Sun Insurance v Asuncion Digest

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

Facts:
Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of
a decision on the consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the
Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint for the refund of premiums and
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against
SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for damages, attorney’s fees, litigation
costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of damages
sought although from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in
amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in
docket fees. The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make
way for subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as
well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required.

Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if
private respondent did not pay the correct or sufficient docket
fees?

YES.
It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that
vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of
the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied
by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims,
third party claims and similar pleadings.

In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud
the government of the docket fee due not only in the filing of the original
complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required.

Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently,

the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified
the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing
fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.,
Petitioners , vs.COURT OFAPPEALS, CITY
LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN
ROXAS, ANDREWLUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE
DE MAISIP, Respondents
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987

FACTS:
Originally, this was a case of an action for torts and damages and
specific performance with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order. In the present case the damages were not specifically
stated in the prayer but was alleged in the body of the complaint
which assessed ₱78.75 million as damages suffered by the
petitioner. The amount of the docket fee paid was only ₱ 410.00.
With leave of court the petitioner then amended the complaint
with the inclusion of additional co-plaintiffs and by eliminating
any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the
complaint thereby reducing the amount of damages to ₱10M only

ISSUE: WON THE COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION

OVER THE CASE WHEN THECORRECT AND PROPER
DOCKET FEE HAS NOT BEEN PAID.

HELD:
No. The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by
the payment of only ₱410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the
amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the
court.
The basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount
of damages sought in the original complaint and not in
the amended complaint. All complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages
being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in
the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails
to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
ENERIO v HON. ALAMPAY
FACTS:
On May 27, 1914, petitioners as plaintiffs filed with respondent court of first instance of
Negros Occidental presided by respondent Judge Nestor B. Alampay a complaint for the
recovery of actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs of litigation
totalling close to P30,000.00 against private respondents Sonetran Co., Inc., Ernesto Kho and
Max Villegas y Yanson as defendants as a result of the physical injuries caused petitioner-
minor, Russel Enerio, eight years of age (herein represented by his parents, the co-petitioners) when
bumped on the road on January 15, 1974 by a passenger bus of respondents driven allegedly "in
a very reckless, negligent and imprudent manner" by respondent Max Villegas.
Respondents filed in due course their answer with counterclaim for P20,000.-moral damages and
P2,000.-attorney's fees.
Pre-trial was held by respondent court on November 27, 1974 and on said date, without its jurisdiction
having been questioned or placed in issue by respondents, it issued moto proprio an order dismissing
the complaint on the ground that "without the claims for moral and exemplary damages, this
case will not fall within the jurisdiction of the court of first instance,"
Petitioners filed petition for review on certiorari of the dismissal order.
ISSUE: WON CFI has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: YES
It is well settled and beyond question that the jurisdiction of a court over a case, is determined
by the allegations of the complaint, and since petitioners' complaint asserted a total demand,
exclusive of interest of over P10,000.00 (and sought recovery of damages of close to
P30,000.00) the case clearly falls within the original jurisdiction of respondent court of first
instance as provided by section 44 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296 as amended.
The totality of the demand in suits for recovery of sums of money between the same parties,
i.e. the total or aggregate amount demanded in the complaint constitutes the basis of
jurisdiction and for determining the jurisdictional amount in civil cases. Here, petitioners' total
claim of P978.00 for actual damages, P10,000.-moral damages, P15,000.-exemplary damages and
P3,000.-attorney's fees, etc., was clearly in excess of P10,000.00 and therefore properly fell
within the jurisdiction of respondent court of first instance. Respondent court could not
arbitrarily isolate petitioners’ lesser claim for actual damages and without hearing and proofs rule out
petitioners’ other claims for moral and exemplary damages as "bloated" and summarily dismiss motu
proprio the case as not falling within its jurisdiction contrary to the very allegations on the face of the
complaint.
Respondents’ contention in their comment that "since the award of said amount (of moral and
exemplary damages) is discretionary on its (respondent court) part, it believed that plaintiffs cannot
recover a total amount in excess of P10,000.00, hence, there is basis for the court in dismissing the
complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction" is manifestly erroneous. If such were the case, respondent
court should have narrowed down the issue at the pre-trial to the question and amount of recoverable
damages, if any, and proceeded to receive the parties’ proofs thereon and thereafter rendered
judgment on the merits, even utterly refusing any award of moral or exemplary damages to
petitioners if this were its determination. This simply means that it should have properly assumed
and exercised its jurisdiction and disposed of the case on the merits rather than erroneously
dismissed the complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction with all the attendant delay caused thereby
and the remand of the case back to it.
 FLORES V MALLARE-PHILLIPS
Facts:
Flores sued the respondents for refusing to pay him certain amount of money as alleged in the
complaint:
-first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against respondent Ignacio
Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which
he purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions from August to October, 1981;
-second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly
refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased
on credit from petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
The action was opposed by an action to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Under Sec
19 of BP 129, the regional trial court had exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the
demand is more than P20,000. That although, the other respondent was indebted in the
amount of P10, 212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other
respondent.
The trial court by Judge Mallare (one of the respondents) dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff appealed by certiorari in Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of parties
under the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section
6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state
also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or
against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.

Here, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on
joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder
of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are
separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows:
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect
to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as
plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact
common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court
may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no
interest.
OTHERS:
Brillo vs. Buklatan (former rule):
Separate claims against several defendants of different amounts each of which is not
more than P2,000 and falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court. The several
claims do not arise from the same transaction or series of transactions and there seem
to be no questions of law or of fact common to all the defendants as may warrant their
joinder under Rule 3, section 6.

The difference between the former and present rules in cases of permissive joinder of parties
may be illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice
of the Peace as exceptions to the totality rule.
· Soriano y Cia vs. Jose 29 dismissed employees joined in a complaint against the defendant
to collect their respective claims, each of which was within the jurisdiction of the municipal
court although the total exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under
the law then the municipal court had jurisdiction. Although the plaintiffs' demands were
separate, distinct and independent of one another, their joint suit was authorized under
Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the jurisdictional test.
· International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza, 25 dismissed teachers jointly sued for unpaid
salaries, the MC had jurisdiction because the amount of each claim was within, although the
total exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff
under Section 6 of Rule 3.

Under the present law, the two cases would be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Similarly, Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez, if the separate claims against the several
defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there is a common
question of law or fact, they would now be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
COMPARISON OF RULES

Where a Totality of the claims in all
plaintiff sues the causes of action
a defendant irrespective of whether the
on two or COA arose out of the same
more or diff transactions. If the
separate total demand exceeds
causes of P20K – RTC has
action jurisdiction
If the causes of action are
separate and independent,
their joinder in one
complaint is permissive
and not mandatory, and
any cause of action where
the amount of the demand
is 20K or less may be the
subject of a separate
complaint filed with a
metropolitan or MTC.
Two or more Where the claims or
plaintiffs causes of action joined in a
having a single complaint are
separate separately owned by or
causes of due to different
action parties, each separate
against a claim shall furnish the
defendant jurisdictional test
join in a The former rule applied
single only to cases of permissive
complaint joinder of parties plaintiff.
However, it was also
applicable to cases of
permissive joinder of
parties defendant.
Totality of the claims in all the
causes of action irrespective of
whether the COA arose out of the
same or diff transactions. If the
total demand exceeds P20K –
RTC has jurisdiction
If the causes of action are
separate and independent, their
joinder in one complaint is
permissive and not mandatory,
and any cause of action where
the amount of the demand is 20K
or less may be the subject of a
separate complaint filed with a
metropolitan or MTC.
The causes of action in favor of
the two or more plaintiffs or
against the two or more
defendants should arise out of
the same transaction or series of
transactions and there should be
a common question of law or fact,
as provided in Section 6 of Rule
3.
Heirs of the Late Ruben Reinoso Sr., v. CA (2011)

Doctrine: A reiteration of the more liberal Sun Insurance case. Where the party
does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees,
and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket
fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in Manchester, will
apply.

Facts:

 In 1979, Ruben Reinoso was a passenger in a jeepney traversing E.

Rodriguez Ave. The jeepney owned by Tapales, collided with a truck
owned by Guballa.
 Reinoso died as a result of the collision. His heirs filed the instant case
for Damages against Tapales and Guballa
 IN 1988, RTC found the Truck liable and held Guballa liable for damages
sustained by the Heirs of Reinoso and the jeepney owner
 Case litigated before the RTC which rendered a decision
 In 1994, CA motu propio dismissed the petition on the ground of
nonpayment of docket fees pursuant to the 1987 Manchester ruling
 Reinoso’s defense: Manchester should not be made to apply
retroactively to their case as the case was filed prior to the
promulgation of Manchester ruling
WON: The dismissal by the CA was proper due to the nonpayment of docket
fees? NO

HELD:

 The Court reiterates the ruling in Sun Insurance v. Asuncion

 the case at bench has been pending for more than 30 years
and the records thereof are already before this Court, a
remand of the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) would only
unnecessarily prolong its resolution
 In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule
was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion
 The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was
filed before the Manchester ruling came out. Even if said
ruling could be applied retroactively, liberality should be
accorded to the petitioners in view of the recency then of the
ruling. Leniency because of recency was applied to the cases
of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals
 RTC decision was reinstated
DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES, INC. V. SECURITY BANK CORPORATION

Non-payment of additional filing fees due on additional claims do not divest the
Court of the jurisdiction it already had over the case. However, after-judgment lien
for said unpaid filing fees only applies to cases (1) where the filing fees were
incorrectly assessed or paid or (2) where the court has discretion to fix the amount
of the award. None of these are present in this case and award was in fact already
specified. Also, ONLY the Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of
the fees due the courts. Parties or even the trial court cannot waive payment of
fees.

Facts: Spouses Lim took a loan from Security Bank. Unable to pay on time, the
Lims assigned to the Bank their real properties including a building and lot. The
Bank then offered to lease said property to the Lims through Do-All Metals
Industries, Inc. (DMI) primarily for business and partly as Lim's residence. A 2-year
lease contract was executed on the condition that the Bank has the right to pre-
terminate the lease and should the Bank decide to sell the property, DMI shall have
the right of first refusal.

Months before the lease was up, the Bank notified DMI that it was pre-terminating
it. While negotiations were ongoing, the Lims claim that they continued to use the
property but the Bank posted security guards at the said place and the guards, on
instructions of the Bank, padlocked the entrances and barred the Lims and DMI’s
employees from entering, even pointing gun at one employee. Because of this,
DMI was unable to close several projects with potential clients and Lims were
unable to retrieve personal items left at the property. DMI and Lims (DMI) then
filed a complaint with RTC Pasig for damages with prayer for the issuance
of a TRO or preliminary injunction against the Bank.

RTC directed the Bank to allow DMI to enter the building and get their machineries,
equipment and personal things but DMI was unable to find their properties. In a
supplemental complaint, DMI alleged that the Bank surreptitiously took such
properties, resulting in additional actual damages of over P27M. RTC ruled in
favor of DMI, ordering the Bank to pay the P27M actual damages, + moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

The Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among

other things the RTC’s authority to grant damages considering DMI’s failure
to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint. The RTC denied the
motion. On appeal, CA ruled in favor of the Bank and denied the subsequent MR,
hence this petition.

Issues:

1. W/N the RTC acquired JURISDICTION on the supplemental complaint

against the Bank considering DMI and Lims' failure to pay the filing fees on
the amounts of damages they claim in it; YES.

2. Whether or not the Bank is liable for the intimidation and harassment committed
against DMI. YES.

3. W/N the Bank is LIABLE to DMI for the machineries, equipment, and other
properties they allegedly lost after they were barred from the property. NO.
Held:

(1) YES. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over their action from the moment
they filed the original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing
fees due on the same. Their non-payment of the additional filing fees due on
their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already
had over the case.

(2) YES. The Bank belittles the testimonies of the DMI’s witnesses for having been
presented ex parte but the ex parte hearing, having been properly authorized,
cannot be assailed as less credible. It was the Bank’s fault that it was unable to
attend the hearing. It cannot profit from its lack of diligence. Employees of DMI
testified regarding the Bank guards’ unmitigated use of their superior strength and
firepower and such were never refuted. Police testified finding Lim locked in the
building and being told by a Bank representative that they had instructions to
prevent anyone from taking any property out of the premises. While the lease may
have already lapsed, the Bank had no business harassing and intimidating the
Lims and DMI employees.

(3) NO. DMI's stand is that the RTC correctly admitted the supplemental complaint
even if they had not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees constituted a lien
anyway on the judgment award. But this after-judgment lien, which implies that
payment depends on a successful execution of the judgment, applies to
cases (1) where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or (2) where
the court has discretion to fix the amount of the award. NONE of these
circumstances are present in this case.

Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual
damages that DMI sought against the Bank. Still DMI paid no filing fees on
the same and gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same,
merely saying that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not
assessed them for it. But a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and
the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its
filing. The rules DO NOT require the court to make special assessments in
cases of supplemental complaints. Although the Bank brought up the question
of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion for reconsideration, DMI
made no effort to make at least a late payment before decision. Consequently,
the trial court should have treated their Supplemental Complaint as not filed.

DMI argues that the Bank raised the issue of non-payment of additional filing fees
only after the RTC had rendered its decision, thus waiving its objection. But it is
not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the payment of
the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint. Only the
Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the
courts and these exemptions are embodied in its rules.

Court reinstated the RTC decision and ordered the bank to pay damages, but
deleted the claim for the P27M actual damages in the supplemental complaint.