MARÍA JOSÉ ALCARAZ LEÓN

Aesthetics Makes Nothing Happen? The Role

of Aesthetic Properties in the Constitution
of Non-aesthetic Value

abstract
The relationship between aesthetic value and other moral and cognitive values has been a key theme within contemporary
aesthetic discussion. In this article, I explore once again the implications of this relationship, but from what I think might be
a different angle. With few exceptions, notably Dominic Lopes, most of the contributions to this issue have dealt with the
impact that moral or cognitive values could possibly have on the overall aesthetic value of a work of art. In this article, I
explore instead how aesthetic properties or merits could play a role in explaining moral and cognitive properties. To do so, I
first offer some examples that I think may reasonably exemplify the phenomenon we are considering. Second, I argue that a
proper account of interactionism should meet at least two constraints: the relevance constraint and the autonomy constraint.
Finally, I try to clarify how it is possible that aesthetic properties substantially contribute to other values by appealing to the
notions of expression and the affective character of aesthetic properties.

The relationship between aesthetic value and
other moral and cognitive values has been a key
theme within contemporary aesthetic debates.
In particular, there has been a rich discussion
about how, if at all, moral or cognitive values
of artworks can impinge upon their aesthetic or
artistic value. Different positions have entered
the frame ranging from Radical Autonomism to
Radical Moralism or Ethicism.1 In this sense, the
relationship between aesthetic and non-aesthetic
value has been understood mostly as a one-way
relationship. While moral and cognitive values
have been regarded as partly responsible for the
aesthetic greatness of a particular work, little
attention has been paid to the way in which some
cognitive or moral values can be partly determined
by aesthetic aspects. A significant exception to
this approach is Dominic Lopes’s (2005) defense
of interactionism, which pays attention to the way
in which aesthetic merits can have an impact on
pictorial artworks’ moral or cognitive properties.
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 76:1 Winter 2018
C 2018 The American Society for Aesthetics
In tune with Lopes’s proposal, I explore the
possibility that aesthetic properties or merits
play a significant role in explaining moral and
cognitive value. Thus, I am sympathetic to
Lopes’s attempt to defend interactionism, but I
expand its scope to other artifacts and show that
interactionism is compatible with Particularism.2
In this sense, I concentrate upon the various
ways in which aesthetic properties may partly
explain our attribution of moral or cognitive
value to artworks as well to nonartistic artifacts
and human behavior. To illuminate the sort of
contribution that aesthetic properties can make
to the emergence of other non-aesthetic features,
I appeal to the affective character of aesthetic
properties.
I argue that the role that aesthetics properties
may play in explaining other non-aesthetic prop-
erties is not a matter of chance or coincidence.
Rather, aesthetic properties play this role—or at
least it is possible that they play it—because their
22
affective character provides an explanation for
such a role. Finally, if the analysis is cogent, it could
be shown that, in some evaluative judgments, aes-
thetic properties partly explain the presence of
moral and cognitive value.
But, before addressing the main issue of this ar-
ticle, some clarifications could be required. Since
the main problem concerns what role, if any, aes-
thetic properties or values may have in the expla-
nation of other non-aesthetic properties or values,
we need to specify which aspects exactly are to be
the focus of attention in order to clarify this rela-
tionship. What kind of items are exactly the items
that enter into this relation: do we talk about aes-
thetic properties, values, or merits? To what do
these elements contribute? To moral and cogni-
tive properties, values, or merits? Although there
are important distinctions between, for example,
aesthetic properties and aesthetic values, I address
the problem without entering into these distinc-
tions. The main issue here is whether an object’s
aesthetic aspects can have a role in explaining
other non-aesthetic features. The phenomenon
will be characterized, then, as broadly as possible.
And I offer examples involving aesthetic proper-
ties, values, and merits. To which of these we refer
will be determined by the particular case under
examination. While in some cases the relationship
will be better exemplified by the contribution that
aesthetic properties make to other non-aesthetic
aspects, in others the moral worth, or merit, we
attribute to a particular work can be grounded
upon the aesthetic merit we also find in it. My
aim is to show that, whatever the differences be-
tween properties and values, the issue of how the
aesthetic contributes to the non-aesthetic can be
addressed consistently. Although elucidating this
contribution will in some cases require evaluative
discourse and in others descriptive one, the key
issue is, I believe, that the aesthetic dimension of a
work, object, or action can play a particular role in
the emergence of other non-aesthetic properties.
i. varieties of interactionism
Interactionism has been mostly discussed in
the context of art appreciation. More narrowly,
Lopes’s proposal is in principle limited to the field
of pictorial appreciation and evaluation. Likewise,
most of the authors who have paid some attention
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
to this relationship have looked at the representa-
tional arts, notably literature.3
In this section, I would like to show that interac-
tionism may apply to a wider scope of objects and
phenomena—such as nonartistic artifacts, pieces
of behavior, or character traits—and that the focus
upon artworks might narrow our understanding of
this phenomenon. Second, I explore the different
kinds of contributions that aesthetic (de)merits
can make to other moral or cognitive values.
Finally, I also defend, partly relying on the variety
of cases displayed, that interactionism is not only
compatible with the view called Particularism, but
that it requires it.
Before introducing some examples that I think
might illustrate this kind of relation and since
moral and cognitive merits will be mentioned
continuously, I should say how to understand
these nonaesthetic properties whose emergence
is, at least in the cases I am interested in, partly
explained by the aesthetic dimension of the work.
Since I think interactionism applies not only to
artworks but to a wider range of representations,
artifacts, actions, and so on, it seems the notion
of a moral or cognitive (de)merit must be wide
enough to find its home in all these different
kinds of objects. Nevertheless, I take for granted
that what makes for a moral value in a represen-
tational work might be different from what makes
it that a piece of music is sentimental or a building
aggressive. My aim is not to offer a precise charac-
terization of what constitutes a moral or cognitive
(de)merit or property in each case. Rather, I
assume these kinds of attributions are part of our
current characterization of artworks, representa-
tions, actions, and so on. And I explain the extent
to which these attributions are partly explained by
the aesthetic dimension of the items in question.
Now, if we try to illustrate interactionism with
some examples, it seems that the natural realm
to begin with is representational arts. At least, if
we pay attention to the literature on this subject,
the typical examples are works of art. However,
as I have mentioned above, I think we can often
find examples of interactionism that fall outside
artistic media and that, therefore, indicate that this
relation has a wider scope.
Artifacts such as mathematical proofs or dia-
grams can be good examples of the contribution
that aesthetic properties can make to cognitive
value.4 Although it is not completely uncontro-
versial, there is a certain agreement on the idea
Alcaraz León Aesthetics Makes Nothing Happen?
that the cognitive value of a mathematical proof
might be partly improved by its formal beauty.
For some recent work on this issue, see especially
McAllister (2005). Mathematicians and philoso-
phers alike have remarked that the elegance and
beauty of a mathematical proof may increase its
cognitive value insofar as it presents mathemati-
cal relations in a way that makes them clearer and
more graspable. In this sense, two equally right
mathematical proofs will possess the same truth-
value in terms of the content afforded but differ-
ent cognitive values in terms of the availability or
clarity with which the content is delivered. Hence,
the alleged cognitive value that simple, but elegant
and clear, mathematical proofs possess seems to
be strongly connected to these aesthetic proper-
ties. Moreover, this could probably be true in the
case of scientific theories as well. The simplicity
and elegance with which a theory is formulated
usually contributes to its cognitive value not in the
sense of making the content of the theory true but
in the sense of providing a better grasp of the facts
and relationships described within the theory.
A different scenario in which we can identify
this role that aesthetic properties may play in
an explanation of other cognitive and moral
properties pertains to the way we perceive and
judge people’s behavior. Thus, aesthetic features
of the way an action is performed or the aesthetic
aspects of personality and character may also be
significant here. Our moral judgments usually go
beyond assessing the moral value of particular ac-
tions. They also assess character traits or features
of personality that may, in turn, also be grounded
on an aesthetic dimension. An edgy character
can be linked to restless, unpurposive behavior;
a friendly and honest approach is usually seen
in spontaneous, graceful, bodily movements. In
fact, sometimes, the moral worth of an action can
be manifested by what we could identify as the
aesthetic or expressive aspects of the action.
Consider two agents performing a similar ac-
tion, which, considering the situation, amounts to
the right thing to do. However, while one of the
subject’s performances is dry and mechanical, the
other seems to be delicate and well adjusted. Even
if the outcome of these two actions is the same, we
could have some reasons to praise the latter in a
way that will not be possible with the former. That
is, the aesthetic character with which the agent per-
forms the action can improve an action’s overall
value.5
23
These examples show, in my view, that interac-
tionism has a wider scope than most thinkers have
assumed.6
If we turn now to the arts, we can also see
that interactionism, although clearly exempli-
fied within the representational arts, is not
limited to them. Examining examples from
different artistic media can provide some initial
support to approaching this issue as broadly
as possible. I begin with a clear example of
representational painting, and I offer examples of
different artistic media, both representational and
nonrepresentational.
Chardin’s still life paintings have been fre-
quently described as possessing a moral grandeur,
which other works belonging to the same genre
lack. This aspect of Chardin’s work is related
to his characteristic pictorial display of objects.
Although most of the elements that feature in
Chardin’s still lifes are inanimate beings, they of-
ten look as if they were something alive—as if the
objects were almost on the verge of moving. Of-
ten, this quality has been described by saying that
the objects of Chardin’s paintings look more like
people moving on a stage than like mere inert ob-
jects. This dramatic quality explains why Chardin’s
still life paintings, in spite of belonging to an un-
dervalued genre, were so much cherished in his
time. In a sense, he endowed the depicted ob-
jects with a human quality that, in turn, elevated
the subject matter to another better-considered
genre.
But, how do we move from noticing this as-
pect of Chardin’s still lifes to the claim about the
moral depth made visible in his paintings? How
can simple, domestic objects invite thoughts usu-
ally associated with higher pictorial motives, such
as human action or human presence? It seems that
this moral depth or quality cannot be simply ex-
plained by the fact that Chardin rendered ordinary
objects with a human-like appearance—albeit, as
I argue, this is important, too. What makes for the
moral depth in Chardin is how his endowing of
these objects with a human appearance serves as
a kind of visual metaphor for human dignity. His
paintings show a kind of dignity that, because it is
instantiated in humble, ordinary objects, achieves
a deeper sense for the viewer. Chardin’s mode of
depicting the objects in the pictorial space is one
of the main resources for achieving this effect. In
fact, one of the features that seems to contribute
to this overall effect is the way Chardin typically
24
arranged the pictorial space; he rendered it as if
it were a theatrical stage where action could take
place. In doing so, a simple vase, a bunch of fruit,
or a dead ray—whose abdominal side seems to be
looking at us—acquired a dramatic presence that
became a personal mark of Chardin’s work. For a
salient interpretation of Chardin’s work in terms
of the notions of absorption and theatricality see
Fried (1980).
Similarly, the delicacy of Chardin’s brushstroke
and the atmospheric treatment of light and color
are partly responsible for the profoundness of
his still lifes and for the peculiar sense of live-
liness that Proust (1988) so much praised and
which Diderot (1995) found somehow magical.
Thus, the moral dimension usually ascribed to
Chardin’s paintings is strongly grounded in their
aesthetic character; for this dimension depends
not on the representation of a clear moral scene
but on the aesthetic qualities we experience the
ordinary objects depicted as possessing. Com-
monplace pots and cutlery, ordinary pieces of
bread and fruit become—through features such
as theatricality, dramatization, atmospheric qual-
ities, and delicate brushstrokes—dignified and
morally charged. I think that a significant aspect of
Chardin’s achievement has also to do with the fact
that the objects in his still lifes become dignified
without losing their ordinariness. Chardin’s pots,
vases, and goods are dignified without being sub-
limated or merely transformed into metaphoric
devices.
If we now look at some examples of nonrepre-
sentational art, we can easily find examples where
the relationship between the aesthetic character
of the work and its moral or cognitive value seem
to be intimately connected. Thus, for example,
the authoritarian character7 of a building or
an architectural element, such as the façade of
the Palazzo delle Espozisioni on the occasion
of the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution that
took place in 1932–1934, seems to be noticeably
grounded upon its aesthetic appearance. It is the
aesthetic dimension of the façade, its overwhelm-
ing solidness and grandeur, which endowed it
with such moral quality.8 Its sober color and its
location relative to other surrounding buildings
also stroke the viewer’s aesthetic sensibility in a
way that led to an experience of authority. Finally,
its verticality was emphasized by the solidity of
the buttresses and made the viewer feel the power
the building was designed to embody.
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
Other nonrepresentational works, such as ab-
solute or pure music, could similarly be said to
possess certain moral properties by virtue of the
expressive and aesthetic qualities the composer
endows the piece with (see Alcaraz León 2012).
Thus, for example, Rêve d’amour by Liszt, whose
excessive sentimental character could be regarded
as a moral defect of the piece, could be shown to be
dependent upon the expressive resources devel-
oped by the composer.9 For example, the increase
in intensity in the development of the theme con-
trasts with the final pianissimo section. This re-
source allows the exploration of the same melody
under different expressive characters: while it is
much more extroversive in the development of the
melodic theme (thanks to the fast tempo and the
forte dynamics), the slowing down of the tempo
and the pianissimo in the final bars endows the
melody with an intimate character. Finally, the
rubatto effect that typically characterizes the in-
terpretation of this piece endows the theme with
a hesitant, but longing, character. One could say
that Liszt conveys sentimentality right across the
musical spectrum.
Although I have mostly presented cases where
aesthetic qualities seem to contribute positively to
the emergence of other values—except the cases
from the nonrepresentational arts—I think we can
also find examples where an aesthetic merit may
be regarded as deterring the cognitive or moral
value of a work, artifact, and so on.
The beautification of appalling scenes or of
depraved characters may just make this sort of
contribution. In this sense, the alleged aesthetic
merit will not, as in the former examples, lead
to other moral and cognitive merits. Rather,
it will increase the immoral character of the
representation. Thus, the alleged beauty of Leni
Riefenstahl’s fascist cinematic propaganda pur-
portedly increases its malevolent effect.10 In this
sense, it has been pointed out that some positive
aesthetic properties—especially beauty—may be
partly responsible for moral and cognitive demer-
its. Typical examples will be the aesthetization of
violence or of crude images of victims of natural
disasters.11 Feminist thinkers have also pointed
to the way in which the aesthetization of women
leads to their objectification and to the promotion
of a dominant male perspective. One of the sem-
inal works defending this idea is John Berger’s
Ways of Seeing (1972). In this book, he shows how
certain pictorial treatments of women’s nudity
Alcaraz León Aesthetics Makes Nothing Happen?
could promote treating it as an object for male
desire.
In these cases, aesthetic positive features may
be put at the service of making palatable what is
horrendous or despicable and, hence, of produc-
ing some moral harm upon those whose image is
perversely misused. Thus, it can be claimed that
it is precisely by virtue of the image’s aesthetic
properties that it can be morally condemned: its
immoral quality relies precisely upon its aesthetic
“success.”
Finally, we could also try to think of examples in
which a negative aesthetic property or an aesthetic
demerit could contribute positively or negatively
to the moral or cognitive value of an artwork or
artifact. Although the latter cases may seem eas-
ier to exemplify—for the negative contribution of
an aesthetic demerit seems less puzzling than a
positive one—we can offer some examples that il-
lustrate how an aesthetic demerit may be partly
responsible for a cognitive or moral value.
Let us start with the easiest cases first. It
seems uncontroversial that a poor or formulaic
description in a novel will render the novel’s
characters stereotypical and lacking depth. So,
the cognitive insight of the novel can be clearly
diminished by an aesthetic flaw. Similarly, the
moral sentimentality usually ascribed to the
pictorial genre of Sentimental Realism is directly
grounded upon a formulaic way of drawing hu-
man figures, which tend to beautify the hopeless
condition of the characters and to give them
an attractive and tender appearance that runs
against the truthful depiction of misery.
But negative aesthetic qualities can also be
part of what makes a work cognitively valuable
or morally sound. Looking at a specific example,
it could be claimed that Goya’s distorted figures
in his Dark Paintings (or in Bacon’s portraits)
and the corresponding disturbing aesthetic expe-
rience that follows from them is what upholds its
insightful character; in the sense that it is through
the aesthetic distortion of the human figure that
the viewer may come to be aware of a range of
physical and psychological experiences whose
communication would not have been successful
if the paintings were aesthetically pleasant. Thus,
negative aesthetic qualities can be partly responsi-
ble for the revelatory character of some artworks
and hence contribute to both their moral and
cognitive value. It should be said that the negative
qualification here is not meant to indicate that
25
the formal distortions are an aesthetic demerit or
that distortion is ethically bad tout court. It is only
meant to point out the negative affective charac-
ter that a distorted form usually implies. The point
of this example is to show how some qualities that
we would characterize as possessing a negative
affective component can, nevertheless, contribute
positively to the presence of an insightful and,
hence, cognitively valuable representation.
These examples do not aim at providing a
general claim about the role this kind of aesthetic
feature can play in other works of art. The un-
easiness with which the viewer may contemplate
the human figures depicted in Bacon’s work or in
Goya’s paintings and which, I believe, are partly
grounded upon the formal and aesthetic resources
of these painters’ pictorial style might be exclusive
to their work. This is, I think, unproblematic;
all that is required is that we can show how the
aesthetic dimension of the experience afforded by
these paintings is essential to its cognitive value.
Other works may use similar devices but in a
completely different manner, and, therefore, they
may produce other effects in the viewer. But that
a particular aesthetic device can play different
roles in different artworks does not imply we
should give up on the idea that within a particular
work—and in virtue of the affective character it
endows that particular work with—it can make a
significant contribution to the emergence of other
non-aesthetic qualities.
Having reflected upon the variety of objects,
both artistic and nonartistic, and of the rela-
tionships between aesthetic (dis)value and other
moral and cognitive (dis)values, I think it may be
easier to defend the view, at least based upon the
examples offered, that we should understand in-
teractionism along Particularist terms. That is, I
think that there seems to be no principle we can
properly embrace to uphold the fact that aesthetic
merits or demerits always contribute in the same
way to the presence of other moral or cognitive
values. We have seen that a positive aesthetic fea-
ture can both support moral (or cognitive) value
and disvalue and that negative aesthetic features
do not always contribute negatively when they are
grounding other moral and cognitive properties.
Hence, I think we should embrace a Particular-
ist view about the relationship between aesthetic
and other moral and cognitive merits. That is, we
should assume that no principles or rules could de-
termine what kind of contribution can be found.
26
Aesthetic virtues may increase moral depravation
and negative aesthetic experiences may contribute
to moral or cognitive insight. Also, similar aes-
thetic devices might play different roles depend-
ing on the work in which they appear and their
significance given other features they relate to.
ii. a proper account of interactionism
I think that in order to offer a proper account of
interactionism two requirements are to be met.
On the one hand, if aesthetic properties are to
be able to play the explanatory role we assume
they play, we need to show that it is precisely by
virtue of possessing a particular aesthetic char-
acter that a work, artifact, and so on possesses
some other moral or cognitive (de)merit and not
merely that these properties are coincidental. On
the other hand, a proper account of interactionism
should not undermine aesthetic autonomy; that
is, it should not involve aesthetic properties no
longer being autonomous. In what follows I ex-
plain the importance of these two requirements
for a sound defense of interactionism.
The first one, which I call the ‘relevance con-
straint,’ neutralizes one possible worry about the
philosophical accuracy of the analysis offered. It
could be thought that interactionism is trivially
true if the moral and cognitive properties of art-
works are partly explained by aesthetic qualities
simply because they are part of the properties that
artworks possess and are, hence, articulated within
a particular artistic medium. After all, it is uncon-
troversial that moral and cognitive properties of
artworks, as well as other representational or ex-
pressive properties, are the result of the artist’s
work.12 Since such an interpretation will render
interactionism trivially true and, hence, vacuous,
we need to articulate it in a way that lets us distin-
guish between genuine cases of an aesthetic con-
tribution to other non-aesthetic values and cases
where cognitive and moral merits are merely given
in an artwork. That is, we need to be able to distin-
guish cases in which the moral or cognitive proper-
ties are truly informed by the aesthetic character
of the work and cases where such a contribution
is missing.
It does not seem difficult, in principle, to
identify examples of both types. If we focus on
cognitive value, for example, we can easily imag-
ine a case where the knowledge conveyed by an
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
artwork is not linked to its aesthetic character
in any significant way. For example, I may come
to know about the usual size and structure of a
traditional Japanese house by reading Kokoro
(Sōseki 1914). While this may be considered a
cognitive value of the work, it is certainly not one
the work possesses because of any of its aesthetic
properties, for I can easily imagine this property
to be possessed by works lacking the aesthetic
properties of Kokoro. On the other hand, the
insightful character that a literary description
may possess can be intimately linked to the words
chosen by the narrator and to the descriptive
rhythm that determines the mode in which the
reader has access to the character’s features.
The sort of access and, hence, knowledge we have
about the character’s mind in Thomas Bernhard’s
novel The Loser (1983) is inextricably linked to
the abundance of run-on sentences, obsessive
repetitions, and unexpected changes of the verbs’
tenses. In this second case, it seems more evident
that the novel’s insightful character strongly de-
pends upon the aesthetic aspects that result from
the literary procedure. Our access to the narrative
voice’s psychological profile is intimately linked to
the formal aspects that build it up. After examin-
ing these two examples we can at least offer some
resistance to the worry about the trivial contribu-
tion of aesthetic properties to cognitive and moral
values.
The second condition that a proper account
of interactionism should meet is what I call the
‘autonomy constraint.’ That is, we should be able
to account for the contribution that aesthetic
qualities make to other kinds of non-aesthetic
value while accommodating the idea of aesthetic
autonomy.
The autonomous character of aesthetic judg-
ments is related, at least in Kant’s seminal work
Critique of Judgement (1790), to two different, but
somehow related, ideas. An aesthetic judgment is
autonomous in the sense that it is nonconceptual
or not governed by any principles or rules; that is
to say it is grounded solely on the experience of
the object evaluated. In another sense, Kant refers
to the autonomy of the judgment of taste when he
claims that no one’s opinion may be a determining
factor for rectifying one’s judgment, assuming this
is rightly grounded in a response of disinterested
pleasure. I think that if we focus upon the first of
these ideas, endorsing the autonomous character
of an aesthetic judgment or experience does not
Alcaraz León Aesthetics Makes Nothing Happen?
necessarily involve the rejection of the central
tenet of interactionism. And this is so for two
reasons: the first is that, at least within the limited
scope of our problem, there is nothing incompat-
ible between, on the one hand, the autonomy of
aesthetic properties or values and, on the other,
its contribution to reasons supporting attribution
of other values. For, insofar as the aesthetic
character of the work is not derived from other
values, the requirements for the autonomy of
aesthetic judgment will be met. But even if I was
trying to defend interactionism as Lopes does,13
there is another consideration that can refute the
incompatibility between aesthetic autonomism
and interactionism. This consideration appeals
to a possible interpretation of the a-conceptual
character of aesthetic judgments. According to
this interpretation, we can acknowledge that
concepts may to some extent determine our
perceptual experience without fully determining
its aesthetic character. That is, there may be
conceptual aspects that partly determine our
aesthetic experience without threatening the idea
that aesthetic value is autonomous in the minimal
sense required.14 For example, the fact that I see
a particular object as an Abstract Expressionist
painting—that is, under the concept, or category,
of Abstract Expressionist Painting—rather than
as a randomly marked surface that happened to
have that appearance by being left on the artist’s
studio floor can make a difference to my aesthetic
experience; however, the aesthetic value of each
work, and the resulting judgment, will still depend
on my experience of it; and no prior knowledge
of the category under which I should look at it
will by itself establish its aesthetic value. Thus,
while acknowledging that perceptual experience
may be somehow conceptually constrained,
we could claim that this is indeed so in a way
that does not undermine aesthetic autonomy.
Aesthetic autonomy will be undermined if, by
the mere application of a concept or, in our
case, by the presence of a particular moral value,
the resulting aesthetic experience could be fully
anticipated. However, that I perceive something
in such a way that it conforms to a concept or
as exhibiting some moral property still leaves
room for the autonomy of aesthetic experience
as long as the resulting judgment depends upon
the experience of that object and not on the
concept by itself. Insofar as the aesthetic value of
the work is not determined a priori by its moral
27
value (or independently from the experience
it affords), there is room for autonomy within
interactionism.
Autonomy is thus vindicated in spite of the
recognition that some other properties may play
some role in how the object is experienced. The
minimal condition for the autonomy of taste is pre-
served. And, thus, the sort of interactionism that I
am trying to characterize can meet the autonomy
constraint.
iii. expression and the affective character
of aesthetic properties
Having these remarks in mind, I offer, in what
follows, some flesh to the view defended in this ar-
ticle. In order to meet the first requirement stated
above, we should be able to show that some moral
or cognitive properties typically experienced in
or attributed to artworks are, at least partly, ex-
plained by aesthetic properties. How can we show
that this relation obtains nontrivially? What as-
pects of aesthetic properties can help us to explain
this role?
I think we can focus upon the affective charac-
ter of aesthetic properties and its role in explaining
the expressive dimension of art (artifacts, actions,
and so on) in order to offer a cogent answer to
these questions.
The common view about what it is to ascribe
moral properties to artworks or representations
in general focuses upon the notion of expression.
Moral content can be rightly located in an artwork
not by focusing upon its representational content
but by examining the attitudes that the artwork
embodies, or expresses, toward the content pre-
sented. Those moral attitudes can be grasped, in
turn, by identifying the responses that the artwork
prescribes to the reader, viewer, or listener. (This
would not imply that the viewer has to actually
feel the emotions prescribed. It suffices that she
perceives the work as demanding (or prescribing)
those emotions.) It is, then, by focusing upon the
expressive aspects of a work that we can come to
assess its moral content. Thus, the alleged immoral
character of a representation that, for example,
glorifies violence hangs not onto the representa-
tion of violent acts as such but on the prescribed
positive response to something that should be
rejected.15 It is by virtue of prescribing an immoral
response—for responding positively to violence
28
seems clearly wrong—that the work can be said to
be immoral or to possess negative moral value.16
Now, a way to show how this picture of the
moral character of an artwork can pave the way
for the role of aesthetic properties in the configu-
ration of other moral properties is to make clear
the role that aesthetic properties may play in ex-
plaining a work’s expressive content and, there-
fore, in the formation of its moral content.17
To do so, it might be necessary to provide some
view of what artistic expression is and in what
sense expressive content can be rightly embedded
in the aesthetic character of a work. Although,
given the scope of this article, such a task may be
unaccomplished, I would like to offer some ex-
amples that may render the relationship between
the aesthetic qualities of a work and its expressive
character clearer. That is, I would like to motivate
the idea that the expressive character of a work
of art, as a work of art, results from the work’s
aesthetic character.
A simple way to show that there may be a
connection between the aesthetic aspects and the
expressive character of a work in the way I am sug-
gesting is by underlying how the affective dimen-
sion of a work’s aesthetic character contributes
to its expressive content and, through this, to its
moral character. Since the phenomenon of expres-
sion is typically linked to the affective dimension
of an object, action, or representation, we can ar-
ticulate the role that aesthetic properties can play
in explaining other values by focusing on their
characteristic affective dimension. By the affec-
tive dimension of aesthetic properties, I refer to
the idea that grasping this kind of property typ-
ically has an affective or responsive dimension.
For example, to see that something is garish in-
volves affectively responding in a certain way to
the work.18
The aesthetic properties of a work can, thus,
contribute to its expressive character insofar as
they are typically grasped affectively. It is through
the affective dimension usually attached to aes-
thetic properties that their contribution to the ex-
pressive character of a work can be intimated. A
graceful line or a vacillating melody can elicit af-
fective responses in the viewer or the listener that,
in turn, play a role in grasping the work’s partic-
ular expressive content. And, since expression is
the mode through which a work’s moral content
becomes articulated, we can easily show its depen-
dence upon the aesthetic character of the work.
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
Thus, for example, Goya’s Disasters’ powerful
moral criticism is partly due to the affective re-
sponse triggered by aesthetic properties such as
its chaotic composition, its somber character, or
its unsublimating perspective. Its moral character
is not primarily due to the represented content but
to the affective attitude with which the content is
presented—which, in turn, explains the core of
the prescribed response to the viewer. And this
affective attitude is mainly conveyed through the
aesthetic characterization of the subject. This was
also the case with the still life paintings we referred
to above. The moral dignity of Chardin’s still lifes
was, as we pointed out, due to aesthetic qualities
such as theatricality or subtle atmospheric effects.
The aesthetic presentation of the objects depicted
endowed them with a human-like presence with-
out depriving them of their everyday character.
The kind of regard projected onto these humble
items invites the viewer to adopt a respectful and
quiet attitude. It is significant, I think, that some of
the most salient commentators of Chardin’s still
lifes tend to invoke silence as a way to describe
the experience afforded by these pictorial scenes.
(See, for example, Diderot 1995.)
Expressive failures might, conversely, be
responsible for moral attributions such as
sentimentality.19 The moral assessment of Ilya
Repin’s painting What a Freedom! (1903) is nega-
tive precisely because the aesthetic features with
which the theme is endowed seem to prescribe
an enthusiastic response the viewer may find ex-
cessive or forced.20 As a result, a sensitive viewer
may find that the affective engagement that the
work prescribes is undeserved or inappropriate.
And, hence, the sentimental character of the
painting—that is, its moral flaw—can be shown
to be dependent upon its expressive and aesthetic
failure. The affective response that actually
results from the aesthetic plainness of the work
runs against the intended expressive content of
the work and, thus, makes it fail in this respect.
Although the examples offered so far are picto-
rial and, more specifically, depictive, we can spec-
ulate that the relationship between the aesthetic
dimension of a work and its expressive character
may also hold in cases where the work possesses
expressive content without representing anything
in particular. Architecture or pure music could
also provide good examples. Thus, condemning a
pompous mansion in the middle of a rather hum-
ble but nicely built village can be partly explained
Alcaraz León Aesthetics Makes Nothing Happen?
by the mansion’s assertive and exhibitionist char-
acter, which, in turn, results from its aesthetic
properties, such as sumptuousness and intended
impressiveness. Although it becomes less frequent
that we similarly condemn ordinary objects with
the same strength as we might condemn Repin’s
sentimentalism or a mansion’s presumptuousness,
I think one can also make sense of the inadequacy
of a certain dress or of a certain form of speech,
given a particular context. However, for reasons of
space I will not expand more on these examples.21
The possible contribution that aesthetic prop-
erties can therefore make to the emergence of
other non-aesthetic properties, such as moral or
cognitive ones, is then clarified by paying atten-
tion to their characteristic affective character and,
furthermore, to the way in which this affective
character is involved in the expressive dimension
of a particular work or representation.
iv. final remarks
In this article I have argued that aesthetic
properties can be properly cited in an account of
other non-aesthetic properties, such as moral or
cognitive ones. To do so, I began by offering some
examples of the kind of explanatory contribution
that aesthetic properties may make to other
non-aesthetic properties. After examining several
examples, I argued that we should aspire to an
explanation of the phenomenon that is compat-
ible with a Particularist view of the relationship
between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic.
Second, I have pointed out two necessary
requirements that a cogent account of interac-
tionism should meet: the relevance constraint and
the autonomy constraint. In my view, a proper
explanation of interactionism should respect the
view known as ‘aesthetic autonomy’ and provide
an explanation of the fact that grasping aesthetic
properties can be a condition for grasping other
non-aesthetic properties.
Finally, I have appealed to the notion of
expression in order to flesh out the idea that aes-
thetic properties can play a significant role as rea-
sons for the presence of other non-aesthetic prop-
erties. As I have shown, the affective character
of aesthetic qualities can be appealed to in order
to explain how a work’s artistic content, includ-
ing its expressive character and hence some of its
moral or cognitive values, can be explained. Thus,
29
a comprehensive specification of our experience
of a work as possessing certain moral or cognitive
features may require having grasped its aesthetic
dimension and the way in which this aspect in-
forms other properties that are graspable in the
work or object.
This conclusion also aspires not only to cover
artistic examples but also cases in which we could
reasonably appeal to an aesthetic property or
quality in order to justify our attribution of a cog-
nitive or moral (de)merit. In this sense, the view
proposed aims at being as comprehensible as pos-
sible and to explain in what sense particular moral
judgments about, say, an action may legitimately
appeal to aesthetic aspects of the performing of
the action.
If the notion of expression is robust enough
in order to articulate the relationship that I have
explored, we could conclude that, in some cases,
aesthetic properties partly explain the presence of
moral and cognitive value.22
MARÍA JOSÉ ALCARAZ LEÓN
Department of Philosophy
University of Murcia
Murcia, Spain
internet: mariajo@um.es
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Bradley, A. C. 1959. “Poetry for Poetry’s Sake.” In Oxford
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Budd, Malcolm. 2008. “The Pure Judgement of Taste as an
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. 2004. Ethics without Principles. Clarendon Press.
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Gaut, Berys. 1998. “The Ethical Criticism of Art.” In Aesthet-
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1. For a classical defence of Autonomism, see Bradley
(1959). Concerning Ethicism, see Gaut (1998).
2. Although the view called Particularism has its home
domain in moral philosophy or meta-ethics and has been
prominently defended by Dancy (1999, 2004), I try to defend
the view that, if aesthetic properties can contribute to an
explanation of other non-aesthetic properties, we need to
understand this kind of contribution in a way that rejects
the need—and, more strongly, the possibility—of finding
principles that articulate this relationship.
3. I think the reason why interactionism has been
mostly discussed in relation to literary works has to do with
the usual attribution of moral value to literature as opposed
to, say, music or architecture.
4. I understand ‘artifact’ here in a very broad sense. For
example, I consider that things such as a mathematical proof
are artifacts, albeit of an intellectual character.
Although there has been some discussion about aesthetic
properties that can be attributed to artifacts that we do not
become acquainted with through perceptual experience, I
assume that, at least within a broader understanding of the
notion of aesthetic properties, some conceptual entities such
as mathematical proofs may possess aesthetic properties.
Significant defenders of a broad view of aesthetic experience
are Shelley (2003) and Goldie and Schellekens (2007, 2009).
5. Although my approach to the relationship between
moral and aesthetic value is in some crucial aspects dis-
tinct from classical approaches to this issue, the proximity
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
between aesthetic sensibility and moral disposition has a
long history. Both Kant and Schiller pointed out that aes-
thetic sensibility contributed to, or disposed us to, good ac-
tion. In “The Moral Utility of Aesthetic Manners,” Schiller
defended “that a strong and pure feeling for the beautiful
ought to exercise a salutary influence upon the moral life”
(1884, 126).
6. At this stage of the argument, these examples are pre-
sented merely as a way to illustrate as widely as possible the
phenomenon we are interested in. They are intended, first,
to show that the phenomenon can be instantiated in many
different kinds of objects, both artistic and nonartistic, and,
second, to motivate the case for a role of aesthetic proper-
ties in the explanation of other sorts of properties. Since the
examples are merely presented but not fully explained, they
cannot be considered as conclusive but merely as indicating
that the phenomenon might be worth exploring. Some of
them will be further developed alongside the following dis-
cussion, but others have been presented as mere indications
in favor of the idea that the aesthetic aspect of a particular
work, object, or action can have an impact upon other of
their non-aesthetic properties.
7. Although it could be said that here the authoritative
character could be considered as an aesthetic quality, I think
the sense in which this quality also has a moral dimension
remains in place. In this sense, even if some adjectives may
be taken to possess a twofold character in the sense that they
may be understood as possessing an aesthetic and a moral
dimension, I think there is still room to see in which way
the moral character attributed to the building is articulated
through other aesthetic features that can be easily identified
and that invite no confusion as to their status as aesthetic
qualities.
8. For other approaches to the issue of morality in ar-
chitecture see Architecture-Philosophy (Vol. 2, no. 1, Win-
ter 2016): http://isparchitecture.com/volume-2-number-1/.
Also, Scruton (1980).
9. For a defense of the idea that sentimentality can be
considered both a moral and an aesthetic defect see Pérez
Carreño (2014). According to the account offered by Pérez
Carreño, sentimentality in art can be considered as a moral
defect because it results from an expressive failure, that is,
from a failed attempt to express something truthfully. Thus,
sentimentality could be regarded as a form of insincerity
at the level of the expressive content of the work. If we
consider sentimentality under this light, it is easier to see
how the aesthetic resources displayed in Liszt’s composition
contribute to this moral flaw of his work.
10. Although I am aware that discussion over this work
cannot be covered in a single footnote, I think that the focus
of the article can throw some new light upon the puzzlement
that Riefenstahl’s work has often produced. In this respect,
it should be noticed that much of the literature around this
work has focused upon the relationship between the im-
moral content it conveys and its aesthetic worth. The initial
setting of the problem was due to Deveraux (1998), who
wondered whether the work could be less aesthetically suc-
cessful given its immoral character. However, there is no re-
search, at least to my knowledge, that focuses upon whether
the immoral character of the work is partly caused by its aes-
thetic success. This is the alternative I would like to explore.
I think that looking at how the work’s aesthetic value can
increase its malice can offer some insight into works whose
Alcaraz León Aesthetics Makes Nothing Happen?
puzzling character seem to be related to the fact that they are
both aesthetically valuable but morally revolting. The work’s
menacing message is even more menacing because the way
the message is conveyed, the aesthetic means through which
it is presented to the viewer, are good aesthetic means. That
is, its malicious character and its dangerous effect are partly
supported by the aesthetic success of the work.
11. Aesthetization is usually considered a moral flaw di-
rectly caused by the inappropriate use of aesthetic resources.
Aesthetization often involves embellishing or making ap-
pealing something that should not be shown as pleasant.
This is why it is often mentioned when deceitful methods
are employed in politics or when political reasoning is sub-
stituted for aesthetic appeal. In a sense this phenomenon
could be a paradigmatic case of the significant contribution
that aesthetic properties or features can make to other non-
aesthetic features. It is precisely through the embellishing
of a theme that should not be presented under an appealing
light that the representation becomes immoral.
12. This worry is referred to by Lopes (2005) as
“aesthetic saturation.” Aesthetic saturation is the view that
“for any type of non-aesthetic evaluation, V, some aesthetic
evaluations imply or are implied by some V-evaluation”
(Lopes 2005, 7). Clearly, this view will render interactionism
vacuous, and that is why Lopes rejects it. I regard my
proposal in this article as related to Lopes’s attempt to
defend what he calls interactionism and, in particular, what
he terms as “aesthetic articulation,” that is, the view that
“there are some types of non-aesthetic evaluations, V, such
that some aesthetic evaluations imply or are implied by
some V-evaluations” (8). In this sense I attend to the way
in which aesthetic evaluations (or, more generally, aesthetic
properties) may imply other non-aesthetic values. However,
for reasons that will become apparent in this article, I
depart from Lopes’s characterization of interactionism.
13. That is, following Lopes’s formulation that aes-
thetic evaluations may imply other non-aesthetic values but
also that some non-aesthetic values may imply aesthetic
evaluations.
14. For a similar understanding of aesthetic autonomy
see Budd (2008).
15. It could be questioned that prescribing a positive
response to violence or other dreadful events generally
involves prescribing an immoral response. Maybe the
prescribed response is prescribed in a manner that triggers
further thoughts about how we usually respond to violence
and, therefore, has a further moral insightful character. It
might require a case-by-case study to determine whether
the prescription of a positive response to dreadful events
31
in a particular work contributes to immorality or not. Once
we have assessed the moral character of the prescribed
response, however, I think that we can generally assume
that the morality or immorality of those responses is what
determines the moral character of the work. I owe this
clarification to a comment by an anonymous referee.
16. Although I will not enter into the discussion of what
counts as a merited or unmerited response toward the repre-
sented content of an artwork or representation, I will assume
that the moral or immoral character of an artwork or repre-
sentation is grounded upon the moral or immoral character
of the response prescribed toward the events represented.
In this sense, I will avoid the discussion about whether all
immoral responses are unmerited. That is, whether it might
be the case that a particular response might be immoral but
merited by the work. For two prominent defenders of the
opposing views that articulate this debate, see Gaut (2009)
and D’Arms and Jacobson (2000).
17. Although I refer mostly to artworks in this section,
I think what it is said about expression in art can also be
extended to other expressive devices, including behavior.
18. I would like to clarify that the way in which the char-
acteristic affectivity of aesthetic properties is understood
here does not involve endorsing the view that all aesthetic
concepts are evaluative or that their canonical use is sys-
tematically linked to a positive or negative response. In this
sense, while I think that grasping the garishness of a picture
may in some cases lead to a negative aesthetic judgment of
the picture, there may be cases in which a work’s garishness
is a reason for its aesthetic merit. In any case, perceiving
something as garish involves responding affectively to that
feature.
19. See Pérez Carreño (2014).
20. Following Greenberg’s (1939) assessment of
Repin’s work as sentimental and kitsch, we can consider
this particular work as an example of an expressive failure
in the sense that the response that it effectively triggers in the
sensitive viewer is not one of complacency but of despisal.
21. For a consideration of how the moral character of
pure music can be grounded in its expressive character see
Alcaraz León (2012).
22. This article has been funded by the Program
Jóvenes Lı́deres en Investigación de la Fundación Séneca-
Agencia de Ciencia y Tecnologı́a de la Región de Murcia
(18958/JLI/13) “El valor estético y su interacción con otros
valores en la práctica apreciativa” and (FFI2015-64271-
P) “Experiencia estética de las artes y complejidad de la
percepción” (Ministerio de Economı́a y competitividad)
2016–2020.