1
G.R. No. 145527 May 28, 2002
AUGUSTUS CAEZAR R. GAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO C. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Br. 61, Baguio City,
ALBERT G. TOLENTINO, in his capacity as RTC Sheriff of Baguio City, and
FRANCHESKA JOY C. PONDEVIDA, assisted by BERNADETTE C.
PONDEVIDA, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to school her three (3)-year old
daughter Francheska Joy S. Pondevida, Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote petitioner Augustus
Caezar R. Gan1 demanding support for their "love child." Petitioner, in his reply, denied
paternity of the child. An exasperated Bernadette thereafter instituted in behalf of her
daughter a complaint against petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite.2
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action. He argued that since Francheska's certificate of birth indicated her father as
"UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual basis for the claim of support. 3 His motion,
however, was denied by the trial court.4
Despite denial of his motion, petitioner failed to file his answer within the reglementary
period. Thus, on 19 January 2000 private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in
default, which motion was granted. In itsOrder declaring petitioner in default the trial court
noted that petitioner's Motion to Admit Answer was filed more than ninety (90) days after
the expiration of the reglementary period, and only after private respondent moved that
petitioner be declared in default. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Hence, the court received the evidence of private respondent ex parte.
After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, the trial court
rendered its Decision on 12 May 2000 ordering petitioner to recognize private respondent
Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and support her with P20,000.00
every month to be paid on or before the 15th of each month starting 15 April 2000.
Likewise petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S. Pondevida the accumulated
arrears ofP20,000.00 per month from the day she was born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees
and P25,000.00 for expenses of litigation, plus P20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every
month from 15 May 2000 as alimony pendente liteshould he desire to pursue further
remedies against private respondent. 5
Forthwith, private respondent moved for execution of the judgment of support, which the
trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution, citing as reason therefor private
respondent's immediate need for schooling. 6Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff levied upon a
motor vehicle, a Honda City, with Plate No. UMT 884, registered in the name of "A.B.
Leasing & Fin. Corp., Leased to: G & G Trading," and found within the premises of
petitioner's warehouse in Caloocan City. 7
Meanwhile, petitioner appealed the Judgment to the Court of Appeals.8
On 9 June 2000 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate
execution of the judgment. Petitioner averred that the writ of execution was issued despite
the absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as the
judgment sought to be executed did not yet attain finality there should be an exceptional
reason to warrant its execution. He further alleged that the writ proceeded from an order
of default and a judgment rendered by the trial court in complete disregard of his "highly
meritorious defense." Finally, petitioner impugned the validity of the writ as he argued that
it was issued without notice to him. Petitioner stressed the fact that he received copy of the
motion for immediate execution two (2) weeks after its scheduled hearing.9
On 31 August 2000 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that
under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure judgments for support are
immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. Thus, it did not help petitioner
any to argue that there were no good reasons to support its immediate execution. The
second challenge hurled against the validity of the writ concerning the lack of notice and
hearing was likewise dismissed with the appeals court favoring substantial justice over
technicalities. Lastly, petitioner's justification for belatedly filing his
answer, i.e., miscommunication with his lawyer, was disregarded since it fell short of the
statutory requirements of "fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence." 10
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner came to us impugning the
dismissal of his petition for certiorari. Petitioner argues that under the rules a judgment for
support which is subject of an appeal cannot be executed absent any good reason for its
immediate execution. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the writ asserting that it
was issued in violation of his right to notice and hearing. Petitioner also seeks the setting
aside of the default order and the judgment rendered thereafter for the reason that should
he be allowed to prove his defense of adultery, the claim of support would be most likely
denied.11 Petitioner claims that in an action by a child against his putative father, adultery
of the child's mother would be a valid defense to show that the child is a fruit of adulterous
relations for, in such case, it would not be the child of the defendant and therefore not
entitled to support. Parenthetically, how could he be allowed to prove the defense of
adultery when it was not even hinted that he was married to the mother of Francheska Joy.
Petitioner consents to submit to Dioxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing to resolve the issue
of paternity, which test he claims has a reputation for accuracy. 12
A careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case fails to persuade this Court to
brand the issuance of the writ of execution by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals with the vice of grave abuse of discretion. There is no evidence indeed to justify
the setting aside of the writ on the ground that it was issued beyond the legitimate bounds
of judicial discretion.
Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court,
judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an
appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal
stays the execution of the judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if
there are urgent reasons therefor. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate
execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between those which are
the subject of an appeal and those which are not. To consider then petitioner's argument
 2

that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate
the clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution.
Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no
further explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation
which petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance
negating the plain meaning of the provision subject of the petition.
Petitioner would also have us annul the writ of execution on the ground that he was not
notified of its issuance. We are unable to accept such a plea for enough has been done by
petitioner to delay the execution of the writ. As the records show, in partial fulfillment of
the writ of execution petitioner surrendered a sedan which apparently was not his as it
was later ordered released to a third party who laid claim over the levied vehicle. 13 Also,
petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Deposit in Court Support
Pendente Litepromising to deposit the amount due as support every 15th of the month, but
to date has not deposited any amount in complete disavowal of his undertaking. 14 He was
not even deterred from appealing before us and needlessly taking up our time and energy
by posing legal questions that can be characterized, at best, as flimsy and trivial. We are
thus not prepared to abrogate the writ of execution issued in favor of private respondent
for substantial justice would be better served if petitioner be precluded from interposing
another barrier to the immediate execution of the support judgment.
missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the
payment of such funds for support and education for the reason that if paid long
afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the
evil and repair the damage caused. The children with such belated payment for
support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely,
afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they
enrol in several classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to
make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the funds
when needed.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Decision sought to be reviewed, the instant
petition is DENIED. The 31 August 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari instituted by petitioner Augustus Caezar C. Gan and upholding the
validity of the 2 June 2000 Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court – Br. 61,
Baguio City, in Civil Case No. 4234-R, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Corona, JJ., concur.

We are not intimating that in every case the right to notice of hearing can be disregarded.
That is not so. It appears in this case that there has been too much temporizing in the
execution of the writ which must not be allowed to thwart the constitutional mandate for
speedy disposition of cases. As has been said, a technicality should be an aid to justice and
not its great hindrance and chief enemy. 15 Truly, if the writ of execution would be voided on
this ground alone, then procedural rules which were primarily drafted to protect parties in
the realm of constitutional guarantees would acquire a new sanctity at the expense of
equity and justice.

Lastly, we note that no useful purpose would be served if we dwell on petitioner's

arguments concerning the validity of the judgment by default and his insistence that he be
subjected, together with private respondent Bernadette C. Pondevida to DNA testing to
settle the issue of paternity. The futility of his arguments is very apparent. It is not for us at
this instance to review or revise the Decision rendered by the trial court for to do so would
pre-empt the decision which may be rendered by the Court of Appeals in the main case for
support.

In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns.
There may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of
justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time
continues to slip away. An excerpt from the early case of De Leon v. Soriano16 is relevant,
thus:

SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and G.R. No. 163209

The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be
given presently and without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the FILOMENA LIM,
children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have
 3

Petitioners,

Present: In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of
petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in
Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her
QUISUMBING,* husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edwards family business, which provided him with a
monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of
CHICO-NAZARIO, income.

- versus - PERALTA, and

ABAD,** JJ. On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the
children with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she
MA. CHERYL S. LIM, caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described a very
compromising situation.[3]
for herself and on behalf of

her minor children LESTER

Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano
EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for
support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente
GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO Promulgated: lite.[4]
S. LIM, III, The Ruling of the Trial Court
Respondents. October 30, 2009

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

On 31 January 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and
petitioners to jointly provide P40,000 monthly support to respondents, with Edward
DECISION shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks
subsidiary liability.[5]
CARPIO, J.:

The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their liability. The trial court,
while denying reconsideration, clarified that petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly
The Case liable with Edward because of the latters inability x x x to give sufficient support x x x. [6]

For review[1] is the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, dated 28 April 2003, ordering
petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim (petitioners) to provide legal support to
respondents Cheryl, Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim
(respondents).
The Facts
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing, among others, their liability to
support respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edwards income is insufficient, the law
itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal support should be in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by
Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the Philippines). [7]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 April 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. On the
issue material to this appeal, that is, whether there is basis to hold petitioners, as Edwards
parents, liable with him to support respondents, the Court of Appeals held:
The law on support under Article 195 of the Family Code is clear on this
matter. Parents and their legitimate children are obliged to mutually
support one another and this obligation extends down to the legitimate
grandchildren and great grandchildren.
In connection with this provision, Article 200 paragraph (3) of the
Family Code clearly provides that should the person obliged to give
support does not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the other
persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order shall provide the
necessary support. This is because the closer the relationship of the
relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to
support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and
only in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives
and so on.[8]
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in
the Resolution dated 12 April 2004.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
4
The issue is whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to
respondents.
The Ruling of the Court
We rule in the affirmative. However, we modify the appealed judgment by limiting
petitioners liability to the amount of monthly support needed by respondents Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III only.
Petitioners Liable to Provide Support
but only to their Grandchildren
By statutory[9] and jurisprudential mandate,[10] the liability of ascendants to provide legal
support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they
limit their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are
liable. Relying on provisions [11] found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental
Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental
authority, conceivably either by its termination [12] or suspension[13] during the childrens
minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised
parental authority over their children,[14] petitioners submit that the obligation to support
the latters offspring ends with them.
Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe
constriction of the scope of familial obligation to give support. In the first place, the
governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on
Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both areas share a
common ground in that parental authority encompasses the obligation to provide legal
support,[15] they differ in other concerns including the duration of the obligation and
its concurrence among relatives of differing degrees. [16] Thus, although the obligation to
provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child,
[17]
the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during
the obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative
parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or
suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon
default of the parents but also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support. As we
observed in another case raising the ancillary issue of an ascendants obligation to give
support in light of the fathers sufficient means:
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand
support directly from their grandparents if they have parents

(ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them.
This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art.
199. We agree with this view.
xxxx
There is no showing that private respondent is without means to
support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner,
as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her
grandson's legal support. x x x[18] (Emphasis supplied; internal citations
omitted)
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide
sufficient legal support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the
amount of support Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to
meet respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide
for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest
degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal [19] lines, following the ordering in
Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to sanction the
anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of
parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are
more than able to fill the void.
However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this
word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As
petitioners grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim
family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.
[20]
Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the amount of monthly support the trial court
awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the
case to the trial court for this limited purpose. [21]
Petitioners Precluded from Availing
of the Alternative Option Under
Article 204 of the Civil Code, as Amended
As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of the
Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their obligation by
maintaining respondents at petitioners Makati residence. The option is unavailable to
petitioners.
5
The application of Article 204 which provides that
The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the
obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive
support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is
a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled to receive support are
petitioners grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in Article
204 will secure to the grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also force
Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the scene of her husbands infidelity. While
not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryls charge against Edward for
concubinage did not prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its
occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the
exception clause of Article 204, precluding its application.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 28 April 2003, and its Resolution dated 12 April 2004 with
the MODIFICATION that petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim are liable to provide
support only to respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed
Lim. We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140, for
further proceedings consistent with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013
SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner seeks to set aside the
Decision1 dated April 20, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 26, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dismissing her petition for contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 01154) and granting
respondent's petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 01315).
The factual background is as follows:
On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
29346 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 14.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought
the amount ofP500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from
salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad. 4
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order 5 dated March 31, 2004
granting support pendente lite, as follows:
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff.
This amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for
medical attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the operation of both her eyes which
is demandable upon the conduct of such operation. The amounts already extended to the
two (2) children, being a commendable act of defendant, should be continued by him
considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff
needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand. Since the
instant complaint was filed on 03 September 2003, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(P250,000.00) Thousand should be paid by defendant to plaintiff retroactively to such date
until the hearing of the support pendente lite. P250,000.00 x 7 corresponding to the seven
(7) months that lapsed from September, 2003 to March 2004 would tantamount to a total
of One Million Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750,000.00) Thousand Pesos. Thereafter, starting
the month of April 2004, until otherwise ordered by this Court, defendant is ordered to pay
a monthly support of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos payable within
the first five (5) days of each corresponding month pursuant to the third paragraph of Art.
203 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The monthly support of P250,000.00 is without
prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that this Court may grant plaintiff as the
circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the
proceedings for the main action for support. 6
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, 7 asserting that petitioner is not entitled to
spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling
from their children and respondent has continued to support the family for their
sustenance and well-being in accordance with family’s social and financial standing. As to
the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as
theP1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it unconscionable and beyond the
intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent.
6
In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the March 31, 2004 Order had become
final and executory since respondent’s motion for reconsideration is treated as a mere
scrap of paper for violation of the threeday notice period under Section 4, Rule 15 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and therefore did not interrupt the running of
the period to appeal. Respondent was given ten (10) days to show cause why he should not
be held in contempt of the court for disregarding the March 31, 2004 order granting
support pendente lite.8
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA.
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,9 finding merit in respondent’s contention
that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting P250,000.00 monthly support
to petitioner without evidence to prove his actual income. The said court thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is given due course. The
assailed Orders dated March 31, 2004, May 13, 2004, June 4, 2004 and June 18, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB No. 29346 entitled
"Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua" are hereby nullified and set aside and instead a new
one is entered ordering herein petitioner:
a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00
beginning the month of April 2005 and every month thereafter within the first
five (5) days thereof;
b) to pay the private respondent the amount of P115,000.00 a month multiplied
by the number of months starting from September 2003 until March 2005 less
than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her
and their two (2) children monthly support; and
c) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a Compliance 11 dated June 28,
2005, respondent attached a copy of a check he issued in the amount of P162,651.90
payable to petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA decision, he
deducted from the amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005)
ordered by the CA -- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00 (April, May, June and July 2005),
totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his children and petitioner in the sum
of P2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of receipts/billings).
In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution, 12 petitioner
asserted that none of the expenses deducted by respondent may be chargeable as part of
the monthly support contemplated by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.

On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an Order 13 granting petitioner’s motion for
issuance of a writ of execution as it rejected respondent’s interpretation of the CA decision.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently also filed a motion for
inhibition of Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. On November 25, 2005, Judge Yrastorza, Sr.
issued an Order14 denying both motions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, both motions are DENIED. Since a second
motion for reconsideration is prohibited under the Rules, this denial has attained finality;
let, therefore, a writ of execution be issued in favor of plaintiff as against defendant for the
accumulated support in arrears pendente lite.
Notify both parties of this Order.
SO ORDERED.15
Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears pendente lite,
petitioner filed in the CA a Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 01154 ("Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua"). Respondent, on the other hand,
filed CA-G.R. SP No. 01315, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
("Danilo Y. Lua versus Hon. Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 14, and Susan Lim Lua"). The two cases were
consolidated.
By Decision dated April 20, 2006, the CA set aside the assailed orders of the trial court, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with
Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-GR
No. 01154;
b) GRANTING Danilo Y. Lua’s Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-GR No.
01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25
November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil
Case No. CEB-29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of PhP2,482,348.16 plus
946,465.64, or a total of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support
in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2)
children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support
of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount
was deferred by him subject to the deductions aforementioned.
7
iii. DIRECTING the issuance of a permanent writ of preliminary
injunction.
SO ORDERED.16
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the
expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two
cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card purchases involving
groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two
children, but their mother (petitioner) as well. It held that respondent’s act of deferring the
monthly support adjudged in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 was not contumacious as it was
anchored on valid and justifiable reasons. Respondent said he just wanted the issue of
whether to deduct his advances be settled first in view of the different interpretation by
the trial court of the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. It also noted the
lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their
children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition raising the following errors allegedly committed by the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING RESPONDENT GUILTY OF
INDIRECT CONTEMPT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEDUCTION OF THE
AMOUNT OF PHP2,482,348.16 PLUS 946,465.64, OR A TOTAL OF
PHP3,428,813.80 FROM THE CURRENT TOTAL SUPPORT IN ARREARS OF THE
RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER AND THEIR CHILDREN.17
The main issue is whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be
deducted from the total support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children pursuant
to the Decision dated April 12, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation,
 8

even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and drivers and house helpers, and other household expenses. Petitioner’s testimony also
from school, or to and from place of work. (Emphasis supplied.) mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and vitamins/medicines.

Petitioner argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have allowed the deduction ATTY. ZOSA:
of the value of the two cars and their maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as
these items are not indispensable to the sustenance of the family or in keeping them alive. xxxx
She points out that in the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740, the CA already considered the
said items which it deemed chargeable to respondent, while the monthly support pendente
lite (P115,000.00) was fixed on the basis of the documentary evidence of respondent’s Q How much do you spend for your food and your two (2) children every month?
alleged income from various businesses and petitioner’s testimony that she
needed P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous A Presently, Sir?
expenses excluding the P135,000.00 medical attendance expenses of petitioner.
ATTY. ZOSA:
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that disallowing the subject deductions would
result in unjust enrichment, thus making him pay for the same obligation twice. Since Yes.
petitioner and the children resided in one residence, the groceries and dry goods
purchased by the children using respondent’s credit card, totallingP594,151.58 for the
period September 2003 to June 2005 were not consumed by the children alone but shared A For the food alone, I spend not over P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 a month for the food alone.
with their mother. As to the Volkswagen Beetle and BMW 316i respondent bought for his
daughter Angelli Suzanne Lua and Daniel Ryan Lua, respectively, these, too, are to be xxxx
considered advances for support, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Respondent stressed that being children of parents belonging to the upper-class society, ATTY. ZOSA:
Angelli and Daniel Ryan had never in their entire life commuted from one place to another,
nor do they eat their meals at "carinderias". Hence, the cars and their maintenance are
indispensable to the children’s day-to-day living, the value of which were properly Q What other expenses do you incur in living in that place?
deducted from the arrearages in support pendente lite ordered by the trial and appellate
courts. A The normal household and the normal expenses for a family to have a decent living, Sir.

As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family Q How much other expenses do you incur?
relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources
or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. 18 Such support comprises WITNESS:
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
A For other expenses, is around over a P100,000.00, Sir.

Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for
annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the
proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon verified application of any of the parties,
guardian or designated custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the
rendition of judgment or final order. 19 Because of its provisional nature, a court does not
need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this
relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which
may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be
established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. 20
In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two
children was determined after due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by
the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was reduced on appeal, it is clear
that the monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended
primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of
Q Why do you incur that much amount?
A For the clothing for the three (3) of us, for the vitamins and medicines. And also I am
having a special therapy to straighten my back because I am scoliotic. I am advised by the
Doctor to hire a driver, but I cannot still afford it now. Because my eyesight is not reliable
for driving. And I still need another househelp to accompany me whenever I go marketing
because for my age, I cannot carry anymore heavy loads.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:
xxxx
 9

Q On the issue of the food for you and the two (2) children, you mentioned P40,000.00 Q Madam witness, let us talk of the present needs. x x x. What else, what specific need that
to P50,000.00? you would like to add so I can tell my client, the defendant.

A Yes, for the food alone. WITNESS:

Q Okay, what other possible expenses that you would like to include in those two (2) items? A I need to have an operation both of my eyes. I also need a special therapy for my back
You mentioned of a driver, am I correct? because I am scoliotic, three (3) times a week.

A Yes, I might need two (2) drivers, Sir for me and my children. Q That is very reasonable. [W]ould you care to please repeat that?

Q Okay. How much would you like possibly to pay for those two (2) drivers?
A I think P10,000.00 a month for one (1) driver. So I need two (2) drivers. And I need
another househelp.
Q You need another househelp. The househelp nowadays would charge you something
between P3,000.00 toP4,000.00. That’s quite…
A Right now, my househelp is receiving P8,000.00. I need another which I will give a
compensation of P5,000.00.
A Therapy for my scoliotic back and then also for the operation both of my eyes. And I am
also taking some vitamins from excel that will cost P20,000.00 a month.
Q Okay. Let’s have piece by piece. Have you asked the Doctor how much would it cost you
for the operation of that scoliotic?
A Yes before because I was already due last year. Before, this eye will cost P60,000.00 and
the other eyesP75,000.00.
Q So for both eyes, you are talking of P60,000.00 plus P75,000.00 is P135,000.00?

Q Other than that, do you still have other expenses? A Yes.

A My clothing. xxxx

COURT: Q You talk of therapy?

How about the schooling for your children? A Yes.

WITNESS: Q So how much is that?

A The schooling is shouldered by my husband, Your Honor. A Around P5,000.00 a week.21

COURT: As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can solely provide
for the subsistence, education, transportation, health/medical needs and recreational
Everything? activities of his children, as well as those of petitioner who was then unemployed and a
full-time housewife. Despite this, respondent’s counsel manifested during the same hearing
that respondent was willing to grant the amount of only P75,000.00 as monthly support
A Yes, Your Honor. pendente lite both for the children and petitioner as spousal support. Though the receipts
of expenses submitted in court unmistakably show how much respondent lavished on his
xxxx children, it appears that the matter of spousal support was a different matter altogether.
Rejecting petitioner’s prayer for P500,000.00 monthly support and finding the P75,000.00
ATTY. FLORES: monthly support offered by respondent as insufficient, the trial court fixed the monthly
support pendente lite at P250,000.00. However, since the supposed income in millions of
respondent was based merely on the allegations of petitioner in her complaint and
registration documents of various corporations which respondent insisted are owned not
 10

by him but his parents and siblings, the CA reduced the amount of support pendente lite GRAND TOTAL - Php 3,428,813.80
to P115,000.00, which ruling was no longer questioned by both parties.

Controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the final
CA decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00)
the sum of P2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars for the children, their cost
of maintenance and advances given to petitioner and his children. Respondent explained
that the deductions were made consistent with the fallo of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 84740 ordering him to pay support pendente lite in arrears less the amount
supposedly given by him to petitioner as her and their two children’s monthly support.
The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the foregoing expenses already incurred
by the respondent should, in equity, be considered advances which may be properly
deducted from the support in arrears due to the petitioner and the two children. Said court
also noted the absence of petitioner’s contribution to the joint obligation of support for
their children.
We reverse in part the decision of the CA.

The following is a summary of the subject deductions under Compliance dated June 28, Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal separation and petitions
2005, duly supported by receipts 22: for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage are guided by the following provisions
of the Rule on Provisional Orders 24
Car purchases for Angelli Suzanne - Php1,350,000.00
Sec. 2. Spousal Support.–In determining support for the spouses, the court may be guided
and Daniel Ryan - 613,472.86 by the following rules:

Car Maintenance fees of Angelli - 51,232.50

Suzanne (a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the
spouses, the spouses may be supported from the properties of the absolute
Credit card statements of Daniel Ryan - 348,682.28 community or the conjugal partnership.

Car Maintenance fees of Daniel Ryan - 118,960.52

(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and for such
period of time as the court may deem just and reasonable based on their standard
Php2,482,348.16 of living during the marriage.

(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) whether the spouse
After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions, respondent filed a motion for seeking support is the custodian of a child whose circumstances make it
reconsideration further asserting that the following amounts, likewise with supporting appropriate for that spouse not to seek outside employment; (2) the time
receipts, be considered as additional advances given to petitioner and the children 23: necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to enable the spouse
seeking support to find appropriate employment, and that spouse’s future
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71 earning capacity; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the comparative financial
resources of the spouses, including their comparative earning abilities in the
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00 labor market; (5) the needs and obligations of each spouse; (6) the contribution
of each spouse to the marriage, including services rendered in home-making,
Travel expenses of Susan Lim-Lua 14,611.15 child care, education, and career building of the other spouse; (7) the age and
Credit card purchases of Angelli 408,891.08 health of the spouses; (8) the physical and emotional conditions of the spouses;
Suzanne (9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give support, taking into account that
spouse’s earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of
Salon and travel expenses of Angelli 87,112.70 living; and (10) any other factor the court may deem just and equitable.
Suzanne
(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from
School expenses of Daniel Ryan Lua 260,900.00
the salary of the spouse.
Cash given to Daniel and Angelli 121,000.00
Sec. 3. Child Support.–The common children of the spouses shall be supported from the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
TOTAL - Php 946,465.64

Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be ordered to give
an amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise consider the
following factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and
those of the child; (2) the physical and emotional health of the child and his or her special
needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the
non-monetary contributions that the parents will make toward the care and well-being of
the child.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of
the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by
either party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute
concerns the deductions made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.
On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against accrued support, we find
as relevant the following rulings by US courts.
In Bradford v. Futrell,25 appellant sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court which
found him in arrears with his child support payments and entered a decree in favor of
appellee wife. He complained that in determining the arrearage figure, he should have been
allowed full credit for all money and items of personal property given by him to the
children themselves, even though he referred to them as gifts. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland ruled that in the suit to determine amount of arrears due the divorced wife
under decree for support of minor children, the husband (appellant) was not entitled to
credit for checks which he had clearly designated as gifts, nor was he entitled to credit for
an automobile given to the oldest son or a television set given to the children. Thus, if the
children remain in the custody of the mother, the father is not entitled to credit for money
paid directly to the children if such was paid without any relation to the decree.
In the absence of some finding of consent by the mother, most courts refuse to allow a
husband to dictate how he will meet the requirements for support payments when the
mode of payment is fixed by a decree of court. Thus he will not be credited for payments
made when he unnecessarily interposed himself as a volunteer and made payments direct
to the children of his own accord. Wills v. Baker, 214 S. W. 2d 748 (Mo. 1948); Openshaw v.
Openshaw, 42 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1935). In the latter case the court said in part: "The
payments to the children themselves do not appear to have been made as payments upon
alimony, but were rather the result of his fatherly interest in the welfare of those children.
We do not believe he should be permitted to charge them to plaintiff. By so doing he would
be determining for Mrs. Openshaw the manner in which she should expend her allowances.
It is a very easy thing for children to say their mother will not give them money, especially
as they may realize that such a plea is effective in attaining their ends. If she is not treating
them right the courts are open to the father for redress." 26
11
In Martin, Jr. v. Martin,27 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a father, who is
required by a divorce decree to make child support payments directly to the mother,
cannot claim credit for payments voluntarily made directly to the children. However,
special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such
payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when such can be done without injustice to
her.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to
the mother money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued
installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on
account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Koon v. Koon, supra; Briggs
v. Briggs, supra. However, special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court
in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when that can be done
without injustice to her. Briggs v. Briggs, supra. The courts are justifiably reluctant to lay
down any general rules as to when such credits may be allowed. 28 (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be
credited against the accrued support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly
support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily for food, household
expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis
therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his
children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases
through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have
been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite.
While it is true that the dispositive portion of the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
84740 ordered herein respondent to pay the support in arrears "less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and their two (2) children
monthly support," the deductions should be limited to those basic needs and expenses
considered by the trial and appellate courts. The assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge
deductions from the accrued monthly support of petitioner and her children, while correct
insofar as it commends the generosity of the respondent to his children, is clearly
inconsistent with the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. More important, it
completely ignores the unfair consequences to petitioner whose sustenance and well-
being, was given due regard by the trial and appellate courts. This is evident from the
March 31, 2004 Order granting support pendente lite to petitioner and her children, when
the trial court observed:
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of financial
assistance to his two (2) children via their credit cards and paying for their school
expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form of spousal support to the plaintiff, for, at
this point in time, while the action for nullity of marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent
upon the defendant, considering the physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the
overwhelming capacity of defendant, to extend support unto the latter. x x x 29
On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the amount of monthly
support fixed by the trial court, it nevertheless held that considering respondent’s financial
resources, it is but fair and just that he give a monthly support for the sustenance and basic
necessities of petitioner and his children. This would imply that any amount respondent

seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those incurred for sustenance
and household expenses.1avvphi1
In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been admitted by petitioner that
aside from paying the expenses of their two (2) children’s schooling, he gave his two (2)
children two (2) cars and credit cards of which the expenses for various items namely:
clothes, grocery items and repairs of their cars were chargeable to him which totaled an
amount of more than One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) for each of them and
considering that as testified by the private respondent that she needs the total amount
of P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous expenses
and considering further that petitioner can afford to buy cars for his two (2) children, and
to pay the expenses incurred by them which are chargeable to him through the credit cards
he provided them in the amount of P100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the
monthly support pendente lite for his wife, herein private respondent, be fixed as of the
present in the amount of P115,000.00 which would be sufficient enough to take care of the
household and other needs. This monthly support pendente lite to private respondent in
the amount of P115,000.00 excludes the amount of One Hundred ThirtyFive (P135,000.00)
Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by private respondent for the
operation of both her eyes which is demandable upon the conduct of such operation.
Likewise, this monthly support ofP115,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or
decrease thereof that the trial court may grant private respondent as the circumstances
may warrant i.e. depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings
for the main action for support.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of
petitioner, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his
disposal.30 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as deductions from
the accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her children:
1âwphi1
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00
Credit card purchases of Angelli 365,282.20
(Groceries and Dry Goods) 228,869.38
Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan
TOTAL Php 648,102.29
As to the contempt charge, we sustain the CA in holding that respondent is not guilty of
indirect contempt.
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its
authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
12
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration
of justice.31 To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or
improper purpose.32 The good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be
considered.33
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support pendente lite
granted by the trial court, which is immediately executory. However, we agree with the CA
that respondent’s act was not contumacious considering that he had not been remiss in
actually providing for the needs of his children. It is a matter of record that respondent
continued shouldering the full cost of their education and even beyond their basic
necessities in keeping with the family’s social status. Moreover, respondent believed in
good faith that the trial and appellate courts, upon equitable grounds, would allow him to
offset the substantial amounts he had spent or paid directly to his children.
Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to generate income on her
own because she presently maintains a boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in Cebu City and
at the same time engages in the business of lending money. He also claims that the two
children have finished their education and are now employed in the family business
earning their own salaries.
Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support should be submitted to
the trial court in which the action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this
Court is not a trier of facts. The amount of support may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient
and the resources or means of the person obliged to support. 34 As we held in Advincula v.
Advincula35
…Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that
its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is
entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his
increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as
subject to final determination. 36
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated April 20, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 01154 and 01315 is hereby MODIFIED to read as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with
Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-G.R.
No. 01154;
b) GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua's Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-
G.R. No. 01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and
25 November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in
Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is entered:
 13

i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php 648,102.29 from the

support pendente lite in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim
Lua and their two (2) children;

ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support

of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount
was deferred by him subject to the deduction aforementioned.

iii. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this judgment.

SO ORDERED."

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004

JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner,

vs.
MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of
that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive
her of custody, absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such
authority and care.

The Case

The Petition for Review1 before the Court seeks to reverse and set aside the August 28,
2002 Decision2 and the December 11, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP
No. 69400.4 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel

shall have custody over the child Michael Kevin Pineda until he reaches ten (10)
years of age. Once the said child is beyond ten (10) years of age, the Court allows
him to choose which parent he prefers to live with pursuant to Section 6, Rule 99
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The petitioner, Joey D. Briones,
shall help support the child, shall have visitorial rights at least once a week, and
may take the child out upon the written consent of the mother.

"Acting on the petitioner’s ‘Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order’, and
finding it to be without merit, the same is DENIED." 5

The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of the case in this wise:
"On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus
against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to
obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
"On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P.
Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.
"A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering
the respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael
Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
"The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son
with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as
evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now
married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan.
"The petitioner further alleges that on November 4, 1998 he caused the minor
child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send
him to school. In the school year 2000-2001, the petitioner enrolled him at the
nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City, where he
finished the nursery course.
"According to the petitioner, his parents, who are both retired and receiving
monthly pensions, assisted him in taking care of the child.
"On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to
the house of the petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting
the minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring the said child for
recreation at the SM Department store. They promised him that they will bring
him back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, the
respondents did not bring him back as promised by them.
"The petitioner went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza,
Tuguegarao City but he was informed that the child is with the latter’s mother at
Batal Heights, Santiago City. When he went there, respondent Francisca P. Miguel
told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is with her daughter at Tuguegarao City.
"He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to
locate his son and to bring him back to him, but all his efforts were futile.
14
"Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City which was docketed as SPC No. 2711. However, the
said case was withdrawn ex-parte.
"The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to
him as his biological father and [as] he has demonstrated his capability to
support and educate him.
"On May 6, 2002, the respondents filed their Comment, in compliance with the
May 2, 2002 Resolution of this Court.
"In their Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies the allegation of the
petitioner that he was the one who brought their child to the Philippines and
stated that she was the one who brought him here pursuant to their agreement.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel likewise denies petitioner’s allegation that
respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who took the
child from the petitioner or the latter’s parents. She averred that she was the one
who took Michael Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when she returned to the
Philippines and that the latter readily agreed and consented.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that sometime in October 2001, the
petitioner was deported from Japan under the assumed name of Renato Juanzon
when he was found to have violated or committed an infraction of the laws of
Japan. She further stated that since the time the petitioner arrived in the
Philippines, he has not been gainfully employed. The custody of the child,
according to respondent Loreta P. Miguel was entrusted to petitioner’s parents
while they were both working in Japan. She added that even before the custody of
the child was given to the petitioner’s parents, she has already been living
separately from the petitioner in Japan because the latter was allegedly
maintaining an illicit affair with another woman until his deportation.
"She likewise stated in her Comment that her marriage to a Japanese national is
for the purpose of availing of the privileges of staying temporarily in Japan to
pursue her work so she could be able to send money regularly to her son in the
Philippines. She further stated that she has no intention of staying permanently in
Japan as she has been returning to the Philippines every six (6) months or as
often as she could.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given
to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Applying Article 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family Code, the CA awarded the custody of
Michael Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother, Respondent Loreta P. Miguel. While

acknowledging that petitioner truly loved and cared for his son and considering the trouble
and expense he had spent in instituting the legal action for custody, it nevertheless found
no compelling reason to separate the minor from his mother. Petitioner, however, was
granted visitorial rights.
Hence, this Petition.6
Issue
In his Memorandum, petitioner formulated the "ultimate" issue as follows: "x x x [w]hether
or not [he], as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own
child in the absence of the mother who is away." 7
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit. However, the assailed Decision should be modified in regard to
its erroneous application of Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Sole Issue
Who Should Have Custody of the Child?
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor child.
He insists, however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan
and during the period that she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the
minor, such that the mother would have custody when she is in the country. But when she
is abroad, he -- as the biological father -- should have custody.
According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she is abroad, she cannot
take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is that she lives most of the time in
Japan, as evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001, 8 granting to her
sister temporary custody over the minor.
At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is
studying,9 thus rendering petitioner’s argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas
Corpus was pending before the CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for
a Hold Departure Order," 10 alleging therein that respondents were preparing the travel
papers of the minor so the child could join his mother and her Japanese husband. The CA
denied the Motion for lack of merit. 11
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the
Philippines12 explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall
be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits
paternity.13
15
Previously, under the provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children were generally
classified into two groups: (1) natural, whether actual or by legal fiction; and (2) spurious,
whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit. 14 A natural child is one born outside a lawful
wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other.15 On the other hand, a spurious child is one born of
parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to marry each other on account of
certain legal impediments.16
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority
was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. 17 If both acknowledge the child,
authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was
awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter
case, parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother. 18
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated
in the Family Code.19Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those
who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself
gives them legitimate status.20
Article 54 of the Code provides these exceptions: "Children conceived or born before the
judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become
final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the
subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate."
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under
one category, without any distinction between natural and spurious. 21 The concept of
"natural child" is important only for purposes of legitimation. 22 Without the subsequent
marriage, a natural child remains an illegitimate child.
Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under the Family Code) child, as there is
nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to
marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier
explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother,
Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his father’s recognition of him.
David v. Court of Appeals23 held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father
could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child.
The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it
follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the
minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child; 24 in such a case,
the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent. 25
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole
parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. 26 She has the right to
keep him in her company. 27 She cannot be deprived of that right, 28 and she may not even
renounce or transfer it "except in the cases authorized by law." 29
 16

Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds
cause to order otherwise.

Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole
parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of
custody to someone else.30 In the past, the following grounds have been considered ample EDWARD V. LACSON, G.R. No. 150644
justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or
abandonment,31 unemployment, immorality, 32 habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, Petitioner,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease.
Present:
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
factor,33 we hold that the CA did not err in awarding care, custody, and control of the child
to Respondent Loreta. There is no showing at all that she is unfit to take charge of him. - versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

We likewise affirm the visitorial right granted by the CA to petitioner. In Silva v. Court of CORONA,
Appeals,34 the Court sustained the visitorial right of an illegitimate father over his children
in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their AZCUNA, and
children.35 Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost,
their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor GARCIA, JJ.
the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-
being of the child. MAOWEE DABAN LACSON

and MAONAA DABAN Promulgated:

However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This
provision contemplates a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each
LACSON, represented by their
other, but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they are
living separately de facto. In the present case, it has been established that petitioner and mother and guardian ad-litem,
Respondent Loreta were never married. Hence, that portion of the CA Decision allowing
the child to choose which parent to live with is deleted, but without disregarding the LEA DABAN LACSON, August 28, 2006
obligation of petitioner to support the child.
Respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the disposition allowing the child, upon reaching ten (10) years of x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
age, to choose which parent to live with isDELETED for lack of legal basis. Costs against
petitioner.

DECISION
SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales*, JJ., concur.

GARCIA, J.:

Petitioner Edward V. Lacson, father of the respondent sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and
Maonaa Daban Lacson and husband of their mother and guardian ad-litem, Lea Daban
Lacson, has come to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court to seek the reversal and setting aside of the Decision[1] dated July 13, 2001 of the
 17

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60203, as reiterated in its Resolution[2] of October
18, 2001 denying his motion for reconsideration.
From the petition and its annexes, the respondents reply thereto, and other pleadings, the
As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee
and Maonaa support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject to the schedule of
payment and other conditions set forth in the courts corresponding order of May 13, 1996.
[4]

Court gathers the following facts:

Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of sisters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court, following an
petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a
on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears. The fallo of
Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and the trial courts decision[5] reads:
children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they
stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with
her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to
the house of Leas mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place
to another not their own.

1) Ordering defendant to compensate plaintiffs

It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her support in arrears in the amount of TWO
husband Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note MILLION FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND
dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, (P2, 496,000.00) PESOS from which amount shall be
Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill deducted ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR
the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager (P124,000.00) PESOS that which they received from
amounts for school expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part of 1992, defendant for two years and that which they received
Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee by way of support pendent lite;
and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St. Pauls College in Iloilo City. In
the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against
Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was
about to graduate. 2) Ordering defendant to pay TWENTY THOUSAND
(P20,000.00) PESOS as attorneys fees; and

In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended, [3] docketed as Civil Case No. 22185,
Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being
gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them 3) Pay costs.
support since 1976. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edwards failure and neglect,
their mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she
would later testify, Lea had received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much
as P400,000.00 to P600,000.00. SO ORDERED.

In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their
needs. He explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the
land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. Therefrom, Edward appealed to the CA whereat his recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV.
He also blamed financial constraint for his inability to provide the P12,000.00 monthly No. 60203.
allowance prayed for in the complaint.

Eventually, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision dated July 13, 2001,[6] dismissed Edwards
appeal, disposing as follows;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED and
the appealed Decision in Civil Case No. 22185 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Double costs against the defendant appellant [Edward Lacson].
SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket added.)
In time, Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the appellate
court in its equally assailed Resolution of October 18, 2001.[7]
Hence, Edwards present recourse on his submission that the CA erred -
I. XXX WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE GRANT OF SUPPORT IN ARREARS
FROM 1976 TO 1994.
II. XXX IN AFFIRMING THE ALLEGED ADVANCES OF SUPPORT BY
RESPONDENTS UNCLE NOEL DABAN.
III. XXX IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF SUPPORT EVEN IF PETITIONER IS
NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THE SAME TO
RESPONDENTS.
IV. XXX WHEN IT ORDERED PETITIONER TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO XXX
RESPONDENTS EVEN IF PETITIONERS OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE
SUPPORT HAD ALREADY BEEN COMPLETELY SATISFIED BY THE
18
PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY WHICH WERE
ALL APPROPRIATED BY THE RESPONDENTS.
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents, Maowee
and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay
support in arrears,i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial,
demand having been made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the
Family Code to complete his point:
Article 203 The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the
time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or
extrajudicial demand.
To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the aforequoted provision starts from the filing of
Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can it be said that an effective
demand for support was made upon him.
Petitioners above posture has little to commend itself. For one, it conveniently glossed over
the fact that he veritably abandoned the respondent sisters even before the elder of the
two could celebrate her second birthday. To be sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect
any of the sisters during their tender years to go through the motion of demanding support
from him, what with the fact that even their mother (his wife) found it difficult during the
period material to get in touch with him. For another, the requisite demand for support
appears to have been made sometime in 1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial
demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor
commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would pass as a
demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to
support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand because it came by way
of a request or a plea. As it were, the trial court found that a demand to sustain an award of
support in arrears had been made in this case and said so in its decision, thus:
From 1976, [respondents] mother now and then went to their
[paternal] grandmothers house by their father and asked for support;
this notwithstanding their fathers commitment for this purpose which
the latter embodied in a note dated December 10, 1975. For twenty-one
years that they needed support, [petitioner] complied with his
obligation for only two (2) years.

xxx xxx xxx
Last December 10, 1975, [petitioner] committed self for the support of
his children, the [respondents] herein but failing, plaintiffs mother
asked extrajudicially for her childrens support since 1976, when she
went to her mothers house. .[8] (Words in bracket and underscoring
added.)
The appellate court made a parallel finding on the demand angle, formulating the same in
the following wise:
We could not confer judicial approval upon [petitioners] posture
of trying to evade his responsibility to give support to his daughters
simply because their mother did not make a formal demand therefor
from him. [Petitioners] insistence on requiring a formal demand from
his wife is truly pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and
commitment to comply with such obligation through a note in his own
handwriting. Said note [stating that he will sustain his two daughters
Maowee and Maonaa] also stated as requested by their mother thus
practically confirming the fact of such demand having been made by
[respondents] mother. The trial court thus correctly ruled that
[petitioners] obligation to pay support in arrears should commence
from 1976.[9] (Words in bracket added).
The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA
confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner to
secure support for the respondents. As a matter of long and sound appellate practice,
factual findings of the CA are accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most compelling
and cogent reasons.[10] Not one of the well-recognized exceptions to this
rule on conclusiveness of factual findings appear to obtain in this case. Accordingly, the
Court cannot grant the petitioners plea for a review of the CAs findings bearing on the
actuality that, as basis for an award of support in arrears, an extrajudicial demand for
support had been made on the petitioner as evidenced by the December 10, 1975 note
adverted to. Lest it be overlooked, the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review, as
here, is generally limited to correction of errors of law. Complementing that postulate is the
rule that the Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below, [11] except when, as earlier indicated, compelling
reasons demand a review of the factual conclusions drawn from such evidence.
Petitioners second specification of error touches on the CAs affirmatory holding that
respondents uncle, Noel Daban, advanced the money for their support. Again, petitioners
lament on the matter isa veritable call for review of factual determinations of the two
courts below. It need not, accordingly, detain us long. Suffice it to state in that regard that,
19
of their close relatives, the respondents appeared to have stayed longest with their uncle,
Noel Daban. Noteworthy also is the fact that petitioner, from 1976 to 1994, only gave
Maowee and Maonaa token amounts for schooling when support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance and education, [12] or,
in short, whatever is necessary to keep a person alive. Logically, the sisters would, thru
their mother, turn to their uncle (Noel Daban) for their sustenance and education when
petitioner failed to give the same, a failing which stretched from their pre-schooling days to
their college years. Since such failure has been established, it is not amiss to deduce, as did
the trial court and the CA, that Noel Daban who, owing to consideration of kinship, had
reasons to help, indeed lent his sister Lea money to support her children.
Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement
from the petitioner. The provision reads:
When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to
give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may
furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement
from the person obliged to give support.
Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between
the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract, [13] an equitable principle enjoining one
from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another.
As for the amount of support in arrears, there is also no reason to disturb the absolute
figures arrived at by the two courts below, appearing as they do to be reasonable and
proper. Arbitrariness respecting the determination of the final numbers cannot plausibly
be laid on the doorsteps of the CA, and the trial court before it, considering that they fixed
such amount based on the varying needs of the respondents during the years included in
the computation and to the financial resources of the petitioner, as proved by the evidence
adduced below. As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage
and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. [14]
Petitioner closes his petition by urging the Court, as it did the CA earlier, to consider a
transaction that transpired after the trial court had rendered judgment. We refer to the sale
by Lea of half of what petitioner claims to be his exclusive or capital property. As the
petitioner would have this Court believe, Lea and the respondent sisters appropriated
the P5 Million proceeds of the sale for themselves. Pressing on, he alleged that the amount
thus received from the sale is more than enough to fully satisfy thus release him from
complying with- the underlying judgment for support,assuming ex gratia argumenti his
obligation to pay support in arrears.

Petitioners above submission is flawed by the premises holding it together. For firstly, it
assumes as a fact that what was sold for P5 Million was indeed his exclusive property. But,
as the CA aptly observed, there is no showing whether the property subject of the
transaction mentioned by [the petitioner] is a conjugal property or [his] exclusive property,
as in fact [respondents] mother asserts that she and [petitioner] had separately sold their
respective shares on said property. [15]
Secondly, the respondent sisters were not party to the sale aforementioned. Petitioners
suggestion, therefore, that part of the proceeds of the sale went to them and may be set off
for what petitioner owes them by way of support in arrears is unacceptable, being at best
gratuitous and self-serving.
Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide
respondents with support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the
sisters have been deprived by a neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it is
their fault to have been born. This disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure
to right a wrong done the herein respondents who are no less petitioners daughters.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the appealed CA decision and resolution
are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989
20
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR
ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA CARREON
CERVANTES, petitioners,
vs.
GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO, respondents.
Yolanda F. Lim for petitioners.
Voltaire C. Campomanes for respondents.
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the person of the
minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. In a resolution, dated 5 October 1987, the Court resolved to
issue the writ returnable to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig at the hearing
of 12 October 1987 at 8:30 a.m. Said Judge was directed to hear the case and submit his
report and recommendation to the Court.
On 3 December 1987, said Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig submitted to the
Court his report and recommendation, also dated 3 December 1987.
It appears that the minor was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo
and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child
for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida
Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child
when she was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child
by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April 1987. 1
The appropriate petition for adoption (Sp. Proc. No. 057-B) was filed by herein petitioners
over the child before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Fourth Judicial District, Branch 67
which, on 20 August 1987, rendered a decision 2 granting the petition. The child was then
known as Angelie Anne Fajardo. The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental
authority of her natural parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them
and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne
Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate ." 3
Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents, herein petitioners Nelson and
Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the
amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to
accede to the demand.
As a result, on 11 September 1987, while petitioners were out at work, the respondent
Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners' residence in Angono, Rizal,
 21

on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Respondent Gina Carreon respondents are ordered (if they still have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners
brought the child to her house in Paranñ aque. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return immediately upon notice hereof This resolution is immediately executory.
of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for
adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully SO ORDERED.
explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners that she will, however, return the child to
the petitioners if she were paid the amount of P150,000.00.

Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case study on the adoption and
submitted a report thereon to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal in the adoption case,
testified on 27 October 1987 before the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig in
connection with the present petition. She declared that she had interviewed respondent
Gina Carreon on 24 June 1987 in connection with the contemplated adoption of the child.
During the interview, said respondent manifested to the social worker her desire to have
the child adopted by the petitioners. 4

In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's
welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under
five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule
otherwise. 5 In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost
consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into
account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents.
Never has this Court deviated from this criterion. 6

It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than
respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband
and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not
accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an
upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given
birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3)
years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C.
Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect
the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are
legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of
supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother (herein
respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with
a married man, can most likely give her.

Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and
consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the
authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting
parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority
over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. 7 The adopting parents have
the right to the care and custody of the adopted child 8 and exercise parental authority and
responsibility over him. 9

ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Hon. Eutropio Migrino, the Petition is GRANTED. The custody and care of the minor Angelie
Anne Cervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to whom they properly belong, and

G.R. No. L-64982 October 23, 1984
ALEJANDRO B. HONTIVEROS, JR., petitioner,
vs.
22
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, Third Special Cases Division, HON.
WILFREDO G. CAINGLET in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch CLVIII, RTC and
BRENDA M. HERNANDO, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This petition for certiorari seeks to review the decision of the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Court) dated August 5, 1983,
which affirmed the order of respodent Judge Cainglet (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent Judge) dated May 30, 1983. The dispositive portion of the respondent court's
decision reads as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is denied and the petition dismissed
for lack of merit. Accordingly, the restraining order issued by this Court
earlier is hereby lifted, without pronouncement as to costs (p. 97, rec.).
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. and private respondent Brenda M. Hernando are the
father and mother of an acknowledged natural child born on November 27, 1981 and given
the name Margaux H. Hontiveros.
For the period from November 1981 to June 1982, the child had been under the care and
custody of the mother. The father, petitioner herein, used to take the child out during
Saturdays and return the child to private respondent's residence on Saturday evenings (p.
29, rec.).
On June 21, 1982, Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. passed by the house of Brenda Hernando to
take the child to their house for a visit, with the agreement that she will be returned by
nightfall (p. 29, rec.). However, the child was never returned to the mother.
To recover the custody of her child, private respondent filed on August 24, 1982 a petition
for habeas corpus in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Metro Manila, entitled "In the
Matter of the Custody of the Minor Child Margaux H. Hontiveros, Brenda M. Hernando,
Petitioner, versus Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. and Alejandro Hontiveros, Sr., respondents",
which petition was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 9784 of said court and assigned to
Branch XIX thereof (p. 8, rec.).
On August 26, 1982, the petitioner filed a petition for custody of minor Margaux H.
Hontiveros with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 9788 with Branch XXIII of the said court. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss
the petition in Special Proceedings No. 9788 on the ground of litis pendency, citing the
pendency of Special Proceedings No. 9784. The motion to dismiss was denied.
Subsequently, however, petitioner Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. abandoned the prosecution of

Special Proceedings No. 9788, for which reason the Hon. Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera
dismissed said petition on October 26, 1983.
On September 9, 1982, a hearing was conducted by the Hon. Judge Santiago Ranñ ada in
connection with Special Proceedings No. 9784. The parties agreed that the minor child
Margaux shall be under the custody of the petitioner for seven (7) days every other week
(p. 171, rec.). Accordingly, Judge Rafiada issued the following order: têñ.£îhqwâ£
As preliminarily agreed upon by petitioner and respondent Alejandro
Hontiveros, Jr., the Court hereby orders the minor child Margaux H.
Hontiveros to be put under the custody of the petitioner, with the
understanding that respondent Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. will be allowed
to take said minor child into his custody every other week for a period
of seven (7) days with the obligation of taking said minor child from the
residence of petitioner every other Friday, at 9:00 A.M., and return said
child on or before the next Friday morning at 9:00 A.M. This
arrangement is effective immediately, with the condition that the
custody of said child is now immediately given to petitioner and
respondent Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. will be allowed to pick up said
child on Friday, 17 September 1982, at about 9:00 A. M. (P. 37, rec.).
On May 24, 1983, the petitioner filed an urgent ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Regions Branch CLVIII, to which the Court the aforesaid case was reassigned following the
reorganization of the inferior courts under BP 129 (p. 38, rec.). The object of the petition
for preliminary injunction is to prevent the private respondent from bringing the minor
child outside the country, specifically the United States of American where she was
allegedly bound for.
The petition was set for hearing on May 30, 1983. On said date, the counsel for private
respondent moved for the withdrawal of the petition for habeas corpus on the ground that
said petition has become moot and academic upon the production of the body of Margaux
Hontiveros before Judge Rafiada and in view of the order of September 9, 1982.
Respondent Judge Wilfredo Cainglet (presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch CLVIII) granted the motion for the withdrawal of
the petition for habeas corpus. Since the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is but an ancillary action, the same was denied by the respondent Judge in his
order dated May 30, 1983. Said order states: têñ.£îhqwâ£
xxx xxx xxx
As preliminarily agreed upon by petitioner and respondent Alejandro
Hontiveros, Jr., the Court hereby orders the minor child Margaux H.
Hontiveros to be put under the custody of the petitioner, with the
understanding that respondents Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. will be
allowed to take said minor child into his custody every other week for a
period of seven (7) days with the obligation of taking said minor child
from the residence of petitioner every other Friday, at 9:00 A.M., and
23
return said child on or before the next Friday morning at 9:00 A.M. This
arrangement is effective immediately, with the condition that the
custody of said child is now immediately given to petitioner and
respondent Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. will be allowed to pick up said
child on Friday, 17 September 1982, at about 9:00 A.M.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
When this petition was called for hearing today, petitioner's counsel,
Atty. Wilfredo Chato moved for the withdrawal this petition on the
ground that the same has now become moot and academic in view of
the Order of this Court aforecited, to which motion for withdrawal
residents' counsel, Atty. Yolanda Q. Javellana interposed her objection.
The said counsel for the respondents in open Court today,admitted that
the respondents have not filed a counterclaim anent the herein petition
and further admitted that there is a present case involving the same
parties and same subject matter filed with the Pasig Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) and pending before Branch 162,
presided by the Executive Judge, the Hon. Rizalina Bonifacio Vera since
August 26, 1982.
The Court believes that the matter of withdrawing a case is a prerogative
of plaintiff or petitioner and ordinarily could not be validly objected to
by the defendant or respondent as in the present case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court, finding the petitioner's motion
to withdraw the herein petition to be justified grants the same and
hereby orders the WITHDRAWAL of the present petition for Habeas
Corpus, subject to the mandate of this Court in its Order dated
September 9, 1982, predicated upon the agreement of the herein
petitioner and respondents.
Anent the respondents' motion/petition for the issuance of a Writ of
preliminary injunction praying for the immediate issuance of a
restraining Order against the herein petitioner, the same being merely
ancillar action and now moot and academic there being no principal or
main action or petition upon which respondents' motion/petition may be
predicated upon for the issuance of the said restraining Order, upon
motion by petitioner's counsel with objection of respondents' counsel
the same is hereby DENIED for lack of factual and legal justification.
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 48-49, rec.,emphasis supplied).
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was likewise denied for lack of factual and
legal justification (p. 50, rec.)

On June 3, 1983, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for
preliminary injunction with the Intermediate Appellate Court questioning the order of
respondent Judge dated May 30, 1983 and the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
The respondent Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit in its decision dated August
5, 1983. The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the adverse ruling but the same was
affirmed by respondent Court in its resolution dated August 17, 1983.
Hence, this petition.
The following issues are presented:
1. Whether or not the order of respondent Judge dated May 30,1983 was issued with grave
abuse of discretion, and
2. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the custody of his minor child Margaux H.
Hontiveros.
I
The records reveal that the original action instituted by private respondent in the then
Court of First Instance was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to recover custody of her
acknowledged natural child Margaux without depriving the father of his visitorial rights.
The petition was filed against the father who allegedly took the child from her mother's
home and kept her indefinitely without the mother's consent.
At the hearing conducted on September 9, 1982, the minor child was "produced before the
Court and a settlement was reached upon agreement of the parties. Thus, the order of
Judge Ranñ ada was issued. Even if the order was termed "preliminary ", WE take note of the
fact that the private respondent's prayer in her pleading had been satisfied for her evident
purpose in filing the petition for habeas corpus was to get back the custody of her child.
Because of such settlement and considering that as noted in the questioned order of May
30, 1983, the petitioner's counsel admitted that there was a pending case (Special
Proceedings No. 9788) involving the same parties and same subject matter filed with
another branch of the same court and the petitioner herein did not file a counterclaim, the
respondent Judge allowed the withdrawal of the case for habeas corpus pending before him
(pp. 48-49, rec.).
Section 2, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the dismissal of an action by
order of the court at plaintiff's instance (private respondent herein) upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper. WE agree with the respondent Court that
considering the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, as earlier noted, and
considering further that no real injury would result if the urgent ex parte petition could not
be acted upon since it could be threshed out in the coordinate branch of the Pasig Regional
Trial Court, the dismissed of the petition for habeas corpus is warranted. In the case
of Duque vs. Vinarao (63 SCRA 206), WE held that a petition for habeas corpus can be
24
dismissed upon voluntary withdrawal of the petitioner and certification of the Judge
Advocate General.
WE agree with the respondent Judge that the petition for habeas corpus has been rendered
moot and academic with the issuance of the order dated September 9, 1982, which was
predicated upon the agreement of the parties. In Pestrano vs. Corvista (81 Phil. 53), WE
held that where the subject person had already been released from the custody complained
of, the petition for habeas corpus then still pending was considered already moot and
academic and should be dismissed. In the case at bar, the minor child Margaux H.
Hontiveros was in fact produced in court. By virtue of the order of Judge Ranada, she was
released to the custody of her mother with the father having the right to take her in his
custody every other week.
WE believe that the respondent Judge merely exercised his sound discretion in allowing
the withdrawal of the case in his branch. "Grave abuse of discretion" means such capricious
and arbitrary exercise of judgment as is equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to lack of
jurisdiction (Vda. de Bacaling vs. Laguda 54 SCRA 243). In the case at bar, there was no
abuse of discretion by the respondent Judge. He acted within the ambit of judicial
discretion allotted to Judges of inferior courts, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The court may, subject to the requirement of due process, give all such
directions and orders as it may deem necessary or expedient in the
determination of the dispute before it. It may refrain from hearing the
dispute or part thereof, or dismiss any matter or part of any matter,
where further proceedings are not necessary or desirable. Certainly, it
may also defer the hearing of any motion or hear one motion in
preference to others, when its judgment such is necessary ... The
discretion granted by law is not interfered with unless it is gravely
abused (Maritime Company of the Philippines, et al. vs. Paredes, et al.,
19 SCRA 569, 580).
Petitioner is of the theory that he was deprived of due process because the respondent
Judge dismissed his urgent ex parte petition for preliminary injunction without hearing.
WE cannot sustain the stand of the petitioner.
It should be borne in mind that petitioner Med a petition for custody of minor Margaux H.
Hontiveros with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 9788. The respondent Judge knew of the existence of Special Proceedings No. 9788
because this fact was admitted by the counsel of the petitioner himself. All that the
petitioner must do then is to file the petition for preliminary injunction in Branch XXIII of
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal where Special Proceedings No. 9788 is assigned.
The issue as to whether he can be granted a preliminary injunction could have properly
been ventilated below. Unfortunately, petitioner chose to appeal by way of certiorari, a
remedy which WE cannot grant because the respondent Judge acted within the parameters
of judicial discretion.
 25

What is more, petitioner himself did not pursue his action for custody of the minor Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Margaux H. Hontiveros. Worse, he abandoned the case and Special Proceedings No. 9788
was dismissed by Judge Vera on October 26, 1983 for lack of interest on the part of the Concepcion, Jr. and Escolin, JJ., took no part.
petitioner to prosecute (p. 208, rec.). If at all petitioner can only blame himself if he feels
that he was deprived of due process.

II

The second issue is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the custody of the minor child
Margaux H. Hontiveros. Once more, WE are asked to arbitrate between the rights and
duties of parents and children.

Article 363 of the Civil Code provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£

In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children,

the latter's welfare shall be paramount. No matter shall be separated
from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure.

The Code Commission observed that the rule in Article 363 of the Civil Code is necessary
"in order to avoid many a tragedy when a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No
man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 12).

Finding the above rationale beyond question, Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth
Welfare Code) provides the following:

Article 17 — ...

In case of separation of his parents, no child under five years of age shall be separated from
his mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to do so (P.D. 603, dated December 10,
1974, 70 O.G. 10774).

While the petitioner would have US believe in his reply that the private respondent is unfit
to take care of his child, it is too late in the day to do so because under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, only questions of law may be raised in this Tribunal What the petitioner should
have done is to bring out the questions of fact in Special Proceedings Nos. 9788. It is just
too bad that the case for custody was dismissed for lack of interest on the part of the
petitioner.

Clearly, the private respondent has a clear legal right under Article 17 of P.D. 603 to the
custody of her minor child, there being no compelling reason to the contrary.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY DENIED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
 26

Petition for certiorari to have the order of respondent judge of December 28, 1979
ordering petitioner to produce the child, Maria Teresa Unson, his daughter barely eight
years of age, with private respondent Edita N. Araneta and return her to the custody of the
later, further obliging petitioner to "continue his support of said daughter by providing for
her education and medical needs," allegedly issued without a "hearing" and the reception
of testimony in violation of Section 6 of Rule 99.

Petitioner and private respondent were married on April 19, 1971 1 and out of that
marriage the child in question, Teresa, was born on December 1, 1971. However, as stated
in a decision rendered on August 23, 1974 in Civil Case No. 7716 of respondent judge
himself, on July 13, 1974 they executed an agreement for the separation of their properties
and to live separately, as they have in fact been living separately since June 1972. The
agreement was approved by the Court. The parties are agreed that no specific provision
was contained in said agreement about the custody of the child because the husband and
wife would have their own private arrangement in that respect. Thus, according to the
affidavit of petitioner attached to his supplement to petition, submitted in compliance with
the directive of this Court during the hearing of this case, he affirms that:

xxx xxx xxx

(8) That when Maria Teresa started pre-school in 1976 at the Early
Learning Center in San Lorenzo, very near petitioner's residence, and
later, when she started school at Assumption College, Maria Teresa
would stay with petitioner during school days and spend weekends with
her mother, but there were times when her mother would not even
bother to pick her up during non-school days;

(9) That during the early part of 1978 petitioner personally acquired
knowledge that his wife Edita Araneta has been living with her brother-
in-law Agustin F. Reyes, in an apartment at C. Palma St., Makati, Metro
Mla. and so petitioner tightened his custody over his daughter, especially
after:

a. he found out that Agustin F. Reyes was confined at

the Makati Medical Center from October 13 up to
December 3, 1977 for "Manic Depressive" disorder,
under the care of Dr. Baltazar Reyes;
G.R. No. L-52242 November 17, 1980

b. he found out that his wife Edita Araneta delivered a

MIGUEL R. UNSON III, petitioner,
child fathered by Agustin F. Reyes on September 24,
vs.
1978, (Please see Birth Certificate attached hereto as
HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO AND EDITA N. ARANETA, respondents.
Annex "A-1");

c. he found out that Agustin F. Reyes had been

confined again for the same ailment at the Makati
BARREDO, J.: Medical Center from June 27 up to August 29, 1978
under the care of the same doctor .

(10) That on May 21, 1980 Edita Araneta delivered another child
fathered by Agustin F. Reyes. (Please see Birth Certificate attached
hereto as Annex "A-2");
(11) That aside from the foregoing circumstances, the following militate
against custody of Maria Teresa in favor of Edita Araneta:
a. Agustin F. Reyes is the child's godfather/baptismal
sponsor;
b. Agustin F. Reyes and Edita Araneta have left the
Roman Catholic Church and have embraced a
protestant sect (Please see Annex "A-2" hereof, which
lists the occupation of Agustin F. Reyes as a
seminarian);
(12) That Maria Teresa is almost nine (9) years old, born and reared
under the Roman Catholic faith, impressionable, and should not be
exposed to an environment alien to the Catholic way of life, which is the
upbringing and training petitioner, as her father is committed to;
(13) That petitioner is executing this affidavit for all legal purposes. (Pp.
81-82 of Record)
Upon the other hand, private respondent affirms in her affidavit Annex "A" aforementioned
that:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Since the birth of Maria Teresa, she has always lived with affiant, her
mother, who has reared and brought up the child to the best of her
ability. Affiant has not in any way spoken ill of nor turned the child
against her father, herein petitioner;
7. In fact, it was affiant who was always insistent that petitioner have
custody of Maria Teresa every week end and half of summer and
Christmas vacation so that the child could establish a healthy and viable
relationship with her father, herein petitioner;
8. This was especially so when affiant noticed that petitioner's parents
showed more interest in the child than petitioner; since it was
petitioner's parents who would more often pick up Maria Teresa and
bring her back to and from affiant's home;
9. This fact was even noticed by the child; thus affiant immediately
requested petitioner to spend more time with Maria Teresa;
27
10. From 1972 to 1978, affiant had always exercised full custody of
Maria Teresa. It was affiant who voluntarily gave custody of the child to
petitioner on weekends and half of the summer and Christmas
vacations. In view of this amicable arrangement, no specific terms were
agreed and stipulated upon by affiant and petitioner regarding custody
of the child in their petition for separation of property before the lower
court;
11. From 1972 to September, 1979, affiant and petitioner have always
had a cordial and amicable relationship. Even from 1973 when affiant
started living with her brother-in-law, Agustin F. Reyes at San Lorenzo,
Makati, affiant and petitioner retained a cordial relationship. Petitioner,
since 1973, always knew about affiant's relationship with Agustin F.
Reyes. In fact, petitioner would visit Maria Teresa at affiant's home.
Petitioner was always welcome to pick up Maria Teresa at any time.
12. When petitioner left for Australia in 1974 for a period of one year,
petitioner left Maria Teresa to stay with affiant at San Lorenzo. During
this time, Maria Teresa was always allowed to visit with and to be picked
up at any time by petitioner's parents;
13. Petitioner, his family, affiants family (Mr. and Mrs. Teodoro Araneta),
affiant's relatives and friends, since 1973, have long known of and
accepted the circumstances involving private respondent and Agustin F.
Reyes;
14. Affiant admits that her present circumstances at first impression
might seem socially if not morally unacceptable; but in reality this is not
so. Maria Teresa has been reared and brought up in an atmosphere of
Christian love, affection and honesty to the import of the situation.
Further, the quality and capacity of affiant of being a good mother has
always remained; (Pars. 6 to 14 of Annex "A" of Record)
It is axiomatic in Our jurisprudence that in controversies regarding the custody of minors
the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of
the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parents. Never has this Court diverted from that criterion.
With this premise in view, the Court finds no difficulty in this case in seeing that it is in the
best interest of the child Teresa to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to say
immoral influence, that the situation in which private respondent has placed herself, as
admitted by her, might create in the moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now in her
formative and most impressionable stage in her life. The fact, that petitioner might have
been tolerant about her stay with her mother in the past when she was still too young to
distinguish between right and wrong and have her own correct impressions or notions
about the unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the
husband of her sister's mother, is hardly of any consequence now that she has reached a
perilous stage in her life. No respectable father, properly concerned with the moral well-

being of his child, specially a girl, can be expected to have a different attitude than
petitioner's in this case. Under the circumstances thus shown in the record, the Court finds
no alternative than to grant private respondent no more than visitorial rights over the child
in question. Anyway, decisions even of this Supreme Court on the custody of minor children
are always open to adjustment as the circumstances relevant to the matter may demand in
the light of the inflexible criterion We have mentioned above. We deem it a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent judge to have acted precipitably in issuing his order of
December 28, 1979 here in question.
As to the issue of jurisdiction, that is, whether or not, after the decision on separation of
properties had become final, the matter of the custody of the child should be the subject of
a separate proceeding under Rule 99. We are inclined to agree with respondents that,
considering that in the decision on the separation of properties mention is made of support
for the child, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, and since under Sec- tion 6 of Rule 99,
the matter of the custody of children of separated spouses may be brought before the Court
of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the respondent
court had jurisdiction to decide the question of custody here. And as regards the
petitioner's claim of denial of hearing and due process before the issuance by respondent
judge of his order of December 28, 1979, We find that-petitioner was given sufficient time
and opportunity to be heard, as, in fact, he filed his written opposition. With the facts in
this case practically uncontroverted, We do not see the need for the calling of witnesses
and the hearing of testimony in open court.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge is hereby set aside, the restraining order
heretofore issued is made permanent and the parties are ordered to submit to this Court
within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof their own agreement as to the visitorial rights
of private respondent, otherwise, the Court will take it upon itself to fix the terms and
conditions thereof. No costs.
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur
[G.R. No. 122906. February 7, 2002]
DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR
DAGUIMOL, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of two (2)
Resolutions dated August 29, 1995 and November 29, 1995 issued by the former Second
28
Division[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35971. The first resolution modified the
appellate courts decision promulgated in the said case, and granted custody of the minor,
Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, to private respondent. The second resolution denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent facts are:
On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth [2] to Gardin Faith
Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V.
Daguimol. Petitioner was then a nursing student while private respondent was a licensed
physician. They cohabited for a time and lived with private respondents parents and sister
in the latters house in Quezon City where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition
to the family.
A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America
where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father
(private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents.
On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin
Faith, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053, in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On March 9, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as
legal guardian of the minor, Gardin Faith.
Petitioner avers that she learned of the judgment of the trial court rendered in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-92-11053 only on April 1, 1992. Accordingly, on May 27, 1992, she filed a
petition for relief from judgment. In a resolution dated September 15, 1992, the trial court
set aside its original judgment and allowed petitioner to file her opposition to private
respondents petition. The latter, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration.In a related
incident, petitioner filed on October 4, 1993, a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to
her.
On November 18, 1994, the trial court issued a resolution denying private
respondents motion for reconsideration and granting petitioners motion for custody of
their child, Gardin. Petitioner moved for immediate execution of the said resolution.
Due to the adverse turn of events, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35971, questioning the actuations
of the trial court. On March 21, 1995, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the
ground of lack of merit. However, after private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court issued a Resolution [3] dated August 29, 1995 modifying
its decision, as follows:
Although We do find the Petition dismissible, insofar as it assails the September 15, 1993
V. Resolution of the respondent Court, giving due course to private respondents Petition for
Relief from Judgment, and the November 18, 1995 Resolution denying his Motion for
Reconsideration, We discern a good ground to let physical custody of subject child, Gardin
Faith Belarde Tonog, continue under the petitioner, with whom the said child had been
living, since birth.
While it is understandable for private respondent, as mother, to assert and seek
enforcement of her legal and natural rights as the natural guardian of her child, the
emotional and psychological effects upon the latter of a change in custody should be

considered. To be sure, transfer of custody of the child from petitioner to private
respondent will be painful for the child who, all her life, has been in the company of
petitioner and her paternal grandparents.
Now, inasmuch as the issue of guardianship and custody over the same child is still pending
determination before the respondent Court, the possibility of petitioners appointment as
the guardian cannot be discounted. It would certainly wreak havoc on the childs
psychological make-up to give her to the custody of private respondent, only to return her
to petitioner should the latter prevail in the main case. Subjecting the child to emotional
seesaw should be avoided. It is thus more prudent to let physical custody of the child in
question be with petitioner until the matter of her custody shall have been determined by
final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Decision, promulgated here on March 21, 1995 is accordingly MODIFIED,
and status quo with respect to the physical custody of the child, Gardin Faith Belarde
Tonog, is ordered. It is understood that the latter shall remain with petitioner until
otherwise adjudged.
Petitioner thus interposed the instant appeal after the appellate court denied her
motion for reconsideration in its Resolution [4] dated November 29, 1995.
Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a
matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon
her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin Faith cannot be separated from
her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven. Employing simple arithmetic
however, it appears that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and
well-being of the child.[5] In arriving at its decision as to whom custody of the minor should
be given, the court must take into account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parents.[6]
In turn, the parents right to custody over their children is enshrined in law. Article
220 of the Family Code thus provides that parents and individuals exercising parental
authority over their unemancipated children are entitled, among other rights, to keep them
in their company. In legal contemplation, the true nature of the parent-child relationship
encompasses much more than the implication of ascendancy of one and obedience by the
other. We explained this in Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals: [7]
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental
authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution
whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children
to the extent required by the latters needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the
law grants to parents for the purpose of the childrens physical preservation and
development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart
and senses. As regards parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no complex of
rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority,
29
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When
a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.
Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar
as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that
illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article
213 of the Family Code provides that [n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. It will be
observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is
specially evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother
is the best custodian. As explained by the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has
seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is
deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for
compelling reasons for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the
mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty
of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient
punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who
is as yet unable to understand her situation.[8]
This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in the
upbringing of their children. Indeed, we have recognized that both parents complement
each other in giving nurture and providing that holistic care which takes into account the
physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. [9] Neither
does the law nor jurisprudence intend to downplay a fathers sense of loss when he is
separated from his child:
While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent,
whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One
cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so
much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child
which is the paramount consideration.[10]
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is
below seven years of age for compelling reasons. Instances of unsuitability are neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. [11] If older
than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound
by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the childs preference
should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to
the other parent, or even to a third person. [12]
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor,
Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court

have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have
final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the
controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father
(private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over
her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and
thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had
apparently formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be
properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. [13] It should be
recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are
not in the best position to assess the parties respective merits vis--vis their opposing claims
for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin
Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and
opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her
person.
A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a
preference toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of the
minor, Gardin Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a statement against petitioners
fitness to have final custody of her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood that, for
the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should
remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial
court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The trial court is directed to
immediately proceed with hearing Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this
decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Buena, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., abroad, on official leave.
G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA
JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON, petitioner,
vs.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
30
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002
resolution1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing
the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance.
The dispositive portion2 read:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds
that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and
b) the petition is not sufficient in substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in
the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent
gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She
wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the
freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country,
respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the
househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her
carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter
Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing
Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City
but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan.
Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their
daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara,
Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification 3 that respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills showing
calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces.
Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals
which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave
family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly
repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas
Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1,
RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction
finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.

In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. – The Family Courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus
in relation to the latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar
as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor
cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did, because there is no other
meaning of the word "exclusive" than to constitute the Family Court as the sole
court which can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also
possesses the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not
exclusive but concurrent – and such an interpretation is contrary to the simple
and clear wording of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for
habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the
service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by just moving out of the region
over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction.
That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a law
conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is
demanded by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court
– or any court for that matter – to determine. The enactment of a law on
jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is a
perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the courts but
only from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in
RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC,
effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a
petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court, 4 Court of Appeals, or with
any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines.5
The petition is granted.
31
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369
that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of
minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since,
by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers
intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo,
the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be construed any other way.
We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving
individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children.
Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be
helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable
only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from
one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus
case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the
intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed
by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to "protect
the rights and promote the welfare of children." The creation of the Family Court
is geared towards addressing three major issues regarding children’s welfare
cases, as expressed by the legislators during the deliberations for the law. The
legislative intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction
over such cases was to avoid further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure
greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the case and the
parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case
remains protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule
therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the
Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas
corpus involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient
will not result in one of the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the
welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus
proceedings will not result in disruption of the child’s privacy and emotional
well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the
evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the child’s welfare and well being will
be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive" as not foreclosing
resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs.
Philex Mining Corporation,6 the heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were
allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.

We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it
supports petitioner’s submission that the word "exclusive" in the Family Courts
Act of 1997 may not connote automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other
courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same manner that the
remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can
issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction.
On the other hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement
of the writ cannot be determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue
the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule
102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or
any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of
Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if
so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be
made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a
Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on
the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge
thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself,
enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioner’s "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the
regular courts for damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it was merely
applying and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the well-established
rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law:
"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the
law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the
letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the
Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an
exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates
of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than
one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected
in the language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to
absurdity, injustice or contradiction. 7 In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word
"exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and
promote the welfare of children" 8 under the Constitution and the United Nations
32
Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities
and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must
surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is
expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus
interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord
with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is
that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the
subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be
resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to
harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject." 9
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of
minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are
absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of
minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP
129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No.
03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ
of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court.
The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court
belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or
with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere
in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any
regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor
may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of
minors is involved.
 33

One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country
is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground
for dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General: 10 FRANCISCA R. MADRIAN,

Respondent. Promulgated:
That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country"
does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task
July 12, 2007
is no more different from or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting
a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the
Philippines.
x------------------------------------------x
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-
SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth
Division.

SO ORDERED.
DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When a family breaks up, the children are always the victims. The ensuing battle
for custody of the minor children is not only a thorny issue but also a highly sensitive and
heart-rending affair. Such is the case here. Even the usually technical subject of jurisdiction
became emotionally charged.

Petitioner Felipe N. Madrian and respondent Francisca R. Madrian were married on July 7,
1993 in Paraaque City. They resided in San Agustin Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Paraaque City.
FELIPE N. MADRIAN, G.R. No. 159374

Petitioner,
Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, born on
Present: January 30, 1994; Phillip, born on November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, born on May 12,
1998 and Krizia Ann, born on December 12, 2000.

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,* took their three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between
- v e r s u s - CORONA, her and petitioner to no avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in
their barangay but this too proved futile.
AZCUNA and

GARCIA,** JJ.
 34

Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis
Angelo in the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioners act of leaving the conjugal dwelling
and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition
deprived them of their mothers care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts
produce their sons before the court and to explain why they should not be returned to her under RA 8369. He invokes Section 5(b) of RA 8369:
custody.

Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September 17, 2002. They initially
agreed that petitioner would return the custody of their three sons to respondent. Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. The Family Courts
Petitioner, however, had a change of heart[1] and decided to file a memorandum. shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases:

On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum [2] alleging that respondent was
unfit to take custody of their three sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently went xxxxxxxxx
home late at night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer
house and neglected her duties as a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May
18, 2002, it was respondent who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then that
he went to Sta. Rosa, Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver. He submitted a b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas
certification from the principal of the Dila Elementary School in Sta. Rosa, Laguna that corpus in relation to the latter;
Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there. He also questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the Family
Courts Act of 1997) family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.[3] xxxxxxxxx

For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18,
2002 but was driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an
alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioners alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his
mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of violence against her and their children. The
situation was aggravated by the fact that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws
who frequently meddled in their personal problems. [4]
Petitioner is wrong.
In Thornton v. Thornton,[7] this Court resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals jurisdiction
to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the
provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such
petitions:

On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals [5] rendered a decision[6] asserting its
authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family
Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo who were at
that time aged six and four, respectively, subject to the visitation rights of petitioner. With
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case
respect to Ronnick who was then eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be
since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to
determined by the proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under
issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

xxxxxxxxx
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was
denied. Hence, this recourse.

We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
xxxxxxxxx
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to
revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to
issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further,
it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely incompatible
since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the
custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in
harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody
of minors is at issue.[8] (emphases supplied)
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further
affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors:
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been
settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas
corpus. A verified petition for a writ of habeas
corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed
with the Family Court. The writ shall be
enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs.
xxxxxxxxx
35
The petition may likewise be filed with
the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any
of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall
be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The
writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or
to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found for hearing and decision on the merits.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with
family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors
is involved.[9] (emphases supplied)
We note that after petitioner moved out of their Paraaque residence on May 18, 2002, he
twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. This situation
is what the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369s provision on jurisdiction precisely
addressed:
[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended them to be the sole
courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus] will result in an
iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like [respondent] without legal
recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not
know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be
helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs
are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus,
if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which
seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case
will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not
have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed [RA
8369].[10]
Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts
are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not inhabeas corpus cases.
Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b)
of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedythat may be availed of in conjunction with a
petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the
issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending before the family court.
The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting
decisions, interference by a co-equal court and judicial instability.

The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial
officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may
be employed by such court or officer. [11] Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all other courts, including related incidents
and ancillary matters.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002]
ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS,
GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals as well
as the resolution denying reconsideration, holding petitioner liable for damages arising
from an accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit
the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
36
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William
Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his
parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St.
Marys Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its
decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the following
manner:
1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William
Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following sums of money:
a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss of
life of Sherwin S. Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages
incurred by plaintiffs for burial and related expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorneys fees;
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral
damages; and to pay costs.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are
hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated in the event of
insolvency of principal obligor St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City;
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort and
who was under special parental authority of defendant St. Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED
from paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged against defendants St. Marys
Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents;
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not
being in order as earlier discussed in this decision, is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206).
From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St.
Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-
1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin

Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin,
along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant
Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The
jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same
school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep
turned turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. [2]
In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals.[3]
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the
actual damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto.[4]
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys Academy filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion.[5]
Hence, this appeal.[6]
The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages
against the petitioner.
The Courts Ruling
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 [7] and 219[8] of the Family Code, pointing out that
petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher
accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental
authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the
school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged
in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized
activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus,
such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the
pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its
teachers.[9]
37
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those
exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their
supervision, instruction, or custody.[10]
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. [11]
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the
injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done;
the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it
consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. [12]
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva
admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was
not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio
Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased
Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator
who stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide
that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of
James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that
those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel
II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was
driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of
the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver
or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the
minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened
 38

the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.

The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. [13]

Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which
petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the
accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral
damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. [14] In this case,
the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of
the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos
must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorneys fees as part of damages is the exception
rather than the rule. [15] The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208
of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification. [16] Thus, the grant of
attorneys fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was
respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that
the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle
was being driven on the highways or streets. [17] Hence, with the overwhelming evidence
presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred
because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but
the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death
of Sherwin Carpitanos.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals[18] and that of the trial court. [19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for
determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys
Academy, Dipolog City.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA, respondents-
appellees.
ROMERO, J.:
In this petition for review, we are asked to overturn the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 granting custody of six-year old Leouel Santos, Jr. to his maternal grandparents
and not to his father, Santos, Sr. What is sought is a decision which should definitively settle
the matter of the care, custody and control of the boy.
Happily, unlike King Solomon, we need not merely rely on a "wise and understanding
heart," for there is man's law to guide us and that is, the Family Code.
The antecedent facts giving rise to the case at bench are as follows:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession,
were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who
was born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had
been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
39
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's
parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital
bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do
so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work.
Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in
the United States proved futile. Private respondents claim that although abroad, their
daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through
deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him
away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward
Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as
respondent. 2
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same
day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and
Ofelia Bedia. 3
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. 4 In its decision dated April 30,
1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's
order. 5 His motion for reconsideration having been denied, 6 petitioner now brings the
instant petition for review for a reversal of the appellate court's decision.
The Court of Appeals erred, according to petitioner, in awarding custody of the boy to his
grandparents and not to himself. He contends that since private respondents have failed to
show that petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable father, substitute parental authority granted
to the boy's grandparents under Art. 214 of the Family Code is inappropriate.
Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by the private respondents in having custody
over the boy, are flimsy and insufficient to deprive him of his natural and legal right to have
custody.
On the other hand, private respondents aver that they can provide an air-conditioned room
for the boy and that petitioner would not be in a position to take care of his son since he
has to be assigned to different places. They also allege that the petitioner did not give a
single centavo for the boy's support and maintenance. When the boy was about to be
released from the hospital, they were the ones who paid the fees because their daughter
and petitioner had no money. Besides, Julia Bedia Santos, their daughter, had entrusted the
boy to them before she left for the United States. Furthermore, petitioner's use of trickery
and deceit in abducting the child in 1990, after being hospitably treated by private
respondents, does not speak well of his fitness and suitability as a parent.

The Bedias argue that although the law recognizes the right of a parent to his child's
custody, ultimately the primary consideration is what is best for the happiness and welfare
of the latter. As maternal grandparents who have amply demonstrated their love and
affection for the boy since his infancy, they claim to be in the best position to promote the
child's welfare.
The issue to be resolved here boils down to who should properly be awarded custody of
the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority.
Parental authority orpatria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby
parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the
extent required by the latter' s needs. 7 It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law
grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and development,
as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. 8 As
regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of
duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor." 9
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. 10 The right attached to parental authority,
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution. 11 When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not
constitute a renunciation of parental authority. 12 Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same. 13
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-
bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company. 14 The child's welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions
concerning his care and custody. 15
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their
common children. 16 In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall
continue exercising parental authority. 17 Only in case of the parents' death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. 18The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother of the
minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is
present. Not only are they physically apart but are also emotionally separated. There has
been no decree of legal separation and petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of the
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has failed. 19
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award
custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under
Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper
only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to
him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents.
40
The Court of Appeals held that although there is no evidence to show that petitioner
(Santos Sr.) is "depraved, a habitual drunkard or poor, he may nevertheless be considered,
as he is in fact so considered, to be unsuitable to be allowed to have custody of minor
Leouel Santos Jr." 20
The respondent appellate court, in affirming the trial court's order of October 8, 1990,
adopted as its own the latter's observations, to wit:
From the evidence adduced, this Court is of the opinion that it is to be
(sic) best interest of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr. that he be placed under
the care, custody, and control of his maternal grandparents the
petitioners herein. The petitioners have amply demonstrated their love
and devotion to their grandson while the natural father, respondent
herein, has shown little interest in his welfare as reflected by his
conduct in the past. Moreover the fact that petitioners are well-off
financially, should be carefully considered in awarding to them the
custody of the minor herein, lest the breaking of such ties with his
maternal grandparents might deprive the boy of an eventual college
education and other material advantages (Consaul vs. Consaul, 63 N.Y.S.
688). Respondent had never given any previous financial support to his
son, while, upon the other hand, the latter receives so much bounty from
his maternal grandparents and his mother as well, who is now gainfully
employed in the United States. Moreover, the fact that respondent, as a
military personnel who has to shuttle from one assignment to another,
and, in these troubled times, may have pressing and compelling military
duties which may prevent him from attending to his son at times when
the latter needs him most, militates strongly against said respondent.
Additionally, the child is sickly and asthmatic and needs the loving and
tender care of those who can provide for it. 21
We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental
authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.,
particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private
respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate
father is still preferred over the grandparents. 22 The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor,
particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position
to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor
son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without
permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the
child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the
severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded
as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance
the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love
for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in
uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are
still the natural guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority,
 41

care and custody over their children merely because of the normal consequences of their
duties and assignments, such as temporary separation from their families.

Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.

Private respondents' attachment to the young boy whom they have reared for the past
three years is understandable. Still and all, the law considers the natural love of a parent to
outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be
unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a fact
which has not been proven here.

The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by private respondents as grandparents
should not be seen as incompatible with petitioner' right to custody over the child as a
father. Moreover, who is to say whether the petitioner's financial standing may improve in
the future?

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
dated April 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution dated November 13, 1992 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody over the minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to his
legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132223 June 19, 2001
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner,
vs.
HELEN G. BELMES, respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
45650, "In the Matter of Guardianship of Minors Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil –
Bonifacia P. Vancil, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Helen G. Belmes, Oppositor-Appellant,"
promulgated on July 29, 1997, and its Resolution dated December 18, 1997 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the said Decision.
The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals in its Decision are:
"Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman
of the United States of America who died in the said country on December 22,
1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent
by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
"Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of
minors Valerie and Vincent docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the
time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is
claimed in the petition that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and
have an estate consisting of proceeds from their father’s death pension benefits
with a probable value of P100,000.00.
"Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for hearing after a
3-consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar Daily.
"On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.
42
"On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted
an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had
already filed a similar petition for guardianship under Special Proceedings No.
2819 before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.
"Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a
motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting
that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental
authority over the subject minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur
where they are permanently residing; that the petition was filed under an
improper venue; and that at the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a
resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized
American citizen.
"On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied
Belmes’ motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie
and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office
and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of
P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for a reconsideration was likewise
dismissed in an Order dated November 24, 1988." 1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the RTC order of
October 12, 1988 and dismissing Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB.
The Court of Appeals held:
"Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers parents, the father,
or in the absence, the mother, as natural guardian of her minor children. The law
on parental authority under the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the New Family
Code, (Article 225 of the Family Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements.
Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court confirms the designation of the
parents as ipso facto guardian of their minor children without need of a court
appointment and only for good reason may another person be named. Ironically,
for the petitioner, there is nothing on record of any reason at all why Helen
Belmes, the biological mother, should be deprived of her legal rights as natural
guardian of her minor children. To give away such privilege from Helen would be
an abdication and grave violation of the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law
and the constitution on family solidarity." 2
On March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present petition, raising the
following "legal points":
"1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential right of a
parent to be appointed guardian over the persons and estate of the minors is
absolute, contrary to existing jurisprudence.
"2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Oppositor Helen G. Belmes,
the biological mother, should be appointed the guardian of the minors despite the

undisputed proof that under her custody, her daughter minor Valerie Vancil was
raped seven times by Oppositor’s live-in partner.
"3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely erred when it disqualified
petitioner Bonifacia P. Vancil to be appointed as judicial guardian over the
persons and estate of subject minors despite the fact that she has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications as judicial guardian, merely on the
basis of her U.S. citizenship which is clearly not a statutory requirement to
become guardian."
At the outset, let it be stressed that in her "Manifestation/Motion," dated September 15,
1998, respondent Helen Belmes stated that her daughter Valerie turned eighteen on
September 2, 1998 as shown by her Birth Certificate. 3 Respondent thus prayed that this
case be dismissed with respect to Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of
guardianship proceedings. The said "Manifestation/Motion" was noted by this Court in its
Resolution dated November 11, 1998.
Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has become moot with
respect to her. Thus, only the first and third "legal points" raised by petitioner should be
resolved.
The basic issue for our resolution is who between the mother and grandmother of minor
Vincent should be his guardian.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural mother
of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling
finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides:
"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over
the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s
decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding
natural and legal right to his custody. In Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals,4 this Court held:
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right
of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights
incident to parenthood,’ a right supported by law and sound public policy. The
right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the
courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship."
Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.
Petitioner’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute
parental authoritypursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:
43
"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute
parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,5 this Court ruled:
"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons
of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent
present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents’
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by
the surviving grandparent."
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in
case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very
much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has
to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability.
Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not
suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally
unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondent’s) live-in partner raped
Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this
guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a
resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and
obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of
discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely
delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.
Moreover, we observe that respondent’s allegation that petitioner has not set foot in the
Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides, petitioner’s old age and
her conviction of libel by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No.
CBU-168846 filed by one Danilo R. Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here.
Indeed, her coming back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for
only two years is not certain.
Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians who
are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the
wards. In Guerrero vs. Teran,7 this Court held:
"Donñ a Maria Munñ oz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory
that her appointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine
Islands. There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents
only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there
are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the
responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate,
etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not
 44

consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are

not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here."
This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification in the sense
that Valerie, who has attained the age of majority, will no longer be under the guardianship petition challenges the 11 June 2004 Decision [2] and 5 January 2005 Resolution[3] of
of respondent Helen Belmes.

Costs against petitioner. the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77751. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 9

SO ORDERED. December 2002[4] and 21 April 2003 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),

Judicial Region 4, Branch 72, Antipolo City, in Special Proceeding Case No. 02-1128.
NOEL B. BAGTAS, G.R. No. 166682
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, The Facts
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
BRION,
HON. RUTH C. SANTOS,Presiding Judge DEL CASTILLO, and
of Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, ABAD, JJ.
Antipolo City,
andANTONIO and ROSITA GALLARDO, Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo (Spouses Gallardo) are the parents of Maricel S. Gallardo
Respondents.
Promulgated:
(Maricel). Two weeks after graduating from high school in April 2000, Maricel ran away to
November 27, 2009
live with her boyfriend. Maricel became pregnant and gave birth to Maryl Joy S. Gallardo
x--------------------------------------------------x
(Maryl Joy). Maricels boyfriend left her.

In February 2002, Maricel returned to her parents. On the same day, Maricel ran away
DECISION again and lived with Noel B. Bagtas (Bagtas) and Lydia B. Sioson (Sioson) at Ma. Corazon,
Unirock, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City. Maricel went to Negros Occidental and left
Maryl Joy in the custody of Bagtas and Sioson. In a letter[5] dated 5 February 2001, Maricel
relinquished her rights over Maryl Joy to Bagtas and his wife. She stated:

CARPIO, J.:
Ako po si Maricel S. Gallardo 18 taong gulang ay kusang ipinagkaloob
ang aking anak sa pagkadalaga sa mag-asawang Noel B.
Bagtas at Neneth A. Bagtas sa kadahilanan pong itinakwil ako ng sarili
kong mga magulang at hindi ko po kayang buhayin at dahil po sa
The Case tinakbuhan ako ng aking boyfriend kaya wala na pong ibang paraan
para ako makabangon o makapagsimula ng panibagong buhay kaya para
mabigyan ng magandang buhay ang aking anak inisip ko po na ito na
ang pinaka madaling paraan para po sa pagbabago ng aking buhay.
 45

Kaya mula sa araw na ito ay wala na akong karapatan sa aking anak. Sila
ang tatayo bilang magulang ng aking anak.

On 29 September 2002, Bagtas and Sioson learned that Rosita S. Gallardo brought

Maryl Joy to Samar. In their motion[10] dated 30 September 2002, Bagtas and Sioson

In April 2002, the Spouses Gallardo tried to obtain the custody of Maryl Joy from prayed that the Spouses Gallardo be directed to produce Maryl Joy before the RTC,

Bagtas and Sioson. Bagtas and Sioson refused. Unable to settle the matter, the that they be directed to explain why they violated the RTCs 13 September 2002

Spouses Gallardo filed with the RTC a petition [6] for habeas corpus. Order, and that they be cited in contempt. In their motion[11] to dismiss dated 11
In its Order[7] dated 10 July 2002, the RTC issued a writ of habeas[8] corpus directing
the deputy sheriff to produce Maryl Joy before it and to summon Bagtas and Sioson
to explain why they were withholding the custody of Maryl Joy. October 2002, Bagtas and Sioson prayed that the Spouses Gallardos action be

dismissed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court. Section 3 states that

The Spouses Gallardo, Bagtas and Sioson entered into a compromise agreement. In If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails x x x to comply with x x x any order of the

its Order[9] dated 13 September 2002, the RTC stated: court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the

courts own motion. Bagtas and Sioson claimed that the Spouses Gallardo failed to
In todays hearing, both parties appeared with their respective
counsels and have agreed on the following:
comply with the RTCs 13 September 2002 Order.
1. that the child should be placed in custody of the
petitioners on Friday, Saturday and Sunday;

2. that the child should be returned to the respondents

by the petitioners on Sunday at 8:00 oclock in the evening In its Order[12] dated 15 October 2002, the RTC cited the Spouses Gallardo in
subject to visitorial rights of the petitioners anytime of the
day; and
contempt, fined them P500, and ordered them to produce Maryl Joy before the trial
3. that the child can be brought by the respondents to
Valenzuela but should be returned to the petitioners on
Friday morning. court.

The above agreement shall take effect today and parties are ordered to
comply strictly with the said agreement under pain of contempt in case
of violation thereof.
The RTCs Ruling

In its Order[13] dated 9 December 2002, the RTC dismissed the action for having
become moot. The RTC stated:
In this petition, the prayer of the petitioners is to produce the person of
Meryl [sic] Joy S. Gallardo before this court to be turned over to herein
petitioners who are the maternal [grandparents] of said minor.
Since the person subject of the petition has already produced [sic] to this court and
has been turned over to the petitioners, the issue on the petition for habeas corpus
is now moot and academic without prejudice to the filing of the proper action to
determine as to the rightful custody over the minor child.
In view thereof, x x x the Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted but without prejudice on the
petitioners to file proper action for custody of the minor. (Emphasis supplied)
In their motion[14] for reconsideration dated 27 December 2002, Bagtas and Sioson alleged
that the ground for the dismissal of the action was erroneous. The action should have been
dismissed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court. They prayed that Maryl Joy
be returned to them to preserve the status quo ante. Bagtas and Sioson stated:
5. Thus, the Honorable Court very clearly issued a conflicting
Order because It has cited the [Spouses Gallardo] in contempt of
court for violating the previous September 13, 2002 Order that the
child should be returned to the respondents in the evening of
September 29, 2002 (Sunday), and yet the Honorable Court has
dismissed the petition for being moot and academic. This is in effect
giving premium to the act of the petitioners of not turning over the
child to respondents on September 29, 2002. Likewise, this is
tantamount to rewarding them for not producing the child in court
in violation of the aforesaid September 13, 2002 Order;
46
6. Moreover, the Honorable Court has issued an unreasonable
Order by stating that the dismissal of the instant case is without
prejudice to the filing of the proper action for custody of the minor
by the petitioners. Why would the petitioners still file the proper
action for custody if they now have the custody of the minor?
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed that the December 9, 2002 Order of the Honorable Court be
partially reconsidered so that the dismissal of the case will not be based
on the ground of being moot and academic but based on failure to
comply with the September 13, 2002 pursuant [sic] to Section 3, Rule 17
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and that petitioners be
consequently directed to return the person subject of the petition to the
respondents to preserve the status quo ante.
In its Order[15] dated 21 April 2003, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. The
RTC held that the sole purpose of the petition for habeas corpus was the production of
Maryl Joy and that the Spouses Gallardo exercised substitute parental authority over Maryl
Joy. The RTC stated that:
The allegations in the Petition show that the sole purpose
for the filing of the Petition is to cause the production before the
Court of the person of minor Meryl [sic] Joy S. Gallardo, not a
determination of the legality or illegality of respondents custody of
the child, petitioners being aware of the fact that the child was left by
their (petitioners) daughter to [sic] the custody of the respondents, as
stated in par. no. 10 of the Petition.
The instant Petition is therefore, essentially not a petition for Habeas Corpus as
contemplated in Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court which is resorted to in all cases of illegal
confinement by which any person is deprived of his liberty (Cruz vs. CA, 322 SCRA 518),
but is resorted to also where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto as contemplated in Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court. In order that the
special remedy of Habeas Corpus maybe [sic] invoked, it is necessary that there should be
an actual and effective restraint or deprivation of liberty. A nominal or moral restraint is
not sufficient (Gonzales vs. Viola, et al., 61 Phil 824).

Since therefore, the purpose of the instant Petition has already been served, as the
child has been produced and delivered to the petitioners, the instant Petition
logically has become moot and academic. Petitioners are, under the law (Art. 214,
Family Code), authorized to exercise substitute parental authority over the child in
case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, the entitlement to the legal
custody of the child being necessarily included therein to make possible and/or
enable the petitioners to discharge their duties as substitute parents.
There is no inconsistency between the Order dated December 9, 2002 sought to be
reconsidered, and the Order dated October 15, 2002, as the latter was issued pursuant to
an incident, an interlocutory matter, that is, the failure of the petitioners to comply with the
agreement reached between the parties in open court on September 13, 2002. The said
Order dated October 15, 2002 is not a resolution of the case in the main, as it did not
terminate the case. The Order dated December 9, 2002, on the other hand, terminated the
case, and considering that the dismissal of the case was unqualified, the same amounted to
an adjudication on the merits pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court
Procedure, therefore, the agreement earlier entered by and between the herein parties is
deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
Bagtas filed with the Court of Appeals a petition [16] for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. Bagtas alleged that (1) the RTC erred when it ruled that the sole
purpose of the 1 August 2002 petition was the production of Maryl Joy before the trial
court, (2) the RTC erred when it ruled that the petition was essentially not a petition for
Habeas Corpus as contemplated in Rule 102, (3) the RTC erred when it ruled that there
must be actual and effective deprivation of liberty, (4) the RTC erred when it ruled that the
action had become moot, (5) the RTC erred when it ruled that the Spouses Gallardo had
substitute parental authority over Maryl Joy, and (6) the RTC erred when it ruled that there
was no inconsistency between the 15 October and 9 December 2002 Orders.
47
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In its Decision dated 11 June 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
affirmed the 9 December 2002 and 23 April 2003 Orders of the RTC. The Court of Appeals
held that:
In the second part of [Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court], x x x
habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Accordingly, the
writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable herein private
respondents to regain the custody of their minor grand daughter Maryl
Joy who was admittedly left by her natural mother in the care of
petitioner and Lydia Sioson.
Significantly, in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal or involuntary
restraint is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ of habeas corpus as a
remedy; rather, the writ is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody
of a child. By dismissing the petition a quo, the trial court in effect upheld private
respondents right of custody over the minor involved as against that of petitioner.
While it cannot be gainsaid that private respondents obtained initial
custody of the minor in violation of a valid court order, we nonetheless
sustain the judgment a quo dismissing the petition and validating such
rightful custody over Maryl Joy. This is because private respondents are
the grandparents of Maryl Joy, hence, lawfully authorized to exercise
substitute parental authority over her in the absence of her
parents. What is more, in awarding custody to private respondents, the
best welfare of the child was taken into consideration inasmuch as, per
report of the Court Social Worker, the implementation of the parties
agreement would cause more psychological damage and traumatic
experience to Maryl Joy. To our mind, therefore, the violation of a court
order pales in significance when considered alongside the best interest
of the minor whose welfare requires that she be in the custody of her
grandparents rather than petitioners. x x x
Under the factual and legal milieux of the case, there is no question that
as grandparents of the minor, Maryl Joy, private respondents have a far
superior right of custody over her than petitioner. [17]
The Issues

In his petition dated 1 February 2005, Bagtas raised as issues that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN NOT FINDING THAT TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
FINDING THAT THE ALLEGATION IN THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS SHOW THAT THE SOLE PURPOSE FOR THE FILING THEREOF
IS TO CAUSE THE PRODUCTION BEFORE THE COURT OF THE PERSON
IN WHOSE FAVOR IT WAS FILED.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT WITH THE DELIVERY OF THE CHILD FOR
WHOM THE PETITION WAS FILED, THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS HAS BECOME
MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
The Courts Ruling
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the RTCs 9 December 2002 and 21 April 2003
Orders. In its Orders, the RTC ruled that, since the sole purpose of the petition for habeas
corpus was the production of Maryl Joy before the trial court, the action became moot
when Maryl Joy was produced. The Court disagrees.
Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court states that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend
to all cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the persons entitled
thereto. In cases involving minors, the purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not
limited to the production of the child before the court. The main purpose of the petition for
habeas corpus is to determine who has the rightful custody over the child. In Tijing v. Court
of Appeals,[18] the Court held that:
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
48
thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain
the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases
involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of
liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a
remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the
right of custody over a child. (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action for having become moot after Maryl Joy
was produced before the trial court. It should have conducted a trial to determine who had
the rightful custody over Maryl Joy. In dismissing the action, the RTC, in effect, granted the
petition for habeas corpus and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo
without sufficient basis. InLaxamana v. Laxamana,[19] the Court held that:
Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo should have
conducted a trial notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to
submit the case for resolution on the basis,inter alia, of the psychiatric
report of Dr. Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from
questioning the absence of a trial considering that said psychiatric
report, which was the courts primary basis in awarding custody to
respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision. The fundamental
policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of children shall
not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which
involve the family and the youth. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 214 of the Civil Code states that in case of absence or unsuitability of the parents,
substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. Article 216
states that in default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the surviving

grandparent shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child. Accordingly, in its
21 April 2003 Order, the RTC held that:
Petitioners are, under the law (Art. 214, Family Code), authorized to
exercise substitute parental authority over the child in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of the parents, the entitlement to the legal
custody of the child being necessarily included therein to make possible
and/or enable the petitioners to discharge their duties as substitute
parents.[20]
In its 11 June 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals held that:
While it cannot be gainsaid that private respondents obtained initial
custody of the minor in violation of a valid court order, we nonetheless
sustain the judgment a quo dismissing the petition and validating such
rightful custody over Maryl Joy. This is because private respondents are
the grandparents of Maryl Joy, hence, lawfully authorized to exercise
substitute parental authority over her in the absence of her parents. [21]
In determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the childs welfare is the most
important consideration. The court is not bound by any legal right of a person over the
child. In Sombong v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court held that:
The controversy does not involve the question of personal freedom,
because an infant is presumed to be in the custody of someone until he
attains majority age. In passing on the writ in a child custody case, the
court deals with a matter of an equitable nature. Not bound by any
mere legal right of parent or guardian, the court gives his or her
claim to the custody of the child due weight as a claim founded on
human nature and considered generally equitable and
just. Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the legal right of the
petitioner to be relieved from unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in
49
the case of adults, but on the courts view of the best interests of those
whose welfare requires that they be in custody of one person or
another. Hence, the court is not bound to deliver a child into the
custody of any claimant or of any person, but should, in the
consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at
the time appears to require. In short, the childs welfare is the
supreme consideration.
Considering that the childs welfare is an all-important factor in custody cases, the Child
and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care
and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration. In the same vein, the Family Code authorizes the courts to, if the
welfare of the child so demands, deprive the parents concerned of parental authority
over the child or adopt such measures as may be proper under the
circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
In Sombong,[23] the Court laid down three requisites in petitions for habeas corpus
involving minors: (1) the petitioner has a right of custody over the minor, (2) the
respondent is withholding the rightful custody over the minor, and (3) the best interest of
the minor demands that he or she be in the custody of the petitioner. In the present case,
these requisites are not clearly established because the RTC hastily dismissed the action
and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo without conducting any trial.
The proceedings before the RTC leave so much to be desired. While a remand of the case
would mean further delay, Maryl Joys best interest demands that proper proceedings be
conducted to determine the fitness of the Spouses Gallardo to take care of her.
WHEREFORE, the Court REMANDS the case to the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 4,
Branch 72, Antipolo City, for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of
the Spouses Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo to have custody of Maryl Joy Gallardo.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO
LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO
AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. ROMULO
CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents.

Jose C. Flores, Jr. for petitioners.
Jovito E. Talabong for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision * of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby affirmed, with the following
modifications: (1) Exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 are hereby
awarded to plaintiffs, in addition to the actual damages of P30,000.00, moral
damages of P20,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00 awarded
to plaintiffs in the decision under appeal; (2) St. Francis High School, represented
by the Spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, and Benjamin Illumin,
are hereby held jointly and severally liable with defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso
de Chaves, Luisito Vinas and Patria Cadis for the payment to plaintiffs of the
abovementioned actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees, and for costs; and (3) Defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones are
hereby absolved from liability, and the case against them, together with their
respective counterclaims, is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (p. 60, Rollo)
The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at
the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class
I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo
Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but
merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he
should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers,
Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of the
female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand,
came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body
was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. He was brought to a certain Dr.
Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel General Hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 8834, in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch LVIII of Lucena City, against the St. Francis High School,
represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its
principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones,
Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages which respondents allegedly incurred from the
death of their 13-year old son, Ferdinand Castillo. Contending that the death of their son
was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of
50
the family in preventing their son's drowning, respondents prayed of actual, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses for litigation.
The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against petitioners-teachers Arquio,
de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly and severally to pay
respondents the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as moral damages,
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. The court a quo reasoned:
Taking into consideration the evidence presented, this Court believes that the
defendant teachers namely: Connie Arquio, Luisito Vinas, Tirso de Chaves, Yoly
Jaro, Nida Aragones and Patria Cadiz had failed to exercise the diligence required
of them by law under the circumstances to guard against the harm they had
foreseen. (pp. 2930, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at
the picnic site, the drowning incident had already occurred, such fact does not
and cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming
late, they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the students. (p. 30,Rollo)
The students, young as they were then (12 to 13 years old), were easily attracted
to the sea without aforethought of the dangers it offers. Yet, the precautions and
reminders allegedly performed by the defendants-teachers definitely fell short of
the standard required by law under the circumstances. While the defendants-
teachers admitted that some parts of the sea where the picnic was held are deep,
the supposed lifeguards of the children did not even actually go to the water to
test the depth of the particular area where the children would swim. And indeed
the fears of the plaintiffs that the picnic area was dangerous was confirmed by the
fact that three persons during the picnic got drowned at the same time. Had the
defendant teachers made an actual and physical observation of the water before
they allowed the students to swim, they could have found out that the area where
the children were swimming was indeed dangerous. And not only that, the male
teachers who according to the female teachers were there to supervise the
children to ensure their safety were not even at the area where the children were
swimming. They were somewhere and as testified to by plaintiffs' witness they
were having a drinking spree. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against the St. Francis High School,
Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna. Said the court a quo:
As shown and adverted to above, this Court cannot find sufficient evidence
showing that the picnic was a school sanctioned one. Similarly no evidence has
been shown to hold defendants Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna
responsible for the death of Ferdinand Castillo together with the other defendant
teachers. It has been sufficiently shown that Benjamin Illumin had himself not
consented to the picnic and in fact he did not join it. On the other hand, defendant
Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to supervise and in fact she was not

amongst those allegedly invited by defendant Connie Arquio to supervise class I-C
to which Ferdinand Castillo belongs. (p. 30, Rollo)
Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondents-spouses
assigned the following errors committed by the trial court:
1. The lower court erred in not declaring the defendant St. Francis High School
and its administrator/principal Benjamin Illumin as equally liable not only for its
approved co-curricular activities but also for those which they unreasonably
failed to exercise control and supervision like the holding of picnic in the
dangerous water of Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.
2. The lower court erred in not declaring the St. Francis High School and principal
Benjamin Illumin as jointly and solidarily liable with their co-defendants-teachers
Rosario Lacandula, et als., for the tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in a picnic at
Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon, last March 20, 1982.
3. The lower court erred in not declaring higher amount for actual and moral
damages for the untimely and tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in favor of
plaintiffs-appellants against all the defendants. (pp. 56-57,Rollo)
The Court of Appeals ruled:
We find plaintiffs-appellants' submission well-taken.
Even were We to find that the picnic in question was not a school-sponsored
activity, nonetheless it cannot be gainsaid that the same was held under the
supervision of the teachers employed by the said school, particularly the teacher
in charge of Class I-C to whom the victim belonged, and those whom she invited
to help her in supervising the class during the picnic. Considering that the court a
quo found negligence on the part of the six defendants-teachers who, as such,
were charged with the supervision of the children during the picnic, the St.
Francis High School and the school principal, Benjamin Illumin, are liable under
Article 2176 taken together with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180
of the Civil Code. They cannot escape liability on the mere excuse that the picnic
was not an "extra-curricular activity of the St. Francis High School." We find from
the evidence that, as claimed by plaintiffs-appellants, the school principal had
knowledge of the picnic even from its planning stage and had even been invited to
attend the affair; and yet he did not express any prohibition against undertaking
the picnic, nor did he prescribe any precautionary measures to be adopted during
the picnic. At the least, We must find that the school and the responsible school
officials, particularly the principal, Benjamin Illumin, had acquiesced to the
holding of the picnic.
Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant school principal
must be found jointly and severally liable with the defendants-teachers for the
damages incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of the death of their son. It is the
rule that in cases where the above-cited provisions find application, the
51
negligence of the employees in causing the injury or damage gives rise to a
presumption of negligence on the part of the owner and/or manager of the
establishment (in the present case, St. Francis High School and its principal); and
while this presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by clear and
convincing proof that the owner and/or manager exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and/or supervision of the employee or
employees causing the injury or damage (in this case, the defendants-teachers).
The record does not disclose such evidence as would serve to overcome the
aforesaid presumption and absolve the St. Francis High School and its principal
from liability under the above-cited provisions.
As to the third assigned error interposed by plaintiffs-appellants, while We
cannot but commiserate with the plaintiffs for the tragedy that befell them in the
untimely death of their son Ferdinand Castillo and understand their suffering as
parents, especially the victim's mother who, according to appellants, suffered a
nervous breakdown as a result of the tragedy, We find that the amounts fixed by
the court a quo as actual damages and moral damages (P30,000.00 and
P20,000.00, respectively) are reasonable and are those which are sustained by
the evidence and the law.
However, We believe that exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 may and should be, as it is hereby, imposed in the present case by way
of example of correction for the public good, pursuant to Article 2229 of the Civil
Code. (pp. 57-59, Rollo)
On the other hand, petitioners-teachers assigned the following errors committed by the
trial court:
1. ". . . in finding the defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de Chavez, Luisito Vinas,
Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro and Patria Cadiz guilty of negligence and jointly and
severally liable for damages such finding not being supported by facts and
evidence.
2. ". . . in dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendants. (p. 59, Rollo)
On this score, respondent Court ruled:
The main thrust of defendants-appellants appeal is that plaintiffs, the parents of
the victim Ferdinand Castillo, were not able to prove by their evidence that they
did not give their son consent to join the picnic in question. However, We agree
with the trial court in its finding that whether or not the victim's parents had
given such permission to their son was immaterial to the determination of the
existence of liability on the part of the defendants for the damage incurred by the
plaintiffs-appellants as a result of the death of their son. What is material to such
a determination is whether or not there was negligence on the part of
defendants vis-a-vis the supervision of the victim's group during the picnic; and,
as correctly found by the trial court, an affirmative reply to this question has been
satisfactorily established by the evidence, as already pointed out.
 52

However, We sustain defendants-appellants insofar as two of the defendants- petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the negligence of those
teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, are concerned. As to them, the trial court under them.
found:
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence. Consequently they
While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones cannot be held liable for damages of any kind.
arrived at the picnic site, the drowning incident had already occurred,
such fact does not and cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim
could be said that by coming late, they were remiss in their duty to Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the excursion.
safeguard the students.
Testimony of Dr. Castillo on cross exam. by Atty. Flores
The evidence shows that these two defendants had satisfactorily explained why
they were late in going to the picnic site, namely, that they had to attend to the
entrance examination being conducted by the school which is part of their duty as Q Now, when your son asked you for money to buy food, did you not ask
teachers thereof. Since they were not at the picnic site during the occurrence in him where he will bring this?
question, it cannot be said that they had any participation in the negligence
attributable to the other defendants-teachers who failed to exercise diligence in A I asked him where he was going, he answered, I am going to the picnic,
the supervision of the children during the picnic and which failure resulted in the and when I asked him where, he did not answer, sir.
drowning of plaintiffs' son. Thus, We may not attribute any act or omission to the
two teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, as to make them liable for the injury Q And after giving the money, you did not tell him anything more?
caused to the plaintiffs because of the death of their son resulting from his
drowning at the picnic. Accordingly, they must be absolved from any liability.
A No more, sir.
As to the second assigned error raised by defendants-appellants, We agree with
the court a quo that the counterclaim must be dismissed for lack of merit. (pp. 59- Q And after that you just learned that your son join the picnic?
60, Rollo)
A Yes, sir.
Hence, this petition.
Q And you came to know of it after the news that your son was drowned
The issues presented by petitioners are: in the picnic came to you, is that correct?

A) Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the defendants which will A Yes, sir.
warrant the award of damages to the plaintiffs;
Q From 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 12:00 o'clock noon of March
B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is 20, 1982, you did not know that your son join the picnic?
applicable to the case at bar;
A No, sir, I did not know.
C) Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under
the circumstances surrounding the case at bar. (pp. 81-82, Rollo) Q Did you not look for your son during that time?

In the resolution of January 16, 1989, We gave due course to the petition and required the A I am too busy with my profession, that is why I was not able, sir.
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
Q You did not ask your wife?
The petition is impressed with merit.
A I did not, sir.
If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this is because of their own negligence or the
negligence of people under them. In the instant case however, as will be shown hereunder, Q And neither did your wife tell you that your son join the picnic?

A Later on after 12:00, sir.
Q And during that time you were too busy that you did not inquire
whether your son have joined that picnic?
A Yes, sir.
(TSN, pp. 16-17, hearing of April 2, 1984 witness Romulo Castillo)
The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing
where it will be held, is a sign of consent for his son to join the same. Furthermore.
Testimony of Dr. Lazaro on cross examination:
Q How did you conduct this mental and physical examination?
A I have interviewed several persons and the patient herself She even felt
guilty about the death of her son because she cooked adobo for him so he
could join the excursion where her son died of drowning.
Q Why were you able to say she was feeling guilty because she was the
one who personally cooked the adobo for her son?
A It was during the interview that I had gathered it from the patient
herself. She was very sorry had she not allowed her son to join the
excursion her son would have not drowned. I don't know if she actually
permitted her son although she said she cooked adobo so he could join.
(Emphasis Supplied) (TSN, p. 19, hearing of April 30, 1984, Dr. Lazaro —
witness).
Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code
in rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's son.
Article 2180, par. 4 states that:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
53
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the
negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must
have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their
assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school day
and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair,
a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of
the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had
no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not
a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of
the planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any
manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application
therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any
jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the findings of respondent Court on this score,
employers wig forever be exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer
for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act or omission he committed
while they are not in the performance of their duties.
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the
award of damages to the respondents-spouses.
Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged,
did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward
incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E.
instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming.
Moreover, even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the defendants
(petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought by the defendants in case of
emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas
did all what is humanly possible to save the child.
Testimony of Luisito Vinas on cross examination,
Q And when you saw the boy, Ferdinand Castillo, you approached the
boy and claim also having applied first aid on him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And while you were applying the so called first aid, the children were
covering you up or were surrounding you?
A Yes, sir.

Q You were rattled at that time, is it not?
A No, sir.
Q You mean you were in calm and peaceful condition?
A Yes, sir.
Q Despite the fact that the boy was no longer responding to your
application of first aid?
A Yes, sir.
Q You have never been disturbed, "nababahala" in the process of your
application of the first aid on the body of Ferdinand Castillo?
A No, sir, because we were attending to the application of first aid that
we were doing, sir.
Q After you have applied back to back pressure and which you claimed
the boy did not respond, were you not disturb anyway?
A I was disturbed during that time, sir.
Q For how many minutes have you applied the back to back pressure?
A From 9 to 11 times, sir.
Q You mean 9 to 11 times of having applied the pressure of your body on
the body of Ferdinand Castillo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please describe how you applied a single act of back to back
pressure?
A This has been done by placing the boy lay first downwards, then the
face was a little bit facing right and doing it by massaging the back of the
child, sir." (TSN, pp. 32-35, hearing of July 30, 1984)
Testimony of Tirso de Chavez on direct examination
ATTY. FLORES:
Q Who actually applied the first aid or artificial respiration to the child?
54
A Myself, sir.
Q How did you apply the first aid to the guy?
A The first step that I took, with the help of Mr. Luisito Vinas, was I
applied back to back pressure and took notice of the condition of the
child. We placed the feet in a higher position, that of the head of the
child, sir.
Q After you have placed the boy in that particular position, where the
feet were on a higher level than that of the head, what did you do next?
A The first thing that we did, particularly myself, was that after putting
the child in that position, I applied the back to back pressure and started
to massage from the waistline up, but I noticed that the boy was not
responding, sir.
Q For how long did you apply this back to back pressure on the boy?
A About 10 seconds, sir.
Q What about Mr. Vinas?
A Almost the same a little longer, for 15 seconds, sir.
Q After you noticed that the boy was not responding, what did you do?
A When we noticed that the boy was not responding, we changed the
position of the boy by placing the child facing upwards laying on the
sand then we applied the mouth to mouth resuscitation, sir. (pp. 92-
93, Rollo)
With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of
respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral
damages.
Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are not guilty of any fault or
negligence, hence, no moral damages can be assessed against them.
 55

While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the
picnic, this does not mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to
observe the required diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the safety of the
children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the
required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision dated November 19, 1987, finding
petitioners herein guilty of negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and
awarding the respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the petitioners herein
are concerned, but the portion of the said decision dismissing their counterclaim, there
being no merit, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988

BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION, petitioners,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, EDUARDO B. CASTRO, DIOMEDES B.
CASTRO, VIRGINIA B. CASTRO and RODOLFO B. CASTRO., respondents.

Edilberto B. Tenefrancia for petitioners.

Leonardo L. Cocjin Jr. for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the
decision 1 of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, dated 7 December 1984, in AC-G.R.
No. CV 69876, in so far as it affirmed the decision 2 of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
(hereinafter referred to as the Trial Court), which held, among others, petitioners solidarily
hable with Jimmy B. Abon, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.

The relevant facts, as found by the Trial Court and adopted by reference by the respondent
Court, are:
... Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an academic institution ... [However], it is
also an institution of arts and trade. It has so advertised itself, as its own evidence shows.
Its brochure (Exh. 2) shows that BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational department
offer Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses as well as Electronics
Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses... these courses divest BCF of the nature or
character of being purely or exclusively an academic institution. 3
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve
Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Unit, which is under the fifth control of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. 4 The ROTC Unit, by way of accommodation to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), pursuant to Department Order No. 14, Series of 1975 of the Department
of Education and Culture, 5 is provided by the BCF an office and an armory located at the
basement of its main building. 6
The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed
armorer. 7 As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the
AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, 8 as well as
orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges Foundation
ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee
(officer) of the AFP. 9Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF. 10
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot
Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which
the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. 11 As a result, Napoleon
Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide
by Military Commission No. 30, AFP. 12
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon,
Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the
Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean
of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges
Foundation Inc. as party defendants. After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1)
sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation,
Inc., jointly and severally, to pay private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro: a)
P12,000.00 for the death of Napoleon Castro, (b) P316,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased, (c) P5,000.00 as moral damages, (d) P6,000.00 as actual
damages, and (e) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs; (2) absolving the other
defendants; and (3) dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit. 13 On appeal
by petitioners, the respondent Court affirmed with modification the decision of the Trial
Court. The modification consisted in reducing the award for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased from P316,000.00 to P30,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and increasing
the indemnity for the death of Napoleon Castro from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
56
The central issue in this case is whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity hable with
Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the
tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such
liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands,
to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]." 14 Likewise, "the phrase used in
[Art. 2180 — 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time." 15
In the case at bar, in holding that Jimmy B. Abon was stin in the protective and supervisory
custody of the Baguio Colleges Foundation when he shot Napoleon Castro, the respondent
Court ruled that:
it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the
time of the shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the
evening; but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and
property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been attending
night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about
dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The time interval is safely
within the "recess time" that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the
Palisoc case, supra. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
In line with the case of Palisoc, 17 a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in
"recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the
school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the
student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school
premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature
does not include dismissal. 18Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the
"protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to
have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon
Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held
solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident, Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit
Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B. Abon "not to leave the office and [to keep the
armory] well guarded." 19 Apart from negating a finding that Jimmy B. Abon was under the
custody of the school when he committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to be
held liable, this circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in the
armory with definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot
Napoleon Castro.
 57

Petitioners also raise the issue that, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, a school which offers
both academic and technical/vocational courses cannot be held liable for a tort committed
by a student enrolled only in its academic program; however, considering that Jimmy B.
Abon was not in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro, the Court deems it
unnecessary to pass upon such other issue. 20

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED in so far as it holds

petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for his tortious act in the killing of
Napoleon Castro. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P.

PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M.
SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and
ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.

Balgos and Perez for petitioners.

Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while
on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)
prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordonñ ez-
Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his
death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was
established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but
were elements from outside the school.

Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim
(President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas
(Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant
Chief of Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge
them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness
and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on
the victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with
the other petitioners by resigning from his position in the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since
they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no
cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic
institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order
dated 8 December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss. A subsequent motion for
reconsideration was similarly dealt with by an order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners
then assailed the trial court's disposition before the respondent appellate court which, in a
decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the trial court's orders. On 22 August
1988, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored
its decision on the law ofquasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the appellate court's now assailed ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption
from the old Spanish Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and learned
authorities on its meaning should give way to present day changes. The
law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest
value and significance of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to
adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity to meet the new
challenges of progress.
Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180
cannot be construed in its narrow concept as held in the old case
of Exconde vs. Capuno 2 and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; 3hence, the
ruling in the Palisoc 4 case that it should apply to all kinds of educational
institutions, academic or vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff
liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last
paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the
diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done at a trial on the
merits of the case. 5
58
While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the
complaint was correctly denied and the complaint should be tried on the merits, we do not
however agree with the premises of the appellate court's ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule
of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde,
Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs.Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it
had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have
been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held
liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material
situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of
Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts mean the
exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. 7 For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education
that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue
higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the
school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing
their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary
undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of
physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when
bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school
premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to
prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the
PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of
Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract,
whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France
vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his
unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted,
however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort,
not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view
that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the
contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of
a similar mind. InCangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated
thus:

The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of
contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of
juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking,
concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another
by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break
the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a
breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-
contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations,
particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. (emphasis supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's
employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man
who allegedly "had a better right to the seat." InAustro-American, supra, the public
embarrassment caused to the passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court of
Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be
concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be
violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that
the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's
negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally
to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of
the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes
material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other
words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua nonto the school's liability. The
negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence
occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools,
above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of
its students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student communities of
the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents
ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect
of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for
notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an
individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and
environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the
breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here
statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and
place. 9
59
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private
respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this
stage, only the trial court can make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of
origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this
ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]
CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.
Alex Y. Tan, for Petitioners.
Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V. Ortiz for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING
FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; RULE. — The
parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who
live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the
provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto
caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who
acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of
age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such
primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said
Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth
Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the
guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of
the youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without
such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise
parental authority over the minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts
committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and
2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone
of love. A tragic illustration is provided by the instant case, wherein two lovers died while
still in the prime of their years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched.
While we cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their families through
seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should at least terminate the acrimony
and rancor of an extended judicial contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.
In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were alternately
initiated by the parties, petitioners are now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment
of respondent court promulgated on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the
following decretal portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiff’s complaint is hereby
reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and
solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the following amounts:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;
2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
3. Attorney’s fees, P20,000.00, and costs.
However, denial of defendants-appellees’ counterclaims is affirmed." 1
Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent spouses are
the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident
which took place and from which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first
year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the
parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his
aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were
sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell
after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and
second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for
reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to
threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend,
Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmenñ a Streets, Cebu City, from
January 7 to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound
inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of
60
petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the
residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets
of the same city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of
both minors, their parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective
theories drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports,
documents and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell
caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the
gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise
distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an
unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his
work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have
caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid
identification.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising
from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court
below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
plaintiffs’ complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendants’ counterclaim is likewise
denied for lack of sufficient merit." 2
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint
of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against
defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit
for resolution the following issues in this case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with
established decisional laws; and
2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent
court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability. 3
In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of
Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions on some postulates for determining whether or
not the gunshot wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However,
undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing
around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however,
that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of
whether it was suicide or not.
It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-contact of
an explosive discharge in the entrance wound. However, as pointed out by private
respondents, the body of deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral
parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours from the
 61

occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not categorically state that the body of right temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna states:chanrob1es
Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his virtual 1aw library
autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a paraffin test
on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on Wendell’s hands was x x x
forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried.cralawnad

More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Wendell "Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion collar widest inferiorly
Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) by 0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented upward, located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8
minutes based on the record of death; that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral cms. behind and 5.5 cms. above right external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward,
Homes, the body of the deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the stage of rigor upward and to the left, involving skin and soft tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the
mortis; and that said body was not washed, but it was dried. 4 However, on redirect temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating extensively along its course the
examination, he admitted that during the 8-hour interval, he never saw the body nor did he brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0
see whether said body was wiped or washed in the area of the wound on the head which he x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left
examined because the deceased was inside the morgue. 5 In fact, on cross-examination, he external auditory meatus.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
had earlier admitted that as far as the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet
and the exit of the wound are concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6
x x x
He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head of the victim
and that he found no burning or singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot
"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the gunshot wound of
wound of entrance which are general characteristics of contact or near-contact fire. On
entrance, gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging, singeing of hair, extensive laceration or
direct examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these clarification:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
bursting of the gunshot wound of entrance, or separation of the skin from the underlying
tissue, are absent." 10
"Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that there would be no
black residue or tattooing that could result from these guns because they are what we call
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was made of record,
clean?
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.
"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the entrance of the
wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound, and measuring yourself 24
ATTY. ORTIZ:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
inches, will you please indicate to the Honorable Court how would it have been possible for
Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches?
Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless, those indications that
you said may not rule out the possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches, is that
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
correct?
A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arm’s length.
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a smokeless powder.
ATTY. SENINING:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that you have noticed, the
singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on the trajectory of the bullet as shown in your
I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by extending his right
own sketch, is it not a fact that the gun could have been fired by the person himself, the
arm almost straight towards his head." 11
victim himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little above the right ear
and point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on your oath?
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of
defendants’ witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of an
A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory of the bullet is
apartment across the street from the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the house
concerned and as far as the angle or the manner of fire is concerned, it could have been
adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a "shadow" of a person at the
fired by the victim." 7
gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom.
As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at the scene of the
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying faces
crime, each of which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi,
the gas station; that it is the second apartment; that from her window she can see directly
respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau
the gate of the Gotiongs and, that there is a firewall between her apartment and the gas
of Investigation, 9 shows that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at the
station. 12 After seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the Tans,

she called the police station but the telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked with
James Enrique Tan and told him that she saw a man leap from the gate towards his rooftop.
13
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of the gate of the
Gotiongs, but denied having talked with anyone regarding what he saw. He explained that
he lives in a duplex house with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe
Gotiong’s house; and he further gave the following answers to these
questions:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).
Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiong’s in relation to your house?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A It is about 8 feet.
ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
Q And where were you looking from?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A From upstairs in my living room.
ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
Q From Your living room window, is that correct?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14
Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that the same do not
inspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses’ observations, since the
visual perceptions of both were obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in
relation to the house of herein private respondents. On the other hand, witness Manolo
Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he and his sister, Malou
Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her scream; that when
Manolo climbed the fence to see what was going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the
first shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he heard another shot. Consequently,
he went down from the fence and drove to the police station to report the incident. 15
Manolo’s direct and candid testimony establishes and explains the fact that it was he whom
Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" of a man at the gate of the Gotiong
house.
We have perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was
another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not
even point to or present any suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any
62
alleged "John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial court’s dubious theory that Wendell Libi
did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence — testimonial,
documentary and pictorial — the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of
Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a
reconciliation.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family,
hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not
borne out by the evidence on record either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi,
owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of
these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita’s key is always in her
bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell
taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no
longer in the safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts
that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family
by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one
of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access
to the bag of his mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship
consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were
gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their
son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of
Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that
Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting
in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children
who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers,
17 or even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of
Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18 holding upright
what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in possession of that firearm.
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as
explained at the start of this opinion, respondent court waved aside the protestations of
diligence on the part of petitioners and had this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged
in this dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees
been diligent in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun
from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong.
Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by their minor children who live in their company.’
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said gun
which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily
liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their

company. This vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has been reiterated by the
Supreme Court in many cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas v. Cadano, et. al. (L-
14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and
criminal offenses.’
‘The subsidiary liability of parent’s arising from the criminal acts of their minor children
who acted with discernment is determined under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and
under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his
or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.’ (3 SCRA
361-362).
". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow
got hold of the key to the drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-
spouses ever knowing that said gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978
when Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and
dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi
was said to have kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU
agent . . ." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
x x x
"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court holds that the lower
court was not correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint because as
preponderantly shown by evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing this
crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell
Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned
that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed."
(Emphases ours.) 19
We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable for
the civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed by
their minor son. We take this opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination
therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.
In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court
cites Fuellas v. Cadano, Et. Al. 20 which supposedly holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability of
parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses,"
followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should
assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor children. The quoted
passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for purposes of the
63
discussion hereunder.chanrobles law library
Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but the
categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a
hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant
comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the
parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents
can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability
imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a
valid and substantial defense.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we
apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the
persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in
case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental
liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides
that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damages."cralaw virtua1aw library
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their
minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. —
x x x
First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed
by . . . a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age,
who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under
their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on
their part." (Emphasis supplied.) 21
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing
provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is
likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on
their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is
buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall
be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of
insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of
the Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the
minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a
guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent
provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to

wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal guardianship
or control, or if such person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own
property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated in
the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the
Civil Code has, aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number of
cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta v. Arreglado, 23
Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et.
Al. 26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of the civil liability of
parents for crimes committed by their minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age,
who acted with discernment, and also of minors 15 years of aye or over, since these
situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this Court
held that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in accordance with the
provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and
adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under
Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in
the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not
where the damage is caused with criminal intent. In said cases, however, there are
unfortunate variances resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the Court’s determination
of whether the liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of
their minor children, is primary or subsidiary.
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through
reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his
father were held jointly and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence of
a good father of a family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability was
imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son who
was found guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil
Code providing for solidary responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict.
However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the
conviction of his son, who was over 15 but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article
2180 but, this time, disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as
already explained, the petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly in line with
Fuellas which purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for
serious physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On the other hand, in Paleyan,
the mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged solidarily liable for damages arising
from his conviction for homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since
this is likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano,
although the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to "lack of intent, coupled with
mistake," it was ruled that while under Article 2180 of the Civil Code there should be
solidary liability for damages, since the son, "although married, was living with his father
and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence," but "is now of age, as a
matter of equity" the father was only held subsidiarily liable.
64
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability
only for persons causing damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear; 27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of
establishments; 28 employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in industry; 29
and principals, accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused
in the other classes. 30
Also, coming back to respondent court’s reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the present
case, it is not exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the
parents therein. A careful scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted verbatim in
its decision now on appeal in the present case, and which it attributed to Fuellas, was the
syllabus on the law report of said case which spoke of "subsidiary" liability. However, such
categorization does not specifically appear in the text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact,
after reviewing therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the discussions in said
cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
this Court concluded its decision in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of evidence
submitted therein by both parties, independent of the criminal case. And responsibility for
fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the present action was instituted, is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence under
the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore
stated, any discussion as to the minor’s criminal responsibility is of no moment."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and
should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses
committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in
their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their
children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without
discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted
with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability
shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child
and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon
the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend
of the youthful offender. 32 However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now,
without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who
exercise parental authority over the minor offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-
delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180
and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a
felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding
petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of
 65

the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein
explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the
requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent
G.R. No. L-68374 June 18, 1985
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED. HORACIO LUNA and LIBERTY HIZON-LUNA, petitioners,

vs.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grinñ o-Aquino, Medialdea, Romero, Nocon INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON ROQUE A. TAMAYO, as Presiding Judge of
and Bellosillo, Jr., JJ., concur. Regional Trial Court, NCR Branch CXXXI1 Makati, Metro Manila, MARIA LOURDES
SANTOS, and SIXTO SALUMBIDES,respondents.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Davide, Jr., J., took no part. I used to be counsel of one of the parties.
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., took no part.

Review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent appellate court in case CA-G. R. No.
SP-01869, entitled: "Horacio Luna, et al., petitioners, versus Hon. Roque A. Tamayo, etc., et
al., respondents, " which affirmed an order denying a motion to restrain the execution of a
final judgment rendered in a habeas corpus case.

The records of the case show that the herein private respondent Maria Lourdes Santos is
an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna who is married to his co-petitioner
Liberty Hizon-Luna. Maria Lourdes Santos is married to her correspondent Sixto
Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides, also known as Shirley Luna
Salumbides, who is the subject of this child custody case.

It appears that two or four months after the birth of the said Shirley Salumbides on April 7,
1975, her parents gave her to the petitioners, a childless couple with considerable means,
who thereafter showered her with love and affection and brought her up as their very own.
The couple doted upon Shirley who called them "Mama" and "Papa". She calls her natural
parents "Mommy" and "Daddy." When Shirley reached the age of four (4) years in 1979, she
was enrolled at the Maryknoll College in Quezon City, where she is now in Grade I I I.

A few months before September, 1980, her "Mama" and "Papa" decided to take Shirley
abroad and show her Disneyland and other places of interest in America. Shirley looked
forward to this trip and was excited about it. However, when the petitioners asked for the
respondents' written consent to the child's application for a U.S. visa, the respondents
refused to give it, to the petitioners' surprise and chagrin Shirley was utterly disappointed.
As a result, the petitioners had to leave without Shirley whom they left with the private
respondents, upon the latter's request. The petitioners, however, left instructions with
their chauffeur to take and fetch Shirley from Maryknoll College every school day.

When the petitioners returned on October 29, 1980, they learned that the respondents had
transferred Shirley to the St. Scholastica College. The private respondents also refused to
return Shirley to them. Neither did the said respondents allow Shirley to visit the
petitioners. In view thereof, the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the

Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, against the private respondents to produce the
person of Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody. The case was docketed in court
as Spec. Proc. No. 9417, and after the filing of an answer and due hearing, a decision was
rendered on March 9, 1981, declaring the petitioners entitled to the child's custody and
forthwith granted the writ prayed for.
The private respondents appealed to the then Court of Appeals where the case was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-12212, and in a decision dated April 7, 1982, the appealed
decision was reversed and set aside and another entered, ordering the petitioners, among
other things, to turn over Shirley to the private respondents. The herein petitioners filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the decision but their motion was denied.
Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for review of the decision of the appellate
court. The case was docketed herein as G.R. No. 60860 and on November 10, 1982, this
Court, in a minute resolution, denied the petition for lack of merit.
Upon finality of the judgment, the case was remanded to the court of origin and assigned to
Regional Trial Court, NCJR Branch CXXXII Makati, Metro Manila, presided over by
respondent Judge Roque A. Tamayo who, thereafter, issued an order directing the issuance
of a writ of execution to satisfy and enforce the resolution of the Supreme Court which
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The execution of the judgment was vigorously opposed by the petitioners who filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the order and to set aside the writ of execution on the
ground of supervening events and circumstances, more particularly, the subsequent
emotional, psychological, and physiological condition of the child Shirley which make the
enforcement of the judgment sought to be executed unduly prejudicial, unjust and unfair,
and cause irreparable damage to the welfare and interests of the child. By reason thereof,
the respondent judge called a conference among the parties and their counsels, and
conducted hearings on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and to set aside the writ
of execution. Shirley made manifest during the hearing that she would kill herself or run
away from home if she should ever be separated from her Mama and Papa, the petitioners
herein, and forced to stay with the respondents. A portion of her testimony is quoted
hereunder:
ATTY. CASTRO:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Would you want to have with your daddy and
mommy, referring to Sixto Salumbides and Maria
Lourdes Salumbides
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
66
A Because they are cruel to me. They always spank
me and they do not love me. Whenever I am eating,
they are not attending to me. It is up to me whether I
like the food or not.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, if you will be taken from your papa and mama
(Luna spouses) and given to your daddy and mommy
(Salumbides spouses), what would you do if you will
do anything?
A I will either kill myself or I will escape. Even now
they said they love me. I don't believe them. I know
they are not sincere. They are only saying that to me.
And I know those words were not coming from their
hearts. If they will get me from my papa and mama,
they will be hurt because they know that my papa
and mama love me very much. 1
Dra. Cynthia Dulay Bruce, a child psychologist, affirmed her findings that —
... She (Shirley) has only grown more embittered, cautions, distrusting of
her biological parents. She threatens to kill herself or run away if given
to her biological parents. She claims she would be very unhappy with
her biological parents since they do not understand her needs are
selfish to her, and don't know how to care for her. Presently, she is very
difficult to encourage in seeing her biological parents in a different
light. 2
and that —
... I reviewed with them (Salumbides spouse) that at the present time, to
get Shirley back in this emotionally charged transaction, would hinder
Shirley seeing them as truly loving and concerned parents. She would
more deeply distrust them if they uproot her from the home of the
choice of Mr. and Mrs. Luna. The biological parents wish to do what is
also helpful to Shirley. I discussed with both parties the
recommendations of placement and follow up. 3
But, the respondent judge denied the petitioners' motion to set aside the writ of execution
The petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order and when it was denied,
they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and
restraining order with the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, which was docketed
therein as CA-G.R. No. SP-01869, to stop altogether the execution of the decision of the
Court of Appeals rendered in CA-G.R. No. SP-12212. The petition was duly heard, after
which a decision was rendered on May 25, 1984, dismissing the petition, Hence, the
present recourse.
 67

The issue is whether or not procedural rules more particularly the duty of lower courts to understanding, guidance and counseling. and moral and material security. 7 But what if the
enforce a final decision of appellate courts in child custody cases, should prevail over and threat is for real.?
above the desire and preference of the child, to stay with her grandparents instead of her
biological parents and who had signified her intention Up kill herself or run away from Besides, in her letters to the members of the Court, Shirley depicted her biological parents
home if she should be separated from her grandparents and forced to live with her as selfish and cruel and who beat her often; and that they do not love her. And, as pointed
biological parents. out by the child psychologist, Shirley has grown more embitered cautious and dismissing
of her biological parents. To return her to the custody of the private respondents to face the
It is a well-known doctrine that when a judgment of a higher court is returned to the lower same emotional environment which she is now complaining of would be indeed traumatic
court, the only function of the latter court is the ministerial one of issuing the order of and cause irreparable damage to the child. As requested by her, let us not destroy her
execution. The lower court cannot vary the mandate of the superior court, or examine it, future.
for any other purpose than execution; nor review it upon any matter decided on appeal or
error apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than to settle so much as has been WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby GRANTED and the writ prayed for
demanded. However, it is also equally well-known that a stay of execution of a final issued, setting aside the judgment of the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-
judgment may be authorized whenever it is necessary to accomplish the ends of justice as G.R. No. SP-01869, and restraining the respondent judge and/or his successors from
when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution enforcing the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-12212. entitled:
inequitable; or when it appears that the controversy had never been submitted to the "Horacio Luna and Liberty Hizon-Luna, petitioners-appellees, versus Maria Lourdes Santos
judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ of execution has been and Sixto Salumbides, respondents-appellants." The decision rendered in Spec. Proc. No.
improvidently issued; or that it is defective in substance; or is issued against the wrong 9417 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal granting the herein petitioners custody of the
party; or that the judgement debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ child Shirley Salumbides should be maintained. Without costs. SO ORDERED.
has been issued without authority.
Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
In the instant case, the petitioners claim that the child's manifestation to the trial court that
she would kill herself or run away from home if she should be forced to live with the
private respondents is a supervening event that would justify the cancellation of the
execution of the final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-12212.
The respondents, upon the other hand, maintain that there are no supervening
developments and circumstances since these events are not new as the Court of Appeals
had taken into account the physiological and emotional consideration of the transfer of
custody of Shirley when it reversed the decision of the trial court and gave to the private
respondents the custody of the child Shirley; and besides, the wishes and desires of the
child is no hindrance to the parents' right to her custody since the right of the parents to
the custody of their children paramount.

We find merit in the petitioner. The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill
herself or run away from home if she should be taken away from the herein petitioners and
forced to live with the private respondents, made during the hearings on the petitioners'
motion to set aside the writ of execution and reiterated in her letters to the members of the
Court dated September 19, 1984 4 and January 2, 1985, 5 and during the hearing of the case
before this Court, is a circumstance that would make the execution of the judgment
rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 9417 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal inequitable, unfair
and unjust, if not illegal. Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating
to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's welfare is
paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules
and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in this case, the very
life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise
an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and
substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her
physical, moral and intellectual development. 6 The threat may be proven empty, but
Shirley has a right to a wholesome family life that will provide her with love, care and
 68

LUZ PINEDA, MARILOU MONTENEGRO, VIRGINIA ALARCON, DINA LORENA AYO, CELIA
CALUMBAG and LUCIA LONTOK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY,
LIMITED, respondents.

Mariano V. Ampil, Jr. for petitioners.

Ramon S. Caguiao for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari to review and set aside the Decision of the public respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 22950 1 and its Resolution denying the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration. 2 The challenged decision modified the decision of the
Insurance Commission in IC Case
No. RD-058. 3

The petitioners were the complainants in IC Case No. RD-058, an administrative complaint
against private respondent Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (hereinafter Insular Life),
which was filed with the Insurance Commission on 20 September 1989. 4 They prayed
therein that after due proceedings, Insular Life "be ordered to pay the claimants their
insurance claims" and that "proper sanctions/penalties be imposed on" it "for its
deliberate, feckless violation of its contractual obligations to the complainants, and of the
Insurance Code." 5 Insular Life's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that "the
claims of complainants are all respectively beyond the jurisdiction of the Insurance
Commission as provided in Section 416 of the Insurance Code," 6 having been denied in the
Order of 14 November 1989, 7it filed its answer on 5 December 1989. 8 Thereafter, hearings
were conducted on various dates.

On 20 June 1990, the Commission rendered its decision 9 in favor of the complainants, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Commission merely orders the respondent company

to:

a) Pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) a day from the receipt
of a copy of this Decision until actual payment thereof;

b) Pay and settle the claims of DINA AYO and LUCIA LONTOK, for
P50,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively;

c) Notify henceforth it should notify individual beneficiaries designated

G.R. No. 105562 September 27, 1993 under any Group Policy, in the event of the death of insured(s), where
the corresponding claims are filed by the Policyholder;

d) Show cause within ten days why its other responsible officers who
have handled this case should not be subjected to disciplinary and other
administrative sanctions for deliberately releasing to Capt. Nuval the
check intended for spouses ALARCON, in the absence of any Special
Power of Attorney for that matter, and for negligence with respect to the
release of the other five checks.
SO ORDERED. 10
In holding for the petitioners, the Insurance Commission made the following findings and
conclusions:
After taking into consideration the evidences [sic], testimonial and
documentary for the complainants and the respondent, the Commission
finds that; First: The respondent erred in appreciating that the powers
of attorney executed by five (5) of the several beneficiaries convey
absolute authority to Capt. Nuval, to demand, receive, receipt and take
delivery of insurance proceeds from respondent Insular Life. A cursory
reading of the questioned powers of authority would disclosed [sic] that
they do not contain in unequivocal and clear terms authority to Capt.
Nuval to obtain, receive, receipt from respondent company insurance
proceeds arising from the death of the seaman-insured. On the contrary,
the said powers of attorney are couched in terms which could easily
arouse suspicion of an ordinary
man. . . .
Second: The testimony of the complainants' rebuttal witness,
Mrs. Trinidad Alarcon, who declared in no uncertain terms that neither
she nor her husband, executed a special power of attorney in favor of
Captain Rosendo Nuval, authorizing him to claim, receive, receipt and
take delivery of any insurance proceeds from Insular Life arising out of
the death of their insured/seaman son, is not convincingly refuted.
Third: Respondent Insular Life did not observe Section 180 of the
Insurance Code, when it issued or released two checks in the amount of
P150,000.00 for the three minor children (P50,000.00 each) of
complainant, Dina Ayo and another check of P40,000.00 for minor
beneficiary Marissa Lontok, daughter of another complainant Lucia
Lontok, there being no showing of any court authorization presented or
the requisite bond posted.
Section 180 is quotes [sic] partly as follows:
. . . In the absence of a judicial guardian, the father, or
in the latter's absence or incapacity, the mother of
any minor, who is an insured or a beneficiary under a
contract of life, health or accident insurance, may
exercise, in behalf of said minor, any right, under the
69
policy, without necessity of court authority or the
giving of a bond where the interest of the minor in the
particular act involved does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos . . . . 11
Insular Life appealed the decision to the public respondent which docketed the case as CA-
G.R. SP No. 22950. The appeal urged the appellate court to reverse the decision because the
Insurance Commission (a) had no jurisdiction over the case considering that the claims
exceeded P100,000.00,
(b) erred in holding that the powers of attorney relied upon by Insular Life were
insufficient to convey absolute authority to Capt. Nuval to demand, receive and take
delivery of the insurance proceeds pertaining to the petitioners, (c) erred in not giving
credit to the version of Insular Life that the power of attorney supposed to have been
executed in favor of the Alarcons was missing, and
(d) erred in holding that Insular Life was liable for violating Section 180 of the Insurance
Code for having released to the surviving mothers the insurance proceeds pertaining to the
beneficiaries who were still minors despite the failure of the former to obtain a court
authorization or to post a bond.
On 10 October 1991, the public respondent rendered a decision, 12 the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified by eliminating
therefrom the award to Dina Ayo and Lucia Lontok in the amounts of
P50,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively. 13
It found the following facts to have been duly established:
It appears that on 23 September 1983, Prime Marine Services, Inc.
(PMSI, for brevity), a crewing/manning outfit, procured Group PoIicy
No. G-004694 from respondent-appellant Insular Life Assurance Co.,
Ltd. to provide life insurance coverage to its sea-based employees
enrolled under the plan. On 17 February 1986, during the effectivity of
the policy, six covered employees of the PMSI perished at sea when their
vessel, M/V Nemos, a Greek cargo vessel, sunk somewhere in El Jadida,
Morocco. They were survived by complainants-appellees, the
beneficiaries under the policy.
Following the tragic demise of their loved ones, complainants-appellees
sought to claim death benefits due them and, for this purpose, they
approached the President and General Manager of PMSI, Capt. Roberto
Nuval. The latter evinced willingness to assist complainants-appellees to
recover Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) benefits
from the POEA and to work for the increase of their PANDIMAN and
other benefits arising from the deaths of their husbands/sons. They
were thus made to execute, with the exception of the spouses Alarcon,
special powers of attorney authorizing Capt. Nuval to, among others,
"follow up, ask, demand, collect and receive" for their benefit

indemnities of sums of money due them relative to the sinking of M/V
Nemos. By virtue of these written powers of attorney, complainants-
appellees were able to receive their respective death benefits. Unknown
to them, however, the PMSI, in its capacity as employer and policyholder
of the life insurance of its deceased workers, filed with respondent-
appellant formal claims for and in behalf of the beneficiaries, through its
President, Capt. Nuval. Among the documents submitted by the latter
for the processing of the claims were five special powers of attorney
executed by complainants-appellees. On the basis of these and other
documents duly submitted, respondent-appellant drew against its
account with the Bank of the Philippine Islands on 27 May 1986 six (6)
checks, four for P200,00.00 each, one for P50,000.00 and another for
P40,00.00, payable to the order of complainants-appellees. These checks
were released to the treasurer of PMSI upon instructions of
Capt. Nuval over the phone to Mr. Mariano Urbano, Assistant
Department Manager for Group Administration Department of
respondent-appellant. Capt. Nuval, upon receipt of these checks from
the treasurer, who happened to be his son-in-law, endorsed and
deposited them in his account with the Commercial Bank of Manila, now
Boston Bank.
On 3 July 1989, after complainants-appellees learned that they were
entitled, as beneficiaries, to life insurance benefits under a group policy
with respondent-appellant, they sought to recover these benefits from
Insular Life but the latter denied their claim on the ground that the
liability to complainants-appellees was already extinguished upon
delivery to and receipt by PMSI of the six (6) checks issued in their
names. 14
On the basis thereof, the public respondent held that the Insurance Commission had
jurisdiction over the case on the ground that although some of the claims exceed
P100,000.00, the petitioners had asked for administrative sanctions against Insular Life
which are within the Commission's jurisdiction to grant; hence, "there was merely a
misjoinder of causes of action . . . and, like misjoinder of parties, it is not a ground for the
dismissal of the action as it does not affect the other reliefs prayed for." 15 It also rejected
Insular Life's claim that the Alarcons had submitted a special power of attorney which they
(Insular Life) later misplaced.
On the other hand, the public respondent ruled that the powers of attorney, Exhibits "1" to
"5," relied upon by Insular Life were sufficient to authorize Capt. Nuval to receive the
proceeds of the insurance pertaining to the beneficiaries. It stated:
When the officers of respondent-appellant read these written powers,
they must have assumed Capt. Nuval indeed had authority to collect the
insurance proceeds in behalf of the beneficiaries who duly affixed their
signatures therein. The written power is specific enough to define the
authority of the agent to collect any sum of money pertaining to the
sinking of the fatal vessel. Respondent-appellant interpreted this power
to include the collection of insurance proceeds in behalf of the
70
beneficiaries concerned. We believe this is a reasonable interpretation
even by an officer of respondent-appellant unschooled in the law. Had
respondent appellant, consulted its legal department it would not have
received a contrary view. There is nothing in the law which mandates a
specific or special power of attorney to be executed to collect insurance
proceeds. Such authority is not included in the enumeration of Art. 1878
of the New Civil Code. Neither do we perceive collection of insurance
claims as an act of strict dominion as to require a special power of
attorney. Moreover, respondent-appellant had no reason to doubt Capt.
Nuval. Not only was he armed with a seemingly genuine authorization,
he also appeared to be the proper person to deal with respondent-
appellant being the President and General Manager of the PMSI, the
policyholder with whom respondent-appellant always dealt. The fact
that there was a verbal agreement between complainants-appellees and
Capt. Nuval limiting the authority of the latter to claiming specified
death benefits cannot prejudice the insurance company which relied on
the terms of the powers of attorney which on their face do not disclose
such limitation. Under the circumstances, it appearing that
complainants-appellees have failed to point to a positive provision of
law or stipulation in the policy requiring a specific power of attorney to
be presented, respondents-appellant's reliance on the written powers
was in order and it cannot be penalized for such an act. 16
Insofar as the minor children of Dina Ayo and Lucia Lontok were concerned, it ruled that
the requirement in Section 180 of the Insurance Code which provides in part that:
In the absence of a judicial guardian, the father, or in the latter's absence
or incapacity, the mother, of any minor, who is an insured or a
beneficiary under a contract of life, health or accident insurance, may
exercise, in behalf of said minor, any right under the policy, without
necessity of court authority or the giving of a bond, where the interest of
the minor in the particular act involved does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos. Such a right, may include, but shall not be limited to,
obtaining a policy loan, surrendering the policy, receiving the proceeds
of the policy, and giving the minor's consent to any transaction on the
policy.
has been amended by the Family Code 17 which grants the father and mother joint
legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child
without the necessity of a court appointment; however, when the market value of
the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, the parent
concerned shall be required to put up a bond in such amount as the court may
determine.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari which we gave due course after the private
respondent had filed the required comment thereon and the petitioners their reply to the
comment.
We rule for the petitioners.

We have carefully examined the specific powers of attorney, Exhibits "1" to "5," which were
executed by petitioners Luz Pineda, Lucia B. Lontok, Dina Ayo, Celia Calumag, and Marilyn
Montenegro, respectively, on 14 May 1986 18 and uniformly granted to Capt. Rosendo Nuval
the following powers:
To follow-up, ask, demand, collect and receipt for my benefit
indemnities or sum of money due me relative to the sinking of M.V.
NEMOS in the vicinity of El Jadida, Casablanca, Morocco on the evening
of February 17, 1986; and
To sign receipts, documents, pertinent waivers of indemnities or other
writings of whatsoever nature with any and all third persons, concerns
and entities, upon terms and conditions acceptable to my said attorney.
We agree with the Insurance Commission that the special powers of attorney "do not
contain in unequivocal and clear terms authority to Capt. Nuval to obtain, receive, receipt
from respondent company insurance proceeds arising from the death of the seaman-
insured. On the contrary, the said powers of attorney are couched in terms which could
easily arouse suspicion of an ordinary man." 19 The holding of the public respondent to the
contrary is principally premised on its opinion that:
[t]here is nothing in the law which mandates a specific or special power
of attorney to be executed to collect insurance proceeds. Such authority
is not included in the enumeration of art. 1878 of the New Civil Code.
Neither do we perceive collection of insurance claims as an act of strict
dominion as to require a special power of attorney.
If this be so, then they could not have been meant to be a general power of
attorney since Exhibits "1" to "5" are special powers of attorney. The execution by
the principals of special powers of attorney, which clearly appeared to be in
prepared forms and only had to be filled up with their names, residences, dates of
execution, dates of acknowledgment and others, excludes any intent to grant a
general power of attorney or to constitute a universal agency. Being special
powers of attorney, they must be strictly construed.
Certainly, it would be highly imprudent to read into the special powers of attorney in
question the power to collect and receive the insurance proceeds due the petitioners from
Group Policy No. G-004694. Insular Life knew that a power of attorney in favor of Capt.
Nuval for the collection and receipt of such proceeds was a deviation from its practice with
respect to group policies. Such practice was testified to by Mr. Marciano Urbano, Insular
Life's Assistant Manager of the Group Administrative Department, thus:
ATTY. CAGUIOA:
Can you explain to us why in this case, the claim was
filed by a certain Capt. Noval [sic]?
71
WITNESS:
a The practice of our company in claim pertaining to
group insurance, the policyholder is the one who files
the claim for the beneficiaries of the deceased. At that
time, Capt. Noval [sic] is the President and General
Manager of Prime Marine.
q What is the reason why policyholders are the ones
who file the claim and not the designated
beneficiaries of the employees of the policyholders?
a Yes because group insurance is normally taken by
the employer as an employee-benefit program and as
such, the benefit should be awarded by the
policyholder to make it appear that the benefit really
is given by the employer. 20
On cross-examination, Urbano further elaborated that even payments, among other things,
are coursed through the policyholder:
q What is the corporate concept of group insurance
insofar as Insular Life is concerned?
WITNESS:
a Group insurance is a contract where a group of
individuals are covered under one master contract.
The individual underwriting characteristics of each
individual is not considered in the determination of
whether the individual is insurable or not. The
contract is between the policyholder and the
insurance company. In our case, it is Prime Marine
and Insular Life. We do not have contractual
obligations with the individual employees; it is
between Prime Marine and Insular Life.
q And so it is part of that concept that all inquiries,
follow-up, payment of claims, premium billings,
etc. should always be coursed thru the policyholder?
a Yes that is our practice.
q And when you say claim payments should always be
coursed thru the policyholder, do you require a power
of attorney to be presented by the policyholder or not?

a Not necessarily.
q In other words, under a group insurance policy like
the one in this case, Insular Life could pay the claims
to the policyholder himself even without the
presentation of any power of attorney from the
designated beneficiaries?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
a No. Sir.
ATTY. AMPIL:
q Why? Is this case, the present case different from
the cases which you answered that no power of
attorney is necessary in claims payments?
WITNESS:
a We did not pay Prime Marine; we paid the
beneficiaries.
q Will you now tell the Honorable Commission why
you did not pay Prime Marine and instead paid the
beneficiaries, the designated beneficiaries?
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. AMPIL:
I will rephrase the question.
q Will you tell the Commission what circumstances
led you to pay the designated beneficiaries, the
complainants in this case, instead of the policyholder
when as you answered a while ago, it is your practice
in group insurance that claims payments, etc., are
coursed thru the policyholder?
WITNESS:
a It is coursed but, it is not paid to the policyholder.
72
q And so in this case, you gave the checks to the
policyholder only coursing them thru said
policyholder?
a That is right, Sir.
q Not directly to the designated beneficiaries?
a Yes, Sir. 21
This practice is usual in the group insurance business and is consistent with the
jurisprudence thereon in the State of California — from whose laws our Insurance Code
has been mainly patterned — which holds that the employer-policyholder is the agent of
the insurer.
Group insurance is a comparatively new form of insurance. In the United States, the first
modern group insurance policies appear to have been issued in 1911 by the Equitable Life
Assurance Society. 22 Group insurance is essentially a single insurance contract that
provides coverage for many individuals. In its original and most common form, group
insurance provides life or health insurance coverage for the employees of one employer.
The coverage terms for group insurance are usually stated in a master agreement or policy
that is issued by the insurer to a representative of the group or to an administrator of the
insurance program, such as an employer. 23The employer acts as a functionary in the
collection and payment of premiums and in performing related duties. Likewise falling
within the ambit of administration of a group policy is the disbursement of insurance
payments by the employer to the employees. 24 Most policies, such as the one in this case,
require an employee to pay a portion of the premium, which the employer deducts from
wages while the remainder is paid by the employer. This is known as a contributory plan as
compared to a non-contributory plan where the premiums are solely paid by the employer.
Although the employer may be the titular or named insured, the insurance is actually
related to the life and health of the employee. Indeed, the employee is in the position of a
real party to the master policy, and even in a non-contributory plan, the payment by the
employer of the entire premium is a part of the total compensation paid for the services of
the employee. 25 Put differently, the labor of the employees is the true source of the
benefits, which are a form of additional compensation to them.
It has been stated that every problem concerning group insurance presented to a court
should be approached with the purpose of giving to it every legitimate opportunity of
becoming a social agency of real consequence considering that the primary aim is to
provide the employer with a means of procuring insurance protection for his employees
and their families at the lowest possible cost, and in so doing, the employer creates
goodwill with his employees, enables the employees to carry a larger amount of insurance
than they could otherwise, and helps to attract and hold a permanent class of employees. 26

In Elfstrom vs. New York Life Insurance Company, 27 the California Supreme Court explicitly
ruled that in group insurance policies, the employer is the agent of the insurer. Thus:
We are convinced that the employer is the agent of the insurer in
performing the duties of administering group insurance policies. It
cannot be said that the employer acts entirely for its own benefit or for
the benefit of its employees in undertaking administrative functions.
While a reduced premium may result if the employer relieves the
insurer of these tasks, and this, of course, is advantageous to both the
employer and the employees, the insurer also enjoys significant
advantages from the arrangement. The reduction in the premium which
results from employer-administration permits the insurer to realize a
larger volume of sales, and at the same time the insurer's own
administrative costs are markedly reduced.
xxx xxx xxx
The most persuasive rationale for adopting the view that the employer
acts as the agent of the insurer, however, is that the employee has no
knowledge of or control over the employer's actions in handling the
policy or its administration. An agency relationship is based upon
consent by one person that another shall act in his behalf and be subject
to his control. It is clear from the evidence regarding procedural
techniques here that the insurer-employer relationship meets this
agency test with regard to the administration of the policy, whereas that
between the employer and its employees fails to reflect true agency. The
insurer directs the performance of the employer's administrative acts,
and if these duties are not undertaken properly the insurer is in a
position to exercise more constricted control over the employer's
conduct.
In Neider vs. Continental Assurance Company, 28 which was cited in Elfstrom, it was held
that:
[t]he employer owes to the employee the duty of good faith and due
care in attending to the policy, and that the employer should make clear
to the employee anything required of him to keep the policy in effect,
and the time that the obligations are due. In its position as
administrator of the policy, we feel also that the employer should be
considered as the agent of the insurer, and any omission of duty to the
employee in its administration should be attributable to the insurer.
The ruling in Elfstrom was subsequently reiterated in the cases of Bass vs. John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance Co. 29 and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. vs. State Board of
Equalization. 30
73
In the light of the above disquisitions and after an examination of the facts of this case, we
hold that PMSI, through its President and General Manager, Capt. Nuval, acted as the agent
of Insular Life. The latter is thus bound by the misconduct of its agent.
Insular Life, however, likewise recognized Capt. Nuval as the attorney-in-fact of the
petitioners. Unfortunately, through its official, Mr. Urbano, it acted imprudently and
negligently in the premises by relying without question on the special power of attorney.
In Strong vs. Repide, 31 this Court ruled that it is among the established principles in the
civil law of Europe as well as the common law of American that third persons deal with
agents at their peril and are bound to inquire as to the extent of the power of the agent
with whom they contract. And in Harry E. Keller Electric Co. vs. Rodriguez,32 this Court,
quoting Mechem on Agency, 33 stated that:
The person dealing with an agent must also act with ordinary prudence
and reasonable diligence. Obviously, if he knows or has good reason to
believe that the agent is exceeding his authority, he cannot claim
protection. So if the suggestions of probable limitations be of such a
clear and reasonable quality, or if the character assumed by the agent is
of such a suspicious or unreasonable nature, or if the authority which he
seeks to exercise is of such an unusual or improbable character, as
would suffice to put an ordinarily prudent man upon his guard, the
party dealing with him may not shut his eyes to the real state of the case,
but should either refuse to deal with the agent at all, or should ascertain
from the principal the true condition of affairs. (emphasis supplied)
Even granting for the sake of argument that the special powers of attorney were in due
form, Insular Life was grossly negligent in delivering the checks, drawn in favor of the
petitioners, to a party who is not the agent mentioned in the special power of attorney.
Nor can we agree with the opinion of the public respondent that since the shares of the
minors in the insurance proceeds are less than P50,000.00, then under Article 225 of the
Family Code their mothers could receive such shares without need of either court
appointments as guardian or the posting of a bond. It is of the view that said Article had
repealed the third paragraph of Section 180 of the Insurance Code. 34 The pertinent portion
of Article 225 of the Family Code reads as follows:
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal
guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child
without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement,
the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is judicial order to the
contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the
child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish
a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten
per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to
guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general
guardians.

It is clear from the said Article that regardless of the value of the unemancipated common
child's property, the father and mother ipso jure become the legal guardian of the child's
property. However, if the market value of the property or the annual income of the child
exceeds P50,000.00, a bond has to be posted by the parents concerned to guarantee the
performance of the obligations of a general guardian.
It must, however, be noted that the second paragraph of Article 225 of the Family Code
speaks of the "market value of the property or the annual income of the child," which
means, therefore, the aggregate of the child's property or annual income; if this exceeds
P50,000.00, a bond is required. There is no evidence that the share of each of the minors in
the proceeds of the group policy in question is the minor's only property. Without such
evidence, it would not be safe to conclude that, indeed, that is his only property.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
10 October 1991 and the Resolution of 19 May 1992 of the public respondent in CA-G.R. SP
No. 22950 are SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Insurance Commission in IC Case No. RD-
058 is REINSTATED.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 95305 August 20, 1992
ELENA, OSCAR, CELIA, TERESITA and VIRGILIO, all surnamed LINDAIN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES APOLINIA VALIENTE and FEDERICO
ILA, respondents.
Maria Rosario B. Ragasa and Oscar L. Lindain for petitioners.
Jose C. Felimon for private respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
74
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August 8, 1990 of the Court
of Appeals which dismissed the complaint for annulment of a sale of registered land,
thereby reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City.
The facts of the case in a nutshell are as follows:
When the plaintiffs were still minors, they were already the registered
owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
NT-63540 (Exh. D-1). On November 7, 1966, their mother, Dolores
Luluquisin, then already a widow and acting as guardian of her minor
children, sold the land for P2,000 under a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Registered Land (Exh. 2) to the defendants spouses Apolonia Valiente
and Federico Ila. The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered in the office
of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija. TCT No. NT-
66311 was issued to the vendees, Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila.
The defendants admitted that the property in question was sold to them
by the mother of the minors as evidenced by a Deed of Sale (Exh. B for
the plaintiffs and Exh. 2 for the defendants) and although at first they
were reluctant to buy the property as the sale would not be legal, the
registered owners thereof being all minors, upon advice of their counsel,
the late Atty. Arturo B. Pascual, and the counsel of Dolores Luluquisin,
Atty. Eustaquio Ramos, who notarized the documents, that the property
could be sold without the written authority of the court, considering
that its value was less than P2,000, they bought the property and had it
registered in their names under Certificate of Title No. 66311 (Exhibit C
for the plaintiffs).
Plaintiffs contend, however, that the sale of the lot by their mother to the
defendants is null and void because it was made without judicial
authority and/or court approval.
The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the sale was valid, as
the value of the property was less than P2,000, and, considering the
ages of plaintiffs now, the youngest being 31 years old at the time of the
filing of the complaint, their right to rescind the contract which should
have been exercised four (4) years after reaching the age of majority, has
already prescribed.
On May 25, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City rendered a decision for the
plaintiffs (now petitioners), the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the following:
(1) Declaring the Deed of Sale executed by the guardian Dolores
Luluquisin in favor of the defendants spouses Apolonia Valiente and
Federico Ila over the property of the minors covered by the TCT No. NT-
66311 to be null and void;

(2) Ordering defendants Spouses Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila to
surrender to the Register of Deeds of San Jose City Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 66311;
(3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of San Jose City to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 66311 in the names of Spouses Apolonia Valiente
and Federico Ila;
(4) Ordering the Register of Deeds to issue a new Transfer Certificate of
Title in lieu of what was ordered cancelled in the names of plaintiffs,
namely: Elena, Oscar, Celia, Teresita and Virgilio, all surnamed Lindain;
(5) Ordering the defendants to vacate the lot covered by TCT No. NT-
66311 and deliver the possession of the same to the plaintiffs subject
however to the rights of the defendants as buyers, possessors and
builders in good faith;
(6) Without cost. (pp. 41,42, Rollo.)
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed and another one was
entered dismissing the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. The Court of
Appeals applied the ruling of this Court in Ortañez vs. Dela Cruz, O.G., Vol. 60, No. 24, pp.
3434, 3438-3439, that:
A father or mother acting as legal administrator of the property of the
child under parental authoritycannot, therefore, dispose of the child's
property without judicial authority if it is worth more than P2,000.00,
notwithstanding the bond that he has filed for the protection of the
child's property. But when the value of such property is less than
P2,000.00, the permission of the court for its alienation or disposition may
be dispensed with. The father or mother, as the case may be, is allowed
by law to alienate or dispose of the same freely, subject only to the
restrictions imposed by the scruples of conscience. (p. 64, Rollo.)
It upheld the sale and dismissed the complaint of the heirs who thereupon filed this
petition for review alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court and in ordering the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in total
disregard of the findings of facts of the trial court and contrary to the provisions of law on
contracts and guardianship.
The principal issue before us is whether judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the
minors' property by their mother.
We find merit in the petition for review.
Art. 320 of the New Civil Code, which was already in force when the assailed transaction
occurred, provides:
75
Art. 320.— The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of
First Instance.
Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished from judicial)
administrator of the property of his/her minor children, does not have the power to
dispose of, or alienate, the property of said children without judicial approval. The powers
and duties of the widow as legal administrator of her minor children's property as
provided in Rule 84 by the Rules of Court entitled, "General Powers and Duties of Executors
and Administrators" are only powers of possession and management. Her power to sell,
mortgage, encumber or otherwise dispose of the property of her minor children must
proceed from the court, as provided in Rule 89 which requires court authority and
approval.
In the case of Visaya, et al. vs. Suguitan, et al., G.R. No. L-8300, November 18, 1955, we held
that:
It is true that under Art. 320 of the new Civil Code the mother, Juana
Visaya, was the legal administrator of the property of her minor
children. But as such legal administrator she had no power
to compromise their claims, for compromise has always been deemed
equivalent to an alienation (transigere est alienare), and is an act of
strict ownership that goes beyond mere administration. Hence, Art.
2032 of the new Civil Code provides:
The Court's approval is necessary in compromises
entered into by guardians, parents, absentee's
representatives and administrators or executors of
decedent's estates. (Emphasis supplied.)
This restriction on the power of parents to compromise claims affecting
their children is in contrast to the terms of Art. 1810 of the old Civil
Code that empowered parents to enter into such compromises, without
requiring court approval unless the amount involved was in excess of
2000 pesetas. At present, the Court['s] approval is indispensable
regardless of the amount involved. (Emphasis ours.)
In the recent case of Badillo vs. Ferrer, 152 SCRA 407, 409, this Court stated.
Surviving widow has no authority or has acted beyond her powers in
conveying to the vendees the undivided share of her minor children in the
property, as her powers as the natural guardian covers only matters of
administration and cannot include the power of disposition, and she
should have first secured court approval before alienation of the property.
The above ruling was a reiteration of Inton vs. Quintana, 81 Phil. 97.

The private respondents' allegation that they are purchasers in good faith is not credible
for they knew from the very beginning that their vendor, the petitioners' mother, without
court approval could not validly convey to them the property of her minor children.
Knowing her lack of judicial authority to enter into the transaction, the private respondents
acted in bad faith when they went ahead and bought the land from her anyway.
One who acquires or purchases real property with knowledge of a defect in the title of his
vendor cannot claim that he acquired title thereto in good faith as against the owner of the
property or for an interest therein (Gatioan vs. Gaffud, 27 SCRA 706).
The minors' action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed for "real actions over
immovables prescribe after thirty years" (Art. 1141, Civil Code). Since the sale took place in
1966, the action to recover the property had not yet prescribed when the petitioners sued
in 1987.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside
and that of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City dated May 25, 1989, being correct, is
hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents.
MELO, J.:
This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship which went sour. The
innocent victims are two children horn out of the same union. Upon this Court now falls
the not too welcome task of deciding the issue of who, between the father and mother, is
more suitable and better qualified in helping the children to grow into responsible, well-
adjusted, and happy young adulthood.
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in
1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and
Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles,
California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. In
1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a
common law relationship of husband and wife. On August 16, 1986, their daughter,
Rosalind Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in the
76
Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States,
their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on
January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in
1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he was always nagging her about
money matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand, contended that Teresita was a spendthrift,
buying expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of attending to household
expenses.
Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita
left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims, however, that she
spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch with her
children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in
Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had
to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a
criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of
conviction in the bigamy case was actually rendered only on September 29, 1994. (Per
Judge Harriet O. Demetriou, Branch 70, RTC, Pasig, pp. 210-222,Rollo). Teresita, meanwhile,
decided to return to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus
starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended
Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have
sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the
parties and to be approved by the Court.
On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with Justices de Pano and
Ibay-Somera concurring, reversed the trial court's decision. It gave custody to Teresita and
visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.
Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for review, in the main contending that the
Court of Appeals disregarded the factual findings of the trial court; that the Court of
Appeals further engaged in speculations and conjectures, resulting in its erroneous
conclusion that custody of the children should be given to respondent Teresita.
We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody over the children
through an automatic and blind application of the age proviso of Article 363 of the Civil
Code which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of
the children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be

separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure.
and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take
into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the
child over seven years of age unless the parent chosen is unfit.
The decision under review is based on the report of the Code Commission which drafted
Article 213 that a child below seven years still needs the loving, tender care that only a
mother can give and which, presumably, a father cannot give in equal measure. The
commentaries of a member of the Code Commission, former Court of Appeals Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy, in a textbook on the Family Code, were also taken into account. Justice Diy
believes that a child below seven years should still be awarded to her mother even if the
latter is a prostitute or is unfaithful to her husband. This is on the theory that moral
dereliction has no effect on a baby unable to understand such action. (Handbook on the
Family Code of the Philippines, 1988 Ed., p. 297.)
The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of law rather than an
appreciation of relevant facts and the law which should apply to those facts. The task of
choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be
determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under
or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests.
Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and
award the custody on the basis of that consideration. In Unson III vs. Navarro (101 SCRA
183 [1980]), we laid down the rule that "in all controversies regarding the custody of
minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and moral
welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and
moral situations of the contending parents", and in Medina vs. Makabali (27 SCRA 502
[1969]), where custody of the minor was given to a non-relative as against the mother, then
the country's leading civilist, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained its basis in this manner:
. . . While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her
child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all
questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the
latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines. Art.
363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be
ordered separated from the mother (do). This is as it should be, for in
the continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria potestas has been
transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the
Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his
parents into a radically different institution, due to the influence of
Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme.
As pointed out by Puig Pena, now "there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a
sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."
77
As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their
children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to
provide the children with adequate support, education, moral,
intellectual and civic training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356).
(pp. 504-505.)
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the
Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years
of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong
but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven,
his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion,
the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even
to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Rosalind
celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the same age
on January 12, 1995. Both are studying in reputable schools and appear to be fairly
intelligent children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they
would want to live. Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to
investigate if the parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial
responsibility.
Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the records to discover
the choice of the children and rather than verifying whether that parent is fit or unfit,
respondent court simply followed statutory presumptions and general propositions
applicable to ordinary or common situations. The seven-year age limit was mechanically
treated as an arbitrary cut off period and not a guide based on a strong presumption.
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her counsel are
more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother separated from her
children and the humiliation she suffered as a result of her character being made a key
issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her
children. While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature,
either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of
custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It
is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the
child which is the paramount consideration.
We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial court because it
gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all the relevant
factors bearing on the issue of custody.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child psychologist, Rita
Flores Macabulos, to determine the effects of uprooting her from the Assumption College
where she was studying. Four different tests were administered. The results of the tests are
quite revealing. The responses of Rosalind about her mother were very negative causing
the psychologist to delve deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by

Rosalind was an incident where she saw her mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man who
lived in their house and worked for her father. Rosalind refused to talk to her mother even
on the telephone. She tended to be emotionally emblazed because of constant fears that
she may have to leave school and her aunt's family to go back to the United States to live
with her mother. The 5-1/2 page report deals at length with feelings of insecurity and
anxiety arising from strong conflict with the mother. The child tried to compensate by
having fantasy activities. All of the 8 recommendations of the child psychologist show that
Rosalind chooses petitioners over the private respondent and that her welfare will be best
served by staying with them (pp. 199-205, Rollo).
At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted for the purpose of
securing the travel clearance required before minors may go abroad. Social Welfare Officer
Emma D. Estrada Lopez, stated that the child Rosalind refused to go back to the United
States and be reunited with her mother. She felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was
more attached to her Yaya who did everything for her and Reginald. The child was found
suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother's infidelity. The application for travel
clearance was recommended for denial (pp. 206-209, Rollo).
Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-year age reference in the law applies to
the date when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed, not to the date when a
decision is rendered. This argument is flawed. Considerations involving the choice made by
a child must be ascertained at the time that either parent is given custody over the child.
The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given
custody suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can
always be re-examined and adjusted (Unson III v. Navarro, supra, at p. 189). To be sure, the
welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of
the time that either parent is chosen to be the custodian. At the present time, both children
are over 7 years of age and are thus perfectly capable of making a fairly intelligent choice.
According to respondent Teresita, she and her children had tearful reunion in the trial
court, with the children crying, grabbing, and embracing her to prevent the father from
taking them away from her. We are more inclined to believe the father's contention that the
children ignored Teresita in court because such an emotional display as described by
Teresita in her pleadings could not have been missed by the trial court. Unlike the Justices
of the Court of Appeals Fourth Division, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin personally observed the
children and their mother in the courtroom. What the Judge found is diametrically opposed
to the contentions of respondent Teresita. The Judge had this to say on the matter.
And, lastly, the Court cannot look at petitioner [Teresita] in similar light,
or with more understanding, especially as her conduct and demeanor in
the courtroom (during most of the proceedings) or elsewhere (but in
the presence of the undersigned presiding judge) demonstrated her
ebulent temper that tended to corroborate the alleged violence of her
physical punishment of the children (even if only for ordinary
disciplinary purposes) and emotional instability, typified by her failure
(or refusal?) to show deference and respect to the Court and the other
parties (pp. 12-13, RTC Decision)
78
Respondent Teresita also questions the competence and impartiality of the expert
witnesses. Respondent court, in turn, states that the trial court should have considered the
fact that Reynaldo and his sister, herein petitioner Guillerma Layug, hired the two expert
witnesses. Actually, this was taken into account by the trial court which stated that the
allegations of bias and unfairness made by Teresita against the psychologist and social
worker were not substantiated.
The trial court stated that the professional integrity and competence of the expert
witnesses and the objectivity of the interviews were unshaken and unimpeached. We might
add that their testimony remain uncontroverted. We also note that the examinations made
by the experts were conducted in late 1991, well over a year before the filing by Teresita of
the habeas corpus petition in December, 1992. Thus, the examinations were at that time not
intended to support petitioners' position in litigation, because there was then not even an
impending possibility of one. That they were subsequently utilized in the case a quo when
it did materialize does not change the tenor in which they were first obtained.
Furthermore, such examinations, when presented to the court must be construed to have
been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in
the determination of the issue before it. The persons who effected such examinations were
presented in the capacity of expert witnesses testifying on matters within their respective
knowledge and expertise. On this matter, this Court had occasion to rule in the case of Sali
vs. Abukakar, et al. (17 SCRA 988 [1966]).
The fact that, in a particular litigation, an NBI expert examines certain
contested documents, at the request, not of a public officer or agency of
the Government, but of a private litigant, does not necessarily nullify the
examination thus made. Its purpose, presumably, to assist the court
having jurisdiction over said litigation, in the performance of its duty to
settle correctly the issues relative to said documents. Even a non-expert
private individual may examine the same, if there are facts within his
knowledge which may help, the court in the determination of said issue.
Such examination, which may properly be undertaken by a non-expert
private individual, does not, certainly become null and void when the
examiner is an expert and/or an officer of the NBI.
(pp. 991-992.)
In regard to testimony of expert witnesses it was held in Salomon, et al. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al. (185 SCRA 352 [1990]):
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they
may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in
accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency
of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to
decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions
upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by
which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side
for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative

opportunities for study and observation of the matters about which he
testifies, and any other matters which reserve to illuminate his
statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it
is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and
circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails,
the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-
1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the
evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court
whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of
that discretion.
(p. 359)
It was in the exercise of this discretion, coupled with the opportunity to assess the
witnesses' character and to observe their respective demeanor that the trial court opted to
rely on their testimony, and we believe that the trial court was correct in its action.
Under direct examination an February 4, 1993, Social Worker Lopez stated that Rosalind
and her aunt were about to board a plane when they were off-loaded because there was no
required clearance. They were referred to her office, at which time Reginald was also
brought along and interviewed. One of the regular duties of Social Worker Lopez in her job
appears to be the interview of minors who leave for abroad with their parents or other
persons. The interview was for purposes of foreign travel by a 5-year old child and had
nothing to do with any pending litigation. On cross-examination, Social Worker Lopez
stated that her assessment of the minor's hatred for her mother was based on the
disclosures of the minor. It is inconceivable, much less presumable that Ms. Lopez would
compromise her position, ethics, and the public trust reposed on a person of her position
in the course of doing her job by falsely testifying just to support the position of any
litigant.
The psychologist, Ms. Macabulos, is a B.S. magna cum laude graduate in Psychology and an
M.A. degree holder also in Psychology with her thesis graded "Excellent". She was a
candidate for a doctoral degree at the time of the interview. Petitioner Reynaldo may have
shouldered the cost of the interview but Ms. Macabulos services were secured because
Assumption College wanted an examination of the child for school purposes and not
because of any litigation. She may have been paid to examine the child and to render a
finding based on her examination, but she was not paid to fabricate such findings in favor
of the party who retained her services. In this instance it was not even petitioner Reynaldo
but the school authorities who initiated the same. It cannot be presumed that a
professional of her potential and stature would compromise her professional standing.
Teresita questions the findings of the trial court that:
1. Her morality is questionable as shown by her marrying Reynaldo at
the time she had a subsisting marriage with another man.
2. She is guilty of grave indiscretion in carrying on a love affair with one
of the Reynaldo's fellow NSC employees.
79
3. She is incapable of providing the children with necessities and
conveniences commensurate to their social standing because she does
not even own any home in the Philippines.
4. She is emotionally unstable with ebullient temper.
It is contended that the above findings do not constitute the compelling reasons under the
law which would justify depriving her of custody over the children; worse, she claims,
these findings are non-existent and have not been proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Public and private respondents give undue weight to the matter of a child under 7 years of
age not to be separated from the mother, without considering what the law itself
denominates as compelling reasons or relevant considerations to otherwise decree. In
the Unson III case, earlier mentioned, this Court stated that it found no difficulty in not
awarding custody to the mother, it being in the best interest of the child "to be freed from
the obviously unwholesome, not
to say immoral influence, that the situation where [the mother] had placed herself . . .
might create in the moral and social outlook of [the child] who was in her formative and
most impressionable stage . . ."
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7 years of age.
They understand the difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant
immorality. Their best interests would be better served in an environment characterized by
emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the
records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. In
fact, he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which
the mother is not in a position to extend.
The argument that the charges against the mother are false is not supported by the
records. The findings of the trial court are based on evidence.
Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto Lustado on December 17,
1984 in California (p. 13, Respondent's Memorandum; p. 238, Rollo; pp. 11, RTC Decision).
Less than a year later, she had already driven across the continental United States to
commence living with another man, petitioner Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh. The two were
married on October 7, 1987. Of course, to dilute this disadvantage on her part, this matter
of her having contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo, Teresita tried to picture
Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she told Reynaldo about her marriage to Lustado
on the occasion when she was raped by Reynaldo. Expectedly, Judge Harriet Demetriou of
the Pasig RTC lent no weight to such tale. And even if this story were given credence, it
adds to and not subtracts from the conviction of this Court about Teresita's values. Rape is
an insidious crime against privacy. Confiding to one's potential rapist about a prior
marriage is not a very convincing indication that the potential victim is averse to the act.
The implication created is that the act would be acceptable if not for the prior marriage.
More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the prior marriage only much later. In
fact, the rape incident itself is unlikely against a woman who had driven three days and
three nights from California, who went straight to the house of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh and
 80

upon arriving went to bed and, who immediately thereafter started to live with him in a minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No
relationship which is marital in nature if not in fact. special pronouncement is made as to costs.

Judge Bersamin of the court a quo believed the testimony of the various witnesses that SO ORDERED.
while married to Reynaldo, Teresita entered into an illicit relationship with Perdencio
Gonzales right there in the house of petitioner Reynaldo and respondent Teresita. Feliciano, Romero, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Perdencio had been assigned by the National Steel Corporation to assist in the project in
Pittsburgh and was staying with Reynaldo, his co-employee, in the latter's house. The
record shows that the daughter Rosalind suffered emotional disturbance caused by the
traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a boarder in their house. The
record also shows that it was Teresita who left the conjugal home and the children, bound
for California. When Perdencio Gonzales was reassigned to the Philippines, Teresita
followed him and was seen in his company in a Cebu hotel, staying in one room and taking
breakfast together. More significant is that letters and written messages from Teresita to
Perdencio were submitted in evidence (p.12, RTC Decision).

The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to another does not
fall under "compelling reasons" is neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only
are the children over seven years old and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or
immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality
conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to
mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records appears to have
become final (pp. 210-222, Rollo).

Respondent court's finding that the father could not very well perform the role of a sole
parent and substitute mother because his job is in the United States while the children will
be left behind with their aunt in the Philippines is misplaced. The assignment of Reynaldo
in Pittsburgh is or was a temporary one. He was sent there to oversee the purchase of a
steel mill component and various equipment needed by the National Steel Corporation in
the Philippines. Once the purchases are completed, there is nothing to keep him there
anymore. In fact, in a letter dated January 30, 1995, Reynaldo informs this Court of the
completion of his assignment abroad and of his permanent return to the Philippines (ff.
p. 263, Rollo).

The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both
over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from
the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two
requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The
presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children
are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for
children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute,
there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the
mother. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have
been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the
Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the

G.R. Nos. 77737-38 August 15, 1988
CHRISTINA MARIE DEMPSEY, a minor and represented by her mother, Janalita
Rapada, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LXXV, Third Judicial Region, Olongapo City, and
JOEL DEMPSEY,respondents.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for petitioners.
Miguel F. Famularcano, Jr. for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition denominated as one for review on certiorari and/or a special civil action
for certiorari from the decision rendered by the respondent court on November 28, 1986
in Criminal Cases Nos. 460-86 and 461-86, entitled "The People of the Philippines v. Joel
Dempsey."
On January 30, 1986, two separate informations were filed against respondent Joel
Dempsey before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch II, Olongapo City charging him with
violation of Article 59 (par. 2) of P.D. 603 and Article 46, par. 8 of P.D. 603.
The Informations read:
Criminal Case No. 68-86
That on or about and during the period from December 1985 to the
present, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously leave their conjugal dwelling at No.
15 Ohio Street, Upper Kalaklan, Olongapo City and abandon his child
Christina R. Dempsey and deprive him (sic) of his love, care and
protection she from the accused (sic) since then, by continuously failing
and refusing to give adequate support to the said minor child and
despite pleas, the accused without lawful justification, failed,
disregarded and still continues to fail and disregard to perform his
obligations to his said minor child Christina R. Dempsey,
81
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 69-86
That on or about and during the period from December 1985 to the
present, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail and refuse to provide his child
Christina R. Dempsey with adequate support, as defined in Article 290
of the Civil Code, despite the fact that he is capable of supporting his
child, and despite pleas, the accused without lawful justification, failed
and refused and still fails and refuses to provide his child with adequate
support, to the damage and prejudice of the said child.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, pp. 18-19)
The facts of the case are summarized by the Trial Court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The testimony of complainant Janalita Rapada purports to show that in
her cohabitation with the accused, without the benefit of marriage,
Christina Marie was born on October 01, 1984, at the St. Jude's Family
Clinic, Olongapo City where she delivered the child. Her birth certificate,
Exhibit "A" bears an entry of the name of the accused as the father and
Exhibit "A-1 " the Affidavit of the Acknowledgment duly signed by him.
At the present, the child receives a monthly support from the accused in
the sum of $150.00 thru the child's mother, Janalita Rapada. Aside from
this monthly support, Janalita Rapada obtained a promise from the
accused to declare Christina Marie as his dependent and also a
commitment to declare the child after his citizenship. This will entitle
the child for all the benefits and privileges extended to dependents of
American US Navy servicemen like free medical check-up. Efforts were
made with the Naval Legal Service Office, US Naval Facilities, Subic Bay,
Philippines to compel the accused to fulfill these commitments but to no
avail. To seek redress thru the Court, she engaged the services of Atty.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr., offering P5,000.00 as Attorney's fee payable after
the cases are decided.
xxx xxx xxx
At the Naval Legal Service Office, someone entertained her demand for
the accused to declare Christina Marie as his dependent and after his
American citizenship. She was of the belief that these could be done not
knowing that the American who entertained her demands had no
authority to effect the same. (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

Upon arraignment, the private respondent freely, voluntarily, and spontaneously entered a
plea of guilty to the offense charged in the Information.
On August 26, 1986, the Trial Court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
charges against him, considering the mitigating circumstances of his
voluntary plea of guilty, this Court sentences him to a prison term of
Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) days to Four (4) months of Arresto
Mayor, medium period and fine of Three hundred (P300.00) Pesos for
each of the cases and to pay the costs.
For the civil liability, judgment is rendered against accused Joel
Dempsey confirming the payment of US $150.00 monthly support to
Christina Marie and to continue payment thru Janalita Rapada, to be
used solely for the needs of the child until she reaches the age of
majority; to recognize the child Christina Marie as his natural child; to
pay Christina Marie thru Janalita Rapada the sum of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damage; and to pay the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fee to
Atty. Manuel Rosapapan as Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid of
the IBP Chapter of Zambales Olongapo City and the same to form part of
the legal aid fund.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 23-24)
The private respondent appealed the municipal trial court's decision to the regional trial
court and prayed that the award on civil liability be set aside and the penalty of
imprisonment be reduced to a penalty of fine only.
In a decision rendered on November 28, 1986, the respondent regional trial court reversed
the municipal trial court's decision on the following grounds:
1. Parental authority to which certain parental obligations are attached pertains only to
legitimate and adopted children unlike petitioner who is an acknowledged illegitimate
minor child of private respondent; that in cases of abandonment of minors, the proper
forum is the Department of Social Welfare where the person to whom the minor has been
left must report immediately (Art. 161, P.D. 603).
2. A person cannot he held criminally liable for failure to support a minor child.
3. The Municipal Trial Court had determined a matter not within its competence and
authority.
Hence, the present petition on pure questions of law.
82
The petitioner maintains that the penalty of imprisonment and fine in both cases is
sanctioned by the law and jurisprudence and that the award of civil liability is justified.
We find merit in the instant petition.
The respondent court committed reversible error when it failed to take into account that
the decision of the municipal trial court was based on the private respondent's plea of
guilty. Respondent Joel Dempsey did not and does not challenge the validity of Presidential
Decree No. 603, Articles 46 and 59 on certain obligations of parents to their children and
Articles 60 and 210 penalizing violations of mandatory provisions. As a matter of fact,
respondent Dempsey's appeal impliedly recognizes the validity of the judgment of
conviction because he asked that the penalty of imprisonment be changed to fine, not that
the trial court's decision was void or that he be acquitted.
There can be no question about the trial court's jurisdiction over the criminal prosecutions.
Article 69 of P.D. 603 penalizes abandonment of a minor child by its parent, as provided in
Article 59, with imprisonment from two to six months or a fine not exceeding five hundred
pesos or both. Article 210 penalizes a violation of the obligation to give adequate support
found in Article 46 with imprisonment not exceeding one month or a fine not exceeding
two hundred pesos or both, unless a higher penalty is provided for in the Revised Penal
Code or special laws.
The respondent court erred in its ruling that the trial court determined a matter not within
its competence and authority. There is likewise no basis for its gratuitous finding that a
parent cannot be held criminally liable under P.D. 603 for withholding support from his
minor child. There is absolutely no discussion on this ruling. The records show, however,
that Joel Dempsey's plea of guilt to the charge of withholding support from his minor
daughter was made without a full understanding of that particular charge. Janalita Rapada
herself testified that she is receiving $150.00 a month for the support of the minor
Christina Marie Dempsey. The amount of P3,000.00 monthly appears to fulfill the
requirement of "adequate support" found in Par. 8, Art. 46 of P.D. No. 603. What Rapada
wants is a judicial declaration for this support to continue. This cannot be the basis of a
criminal conviction.
As to the information charging abandonment, the private respondent entered his plea of
guilt with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act and with the
assistance of his counsel. The reversal of conviction based on a plea of guilty is an act which
is not at all explained by the respondent court and, therefore, in excess of its jurisdiction. It
is well-settled as a general rule that a plea of guilt is sufficient to sustain conviction without
introduction of further evidence (People v. Formentera, 130 SCRA 114; People v. Balisacan,
17 SCRA 119; People v. Gravino, et al., 122 SCRA 123; People v. Pajarillo, 94 SCRA 828).
Only in such exceptional cases as capital offenses is evidence still required.
The respondent court further ruled that Christina Dempsey is not entitled to the rights
arising from the parental responsibility of her father, she being an illegitimate child.
Reliance was made on Art. 17 of P.D. 603 which defines the joint parental authority of
parents over their legitimate or adopted children. The respondent court's observations are
wrong because the law itself protects even illegitimate children. Illegitimate children have
 83

rights of the same nature as legitimate and adopted children. This is enunciated in Art. 3, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) while in Criminal Case No. 69-86 he is
P.D. 603 which provides that "all children shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth ACQUITTED.
without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political
antecedents, and other factors." Rights must be enforced or protected to the extent that it is SO ORDERED.
possible to do so.

The Solicitor General points out that the new Family Code promulgated as Executive Order
No. 209, July 17, 1978 erases any distinction between legitimate or adopted children on
one hand and acknowledged illegitimate children on the other, insofar as joint parental
authority is concerned. Article 211 of the Family Code, whose date of effectivity is
approaching, merely formalizes into statute the practice on parental authority.

The respondent court would shift jurisdiction over the case from the municipal trial court
to the Department of Social Services and Development. It is readily apparent that the DSSD
cannot take cognizance of and enforce the criminal sanctions of P.D. 603. Besides, Christina
Marie Dempsey is not an abandoned child in the strict sense of the word as she is still in
the custody and care of her mother. Art. 141 of P.D. 603 defines an abandoned child as
follows: "... Am abandoned child is one who has no parental care or guardianship or whose
parents or guardians have deserted him for a period of at least six continuous months ... ."
Article 161 cannot, therefore, be applied to the case at bar. Thus, it is not the Department of
Social Services and Development which has jurisdiction but the Municipal Trial Court.

There is one other point which has to be corrected. As part of the civil liability in its
judgment, the trial court required the accused to recognize Christina Marie as his natural
child. This should not have been done. The recognition of a child by her father is provided
for in the Civil Code and now in the new Family Code. In this criminal prosecution, where
the accused pleaded guilty to criminal charges and the issue of recognition was not
specifically and fully heard and tried, the trial court committed reversible error when it
ordered recognition of a natural child as part of the civil liability in the criminal case.

We also agree with the respondent regional trial court that the penalty imposed is
erroneous. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees is improper. Although
fathers like Joel Dempsey should be deterred from committing similar acts of
irresponsibility, the law does not allow us to affirm the grant of exemplary damages only
on the basis of the facts herein presented. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded
inasmuch as there is not one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code).

As to the penalties, we agree with the Solicitor General that these should be modified
accordingly. And finally, it should be noted that the Regional Trial Court after declaring that
the Municipal Trial Court acted outside of its competence merely set aside the appealed
decision. Instead of acquitting the accused, it suggested the filing of necessary pleadings
before the proper court.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch
75 of the Third Judicial Region is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of Branch
II of the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City is REINSTATED with the modification that
in Criminal Case No. 6886, Joel Dempsey is sentenced to imprisonment of One (1) month
 84

afternoon and to show cause why the said child should not be
discharged from restraint.
MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. G.R. No. 162734
SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and Let this Writ be served by the Sheriff or any authorized
ROSARIO C. SALIENTES, Present: representative of this Court, who is directed to immediately make a
Petitioners, QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, return.
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, SO ORDERED.[4]
- versus - TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied.
LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE
JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL
Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH Promulgated:
but the same was dismissed on November 10, 2003. The appellate court affirmed the
203,MUNTINLUPA CITY,
February 24, 2003 Order of the trial court holding that its January 23, 2003 Order did not
Respondents. August 29, 2006
award the custody of the 2-year-old child to any one but was simply the standard order
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x issued for the production of restrained persons.The appellate court held that the trial court
was still about to conduct a full inquiry, in a summary proceeding, on the cause of the
DECISION minors detention and the matter of his custody. The Court of Appeals ruled thus:

QUISUMBING, J.: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

merit.

The instant petition assails the Decision [1] dated November 10, 2003 of the Court SO ORDERED.[5]
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680, which dismissed the petition for certiorari against the
orders of the Regional Trial Court in Special Proceedings No. 03-004. Likewise assailed is
the Court of Appeals Resolution[2] dated March 19, 2004 denying reconsideration. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied on March 19, 2004.

The facts of the case are as follows: Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari anchored on the following
grounds:

Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail
C. Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with
Marie Antonettesparents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to
in-laws problems, private respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own
house, but Marie Antonetterefused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter,
he was prevented from seeing his son.
Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his
son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody,[3] docketed as Special Proceedings No.
03-004 before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. On January 23, 2003, the trial
court issued the following order:
Upon verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by
Petitioners, the Respondents Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes,
Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are hereby directed to
produce and bring before this Court the body of minor Lorenzo
Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at 1:00 oclock in the
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing the
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion, amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing an order for the
petitioner-mother to first show cause why her own three-year
old child in her custody should not be discharged from a so-
called restraint despite no evidence at all of restraint and no
evidence of compelling reasons of maternal unfitness to
deprive the petitioner-mother of her minor son of tender
years. The assailed orders, resolutions and decisions of the
lower court and the Court of Appeals are clearly void;
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing that the
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing a
writ of habeas corpus which clearly is not warranted
considering that there is no unlawful restraint by the mother
and considering further that the law presumes the fitness of
the mother, thereby negating any notion of such mother
illegally restraining or confining her very own son of tender

years.The petition is not even sufficient in substance to
warrant the writ. The assailed orders are clearly void.
3. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, the Sombong vs.
CA case supports rather than negates the position of the
petitioners.
4. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, summary
proceeding does violence to the tender-years-rule
5. The Court of Appeals failed to consider that the private
respondent failed to present prima facie proof of any
compelling reason of the unfitness of the petitioner-mother;
6. The Court of Appeals failed to see that the New Rules on
Custody SUFFICES AS REMEDY. [6]
Plainly put, the issue is: Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed the
petition for certiorari against the trial courts orders dated January 23, 2003 and February
24, 2003?
Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 of the Family Code,
[7]
which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintain that herein
respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling reason but failed to present
even a prima facie proof thereof.
Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the
proper remedy for private respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas
corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under
the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insist there was no illegal or involuntary
restraint of the minor by his own mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause
and explain the custody of her very own child.
Private respondent counters that petitioners argument based on Article 213 of
the Family Code applies only to the second part of his petition regarding the custody of his
son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father to see his
son. He asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains
the minors right to see his father and vice versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely
filed for delay, for had petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court in
accordance with the new rules on custody of minors, they would have done so on the dates
specified in the January 23, 2003 and the February 24, 2003 orders of the trial court.
Private respondent maintains that, under the law, he and petitioner
Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over their son. He alleges that
at times when petitioner MarieAntonette is out of the country as required of her job as an
international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of their son and not the
maternal grandparents.
85
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the assailed January 23, 2003
Order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely
directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his
liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial courts full
inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it.
Under Rule 41, Section 1[8] of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is
not appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under Rule
65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show that
the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order.
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld
from a person entitled thereto.[9] Under Article 211[10] of the Family Code, respondent
Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and
consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of
custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody
to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present
case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as
alleged in his petition.[11] Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the supreme
consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code[12] unequivocally provides that in all
questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be
the paramount consideration.[13]
Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any
of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain
why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive
in Section 9[14] of A.M. 03-04-04-SC[15] that within fifteen days after the filing of the answer
or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the
respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was exactly
what the court did.
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of
custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners
can raise it as a counter argument for private respondents petition for custody. But it is not
a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision
disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.
In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January 23,
2003 and February 24, 2003. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the petition
for certiorari against the said orders of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 10,
2003 and the Resolution dated March 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
75680 areAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

HERALD BLACK DACASIN, G.R. No. 168785
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Promulgated:
Respondent. February 5, 2010
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
For review[1]is a dismissal[2]of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce child custody
agreement for lack of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo
Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one
daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and
obtained from the Circuit Court, 19 th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a
divorce decree against petitioner. [3] In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of
petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained
jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract
(Agreement[4]) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as
exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook
to obtain from the Illinois court an order relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60
(trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the
Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction
because of the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
86
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondents motion and
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from
taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to
enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to
respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the nationality rule
prevailing in this jurisdiction;[5]and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article
2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code[6]prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.[7]
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree
obtained by respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial courts
exercise of jurisdiction over the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike
in the case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his
nationality.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the validity of the Agreement to
justify its enforcement by the trial court: (1) the Agreement novated the valid divorce
decree, modifying the terms of child custody from sole (maternal) to joint; [8]or (2) the
Agreement is independent of the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Issue
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners
suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child.
The Ruling of the Court
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioners suit but not to enforce the
Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the
dismissal of petitioners suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of
Stephanies custody.
Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction
to Enforce Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit
in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction
over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. [9]An action for specific performance,
such as petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this
species of actions.[10]Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
Indeed, the trial courts refusal to entertain petitioners suit was grounded not on
its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois courts divorce decree stripped
it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was
jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of
[its] Judgment for Dissolution.[11]Petitioners suit seeks the enforcement not of the various

provisions of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody.
Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois courts so-called retained jurisdiction.
Petitioners Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is
contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of
agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. [12]Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence,
deemed inexistent and void from the beginning. [13]For lack of relevant stipulation in the
Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine substantive law serve as default
parameters to test the validity of the Agreements joint child custody stipulations. [14]
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are
undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September
1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws of the
United States because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody
for spouses separated in fact or in law [15](under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code) is also undisputed: no child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother x x x.[16] (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody [17]to the mother is
mandatory,[18]grounded on sound policy consideration, [19]subject only to a narrow
exception not alleged to obtain here.[20]) Clearly then, the Agreements object to establish a
post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child
under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been
repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The
Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law
provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together. [21]However, upon
separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below
seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint
custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply
put, for a child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides
for the separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give
custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the
provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years
anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral,
habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have
sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling
to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second
paragraph of Article 213.[22]
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on its text that No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons
to order otherwise. To limit this provisions enforceability to court sanctioned agreements
while placing private agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard in
custody regulation of children under seven years old of separated parents. This effectively
empowers separated parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a
87
legislative policy vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her children under seven
years of age to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her.
[23]
This ignores the legislative basis that [n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother
who is deprived of her child of tender age. [24]
It could very well be that Article 213s bias favoring one separated parent
(mother) over the other (father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint
parental custody, robs the parents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making between
the separated parents.[25]However, these are objections which question the laws wisdom
not its validity or uniform enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these grievances is
the legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rules seeming harshness or undesirability is
tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as
granting the father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not
inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the second paragraph of
Article 213 which merely grants to the mother final authority on the care and custody of
the minor under seven years of age, in case of disagreements.
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited
in duration, lasting only until the childs seventh year. From the eighth year until the childs
emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual
contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even
supposing that petitioner and respondent are not barred from entering into the Agreement
for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole
custody over Stephanie. Respondents act effectively brought the parties back to ambit of
the default custodial regime in the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
vesting on respondent sole custody of Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decrees alleged invalidity - not because the
Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because
the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse[26]- to support the Agreements
enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign
divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo[27]settled the matter by holding that an
alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. [28]There, we
dismissed the alien divorcees Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the
Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is
not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary
to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
 88

released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

xxxx

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does
not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)

We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[29]to dismiss criminal complaints for

adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his
former Filipino spouse because he no longer qualified as offended spouse entitled to file
the complaints under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a
foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this
jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the aliens nationality, irrespective of who
obtained the divorce.

The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding

Justify Remand

Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioners suit, the logical end to its lack of cause of
action, we remand the case for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanies custody.
Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the
mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of
the default standard on child custody proceedings the best interest of the child. [30]As the
question of custody is already before the trial court and the childs parents, by executing the
Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of swift and
efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take advantage of the courts
jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial arrangement best serving Stephanies
interest, and let the trial court render judgment. This disposition is consistent with the
settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the
childs best interest. [31]

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this ruling.

SO ORDERED.