Religion and Politics at The Court of Elizabeth I: The Habsburg Marriage Negotiations of 1559 - 1567 - Susan Doran

Religion and Politics at the Court of Elizabeth I: The Habsburg Marriage Negotiations of 1559-
1567
Author(s): Susan Doran
Source: The English Historical Review, Vol. 104, No. 413 (Oct., 1989), pp. 908-926
Published by: Oxford University Press
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Religionand Politicsat the Courtof

ElizabethI: the Habsburgmarriage
negotiations of I559-I567'
THE royal marriage negotiations of Elizabeth's reign are a relatively
neglected area of historical research. While the Habsburg marriage of
Mary Tudor and the Spanish marriagenegotiations under James I have
attracted scholarly interest, little has been published recently on the
various attempts to arrange a marriage between Elizabeth and her sui-
tors from abroad.1 The reason for this omission is not difficult to
find. Historians do not usually treat the Elizabethan marriagenegotia-
tions seriously. Instead they are seen as an elaborate charade devised
by Elizabeth to deceive either her councillors or foreign rulers or both,
in order to gain a certain freedom of action. Furthermore each scheme
is anachronisticallydoomed to failurebecause of the religious differences
between Elizabeth and her Catholic royal suitors. Consequently, little
reason is found to dwell on the details of the negotiations. Indeed
so much emphasis is placed on the difficulties, not to say the hopeless-
ness, of achieving a religious compromise that it is hard to appreciate
how anyone took the discussions seriously at the time. Yet they did.
The Habsburg marriage negotiations, in particular, were taken very
seriously by contemporaries, Divisions at Court developed over the
issue and threatened at times to lead to open violence. On the one
side stood Norfolk, Sussex and Cecil, and on the other was Leicester
with a steadily growing number of supporters. Leicester's public stance
on the marriage varied according to the circumstances and the person
to whom he was talking at the time, but the pro-Habsburg group
felt sure that he was secretly working to scuttle the project. Fuelled
by personal grievances against the Earl, neither Norfolk nor Sussex
accepted lightly his opposition to a scheme which they believed to
be in the best interests of their Queen and country. Consequently,
on several occasions violence nearly broke out at Court. In June I 56 ,
both Sussex and Leicester, with their followers, carried arms to Court
'as if it were to try their utmost'. When Elizabeth ordered each 'not
to medle with' the other, Sussex complied but Leicester continued
to assemble 'great bandes of men with swords and buckels' to waylay
A draft of this article was read at the Early Modern History seminar at the Institute of Historical
Research. I should like to thank Professor Conrad Russell for his comments at each stage of writing
it. His influence and suggestions have been too numerous to footnote separately but any errors
are mine alone.
i. The exception is W. T. MacCaffrey, 'The Anjou Match and the Making of Elizabethan Foreign
Policy', in Peter Clark, Alan G. T. Smith and Nicholas Tyacke (eds), The English Commonwealth
1547-1640 (Leicester, I979), pp. 59-75.

I989 COURT OF ELIZABETH I 909
his enemy.1 In January I 566 all the Howard adherents at Court were
wearing yellow ribbons while Leicester's friends wore purple.2 Five
months later 'hard words and challenges to fight were exchanged'
between Sussex and Leicester. On this occasion at least their dispute
was thought so public and violent that their show of reconciliation
had to be prominently displayed. Hence they rode together through
the streets of the city 'in order that the people who had become excited
about their dispute might be reassured'.3 Soon after his abortive trip
to Vienna to arrange the marriage, Sussex warned Leicester that he
would publish the names of those who had stood in the way of the
match if the Earl did not now speak out in its favour.4 Further trouble
was probably only averted by Sussex's appointment as Lord President
of the Council of the North. His attainment of high office successfully
neutralized him after the disappointing mission and sent him away
from Court.
There has been a tendency recently to underplay these political ten-
sions, because they do not fall within the category of 'faction' as defined
by Eric Ives and Simon Adams. Both historians seem to be suggesting
that there was no faction at Elizabeth's Court before the 1590S and,
given their definitions (which are in fact not exactly the same), they
are right to do so.5 Nonetheless, the political divisions and tensions
at Court in the I56os were serious. They were important enough to
draw the attention of observers, to necessitate Elizabeth's personal
intervention to keep the peace, and to influence the proceedings of
the I 566 Parliament. Thus whether or not we call their disputes factio-
nal, we must not underestimate their intensity nor their political
importance. Furthermore, we need to modify Adams's general analysis
of Court politics, which he sees as less the product of divisions amongst
courtiers than of disputes between 'an able, charming yet imperious
and idiosyncratic queen and councillors and intimates who generally
shared a high degree of social, political and cultural homogeneity'.6
While it is beyond doubt that Sussex and Leicester shared a common
social background and outlook, it is questionable whether they were
at one in their 'cultural' (i.e. religious) and political views. Sussex,
from the following account, emerges as a conservative Protestant, while
Leicester was the heir to his father's radical Protestant following. In
I. P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice]. S[tate] P[apers], I2/36 fo. I52; C[alendar] [of] S[tate] P[apers]
Span/ish], 1558-1567, pp. 445-6; W. Camden, The History of the Most Renowned and Victorious
PrincessElizabeth, late Queen of England (London, i688), p. 79.
2. CSP Span. i558-i s67, p. 5 1 I.
3. CSP Span. 1558-1567, pp- 56o-i; Historical Manuscripts Commission 7th Report, p. 6I9.
4. CSP Span. 1568-1579, p. 14.
5- E. W. Ives, Faction in Tudor England (Appreciations in History, 6, I979), pp. I-2. S. Adams,
'Faction, Clientage and Party. English Politics 550-1603', History Today, XXXii (I982), 34. Ives
defines factional disputes as conflicts over patronage whereas Adams argues that their 'essence was
a personal rivalry that over-rode all other considerations'.
6. S. Adams, 'Eliza Enthroned?. The Court and its Politics', in Christopher Haigh (ed.), The
Reign of Elizabeth I (London, I984), p. 56.

9IO RELIGION AND POLITICS AT THE October
I 566 when Sussex was urging religious conformity, Leicester was show-
ing 'his colours as the non-conformists' friend'.'
The Habsburg negotiations contributed to religious, as well as politi-
cal, tension in England. Amidst Protestants they exacerbated fears of
a return to Catholicism, fears particularly justified in an England where
Catholic survivalism was strong.2 Yet also from the radical Protestant
standpoint, the negotiations created the danger that the marriagewould
shift the Elizabethan Church in a more Lutheran direction. As the
Austrians tolerated Lutheranism but not Calvinism, some feared that
the marriage would lead to Elizabeth's acceptance of the Augsburg
Confession rather than the Helvetic Confession of the Reformed
Churches. It could not have gone unnoticed that some of those keenest
on the match were Lutheran sympathizers or religious conservatives.
Furthermore, the Lutheran Bishop Guest, as the Queen's Almoner,
had influence at Court and seems also to have backed the scheme.3
Nor were these fears unjustified, for Elizabeth told Sussex to visit the
German Lutheran princes on his way to Vienna in I 567 and assure
them of her intention to abide by the Augsburg Confession.4 The
marriageproject therefore provided an ingredient of uncertainty about
the future of the Elizabethan Church in the 156os, just because many
people believed it might well take place.
The first phase of the Habsburg marriage negotiations opened in
early I 59. The initiative for a matrimonial alliance between England
and Austria came from the Emperor Ferdinand, who sent his ambassa-
dor, Count Helffenstein, to the English Court in February I 55 to
see how the land lay in matters of religion and marriage. In his reports
home, Helffenstein was optimistic. Religion seemed to him no bar to
a marriage since he had found that 'throughout England the form of
the Catholic religion is preserved' and 'there is great hope that if they
get a Catholic King all religious questions may easily be settled by
authority of the Sovereign.'5 His view was deliberately fostered by
Elizabeth, who was trying throughout I559 to represent her new
religious settlement in a conservative light. Thus her Chapel Royal,
which stood as an example to the whole Church, contained a silver
cross and two burning candles 'standing altar-wise'. Likewise, in April
1559, she told the Spanish ambassador, De Feria, that 'she differed
i. P. Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan Movement (London, i967), pp. 92-3.

2. C. Haigh, 'The Continuity of Catholicism in the English Reformation', Past and Present,
xciii (I981), 37-69.
3. J. Strype, The History of the Life and Acts of Archbishop Grindal (Oxford, 1821), p. i66.
The hostile references to Lutheranism in the Zurich Letters in the mid- I56os are also suggestive.
Hastings Robinson (ed.), Zurich Letters 1558-1602 (Second Series, ParkerSociety, Cambridge, I 845),
pp. I25, 143, 157. R. Dixon, History of the Church of England (Oxford, 1902), vi. I34. J. Strype,
Grindal, p. 146. I would like to thank Dr Tyacke for this point.
4. PRO SP70/9I fo. 85S
S. V. Von Klarwill, Queen Elizabeth and Some Foreigners (London, 1928), pp. 26-9, 38, 45,
46, 47.

I989 COURT OF ELIZABETH I 9II
very little from [Roman Catholics] as she believed that God was in
the sacrament of the Eucharist and only dissented from two or three
things in the Mass.'1
Heartened by his ambassador'sreports, Ferdinand sent over another
envoy, Baron Breuner, to England in May, to open formal negotiations
on behalf of his younger son, Charles. Elizabeth, however, immediately
rejected the marriage offer and explained that she intended to remain
single for the foreseeable future.2 Unconvinced, Breuner decided to
remain in England to wait on events, but throughout the summer
months the Imperial suit made little headway. Only in the autumn
were there signs that Elizabeth might be wavering, and Breuner quickly
responded by urging Ferdinand to send over Charles to press his suit.
Ferdinand, however, refused to permit his son to leave Austria on
so uncertain a mission and ordered Breuner home early in I 6o when
Elizabeth's attitude had once again cooled.3
Apart from the Spanish and Imperial ambassadors, few in England
mourned the failure of these early negotiations. The project lacked
support in the Council and at Court. Sir Thomas Parry and the Earl
of Bedford were thought to favour the suit of Sir William Pickering.
The Earl of Arundel entertained hopes of marrying the Queen himself,
and Sir Robert Dudley did not want her to marry at all while he was
still tied to Amy Robsart. There is no evidence that Sir William Cecil
supported a Habsburg match in I 5 59; certainly the Spanishand Imperial
ambassadors thought him hostile to it. The Duke of Norfolk was the
most ardent, and probably the lone, voice at Court in favour of the
Archduke's suit.4
This lack of enthusiasm for the Habsburg marriage was more the
result of political concerns and the experiences of the previous reign
than of anxieties about Charles's Catholicism. Thus, it was political
not religious considerations which dominated Sir Thomas Smith's argu-
ments against a foreign match in a short book, written in I 6o.5 His
arguments articulated deep-seated fears about the political repercus-
sions of a foreign match. A foreign husband might 'favour his country
and countrymen', try to introduce his own laws and customs into
i. CSP Span. 1558-1567, p. 62; Collinson, p. 3 5.

2. Von Klarwill, pp. 67, 76, 86; CSP Span. 1558-1567, pp. 53-4.
3. Patrick Forbes, A Full View of the Public Transactionsin the Reign ofQueen Elizabeth (London,
I74I), i. 176; Von Klarwill, pp. I23-4, i5i; CSPSpan. 1558- 567, pp. 58-67, 97-I04, I06-7.
4. Von Klarwill, pp. 5 1, I2-I3, I23; CSP Span. i558-1567, p. I20. The Earl of Sussex went
to Ireland in August 1 59 and his views on Breuner's proposal are unrecorded, but there is a letter
from him to Cecil, written in October i56o, which makes it clear that he did not then oppose
a Dudley marriage:PRO SP 63/2 fos. 82-3.
S Smith's Dialogue on the Queen's Marriagewas widely copied and appearsin various manuscript
collections including B[ritish] L[ibrary], Additional Manuscripts 48047, fOs. 97-I35 . It is printed
in J. Strype, The Life of the Learned Sir Thomas Smith, Appendix (Oxford, i86o), pp. I84-259.
According to M. Dewar, Sir Thomas Smith, A Tudor Intellectual in Office (London, 1964), p.
85, the pamphlet was 'no academic exercise; it was intended to serve Dudley's cause' and to win
back the Queen's favour.

912 RELIGION AND POLITICS AT THE October
England, and use the country's resources to finance his own territory's
defence and wars. The son and heir of such a marriagewould naturally
show affection to his father's country and, even worse, might one day
be required to rule it. To those who claimed that a foreign match
would bring wealth, power and prestige to England, he replied that
it could well weaken and impoverish her, as Mary's recent marriage
to Philip amply demonstrated. Smith made no direct reference to prob-
lems that might arise from a foreign prince's Catholicism but merely
alluded to them. Thus, when he pointed out the natural wish of a
foreign prince to bring his own laws and institutions to England, he
warned: 'And do you not think that if King Philip had been long
here, he would not have brought some piece from Spain? If nothing
else at least the Inquisition, as they call it, as he did to Naples.' Religion
was thus a side-issue; the arguments used in these early Elizabethan
years against a foreign match were similar to those which had been
raised by opponents of the Spanish marriage in I153, but markedly
different from the Protestant polemics of John Stubbs and Sir Philip
Sidney at the time of the Alencon matrimonial negotiations.
Nonetheless, it was clear to all observers that Elizabeth could not
marry a rigid, uncompromising Roman Catholic. Consequently, dur-
ing his stay in England Breuner had thought it advisable to portray
Charles as a moderate in religion and even to dissemble about the
extent of his commitment to Catholicism. As he explained to the
Emperor:
Had I expresslyaverredthat my graciousmaster,the ArchdukeCharles,

was still devoted to the Catholic religionand would ever remainso, the
whole affairwould havebeenabruptlyterminatedandallhopescut off.1
He had considered such tactics necessary and worthwhile as a means

of promoting a marriage which would in time restore Elizabeth to
the Catholic Church and preserve Habsburg interests in England. This
subterfuge was only possible in the conditions of the early 156os and
led to misunderstandings later on.
The main impetus behind the first phase of the marriagenegotiations
thus came from the Austrians and Spaniards. Elizabeth's councillors
did not seek the match nor even take it seriously, while the Queen
herself consistently and openly rejected the idea of marriage. The brief
flicker of interest in it during the autumn months was a mere diplomatic
ploy intended to keep the friendship of Spain during a time of confron-
tation with France.
In contrast, the impulse behind the second phase of the negotiations
came from England. In I 563 Sir William Cecil, who had been unenthu-
i. Von Klarwill, p. I I9.

I989 COURT OF ELIZABETH I 9I3
siastic about the scheme in I 5 S9 used his agent in Germany, Christo-

pher Mundt, to revive the match.1 At Elizabeth's Court the project
was attracting considerable and influential support. Norfolk, a privy
councillor from I 562, was working with both Cecil and his kinsman,
Sussex, on the latter's return from Ireland in May I 564, to promote
the marriage scheme. By I S6S other identified supporters included the
Earls of Derby and Huntingdon, Lords Hunsdon, Clinton, and How-
ard of Effingham, and Sir Nicholas Bacon. Shrewsbury and Pembroke
may also have spoken in its favour. These men represented a wide
spectrum of religious opinion in England. At one end stood Bacon
and Huntingdon, both godly Protestants, at the other were Norfolk
and Derby, both noted conservatives. This pro-Habsburg grouping
represented so formidable a force at Court that the Earl of Leicester
was loth to express publicly his hostility to the project; instead he
chose to negotiate secretly with the French ambassador to sabotage
it by putting forward first Charles IX's candidature and then his own.2
Elizabeth herself had to bow before the pressure. As the Imperialenvoy,
Zwetkovich, accurately observed in June I 56 : 'she had formerly pur-
posed by all means to remain single but in consequence of the insistent
pressure that was brought upon her by the Estates of her realm, she
was now resolved to marry.'3
The new alignment in favour of the Habsburg match, which overrode
religious differences, arose partly in response to an increased concern
about the succession. Catherine Grey's disgrace, Mary Stuart's mar-
riage and the later birth of her son all made the succession problem
particularly acute in the mid-I 56os. The only way to avoid a disputed
succession was for the Queen to marry or name a successor. A royal
marriage was the preferred option for many, but there was a dearth
of suitable candidates. Those who had previously wanted Elizabeth
to marry an Englishman now, on the whole, had second thoughts.
As Cecil explained in I 564:
Althoughthe magnatesof the realmat one time thoughtthat they would

haveto forcethe Queento marryone of themselves,they havenow changed
their opinion and would preferthat she marrya foreigner,fearingthat the
novus homo who rose to kingshipfrom their midst would favourhis own
i. Von Klarwill, pp. I72-7, i8o-i; S. Haynes, Collection of State Papers ... Left by William
Cecil (London, I740), pp. 407-8.
2. Von Klarwill, p. 232; CSP Span. iy58-i567, pp. 407, 5 I7; Haynes, pp. 409-I0; PRO, Baschet
Transcripts, 3 I/3/25, 26, fos. I, 20-I. T. Wright, Queen Elizabeth and Her Times (London, I838),
i. I98. Breuner included Pembroke and Shrewsbury amongst the match's supporters but De Foix,
who is a more reliable source, thought that Pembroke, Shrewsbury and Bedford were not keen
on the Habsburg match. For Derby's conservatism see C. Haigh, Reformation and resistance in
Tudor Lancashire (Cambridge, I975), p. 2I9; for Norfolk's see D. MacCulloch, Suffolk and the
Tudors (Oxford, I 986), pp. 84-5.
3. Von Klarwill, p. 225.

family and oppressthe others, and thereforeit is that they now desireto
havea foreigner.1
Cecil's 'novus homo' was Robert Dudley. As a married man Dudley

had been ineligible as a candidate in 1559, but in 1564 he was a widower
and Elizabeth's clear favourite as an English husband. It was a choice
that Cecil and others strongly opposed. The Secretary had even threa-
tened to resign in late I56o when it looked as if Dudley might marry
Elizabeth, and he still believed in I 566 that a Dudley marriage would
ruin her honour, reputation, happiness and interests.2 Sussex, though
not averse to this marriage in I56o, also opposed it strongly by I566,
thanks to Leicester's support of his enemies in Ireland.3 Many at
Court therefore preferred to see the Queen look abroad for a husband,
but of the foreign suitors only the Archduke was suitable. Of the Prot-
estants, the German Lutheranprinces had neither the status nor political
weight to be attractive candidates whilst the King of Sweden would
not live in England and in any event was thought 'too rude'. Of the
eligible Catholics, the French King was too young and his brothers
still younger. The Archduke Charles alone seemed compatible on
grounds of age, dignity and descent.4 Although he would not bring
with him the extensive territories promised in the earlier Habsburg
match of I 553-4, he offered prestige and political security. A Habsburg
marriage would open the way to an alliance with Spain which could
provide protection from France and the Papacy. Furthermore it would
preserve the Burgundian connection, which despite the trade embargo
of I 564 many still thought essential to England's commercial and politi-
cal interests.5
The promoters of the match were of course awarethat the Archduke's
religion stood in the way of its success. Yet Cecil for one ignored
rather than wrestled with the problem. He seems to have persuaded
himself that the Archduke would eventually agree to total conformity
with English practices.6 Sussex, on the other hand, referred more
openly to the religious obstacle but hoped for a compromise whereby
Charles would attend English church services with Elizabeth but hear
the Catholic Mass in private.7 Both men believed that the Habsburgs
were more flexible about their religion than was the case. Ferdinand's
decision not to enforce all the Tridentine reforms, Charles's known
I. Von Klarwill, pp. I 89-9o. This reference to Dudley was particularlyoffensive as it drew attention
to the attainder of his father and grandfather. It was their tainted blood as traitors that made Dudley
a new man and the earldom a new line. My thanks are due to Professor Russell for this point.
2. Haynes, p. 444.
3. PRO SP 63/2 fos. 82-3.
4. Von Klarwill, pp. I 74, 230.
S. Haynes, 444; Von Klarwill, p. 22 5; PRO SP 70/94 fos. I 72-6.
6. Wright, i. 206-7; CSP Span. 1558-i367, p. 58o. Cecil made no mention of the Archduke's
religion when listing the disadvantages of the match in a memorandum of I 566. Haynes, p. 444.
7. CSPSpan. I558-I567, pp. 46i, 487.

toleration of Lutherans within his territories, and Breuner's deliberate

misrepresentations in 559 were the cause of their complacency. Had
there been awareness of the Archduke's true feelings it is unlikely that
the match would have commanded so much support from I 564 to
I S 6S. Certainly it lost much of its popularity once the uncompromising
nature of his religion was revealed in late I 567.1
Despite the strong support for the marriage at Elizabeth's Court,
the initial negotiations were slow to get under way. Nearly two years
elapsed from the time the project was first revived until the arrival
of the Imperial envoy, Adam Zwetkovich, in England to discuss terms,
a slow pace of events which owed much to the absence of permanent
ambassadorial representation in England and Vienna.2 Once Zwetko-
vich arrived in London in May I565, serious negotiations began.
Although he had come officially on other business, Elizabeth did not
fob him off with evasive diplomatic niceties but permitted him to talk
about the terms of a marriagealliance with her inner ring of councillors,
Cecil, Norfolk, and Leicester.3 Her positive attitude was largely the
result of the political pressure applied by supporters of the match as
well as her own recognition that relations with the Habsburgs needed
repair after the Burgundian trade embargo of I 564.4
The negotiations with Zwetkowich exposed for the first time the
three main areas of disagreement between the two sides. The most
important concerned religion. While the Emperor Maximilian insisted
that his brother and household should be allowed 'the free exercise
of their religion', by which he meant open and public worship, Eliza-
beth insisted that 'no-one in this realm shall publicly or privately prac-
tise or confess religious rites that are contrary to the laws of this land'.
The second difficulty concerned the Archduke's future status. Maximi-
lian wanted Charles to have a share in government, a royal title and
right of succession should the Queen predecease him childless. Eliza-
beth, on the other hand, proposed that he should possess the same
limited powers and title as Philip II when married to her sister Mary.
The third disagreement was over who should bear the cost of the Arch-
duke's household expenses in England.5 Elizabeth and the English
negotiators considered the Imperial position on these three questions
- especially religion - so extreme that there was a danger the match
would have to be called off. In late July Elizabeth bluntly told Zwet-
i. Von Klarwill, pp. I74-5; BL Cotton MSS Nero B ix fo. I04. The funeral oration for Ferdinand
preached by Grindal on 3 October I 564, interestingly declared 'he was not so adduced to the Roman
religion as appeared . ..'. Strype, Grindal, p. 148. I would like to thank Dr Nicholas Tyacke for
this reference.
2. Von Klarwill, p. I85-7.
3. Von Klarwill, pp. 208-I2.
4. G. Ramsay, The Queen's Merchants and the Revolt of the Netherlands (Manchester, I986),
pp. I2-I 5.
5. Von Klarwill, pp. 239-4 I, 248, 25 I-2.

9I6 RELIGION AND POLITICS AT THE October
kowich that 'owing to the religion everything would be in vain' and
'therefore it was useless to speak about it [the marriage]'.1
Elizabeth's hard-line demand on religion throughout the negotiations
of i165 is not difficult to understand. Whatever her personal feelings
it was politically impossible for her to grant any future husband private
access to a Mass at that time. Since the spring, Archbishop Parker
had been engaged in disciplining the Protestants, Humphrey and Samp-
son, at the University of Oxford for refusing to obey the laws on cere-
monies and clerical dress. Sampson, indeed, was deprived of his deanery
in May at the Queen's command. Elizabeth then could hardly grant
an exemption from the law to Catholics when she was demanding
total conformity from committed Protestants. It might well raise a
political storm, especially as the Oxford divines had important friends
- Leicester, for one.2
By the end of August i165 the negotiations had ground to a halt.
Zwetkowich had returned to Vienna with Elizabeth's uncompromising
conditions and the Habsburgs had decided that 'there was nothing
to be done but to abandon the matter'.3 It was Elizabeth who kept
the negotiations open by sending Thomas Danett to Vienna in May
i166 to persuade Maximilian to reconsider his position.4 Her reasons
for this overture are not clear, but it is possible that she hoped thereby
to avoid a confrontation with her next - and imminent - Parliament
on the issues of marriageand the succession. Perhaps too the re-opening
of the conference at Bruges in May I 566 to settle outstanding grievances
between England and the Netherlands influenced her decision. Eliza-
beth was very anxious that the talks should succeed. She had already
made a personal appeal to Philip II and may have thought that Spanish
goodwill could be encouraged by positive action on the marriagefront.5
The mission was, however, a failure, for Maximilian would not
shift his ground.6 Moreover, Danett's impression of the Archduke
dampened any remaining hopes that Charles might with time convert
to Protestantism; to his surprise Danett discovered that Charles
attended Mass every day and was devoted to the Catholic faith.7
Yet, even when they heard this news, Norfolk, Sussex and Cecil
I. CSP Span. 1558-1567, pp. 452-4.

2. C. Dent, Protestant Reformers in Elizabethan Oxford (Oxford, I983), pp. 34-7.
3. Von Klarwill, p. 255; J. H. Pollen (ed.), 'Papal Negotiations with Mary, Queen of Scots,
567', Scottish HistoricalSociety, XXVii (I901),
I 56i-i 469.
4. There had been some communication by letter after Zwetkovich's return to Austria, and in
February i 66 it was decided to send Thomas Sackville to Maximilian on the same mission. This
was postponed for unclear reasons and Danett was then sent with similar instructions. Hist. MSS
Comm. 70, Pepys MSS at Magdalene College, Cambridge, 1485-1703 (I9I I), pp. 78-9; BL Cott.
MSS Vitellius C xi. fos. 228-32, 23 8-9, 244-6.
S. G. Ramsay, pp. I7-29.
6. Von Klarwill, pp. 259-64.
7. C[alendar][of] S/tate] P[apers] Foreeign] I566-I568, p. 99.

continued to work for the marriage. The Parliament which opened

on 30 September I566 provided them with an opportunity to exert
pressure on Elizabeth to continue negotiations. From both the Spanish
ambassador's dispatches and the parliamentary proceedings it appears
that the pro-Habsburg group used this Parliament as a lever on Eliza-
beth to send a formal embassy to Vienna.1 Their tactics worked.
She promised a joint delegation from both Houses: 'I say again, I
will marry as soon as I can conveniently, if God take not him away
with whom I mind to marry.' At the same time the attempts of Leicester
to stall the marriage by encouraging the Parliament to take up the
question of the succession failed.2
Soon after Parliament's dissolution, the Council drew up instructions
for an embassy led by Sussex to go to Austria; but the Earl did not
leave until the end of June I567, as Elizabeth kept on postponing his
departure.3 Inevitably the supporters of the match, including Sussex,
despaired of his ever going on the mission at all and, even when reas-
sured that he would depart, some feared that the embassy was a mere
public relations device intended to silence demands that the Queen
marry or settle the succession.
On 20 June 1567 Elizabeth gave Sussex his final instructions. She
offered no new compromise to break the deadlock over religion, but
merely reiterated her demand that the Archduke should observe the
laws of the country by attending Divine Service with her. She refused
to use her dispensing power and allow any exception to the law, as
it might encourage others to expect changes in religion and set an exam-
ple of disobedience.5 It seems that she and some of her Council still
thought that the Archduke might conform if he knew the true nature
of the English Church, but feared that he had been given a false account
of it.6 Sussex too was concerned that the Austrians might have an
unfavourable impression of the religion practised in England, but
thought the responsibility for this lay elsewhere. According to the
Spanish ambassador, Sussex said:
although he was a native-born Englishmen [sic], and knew as well as others

what was passing in the country, he was at a loss to state what was the
religion that really was observed here. He believed that her Majesty and
the rest of them held by the Augsburg Confession, but he saw nevertheless
that Calvinism was being preached and being taught nearly everywhere,
and he therefore wished the Council to decide about this as it was a point
of the highest importance, those who adopted the Augsburg Confession being
i. CSP Span. 1558-1567, pp. 59 1-2.

2. PRO SP I2/4I fo. 7; CSPSpan. 1558-I567, p. 577.
3. BL Cott. MSS Vitellius C xi. fos. 240-2.
4. CSPSpan. 1558-1567, pp. 6i i, 614, 6i6, 63I, 640.
S. PRO SP 70/9 I fos. 77-9 I .
6. BL Cott. MSS Vitellius C xi. fos. 240-2.

9I8 RELIGION AND POLITICS AT THE October
furtherremovedfrom the Calviniststhan from those who professedthe
ancientreligion.'
It was necessary, thought Sussex, that the Queen make explicit to
the Austrians exactly what form of Protestantism was practised in Eng-
land, for they could tolerate Lutheranism but not Calvinism. The Privy
Council therefore advised Sussex to assure the Emperor that the Church
in England was such:
as in dede no quyet Catholickmay neede to forebeareto resorteto our
churchesandcommonprayers,for thattheris nothingreddor spokenother
in praiers,or in ministrationof the sacramentebut only the very wordes
of the scripture.
He was to explain that, where the Church departed from the scriptures,
the prayers said had once been used in the Catholic or primitive Church;
the only difference was that the prayers were now usually in English,
though in some colleges and churches of the realm where the company
was learned, the prayers were still spoken in Latin.2 Elizabeth's
instructions to Sussex made the same point but with less good grace.
The Archduke, she said, was not being asked to act against his con-
science as, unlike the service of the Church of Rome, 'there is nothing
in our law which is contrary to the scriptures' - besides as long as
he obeyed the laws he could hold whatever opinions he liked on
religious matters.3 Elizabeth also offered no compromise on either
the question of the title and status of the Archduke or the payment
of Charles's household expenses.4
Sussex left England on 29 June and reached Vienna on S August.5
At first the negotiations made little progress as Sussex had brought
with him no new compromise from the Queen. On 23 October, how-
ever, Maximilian and Sussex hammered out their own compromise
arrangement.6 This was based on the principle that Charles should
be allowed to follow his conscience in religious practices but must
also accept that the exercise of his conscience had to be restricted in
order to provide for the safety of the English realm. Sussex then sug-
gested five conditions which Charles would have to accept as limitations
on his freedom of worship. Firstly, the Mass and other sacraments
would be celebrated only in a private chamber, not in a public place,
and Englishmen would be excluded from it. Secondly, he would accom-
I. CSP Span. 1558-1567, pp. 236-7. Sussex's thoughts on the religion of England in the mid-i 56os
fits in well with Peter Lake's analysis in P. Lake, 'Calvinism and the English Church I570-i635',
Past and Present, cxiv (1987), pp. 32-76.
2. BL Cott. MSS Vitellius C xi. fos. 240-2. Indeed, a Latin prayerbook was printed in i56o
for use in the Universities and the schools of Winchester and Eton. The English defence of the
Prayer Book rested on this argument; it appears again during the Anjou marriagenegotiations.
3. PRO SP 70/9 I fos. 82, 83.
4. PRO SP 70/9 I fos. 86-8.
S. For the diary of Sussex's journey, see Bodleian Library, Tanner MSS 50 fos. I90-200; for his
letters, see PRO SP 70/92 fos. 16-19, 78, 81-2.
6. Von Klarwill, p. 280; PRO SP 70/94 fo. i6i.

1989 COURT OF ELIZABETH I 919
pany the Queen to English services. Thirdly, the Austrians would

refrain from criticizing English religious practices and discussing reli-
gion with any Englishman. Fourthly, Charles would suspend holding
his services for a period of time if any disturbances arose from this
toleration. Finally, he would agree to accept the advice of the Council
on all matters relating to religion. 1
Sussex expressed confidence that this arrangement would resolve
the religious problem. Maximilian, he told the Queen, had secretly
agreed to four of the proposed restrictions and was prepared to recon-
sider the fifth, once he knew her attitude to the compromise. As for
the difficulties concerning the title and status of the Queen's future
husband, Maximilian, he wrote, now accepted her terms: 'yf ye wyll
satisfye the Archduke's request for his conscyence, they wyll bothe
accorde to eny thing you wyll requyre in eny other matter.'2
In fact not all the difficulties had been cleared up. Charles had not
reached any final decision on the first two proposals, which were the
most important, and considered the fifth, the suspension of the Mass
in the event of any disturbances, 'too exorbitant and exacting'. Further-
more, while Sussex believed that he was requesting the Archduke to
attend English services at all times, Maximilian thought the request
was for attendance 'from time to time'.3 Nonetheless, Maximilian
was prepared to concede more than either the Duke of Anjou in I 57I
or Heni-ietta Maria when she married Charles 1.4 It was the Earl's
interpretation of the agreement that was sent for Elizabeth's approval,
by way of his messenger, Henry Cobham. Meanwhile, Sussex remained
in Vienna to await her answer.
Cobham arrivedin England on 7 November I 567. His first interview
with Elizabeth went well, but she would not make a decision before
consulting her Council. Unfortunately for the supporters of the mar-
riage, Norfolk had been absent from Court since Septemberon account
of an illness brought on by the death of his wife, and felt too sick
to obey the Queen's summons to a Council meeting called to discuss
the marriage.5 Despite Sussex's entreaties that he attend, Norfolk
could only write her a letter in favour of the marriage. At the meeting,
therefore, the opponents of the match took advantage of his absence
to press home their case. According to Sir George Stanley, a friend
of Sussex, the opposition came from Leicester, the Lord Steward (Pem-
broke), Northampton and the Vice-Chamberlain (Knollys); whilst its
I. Von Klarwill, pp. 280-2; BL Cott. MSS Julius F vi. fo. 6i.
2. PRO SP 70/94fos. I6I-2.
3. Von Klarwill, pp. 8o-i.
4. Anjou demanded a public Mass, while Henrietta Maria refused to attend any Protestant service,
even the coronation. Cal. SP For. I572-74, p. 9; Hist. MSS Comm., Eleventh Report, App. I,
SkrineMSS, i625-1628(I887), p. 44.
S. CSP Span. I558-1567, p. 684; PRO SP I2/44 fos. go-i; Hist. MSS Comm., 58, Marquess
of Bath at Longleat, II: Harley Papers, I5I5-1772 (I907), pp. I7-I9; BL Cott. MSS Titus B ii.
fo. 308.

supporters were Cecil, Lord Admiral Clinton, the Lord Chamberlain
(Howard of Effingham) and the Comptroller (Rogers).1
Although the Council's deliberations were unrecorded, the kinds
of arguments presented before it appear in an anonymous document
dated November 1567 and entitled 'An Inquisition to gather what is
metest to be done in the marriage between Queen Elizabeth and the
Archduke Charles touching his request on that behalf'.2 Its author
clearly supported the marriageand weighted his argumentsaccordingly,
but, nonetheless, he did justice to his opponents' point of view. Their
case, he declared, rested on two presumptions: that the use of the
Mass was against the law of God and that it was dangerous to the
state of the realm. The danger came from the possibility of religious
unrest created by both 'the malice of the papists' and the fear of the
zealous multitude that this limited toleration might lead to religious
change. There was the additional risk, in their view, that the Archduke
might seek to honour God by restoring England to the obedience of
Rome.
The author found these objections unwarranted. Concerning the first
presumption, he agreed that the Mass was against the scriptures but
argued that the issue was not whether it was evil, but whether a good
Christian might let it be used by another Christian who was in error.
Precedent and practice suggested to him that it was acceptable. Toler-
ation of papists existed in many parts of Germany, while even in
England the ambassadors of France and Spain heard their Masses in
private. Nor did he believe that the hearing of a Catholic Mass was
thought to be such a heinous crime in England, for it was not severely
punished; those found guilty of it were merely fined one hundred
marks, whilst English merchants who had traded the goods of an alien
suffered the loss of all their goods 'of what value so ever they be'.
Moreover, Elizabeth would not be the first to marry someone of a
different faith on similar terms. He pointed out that when the Prince
of Orange had married the Lutheran sister of the Duke of Saxony,
he had permitted her and her household to retain their religion. Evi-
dence from the scriptures led to the same conclusion: good Christians
might allow their marriagepartners some toleration in religion. Lastly,
since papistry was erroneous and blind, it was evident, to him at least,
that it would not survive in the presence of the true faith.3
As for the dangers to the state, they had been exaggerated, thought
I. PRO SP I 2/44 fo. 11 2.

2. There are several copies of this manuscript including BL Addit. MSS 4I49 fos. 88-97 and BL
Cott. MSS Vitellius C xi. fos. 282-94. The handwriting provides no clue to its author's identity
but I suspect that he was Sussex; the writer was apparently absent from Court, and was certainly
knowledgeable about European politics and religious practices.
3. The evidence from scripture was from St Paul, e.g. Corinthians io. The texts, argued the
author, demonstrated that Paul allowed toleration of practices abolished by the New Testament
to those who denied Christ, so it was wrong for them to deny the Mass to those who erroneously
believed it was in his honour.

the author, by the opponents of the match. There was no possibility

of England returning to Rome, he argued. Elizabeth would not be
converted by her husband, for she had demonstrated during her sister's
reign the strength of her conscience. The people dreaded a return to
popery because of the experience of burnings and exiles during Mary's
reign, and religion could only be changed with the consent of Parlia-
ment. It was far more likely in his opinion that the Archduke, once
in England, would see the light and become a Protestant. In any event,
any problems which might possibly arise from the marriage were
nothing like as great as those which were certain to come from the
Queen staying single. The dangers of a disputed succession, the
bloodshed and threat to property from a civil war, isolation in Europe
and the prospect of war, to his mind, far outweighed the fears expressed
about this marriage.
Elizabeth was not to agree with him. On io December 1567 she
announced to Sussex her decision to deny the Archduke the right to
celebrate the Mass in private. Her conscience, she said, balked at the
idea of it, while the laws of the country forbade the practice and she
herself disliked the idea of allowing exceptions to the law. Nor was
the time right, she continued, to consent to a compromise on religion,
for if she disliked the Archduke on meeting him she would be unable
to give religion as the excuse for breaking off the negotiations. Thus,
Sussex was instructed to measure his words carefully in his reply to
Charles, neither to grant nor refuse him the right to hold the Mass
in his chamber. Elizabeth explained that she was still anxious that the
negotiations should continue and hoped that Charles would visit her
in England.1
Two days later Elizabeth took a more negative line. Perhaps after
further consultations with her advisers she saw no point in pursuing
the negotiations. She therefore told Sussex that it was unwise for the
Archduke to come to England with the hope of persuading her to
grant him toleration, in case 'upon conference to be had by us in this
matter, we cannot accord to his request'.2 This letter dealt the death-
blow to the Habsburg marriage scheme, despite Sussex's attempts to
salvage the negotiations. In February I 568 he returned home empty-
handed.3
What motivated Elizabeth to reject the Archduke's request to hear
the Mass privately (which effectively wrecked the negotiations) cannot
be ascertained with complete assurance. Nonetheless the arguments
contained in the letter of io December have the ring of truth. Besides,
the opposition expressed in her Council and the fears aroused at Court
i. PRO SP 70/9 5 fos. I 29-3 I .

2. PRO SP 70/95 fo. 1 33.
3. PRO SP 70/96 fos. 13-14; Von Klarwill, pp. 284-9.

made it unwise to risk political instability by embarking on an unpopu-
lar marriage. It was, moreover, especially difficult to justify granting
Charles the private use of the Mass while non-conforming London
clergy remained in prison and the pamphlet 'warfare' on the so-called
vestiarian issue was still raging.1 No doubt Elizabeth's own prefer-
ences coincided here with political expediency but it would be a mistake
to conclude from this that she had at no point taken the negotiations
seriously and had throughout been playing with the Emperor as part
of 'the diplomatic game.' Her utterances are rarely taken at face-value,
yet there seems no reason why they should not be, as they are open,
frank and consistent. By her own admission, she had reluctantly agreed
in I 564 to abandon the single life, for the good of her realm, if a suitable
candidate could be found. She made it clear, however, from the first,
that she would only marry a man who would practise the same religion
as her own. Thereafter in response to the demands of her councillors
and Parliament, she allowed negotiations to go ahead, but only on
her original terms. Sussex's compromise certainly had its attractions,
but the foreign threat was not sufficient to warrant a risk to internal
stability for the sake of finding allies abroad. Only afterthe deterioration
of relations with Spain, when there were more serious fearsof a Catholic
league against England, was Elizabeth ready to make any religious
concessions to a prospective husband - the Duke of Anjou in I571.
Yet, even then, she was unwilling to grant the use of a private Mass;
instead, she would only allow him 'other ceremonies than ours' which
were 'not repugnant to the church of God' - and these were to be
held in secret for only a limited period of time.2
Sussex was bitterly disappointed at the failure of his mission. To
him the case for the marriage seemed so strong that he could only
believe that its opponents were swayed by self-interest and not by
religion, as they claimed.3 He was mistaken. While self-interest may
have partially influenced Leicester in his hostility to the Habsburg
marriage scheme, religious considerations were keenly felt and domi-
nated the arguments against it in the late I 56os. Moreover, the concur-
rence of Sussex's embassy with the Duke of Alba's arrival in the
Netherlands to suppress the Calvinists must have raisedquestions about
the advisability of forging a matrimonial alliance with another branch
of the Habsburg family. Although no mention of events in the Nether-
lands was made in connection with opposition to the marriage, fears
were expressed about the formation of a Catholic league under the
i. Dixon, Church History, vi. 170-I, 176-8. P. Milward, Religious Controversies of the Eliza-
bethan Age (Leeds, 1977), pp. 2 5-9.
2. D. Digges, The Compleat Ambassador ... (London, i655), p. I30; Hist. MSS Comm., 9,
Salisbury (Cecil) MSS at Hatfield House, II, Addenda 1553-71 (I 888), p. 5S?; BL Cott. MSS Julius
F vi. fo. i 68.
3. PRO SP 70/95fo. i6i.

Pope and Emperor. 1 Finally, while the prospect of a Catholic marriage

did not arouse anything like the same degree of anti-papist ballads,
pamphlet literatureand popular displays of hostility as the later Alenqon
proposal, its opponents tried in the winter of I567 to kindle public
opinion against it by creating an anti-Catholic scare. Bishop Jewel
preached a sermon at St Paul's Cross based on the text, 'Cursed be
he that goeth about to build the walls of Jericho', meaning by the
walls the Catholic Church. The biblical passage both immediately
before and following the text provided a chilling warning to English
Protestants of the consequences of ignoring or side-stepping God's
curse on the Catholic Church by allowing the limited use of the Mass
in England; for, in the bible God punished the children of Israel with
military defeat merely because one family had 'committed a trespass
in the accursed thing' and taken into their home spoil from Jericho.2
Steps were also taken to remove suspected papists from the Queen's
household. The Spanish ambassador's chamber, where he held the
Mass, was raided and the Englishmen found there were thrown into
prison. Judges were called before Star Chamber and ordered to enforce
the laws against the possessors of Catholic books, while the Lord
Keeper in Star Chamber denounced papists who denied the Royal
Supremacy.3
Despite their failure, the marriage negotiations had an important
influence on Elizabeth's religious and foreign policy. The 'half-
reformed' Church which emerged from the I 559 settlement well suited
her diplomatic purposes, in keeping open the possibility of marriage
and alliances with a Catholic power. It may well have been deliberately
designed that way for that reason. During the early I56os, to allay
the threat from abroad, Elizabeth tried to portray her Church as con-
servative.4 This became more urgent during the course of the marriage
negotiations, as their outcome depended on the Austrians believing
that England was basically Lutheran rather than Calvinist. Realizing
this, Elizabeth sent them the Book of Common Prayer and formula
of Divine Service to peruse as a means of reassurance;the prayerbook,
of course, unlike the Thirty-nine Articles, owed much to Lutheran
influences and contained few traces of Calvinism.' At the same time
and for the same reason, she refused to allow the Thirty-nine Articles
to be published and confirmed by the I566 Parliament.6 Moreover,
the timing of the drive for conformity on clerical dress after I S6Sseems
i. BL Cott. MSS Galba B xi. fos. 300-302.

2. The sermon itself has not survived. Reference is made to it in a letter. PRO SP 12/44 fo. I I2.
The biblical text comes from Joshua 6.26.
3. PRO SP 12/44 fos. I09-IO; CSP Span. 1558-1567, pp. 685-7. The manuscript refers to the
Lord Speaker, but this is clearly a mistake.
4. J. Bruce (ed.), Correspondenceof Matthew Parker (ParkerSociety, Cambridge, 18 3), p. 2 I .
S. BL Cott. MSS Vitellius C xi. fos. 228-32.
6. Claire Cross, The Royal Supremacyin the Elizabethan Church (London, 1969), pp. 75-6.

to be connected with the progress of the negotiations. Elizabeth's letter
to Parker urging him to impose uniformity was but a few months
before the expected arrival of Zwetkovich. And surely it is significant
that Cecil, later a protector of 'zealous Protestants', was behind this
attack on diversity in religion. It was he who drafted Elizabeth's letter
to Parker of 25 January and contemporary rumours held him respon-
sible for the Lambeth proceedings which attempted to force the London
clergy to conform.1 Sussex, as shown, was alarmed that Calvinist
preaching and practice put at risk the negotiations. It is understandable
that Cecil, sharing his anxieties, would take action. In the event, how-
ever, Elizabeth found herself in a double bind. On the one hand she
had to impose conformity on radical Protestants in order to keep alive
the marriagenegotiations with the Austrians; on the other, this refusal
to tolerate non-conformity amidst Protestants made it politically diffi-
cult, not to say impossible, to permit the Archduke to celebrate the
Mass even in private.
In the sphere of external relations, the marriage negotiations had
a double significance. Firstly, they were an instrument of foreign policy,
and need to be given their due weight for a proper understanding of
Elizabeth's dealings with her fellow monarchs. Secondly, their outcome
brought about considerable re-adjustmentin the position and behaviour
of all involved.
There are two approaches to foreign policy during the i16os. The
first argues that England's relations with Spain were on the whole
amicable until Alba's arrival in the Netherlands to suppress the I 566
revolt. Elizabeth, according to this approach, continued to follow Eng-
land's traditional friendship with the House of Burgundy for the first
decade of her reign, despite the change in England's religion.2 The
second approach, as proposed by Malcolm Thorp, disagrees with this,
on the grounds that 'religious considerations have been neglected and
demoted to a position of only peripheral importance in the shaping
of policy'. Instead, he emphasizes the underlying religious tensions
between England and the Habsburgs during the i56os, which were
expressed in fears of a Catholic conspiracy against Protestantism. To
his mind, these fears, common amongst men like Cecil, Throckmorton,
Challoner and Mundt, resulted in the emergence of the image of Philip
IIof Spain as the arch-enemy of English Protestantism.3
The research presented here suggests that Thorp's argument is mis-
i. Parker Correspondence, pp. 223-7; J. H. Primus, The Vestments Controversy (Amsterdam,

1960), p. 93-
2. R. B. Wernham, The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy (California, I980); G. D. Ramsay,
'The Foreign Policy of Elizabeth I' in Christopher Haigh (ed.), The Reign of Elizabeth I (London,
I984), pp. I47-68.
3. M. Thorp, 'Catholic Conspiracy in Early Elizabethan Foreign Policy', Sixteenth CenturyJour-
nal, xv (1984), 43 I-44.

leading. While it is true that there were rumours of an Imperial league

against Protestants - Sussex even raised the issue with the Emperor
- the fears were not sufficiently strong to influence policy. Thorp's
quotations are taken out of context and he nowhere mentions that,
at the same time as fears of an Imperial league were being expressed,
the Archduke marriage negotiations were in progress. Nor does he
seem to realize that, with the exception of Throckmorton, whose
influence on the Queen was negligible, the very men he identifies as
believers in the Catholic bogey initiated and supported an alliance with
the Habsburgs. Fear of a Catholic league was a leitmotif running
through the thinking of many Elizabethans in the I 56os, but it did
not dominate policy as Thorp suggests. Indeed for men like Mundt
and Cecil the best way to deal with the danger was to arrangea marriage
alliance with the Austrians which would also neutralize Spain.
The first approach to foreign policy in the I 56os is thus the more
convincing. In the past, however, its proponents have tended to neglect
the role of the Habsburg marriage in the policy of maintaining good
relations with Spain. Yet Cecil hoped that the marriagewould protect
England against France and help to secure the return of Calais; and
it was the neutralization of Spain as a by-product of the marriagethat
made it attractive (or should we say less obnoxious?) to Elizabeth,
despite the warnings of Throckmorton that Philip II was her realenemy.
The possibility of the marriage also encouraged Philip to ward off the
threats of a papal excommunication and look unfavourably at the claims
of Mary Stuart. Furthermore, the marriagenegotiations affected Eliza-
beth's relations with the German Protestants. While she kept on cordial
terms with some of the Lutheranprinces, such as the Duke of Wiirttem-
burg, who were on friendly terms with the Emperor, they created
something of a rift with the Calvinist Elector Palatine, who opposed
the scheme, and the Duke of Saxony who had offered his own hand
to Elizabeth. 1
The coincidence of the collapse of the negotiations and Alba's sup-
pression of the Netherlands revolt reversed the previous trends. Anglo-
Spanish relations cooled. Philip and Maximilian felt betrayed and humi-
liated by Elizabeth's rebuff. Both believed that her heresy was the cause
of the fiasco of Sussex's embassy and was thus more deep-rooted and
dangerous than they had previously supposed. In England, more was
heard of an anti-Protestant league, and in a memorandum of I 569 Cecil
wrote of the advantages of forming a defensive alliance with Denmark,
Sweden and the Protestant states of Germany. In Protestant Germany,
and particularly in the Palatinate, the cooling of Anglo-Habsburg rela-
tions gave rise to new hopes of a general Protestant alliance under
Elizabeth's presidency. In early I 568 Elector Palatine Frederick III
i. Von Klarwill, p. 247.

sent Immanuelo Tremellius to England for this purpose with some
success. 1
In conclusion, while it is true that the Archduke's demand for a
private Mass caused the failure of the Habsburg marriage project, it
would be wrong to assume that religious differences doomed the nego-
tiations from the outset. For a time it looked to contemporaries as
if the negotiations might succeed - and with good reason. The religious
divide between England and the Church of Rome was not as clear-cut
in the I 56os as it was to be in the I 80s, nor did everyone believe
that it would be permanent. A mixed marriage in these circumstances
was acceptable to many and there was considerable support for it at
the English Court, which Elizabeth found difficult to resist. Only as
it became apparent that toleration of a private Mass in the royal house-
hold was a prerequisite of a Catholic marriage did support begin to
die away. Some, like Elizabeth herself, disliked the constitutional impli-
cations and feared the political consequences of such a toleration.
Others were alarmed that a practising Catholic husband would lead
Elizabeth and her Church in a still more conservative direction.
The religious difficulties which emerged during these negotiations
helped to harden attitudes and define, or at least publicize, the differ-
ences between England and the Church of Rome. These difficulties
were to recur each time plans were made to arrange a royal marriage
with a Catholic: in 157I, 1578-81 and the I620S; and as time went
on they were debated with an ideological fervour barely noticeable
in the I 56os. There was then no anti-Catholic outburst to match Stubbs'
'Gaping Gulf' or William Perkins' 'A warning against the idolatry of
the last times'. A study of royal marriagenegotiations in early modern
England can therefore help to chart the development and temperature
of anti-Catholicism.2
St Mary's College, Strawberry Hill SUSAN DO RAN
I. Haynes, pp. 579-88; Parker Correspondence, pp. 3i7-i8; E. I. Kouri, 'England and the
Attempts to form a Protestant Alliance in the late I560s, a Case Study in European Diplomacy'
(Unpublished Ph.D, thesis, University of Cambridge, I978).
2. I intend to examine the religious and political contexts of Elizabeth's marriage negotiations
in a book, now in preparation: 'Monarchy and Matrimony, a study of Elizabeth I's marriagenegotia-
tions'.


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