Navia vs. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618, G.R. No.

184467 June 19, 2012

FACTS: A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore.
The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were
then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards
disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong.
Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the
security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps
in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of
Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.

Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of
Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the
petitioners. The trial court issued the challenged Decision granting the petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.

Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ of amparo is
available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the
aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench, Virginia
miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state with some
degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a violation of or a threat
to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence Virginia adduced
that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries
in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on
March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred in issuing the writ and in
holding them responsible for Bens disappearance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is proper?

HELD: RTCs decision is reversed and set aside.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: writ of amparo

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief
“to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.”

Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes every human beings inherent
right to life, while Article 9 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to life
must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided
by and in accordance with law. This overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and security
without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.

The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this Court defined enforced
disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and
adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances definition
of enforced disappearances, as “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.”

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that
constitute it:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on the
fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.

As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the
persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence
that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation.

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise
essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support
or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this
case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend
to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents,
officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia’s amparo petition whether as responsible or
accountable persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a
hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the
Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private
individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is
a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable
element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City
and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has
been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As
discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance
must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an
enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.

DISMISSED

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Constitutional Law; Writs of Amparo; Enforced Disappearances; A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on
the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances in the country.—A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was
promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its
purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief “to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.”

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 defines enforced or
involuntary disappearances as follows: “Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons” means the
arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a
State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to
give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

 Same; Same; Same; Elements of Enforced Disappearances.—From the statutory definition of enforced
disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute it: (a) that there be an arrest,
detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by
the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and, (d) that the intention for such refusal is
to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time

 Same; Same; Same; The petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation.—It is now clear that for the protective
writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not
enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried
 out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said
missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation.

 Same; Same; Same; In an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise
essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization,
support or acquiescence of the government.

 Same; Same; Same; A writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the
person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or
entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element.

Caram vs. Segui, 732 SCRA 86, G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014

FACTS: Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became pregnant with
the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into
believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During
this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children in Parañaque City.

On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, Marikina
City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina
voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.

On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as
“Legally Available for Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was “matched” with Spouses Medina and
supervised trial custody was then commenced.

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD asking
for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together.

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD Assistant
Secretary Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had
attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State.

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparobefore the RTC seeking to obtain
custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority
and custody of a minor child.

HELD: The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there was no
enforced disappearance in this case.

As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements
constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:

1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
3. That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate
or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparopetition; and,
4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.

The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD officers never
concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the
DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she
filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD officers
presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as
used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up
for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption,
clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and
contesting custody over him.

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of
parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State,
the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Constitutional Law; Writs of Amparo; The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of
“extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. “Enforced disappearances” are “attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals
acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law.

 Same; Same; Enforced Disappearances; Words and Phrases; As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,”
the Supreme Court in Navia v. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 (2012), enumerated the elements constituting “enforced
disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851.

Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 681 SCRA 678, G.R. No. 183533 September 25, 2012

DOCTRINE: Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP,
can be held liable for affront against the petitioner‟s rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidence
exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had
failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary investigations required under the
rules. It cannot be overemphasized that Section 1 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data expressly
include in their coverage even threatened violations against a person‟s right to life, liberty or security. Further, threat
and intimidation that vitiate the free will – although not involving invasion of bodily integrity – nevertheless constitute a
violation of the right to security in the sense of “freedom from threat”.

FACTS: On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs of amparo
and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place and production of documents. In the
petition, he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed; hence, he sought that he be placed in a sanctuary appointed
by the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from further conducting surveillance and monitoring of his
activities and for his name to be excluded from the order of battle and other government records connecting him to the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he
noticed that he was always being followed by a certain “Joel,” a former colleague at Bayan Muna. “Joel” pretended
peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the petitioner‟s store. Three days before the petitioner was apprehended, “Joel”
approached and informed him of his marital status and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. “Joel”
inquired if the petitioner was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during the hearing if the
petitioner had gone home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in the negative explaining that he was
afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier. CA denied the petition for WRIT OF AMPARO because fail to allege how
the supposed threat or violation of petitioner‟s [right to] life, liberty and security is committed. Neither is there any
narration of any circumstances attendant to said supposed violation or threat to violate petitioner‟s right to life, liberty
or security to warrant entitlement to the privilege of the writs prayed for. Application for WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is
likewise denied because allegations therein do not comply with the aforestated requirements of Section 6 [Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data] of the pertinent rule. The petition is bereft of any allegation stating with specific definiteness as to
how petitioner‟s right to privacy was violated or threatened to be violated. The court also dropped Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (then incumbent president) as a party respondent. The court issued a resolution affirming the decision of CA.
Hence, this peititon.

ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the petition and dropping Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo as a party respondent.

2) Whether or not the CA committed gross abuse of discretion when it failed to conclude from the evidence offered by
the petitioner the fact that by being placed in the order of battle list, threats and violations to the latter‟s life, liberty
and security were actually committed by the respondents
HELD: 1) No. The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by substantial evidence his
allegations against the President to make the latter liable for either acts or omissions violative of rights against life,
liberty and security. In the instant case, the petitioner merely included the President‟s name as a party respondent
without any attempt at all to show the latter‟s actual involvement in, or knowledge of the alleged violations. Further,
prior to the filing of the petition, there was no request or demand for any investigation that was brought to the
President‟s attention. Thus, while the President cannot be completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data merely on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit, the
petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability of the President, as commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of
command responsibility.

2) No. The Court notes that the petition for issuance of the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data is sufficient
as to its contents. However, they are mere allegations, which the Court cannot accept “hook, line and sinker”, so to
speak, and whether substantial evidence exist to warrant the granting of the petition is a different matter altogether. In
this case, the petition was mainly anchored on the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security by reason of his
inclusion in the military‟s order of battle, the surveillance and monitoring activities made on him, and the intimidation
exerted upon him to compel him to be a military asset. While as stated earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of
protection of the writs of amparo and habeas data, in the petitioner‟s case, the restraints and threats allegedly made
allegations lack corroborations, are not supported by independent and credible evidence, and thus stand on nebulous
grounds.

(Details of the petitioner‟s claim and respective reasons why it was not considered sufficient:)

-it was claimed that “Joel” once inquired from the petitioner if the latter was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. By itself,
such claim cannot establish with certainty that the petitioner was being monitored.

- The petitioner insisted that he was brought against his will and was asked to stay by the respondents in places under
the latter‟s control. The respondents, on the other hand, averred that it was the petitioner who voluntarily offered his
service to be a military asset, but was rejected as the former still doubted his motives and affiliations.

- inclusion in the “order of battle” - it was categorically denied by respondent Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr. who stated that
he “does not have knowledge about any Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) „order of battle‟ which allegedly lists the
petitioner as a member of the CPP.”

- Moreover, the evidence showed that the petitioner‟s mobility was never curtailed. From the time he was allegedly
brought to Batangas in August of 2007 until the time he sought the assistance of KARAPATAN- ST, there was no restraint
upon the petitioner to go home, as in fact, he went home to Mindoro on several instances.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data; Despite the lack of certain contents, which the Rules on
the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require, for as long as their absence under exceptional
circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be susceptible to outright dismissal.―Although
the exact locations and the custodians of the documents were not identified, this does not render the petition
insufficient. Section 6(d) of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is clear that the requirement of specificity arises
only when the exact locations and identities of the custodians are known. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated
with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. Thus, despite the lack of certain
contents, which the Rules on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require, for as long as their
absence under exceptional circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be susceptible to
outright dismissal.

 Same; Same; Same; Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is explicit that
questions of fact and law can be raised before the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As a
rule then, the Court is not bound by the factual findings made by the appellate court which rendered the judgment
in a petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data.

Salcedo vs. Bollozos, 623 SCRA 27, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2236 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3083-RTJ.)
July 5, 2010 (FULL TEXT CASE)

We pass upon the verified Letter-Complaint, dated August 29, 2008, filed by Ruben N. Salcedo (complainant), charging
Judge Gil G. Bollozos (respondent judge), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, with
Grave Misconduct and Ignorance of the Law in the handling of SPEC. PROC. No. 2008-009, entitled Jose Tanmalack,
Jr., represented by Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan v. Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan De Oro
City, and Insp. Wylen Rojo.

THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The complaint arose from a verified handwritten petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Writ of Amparo (the
petition) filed by Jose Tanmalack, Jr. against the Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan de
Oro City, and Inspector Wylen Rojo. The complainant alleged that he is a co-owner of a parcel of land (disputed property)
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. O-740 and registered in the name of Patricio Salcedo. The disputed property
is about 126,112 square meters wide and is situated in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.

On January 23, 2008 at around 2:30 p.m., while the complainant (together with his niece Rebecca R. Lumbay and his
nephew Alan Jose P. Roa) was supervising an on-going construction over the disputed property, Tanmalack and heavily
armed men arrived and forced themselves inside the fenced premises of the disputed property. The complainant averred
that Tanmalack and his companions harassed and threatened to kill and to harm him and his workers; that Tanmalack
uttered defamatory statements and accused him of land-grabbing; and that Tanmalack and his companions occupied the
property and destroyed building materials such as G.I. sheets, lumber and other construction materials.

The complainant forthwith reported the incident to the nearby police station. The police promptly responded and arrested
Tanmalack and brought him in for questioning. That same afternoon at around 4:45 p.m., Tanmalack, represented by his
sister, Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan, filed the petition[1] on his behalf while Tanmalack was detained by the police for
employing self-help in preventing squatters from putting up improvements in their titled property.

Clerk of Court Atty. Herlie Luis-Requerme narrated the circumstances surrounding the filing of the petition and how it
came to be referred to the respondent judges sala, as follows:

1. In the late afternoon of January 23, 2008, a query was received by the Office regarding the
procedure in filing a petition for a Writ of Amparo. We gave the information that the established
procedure is to assign cases to the different branches by raffling or in urgent cases, by a special raffle
upon proper motions. But since the office has not received any case of that nature yet, and as the schedule
of raffling will still be in the afternoon of the next day, it will be referred to the Executive Judge for
instruction and or appropriate action;
2. That since the Executive Judge was on leave, I went to consult the 1st Vice Executive Judge Evelyn
Gamotin Nery. Since Judge Nery was busy at that time, I went to see 2nd Vice Executive Judge Ma. Anita
Esguerra-Lucagbo;
3. That I clarified from Judge Lucagbo the procedure to be adopted under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC);
4. That the issue if any judge can immediately act on the petition was not clearly stated in the Rule
but if the case will be referred to her as the 2nd Vice Executive Judge, she will be willing to look at the
petition;
5. That when I went back at the Office at a little past 5:00 P.M. already, direct from the chamber of
Judge Lucagbo, I found out that a Petition for Writ of Amparo was filed at around 4:45 P.M. as stamped
in the petition;
6. That since I was out of the office, the Docket Clerk in charge, Mr. Rudy Exclamador, referred the
case to the Administrative Officer Mary Lyn Charisse Lagamon;
7. That thinking I was no longer around as the personnel to whom I left the information that I was
going to the sala of 1st Vice Executive Judge Nery was not able to inform the Admin. Officer of my
whereabouts, Mr. Exclamador was instructed by her to refer the case to you [referring to the respondent
judge];
8. That upon learning of the fact, I immediately called Mr. Exclamador and Ms. Lagamon to explain
why they referred the case to your sala without any instruction from me;
9. That they said that they are of the honest belief that I was no longer around; that the lawyer was
insisting to refer the case immediately to a judge since it is already 5:00 P.M. and considering the novelty,
urgency and importance of the case, and fearing that no judge will be left to act on the petition if they still
discuss what to do, Mr. Exclamador, with the concurrence of Admin. Officer Lagamon, referred the case
to you since your sala was the nearest to our office, it being adjacent to your court;
10. That there is nobody from this Office who brought the handwritten petition to Judge Lucagbo nor
was there any instruction from her to any of the personnel to have the petition conform to a form
acceptable to the court, such fact was confirmed by Judge Lucagbo;
11. That the office only acted what it deemed best under the circumstances and was not motivated by
any ill motive or malice.[2]
 Based on the petition and answers to the clarificatory questions propounded to Tanmalacks representative and
counsel, the respondent judge immediately issued a Writ of Amparo dated January 23, 2008, directing the police officers
of Agora Police Station 3 or Insp. Wylen Rojo x x x to release immediately upon receipt of [the] writ but not later than
6:00 P.M. today, petitioner Jose Tanmalack, Jr., to the custody of Atty. Francis V. Ku. The respondent judge also directed
the police officers to file their verified return to the petition within five (5) working days, together with supporting
affidavits, in conformity with Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

Around 5:30 p.m., the Writ of Amparo was served upon SPO3 Aener O. Adajar, PNP Chief Investigator. At six
oclock in the evening of that same day, the police released Tanmalack to the custody of Atty. Francis Ku.

In his complaint, the complainant questions the issuance of the Writ of Amparo which he claims had been unusually
issued with haste. The complainant claims that the handwritten petition did not give any ground to warrant the issuance of
the Writ of Amparo; that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, bias, and obvious partiality, and in
grave disregard of the Rules and the rule of law when he acted upon and granted the letter-petition for the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo. The complainant also alleges that the respondent judge accommodated the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo because he and Atty. Francis Ku (Tanmalacks counsel) are members of the Masonic fraternity.

The respondent judge filed his Comment dated March 30, 2009, in compliance with the directive of the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA). In his defense, he alleged:

(a) [W]hen he received the petition from the Office of the Clerk of Court, he had no option but to
exercise his judicial duty without any bias or partiality, nor did he consider that the petitioners
counsel is a fraternal brother (Mason);

(b) [A]lthough the petition is for the issuance of both writ of amparo and writ of habeas corpus, he
deemed it more in consonance with the [Rule on the Writ of Amparo];

(c) [I]t was not improper even if the x x x petition was not raffled, and was immediately assigned to his
sala by the Office of the Clerk of Court, since Par. 2, Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC states that any
judge of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) can issue a writ and the said Sec. 3 further states that it can be
filed on any day and at any time;

(d) [T]he person who filed the petition is the sister of Mr. Tanmalack who was detained at the Agora
Police Station, Cagayan de Oro City; that the issuance of the writ was a matter of great urgency
because the alleged illegal deprivation of liberty was made in the late afternoon of January 23, 2008,
which was a Friday, and that if the Court would not act on the petition, the detainee would certainly
spend the night in jail;

(e) [T]he petition, although in handwritten form, is not improper because Section 5 of the SC Circular (on
the Writ of Amparo) only requires that the same be signed and verified; that he found the petition
sufficient in form and in substance;

(f) [A]lthough the Amparo rules mandate that a judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if
on its face it ought to issue, he propounded clarificatory questions on the petitioners representative
and their counsel, thus, the following information were elicited:

1) That the property of petitioners family, which is under their possession and Tanmalack registered
under TCT No. T-1627491, was intruded by some persons who wanted to fence the area and put
up improvements by constructing shanties thereon;

2) That when petitioner Mr. Tanmalack prevented the intrusion it resulted to heated arguments and
altercations which prompted him to go to the police station to report the incident and be blottered;

3) That when Mr. Tanmalack arrived at the police station in the late afternoon of January 23, 2008 in
order to air his complaint, the intruders came and introduced themselves as the owners of the
property;

4) That when Police Officer Rojo (Rojo) heard the version of these intruders and despite the
protestations of petitioner and his relatives, the police did not anymore allow Mr. Tanmalack to
leave the police station; and,
 5) That petitioners counsel called up Rojo to secure the immediate release of his client from police
custody but to no avail;

(g) [A]fter he assiduously evaluated the aforestated facts, as well as the allegations in the petition, respondent
Judge, in the exercise of his judicial function, found that the same warranted the issuance of the writ; the
arrest of Mr. Tanmalack was unlawful because Rojo was not present in the area where the alleged incident
happened, so that the statements of the complainants (Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa) would be hearsay;
(h) [I]n the Writ of Amparo the respondents were directed to file a verified return pursuant to the rules; during the
summary hearing of the petition on 25 January 2008, it was only Rojo who appeared, the alleged
complainants (Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa) who caused the detention of the petitioner were absent; P/Insp.
Rojo, when asked by the Court, gave the following answers:

1) That he would no longer file his Answer (which should be a verified return) on the complaint
considering that the petitioner was already released;

2) That he confirmed that it was the petitioner who came first to the police station to complain, followed
by the person who wanted to fence the property; the conflict between the petitioner and the other
persons is on a property dispute, of which it was petitioner who is in possession; and

3) That he denied that he had arrested the petitioner and neither did he detain him but only he could not
release the petitioner because of the complaint and for further evaluation.

(i) [H]e noted that the police blotter did not state that petitioner brought heavily armed men with him when he
allegedly harassed the complainant.

[(j) That in the summary hearing on January 25, 2008, the petitioner as well as the respondent Rojo have arrived
into an agreement that the writ be considered permanent.]

THE REPORT OF THE OCA

The OCA informed the Court that the case was already ripe for resolution in a Report dated April 8, 2010, signed
by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez and Deputy Court Administrator Raul Bautista Villanueva. The Report
likewise presented a brief factual background of the case.

The OCA recommended that the administrative complaint against the respondent judge be dismissed for lack of
merit. The recommendation was based on an evaluation which reads:

EVALUATION: The complaint is bereft of merit.

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, as in the instant case, or of a private individual or entity. Whereas in other jurisdictions the writ
covers only actual violations, the Philippine version is more protective of the right to life, liberty and
security because it covers both actual and threatened violations of such rights.

Nowhere in the records of the instant complaint that the issuance of the writ of amparo was
attended by irregularities. The detainees sister who filed the petition is allowed under Section 2(b) of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo (SC A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC). Also, the petition was properly filed with the
Regional Trial Court where the act or omission was committed or where any of its elements occurred.

Respondent Judge, in whose sala the said petition was assigned is deemed to have complied with
his oath and judicial duty when he ordered the issuance of the writ of amparo upon determination that the
right to liberty of Mr. Tanmalack was being violated or threatened to be violated. These is no showing
that respondent Judge, in granting the petition for a writ of amparo was motivated by bad faith, ignominy
or ill will, thus, herein complainants allegation that respondent Judges act was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion and authority, bias and partiality, and grave disregard of the rules, deserves scant consideration.

This Office agrees with respondent Judges observation that Rojos declaration not anymore to
contest the petition and that he (Rojo) did not arrest nor detain petitioner, but admitted that he could not
release the latter for further evaluation because of the complaint is an admission that he deprived [or
threatened to deprive] Jose [Dy Tanmalack] of his liberty.
 OUR RULING

We concur with the OCAs recommendation that the

administrative complaint against the respondent judge be dismissed for lack of merit.

At the outset, we agree with the complainant that the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo in
Tanmalacks favor. Had he read Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more closely, the respondent judge would
have realized that the writ, in its present form, only applies to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.[3] The present case involves concerns that are purely property and commercial in nature concerns that we have
previously ruled are not covered by the Writ of Amparo.[4] In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[5] we held:

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is
not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we
shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in
line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands
requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact,
to wit:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed
appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate
facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a
threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed.

In the present case, the Writ of Amparo ought not to have been issued by the respondent judge since Tanmalacks
petition is fatally defective in substance and content, as it does not allege that he is a victim of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or the threats thereof. The petition merely states that he is under threat of deprivation of liberty
with the police stating that he is not arrested but merely in custody.[6]

Whether the respondent judge could be held administratively liable for the error he committed in the present case, is,
however, a question we must answer in the negative.

Plainly, the errors attributed to respondent judge pertain to the exercise of his adjudicative functions. As a matter
of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal, or administrative for any of his official acts, no
matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross
ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. Settled is the rule that
errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies.[7]

In the present case, the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo cannot be raised as an issue in the present
administrative case. The proper recourse for the complainant should have been to file an appeal, from the final judgment
or order of the respondent judge, to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo. In Bello III v. Diaz,[8] we reiterated that disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement,
supplement, or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary; an inquiry into their administrative liability
arising from judicial acts may be made only after other available remedies have been settled. We laid down
the rationale for the rule in Flores v. Abesamis,[9] viz:

As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities
being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors
or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of
evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a
motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and
appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in
character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are, inter
alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition
for change of venue, as the case may be.

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies,
whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the
entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other
measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal
nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have
spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be
said to have opened, or closed.

Flores resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for
or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by law from court judgments or orders,
on the theory that the Judges orders had caused him undue injury. This is impermissible, as this Court has
already more than once ruled. Law and logic decree that administrative or criminal remedies are
neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait
on the result thereof. Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from
external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or
administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their
duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges
are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that
exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be had only if there be a final declaration by a competent
court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged
judgment or order, and ** also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable
negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order or under the stringent
circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.[10]

We note, too, that although the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo, we find, as the OCA did,
that there is no evidence on record that supports the complainants allegation that the issuance was tainted with manifest
bias and partiality, bad faith, or gross ignorance of the law. The fact that the respondent judge and Atty. Francis Ku are
members of the Masonic fraternity does not justify or prove that the former acted with bias and partiality. Bias and
partiality can never be presumed and must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. While palpable error may be
inferred from respondent judges issuance of the Writ of Amparo, there is no evidence on record that would justify a
finding of partiality or bias. The complainants allegation of partiality will not suffice in the absence of a clear and
convincing proof that will overcome the presumption that the respondent judge dispensed justice according to law and
evidence, without fear or favor.[11]

Likewise, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party. To hold a
judge administratively accountable simply because he erred in his judgment has never been the intent of the law;
reasonable competence and good faith judgments, not complete infallibility, are what the law requires.
 The more significant issue in this case is the complainants charge of gross ignorance of the law against the
respondent judge.

A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are
expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with laws and procedural rules. They must know the law and
apply it properly in good faith. They are likewise expected to keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence. For, a judge who is
plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office and great privilege vested in him.[12]

We find that the respondent judges error does not rise to the level of gross ignorance of the law that is defined by
jurisprudence. We take judicial notice of the fact that at the time he issued the Writ of Amparo on January 23, 2008, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been effective for barely three months (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo became effective
on October 24, 2007). At that time, the respondent judge cannot be said to have been fully educated and informed on the
novel aspects of the Writ of Amparo. Simply stated, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo at that time cannot be said to be a
simple, elementary, and well-known rule that its patent disregard would constitute gross ignorance of the law.

More importantly, for full liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of
the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous; it must be established that he was
motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive. [13] In the present case, the complainant failed to
prove by substantial evidence that the respondent judge was motivated by bad faith and bias or partiality in the issuance of
the Writ of Amparo.

We take this occasion, however, to remind the respondent judge that under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, a judge must be "the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence." A judge is called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic
legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He owes to the public and to this Court the duty to be
proficient in the law. He is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges must not only render
just, correct, and impartial decisions, resolutions, and orders, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their
fairness, impartiality, and integrity, for good judges are men who have mastery of the principles of law and who discharge
their duties in accordance with law.[14] We mentioned all these to emphasize to the respondent judge the need to be more
judicious and circumspect in the issuance of extraordinary writs such as the Writ of Amparo.

We also reiterate that in an administrative proceeding, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations
in the complaint by substantial evidence.[15] We cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or
speculation. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his claim,
as in this case, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.[16]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the administrative complaint
against Judge Gil G. Bollozos, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Judges; Writ of Amparo; Had the respondent judge read Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more
closely, he would have realized that the writ, in its present form, only applies to “extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof,” not to concerns that are purely property and commercial in nature.—We
agree with the complainant that the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo in Tanmalack’s favor.
Had he read Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more closely, the respondent judge would have realized
that the writ, in its present form, only applies to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.” The present case involves concerns that are purely property and commercial in nature—concerns that
we have previously ruled are not covered by the Writ of Amparo.

 Same; Administrative Complaints; Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned—errors committed by a judge in the exercise
of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be
assailed through judicial remedies
  Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law; A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.—The more significant issue in this case is the complainant’s charge of gross
ignorance of the law against the respondent judge. A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
laws and procedural rules. They must know the law and apply it properly in good faith. They are likewise expected
to keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence. For, a judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office
and great privilege vested in him. We find that the respondent judge’s error does not rise to the level of gross
ignorance of the law that is defined by jurisprudence. We take judicial notice of the fact that at the time he issued
the Writ of Amparo on January 23, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been effective for barely three
months (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo became effective on October 24, 2007). At that time, the respondent
judge cannot be said to have been fully educated and informed on the novel aspects of the Writ of Amparo.
Simply stated, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo at that time cannot be said to be a simple, elementary, and well-
known rule that its patent disregard would constitute gross ignorance of the law.

 Same; Same; Under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must be “the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence.”

Ladaga vs. Mapagu, 685 SCRA 322, G.R. No. 189691 November 13, 2012

Facts:

Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names included in what is alleged to be a
JCICC “AGILA” 3rd Quarter 2007 Order of Battle Validation Result of the Philippine Army's 10th
Infantry Division (10th ID). They perceive that by the inclusion of their names in the said Order of Battle (OB
List), they become easy targets of unexplained disappearances or extralegal killings – a real threat to their
life, liberty and security.

ATTY. LILIBETH O. LADAGA (Atty. Ladaga), first came to know of the existence of the OB List
from an undisclosed source on May 21, 2009. In the OB List, it was reflected that the ULTIMATE GOAL is to
TRY TO OUST PGMA ON 30 NOV 2007.

On the other hand, Atty. Angela Librado-Trinidad (Atty. Librado-Trinidad), delivered a privileged
speech before the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to demand the removal of her name from said OB
List. The Commission on Human Rights, for its part, announced the conduct of its own investigation into the
matter.
According to Atty. Librado-Trinidad, in the course of the performance of her dutites and functions, she
has not committed any act against national security that would justify the inclusion of her name in the said OB
List. She said that sometime in May 2008, two suspicious-looking men tailed her vehicle. Also, on June 23,
2008 three men tried to barge into their house
Meanwhile, Atty. Carlos Isagani T. Zarate was informed that he was also included on the OB List. In his
petition, he alleged that the inclusion of his name in the said OB List was due to his advocacies as a public
interest or human rights lawyer.
The Petitioners assert that the OB List is really a military hit-list as allegedly shown by the fact that
there have already been three victims of extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can be linked directly to the
OB List.
On June 16, 2009 filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo. The RTC
subsequently issued separate Writs of Amparo, directing the respondents to file a verified written return.
In the return of the respondents, they denied authorship of the OB List, and alleged that petitioners
failed to show that they were responsible for the alleged threats.
After submission of the parties’ respective Position Papers, the RTC issued Orders finding no
substantial evidence to show that the perceived threat to petitioners’ life, liberty and security was attributable to
the unlawful act or omission of the respondents. The privilege of the Writ was therefore denied.

Issues: WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under the Writ of Amparo.

Held:
No, the evidence does not satisfy degree of proof for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The Writ of
Amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making powers in response to the alarming rise in
the number of cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It is an extraordinary remedy
intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of
extraordinary character, is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable
certainty. Justifying allegations must support the issuance of the writ, on the following matters:
1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission;
3. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent and how such threat or violation is committed
with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
4. The investigation conducted specifying the names, personal circumstances and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals;
5. Actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission;
6. The relief prayed for.
Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence,
and if the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate

Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Petitioners sought to prove that the inclusion of their names in the OB List
presented a real threat to their security by attributing the violent deaths of the other known activists to the
inclusion of their names or the names of their militant organizations in the subject OB List. However, the
existence of the OB List could not be directly associated with the menacing behaviour of suspicious men or the
violent deaths of certain personalities.

The Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their names in the OB List is as real a threat as that
which brought ultimate harm to the other victims without corroborative evidence from which it can be
presumed that the suspicious deaths of these three people were in fact, on account of their militant affiliations.

The Petitioners therefore were not able to prove by substantial evidence that there was an actual threat to their
rights to life, liberty and security. The mere inclusion of their names in the OB List is not sufficient enough
evidence for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Same; Same; Freedom from Fear; A person’s right to security is, in one sense, “freedom from fear” and that any
threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is an actionable wrong.―In the case of Secretary of National Defense
v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 (2008), the Court ruled that a person’s right to security is, in one sense, “freedom from
fear” and that any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is an actionable wrong. The term “any threat,”
however, cannot be taken to mean every conceivable threat in the mind that may cause one to fear for his life,
liberty or security. The Court explicated therein that “[f]ear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a
cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people
react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of
their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus.” Certainly, given the uniqueness of
individual psychological mindsets, perceptions of what is fearful will necessarily vary from one person to another.

 Same; Same; Same; Only actual threats, as may be established from all the facts and circumstances of the case,
can qualify as a violation that may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.―The alleged threat to
herein petitioners’ rights to life, liberty and security must be actual, and not merely one of supposition or with the
likelihood of happening. And, when the evidence adduced establishes the threat to be existent, as opposed to a
potential one, then, it goes without saying that the threshold requirement of substantial evidence in amparo
proceedings has also been met. Thus, in the words of Justice Brion, in the context of the Amparo rule, only actual
threats, as may be established from all the facts and circumstances of the case, can qualify as a violation that
may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

 Same; Same; Extraordinary Diligence; An amparo petitioner’s failure to establish by substantial evidence the
involvement of government forces in the alleged violation of rights is never a hindrance for the Court to order the
conduct of further investigation where it appears that the government did not observe extraordinary diligence in
the performance of its duty to investigate the complained abduction and torture or enforced
disappearance.―Emphasizing the extraordinary character of the amparo remedy, the Court ruled in the cases of
Roxas and Razon, Jr. that an amparo petitioner’s failure to establish by substantial evidence the involvement of
government forces in the alleged violation of rights is never a hindrance for the Court to order the conduct of
further investigation where it appears that the government did not observe extraordinary diligence in the
performance of its duty to investigate the complained abduction and torture or enforced disappearance. The Court
 directed further investigation in the case of Roxas because the modest efforts of police investigators were
effectively putting petitioner’s right to security in danger with the delay in identifying and apprehending her
abductors. In Razon, Jr., the Court found it necessary to explicitly order the military and police officials to pursue
with extraordinary diligence the investigation into the abduction and disappearance of a known activist because
not only did the police investigators conduct an incomplete and one-sided investigation but they blamed their
ineffectiveness to the reluctance and unwillingness of the relatives to cooperate with the authorities. In both of
these cases, the incidents of abduction and torture were undisputed and they provided the evidentiary support for
the finding that the right to security was violated and the necessity for further investigation into such violation.

6. R.A. No. 10353 – An Act Defining and Penalizing Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance.

7. R.A. 9745 – An Act Penalizing Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment and Prescribing Penalties.

8. WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

Gamboa vs. Chan, 677 SCRA 385, G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012

FACTS: Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG).
Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the
Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is invoked
as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security.

RULING: NO.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and
to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It
must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right
to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list
of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police
surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in
relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity,
which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private
life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a
lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom
from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of
freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.—The right to privacy, as an
inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional right. The concept of liberty
would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique individual
whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.

 Same; Same; The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from
intrusion or constraint.—Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be
protected from intrusion or constraint.
 Same; Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed
to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.—The writ of habeas
data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to
the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information
 regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the
writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right
to life, liberty or security on the other.

 Same; Private Armies; The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other
armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.

Vivares vs. St. Theresa's College, 737 SCRA 92, G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

PREFATORY:

The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each
individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the
desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set
by the society in which he lives. – Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

FACTS: Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and
Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures
were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.

At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from her students that some
seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then
asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne, among
others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her
photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a
bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that showvirtually the entirety of their
black brassieres.

Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the identified students’
photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.

Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were barred from joining the
commencement exercises.

Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC
dismissed the petition for habeas data on the following grounds:

1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the
preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some
way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s
policies and rules on discipline.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
security of the minors involved in this case. (Is there a right to informational privacy in online social network activities of its
users?)

HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check the ruling at the latter part)

Nature of Writ of Habeas Data

It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks
to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age.”
 Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements

1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy

2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim (proven by at least substantial
evidence)

Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.

The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances

The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically
the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents. Clearly then,
the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.

Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities
engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or
her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take
part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What
matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved
party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business,
and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will
not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.

As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like STC.

Right to informational privacy

Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information about themselves. Several
commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, “in
this Social Networking environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.” So the underlying question now is: Up to what extent is the right
to privacy protected in OSNs?

Facebook Privacy Tools

To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools
designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South
Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but did so with this caveat:
“Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings
are not foolproof.”

For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images (photos), posted on his or her
personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

1. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
2. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
3. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
4. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
5. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of
his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other
words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their
choice as to “when and to what extent to disclose facts about themselves – and to put others in the position of
receiving such confidences.”

LONE ISSUE:

NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy as the subject digital
photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the public at large.
Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and
without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at
best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the minors’
Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special
means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by
the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.

US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all
privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ
protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.

United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect.
Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent
loses any semblance of privacy.

The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content.
The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a
person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the
post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with
visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to
petitioners’ argument.

No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors

Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends
who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any
unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to
the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors
nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.

Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the “Me Only”
privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the “Custom”
setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead
of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Constitutional Law; Habeas Data Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas
data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

 Same; Same; Same; The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least
by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.—In developing
the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a procedure designed to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.” The writ, however, will not issue on
the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment of the writ
requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.

 Same; Same; Same; Informational Privacy; The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an
independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational
privacy.—Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of
 extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a
variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made. Habeas data, to stress, was designed
“to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.” As such, it is erroneous to limit its
applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only.

 Same; Same; Same; Nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be
available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and
collecting of data.

 Same; Same; Same; Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials
and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the
aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family.

 Same; Same; Same; The Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would allow
a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of the
right to privacy.

 Same; Same; Same; Online Social Networks; The purpose of an Online Social Networks (OSN) is
precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to other members of the same or
different social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others,
depending on the services provided by the site.

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Informational Privacy; Before one can have an expectation of
privacy in his or her Online Social Networks (OSN) activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this
case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.—Before one can have an
expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the
children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of
measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in
cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy
tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational
privacy.

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it
can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any
proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph.

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that
is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source
of the content

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be
more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if
indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution.

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence
in their online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights

Castillo vs. Cruz, 605 SCRA 628 (supra)

9. WRIT OF KALIKASAN

Agham Partylist vs. LNL Archipelagic Minerals Inc., G.R. No. 201918, June 13, 2012 (can’t find online)

LNL ARCHIPELAGO MINERALS v. AGHAM PARTY LIST, GR No. 209165, 2016-04-12 (different case)
Facts:
Petitioner LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is the operator of a mining claim located in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. LAMI's mining area
is covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement[3] No. 268-2008-III dated 26 August 2008 by virtue of an Operating
Agreement[4] dated 5 June 2007 with Filipinas Mining Corporation.
LAMI embarked on a project to build a private, non-commercial port in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
A port is a vital infrastructure to the operations of a mining company to ship out ores and other minerals extracted from the mines
and make the venture economically feasible.
LAMI secured the following permits and compliance certificates for the port project:
The Zambales Alliance, a group of other mining companies operating in Sta. Cruz, Zambales which do not have their own port,
namely Eramen Minerals, Inc.; Zambales Diversified Metals Corporation; Zambales Chromite Mining Corporation, Inc.; BenguetCorp
Nickel Mines, Inc., supported the port project of LAMI and issued Letters[11] of Intent to use the port facilities of LAMI upon
completion.
The Bolitoc community - the barangay, its officials and residents -gave several endorsements[12] supporting the project. Even the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz gave its consent to the construction of the port.
LAMI stated that Mayor Marty unduly favored some mining companies in the municipality and allegedly refused to issue business
and mayor's permits and to receive payment of occupation fees from other mining companies despite the necessary national
permits and licenses secured by the other mining companies.
On 24 April 2012, Mayor Marty issued an order[14] directing LAMI to refrain from continuing with its clearing works and directed the
Sta. Cruz Municipal Police Chief Generico Binan to implement his order.
Thereafter, Rep. Dan Fernandez, a member of the Committee on Ecology of the House of Representatives, passed House Resolution
No. 117 (HR 117) entitled "Resolution Directing the Committee on Ecology to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the
Implementation of Republic Act No. 7942, Otherwise Known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, Particularly on the Adverse Effects
of Mining on the Environment."
The DENR PENRO team found that LAMI violated some of its conditions under the ECC. Accordingly, a Notice of Violation (NOV)
dated 1 June 2012 was issued against LAMI for violation of certain conditions of the ECC with a cease and desist order from further
constructing and developing until such time that the ECC conditions were fully complied.
On 8 June 2012, a technical conference was held where LAMI presented its reply to the NOV. The DENR-EMB R3 ascertained that
LAMI's violations of the four conditions of its ECC constitute minor violations since they only pertain to non-submission of
documents.
However, the leveling of the elevated portion of the area was a major violation.
On 11 June 2012, LAMI wrote a letter[17] to the DENR-EMB R3 regarding the commitments agreed upon during the technical
conference. LAMI signified compliance with the conditions of DENR-EMB R3.
The composite team found that LAMI's activities in its property would not result to any environmental damage to its surrounding
communities.
Thereafter, the DENR-EMB R3 lifted the cease and desist order after LAMI was found to have complied with the requirements.
Meanwhile, earlier, or on 6 June 2012, respondent Agham Party List (Agham), through its President, former Representative Angelo
B. Palmones (Rep. Palmones), filed a Petition[21] for the issuance of a Writ[22] of Kalikasan against LAMI, DENR, PPA, and the
Zambales Police Provincial Office (ZPPO).
In a Decision[37] dated 23 November 2012, the Court of Appeals decided the case in favor of petitioner. The appellate court found
that the government, through the CENRO, authorized LAMI to cut trees and LAMI strictly followed the proper guidelines stated in
the permit.
Agham filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.
In an Amended Decision dated 13 September 2013, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside its original Decision dated 23
November 2012.
Issues:
The issues for our resolution are (1) whether LAMI violated the environmental laws as alleged by Agham, and (2) whether LAMI
flattened any mountain and caused environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Ruling:
The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil action and conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy,[43] covers environmental
damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
In the present case, Agham, in its Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan, cited two laws which LAMI allegedly violated: (1) Section 68 of the
Revised Forestry Code, as amended; and (2) Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining Act.
In the present case, LAMI was given a Tree Cutting Permit[45] by the CENRO dated 17 April 2012
Since LAMI strictly followed the permit issued by the CENRO and even passed the evaluation conducted after the issuance of the
permit, then clearly LAMI had the authority to cut trees and did not violate Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
In the present case, the allegation by Agham that two laws - the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, and the Philippine Mining Act -
were violated by LAMI was not adequately substantiated by Agham. Even the facts submitted by Agham to establish environmental
damage were mere general allegations.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Amended Decision dated 13 September 2013 of the Court of
Appeals and REINSTATE AND AFFIRM the original Decision dated 23 November 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00012
which DENIED the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan.
Principles:
Writ of Kalikasan which is under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.[42] Section 1, Rule 7, Part III of the said Rules
provides:Section 1. Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law,
people's organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government
agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
The following requisites must be present to avail of this remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, states:Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens,
they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authorization; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Writ of Kalikasan; Environmental Law; Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases; The present case involves the extraordinary remedy of a Writ of Kalikasan which is under the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases.—The present case involves the extraordinary remedy of a Writ of Kalikasan
which is under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. Section 1, Rule 7, Part III of the said Rules
provides: Section 1. Nature of the writ.—The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity
authorized by law, people’s organization, nongovernmental organization, or any public interest group accred ited
by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

 Same; Same; Same; The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil action and conceptualized as an
extraordinary remedy, covers environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two (2) or more cities or provinces.—The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil
action and conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, covers environmental damage of such magnitude that will
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The writ is available against
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity. The following requisites
must be present to avail of this remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will
lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in
two or more cities or provinces.

 Same; Same; Same; Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases; The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan
petitioner has the burden to prove the (1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be
violated; (2) act or omission complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice
the life, health or property of inhabitants in two (2) or more cities or provinces.—The Rules are clear that in a Writ
of Kalikasan petitioner has the burden to prove the (1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened
to be violated; (2) act or omission complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. Even the Annotation to the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases states that the magnitude of environmental damage is a condition
sine qua non in a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and must be contained in the verified petition.

 Same; Same; Same; It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan has
to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated.

Philippine Earth Justice Center, Inc., et al. vs. SEC. of DENR, et al., G.R. No. 197754

[G.R. No. 197754 : September 06, 2011]

PHILIPPINE EARTH JUSTICE CENTER, INC., ET AL. VS. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL.
Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated SEPTEMBER 6, 2011, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 197754 (Philippine Earth Justice Center, Inc., et al. vs. Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, et al.). - The Court Resolved to

(a) NOTE the Return of the Writ dated August 26, 2011 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for the public
respondents in compliance with the resolution of August 16, 2011;

(b) NOTE the Return dated August 29, 2011 filed by counsel for respondent Chamber of Mines in compliance with the
resolution of August 16, 2011;

(c) NOTE the Manifestation dated September 1, 2011 filed by counsel for respondent Chamber of Mines relative to the
filing and service by registered mail of its Return; and

(d) NOTE and GRANT the Manifestation and Motion dated September 2, 2011 filed by the OSG for the public
respondents relative to the above-mentioned Return of the Writ, praying that the documentary evidence marked as
Annexes "6-GGG" to "6-RRRR" be attached to, and incorporated with, the said Return.

The Court further Resolved to REFER this case to the COURT OF APPEALS for further proceeding in accordance with
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases."

Sereno, J., on leave.

Reyes, J., on official leave.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL

Clerk of Court

Hernandez vs. Placer Dome, Inc., G.R. No. 195482, June 21, 2011

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 195482 : June 21, 2011]

ELIZA M. HERNANDEZ, ET AL. V. PLACER DOME, INC.

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated JUNE 21, 2011, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 195482 (ELIZA M. HERNANDEZ, ET AL. v. PLACER DOME, INC.)

RESOLUTION

In the Resolution dated 8 March 2011, the Court granted petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and for
the service of said writ as well as the summons issued in the case, by their counsel and representative, Civic Action
Group Ltd./APS International, Ltd. In the same resolution, the Court likewise ordered respondents Placer Dome, Inc. (PDI)
and Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC) to make a verified return of the same writ and referred the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA) for hearing, reception of evidence and rendition of judgment. On 29 March 2011, the Court additionally
issued a resolution granting petitioners' motion for the inclusion of AI Legal Service & Training Ltd. and Select Document
Services among those authorized to serve summons on respondents, on the ground that Civic Action Group Ltd./APS
International, Ltd. had limited their services to the United States of America.

Subsequent to its filing of a 29 March 2011 Urgent Motion to Suspend Filing of Return, BGC filed a 31 March 2011 Urgent
Motion for Ruling on Jurisdiction, questioning the constitutionality of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases (AMC No. 09-6-8-SC) as well as the validity of the issuance and service of summons in the case. On 4 April 2011,
BGC also filed a Return Ad Cautelam, accompanied by a Manifestation dated 4 April 2011, undertaking to submit within a
reasonable time the authenticated copies of the sworn statements attached to said Return in view of time constraints. On
12 April 2011, the Court issued a Resolution noting the foregoing motions and incidents and requiring petitioners to file
their comment to BGC's Urgent Motion for Ruling on Jurisdiction.

On 12 April 2011, petitioners also filed an Urgent Motion of even date, seeking leave to serve summons upon
respondents through any of in the means provided under Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. As amended by A.M.
No. 11-3-6-SC which was issued on 15 March 2011, said provision allows service of summons through any of the
following means to a foreign private juridical entity not registered in the Philippines or without a resident agent, viz.: (a) by
personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country with the assistance of the Department of
Foreign Affairs; (b) by publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where the defendant may be
found and by serving a copy of the summons and the court order by registered mail at the last known address of the
defendant; (c) by facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of service; and, (d) by such other
means as the court may in its discretion direct.

On 18 April 2011, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Compliance dated 15 April 2011, submitting the affidavit executed
by Brian Nolan of the Civic Action Group Ltd./APS International, Ltd. attesting to the 25 March 2011 service of summons
on BGC. Without prejudice to the Urgent Motion for Ruling on Jurisdiction it earlier filed, BGC in turn filed
a Submission dated 19 April 2011, proffering the original authenticated copies of the affidavits executed by Debra Bilous
and James Donald Robertson and reiterating its commitment to submit within a reasonable time the authenticated copies
of the other affidavits attached to its Return Ad Cautelam. On 6 May 2011, Sycip Salazar Hernandez and Gatmaitan,
BGC's counsel of record, filed a Manifestation dated 5 May 2011 stating, among other matters, that they have been
served with copies of petitioners' Notice of Deposition, Interrogatories and Motion for Production of Inspection of
Documents (Discovery Papers) intended for their client, in connection with the proceedings pending before the CA as CA-
G.R. SP No. 00001; that being for the limited purpose of raising constitutional and jurisdictional issues, their special
appearance is not of such nature as would authorize them to receive said Discovery Papers for and in behalf of BCG.

On 12 May 2011, petitioners filed their Manifestation with Reiterated Motion dated 11 May 2011, alleging that they have
received a copy of the 3 May 2011 Manifestation and Motion filed before the CA by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) on behalf of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), praying that petitioners be directed to manifest whether
they have already caused the service of summons upon PDI and, if not, to coordinate with the OSG with respect to the
mode of service as well as the manner of payment thereof; that although it had been served with copies of their petition
and its annexes by registered mail, PDI has yet to be served with summons; and, that while they are willing to coordinate
with the OSG regarding the mode and manner of payment for the service of summons to PDI, the Court has yet to resolve
their motions for the inclusion of AI Legal Service & Training Ltd. and Select Document Services among those authorized
to serve summons on respondents and for the service of summons in accordance with Section 12, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.

On 17 May 2011, BGC filed a Clarificatory Manifestation dated 16 May 2011, alleging that it received the Resolution
dated 4 May 2011 issued by the CA's First Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 00001, the decretal portion of which states:

"ACTING on the pending incidents, We hereby resolve as follows:

1) In order to attain a judicious determination of the Urgent Motion for Ruling on Jurisdiction, the petitioners are
DIRECTED to submit their COMMENT within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Perforce, Our resolution on
petitioners' Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents is held in abeyance;

2) Petitioners are ORDERED to manifest whether or not respondent Placer Dome has been served with Summons and if
none had been served yet, to coordinate with the DTI, through the OSG, for the implementation thereof.

SO ORDERED."

BGC calls the attention of the Court to the fact, among other matters, that the foregoing resolution is in conflict with our
resolution dated 12 April 2011 which required petitioners to file their comment to its Urgent Motion for Ruling on
Jurisdiction; and, that consequently, there is a need to clarify which court exercises jurisdiction over the case in order to
shed light to the procedural paths available to the parties. Subsequent to its filing of a Submission dated 18 May 2011
submitting the original of the authenticated affidavit of Geoffrey Marlow, BGC filed a Manifestation dated 6 June 2011
reiterating the need for said clarification, in view of petitioners' filing on 2 June 2011 of their Opposition to its Urgent
Motion for Ruling on Jurisdiction.

Pursuant to Section 3, Rule VII of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, petitions for the Writ of
Kalikasan "shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals." It was in consonance
with this provision that, on 8 March 2011, the Court issued the Resolution which, after granting the Writ of
Kalikasan sought by petitioners, referred the case to the CA for hearing, reception of evidence and rendition of judgment.
Considering said referral of the case to the CA, its re-docketing of the petition as CA-G.R. SP No. 00001 and its conduct
of proceedings relative thereto, it is imperative that the various motions and incidents filed by the parties, together with the
entire records of the case, be likewise referred to said Court in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and in the
interest of the orderly and expeditious conduct of the proceedings in the case. With respect to petitioners' Manifestation
with Reiterated Motion dated 11 May 2011, attention is, however, called to the fact that the motion for the inclusion of AI
Legal Service & Training Ltd. and Select Document Servicesamong those authorized to serve summons on respondents
had already been granted in the Court's 29 March 2011 Resolution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the records of the case are REFERRED to the CA, for appropriate action on the
various motions and incidents filed by the parties."

ELIZA M. HERNANDEZ, ET AL. V. PLACER DOME, INC. (CASE DIGESTS)

Antecedent Facts:
Placer Dome is the parent corporation of Marcopper Mining Company. It is engaged in themining operations in
Marinduque from 1964–1997. In May 2006, Placer Dome merged with BarrickGold Corporation, a foreign entity.In
March 1996, the disaster came about. A fracture in the drainage tunnel of a large pitcontaining leftover mine tailings led
to a discharge of toxic mine waste into the Makulapnit-Boac riversystem and caused flash floods in areas along the river.
Barangay Hinapulan, was buried in six feet of muddy floodwater, causing damage to people and their families, as well as
livestock, marine resourcesand maritime life. Placer Dome entered into a contract with then President Fidel V. Ramos to
rehabilitate thewaters of Marinduque. It did not reach fruition.

Start of Court Process:

In 2011, three residents of Marinduque, Eliza M. Hernandez, Mamerto M. Lanete andGodofredo L. Manoy, represented
by Father Joaquin Bernas, filed a petition for writ of kalikasan.

In their petition, they argued that said Placer Dome should be held liable for expelling some 2 million cubic meters of
toxic industrial waste into the Boac river when a drainage plug holding toxic mining waste from its operations ruptured.
The writ of Kalikasan was granted. In March 2011, the Court issued a resolution which referred the case to the Court of
Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence, and rendition of judgment. CA then issued a resolution requiring the
petitioners to issue a subpoena against Placer Dome.

Issue:
After receiving the resolution issued by CA, Barrick Gold, currently the owner of Placer Dome,filed a Clarificatory
Manifestation to clarify which court exercises jurisdiction over the case in order to shed light to the procedural paths
available to the parties.

Held:
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule VII of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, petitions for the Writ of Kalikasan
"shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals." It was in consonance with
this provision that, on 8 March 2011, the Court issued the Resolution which, after granting the Writ of Kalikasan sought
by petitioners, referred the case to the CA for hearing, reception of evidence and rendition of judgment. Considering
said referral of the case to the CA, its re-docketing of the petition as CA-G.R. SP No. 00001 and its conduct of
proceedings relative thereto, it is imperative that the various motions and incidents filed by the parties, together with
the entire records of the case, be likewise referred to said Court in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
and in the interest of the orderly and expeditious conduct of the proceedings in the case

10. ANTI-WIRE TAPPING ACT

Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private
respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile
and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was
illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition.

Issue: W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Held: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations
of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction
as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion that in enacting
R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
“Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as
well as its communication to a third person should be professed.”
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private
conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The word communicate
comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, or signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of “meanings or
thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase
“private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200); Statutory Construction; Legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute.—First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or
would lead to an injustice.

 Same; Same; Even a person privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without
the knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.—Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly
and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier “any.” Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
“even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

 Same; Same; Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.—The unambiguity of the express
words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record,
therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those
privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

 Same; Criminal Procedure; The mere allegation that an individual made a secret reco rding of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of RA 4200

 Same; Words and Phrases; The contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of
absurdity.—Finally, petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of
absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its
ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies
the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)” These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally—
charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s
office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore,
put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used by Senator
Tanada in his Explanatory Note to the bill.
 Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 112, No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

Facts: Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant’s residence
discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal
of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone
call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise
him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a
telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later,
complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’. Complainant
then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money.

Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of
Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the
Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the
Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the
withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200, which prompted
petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present petition for certiorari.

Issue: W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under Rep. Act No. 4200

Held: No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap
or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a
telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Criminal Law: Evidence; Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction: Wiretapping Law: The pkrase
“any other device or arrangement” in R.A, 4200 known as Anti-Wire Tapping Law does not cover an
extension line.—The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “deviee or arrangement” for
the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either
a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in
the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No.
4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to deterrniiss the true intent of the
legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and
isoiated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in ftxing the meaning of
any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The phrase “device or arrangement” in the Anti-Wire Tapping Law
should be interpreted to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature used to tap, intercept or
record a telephone conversation, not an extension line.—Hence, the phrase “device or arrangement” in
Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be
tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or
presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature,
they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a
telephone conversation.

 Same; Same; Same; Same, Same; A person calling another by phone may safely presume that the
other may have an extension line and runs the risk of being heard by a 3rd party.

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Framers of R.A. 4200 were more concemed with penalizing the act
of recording a telephone conversation than merely listening thereto. ‘

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Mere act of listening to a telephone conversation in an extension
line is not punished by AntiWiretappingLaw.
 Alejano vs. Cabuay, 468 SCRA 188, G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005
(read RA 7438 -Rights Of Person Arrested, Detained Or Under Custodial Investigation)

Facts: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took
control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”). The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood
and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the
administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members. Around
7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with
government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then
returned to their barracks. Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place while
military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident. Government
prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the RTC against the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident. the
CA rendered its decision ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP
Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No.
0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours
and the detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day. The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading
of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus
proceedings.

Issue: Whether the opening, inspection and reading of the letter of the detainees is an infringement of a citizen’s privacy
rights.

Held: No, the SC do not agree with the CA that the opening and reading of the detainees’ letters violated the detainees’
right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid
measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. The letters
alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers.
The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’
personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters
were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center
could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful
detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a
diminished expectation of privacy rights. The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300
soldiers in committing coup d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua. The junior officers are not ordinary
detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the
financial district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War.
Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must
give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The
military custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior officers, together with the
suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks
involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Habeas Corpus; In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a
preliminary step in the hearing of the petition as the respondent must produce the person and explain
the cause of his detention but such order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the
substantive matters covered by the remedy.—In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an
individual before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition. The respondent must
produce the person and explain the cause of his detention. However, this order is not a ruling on the
propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Court’s order to
the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy
of habeas corpus. For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily
includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the
detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after
hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively
participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that the
appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.

 Same; The remedy of habeas corpus is not proper remedy to address the detainees’ complaint against
the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center—the purpose of the writ is to determine
whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty.
 Same; Case law has expanded the writ’s application to circumstances where there is deprivation of a
person’s constitutional rights.—Case law has expanded the writ’s application to circumstances where
there is deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person continues to
be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due
process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. However, a mere allegation of a
violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if
any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting
in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an
excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess. Whatever situation the
petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to
void the entire proceedings.

 Same; Pre-Trial Detainees; Republic Act No. 7438; Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional
rights upon confinement but the fact the detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than
those of the public; RA 7438 expressly recognizes the power of the detention officer to adopt and
implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape.—Pre-trial
detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement. However, the fact that the
detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than those of the public. RA 7438, which
specifies the rights of detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the power of
the detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee
and prevent his escape.

 Same; Same; The regulations must be reasonably connected to the government’s objective of securing
the safety and preventing the escape of the detainee.

 Same; Same; Right to Counsel; While the detainee’s lawyer may not visit the detainees any time they
want, the fact the detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly
shows that there is no impairment of detainees’ right to counsel.—In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph
of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to make regulations in detention centers allowable:
“such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the detainee’s safety and prevent his
escape.” In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably
connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees.
While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the detainees still have
face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of
detainees’ right to counsel. Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00
p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours
when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard
of reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could always seek permission from the
ISAFP officials to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours. The scheduled visiting hours
provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the
detainees. The detainees’ right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the
hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with
the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit. Thus, at no point were the detainees denied
their right to counsel.

 Same; Same; Penalties; The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrudes into the detainees’
desire to live comfortably does not convert those restrictions to punishment. Petitioners further argue
that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells
with plywood amount to unusual and excessive punishment. This argument fails to impress us.
 Same; Same; Punishments; Words and Phrases; An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that
action causes the inmate to suffer harm or “disability,” and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the
inmate.—An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some
harm or “disability,” and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. Punishment also requires
that the harm or disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of
confinement.

 Same; Same; Same; Punishment cannot be inferred from the separation of the detainees from their
visitors by the iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits—the iron bars prevent direct
physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical
contact with their visitors.

 Same; Same; Privacy of Communications and Correspondence; While letters containing confidential
communication between detainees and their lawyers enjoy a limited protection in that prison officials
can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents thereof without violating
the inmates’ right to correspondence, letters that are not of that nature could be read by prison officials.
  Same; Same; Same; That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s
privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are
detained or imprisoned—by the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners
have a diminished expectation of privacy of rights.
 Same; Same; Same; Since appropriate regulations depend largely on security risks involved, deferment
in the present case to regulations adopted by military custodian in absence of patent arbitrariness
should be made.—The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers
in committing coup d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua. The junior officers are not
ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian
building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the
detainees are subject to the Articles of War. Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-
risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider
range of deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military
custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior officers,
together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate regulations depend
largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military
custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.

 Same; Same; Same; Habeas Corpus; The ruling in this case does not foreclose the right of the
detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for redress of grievances; Habeas corpus
is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement—the writ of habeas corpus will not lie if
what is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement.

Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992

AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE
DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. Statement of Policy. – It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of every human being and guarantee full respect for human rights.

Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.–

(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.

(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the
commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1Ÿ

(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer, provided that before such report is signed, or
thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his
counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person,
otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers
and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by
him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.

(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial
investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of
no effect.

(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by any international non-
governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse,
fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.

Section 3. Assisting Counsel. – Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary
investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes.

The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees;

(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with light felonies;lawphi1©alf

(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with less grave or grave felonies;

(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with a capital offense.
 The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the
municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal or
City Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the province pays said fees.

In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in
accordance with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Section 4. Penalty Clause. – (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained
or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a
fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.

The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon orders of such investigating officer or in his
place, who fails to provide a competent and independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.

(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any
hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6)
years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).

The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such
reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.

Bratnicki vs. Vopper, 532 US 514

Facts of the case

An unidentified person intercepted and recorded a phone call between the chief union negotiator and the union president
(the petitioners) during collective-bargaining negotiations involving a teachers' union and the local school board. After a
teacher-favorable proposal was accepted, a radio commentator played a tape of the intercepted conversation. Petitioners
filed suit under both federal and state wiretapping laws, alleging that an unknown person using an electronic device had
surreptitiously intercepted their telephone conversation. Rejecting a First Amendment protection defense, the District
Court concluded, in part, that the statutes were content-neutral laws of general applicability containing "no indicia of prior
restraint or the chilling of free speech." Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found the statutes invalid because they deterred
significantly more speech than necessary to protect the private interests at stake.’

Question
Does the First Amendment provide protection to speech that discloses the contents of an illegally intercepted
communication?

Conclusion
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the First Amendment protects the
disclosure of illegally intercepted communications by parties who did not participate in the illegal interception. "In this
case, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance," wrote
Justice Stevens. "[A] stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about
a matter of public concern." Noting that the negotiations were a matter of public interest, Justice Stevens wrote that the
"debate may be more mundane than the Communist rhetoric that inspired Justice Brandeis' classic opinion in Whitney v.
California, but it is no less worthy of constitutional protection."