Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to claim unpaid salaries (or in this
case, unpaid salary differentials) accrue as they fall due.—We do not
agree with the CA when it held that the cause of action of petitioner had
already prescribed as the three-year prescriptive period should be
reckoned from September 1, 1989 when petitioner was forced to sign
another contract against her will. As stated in the complaint, one of
petitioner’s causes of action was for underpayment of salaries. The NLRC
correctly ruled the right to claim unpaid salaries (or in this case, unpaid
salary differentials) accrue as they fall due. Thus, petitioner’s cause of
action to claim salary differential for October 1989 only accrued after she
had rendered service for that month (or at the end of October 1989). Her
right to claim salary differential for November 1989 only accrued at the
end of November 1989, and so on and so forth.
D. G.R. No. 182232.
October 6, 2008.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NENITA B. HU,
accused-appellant.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The act of referral, which means the
act of passing along or forwarding an applicant after an initial
interview to a selected employer, placement or bureau, is included in
recruitment.—Garcia testified that she applied for employment in Taiwan
for the position of Electronic Operator thru Brighturn in April 2002. Due
to the alleged suspension of Brighturn’s license, Hu referred her to a
neighboring agency (Best One), but Hu continued collecting placement fees
from her. The act of referral, which means the act of passing along or
forwarding an applicant after an initial interview to a selected employer,
placement or bureau, is included in recruitment. Undoubtedly, the act of
Hu in referring Garcia to another recruitment agency squarely fell within
the purview of recruitment that was undertaken by Hu after her authority
to recruit and place workers already expired on 17 December 2001.
Cases:
A. G.R. No. 122917
Labor Law; Labor Code; The facts, viewed in light of the Labor
Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show
that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed
regular employees.—At the outset, let it be known that this Court
appreciates the nobility of private respondent’s effort to provide
employment to physically impaired individuals and to make them
more productive members of society. However, we cannot allow it to
elude the legal consequences of that effort, simply because it now
deems their employment irrelevant. The facts, viewed in light of the
Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably
show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed
regular employees. As such, they have acquired legal rights that this
Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of
compassion but as a consequence of law and justice.
Same; Same; Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of
qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article
280 of the Labor Code.—The fact that the employees were qualified
disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from
the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the
rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by
Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Same; Same; When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse
of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby
became regular employees.—As held by the Court, “Articles 280 and
281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of making
permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of
extending to them probationary appointments, ad infinitum.” The
contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment,
during which the bank determined the employees’ fitness for the job.
When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month
probationary period, the employees thereby became regular
employees. No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness
of its employees.
Cases
Onus Probandi of Empoyer-Employee Relationship
Labor Law; Appeals; Generally, the Supreme Court does not review
errors that raise factual questions, however, when there is conflict
among the factual findings of the antecedent deciding bodies like
the Labor Arbiter (LA), the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) and the Court of Appeals (CA), “it is proper, in the exercise
of the High Court’s equity jurisdiction, to review and re-evaluate
the factual issues and to look into the records of the case and re-
examine the questioned findings.”—It must be noted that the issue
of Javier’s alleged illegal dismissal is anchored on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between him and Fly Ace. This is
essentially a question of fact. Generally, the Court does not review
errors that raise factual questions. However, when there is conflict
among the factual findings of the antecedent deciding bodies like the
LA, the NLRC and the CA, “it is proper, in the exercise of Our equity
jurisdiction, to review and re-evaluate the factual issues and to look
into the records of the case and re-examine the questioned findings.”
In dealing with factual issues in labor cases, “substantial evidence—
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion—is sufficient.”
Same; Same; Labor officials are enjoined to use reasonable means
to ascertain the facts speedily and objectively with little regard to
technicalities or formalities but nowhere in the rules are they
provided a license to completely discount evidence, or the lack of
it; When confronted with conflicting versions on factual matters,
it is for them in the exercise of discretion to determine which party
deserves credence on the basis of evidence received, subject only
to the requirement that their decision must be supported by
substantial evidence.—As the records bear out, the LA and the CA
found Javier’s claim of employment with Fly Ace as wanting and
deficient. The Court is constrained to agree. Although Section 10, Rule
VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows a relaxation of the
rules of procedure and evidence in labor cases, this rule of liberality
does not mean a complete dispensation of proof. Labor officials are
enjoined to use reasonable means to ascertain the facts speedily and
objectively with little regard to technicalities or formalities but nowhere
in the rules are they provided a license to completely discount evidence,
or the lack of it. The quantum of proof required, however, must still be
satisfied. Hence, “when confronted with conflicting versions on factual
matters, it is for them in the exercise of discretion to determine which
party deserves credence on the basis of evidence received, subject only
to the requirement that their decision must be supported by substantial
evidence.” Accordingly, the petitioner needs to show by substantial
evidence that he was indeed an employee of the company against which
he claims illegal dismissal.
Same; Social Justice; Out of its concern for the less privileged in
life, the Supreme Court has inclined, more often than not, toward
the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the
employer.—While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social
justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be
supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor
of labor. Management also has its rights which are entitled to respect
and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern
for the less privileged in life, the Court has inclined, more often than
not, toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the
employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the
rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in
the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.
B. G.R. No. 193493
June 13, 2013
JAIME N. GAPAYAO, vs. ROSARIO FULO, SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION,
Labor Law; Holiday Pay; Service Incentive Leave Pay; The employer
has the burden of proving of paying holiday pay, service incentive
leave pay and other benefits.—Article 94 of the Labor Code provides
that: ART. 94. RIGHT TO HOLIDAY PAY.—(a) Every worker shall be paid
his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service
establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers; x x x x
While Article 95 of the Labor Code provides: ART. 95. RIGHT TO SERVICE
INCENTIVE LEAVE.—(a) Every employee who has rendered at least one
year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive of five days
with pay. x x x x Under the Labor Code, Pigcaulan is entitled to his regular
rate on holidays even if he does not work. Likewise, express provision of
the law entitles him to service incentive leave benefit for he rendered
service for more than a year already. Furthermore, under Presidential
Decree No. 851, he should be paid his 13th month pay. As employer, SCII
has the burden of proving that it has paid these benefits to its employees.
B. No. L-31341
March 31, 1976
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA) and
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES SUPERVISORS’ ASSOCIATION (PALSA), vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC.
Same; Same; Same; Off-days not paid days; Reasons.—Off-days are not
paid days. Precisely, off-days are rest days for the worker. He is not
required to work on such days. This finds support not only in the basic
principle in labor that the basis of remuneration or compensation is actual
service rendered, but in the ever-pervading labor spirit aimed at
humanizing the conditions of the working man. Since during his off-days
an employee is not compelled to work he cannot, conversely, demand for
his corresponding pay. If, however, a worker works on his off-day, our
welfare laws duly reward him with a premium higher than what he would
receive when he works on his regular working day.
Same; Same; Same; An employee who takes steps to protest his layoff
cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to have abandoned his
work and the filing of the complaint is proof enough of his desire to
return to work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment—a
contrary notion would not only be illogical but also absurd.—An
employee who takes steps to protest his layoff cannot by any stretch of
imagination be said to have abandoned his work and the filing of the
complaint is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus negating
any suggestion of abandonment. A contrary notion would not only be
illogical but also absurd.
Same; Field Personnel; Words and Phrases; Field personnel shall refer
to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties
away from the principal place of business or branch office of the
employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty.—“Field personnel” shall refer to
non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from
the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose
actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable
certainty.
Same; Same; The amount that can only be demanded by the aggrieved
employee shall be limited to the amount of the benefits withheld
within three years before the filing of the complaint.—The amount that
can only be demanded by the aggrieved employee shall be limited to the
amount of the benefits withheld within three years before the filing of the
complaint.
Same; Same; Control not only applies to the work or goal to be done
but also to the means and methods to accomplish it; Not all forms of
control would establish an employer-employee relationship.—An
impasse appears to have been reached between the CA and the NLRC on
the sole issue of control over an employee’s conduct. It bears clarifying
that such control not only applies to the work or goal to be done but also
to the means and methods to accomplish it. In Sonza v. ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, 431 SCRA 583 (2004), we explained that not all
forms of control would establish an employer-employee relationship, to
wit: Further, not every form of control that a party reserves to himself over
the conduct of the other party in relation to the services being rendered
may be accorded the effect of establishing an employer-employee
relationship. The facts of this case fall squarely with the case of Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd. vs. NLRC, 179 SCRA 459 (1989). In said case, we
held that: Logically, the line should be drawn between rules that merely
serve as guidelines towards the achievement of the mutually desired result
without dictating the means or methods to be employed in attaining it, and
those that control or fix the methodology and bind or restrict the party
hired to the use of such means. The first, which aim only to promote the
result, create no employer-employee relationship unlike the second, which
address both the result and the means used to achieve it.
Same; Same; Insurance Agents; If the specific rules and regulations
that are enforced against insurance agents or managers are such that
would directly affect the means and methods by which such agents
or managers would achieve the objectives set by the insurance
company, they are employees of the insurance company.—Based on
the foregoing cases, if the specific rules and regulations that are enforced
against insurance agents or managers are such that would directly affect
the means and methods by which such agents or managers would achieve
the objectives set by the insurance company, they are employees of the
insurance company. In the instant case, Manulife had the power of control
over Tongko that would make him its employee. Several factors contribute
to this conclusion.
Same; Same; Same; Employer must show that the transfer is not
unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee, nor does
it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges
and other benefits.—When the transfer is not unreasonable, or
inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee, and it does not involve a
demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits, and other privileges,
the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive
dismissal. However, the employer has the burden of proving that the
transfer of an employee is for valid and legitimate grounds. The employer
must show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or
prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a
diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits.
Same; 13th Month Pay; As with holiday and service incentive leave
pay, 13th month pay benefits generally cover all employees; an
employee must be one of those expressly enumerated to be exempted.
Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 851 enumerates the exemptions from the coverage
of 13th month pay benefits.—The governing law on 13th month pay is
PD No. 851. As with holiday and SIL pay, 13th month pay benefits
generally cover all employees; an employee must be one of those expressly
enumerated to be exempted. Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing P.D. No. 851 enumerates the exemptions from the coverage
of 13th month pay benefits. Under Section 3(e), “employers of those who
are paid on x x x task basis, and those who are paid a fixed amount for
performing a specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in the
performance thereof” are exempted. Note that unlike the IRR of the Labor
Code on holiday and SIL pay, Section 3(e) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing PD No. 851 exempts employees “paid on task basis” without
any reference to “field personnel.” This could only mean that insofar as
payment of the 13th month pay is concerned, the law did not intend to
qualify the exemption from its coverage with the requirement that the task
worker be a “field personnel” at the same time.
CASES:
Judgments; Law of the Case; Words and Phrases; Law of the case
has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal—it is
a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court
passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for
further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of
the case upon subsequent appeal.—Law of the case has been defined
as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It is a term applied to an
established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and
remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the
question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent
appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same
case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Indeed,
courts must adhere thereto, whether the legal principles laid down were
“correct on general principles or not” or “whether the question is right
or wrong” because public policy, judicial orderliness and economy
require such stability in the final judgments of courts or tribunals of
competent jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Backwages; The only instance when the
principal can also be held liable with the independent contractor
or subcontractor for the backwages and separation pay of the
latter’s employees is when there is proof that the principal
conspired with the independent contractor or subcontractor in the
illegal dismissal of the employees.—There is no question that private
respondents are operating as an independent contractor and that the
complainants were their employees. There was no employer-employee
relationship that existed between the petitioner and the complainants
and, thus, the former could not have dismissed the latter from
employment. Only private respondents, as the complainants’ employer,
can terminate their services, and should it be done illegally, be held
liable therefor. The only instance when the principal can also be held
liable with the independent contractor or subcontractor for the
backwages and separation pay of the latter’s employees is when there
is proof that the principal conspired with the independent contractor
or subcontractor in the illegal dismissal of the employees.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The joint and several liability of the
principal with the contractor and subcontractor was enacted to
ensure compliance with the provisions of the Labor Code,
principally those on statutory minimum wage, facilitating, if not
guaranteeing, payment of the workers’ compensation, thus, giving
the workers ample protection as mandated by the 1987
Constitution; While the Supreme Court had previously ruled that
the indirect employer can recover whatever amount it had paid to
the employees in accordance with the terms of the service
contract between itself and the contractor, the said ruling cannot
be applied in reverse to this case as to allow the independent
contractor, who paid for the judgment awards in full, to recover
from the indirect employer.—In this case, however, private
respondents had already posted a surety bond in an amount sufficient
to cover all the judgment awards due the complainants, including those
for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay. The joint
and several liability of the principal with the contractor and
subcontractor were enacted to ensure compliance with the provisions
of the Labor Code, principally those on statutory minimum wage. This
liability facilitates, if not guarantees, payment of the workers’
compensation, thus, giving the workers ample protection as mandated
by the 1987 Constitution. With private respondents’ surety bond, it can
therefore be said that the purpose of the Labor Code provision on the
solidary liability of the indirect employer is already accomplished since
the interest of the complainants are already adequately protected.
Consequently, it will be futile to continuously hold the petitioner jointly
and solidarily liable with the private respondents for the judgment
awards for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay.
But while this Court had previously ruled that the indirect employer
can recover whatever amount it had paid to the employees in
accordance with the terms of the service contract between itself and the
contractor, the said ruling cannot be applied in reverse to this case as
to allow the private respondents (the independent contractor), who paid
for the judgment awards in full, to recover from the petitioner (the
indirect employer).
Same; Same; Since San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (SSASI) was
a labor-only contractor, and petitioners were to be deemed the
employees of respondent, then the said reason would not
constitute a just or authorized cause for petitioners’ dismissal.—
The sole reason given for the dismissal of petitioners by SSASI was the
termination of its service contract with respondent. But since SSASI
was a labor-only contractor, and petitioners were to be deemed the
employees of respondent, then the said reason would not constitute a
just or authorized cause for petitioners’ dismissal. It would then appear
that petitioners were summarily dismissed based on the afore-cited
reason, without compliance with the procedural due process for notice
and hearing.
A. No. L-15045
January 20, 1961
IN RE PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. ROMAN CATHOLIC
ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA
vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION
Social security; Scope of coverage.—The coverage of the Social
Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship of more or less permanent nature and
extends to employment of all kinds except those expressly
excluded.
B. No. L-21448
August 30, 1967
POBLETE CONSTRUCTION Co., vs. JUDITH ASIAIN, SOCIAL
SECURITY COMMISSION and BENITO MACRHON, in his
capacity as Sheriff of Rizal
Judicial Review; The rule is that the Court does not decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case—the question of the
constitutionality of the proviso in Section 12-B(d) of R.A. No.
8282 is absolutely for the proper resolution of the present
case.—The Court concedes that the petitioner did not raise the
issue of the validity of the proviso “as of the date of his retirement”
in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. The rule is that the Court
does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
absolutely necessary to a decision of the case. However, the
question of the constitutionality of the proviso is absolutely
necessary for the proper resolution of the present case.
Accordingly, the Court required the parties to present their
arguments on this issue and proceeded to pass upon the same
in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and in order to render
substantial justice to the petitioner who, presumably in her
advanced age by now, deserves to receive forthwith the survivor’s
pension accruing upon the death of her husband.
Same; Same; When the alleged valid cause for the termination
of employment is not clearly proven, as in this case, the law
considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.—The law is
clear that drug tests shall be performed only by authorized drug
testing centers. In this case, Sulpicio Lines failed to prove that
S.M. Lazo Clinic is an accredited drug testing center. Sulpicio
Lines did not even deny Nacague’s allegation that S.M. Lazo
Clinic was not accredited. Also, only a screening test was
conducted to determine if Nacague was guilty of using illegal
drugs. Sulpicio Lines did not confirm the positive result of the
screening test with a confirmatory test. Sulpicio Lines failed to
indubitably prove that Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs
amounting to serious misconduct and loss of trust and
confidence. Sulpicio Lines failed to clearly show that it had a valid
and legal cause for terminating Nacague’s employment. When the
alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not
clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter a
case of illegal dismissal.
Labor Law; Social Security Law; Republic Act (RA) No. 8282,
the amendatory law of R.A. No. 1161 or the “Social Security
Law” is a tax-exempt social security service designed to
promote social justice and provide meaningful protection to
members and their beneficiaries against the hazards of
disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other
contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial
burden.—The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8282, the amendatory law of R.A. No.
1161 or the “Social Security Law.” It is a tax-exempt social
security service designed to promote social justice and provide
meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against
the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and
other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial
burden.
CASE:
Same; Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; In labor disputes, grave abuse
of discretion may be ascribed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) when, inter alia, its findings and the
conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial
evidence.—In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be
ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and the conclusions
reached thereby are not supported by substantial evidence. This
requirement of substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that “in cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion.”
Same; Bad Faith; Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a
breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill
will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.―“[B]ad faith does
not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive
or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.” Here,
although we agree with the Labor Arbiter that Ke-e acted in
an arbitrary manner in effecting Cagalawan’s transfer, the
same, absent any showing of some dishonest or wrongful
purpose, does not amount to bad faith.
Constructive Dismissal
Probationary Employment
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts, the resolution of factual issues being the function of lower courts
whose findings are received with respect and are binding on the Court
subject to certain exceptions such as when there are conflicting findings of
fact by the Court of Appeals, on the one hand, and the trial court or
government agency concerned, on the other, as in the present case.—As a
rule, the Court is not a trier of facts, the resolution of factual issues being the
function of lower courts whose findings are received with respect and are binding
on the Court subject to certain exceptions. A recognized exception to the rule is
the circumstance in which there are conflicting findings of fact by the CA, on the
one hand, and the trial court or government agency concerned, on the other, as
in the present case. The factual findings of the NLRC on the dispute between
Dalangin and the company are at variance with those of the CA, thus
necessitating our review of the case, especially the evidence on record.
Same; Same; Same; The Labor Code mandates the employer to furnish
the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated, a written
notice containing a statement of the causes of termination and shall
afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of a representative if he so desires.—Article 277(b)
of the Labor Code mandates that subject to the constitutional right of
workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against
dismissal, except for just and authorized cause and without prejudice to
the requirement of notice under Article 283 of the same Code, the employer
shall furnish the worker, whose employment is sought to be terminated, a
written notice containing a statement of the causes of termination, and
shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of a representative if he so desires, in accordance with
company rules and regulations pursuant to the guidelines set by the
Department of Labor and Employment.
Same; Same; Same; The due process requirements under the Labor
Code are mandatory and may not be supplanted by police
investigation or court proceedings; Criminal aspect of the case is
considered independent of the administrative aspect.—As correctly
pointed out by the NLRC, the due process requirements under the Labor
Code are mandatory and may not be supplanted by police investigation or
court proceedings. The criminal aspect of the case is considered
independent of the administrative aspect. Thus, employers should not rely
solely on the findings of the Prosecutor’s Office. They are mandated to
conduct their own sep,arate investigation, and to accord the employee
every opportunity to defend himself. Furthermore, respondent was not
represented by counsel when she was strip-searched inside the company
premises or during the police investigation, and in the preliminary
investigation before the Prosecutor’s Office.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has the authority to review matters
not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties.—Truly, it is
axiomatic that an appeal, once accepted by this Court, throws the entire case
open to review, and that this Court has the authority to review matters not
specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.
Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; Findings of the Labor Arbiter, when
affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the
Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court, unless patently
erroneous.—Settled is the rule that the findings of the Labor Arbiter, when
affirmed by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, are binding on the
Supreme Court, unless patently erroneous. It is not the function of the
Supreme Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below. The jurisdiction of this Court in a
petition for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing only errors of law,
not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by
evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts. The more recent Peñafrancia Tours and Travel
Transport, Inc., v. Sarmiento, 634 SCRA 279 (2010), has reaffirmed the
above ruling, to wit: Finally, the CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and
adopted as its own the latter’s factual findings. Long-established is the
doctrine that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies x x x are accorded
respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. When passed
upon and upheld by the CA, they are binding and conclusive upon this
Court and will not normally be disturbed. Though this doctrine is not
without exceptions, the Court finds that none are applicable to the present
case.
Same; Same; To effect a legal dismissal, the employer must show not
only a valid ground therefor, but also that procedural due process has
properly been observed.—To effect a legal dismissal, the employer must
show not only a valid ground therefor, but also that procedural due
process has properly been observed. When the Labor Code speaks of
procedural due process, the reference is usually to the two (2)-written
notice rule envisaged in Section 2 (III), Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code, which provides: Section 2. Standard
of due process: requirements of notice.—In all cases of termination of
employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially
observed. I. For termination of employment based on just causes as
defined in Article 282 of the Code: (a) A written notice served on the
employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to
said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; (b)
A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence
presented against him; and (c) A written notice [of] termination served on
the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the
circumstance, grounds have been established to justify his termination. In
case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employee’s
last known address.
Termination by Employer
Same; Same; Fighting in the Workplace; In People v. Asto, 277 SCRA 697
(1997), the Supreme Court (SC) characterized fight as not just a merely
verbal tussle but a physical combat between two opposing parties.—In
several rulings where the meaning of fight was decisive, the Court has observed
that the term fight was considered to be different from the term argument. In
People v. Asto, 277 SCRA 697 (1997), for instance, the Court characterized fight
as not just a merely verbal tussle but a physical combat between two opposing
parties, to wit: Well into their second bottle of gin, at about eleven o’clock that
morning, Fernando Aquino and Peregrino had a verbal tussle. Fernando Aquino
declared that he was going to run for councilor of Alcala, Pangasinan. Peregrino
countered by saying: “If you will run for that post, cousin, I will fight you.” After
a brief exchange of words, Fernando Aquino, laughing, went to sit beside Abagat.
As Aquino continued with his mirth, Abagat stared at Peregrino with contempt.
x x x. A few minutes later, he heard a commotion in the plantation some two
hundred meters away. He claims to have seen several people fighting each other
with pieces of wood but did not go to the field to check what was happening.
(Italics supplied) Similarly, in Pilares, Sr. v. People, 518 SCRA 143 (2007), fight
was held to be more than just an exchange of words that usually succeeded the
provocation by either party, thus: When the petitioner was about to hand over
the bottles of beer to the private complainant, the latter called him “coward” and
dared him to get out for a fight. Insulted, the petitioner went out of his store and
chased the private complainant. (Italics supplied) Based on the foregoing, the
incident involving Del Rosario and Gamboa could not be justly considered as
akin to the fight contemplated by Northwest. In the eyes of the NLRC, Del Rosario
and Gamboa were arguing but not fighting. The understanding of fight as one
that required physical combat was absent during the incident of May 18, 1998.
Moreover, the claim of Morales that Del Rosario challenged Gamboa to a brawl
(sabunutan) could not be given credence by virtue of its being self-serving in
favor of Northwest, and of its being an apparent afterthought on the part of
Morales during the investigation of the incident, without Del Rosario having the
opportunity to contest Morales’ statement. In that context, the investigation then
served only as Northwest’s means to establish that the grounds of a valid
dismissal based on serious misconduct really existed.
Same; Same; Same; Even assuming arguendo that the incident was the kind
of fight prohibited by Northwest’s Rules of Conduct, the same could not be
considered as of such seriousness as to warrant Del Rosario’s dismissal
from the service.—Even assuming arguendo that the incident was the kind of
fight prohibited by Northwest’s Rules of Conduct, the same could not be
considered as of such seriousness as to warrant Del Rosario’s dismissal from the
service. The gravity of the fight, which was not more than a verbal argument
between them, was not enough to tarnish or diminish Northwest’s public image.
XII
Authorize Causes
“FLAOTING STATUS”
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has held, citing Sebuguero
v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 532 (1995), that the placement of the employee
on a floating status should not last for more than six (6) months. After
six months, the employee should be recalled for work, or for a new
assignment; otherwise, he is deemed terminated.—This Court has
held, citing Sebuguero v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 532 (1995), that the placement
of the employee on a floating status should not last for more than six
months. After six months, the employee should be recalled for work, or for
a new assignment; otherwise, he is deemed terminated. There is no specific
provision of law which treats of a temporary retrenchment or layoff and
provides for the requisites in effecting it or a period or duration therefor.
These employees cannot forever be temporarily laid off. To remedy this
situation or fill the hiatus, Article 286 [now 292] may be applied but only
by analogy to set a specific period that employees may remain temporarily
laid off or in floating status. Six months is the period set by law that the
operation of a business or undertaking may be suspended thereby
suspending the employment of the employees concerned. The temporary
layoff wherein the employees likewise cease to work should also not last
longer than six months. After six months, the employees should either be
recalled to work or permanently retrenched following the requirements of
the law, and that failing to comply with this would be tantamount to
dismissing the employees and the employer would thus be liable for such
dismissal.
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The Supreme Court (SC) has
declared that the burden of proving that there are no posts available
to which the security guard may be assigned rests on the employer.—
In every case, the Court has declared that the burden of proving that there
are no posts available to which the security guard may be assigned rests
on the employer. We ruled in Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc.
v. Valderama, 644 SCRA 299 (2011): In cases involving security guards, a
relief and transfer order in itself does not sever employment relationship
between a security guard and his agency. An employee has the right to
security of tenure, but this does not give him a vested right to his position
as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment
or transfer him where his service, as security guard, will be most beneficial
to the client. Temporary “off-detail” or the period of time security guards
are made to wait until they are transferred or assigned to a new post or
client does not constitute constructive dismissal, so long as such status
does not continue beyond six months. The onus of proving that there is no
post available to which the security guard can be assigned rests on the
employer x x x.
Same; Security Guards; While the Supreme Court (SC) has recognized
the security guards’ right to security of tenure under the “floating
status” rule, the Court has similarly acknowledged the management
prerogative of security agencies to transfer security guards when
necessary in conducting its business, provided it is done in good
faith.—It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that the right of security guards
to security of tenure is safeguarded by administrative issuances and
jurisprudence, in parallel with the mandate of the Labor Code and the
Constitution to protect labor and the working people. Nonetheless, while
the Court has recognized the security guards’ right to security of tenure
under the “floating status” rule, the Court has similarly acknowledged the
management prerogative of security agencies to transfer security guards
when necessary in conducting its business, provided it is done in good
faith.
Same; Same; Same; Procedural Due Process; The Labor Code and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) are silent on the
procedural due process required in terminations due to disease.
Despite the seeming gap in the law, Section 2, Rule 1, Book VI of
the IRR expressly states that the employee should be afforded
procedural due process in all cases of dismissals.—The Labor Code
and its IRR are silent on the procedural due process required in
terminations due to disease. Despite the seeming gap in the law,
Section 2, Rule 1, Book VI of the IRR expressly states that the employee
should be afforded procedural due process in all cases of dismissals.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals, 398 SCRA 301, and Manly Express, Inc. v.
Payong, Jr., 474 SCRA 323, promulgated in 2003 and 2005,
respectively, the Court finally pronounced the rule that the employer
must furnish the employee two written notices in terminations due to
disease, namely: (1) the notice to apprise the employee of the ground
for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the notice informing the
employee of his dismissal, to be issued after the employee has been
given reasonable opportunity to answer and to be heard on his defense.
These rulings reinforce the State policy of protecting the workers from
being terminated without cause and without affording them the
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although the general rule is that failure
to attach a verification and certification against forum shopping
is a ground for dismissal, there are cases where this court allowed
substantial compliance.—Although the general rule is that failure to
attach a verification and certification against forum shopping is a
ground for dismissal, there are cases where this court allowed
substantial compliance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has recognized
that there are instances when officials or employees of a
corporation can sign the verification and certification against
forum shopping without a board resolution.—This court has
recognized that there are instances when officials or employees of a
corporation can sign the verification and certification against forum
shopping without a board resolution. In Cagayan Valley Drug
Corporation v. CIR, 545 SCRA 10 (2008), it was held that: In sum, we
have held that the following officials or employees of the company can
sign the verification and certification without need of a board
resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the
President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General
Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a
labor case. While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of
authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by
the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was
done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing
cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives
of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum
shopping, being ‘in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness
of the allegations in the petition.’ Corazon’s affidavit states that she is
the “office manager and resident interpreter of the Manila Bureau of
Fuji Television Network, Inc.” and that she has “held the position for
the last twenty-three years.” As the office manager for 23 years,
Corazon can be considered as having knowledge of all matters in Fuji’s
Manila Bureau Office and is in a position to verify “the truthfulness
and the correctness of the allegations in the Petition.” Thus, Fuji
substantially complied with the requirements of verification and
certification against forum shopping.
Labor Law; Appeals; Article 223 of the Labor Code does not provide
any mode of appeal for decisions of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).—Article 223 of the Labor Code does not provide
any mode of appeal for decisions of the National Labor Relations
Commission. It merely states that “[t]he decision of the Commission
shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt
thereof by the parties.” Being final, it is no longer appealable. However,
the finality of the National Labor Relations Commission’s decisions
does not mean that there is no more recourse for the parties.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) clarified that judicial review
of National Labor Relations Commission’s (NLRC’s) decisions shall
be by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Citing the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts, it further ruled that such petitions
shall be filed before the Court of Appeals (CA). From the CA, an
aggrieved party may file a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.—In St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 295 SCRA 494 (1998), this court cited several cases and
rejected the notion that this court had no jurisdiction to review
decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission. It stated that
this court had the power to review the acts of the National Labor
Relations Commission to see if it kept within its jurisdiction in deciding
cases and also as a form of check and balance. This court then clarified
that judicial review of National Labor Relations Commission’s decisions
shall be by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Citing the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts, it further ruled that such petitions shall
be filed before the Court of Appeals. From the Court of Appeals, an
aggrieved party may file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action where
the issue is limited to grave abuse of discretion. As an original action,
it cannot be considered as a continuation of the proceedings of the
labor tribunals. On the other hand, a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal where the issue is limited to
questions of law. In labor cases, a Rule 45 petition is limited to
reviewing whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion and deciding other
jurisdictional errors of the National Labor Relations Commission.
Same; Attorney’s Fees; Article 111 of the Labor Code states that
“[i]n cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party
may be assessed attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%)
of the amount of wages recovered”; Where an employee was forced
to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and
interest, the award of attorney’s fees is legally and morally
justifiable.—With regard to the award of attorney’s fees, Article 111 of
the Labor Code states that “[i]n cases of unlawful withholding of wages,
the culpable party may be assessed attorney’s fees equivalent to ten
percent of the amount of wages recovered.” Likewise, this court has
recognized that “in actions for recovery of wages or where an employee
was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights
and interest, the award of attorney’s fees is legally and morally
justifiable.” Due to her illegal dismissal, Arlene was forced to litigate.
Fuji Television Network, Inc. vs. Espiritu, 744 SCRA 31, G.R. Nos.
204944-45 December 3, 2014
XIII
CONSEQUENCES OF TERMINATION
Same; Same; Same; Even if the specific issue brought before the
arbitrators merely mentioned the question of “whether an
employee was discharged for just cause,” they could reasonably
assume that their powers extended beyond the determination
thereof to include the power to reinstate the employee or to grant
back wages.—A more recent case is Ludo & Luym Corporation v.
Saornido, 395 SCRA 451 (2003). In that case, we recognized that
voluntary arbitrators are generally expected to decide only those
questions expressly delineated by the submission agreement; that,
nevertheless, they can assume that they have the necessary power to
make a final settlement on the related issues, since arbitration is the
final resort for the adjudication of disputes. Thus, we ruled that even if
the specific issue brought before the arbitrators merely mentioned the
question of “whether an employee was discharged for just cause,” they
could reasonably assume that their powers extended beyond the
determination thereof to include the power to reinstate the employee or
to grant back wages. In the same vein, if the specific issue brought
before the arbitrators referred to the date of regularization of the
employee, law and jurisprudence gave them enough leeway as well as
adequate prerogative to determine the entitlement of the employees to
higher benefits in accordance with the finding of regularization. Indeed,
to require the parties to file another action for payment of those benefits
would certainly undermine labor proceedings and contravene the
constitutional mandate providing full protection to labor and speedy
labor justice.
December 4, 2007
December 4, 2007
CITIBANK, N.A., WILLIAM FERGUSON, and AZIZ RAJKOTWALA,
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
MARILOU GENUINO, respondents Genuino vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 539 SCRA 342, G.R. Nos. 142732-33, G.R.
Nos. 142753-54 December 4, 2007
Same; Same; Same; Same; The fact that the employee may not be
residing in the address indicated in the employer’s records does
not excuse the employer from sending the notices to the
employee’s last known address.—The present case squarely falls
under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it
was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for
another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the
notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last
known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside
there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a
valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to
the employee’s last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for
non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court believes that the ruling in
Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission, 323 SCRA 445
(2000), did not consider the full meaning of Article 279 of the
Labor Code which provision means that the termination is illegal
only if it is not for any of the justified or authorized causes
provided by law and that payment of backwages and other benefits,
including reinstatement, is justified only if the employee was
unjustly dismissed; The fact that the Serrano ruling can cause
unfairness and injustice which elicited strong dissent has
prompted the Court to revisit the doctrine.—The rationale for the
re-examination of the Wenphil doctrine in Serrano was the significant
number of cases involving dismissals without requisite notices. We
concluded that the imposition of penalty by way of damages for
violation of the notice requirement was not serving as a deterrent.
Hence, we now required payment of full backwages from the time of
dismissal until the time the Court finds the dismissal was for a just or
authorized cause. Serrano was confronting the practice of employers to
“dismiss now and pay later” by imposing full backwages. We believe,
however, that the ruling in Serrano did not consider the full meaning
of Article 279 of the Labor Code which states: ART. 279. Security of
Tenure.—In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from
the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement. This means that the termination is illegal only if
it is not for any of the justified or authorized causes provided by law.
Payment of backwages and other benefits, including reinstatement, is
justified only if the employee was unjustly dismissed. The fact that the
Serrano ruling can cause unfairness and injustice which elicited strong
dissent has prompted us to revisit the doctrine.
Same; Same; Same; The better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine
and to follow Wenphil v. National Labor Relations Commission, 170
SCRA 69 (1989), by holding that the dismissal was for just cause but
imposing sanctions on the employer, which sanctions, however, must
be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil.—After carefully analyzing the
consequences of the divergent doctrines in the law on employment
termination, we believe that in cases involving dismissals for cause but
without observance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the
better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by
holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on
the employer. Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed
in Wenphil. By doing so, this Court would be able to achieve a fair result
by dispensing justice not just to employees, but to employers as well.
petitioners are allowed sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed order or
resolution within which to file the petition. Hence, in cases where a petition
for certiorari is filed after the expiration of the 10-day period under the
2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure but within the 60-day period under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, the CA can grant the petition and modify, nullify
and reverse a decision or resolution of the NLRC.
Same; Same; Mass Leave; Words and Phrases; The phrase “mass
leave” may refer to a simultaneous availment of authorized leave
benefits by a large number of employees in a company.―The term
“Mass Leave” has been left undefined by the Labor Code. Plainly, the
legislature intended that the term’s ordinary sense be used. “Mass” is
defined as “participated in, attended by, or affecting a large number of
individuals; having a large-scale character.” While the term “Leave” is
defined as “an authorized absence or vacation from duty or employment
usually with pay.” Thus, the phrase “mass leave” may refer to a
simultaneous availment of authorized leave benefits by a large number
of employees in a company.
Labor Law; Money Claims; The prevailing party’s receipt of the full
amount of the judgment award pursuant to a writ of execution
issued by the labor arbiter does not close or terminate the case if
such receipt is qualified as without prejudice to the outcome of
the petition for certiorari pending with the Court of Appeals (CA).—
The petitioner’s receipt of the monetary award adjudicated by the NLRC
is not absolute, unconditional and unqualified. The petitioner’s May 3,
2007 Motion for Release contains a reservation, stating in his prayer
that: “it is respectfully prayed that the respondents and/or Great
Domestic Insurance Co. be ordered to RELEASE/GIVE the amount of
P23,521.67 in favor of the complainant TIMOTEO H. SARONA without
prejudice to the outcome of the petition with the CA.” In Leonis
Navigation Co., Inc., et al. v. Villamater, et al., 614 SCRA 182 (2010),
this Court ruled that the prevailing party’s receipt of the full amount of
the judgment award pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the labor
arbiter does not close or terminate the case if such receipt is qualified
as without prejudice to the outcome of the petition for certiorari
pending with the CA.
CASES
Same; Same; Same; Same; The relations between capital and labor
are not merely contractual—they are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good.—The
relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They
are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to
the common good. x x x The supremacy of the law over contracts is
explained by the fact that labor contracts are not ordinary contracts;
these are imbued with public interest and therefore are subject to the
police power of the state. It should not be taken to mean that retirement
provisions agreed upon in the CBA are absolutely beyond the ambit of
judicial review and nullification. A CBA, as a labor contract, is not
merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest. If the
retirement provisions in the CBA run contrary to law, public morals, or
public policy, such provisions may very well be voided.
G.