Professional Documents
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b. Dwelling
People vs. Sto. Tomas, 138 SCRA 206
Facts:
Three Criminal Cases were filed against appellant PACITO STO. TOMAS. One for PARRICIDE, for the death of Salvacion
Grulla; another one for MURDER, for the death of appellant's mother-in-law Consolacion Grulla; and the third one for
FRUSTRATED for the near fatal shooting of Natividad Grulla, appellant's sister-in-law. On May 23, 1967, Pacito Sto.
Tomas arrived by car and at Grulla residence. Pacito asked his wife, Salvacion Grulla to go with him, together with their
children, and rushed the maid to get their things packed for Legaspi City. Awakened by Pacito and Salvacion's conversation,
Consolacion Grulla, came out and joined the spouses in the sala. There, Pacito asked his mother-in-law's permission to bring
his wife and children to Legaspi City. The mother-in-law replied that her daughter cannot go with him to Legaspi because she
does not want to live with him since she can no longer endure the sufferings she is undergoing because of his jealousy. His
wife also refused because their youngest child Blesilda, then only seven months old, was with fever. While Natividad Grulla
was in her room, she heard a series of gunshots and she went out her room to see Pacito firing at her sister. After the series of
gunshot by Pacito, Natividad then saw her mother seated, motionless. Natividad pleaded with Pacito to spare Salvacion's life
telling him that the latter would go with him to Legaspi. But her pleas merited no more than an expression of "Hmmm" from
Pacito who began to reload his revolver. Natividad thought of escaping, as she entered her room, Pacito shot her with her
back turned agaist appelant. Appellant denies any liability for the death of Salvacion, Consolacion, and the near fatal
shooting of Natividad claiming that the death of the two (2) victims was purely accidental.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that there is no dispute that the place where the crimes herein involved were committed is
the house of Consolacion Grulla. It is there where she lives with her daughter, Natividad Grulla (the other victim) and where
Salvacion Grulla was temporarily staying in order to escape from the brutalities of the appellant brought about by the latter's
jealousy. The fact that Salvacion's stay in the said place may be considered as a temporary sojourn adds no validity to
appellant's stance on this point.
A review of the evidence on record, however, clearly indicates that Natividad was fired upon by the appellant while she was
entering her bedroom with her back turned against the appellant. It was while she was running away with her arms raised in
surrender that accused fired at her. Treachery therefore clearly attended the attack made upon her.
c. Nighttime
Facts: The accused, Antonio Garcia and Reynaldo Arviso was found guilty of the crime of Murder considering the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime; superior strength; and treachery. The two accused together with unidentified
companions maltreat, boxed, beat with pieces of wood and stabbed the deceased Apolonio Dioquino, Jr with 22 stab
wounds. The accused contended that the lower court erred: in not considering nighttime and superior strength as absorbed in
treachery and in finding nighttime as an aggravating circumstance despite absolute absence of evidence that nighttime was
purposely sought to insure the execution of the crime.
d. Evident premeditation
Issue: Whether or not aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is present in the case
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that it is unquestionable that the accused, upon accepting the order and undertaking the journey in
order to comply therewith, deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully meditated over the nature and the
consequences of the acts which, under orders received from the said datto, he was about to carry out, and to that end provided
himself with a weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up, and started on a journey of a day and a night for the sole purpose of
taking the life of two unfortunate persons whom he did not know, and with whom he had never had any trouble; nor did there
exist any reason which, to a certain extent, might warrant his perverse deed. The fact that the arrangement between the
instigator and the tool considered the killing of unknown persons, the first encountered, does not bar the consideration of the
circumstance of premeditation. The nature and the circumstances which characterize the crime, the perversity of the culprit,
and the material and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not affect nor alter the
nature of the crime. The person having been deprived of his life by deeds executed with deliberate intent, the crime is
considered a premeditated one as the firm and persistent intention of the accused from the moment, before said death, when
he received the order until the crime was committed in manifestly evident. Even though in a crime committed upon offer of
money, reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not being inherent in the former, and there existing
no incompatibility between the two, premeditation can not necessarily be considered as included merely because an offer of
money, reward or promise was made, for the latter might have existed without the former, the one being independent of the
other. In the present case there can be no doubt that after the crime was agreed upon by means of a promise of reward, the
criminal by his subsequent conduct showed a persistency and firm intent in his plan to carry out the crime which he
intentionally agreed to execute, it being immaterial whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once Manalinde
obeyed the inducement and voluntarily executed it. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that where no sufficient lapse of time is appreciable from the determination to commit the
crime until its execution, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. Hence, the lower court erred in holding that evident
premeditation qualified the killing to murder. In this case, the first two elements of evident premeditation are present. As
found by the RTC, the time appellant determined to commit the crime was when he started shouting at the victim and the
latters companions: You, there, get out and we will kill you! By staying outside the house and following the victims
companions when they came out, he manifestly indicated that he clung to his determination.
As for the third element, the prosecution evidence shows that appellant started shouting outside Mrs. del Rosarios house
at 3:30 p.m. When the victims group left the house, it was not yet dark; it was only past four oclock in the afternoon. The
police received information on the stabbing incident at 4:30 p.m. on the same day. It took less than an hour from the time
appellant evinced a desire to commit the crime, as manifested by his shouts outside the house, up to the time he stabbed the
victim. The span of less than one hour could not have afforded the former full opportunity for meditation and reflection on
the consequences of the crime he committed.
US vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 385
Facts: At the general election which was held on June 6, 1916, Conrado Lerma was elected governor of the Province of
Bataan. One of his competitors upon this occasion was the accused, Jose I. Baluyot, who came out third in the race. As a
result of this contest a feeling of personal rancor was developed in the mind of Baluyot against his successful competitor, and
during the two years which followed the accused became fully imbued with the idea that Governor Lerma was persecuting
him. Baluyot was convicted of the crime of murder, committed August 3, 1918, upon the Conrado Lerma, governor of said
province.
Issue: Whether or not aggravating circumstance of treachery will be appreciated.
Ruling: The fact Baluyot had already been called into the office upon the governor's first arrival and had withdrawn for a few
moments to permit another person to have an interview was also calculated to put the governor off his guard at the moment
Baluyot reentered the office. Being seated in a reclining chair, and hemmed in by obstacles which prevented him from
reaching his assailant, it is plain that the unarmed governor could make no effectual defense against a person armed with such
a deadly weapon as a revolver. It is obvious also that the means and methods thus deliberately selected by the assailant were
intended to insure the execution of the crime without any risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
could make. The court has held repeatedly that, even though the beginning of an attack resulting in the death of the deceased
is free from treachery of any sort, nevertheless it will be found present if, at the time the fatal blow is struck, the deceased is
helpless and unable to defend himself. While the writer of this opinion formerly held the view that, where there is no
treachery in the attack which results in the death of the deceased, there can be no treachery which will qualify the crime as
murder notwithstanding the fact that, at the time the fatal blow was struck, the deceased was unarmed and defenseless,
nevertheless, the court having held so frequently the contrary, the writer accepts the doctrine so well established.
Facts: The accused Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr., armed with handguns robbed a bus and divested the money
and valuables of the passengers. Juan divested Romulo, the conductor, of the fares he had collected from the passengers. The
felons then went to the place Manio, Jr. was seated and demanded that he show them his identification card and wallet. Juan
and Victor took the identification card of the police officer as well as his service gun and told him: Pasensya ka na Pare,
papatayin ka namin, baril mo rin and papatay sa iyo. The police officer pleaded for mercy. However, Victor and Juan
ignored the plea of the police officer and shot him on the mouth, right ear, chest and right side of his body. Manio, Jr.
sustained six entrance wounds which caused his death. Victor and Juan ordered Rodolfo to stop the bus along the overpass in
Mexico, Pampanga where they alighted from the bus. Rodolfo, the driver and Romulo proceeded to the police station of
Plaridel, Bulacan where they reported the robbery. The two accused were subsequently arrested. The RTC found them guilty
of the crime of robbery with homicide. The accused contended that the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of crime
of robbery with homicide.
Issue: Whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide and whether treachery may
be appreciated to the accused.
Ruling: The Supreme Court finds that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide when the
victim of homicide is killed by treachery. However, treachery cannot be appreciated against Juan and Victor in the case at bar
because the same was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedures. Although at the time the crime was committed, generic aggravating circumstance need not be alleged in the
Information, however, the general rule had been applied retroactively because if it is more favorable to the accused. Even if
treachery is proven but it is not alleged in the information, treachery cannot aggravate the penalty for the crime.
People vs. Caratao GR 126281
Facts: The accused-appelant, Sergio A. Caratao, stabbed the deceased Edgardo Bulawin, from behind thus inflicting upon
him stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which directly caused his death. The appellant admitted stabbing the
victim, but interposed self-defense to exculpate himself. The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions version of the
incident. It found that the victims indifference to appellants repeated pleas for rice must have angered appellant to the point of
attacking the victim upon seeing the latter about to leave without heeding his request. It rejected the plea of self-defense for
appellants failure to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. It upheld the presence of treachery, but ruled out the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and cruelty, for lack of evidence. The appellant contends that the court
erred in holding the accused committed murder in treachery.
Issue: Whether or not the accused be guilty of murder in treachery.
Facts: Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely: (1) that the means, methods and forms of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods and
forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. In the case at bar,
the first element was established by the fact that appellant suddenly attacked from behind the unsuspecting and unarmed
victim who was then astride his motorcycle. However, the Supreme Court find the prosecutions evidence insufficient to
sustain the finding of the presence of the second element, namely, that appellant deliberately adopted the mode of attack.
Repeatedly upheld has been the rule that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment,
or those that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery, for lack of opportunity of the
accused deliberately to employ a treacherous mode of attack. In the present case, it appears from the evidence that appellants
grudge against the victim was brought about only moments before the attack, when the latter ignored his repeated pleas for
rice. As observed by the trial court, the sight of the victim leaving the compound without heeding appellants request must
have worsened his anger. Hence, as the killing was done at the spur of the moment, treachery cannot be appreciated. The trial
court decision was modified from murder to homicide.
People vs. Sitchon GR 134362
Facts: The accused-appellant beat MARK ANTHONY FERNANDEZ y TABORA a minor, 2 years old, on the different
parts of his body with the use of a steel hammer and a wooden stick, approximately 18 inches long, thereby inflicting upon
the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter. Explaining his change of plea,
appellant clarified that the killing of the boy was "accidental." He reiterated that he was under the influence of drugs, which
he had taken one after the other. He was a drug dependent and, in fact, had been confined at
the Tagaytay Rehabilitation Center. The RTC found him guilty of the crime of murder.
Issue: Whether or not the accused be guilty of murder
Ruling: The killing in this case was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It is beyond dispute that the
killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected to put up a defense, is treacherous.
Evident premeditation is absent. For the court to appreciate evident premeditation, the prosecution must prove: (a) the time
the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (c)
sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequence of his
act. The prosecution failed to establish any of these requisites. In view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, the killing of the victim is qualified to murder.
Ruling: While it was established that accused-appellant intentionally shot his brother Julian, the witnesses never saw how the
killing started. Treachery cannot be considered where the witnesses did not see the commencement of the assault and the
importance of such testimonies cannot be overemphasized considering that treachery cannot be presumed nor established
from mere suppositions. And where no particulars are shown as to the manner by which the aggression was commenced or
how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, treachery can in no way be established. Hence,
without the existence of treachery accused-appellant can only be convicted of homicide in Crim. Case No. C-44939.
Neither was treachery established in the shooting of Jonathan Aromin. Two (2) conditions must concur for treachery to
exist, namely: (a) the employment of means of execution that gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and, (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. Both these circumstances must
be proved as indubitably as the crime itself.
In the case at bar, however, there is no sufficient proof to establish with certainty that accused-appellant deliberately and
consciously adopted the means of executing the crime against Jonathan Aromin. Furthermore, the victim was already aware
of the danger as he saw accused-appellant carrying a gun and heard two (2) gunshots prompting him to run and hide behind a
wall. Thus, there could be no treachery since prior to the attack the victim was forewarned of the danger to his life and even
managed to flee, albeit unsuccessfully. Consequently, accused-appellant can only be convicted of frustrated homicide.
f. Ignominy
People vs. Alfanta, 320 SCRA 357
Facts: The victim, Nita Fernandez, was asleep in the residence of a friend when at around 12 midnight, a man she had not
seen before suddenly entered the house, boxed her jaw and covered her mouth with his hand. He was pointing a bolo at her
and threatened to kill her if she will resist. Thereafter, she was taken and brought to a vacant house where the stranger
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. After the first intercourse, she was ordered to lie face down while the man
sodomized her. Not satisfied, the accused then inserted his finger inside her. Thereafter, the man lay down beside her and
again threatened to kill her. After a while, Nita noticed that the man was asleep, she then stabbed the man with the knife and
hacked him with the bolo when the former broke. She was able to escape and go to the authorities, who apprehended the man
later on identified as the accused.
Issue: Whether the crime of rape should be aggravated by nighttime. Whether there was ignominy when the accused forced
the victim to engage in anal sex.
Ruling: The law defines night as being from sunset to sunrise. By and itself, nighttime would not be an
aggravating circumstance unless it is specially sought by the offender or taken advantage of by him, or it facilitated the
commission of the crime by insuring the offender’s immunity from capture. In the present case, the accused abducted the
victim, brought her to an abandoned, unlit house and then unleashed his carnal desire on her, assured of the stillness of a
sleeping world.
With respect to ignominy, Art 14 par 17 of the RPC considers to be aggravating any means employed or circumstance that
adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. The case of People vs Saylan is applicable. In this case
wherein the accused entered the victim from behind, the offender claimed that there was no ignominy because the
studies of experts have shown that the position is not novel and has been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation. This
may well be true if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.
Whether or not a place may be considered uninhabited, is determined not by the distance of the nearest house to the scene of
the crime but whether or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help.
Appellant precisely sought the solitude of the basketball court to ensure that private complainant would not be able to call
for, and receive, any help. Aside from being cloaked by the darkness of the night, the basketball court was a relatively
isolated place, shielded from the public view by the high walls of the surrounding houses. Private complainant could have
screamed at the top of her lungs and nobody still would have heard her. Without a doubt, therefore, the trial court properly
appreciated the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place against appellant. In the case at bar, two (2) aggravating
circumstances attended the commission of the robbery with rape, thus the trial court correctly imposed on the appellant the
penalty of death.