69 70 73 76 74 75 73.2
363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
MRP- Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 88 64 58 75 77 73.95
364.
MRP- Macasaet, Tomas S. 73 81 72 83 66 75 72 70 72.5
365.
366. Magbiray, Godofredo V. 80 67 84 76 70 62 65 68 73.05
367. Majarais, Rodolfo P. 70 62 64 82 88 75 71 79 72.85
MRP- Makabenta, Eduardo 75 90 77 83 59 71 72 78 73.3
368.
MRP- Malapit, Justiniano S. 74 83 74 89 58 60 72 76 71.1
369.
370. Maloles, Iluminado M. 70 87 73 76 77 50 76 76 72.3
371. Maniquis, Daniel R. 75 80 73 91 69 71 65 70 72.1
372. Maraña, Arsenio 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
373. Marasigan, Napoleon 75 71 83 75 69 62 69 70 72.75
MRP- Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74 76 64 75 75 57 71.9
374.
MRP- Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86 76 78 72 71 75 53 72.95
375.
MRP- Masancay, Amando E. 73 87 75 77 72 50 78 80 73.2
376.
MRP- Mati-ong, Ignacio T. 62 87 72 79 73 76 69 77 71.3
377.
378. Mara, Guillermo L. 70 78 78 89 75 67 66 65 72.35
MRP- Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77 82 82 78 52 69 85 73.9
379.
MRP- Miculob, Eugenio P. 70 82 73 86 77 52 79 65 72.8
380.
381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr., 79 78 73 75 71 68 69 53 71.95
MRP- Monponbanua, Antonio 79 79 68 88 64 78 69 83 73.1
382. D.
MRP- Montero, Leodegario C. 72 89 69 89 70 68 70 75 72.15
383.
384. Morada, Servillano S. 75 76 67 71 65 66 75 76 70.9
385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78 84 60 73 68 70 73
MRP- Mosquera, Estanislao L. 75 78 75 85 72 55 77 66 73.15
386.
 387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70 94 72 75 70 57 73.75
388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 86 78 63 72 66 72.15
MRP- Nadela, Geredion T. 72 64 64 81 73 50 75 75 69.15
389.
MRP- Nazareno, Romeo P. 67 70 71 76 76 79 75 57 72.05
390.
391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77 77 72 62 76 76 72.9
MRP- Noguera, Raymundo 71 86 81 80 73 56 72 70 73.15
392.
MRP- Nodado, Domiciano R. 70 70 69 73 57 37 64 72 63.6
393.
394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 67 75 59 71 76 71.35
MRP- Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67 90 72 68 78 67 73.65
395.
396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77 72 69 55 65 67 60.7
397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68 72 84 50 75 79 71.9
398. Opiña, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 67 73 66 68 70 71.85
MRP- Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85 81 74 50 68 79 71.8
399.
MRP- Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76 87 72 66 70 79 73.45
400.
401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84 86 66 50 72 68 71.45
402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78 81 66 67 70 78 72.1
MRP- Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64 76 86 72 61 76 75 72.95
403.
404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69 80 76 52 72 80 71.95
MRP- Paderna, Perfecto D. 75 69 72 75 78 58 75 70 72.6
405.
406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76 79 68 67 74 66 71.65
407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82 78 75 78 75 73.3
408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. 71 88 78 86 59 75 78 50 72.95
MRP- Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80 82 71 75 69 75 73.25
409.
MRP- Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 85 77 59 63 71 73.45
410.
MRP- Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74 89 69 66 76 73 73.65
411.
412. Pariña, Santos L. 70 87 85 77 64 67 63 76 71.85
MRP- Pasion, Anastacio 63 80 68 81 82 79 76 58 72.55
413.
414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 76 71 76 68 63 77 83 71.65
MRP- Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 87 75 50 65 80 70.9
 415.
MRP- Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. 79 87 73 83 69 71 68 65 73.2
416.
417. Peña, Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
418. Perez, Toribio R. 71 64 81 92 69 58 67 70 71.25
419. Pestaño, Melquiades 77 81 74 87 59 68 76 75 73.2
MRP- Pido, Serafin C. 77 81 72 82 69 71 60 75 71.15
420.
421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 76 74 86 65 79 65 72 70.55
422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 79 82 76 66 64 74 50 72.15
MRP- Piza, Luz 68 70 75 87 74 67 64 75 70.8
423.
424. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 80 81 69 72 53 67 70 71.05
425. Quetulio, Josefina D. 75 90 60 93 64 78 76 83 72.9
MRP- Quipanes, Melchor V. 69 88 79 82 65 62 71 66 71.55
426.
MRP- Quietson, Bayani R. 73 75 76 77 70 81 71 53 72.85
427.
428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81 82 78 53 66 54 70.55
429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 80 73 87 62 62 75 80 71.65
MRP- Raffiñan, Jose A. 80 83 79 79 62 72 68 65 73.25
430.
MRP- Ramos, Patricio S. 75 87 76 75 72 72 61 75 72.25
431.
MRP- Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 78 84 76 90 48 75 80 65 73.45
432.
MRP- Raro, Celso 75 81 76 67 75 77 55 77 71.4
433.
MRP- Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79 91 71 67 67 70 73.9
434.
435. Revilla, Mariano S. 75 78 81 90 70 54 69 81 73.35
436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 64 81 78 76 73 69 53 72.85
437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 87 78 83 72 75 62 70 72.7
438. Reyes, Francisco M. 75 85 84 68 75 71 68 50 73.9
439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 57 78 79 78 65 64 79 73.35
MRP- Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82 82 76 64 68 60 73.65
440.
441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 85 65 86 75 70 76 70 72.7
442. Rivera, Honorio 71 56 70 90 71 65 75 71 71.2
MRP- Rivero, Buenaventura A. 72 88 72 94 68 73 66 80 72.6
443.
MRP- Robles, Enrique 75 77 75 77 82 64 69 70 73.7
 444.
445. Rodriguez, Orestes 76 75 76 63 69 77 65 78 72.25
Arellano
446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 80 79 83 73 71 75 70 73.9
447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del 80 75 65 70 68 72 80 70 73.15
448. Rosario, Restituto F. del 75 75 79 90 68 65 66 63 72.1
MRP- Sabelino, Conrado S. 71 81 69 75 77 71 75 70 72.95
449.
450. San Juan, Damaso 77 86 72 89 59 76 65 72 71.6
451. Sañiel, Felix L. 72 93 76 80 67 75 66 62 72.1
452. Samaniego, Jesus B. 75 80 76 72 60 67 68 70 70.6
MRP- Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75 83 70 83 77 67 77 60 73.95
453.
MRP- Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. 71 75 81 90 62 64 76 68 72.95
454.
455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal 75 76 84 93 63 65 59 70 71.8
456. Santillan, Juanito Ll. 76 89 83 83 63 58 65 52 71.25
MRP- Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75 78 82 73 76 66 70 73.7
457.
MRP- Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54 69 76 63 64 71 60 66.75
458.
MRP- Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71 73 79 73 79 71 85 73.8
459.
MRP- Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79 85 74 72 66 54 73.3
460.
461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 92 79 59 76 76 73.1
MRP- Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 78 72 75 68 67 73.5
462.
463. Songco, Felicisimo G. 70 68 82 84 60 69 76 65 73.35
464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77 80 80 53 70 65 70.7
465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 87 76 70 64 70 71.9
MRP- Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 72 75 75 72 60 73.05
466.
467. Tabaque, Benjamin R. 69 68 77 79 74 68 72 60 71.85
MRP- Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79 72 80 62 75 73 80 73.95
468.
MRP- Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 83 71 61 71 60 72
469.
470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65
471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.15
MRP- Tiongson, Federico T. 70 70 76 84 77 75 75 50 73.45
472.
MRP- Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 73.4
473.
474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67 83 68 75 71 63 71.3
MRP- Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58 74 81 71 55 65 57 67.55
475.
MRP- Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 73.8
476.
MRP- Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91 83 75 63 66 67 65 70.8
477.
478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78 85 78 51 64 75 70.8
MRP- Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77 82 67 56 68 75 72.6
479.
480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81 80 71 69 68 60 71.7
481. Umayam, Juanito C. 77 75 87 85 56 56 66 60 71
MRP- Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75 74 73 76 71 70 73.55
482.
483. Valino, Francisco M. 72 81 80 84 62 78 71 75 73.7
484. Varela, Dominador M. 67 75 81 86 72 57 81 70 73.85
485. Vega, Macairog L. de 78 62 79 87 70 70 71 65 73.8
MRP- Velasco, Emmanuel D. 71 80 74 85 60 66 76 76 71.85
486.
487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 80 56 50 72 67 71.05
MRP- Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58 67 76 55 75 73 73.65
488.
489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74 85 62 66 72 77 77.05
MRP- Verzosa, Federico B. 75 79 72 88 76 68 74 59 73.7
490.
MRP- Villafuerte, Eduardo V. 75 83 70 76 64 64 75 65 71.2
491.
MRP- Villanueva, Cecilio C. 75 85 79 88 66 77 67 70 73.95
492.
493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70 88 76 66 69 50 70.75
MRP- Villaseñor, Leonidas F. 80 85 67 77 62 75 76 73 73.15
494.
495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 77 65 93 70 65 65 65 70.65
496. Yaranon, Pedro 70 77 76 85 72 50 75 75 71.85
MRP- Yasay, Mariano R. 75 75 72 76 63 77 70 60 71.1
497.
MRP- Ygay, Venancio M. 73 80 83 84 62 59 72 77 72.65
498.
499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro 73 82 78 75 60 81 75 75 73.95
500. Zamora, Alberto 70 65 76 79 62 77 69 82 71.3
 501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70 79 69 89 76 62 71 64 71.2

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in
previous examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations together with
their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were
denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.
1. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.5
1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4
2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.
1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9
1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.75
1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
3. Blanco, Jose B.
MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.15
1951 64 71 58 65 68 70 75 71 66.95
4. Condeno, Mateo
1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 92 69.3
1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 81 67.85
5. Ducusin, Agapito B.
MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 60 68.65
1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 56 89 68.1
6. Garcia, Manuel N.
MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 80 69.25
1950 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 84 60.3
7. Luna, Lucito A.
1946 63 53 69 76 75 76 57 69 66.55
1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
8. Maraña, Arsenio s.
1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 75 69.35
1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
9. Montano, Manuel M.
1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 64.8
1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
10. Peña, Jesus S.
1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2
1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
11. Placido, Sr., Isidro
1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 67.75
1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 71 66.8
12. Rementizo, Filemon S.
1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.65
1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 64.05
1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 65.7
13. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.35
1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
14. Rodulfa, Juan T.
1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.75
1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 70.1
15. Sanchez, Juan J.
1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 63.5
MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68
1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8
16. Santos, Constantino
1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 66.65
1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
17. Santos, Salvador H.
1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.85
1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1
1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
18. Sevilla, Macario C.
MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 63.1
MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 68
1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 45
MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 69.3
 1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05

Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented
motions for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A
list of those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those
who invoked the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.
1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 73.45
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Alejandro, Exequiel 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 73.4
4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 72.7
5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 73.4
6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 71.25
7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 70.95
8. Bala, Florencio F. 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 67
9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
10. Barrios, Benjamin O. 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 73.95
11. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
12. Burgos, Dominador C. 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 70.05
13. Cariño, Eldo J. 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73
14. Casar, Dimapuro 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 73.35
15. Castañeda, Gregorio 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 73.95
16. Estrellado, Benjamin R. 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 70.2
17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 71.1
18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 71.6
19. Fernandez, Alejandro G. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 73.9
21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 71.65
22. Gracia, Miguel L. de 73 68 75 59 80 51 72 71 71
23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 73.6
24. Gutierrez, Antonio S. 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 69.1
25. Ilejay, Abraham I. 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 73.7
26. Leon, Benjamin La. De 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 70.35
27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 69.9
28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 70.45
29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 70.85
30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 69.75
31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 71.1
32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 72.75
33. Melocoton, Nestorio B. 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 72.35
34. Molina, Manuel C. 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 70.95
35. Muñoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 73.75
36. Navarro, Buenaventura M. 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 73
37. Nodado, Domiciano R. 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7
38. Papas, Sisenando B. 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66
39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4
40. Padula, Benjamin C. 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05
41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 69.85
42. Peña, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55
43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7
44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75
45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 70.6
46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 72.2
47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 70.1
48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 70.65
49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 73.6
50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 69.5
51. Sabaot, Solomon B. 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 73.85
52. Sumaway, Ricardo S. 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 69.1
53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 69.55
54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 60.9
55. Viray, Venancio Bustos 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 67.15
56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 64.5

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.

1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77 73.5

2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 72.9
4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 73.2
6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 73.05
7. Enriquez, Pelagio y 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 72.05
Concepcion
 8. Estonina, Severino 80 74 64 89 81 56 68 82 72.4
9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35
11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3
12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25
13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71
14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 75 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6
15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952) 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3
17. Macalindong, Reinerio L. 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77 72.75
18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70 71.45
19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
20. Plomantes, Marcos 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71 71.6
21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79 72.6
22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2
23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70 72.9
24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
25. Santos, Constantino P. 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05
28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2
29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83 73.25

There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490
candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in
the bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74
per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those
who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the
Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession.
The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16
immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:

SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects
shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and
Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law,
10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent.
 Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in
which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into
account in determining their general average in any subsequent examinations: Provided,
however, That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third
examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some subjects and shall be
required to the examination in all the subjects.

SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be
entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme
Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:

It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled

to repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any
other government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this
measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed with
a rating of 75 per cent or higher."

Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the
comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices
while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that
interests us, the Court said:

The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that
if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort
of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a
time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more
convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one
or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last
required subjects, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and
passed the firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in
those subjects and remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had last
reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing in the law which
requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The
only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no
more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years
intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the
requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a
person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately
render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the
candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago,
another three subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe
that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no
grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to
be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the
practice of law.
 xxx xxx xxx

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment
provides that any application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th
day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In
other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since
the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to
the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in
any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but
retroactive in its effects.

We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not
exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to
govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have
serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations,
the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those
who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have
the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and
rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more
but less than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question
involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might
have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion,
when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in
accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even
repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already
promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.

Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are
officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the
Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be
its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who
in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than
that required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly
considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its
officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general
average runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically
and in effect says that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its
officer because he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite
of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this
is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously considered.

The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:

I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of
the legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by
admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination,
Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.

Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the
 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of
office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group
of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950
bar examinations.

The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court
made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to
the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying
the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration
would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said
provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant
a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other
professions such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.

Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by
2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No.
371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO
AND INCLUDING 1953

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations
after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar
examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing
general average shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That
for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as
one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects
and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that
said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another
opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to
1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily
not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court
has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the
apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it
is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar
examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar
examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination,
73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be
restored with the condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below
50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese
occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the
inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is
believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available reading
materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the last
world war.

In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would
admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He
considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience,
correct because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already
established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who
took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted,
considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the
established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable
difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such
precedent cannot or could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court,
without giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates
who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still
enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.

If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective
statute which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as
against class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:

A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a
common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a
class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the
dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each.
(Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).

Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which
must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a
class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only
a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does
not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils
with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain
the special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide
margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be
revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77
L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
 This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of
the care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated
from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.

For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President
again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the
same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951,
contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant
Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by
virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972
(many times erroneously cited as No. 974).

It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the
author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located at 959
San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu,
contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the
building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was
initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
Manila4 where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation

meetings.5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for
the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the
conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear
complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of
Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with
utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were
not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then
that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free
because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent
injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the
contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the
conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and
Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed
against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings
including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so
doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of
RA 6713:8
 SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the

Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND,PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of
law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.10

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government
Lawyers

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in
connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service." In PCGG v.
Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
"engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in
said service."

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of.
Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of Profession of
Elective Local Government Officials

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from
engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the
general law which applies to all public officials and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs:

 SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach
in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are
members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when

the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only
on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary
compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local
officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local
officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in
the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat
generalibus.13

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the
following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for
provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for
cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang
bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and
the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as
local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They should
therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang

panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city
mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a
week.14 Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure
prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board
members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their
profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and
the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession.
And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang
barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.16

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior
Authority From The Head Of His Department

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission
of the head of the department concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided,
That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose
duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in
outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to
the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee:
And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by
an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he
shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of
directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for
Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the
law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote
respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first
canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not
only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a
breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the
legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and
disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.19

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of
the lawyer's oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records
of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to
all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T.
SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN,
ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N.
SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO,
MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA,
WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING
CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC
HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN
DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW
HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE
FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the
efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect
on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank.1 It was later found
by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders
and related interests totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and ₱0.505
million as uncollectible.2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK
which reached a total of ₱310 million.3 Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from
its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, and ordering its liquidation.4 A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held
from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
bid.5 Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then
Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s
liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of
President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and
his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against
respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo
Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos,
Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo,
Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita,
Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia
Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation,
Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel
Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp.,
Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading
Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et
al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea,
Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage
of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.7 After the filing of
the parties’ comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.
These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et
al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then
resumed his private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General10 and
counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et
al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank’s officials on
the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank
in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG’s
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.11 It found that the PCGG failed to
prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor
General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent
Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term
as Solicitor General.12 It further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic
Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a
former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before
the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from
public office.13The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.14

It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan’s Second
Division to the Fifth Division.15 In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent
Mendoza.16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that
the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005.
The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated
December 5, 2001.17

Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.18 The PCGG alleged that the Fifth
Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in
which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not
waive the objection to respondent Mendoza’s appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the
resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.19

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import
and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the
government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I

Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent
Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the
said service."

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive
in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern
codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were
comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation
conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to
any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including
specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore
settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty,
confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but
ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ
markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial
oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the
pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but
the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single
colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some standards
of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of
the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the
colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable
fees.20

The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By
mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field,
the drafter of the highly influential New York "Field Code," introduced a new set of uniform standards
of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states
in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David
Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad
outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and
thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century
laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial
regulations – e.g., the "do no falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states.
Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The
developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client
property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and
its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service
to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary
periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's
duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties,
and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics.21

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers
in their practice — the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical
standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical
guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave
detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures,
however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and
oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as
binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar
associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but
they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations
began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar
associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association,
assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members.22

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The
1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states’ codes, and it was the foundation for
the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.23

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the
full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine
Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.24

As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons.
Among their concerns was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others
temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private
practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government
service."25 These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former government
lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt
with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse.26 On
the other hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are unique to government lawyers
and apply primarily to former government lawyers.27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct
and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In
1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new canons.28 To deal with problems peculiar
to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for "adverse-
interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest representation conflicts."29 The rationale for disqualification
is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions would be influenced
by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the
advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients.30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he
has previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after
his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or
passed upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46
and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.31

In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics.32

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons
needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the
creation of a committee to study the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The
committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA
Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and were thus
unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed
that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of
lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government.

The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional
Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to
which the lawyer must adhere.34 In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)35 became the applicable
supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved
the Model Code.36

Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite
standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a
whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where the conduct standards were
set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give better
guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable standards were the black letter
Rules." The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on
narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the
content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements
particularly with regard to conflicts of interests.37 In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9,
citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of
anxious clients as well as the norm’s indefinite nature.38

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed
Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The
Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform
with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former
government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment
in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2,
Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated
and passed upon" with the word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly applicable to
both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."
The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil
Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of
whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza
from representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the
rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former government
lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as
any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular
situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government
or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by
respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of
respondent Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:40

The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in
issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty.
Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the
Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation with the CFI of Manila.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key
officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy
Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then
Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B.
Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr.,
where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty.
Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent
portion of the said memorandum states:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that
the following procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and
evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is
believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to
resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and
indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to
liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it
was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in
order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The
pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

...

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977,
together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by
P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then
CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court
should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The procedure of
liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of the
appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of
any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed
that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve
probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head concerned
forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the
statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines
and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking
or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as
possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors,
exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits
and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions.
...

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business
with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires,
order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central
Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such
institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims
against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce
individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such
institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary
Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in
banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously
appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed,
convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other
parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be
necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under
this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can
be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made
in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank
from implementing its actions under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act,
unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made
in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is
pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The
restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the
Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an
amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the
damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction.
The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the
restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and
ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an
otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions
caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or
financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver
under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law,
general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 &
1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK
is not the "matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA
Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and cannot disqualify.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent
Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the
said act of respondent Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely
different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for
themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central
Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to
Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary
petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp.
Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject
"matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the
stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-
gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten
is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was
liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners
and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the
sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a
Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the
matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03.
"Intervene" means, viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or

come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay
on both sides of an intervening river . . .)41

On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of
others.42

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first
interpretation, "intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant
or has no effect or little influence.43 Under the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes an
act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings.44 We hold that this second
meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not
exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as "x x
x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law."

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided
that a former government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection
with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." As
aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase "which he has investigated or passed upon" resulted
in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence,
in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the
government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules further constricted
the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a private client in
connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public
officer or employee."

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is
an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting
Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent
Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of
years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed
merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the
court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of
creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an
agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the
participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the
interest of government.

II

Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort
on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed,
it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To
date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.

In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and
application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of
equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government
recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match
compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse
that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to
recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can
later be exchanged for higher income in private practice.45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the
sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical
rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in
acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be disqualified.46 Indeed, "to
make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter."47

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass
opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that
the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted "the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in
order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and
embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so prevalent in large civil cases in
recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary."48 Even the United States
Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals’ description of disqualification motions as
"a dangerous game."49 In the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is
difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was
resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the
hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar
was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed
as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to
disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the
client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification
motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in
whom the client has confidence.51 The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without
the benefit of the work done by the latter.52 The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an
effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule
on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan:
"An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving
the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them
to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of
private employment does not enjoy such freedom."53 He adds: "Any system that affects the right to
take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official
independence."54 The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once
occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor
General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that
allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that
gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue
dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the
freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a
former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm.55 Former government lawyers
stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public
confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a
highly speculative exercise at best56 which can lead to untoward results.57 No less than Judge
Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any
detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys
which the canons seek to protect.58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been
rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct59 and some courts have
abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest
exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the
case, and the public.60

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors
lawyers who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that former
government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this
concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent
Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different
matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares
of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official
information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent
"sides" to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for
respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On
the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating
GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for
this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil
Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two
sides are involved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of
loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in
government service.61 The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who
plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted
to prosecute less vigorously.62 In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in
1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well occur during the
period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government
policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably excessive."64 He opines "x x x
it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal
to his or her last client – the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms
want the ‘best’ government lawyers – the ones who were hardest to beat – not the least qualified or
least vigorous advocates."65 But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar.
There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate
GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he
continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above
cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive
influence of former officials" or their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this
concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be an
employee’s influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her position, power that
evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x."67 More, he contends that the concern can
be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: "x x x The idea that, present
officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the
present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in
federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials
will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism."68

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest
prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive
period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza.
Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the
Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the
bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any
standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if
applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and
deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the
practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved
and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance
as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question,
however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when
he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
 charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice
of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties
and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant
for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate
of the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of
the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen
of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership
in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority
for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who
reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure
from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to

compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar
Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,

Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

dm. Case No. 6290 July 14, 2004

ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO, respondent.
 RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of
respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly
immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.

On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing herself to be
married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another woman.
However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to
obtain a false marriage contract,1which states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in Manila.
Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila2 and the National Statistics Office (NSO)3 prove that no
record of marriage exists between them. The false date and place of marriage between the two are
stated in the birth certificates of their two children, Donnabel Tenorio4 and Felicisimo Tenorio III.5 But
in the birth certificates of their two other children, Oliver Tenorio6 and John Cedric Tenorio,7 another
date and place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February 1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the
dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora
Jacome. The respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the complainant and her
co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome.

On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the respondent (1)
cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar;
(2) converted her client's money to her own use and benefit, which led to the filing of an estafa case
against her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the
statement "Isang bala ka lang" to deter them from divulging respondent's illegal activities and
transactions.

In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the charge of deceit, she
declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February
1980 as shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil Registry of
Quezon City.8 Her husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with another woman.

As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she caused the
dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it
was Councilor Jacome who caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the complainant
and her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around the city of Makati on the pretext of
conducting a survey but did so to besmirch respondent's good name and reputation.

The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise denied by the
respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law Office is registered with the Department of
Trade and Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of Registration of Business
Name.9 Hence, she has no partners in her law office. As to the estafa case, the same had already
been dropped pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.10 The respondent likewise denied that she threatened the complainant with the
words "Isang bala ka lang" on 24 January 2000.

Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the complainant to get
even with her. She terminated complainant's employment after receiving numerous complaints that
the complainant extorted money from different people with the promise of processing their passports
and marriages to foreigners, but she reneged on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is
politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire the complainant and her cohorts should they
initiate this complaint, which they did and for which they were re-hired. The respondent also flaunted
the fact that she had received numerous awards and citations for civic works and exemplary service
to the community. She then prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.

The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico.

During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the complainant would submit a
Reply to respondent's Answer, while the respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The
parties also agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would constitute as the
respective direct testimonies of the parties and the affiants.11

In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent cooperated in the illegal
practice of law by her husband by submitting (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office12 where
the name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a Sagip Communication
Radio Group identification card13 signed by the respondent as Chairperson where her husband is
identified as "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr." She added that respondent's husband even appeared
in court hearings.

In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership with her husband nor
allowed her husband to appear in court on her behalf. If there was an instance that her husband
appeared in court, he did so as a representative of her law firm. The letterhead submitted by the
complainant was a false reproduction to show that her husband is one of her law partners. But upon
cross-examination, when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office bearing her
signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo
A. Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as senior partners because they have
investments in her law office.14

The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February 1980 in
Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their marriage contract was not registered she
applied for late registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a certified copy of the
marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General and authenticated by the NSO.
The erroneous entries in the birth certificates of her children as to the place and date of her marriage
were merely an oversight.15

Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and Memoranda, the
complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly realizing
that this disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts. Thus,
she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.

In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline
Milagros V. San Juan found that the complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the charge of cooperating in
the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the letterhead of Cristal-
Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip
Communication Radio Group identification card of "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.," signed by
respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997 issued by the Metropolitan Trial
Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729 – 20734, wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his
appearance as counsel and even moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the
private complainants to appear and for lack of interest to prosecute the said cases. Thus,
Commissioner San Juan recommended that the respondent be reprimanded.

In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The
modification consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from the practice of
law for six months with a warning that a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more
severely.

We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as approved and adopted
with modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP.

At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to Withdraw Complaint
filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos,16 we declared:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does
not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken
and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.
The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on
record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of
complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.

Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case should proceed
accordingly.

The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct were not
substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving his case by
convincing evidence.17 With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the charge of
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the respondent is not yet convicted thereof.
In Gerona vs. Datingaling,18 we held that when the criminal prosecution based on the same act
charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must
await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.

We, however, affirm the IBP's finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer
and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read as follows:

Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a
lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding one's
self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying oneself as
attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law
office for the general practice of law.19 Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.

In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one. His wife, the
respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.

At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She
admitted that the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her law
office as senior partners because they have investments in her law office.20 That is a blatant
misrepresentation.

The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof that the respondent
assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the public that he is a lawyer. Notably, the
identification card stating that he is "Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr.," bears the signature of the
respondent as Chairperson of the Group.

The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on
the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is
attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by,
any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.21

WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorio's record as attorney in this
Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 810 January 27, 1998

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations 1. His oath-taking was held
in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution dated August 27, 1996 which permitted him to take the Bar
Examinations "subject to the condition that should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath pending approval of the Court . . ." due to his previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioner's participation in the initiation
rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime
in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence
inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 10, 1995, he was
discharged from probation and his case considered closed and terminated.

In this petition, received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that "he be allowed to take his
lawyer's oath at the Court's most convenient time" 2 attaching thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his probation, and certifications attesting
to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of
Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of
Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and officers; (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish
Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph Cathedral, San Jose, Antique; and (f) the President of the Parish
Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before acting on
petitioner's application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing
victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In compliance with the Court's directive, Atty. Gilbert D.
Camaligan filed his comment which states as follows:

1 — He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in allowing him to
comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the lawyer's oath, and
hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such gesture.

2 — He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its resolution dated
March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 712 that the infliction of severe physical injuries which
approximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather
than merely accidental or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character flaws on the part
of those who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with his stand at the outset of the
proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner and his co-defendants that they
are liable not only for the crime of homicide but murder, since they took advantage of the
neophytes' helpless and defenseless condition when they were "beaten and kicked to
death like a useless stray dog", suggesting the presence of abuse of confidence, taking
advantage of superior strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524).

3 — He, however, has consented to the accused-students' plea of guilty to the lesser
offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the petitioner, out of
pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of the accused who went together at his house
 in Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for their sons, on a
Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they reported that
the father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon learning of his son's
involvement in the case.

4 — As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the criminal
case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in whom he has high
hope to become a good lawyer — to succeed him, he still feels the pain of his untimely
demise, and the stigma of the gruesome manner of taking his life. This he cannot forget.

5 — He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has become
morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He politely submits this matter
to the sound and judicious discretion of the Hon. Court. 3

At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and commiserates with the
untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that "[h]e is not, right now, in a
position to say whether petitioner since then has become morally fit . . ." and submits petitioner's plea to
be admitted to the noble profession of law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court.

The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or allowing petitioner's
admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a
helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness
required for admission to the bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who
possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the
entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become a
disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a chance in the same
manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's
oath. 4

Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any infraction of the attendant
conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented
character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and
atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the
doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating. 5 Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited
for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. Petitioner
is exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Padilla's comment in the sister
case of Re: Petition of Al Agrosino To Take Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, "[t]he
Court sincerely hopes that" Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society" 6.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M.. Cuevas, Jr., to take the lawyer's
oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment of
appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioner's personal records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban and Martinez, JJ., concur.

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the
age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving
the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April
1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St.
Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations.
In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar
Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his
Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the
following documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of

the Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified
public accountant;

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,

Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La
Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B.

Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized
elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was
one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees
was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's
citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court,
dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the
same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a
comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing
his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate
child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a
Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he
elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the
Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a
Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate
Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of
majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order
that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the
person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election
must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the
meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to
mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been
interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years
(VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb.
27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as
when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino
(ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953).
But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years
was not made within a reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine
citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time"
allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on
the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election
of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his
Manifestation, Ching states:

1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;

 2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in
my school records and other official documents;

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for

Filipino citizens;

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to

vote;

5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the

Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with

Commonwealth Act No. 625;

7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me

before a notary public;

8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of

allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;

9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to

(sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and

10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.

Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question
raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the
affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar
examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under
Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born
of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless,
upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to
elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided
that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the
Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the
1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are
Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional
provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a
curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by
the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the
old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid
election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a
statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said
party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within
which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only
provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age
of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of
the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine
citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this
Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper
period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of
the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election
should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The
phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3)
year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period
after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has
ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which
period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. 13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine
citizenship is not indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He

became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was
made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age,
or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear
that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of
majority." 14

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five
(35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June
1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on
the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election
was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to
exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former
elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically
lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching

erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the
case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married
to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of
age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has
been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April
14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old),
Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for
certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship. 16

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein
are very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First,
Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the
enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under
the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be
applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed
out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship
because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this
regard, the Court stated:

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore

himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him
all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong
Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands,
42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs.
Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28,
1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a
non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully
entitled. 17

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal
of the House of Representatives, 18 where we held:
 We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an
informal process.

In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held
that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In
the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of

age constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52:
emphasis supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be

excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already
citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for

those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when
the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot
be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in
public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election
time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature
are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing

is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two
countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino
when he turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the

private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also
have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine
citizenship? 19

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we
consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the
Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes
and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG.
Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span
of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he
finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority."
Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a
tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his
election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when
needed and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the
right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped
away from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's

application for admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
 EN BANC

January 9, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration1 submitted its Report dated November 30,
1972, with the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings
had in Administrative Case No. 5262 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel
received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide
sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the
Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court
Rule."

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine
Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and
other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to
the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted,3 and all
parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda.4

Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the
matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.

In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in
favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.

In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act
6397. This law provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.

SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any
funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes
of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall
be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
 SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and
contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar
integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations
of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a
proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a
national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court
may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.

The following are the pertinent issues:

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It
will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on
pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:

Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the
Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all
lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do

so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government
authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of
the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the
Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their
own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and conduct;

(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading,
practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public,
and publish information relating thereto;

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law,
and make reports and recommendations thereon; and

(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal
profession to:

(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;

(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and
prosecuting officers;

(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal
of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own
forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;

(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;

(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local
practice maintained through influence or position;

(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;

(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer
reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent
legal service;

(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in
many of our provinces;

(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising
attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;

(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
 (13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations,
on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the
Filipino lawyer; and

(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of

the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the
nation.

Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of
its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to
integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act
6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional —
hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association
and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.

The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar
Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:

Constitutionality of Bar Integration

Judicial Pronouncements.

In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the
Courts have upheld their constitutionality.

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

— Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.

— The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover,
clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but
also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part
in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as
an officer of the court.

— Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and
just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.

— These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but
there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can
operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all
attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given
existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar
through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated
Bar.

1. Freedom of Association.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his

constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues.

Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues
in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial
support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.

The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the
educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the
legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.

Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the

Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative
regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to
regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.

2. Regulatory Fee.

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the
Court levies a tax.

A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the
purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it
follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without
means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation
does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the
 integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member
that might result from his required payment of annual dues.

3. Freedom of Speech.

A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any
manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the
Unified Bar.

For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said
member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.

Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become
unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for
which it was established.

The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free
speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us
to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his
liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of
war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The
right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government.

4. Fair to All Lawyers.

Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the
requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the
Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper
work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their
public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in
the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory
power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the
time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for
new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.

To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at
this time — requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages
and disadvantages of Bar integration.

In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has
yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater
influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual
lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of
unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an
official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge
by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No
less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of
the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government
authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the
inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and
politics will intrude into its affairs.

It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration
have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and
the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses
or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved
the administration of justice.

How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the
Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission
in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the
archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor
of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are
non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the
Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or
support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed
opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on
the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in
favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal.5 All
these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced
in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
"perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in
the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully
and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the
attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Created by Supreme Court Resolution of October 5, 1970 "for the purpose of

ascertaining the advisability of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction," the
Commission is composed of Supreme Court Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro
(Chairman), Senator Jose J. Roy, retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Conrado
V. Sanchez, Supreme Court Associate Justice (then Court of Appeals Presiding
Justice) Salvador V. Esguerra, U. P. Law Center Director Crisolito Pascual, Ex-
Senator Tecla San Andres Ziga, and San Beda Law Dean and Constitutional
Convention Delegate Feliciano Jover Ledesma (Members).
 2 Filed on July 11, 1962 (by a Committee composed of Jose W. Diokno, Roman
Ozaeta, Jose P. Carag, Eugenio Villanueva, Jr. and Leo A. Panuncialman), the
petition represented the unanimous consensus of 53 Bar Associations (from all over
the Philippines) reached in convention at the Far Eastern University Auditorium in
Manila on June 23, 1962.

3 Written oppositions were submitted by Attys. Cesar Fajardo and Vicente L. Arcega,
the Camarines Norte Lawyers League, Atty. Fructuoso S. Villarin, the Camarines Sur
Bar Association and the Manila Bar Association.

4 The Petitioners and the Negros Occidental Bar Association submitted memoranda
in favor of Bar integration, while the Manila Bar Association submitted a memoranda
opposing Bar integration.

5 All figures are as of January 8, 1973.

THIRD DIVISION

CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline, National
Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito
M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit:
representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment
which complainant might obtain.

The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal Case No.
7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action Civil Case
No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real
property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was
attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of a sum of
money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the
said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared
in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against
them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due
time, issued and the same property previously attached by complainant was levied upon.

It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo
and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number to wit"
Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No.
246722 dated 1-12-88.

Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the
scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in
Civil Case No. 56934.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and
recommendations:

Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the
records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to
be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the Memorandum of
Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband
was registered and annotated in said title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of
Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of
Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel
spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.

Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests
and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which
Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on.

However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in
their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using,
apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M.
Martija. According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as
his delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No.
2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.

The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who
alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official
receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings Atty.
Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her employer, deserves
scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that
he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the courts, as
required by the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of
his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.

The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-4,
Resolution)

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the practice of
law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is
the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from
the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to
satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his
lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in
the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the
personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 5704 May 8, 2009

WILLEM KUPERS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOHNSON B. HONTANOSAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

This administrative case against respondent Atty. Johnson B. Hontanosas was triggered by a letter-
complaint1 dated April 15, 2002 of complainant Willem Kupers to the Court through the Court Administrator.
The Court Administrator referred the letter to the Bar Confidant on April 25, 2002.2 On May 7, 2002, the Acting
Bar Confidant wrote complainant that for the court to take cognizance of an administrative case against a
lawyer, a verified complaint must be filed in nineteen (19) copies together with supporting documents. 3 Thus,
complainant was told to submit an additional thirteen (13) copies of his complaint. On May 25, 2002,
complainant complied and submitted an additional thirteen (13) copies of his complaint.

Complainant alleged that respondent4 had: (1) prepared and notarized contracts that are both invalid and illegal
as these contracts violated the limitations on aliens leasing private lands; (2) served conflicting interests since
he performed legal services for adverse parties; (3) refused to furnish copies of the contracts he notarized to
the parties thereof; (4) notarized documents without keeping copies thereof and (5) failed to properly discharge
his duty to his client Karl Novak, particularly when respondent allegedly refused to accept his dismissal as
counsel for Novak, failed to turn over Novak’s documents thereafter, handled legal matters without adequate
preparation, betrayed Novak’s trust and refused to see Novak with a translator of Novak’s choice.

Complainant claimed that as counsel for Hans and Vivian Busse, respondent had prepared a memorandum of
agreement and a contract of lease between the spouses Busse and Hochstrasser, a Swiss national. Under said
agreement, Hochstrasser would lease Vivian Busse’s property in Alcoy, Cebu for fifty (50) years, renewable for
another fifty (50) years.5 Complainant added that respondent had acted despite conflict of interest on his part
since the Spouses Busse and Hochstrasser were both his clients. Respondent prepared a similar agreement
and lease contract between the spouses Busse and Karl Emberger, a Swiss national, over another parcel of
land in Alcoy, Cebu. This time the lease contract was for a period of forty nine (49) years renewable for another
forty nine (49) years.6 All four (4) documents were notarized by respondent. It was also averred that respondent
drafted two deeds of sale over the leased properties of Spouses Busse to Naomie Melchior, a Filipina, and Karl
Novak, a German National.

The Court required respondent to comment on the charges.7 He answered that if anyone should be penalized,
it should be respondent for meddling in the affairs of his clients and otherwise making a mockery of the
Philippine legal system by deceitfully passing as material facts opinionated, baseless and false allegations as
well as a falsified document.8 Respondent also moved that complainant be made to show cause why he should
not be cited for contempt.

Complainant filed a reply on November 6, 2002, in which he stated among other things that respondent is like
Pontius Pilatus [sic].9

On February 10, 2003, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.10
In lieu of hearings, Commissioner Doroteo Aguila required the parties to file their respective memoranda due to
the limited time period given by the Court. The parties did. The Commissioner found that respondent had
prepared and notarized contracts that violated Presidential Decree No. 471 (P.D. No. 471) since leases of
private lands by aliens cannot exceed twenty five (25) years, renewable for another twenty five (25)
years.11 Nonetheless, complainant failed to prove the other charges he had hurled against respondent as the
former was not privy to the agreements between respondent and the latter’s clients. Moreover, complainant
failed to present any concrete proof of the other charges. The commissioner recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) months.

Upon review, the IBP Board of Governors disregarded the recommendation of the commissioner and dismissed
the complaint on February 27, 2004.12 The Board of Governors ratiocinated that suspension was not warranted
since respondent did not really perform an illegal act. The act was not illegal per se since the lease agreement
was likely made to reflect the agreement among the parties without considering the legality of the situation.
While admittedly respondent may be guilty of ignorance of the law or plain negligence, the Board dismissed the
complaint out of compassion.

We reject the Board’s recommendation. We stress that much is demanded from those who engage in the
practice of law because they have a duty not only to their clients, but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public.13 The lawyer’s diligence and dedication to his work and profession ideally should not only promote the
interests of his clients. A lawyer has the duty to attain the ends of justice by maintaining respect for the legal
profession.14

The investigating commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors both found that the majority of the charges
against the respondent lack proof. Our own review of the records confirms that most of the charges are
unsupported by evidence. Such charges are simply the unsubstantiated accusations in the complaint with nary
a whit of concrete proof such as affidavits of the clients whose trust respondents had allegedly breached.

However, administrative cases against lawyers are sui generes and as such the complainant in the case need
not be the aggrieved party. Thus even if complainant is not a party to the contracts, the charge of drafting and
notarizing contracts in contravention of law holds weight. A plain reading of these contracts clearly shows that
they violate the law limiting lease of private lands to aliens for a period of twenty five (25) years renewable for
another twenty five (25) years.

In his defense, respondent avers that the assailed contracts are valid under Republic Act No. 7652 (R.A. No.
7652), entitled "An Act Allowing The Long-Term Lease of Private Lands by Foreign Investors." They add that
these contracts should not be viewed purely as lease contracts since they allow the leasor to nominate a
Filipino citizen or corporation to purchase the subject property within the lease period. Respondent’s defenses
are frivolous. Assuming that it can be duly established that his foreign clients are indeed "foreign investors" as
contemplated under R.A. No. 7652,15 said law allows the lease for the original period of fifty (50) years,
renewable for another period of twenty five (25) years, well below the periods of fifty (50) years renewable for
another fifty (50) years, and forty-nine (49) years renewable for another forty-nine (49) years respectively,
stipulated in the two lease agreements. 1av vphi1

Respondent, by drafting the questioned lease agreements, caused his clients to violate Section 7 of R.A. No.
7652 which states:

Sec. 7. Penal Provision. — Any contract or agreement made or executed in violation of any of the following
prohibited acts shall be null and void ab initio and both contracting parties shall be punished by a fine of not
less than One Hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) nor more than One million pesos (₱1,000,000), or
imprisonment of six (6) months to (6) years, or both, at the discretion of the court:

(1) Any provision in the lease agreement stipulating a lease period in excess of that provided in
paragraph (1) of Section 4;

(2) Use of the leased premises for the purpose contrary to existing laws of the land, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs;
 (3) Any agreement or agreements resulting is the lease of land in excess of the area approved by the
DTI: Provided, That, where the excess of the totality of the area leased is due to the acts of the lessee,
the lessee shall be held solely liable therefor: Provided, further, That, in the case of corporations,
associations, or partnerships, the president, manager, director, trustee, or officers responsible for the
violation hereof shall bear the criminal liability. (Emphasis ours)

In preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts, respondent violated the Attorney’s Oath and several
canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. One of the foremost sworn duties of an attorney-at-law is to
"obey the laws of the Philippines." This duty is enshrined in the Attorney’s Oath16 and in Canon 1, which
provides that "(a) lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes." Rule 1.02 under Canon 1 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at decreasing confidence in the legal systems."

The other canons of professional responsibility which respondent transgressed are the following:

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

xxx

Rule 15.07- A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of hairness.

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

Aside from constituting violation of the lawyer’s oath, the acts of respondents also amount to gross misconduct
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ― A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. x
xx

The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring
attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him
where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.

We cannot accept, however, the plea of leniency expressed by the IBP Board of Governors in behalf of
respondent. We also find that the suspension for two (2) months recommended by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner too light. We find six (6) months suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Johnson B. Hontanosas, is found GUILTY of violating the lawyer’s oath and
gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent’s suspension is effective upon
notice hereof. Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondent’s record as an attorney in this Court, and
notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7434 August 23, 2007

SPS. AMADOR and ROSITA TEJADA, Petitioners,

vs.
ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAÑA, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Petitioners-spouses Rosita and Amador Tejada filed a Complaint Affidavit before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) to initiate disbarment proceedings against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaña for his
continued refusal to settle his long overdue loan obligation to the complainants, in violation of his sworn duty as
a lawyer to do justice to every man and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

More specifically, the complaint alleges that:

3. Sometime on January, 2001, respondent lawyer Antoniutti K. Palana taking advantage of his special
knowledge as a lawyer represented to the petitioners that he has an alleged parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (73196) 16789 and that he needs an amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) so that he could reconstitute the torrens title on the same;

4. Respondent then induced by sweet promises and assurances petitioners spouses to finance such
undertaking with a solemn commitment on his part that after he has already reconstituted such torrens
title, he will deliver the same to the petitioners spouses as security for the amount they had financed;

Thereafter, petitioner spouses shall earn an amount of P70,000.00 from the P100,000.00 they had
financed or all and [sic] all, respondent lawyer shall pay petitioner spouses a total amount of
P170,000.00;

5. The agreement between the petitioner spouses and respondent lawyer, Antoniutti K. Palana in this
regard is being partly evidenced by their written agreement thereon dated January 12, 2001, a xerox
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A". Likewise, the receipt by the respondent of the
P100,000.00 is being evidenced in the bottom part of page 1 of the agreement;

6. Under the clear terms of their agreement, respondent lawyer Antoniutti K. Palana solemnly assured
petitioner spouses that he will reconstitute, deliver the reconstituted title and give the P170,000.00 to
the petitioners spouses all within a period of three months reckoned from their execution of their
written agreement dated January 12, 2001;

7. However, after respondent lawyer, Antoniutti K. Palana had gotten the P100,000.00 amount from
the petitioner spouses, respondent from that time on up to the present had intentionally evaded the
performance of his due, just, legal and demandable obligations to petitioner spouses.

It turned out that all his assurances that he had a torrens title, he will reconstitute the same and deliver
an amount of P170,000.00 to petitioner spouses were all fraudulent representations on his part or else
were only fictitious in character to defraud petitioner spouses of their hard owned monies;

xxxx
 9. Legal demands had already been made to respondent lawyer to fulfill all his moral and legal
responsibilities to petitioner spouses but all of said demands simply went unheeded. A xerox copy of
the two legal demand letters to respondent lawyer in this regard is hereto attached as Annex "B" and
"C."1

Despite due notice, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint as required by the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP. Respondent likewise failed to appear on the scheduled date of the mandatory conference
despite due notice.

Thus, on March 10, 2005, the IBP declared respondent to have waived his right to submit evidence and to
participate further in the proceedings of the case.

After a careful consideration of the pleadings and evidence submitted by the complainants ex parte,
Investigating Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano III submitted his February 1, 2006 Report to the IBP Board of
Governors, recommending respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months.

Based on said Report, petitioners were able to satisfactorily prove the following: that Rosita Tejada and
respondent and his companion executed a written agreement (Annex "A"); that respondent received the
amount of one hundred thousand pesos (PhP 100,000) from Rosita Tejada pursuant to said agreement; and
that petitioners sent a demand letter to respondent (Annex "C"), but, until now, respondent has failed to settle
his obligation. Petitioners, however, failed to present evidence to show that respondent fraudulently
represented himself to be the owner of the aforesaid lot. Noting respondent’s indifference to the proceedings of
the case, the Investigating Commissioner cited Ngayan v. Tugade,2 where the Supreme Court considered
respondent’s failure to answer the complaint and his failure to appear in four hearings below as evidence of his
flouting resistance to a lawful order of the court, and illustrate his despiciency to his oath of office in violation of
Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, for respondent’s misconduct, the Investigating Commissioner recommended respondent’s suspension for
a period of three (3) months, guided by Supreme Court rulings in analogous cases, viz: Sanchez v.
Somoso,3 where the lawyer was suspended for six (6) months for having issued personal checks from a closed
bank account and subsequently refused to pay for his medical expenses despite demand after the checks were
dishonored; Constantino v. Saludares,4 where the lawyer was suspended for three (3) months for his
unwarranted refusal to pay a personal loan despite demand; and Lizaso v. Amante,5 where the lawyer was
suspended indefinitely for his failure to return and account for the money delivered to him for investment
purposes.6

In its November 18, 2006 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, "considering Respondent's continued refusal to settle his
obligation to the complainants and for his failure to participate in the proceedings before the Commission of Bar
Discipline."7

After a review of the records and especially sans the submittal of any response or evidence from respondent,
we find no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Soriano.

Respondent, like all other members of the bar, is expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons, viz:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair
dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." The nature of the
office of a lawyer requires that s/he shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to the admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one’s
good standing in the profession.8

Indeed, the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. As previously
explained in Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence
1avvphi1

necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his
clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as
well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, members of
the legal fraternity can do nothing that might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.9

In the instant case, respondent’s unjustified withholding of petitioners’ money years after it became due and
demandable demonstrates his lack of integrity and fairness, and this is further highlighted by his lack of regard
for the charges brought against him. Instead of meeting the charges head on, respondent did not bother to file
an answer nor did he participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his conduct.

The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough
that s/he denies the charges against him; s/he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against
him/her. S/he must show proof that s/he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him/her.10

Finally, respondent’s acts, which violated the Lawyer's Oath "to delay no man for money or malice" as well as
the Code of Professional Responsibility, warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him.

With respect to the recommendation to suspend respondent Palaña for three (3) months, we find that the
sanction is not commensurate to the breach committed and disrespect to the Court exhibited by the erring
member of the bar. We increase the suspension to six (6) months in view of our ruling in Barrientos v. Libiran-
Meteoro.11

We find that the complainants could not have been defrauded without the representations of respondent that he
can easily have the torrens title of his lot reconstituted with his special knowledge as a legal practitioner as long
as he is provided PhP 100,000 to finance the reconstitution. Respondent knew that his representations were
false since the filing fee for a petition for reconstitution in 2001 was only PhP 3,145, and other expenses
including the publication of the filing of the petition could not have cost more than PhP 20,000. It is clear that he
employed deceit in convincing complainants to part with their hard earned money and the latter could not have
been easily swayed to lend the money were it not for his misrepresentations and failed promises as a member
of the bar. Moreover, when he failed to pay his just and legal obligation, he disobeyed the provisions of the Civil
Code which is one of the substantive laws he vowed to uphold when he took his oath as a lawyer. Lastly, to
aggravate his misconduct, he totally ignored the directives of the IBP to answer the complaint when he fully
knew as a lawyer that the compulsory bar organization was merely deputized by this Court to undertake the
investigation of complaints against lawyers, among which is the instant complaint. In short, his disobedience to
the IBP is in reality a gross and blatant disrespect to the Court. Lawyers fully know, as respondent is aware or
at least is assumed to know, that lawyers like him cannot disobey the orders and resolutions of the Court.
Failing in this duty as a member of the bar which is being supervised by the Court under the Constitution, we
find that a heavier sanction should fall on respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaña is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months and is ordered to settle his loan obligation to petitioners-spouses Amador and Rosita
Tejada within two (2) months from the date of this Decision’s promulgation.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 7505 October 24, 2008

WALTER WILKIE, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS, Respondent.

Puno, CJ.:*

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This administrative case arose from a Complaint dated April 27, 20051 initially filed with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), La Union Chapter, and forwarded to the IBP, National Office in Pasig City, by Mr. Walter
Wilkie against Atty. Sinamar E. Limos. In the complaint, it was alleged that the respondent committed deceitful
and dishonest conduct when she obtained a loan from the complainant and issued two (2) postdated checks in
the latter’s favor to pay the said loan despite knowledge of insufficiency of funds to cover the same.

The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP, Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) in
this wise:

Complainant alleged that on 2 April 2003, he engaged the services of respondent regarding his intention of
adopting his wife’s nephew, Reynal Alsaen Taltalen. Complainant has given his full trust and confidence on
respondent. Notwithstanding their lawyer and client relationship, on March 30, 2003, respondent borrowed
money from complainant in the amount of P250,000.00. The loan agreement was evidenced by a Contract of
Loan with a stipulation of interest in the amount of 24% per annum and that respondent will issue two (2) post
dated checks representing the principal amount of P250,000.00 and the interest in the amount of P60,000.00.

When the checks became due, complainant deposited the same to his account at Equitable PCI Bank but to his
surprise and dismay, the checks were returned as they were drawn against insufficient funds. Despite demands
made, respondent failed to pay her obligation.
Complainant decided to engage the services of a counsel who also made a formal demand to respondent but
to no avail. Criminal complaints were filed against respondent before Branch 2, Municipal Trial Court of San
Fernando City, La Union.

Complainant has also withdrawn the adoption case from respondent who did not do anything regarding the
case despite the lapse of almost a year.2

In its Order3 dated July 21, 2005, the CBD gave respondent a period of fifteen (15) days to submit her Answer
to the Complaint. Through Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, the CBD also sent a Notice
of Mandatory Conference/Hearing4 dated February 8, 2006 to the parties which required them to appear before
the Commission on March 29, 2006. 5

In response to the aforementioned Notice, a Manifestation and Motion6 dated February 23, 2006 was filed by
the respondent, requesting that she be furnished a copy of the complaint and be given a reasonable time after
receipt of the complaint to submit a responsive pleading thereto. Respondent also moved for the cancellation
and re-scheduling at a later date of the mandatory conference/hearing.

In her Order7 dated March 1, 2006, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala rejected respondent’s claim that she did
not receive the complaint in view of the registry return receipt attached to the records showing that a certain JE
Limos received the Order dated July 21, 2005. However, in the interest of justice, respondent was given a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days to file an Answer but the mandatory conference/hearing set on March 29,
2006 was maintained.

At the scheduled March 29, 2006 mandatory conference/hearing, the complainant was present but the
respondent failed to appear. Furthermore, respondent failed to file an answer. Thus, the Commissioner
considered respondent in default and deemed the case submitted for report and recommendation in her
Order8 dated March 29, 2006.

Eventually, the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation,9 dated July 28, 2006, was
submitted to the IBP Board of Governors with the following conclusion and recommendation:

A lawyer who issued bouncing checks violates the law and is subject to disbarment or suspension. Violation of
B.P. 22 is considered a crime involving moral turpitude as this mischief creates not only a wrong to the payee
or holder, but also an injury to the public. Although it does not relate to the exercise of the profession of a
lawyer, however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person. The Court has
stressed that the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law; its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby recommend that respondent ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS be
suspended for a period of TWO (2) YEARS from receipt hereof from the practice of her profession and as a
member of the Bar.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

On December 15, 2006, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-59110 in CBD
Case No. 05-1534 adopting and approving, with modification, the afore-quoted report and recommendation of
the commissioner, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as annex "A"; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and for respondent’s deceitful and dishonest conduct, Atty. Sinamar E. Limos is
hereby REPRIMANDED with STERN WARNING that a repetition of similar conduct will be dealt with more
severely.
On March 21, 2007, the CBD transmitted the Notice of Resolution pertaining to Resolution No. XVII-2006-591
together with the records of CBD Case No. 05-1534, 11 which this Court noted in its Resolution12 dated June 27,
2007.

On October 16, 2007, the additional records of the case were transmitted to the Court by the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline, through the Office of the Bar Confidant. Notably, the transmittal included the letter 13 dated
December 11, 2006 of the respondent explaining her failure to attend the hearing of CBD Case No. 05-1534
and pleading for the consideration of the members of the IBP Board of Governors. According to respondent,
she was not able to attend the mandatory conference/hearing because she was physically unfit at that time.
Her office staff whom she relied upon to receive communications for the office went on leave without her
knowledge and she was made to believe that the administrative complaint would be withdrawn in view of the
Affidavit of Desistance14 dated August 24, 2005 executed by complainant. Respondent claimed that her loan
from complainant was actually an accommodation she extended in behalf of a client, Hilario Inocencio. She
issued the postdated checks on the belief that Inocencio will send her the funds to cover the said checks
pursuant to their agreement. To this day, however, Inocencio had not complied with his promise in spite of the
loan having been fully paid by respondent on August 21, 2005 to the complainant who had filed cases against
her for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22). Inocencio’s demise had left her without any recourse. To
support her allegations, respondent attached to her letter the Affidavit of Desistance and the Order 15 of the
MTC, San Fernando, La Union, dated August 31, 2005 dismissing the criminal cases for violation of BP 22
against her (respondent).

We find the records sufficient to support the IBP’s findings.

In Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,16 we held that:

x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct,
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to
the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must
conduct themselves in a manner that reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of which explicitly states:

CANON 1-- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Respondent did not deny that she obtained a loan in the amount of ₱250,000.00 with interest from the
complainant. Respondent’s bare claim that the loan was, in fact, only an accommodation for a former client
who according to respondent had already died cannot be given credence and, indeed, too specious to be
believed. Besides, she did not file any answer to the complaint nor even appeared personally before the CBD
despite being duly notified, to allege such claim. Added to this observation is the fact that in her Manifestation
and Motion dated February 23, 2006, no mention was made with regard to the complainant’s August 24, 2005
Affidavit of Desistance. It was only mentioned in her letter to the IBP dated December 14, 2006 which was
received in the IBP-CBD on January 3, 2007. By then, the Report and Recommendation dated July 28, 2006 of
the Commissioner was already submitted to the Board of Governors which resolved to affirm said Report in its
Resolution dated December 15, 2006.

At any rate, the excuses given by respondent cannot exculpate her from an administrative sanction considering
her acknowledgement that worthless checks were issued by her in payment of the loan.

We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed
account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her.17 It shows a lack of personal
honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of
worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of
such act to the public interest and public order.18 It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to
the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the
profession she should hold in high esteem.19

Respondent, however, to secure her exoneration from the consequence of her act in issuing worthless checks,
heavily relies on the complainant’s Affidavit of Desistance dated August 24, 2005. But such reliance is
misplaced because while the complainant filed his affidavit with the trial court, he did not do the same thing in
this case. Notably, at the time of the mandatory conference/hearing before the CBD on March 29, 2006,
complainant did not even inform the Commissioner that he already desisted in prosecuting the criminal cases
he filed with the MTC against the respondent and that such desistance resulted in the dismissal of said cases.
In any event, the Court has consistently frowned upon the desistance of complainants because of legal and
jurisprudential injunction.

Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides in part:

Sec. 5. Service or dismissal. – . . . .

xxxx

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,

restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.

Pertinently in Rangwani v. Dino,20 citing Bolivar v. Simbol,21 the Court ruled that the discipline of lawyers cannot
be cut short by a compromise or withdrawal of charges. We ratiocinated, thus:

It is contended on the part of the plaintiff in error that this settlement operated as an absolution and remission
of his offense. This view of the case ignores the fact that the exercise of the power is not for the purpose of
enforcing civil remedies between parties, but to protect the court and the public against an attorney guilty of
unworthy practices in his profession. He had acted in clear disregard of his duty as an attorney at the bar, and
without "good fidelity" to his client. The public had rights which Mrs. Curtis could not thus settle or destroy. The
unworthy act had been fully consummated.22

Accordingly, an administrative sanction on the respondent is warranted. We disagree, however, with the
recommended sanction of reprimand by the IBP Board of Governors for being not commensurate to the gravity
of the wrong committed by respondent.

Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so.

The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.23 While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from
the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser
penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.24

In Barrios v. Martinez,25 we disbarred the respondent who issued worthless checks for which he was convicted
in the criminal case filed against him.

In Lao v. Medel,26 we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice
of law. The same sanction was imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino27 having been found
guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of property the title of which was only
entrusted to him by the complainant.

But in Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,28 we meted out only a six-month suspension to Atty. Elerizza Libiran-
Meteoro for having issued several checks to the complainants in payment of a pre-existing debt without
sufficient funds, justifying the imposition of a lighter penalty on the ground of the respondent’s payment of a
portion of her debt to the complainant, unlike in the aforementioned Lao and Rangwani cases where there was
no showing of any restitution on the part of the respondents.

In this case, the respondent has fully paid her obligation to the complainant which according to the receipts
dated July 21, 2005 and August 24, 2005,29 amounted to ₱400,000.00. The criminal cases filed by the
complainant have been dismissed and this is the first time a complaint of such nature has been filed against the
respondent. Under these circumstances, the Court rules and so holds that a suspension of three months from
the practice of law would be sufficient sanction on the respondent.

On a final note, we reiterate that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of
good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for
the practice of law.30 Sadly, herein respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of her as a
vanguard of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar E. Limos is SUSPENDED FOR THREE MONTHS from the practice
of law with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in the respondent’s record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7022 June 18, 2008

MARJORIE F. SAMANIEGO, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANDREW V. FERRER, respondent.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For resolution is the Complaint of Marjorie F. Samaniego against respondent Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer for
immorality, abandonment and willful refusal to give support to their daughter, filed before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) and docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1184.

The facts are as follows:

Early in 1996, Ms. Samaniego was referred to Atty. Ferrer as a potential client. Atty. Ferrer agreed to handle
her cases1 and soon their lawyer-client relationship became intimate. Ms. Samaniego said Atty. Ferrer courted
her and she fell in love with him.2 He said she flirted with him and he succumbed to her
temptations.3 Thereafter, they lived together as "husband and wife" from 1996 to 1997, 4 and on March 12,
1997, their daughter was born.5 The affair ended in 20006 and since then he failed to give support to their
daughter.7
Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Ms. Samaniego presented their daughter's birth and baptismal
certificates, and the photographs taken during the baptism. She testified that she knew that Atty. Ferrer was in
a relationship but did not think he was already married. She also testified that she was willing to compromise,
but he failed to pay for their daughter's education as agreed upon.8 Atty. Ferrer refused to appear during the
hearing since he did not want to see Ms. Samaniego.9

In his position paper,10 Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to support their daughter. He also admitted his
indiscretion; however, he prayed that the IBP consider Ms. Samaniego's complicity as she was acquainted with
his wife and children. He further reasoned that he found it unconscionable to abandon his wife and 10 children
to cohabit with Ms. Samaniego.

In Resolution No. XVII-2005-13811 dated November 12, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report
and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and imposed upon Atty. Ferrer the penalty of six (6)
months suspension from the practice of law for his refusal to support his daughter with Ms. Samaniego. The
IBP also admonished him to be a more responsible member of the bar and to keep in mind his duties as a
father.

On February 1, 2006, Atty. Ferrer filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 with prayer for us to reduce the penalty,
to wit:

Without passing judgment on the correctness or incorrectness of the disposition of the Honorable
Commission on Bar Discipline, herein respondent most humbly and respectfully begs the compassion
of the Honorable Court and states that the gravity of the penalty imposed and meted out, depriving
herein respondent to earn a modest living for a period of six (6) months, will further cause extreme
hardship to his family of ten (10) children.13

We referred the motion to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation. Upon finding that Atty. Ferrer lacked
the degree of morality required of a member of the bar for his illicit affair with Ms. Samaniego, with whom he
sired a child while he was lawfully married and with 10 children, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended
that we affirm Resolution No. XVII-2005-138 and deny the prayer for reduced penalty.14

We agree with the IBP on Atty. Ferrer's failure to give support to his daughter with Ms. Samaniego. We also
agree with the Office of the Bar Confidant that Atty. Ferrer's affair with Ms. Samaniego showed his lack of good
moral character as a member of the bar. We dismiss, however, Ms. Samaniego's charge of abandonment since
Atty. Ferrer did not abandon them. He returned to his family.

Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair; in his words, his indiscretion which ended in 2000. We have
considered such illicit relation as a disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action. 15 The penalty
for such immoral conduct is disbarment,16 or indefinite17 or definite18 suspension, depending on the
circumstances of the case. Recently, in Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr.,19 we ruled that suspension from the
practice of law for two years was an adequate penalty imposed on the lawyer who was found guilty of gross
immorality. In said case, we considered the absence of aggravating circumstances such as an adulterous
relationship coupled with refusal to support his family; or maintaining illicit relationships with at least two women
during the subsistence of his marriage; or abandoning his legal wife and cohabiting with other women.20

In this case, we find no similar aggravating circumstances. Thus we find the penalty recommended by the IBP
and Office of the Bar Confidant as adequate sanction for the grossly immoral conduct of respondent.

On another point, we may agree with respondent's contention that complainant was not entirely blameless. She
knew about his wife but blindly believed him to be unmarried. However, that one complicit in the affair
complained of immorality against her co-principal does not make this case less serious since it is immaterial
whether Ms. Samaniego is in pari delicto.21 We must emphasize that this Court's investigation is not about Ms.
Samaniego's acts but Atty. Ferrer's conduct as one of its officers and his fitness to continue as a member of the
Bar.22
Finally, it is opportune to remind Atty. Ferrer and all members of the bar of the following norms under the Code
of Professional Responsibility:

xxxx

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the integrated bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

xxxx

Needless to state, respondent ought always to keep in mind the responsibilities of a father to all his children. If
there be a resultant hardship on them because of this case, let it be impressed on all concerned that the direct
cause thereof was his own misconduct.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer GUILTY of gross immorality and, as recommended
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, SUSPEND him from the practice of
law for six (6) months effective upon notice hereof, with WARNING that the same or similar act in the future will
be dealt with more severely.

To enable us to determine the effectivity of the penalty imposed, the respondent is DIRECTED to report the
date of his receipt of this Decision to this Court.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of
the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 1481 October 17, 2008

REBECCA B. ARNOBIT, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PONCIANO P. ARNOBIT, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Rebecca B. Arnobit, in her affidavit-complaint1 dated May 11, 1975, prays that the Court exercise its disciplinary
power over her husband, respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, on the grounds of Immorality and Abandonment.
In her complaint, Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were married on August 20, 1942. Twelve children
were born out of this union. Rebecca further alleged seeing respondent through law school, continuously
supporting him until he passed the bar examinations and became a member of the Philippine bar. Several
years after, however, or in 1968, respondent left the conjugal home and started cohabiting with one Benita
Buenafe Navarro who later bore him four more children. Respondent’s infidelity, according to Rebecca,
impelled her to file a complaint for legal separation and support. A criminal case for adultery against Benita and
respondent later followed.

In his Answer2 dated July 31, 1975, respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife and the mother of
their 12 children. He denied, however, having cohabited with Benita. And he pointed to his complaining wife as
the cause of their separation, stating the observation that she was "always traveling all over the country,
ostensibly for business purposes, without his knowledge and consent, x x x thereby neglecting her obligations
toward her family."3

Issues having been joined, hearings were conducted before the Office of the Solicitor General and,
subsequently, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission).
At the hearings, Rebecca presented both oral and documentary evidence to support her allegations of
abandonment and immorality.

Aside from her testimony, Rebecca presented two other witnesses, viz: Venancia M. Barrientos, her sister, who
identified a letter dated August 28, 1970 written by respondent to her, addressing her as "Vending" (Exhibit "B-
1"), therein asking for forgiveness for the unhappiness he caused his family; and Melecio Navarro, husband of
Benita, who testified about how respondent took his wife Benita as a mistress, knowing fully well of their lawful
marriage.

Rebecca also presented the affidavits of National Bureau of Investigation agents Eladio C. Velasco and Jose
C. Vicente (Exhibits "H-1" and "H-2") to show the existence of a prima facie case for adultery. The pictures and
baptismal and birth certificates of Mary Ann, Ma. Luisa, Caridad, and Ponciano Jr., all surnamed Arnobit, were
submitted to prove the fact that respondent sired four illegitimate children out of his illicit cohabitation with
Benita.4

According to the investigating commissioner, respondent, despite due notice, repeatedly absented himself
when it was his turn to present evidence, adding that scheduled hearings had to be postponed just to afford
respondent ample opportunity to present his side of the controversy. The investigating commissioner also
stated that, in most cases, respondent would seek postponement, pleading illness, on the very date of the
hearing. And according to the Commission, its several directives for respondent to send by mail his affidavits
and documentary exhibits in lieu of personal appearance so that the commission could finish with the
investigation proved futile.

In its Report dated June 21, 1995, the Commission found respondent liable for abandonment and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. The recommendation portion of the
report reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended to the Board of Governors that the respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months as a lesson for him to change his ways. An indefinite
suspension is not recommended because it has been gathered from complainant herself that respondent
supports himself through the practice of law – which would be cruel for us to curtail at this time when he is
already advanced in age – the penalty of three (3) months suspension and recording of such penalty in his
record being sufficient to berate him as to his lack of responsibility as evidenced by his abandonment of the
children. [Report and Recommendation rendered by Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas]

On January 27, 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XII-96-43 adopting and approving
the Commission report aforementioned.
While the Court concurs with the inculpatory findings of the IBP on the charge of abandonment, it cannot bring
itself to agree that respondent is liable only for that offense. As it were, the charge for gross immoral conduct
has sufficiently been proven. Following established jurisprudence, respondent deserves to be disbarred.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct:

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As this Court often reminds members of the bar, the requirement of good moral character is of much greater
import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character
is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to
maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just
the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right
and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because "vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s property,
reputation, his life, his all."5

Immoral conduct has been described as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary
action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.6

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. 7 A
member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
impression that he is flouting those moral standards.

A review of the records readily reveals that despite the protracted delay in the hearings mainly caused by
respondent’s failure to appear, complainant relentlessly pursued this administrative case against her husband.
She was, to be sure, able to establish by clear, convincing, and preponderant evidence his commission of
marital infidelity and abandonment of his family.

Although respondent in his answer denied abandoning complainant and their children and offered an
explanation as to the cause of his and his wife’s separation, he opted not to take the witness stand and be
cross- examined on his sworn answer. Neither did he bother to call and present his alleged paramour, Benita,
who could have had disproved an existing adulterous relationship between them, or, at least, confirm his
protestation about the paternity of her four children. Significantly, Benita’s husband, no less, risked personal
ridicule by testifying on the illicit liaison between his wife and respondent.

The fact that respondent’s philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession would not
save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated
to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
with which his license and the law invest him.8 To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he grounds expressed in
Section 27, Rule 138,9of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct x
x x of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity."10 To reiterate, possession of good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
While the onus rests on the complainant proffering the charges to prove the same, respondent owes himself
and the Court the duty to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial of wrongdoing
would not suffice in the face of clear evidence demonstrating unfitness.

When one’s moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is
imperiled, it behooves the individual concerned to meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the
satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of
Attorneys.11Respondent has not discharged the burden in this regard. Although duly notified, he never attended
the hearings to rebut the serious charges brought against him, irresistibly suggesting that the charges are true.

Undoubtedly, respondent’s act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have children with another
woman constitutes grossly immoral conduct. And to add insult to injury, there seems to be little attempt on the
part of respondent to be discreet about his liaison with the other woman.

As we have already ruled, disbarment is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife to maintain
an illicit relationship with another woman who had borne him a child.12 In the instant case, respondent’s grossly
immoral conduct compels the Court to wield its power to disbar. The penalty is most appropriate under the
premises.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ponciano P. Arnobit is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this Decision be entered into
the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished the IBP and circulated by the Court Administrator to all
appellate and trial courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli
Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with
whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene
had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I
miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the
following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied
that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the
venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.

Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its
face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to
Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for
you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience
eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger
plan for the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to
love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we
spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the
life in me is gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime.
Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE
YOU'LL BE!"2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New
Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still
later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert,
she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was
handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they
attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the
couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega
Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of
the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were
photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A
photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low
profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that
Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or
neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep
his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of
paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the very day of
her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now they
are.6 (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding

his adulterousrelationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him
unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene
was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as
in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special
friendship with Irene.

xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling
the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was
merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The
Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family
(Article XV, Sec. 2).9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

 19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a
lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife,
he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's
marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being
that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low
profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as
Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father
of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from
respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the
complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by
complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against
respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were
adopted as his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006
briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
 RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-
entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139 22 of the
Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word
Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence
against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published
in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is
carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on
record which support the accusation of complainant against respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made
the following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being
[that] their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective
families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the
reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely
personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a
"special" relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with
the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that
there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of
the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child.
Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to
believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child.
It should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of
Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
"adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman
who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of
her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What
respondent denies is havingflaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only to
the immediate members of their respective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are
not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at
least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it
 has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha
Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent – a "lawyer," 38 years
old – as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE
AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate 28 with her
signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu
dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of
Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more
than clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and
credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 – which is the quantum
of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence"
is all that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase
"grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall
have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.
 x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." 35 The case at bar
involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v.
Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree.

xxxx

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarriedadults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not
so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous
marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has
been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of
an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable
behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges
which his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly
swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution andobey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
(Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision,
obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support."40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for
nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based
on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition
for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we
are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3,
2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw
the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand
as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The
acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent
should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless
proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with
Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite
respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state
that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had
already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ
Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the
Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on
dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent
phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a
rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be
married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's
eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her about
Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the
more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11thStreet, New Manila, Quezon City,
which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with
complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of
Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas
Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that
Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a
coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje
stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put
short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a
girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents
is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala
 was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the
adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth
certificate is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in
any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise
Moje.45(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the
DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and
Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same
would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one
to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting
in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case 47 (Italics in the
original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath
of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Chief Justice, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,

Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., concur.