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THI2
A.MX A. FORCES
INH
THE BATTLE DOF T E AiT LifliTIO

by.

Jarvis P. Jones
Lt. Col. .AO-32652
United States Air Force

APR'."

The Army Air Forges in -the Battle of~

the Atlantic, by Lt Col J. P. Jonies.
Cokmand andc General Staff~ College.
$ y May l949,

IS A HOLDING OF THE
ARCHIVES SECTION
LIBRARY SERVICES
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
DOCUMENT NO. 1-22~J COPY NO.1

CGSC Form 160 Army-CGSC-P2-1798-7 Mar 52-5M

13 Mar 51
 BRIEF

Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
31 May 1949

File No. 1-53

SUBJECT: The Army Air Forces in the Battle of the

Atlantic

1. PROBLEM. -- To determine the part played by the Army

Air Forces in the Battle of the Atlantic.

2. FACTS BEARING ON TIE 'ROB LEM.

a. Events causing participation.

b. Early organization for antisubmarine warfare.

c, Responsibility for antisubmarine operations

from the air.

d. The Arrmy Air Forces Antisubmarine Command.

e. Antisubmarine operations by the Army Air

Forces.

f. German submarine operations.

3. DISCUSSION.

a. Fifty-nine ships were sunk in American coastal

waters during the 76 days immediately after

11 January -1942. Various agreement's and

statements of policy prior to 1941 made the

Navy primarily responsible for antisubmarine

warfare and obligated the Army Air Forces to

act in support of or in lieu of Naval forces

in case of an emergency. The Army Air

Forces was requested to help the Navy since

the Navy did not have the means to execute

their primary mission.

b. Early organization for antisubmarine warfare

was practically nonexistent during the

early phases of the war consisting only of

 the I Bomber Command carrying out flights

over the Atlantic Ocean at the request of

the commander of the North Atlantic Naval

Coastal Frontier through the commanding

general of the Eastern Defense Command.

c. Responsibility for antisubmarine operations

from the air was a point of «,rgument be-

tween the Army and. the Navy all during the

war. The Navy maintained that operations

over water against seaborne targets should

be a responsibility of the Navy. On the

other hand it was natural for the Army to

maintain that land based aircraft regard-

less of where they operated should remain

under the control and be a responsibility

of the Army. Such a position taken by the

Navy was viewed by the Army as the first

step towards Navy control of all air forces.

The riyid and static regional control of

the Navy was in no way compatible with the

inherent flexibility and mobility of the

Army Air Forces. General Marshall wrote

to Admiral King on 14 September:

Experience with the First Bomber

Command. in antisubmarine operations
since March indicates that the ef-
fective employment of air forces
against the submarine demands rapid
communications, mobility, and free-
dom from the restrictions inherent
in command systems based upon area
responsibility.

General Marshall ordered creation of the

Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command with

centralized control in the War Department.

The Jurisdictional dispute continued through

-2-
 late 1942 and early 1943 during the period

when the German submarine threat was at

its most effective peak of operations.

Since no agencies including the Joint Chiefs

of Staff were able to find a satisfactory

solution, General Marshall on 10 June

1943 ordered. the Army Air Force to cease

antisubmarine operations in the western At-

1 antic.

d. The Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command was

activated 15 October 1942 using I Bomber

Command as a cadre. Allocation of aircraft

was made by the War Department to the Nlavy

and aircraft could attack submarines where

ever they were operating. Provision was

made for moving units to extra continental

areas. This ave the Army Air Force great-

er freedom of movement in their war against

German submarines.

.e. Antisubmarine oper Etions conducted by the

Army Air Force fell in three broad cate-

gories; routine patrol, special patrol and

convoy cover. Routine patrol consisted of

sending aircraft out to patrol areas in

which the threat of enemy action was thought

to exist. Special patrols were those op-

erations by aircraft generally in conjunc-

tion with naval air and.surface forces in

an area in which a particular U-boat was

known to be ooerating or lurking. Convoy

cover consisted of flying cover for convoys.

The pattern of sinkings was forced gradually

-3-
southward until by September 1942 there

were practically no U-boat operations a-

long our eastern Atlantic seaboard and

alone, the Gulf of Mexico. The I Bomber

Command and the Army Air Forces Antisub-

marine Command were the primary commands

engaged in antisubmarine warfare for the

Army, however, other army air units were

fighting the U-boats in other parts of the

western Atlantic especially in the New-

foundland and Caribbean areas. By Novem-

ber 1942 Army Air Force units were oper-

atinS in the eastern Atlantic in the area

of the Bay of Biscay. Two months later

these operations extended to the area of

Port Lyautey, Morocco. Still other units

operated from Bermuda, Trinidad, Cuba and

Ascension. Island. Air operations were

also being carried out by heavy bomber

forces in attacks against U-boat bases,

submarine shipyards and areas producing

component parts for submarines. The sus-

pension of Army Air Force operations in

the western Atlantic did not stop opera-

tions in the eastern Atlantic. The years

1944 and 1945 found the.Army Air Forces

sinking more submarines than in any pre-

vious year with the exception of 1943.

United States Air Force operations in the

Battle of the Atlantic can only be stated

in general terms of thousands of opera-

tional hours and millions of miles of com-

-4-
 bat patrols. The United States ArmyT Air

Forces have been credited wit.- sinking or

disabling 95 enemy submarines from 1941

through 1945. Other sources of statistics

such as those given by the Navy Department

and the British Admiralty credit the United

States Forces with having sunk 151 subma-

rines in all waters. One-hundred and nine-

teen were sunk by aircraft with no distinc-

tion being made between Army Air Forces and

Naval aircraft. The indication is that

Army aircraft played the dominant role in

our antisubmarine warfare.

f. The different techniques and tactics used by

the German submarines were in all cases

successfully countered by tactics and tech-

niques of the air forces. Principal U-boat

tactics were; attacks from submerged posi-

tions at very close ranges, use of the U-

boat as a night surface torpedo boat, con-

voy shadowing by single U-boats, and con-

centrated packs of submarines.

4. CONCLUSTONS.

a. The Army Air Force facilitated the implemen-

tation of United States strategy between 8

December 1941 and 1 September 1943.

b. United States Army Air Forces decisively

damaged the U-boat fleet by actual attacks.

c. Aircraft forced the enemy to submerge so fre-

quently and. so long that sinkings accom -

plished barely justified the expense.

d. Lessons learned.

-5;-
(1) The inh-rent flexibility and mobility

of an air force is vitiated when -employed

under a command system based upon area

responsibility.

(2) The security of a nation is compro-

mised when its armed forces engage in plays

for power.

(3) Armed forces controversial issues must

be resolved quickly even if by arbitrary

methods.

__6-
 THE ARM~Y AIR~ FORCES
IN

TIE BATTLE OF THE ATLA-NTIC

by

Jarvis P. Jones
Lt. Col. AO-32652
United States Air Force
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

1. PROB L EM 1

2. FACTS BEARING ON TE PROBLEM 1

3. DISCUSSION 1

Events causing participation 1

Early organization for anti-

submarine warf are 3

Responsibility for antisub-

marine operations from

the air 5

The Army Air Forces Anti-

submarine Command 10

Antisubmarine operations by

the Army Air Forces 11

German submarine operations 16

4. CONCLUSIONS 17

ANNEX 1 19

ANNEX 2 20

ANNEX 3 21

ANNEX 4 22
 Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
10 May 1949

File No. 1-53

SUBJECT: The Army Air Forces in the Battle of the

Atlantic

1. PROBLEM. --To determine the part played by the Army

Air Forces in the Battle of the Atlantic.

2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

a. Certain events caused the Army Air Forces to

participate in the Battle of the Atlantic.

b. Early organization for antisubmarine warfare

was practically nonexistent during the early

phases of the war.

c. Responsibility for antisubmarine operations

from the air was a highly controversial sub-

ject.

d. The primary organization for operations against

enemy submarines was the Army Air Forces

Antisubmarine Command.-.

e. Antisubmarine operations by the Army Air Forces

were conducted in three broad categories.

f. German submarine tactics were successfully

countered.

3. DISCUSSION.

a. Events causing participation.--It was quite

evident that the Germans would move their

U-boats into what had been formerly neutral

American waters as soon as possible after

the formal entry of the United. States into

World War II. The German U-boats did not

actually enter upon operations in our coast-

al waters until nearly a month later. When

they came however, the U-boats were devas-

tating in their attacks, which began on 11

January 1942 with the sinking of the SS

Cyclops off Nova Scotia and the torpedoing

of the tanker Norness three days later off

Long Island. Following the sinking of the

Norness, 59 ships were sunk in American

coastal waters during the next 76 days.

These sinkings amounted to a total of over

350,000 gross tons. Thus it became evident

that our situation was desperate especially

when gross tons lost to sinkings can be

translated into items of land warfare. For

example, if two ships of 6000-tons each were

sunk it could be translated to mean 2000

tons of stores, 42 tanks, 428 tons of tank

supplies, 8 six-inch Howitzers, 40 two-

pound guns, 88 twenty-five-pound guns, 5210

tons of ammunition, 24 armored cars, 50 Bren

carriers and 600 rifles. By various agree-

ments and statements of policy prior to 1941

the Navy was made responsible for the conduct

and development of antisubmarine defenses

both with respect to protection of coastwise

shipping and conduct of offshore patrol.

These same agreements and statements obli-

gated the Army Air Forces to act in support

of or in lieu of Naval forces in case of an

emergency. Since the Navy found itself un-

able to meet this crisis which fell in their

sphere of primary responsibility it request-

ed emergency help from the Army Air Forces

-2-
 and so it was that the burden of antisubma-

rine warfare became the responsibility of

the -Army Air Forces. This responsibility

was given to the Army Air Forces primarily

because army aircraft, whose. range was

greater than any possessed by naval air-

craft, were better suited for the long pa-

trols of our coastal waters.

b. Early organization for antisubmarine warfare.--

On the afternoon of 8 December 1941, aircraft

of the I Bomber Command began flights over

the Atlantic Ocean at the request of the

Commander of the North Atlantic Naval Coast-

al Frontier through the Commanding General

of the Eastern Defense Command. At this mo-

ment there was no organization other than I

Bomber Command operating under the naval com-

mander. On 12 December, I Bomber Command

set up an advance echelon at New york City

which was to conduct tactical operations with

the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.

By 24 January the orga~nization for joint de-

fense was strengthened somewhat by the est-

ablishment of a liaison office with the Sixth

Naval District at Charleston, South Carolina.

This liaison office.was given an observation

group which was to be under its operational

control in order to strengthen naval patrol

in that area. This observation group came

from the I Air Support Command which was a

subordinate command of the I Bomber Command.

It mi1'.t be well to note at this time that

the Civil ir Patrol began offshore flights

with its newly created Coastal Patrol. This

patrol did much in alleviating the burden of

routine reconnaissance and patrol being con-

ducted by I Air Support Command. At this

time jurisdictional control of airborne anti-

submarine warfare units was a matter of heat-

ed controversy and necessarily retarded the

formation of any specific organization with-

in the Afrmy Air Force to combat the submarine

menace. By the end of March 1942, organiza-

tional problems were somewhat alleviated by

the vesting, of jurisdiction to the sea fron-

tier commanders over naval forces and army

air units engaged in protection of shipping

against enemy submarines. While I Bomber

Command was the main organization for com-

bating the submarine menace other units of

the Army Air Force, such as the Caribbean

Air Force and the squadron supplementing

the Navy air arm in the Newfoundland area

were devoting almost their entire effort to

antisubmarine operations. This then was the

early organization of the army Air Force in

combating the enemy and his submarines in

out coastal waters. In October of 1942

there was a major organizational change

which set up the Army Air Forces Antisubma-

rine Command, however, this organization

cannot be considered until after a discussion

of the matter of jurisdictional control

sinceout of this matter of Jurisdictional

-4-
 control the antisubmarine command had its

genesis.

c. Responsibility for anti subm'rine operations

from the air.--With the advent of military

aviation in the United States, the Army

and the Navy have engaged in strenuous

arguments as to who was going to control

all air units. Specifically the Army and

Navy differences were centered around land

based aviation engaged in seaward patrol.

It was quite natural for the Navy to main-

tain that operations over water against sea-

borne targets should be a responsibility of

the Navy. On the other hand it was natural

enough for the Army to maintain that land

based aircraft regardless of where they op-

erated should remain under the control and

be a responsibility of the Army. This con-

troversy waged back and forth through the

years and extended into the period of World

War II generally because national policy re-

garded the air arm as being subordinate to

either the Armyor the Navy. In 1920, legis-

lotion provided a basis for two air arms in

that it affirmed that the army air arm should

have responsibility for all aerial operations

from land bases and the naval air arm would

have responsibility for any air activity

attached to the fleet. This naval respon-

sibility included maintenance of such shore

facilities a-d installations as were neces-

sary to provide the fleet with an operation-

-.-
al air arm. Responsibility in cases where

joint action might become necessary was left

undefined by this legislation as was pointed

out by General Arnold in a memo to General

Marshall on 21 February 1942. After 1935,

joint action of the Army and Navy expressed

in statements of policy had a tendency to

clarify the relationship between the two

services. These statements of policy Fen-

enally held the Navy responsible for all in-

shore and offshore patrol primarily for the

purpose of protecting coastal frontiers and

shipping, whereas the Army was held prima-

rily responsible for defense of the coast

itself and to execute navy functions in case

of an emergency. Even this formal agreement

did not stop further bickering between the

Army and Navy as to who should control all

air operations in coastal defense. The Navy

claimed that since it held a position of

paramount importance in this situation it

should have control of all air operations.

Sucha position taken by the Navy was view-

ed bythe Army as the first step towards

Navy control of all air forces. The Navy

point of view was that the Navy would always

be declared to have preeminence in coastal

defense and such being the case would give

the Navy- overall command of air units and

consequently bring under control of the Navy

the land based bombers of the Army, which

might well be the principal arm employed in

-6-
coastal defense. In December 1941 the con-

troversy was still under way, however, the

fact remained that the commander of the North

Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier exercised

unity of command as far as joint air action

was concerned. Airmen of the Army protested

against what they called inefficient employ-

ment of the Army Air Force's aircraft by the

Navy in the Battle of the Atlantic. The Navy

wished to use planes primarily for antisub-

marine patrol and convoy cover whereas the

Army wished to organize antisubmarine planes

in killer groups to search for any U-boats

sighted or reported. The Navy believed that

the mere presence of aircraft near a convoy

was sufficient to keep the U-boats submerged

and unable °o attack. The Army believed rou-

tine patrols and convoy cover to be nothing

more than a waste of aircraft capabilities

in areas where Intelligence reports showed

that no U-boats were operating. The Army

further believed that the morale of aviators

could not stand up against the boredom of

daily patrols consisting of hundreds of hours

of flying unless at least a contact was made.

A further misuse of army aircraft charged

a -ainst the Navy was the allocation of Army

Air Force units to sea frontier commanders.

These allocations were made according to

joint agreement. Once the Navy had the Army

Air Force units however, they were treated

as more o° less permanent arrangements and

-7-
prevented these Army Air Force units serv-

ing under one frontier commander from op-

erating in the territory of another. It

is clear that the Navy was executing its

pmrimary mission through a rigid and static

system of regional control which in no

sense of the word was compatible with the

inherent flexibility and mobility of the

Army Air Forces. Most of the actual re-

strictions on the movement of the Army air

Force units from one naval sea frontier to

another, where the need .might be greater,

were imposed by the different sea frontier

com Landers who desired to hold on to what

they had in order to carry out the respon-

sibilit r of their particular area. General

Marshall wrote to Admiral King on 14 Sept-

ember:

Experience with the First Bomber

Command in antisubmarine operations
since March indicates that the ef-
fective employment of air forces
against the submarine demands rapid
communications, mobility, and free-
dom from the restrictions inherent
in command systems based upon area
responsibility.

Accordingly, General Marshall ordered crea-

tion of the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine

Command with centralized control in the

War Department. This centralized control

was for the specific purpose of controlling

the allocation of aircraft in order to en-

sure that they could be concentrated and

employed in the most dangerous areas. Op-

erations were to remain under control of

.?
the sea frontier concerned. The formation

of the Antisubmarine Command had no effect

on the jurisdictional dispute, however, it

did improve the internal organization of

the Army's antisubmarine forces. The juris-

dictional dispute could hardly be expected

to be solved since the activation orders

left the operational control by the Navy un-

defined as to nature and extent, and the

problem of parallel development of two land

based air forces for the execution of the

same task was not touched. Consequently,

jurisdictional disputes became even more

bitter, especially since the Army now had

the organization to cut deeply into tradi-

tiona.l Navy spheres of influence and.re-

sponsibi lity . During the period consisting

of late 1942 and early 1943 the German sub-

marine threat was at its most effective

peak of operations and during this time the

struggle for control of all air aspects of

antisubmarine warfare was going on. No

agencies including the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

were able to find a satisfactory solution

to this controversy. The struggle between

the Army and the Navy became so bitter that

on 10 June 1943 General Marshall decided

that the Army Air Force would no longer en-

gage in antisubmarine work in the western

part of the Atlantic. On 1 September 1943

the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command

was disbanded and an exchange of army air-

 planes containing special antisubmarine

equipment was effected with the Navy on

a plane for plane basis. The Navy's air-

craft did not have the special equipment

which was in the army aircraft and which

the navy needed in order to continue the

antisubmarine campaign.

d. The Arrnr Air Forces Antisubmarine Command..--

The Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command

was activated on 15 October 1942 using I

Bomber Command as a cadre. The activation

of this new command did nothing more than

give a new name, added latitude to already

operating antisubmarine forces of the Army,

and to centralize control in the War Depart-

ment which removed some of the restrictions

held by the Navy. The mission of this or-

ganization was to attack hostile submarines.

There was no restriction as to where the sub-

marines had to be before they could be at-

tacked. This in effect ave the Army Air

Forces the latitude they had been strugling

for. Provision was made for moving units

to extracontinental areas in order to take

the maximum advantage of this newly acquired

freedom of movement, however, such moves

could.be made only with the approval of the

G-enera. Staff. It appears that the actual

command of the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine

Command was under the War Department since

the commanding general of this new organiza-

tion was responsible to the director of

-10-
 Military Requirements through the director

of Bombardment. The Navy retained only op-

erational control over such Army Air Force

units as the War Department saw fit to give

it.

e. Antisubmarine operations by the Army Air

Forces.--German strategy became apparent

when the United States entered the war.

Simply, this strategy ' consi sted of extend-

ing the German counterblockade into American

waters from the Eastern and Northern Atlan-

tic. Conversely the United States strategy

was to oet ships, men and supplies through

this blockade to its allies the world over.

Antisubmarine operations conducted by the

Army Air Force can be regarded as falling

in the three broad categories of routine pa-

trol, special patrol and convoy cover. Rou-

tine patrol consisted of sending aircraft

out to patrol areas in which the threat of

enemy action existed or was thought to exist.

Scecial patrols were those operations by air-

craft general ly in conjunction with naval

air and surface forces. in an area in which a

particular U-bot was known to be operating

or lurking. For the first five months, Army

units were more nearly engaged in operations

of the first category, with occasional kill-

er hunts of the second cate ory. Units op-

crating under I Bomber Command control began

to show a noticibly higher level of success

in attacks against enemy submarines. The

-11-
tactics and techniques are at the present

time still classified, however, it is quite

apparent that six months of experience in

hunting the U-boats was beginning to pay

off since this noticable improvement was

most apparent in July, Ausust and Septem-

ber of 1942. There was a high record of

attacks during the month of June, but dur-

ing the next three months the total number

of attacks greatly decreased. However,

from a study of the pattern of sinkings,

(Annex 2.), which gives a fairly accurate

picture of submarine density, it. can be

seen that frequency of attacks made by

Army aircraft would be roughly determined

by the density of U-boats. The pattern of

sinkings also ive s a picture of the shift-

Ing of the weight of the German submarine

effort caused by the pressure of our air

attacks. The pattern of sinkings was forced

gradually southward until by September 1942

there were pratically no submarine operations

along our eastern Atlantic seaboard and a-

long the Gulf of Mexico. German submarine

operations were forced to gradually withdraw

still further southward and b November 1942

they were virtually abandoned in United States

waters. The I Bomber Command and the Army

Air Forces Antisubmarine Command were the

primaryr commands engaged in antisubmarine

warfare for the Army. However, other Army

Air Force units were also actively enraged
against the German U-boats in other parts of

the western Atlantic. Army B-17's supple-

mented the Navy's air arm in the Newfound-

land area. More intensive action was carried

on by Army units of the Caribbean Air Force,

later called the Antilles Air Task Force, in

the Caribbean area. By November 1942 anti-

subm= rine operations by the Army Air Force

were also being carried out in the Eastern

Atlantic generally in the area of the Bay of

Biscay. Two months later these operations

extended to the general area of Port Lyautey,

Morocco. At other times units of the Anti-

submarine Command operated from Bermuda,

Trinidad, Cuba and Ascension Island. Not

only was the Battle of the Atlantic being

fought in direct operations against opera-

tional enemy submarines but it was also being

fought by Army Air Forces heavy bomber forces

in air attacks against such places as Lorient,

St. Nazaire, Brest and La Pallice. These

towns on the west coast of France were all

U-boat bases. Heavy bomber forces also made

attacks against enemy submarine shipyards

such as those at Vegesack and Wilhelmshaven.

industrial areas such as Essen, Dusseldorf,

Mannheim, Karlsruhe and others were producing

component parts for submarines and became

the targets for Army Air Force heavy bombard-

ment aircraft. The part being played by the

Army Air Force in the Battle of the Atlantic

did not cease when on 1 September 1943 the

-13-
Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command actu-

ally stopped its operations in the western

Atlantic. The Army Air Force continued op-

erations in the eastern Atlantic in conjunc-

tion with the British and other allies and

the years 1944 and 1945 found the Army Air

Force sinking more submarines than in any

previous year with the exception of 1943.

The highly skilled antisubmarine units of

the Army Air Force which were operating with

the British had their initial training and

operational experience while a part of the

Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command. The

reason for their continued operations in

antisubmarine work was primarily because the

British had requested such units from the

United States. As the United States Navy

acquired suitable aircraft. in sufficient num-

bers they gradually relieved units of the

Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command from

operations in the western Atlantic thereby

making these units available to the British.

It can be clearly seen from the foregoing that

the Army Air Forces were engaged in active

antisubmarine operation in the Atlantic un-

til the end of the war against G-ermany in

1945. Briefly, the duration of the Army ' Air

Forces part in the Battle of the Atlantic

was from 8 December 1941 until the end of

the war in Europe. United States Air Force

operations in the Battle of the Atlantic

can only be stated in general terms of thou-

-14-
sands of operational flying hours ond mil-

lions of miles of combat patrols. The total

effort expended by the Army Air Force com-

pared to actual submarine sinkings only in-

dicates that enormous effort must be expend-

ed before a submarine is actually sunk, how-

ever, the total effort expressed in terms

of denying the U-boats the opportunity to

utilize their deadly torpedoes, because of

their fear of aircraft, definitely shows

that submarine operations can be controlled

if not eliminated by air action. The defeat

of the U-boat is essentially a combined op-

eration by air and sea forces, and the United

States Army Air Forces have been credited

with sinking or disabling 95 enemy subma-

rines from 1941 through 1945. (Inclosure 1

Annex 3) Other sources of statistics such

as those given by the Navy Department and

the British Admiralty credit United States

Forces with having sunk 151 submarines in

all waters. (Inclosure 2 Annex 3) Of this

total 119 were sunk by aircraft with no dis-

tinction being made between Army Air Forces

and Naval aircraft. The indication is that

aircraft played the dominant role in our

antisubmarine warfare. Since the chief weap-

on used by the United States in its battle

against the German U-boat was the aircraft

of the Army Air Force it appears that the

major part of our successful operations

should be credited to the Army A"ir Forces.

-15-
f. German submarine operations.--In 1942 German

Submarine Admiral Doenitz stated: "Airplanes

can no more fight submarines than hawks can

fight moles." The fact that Admiral Doenitz

was in error is now a matter of record.

German U-boats in their early operations in

the Atlantic delivered their attacks from

submerged positions at very close ranges

since they had to escape being seen by air-

craft and at the same time had to penetrate

the convoy screen. This technique was soon

abandoned by the U-boats and they retired

to the Baltic to think up new tactics. The

new tactics began to pay dividends for the

Germans in that they were sinking more ships

with less loss to themselves. These tactics

were essentially the use of the U-boats as

a night surface torpedo boat, diving only

when threatened by surface vessels or air-

craft. Once again the Germans had to change

their tactics. They began operations in mid-

ocean areas which were beyond the range of

aircraft. The trend in submarine tactics

now was marked by development of a technique

of shadowing convoys with attacks being made

by single U-boats. Generally these single

U-boat attacks were directed against thinly

screened convoys. When more heavily screen-

ed convoys were used the Germans changed

their tactics again and concentrated packs

of submarines to break through the center of

the line of surface escorts. Land based avi-

 ation was of no value in countering these

tactics since the aircraft could not reach

the scene of operations. The Nvy's escort

carrier provided bases from which aircraft

could operate ard thus the gap between land

based air coverage from the-north, south,

east and west was closed. Again the U-boats

had to retreat to what was now their badly

battered bases. There they were equipped

with the snorkel which enabled the submarine

to cruise under the surface on its diesel

engzines for long periods of time undetected

by radar equipped aircraft. Fortunately,

this submarine never reached maximum op-

erational use. The last phase of the Battle

of the Atlantic as far as the Gniran U-boats

were concerned commenced with the landings

in Normandy. In order to combat the invasion

the U-boats had to concentrate in areas which

made them vulnerable to both surface and air

action and by the spring of 1945, in the

words of Fleet Admiral King, the "U-boat

menace had been reduced to the status of a

problem."

4. CONCLUSIONS.

a. The Army Air Force facilitated the implementa-

tion of United States strategy during the

peroid between 8 December 1941 and 1 Septem-

ber 1943 by its assumption of a primary func-

tion of the United States Navy in the combat-

ing of enemy submarine forces.

b. The part played by the Army Air Forces in the

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 Battle of the Atlantic was decisively dam-

aging to the U-boat fleet through actual

attacks on enemy submarines.

c. Aircraft of the Army Air Force forced the en-

emy to submerge so frequently and to remain

submerged for such long periods of time that

friendly shipping disappeared from the sights

of the U-boats and the U-boats' activities

became handicapped to a point where sinkings

accomplished barely justified the expense.

d. Lessons learned.

(1) The inherent flexibility and mobility

of an air force is vitiated when employed

under a command system which is based upon

area responsibility.

(2) The security of a nation is compromised

when its armed forces engage in plays for

power, especially during periods of national

emergency.

(3) Controversial issues between a nation's

armed forces during periods of national emer-

gency must be resolved quickly by proper au-

thority, even if arbitrary methods have to be

employed.

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 Annex 1

CO M IA AND GEERAL STAFF COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

22 November 1948

MONOG-RAPH SUBJECT NUIVtBER 1-53

Regular Course, Phase V, 1948-49

STUDENT Jarvis P. Jones Major A-0-32652

(Name) (Rank) (ASN)

FACULTY ADVISOR Lt. Col. C.A. Dahlen 204 Sheridan

(Name) (Bldg & Rm No)
7150
(Tel No)

SUBJECT: THE AAF IN THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC.

References:
Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World
War II: Spilman, "The German Submarine War",
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 47;
"Tactics for Destruction of U-Boats by Aircraft",
Great Britain Military Attache Report #9670,
June 1943; Doughty, "The effect of Depth Charges
on Submarines", U. S. Naval Institute Proceed-
inMs, March 35 "Battle of the Atlantic, Army-
Navy Reister, 16 June 45; Coastal Command Re-
view, Jan and Feb 42.

NOTE TO STUDENTS:
1. The references above are furnished to give
the student enough material with which to begin his
research. It is anticipated that the student will
make use of all other available sources in order to
give adequate scope to his subject and, when appro-
priate, to complete development of the subject to date.

2. The scope suggested below is intended as a

guide only, and is not to be construed as a limitation
on the student's perusal of the subject.

SCOPE:

1. German U-Boat Strategy.

2. Early antisubmarine operations.
5. The question of responsibility - Army or Navy
in antisubmarine operations from the air.
4. Beginning of the AAF Antisubmarine Command.
5. Results.
6. Conclusions.

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 r A

Annex

SINKNGS VESEL F MRCHAT

5 t

,4

LEGED: reatst reasof ensiy o aining

 Annex :3

STATISTICS ON SUBMARINES SUINK

--21-
 Incto sure 2.to Annex 3.

GERMANr "U" BOAT CASUALTIS

12.

/.

/ ;,
7I
j

,.
//,

i94"R
LEGEND (showing the main types of attack accounting
for the above HIUl boat casualties)
R.N. (including surface vessels &. F A, A
_ submarines& mines laid by them) 7 .S. Carrier borne
- N to ftU
"A/c

R.A.F. (including bombing raids on Other causes (known-

German harbours etc. & mines laid e.g. collisions)
U.S. A.A.F. rTI T by A/c) Unknown causes
 Inclosure 2 to Annex 3.

Total number of German submarines assessed as sunk and

as announced jointly by the Navy Department and

the British Admiralty. Figures cover the period

from September 2, 1939, to May 8, 1945.

Sunk by U.S. Forces & British Empire Total

other Allied Forces & other German
Forces (except Allied Forces Sub-
British Empire (except U. S. marines
Forces) under Forces) under Assess-
U. S. control British control ed as
Sunk

Ships............... 302 236

.205,2
Shore -based
Aircraft......... 45 224j
.79-2
Carrier-borne
Aircraft......... 32 ............ L8- 5o2
Joint ship-
shore based
Aircraft ......... 29
Joint ship-
carrier-
borne............ 6 4 0 0 0, 10
Submarines.......... ............ 25 26
Bombing raids
on U-boats
afloat in
enemy ports...... 8

TOTALS........151 462 00 "" 0 613

Other losses, including those due to

mining of enemy waters by the Bombe r
Command, and from other causes..... 100

Final Total.. ............ ............ 713

 Annex 4

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF REFERENCES
I. Books

Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II.

Chicago: The University oV Chicago Press,

1948.

Morison, Samuel Eliot, History of United States Naval

Operations in World War II. Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1947.

Tedder, The Lord, Air Power in War. London: Hodder

and Stoughton.

Coastal Command. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943.

Marshall, Arnold and King, The War Reports. New York:

J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947.

II. Articles

Spilman, C. H., "The German Submarine War," United States

Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 73, p. 30

(December, 1948).

"Battle of the Atlantic; Sank 151 German U-Boats," Army

and NavVy Reister, Vol. 66, No. 3419, (June

16, 1945).

III. Documents

M-9405-G9-C.42, Coastal Command Review, Headquarters,

Coastal Command, Royal Air Force. January,

February, March, April, May, June, 1942.

M-9405-G73-AAF, Hi ghlights of the Army Air Forces World

War II, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 1946.

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