Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Studies in Psychology
Jaan Valsiner
Aalborg Universitet
(Received 28 July 2018; accepted 14 December 2018)
Psychology of today has no soul. I do not mean the poetic and eternally self-
torturing subjective demon we usually think of when reading the classic psycho-
logical authors like Gabriel Garcia Marquez or Fyodor Dostoyevsky. Instead,
I think of the absence of the theoretical soul — that of automatized striving
towards obtaining ever-increasing deposits of empirical evidence without first
thinking through what such accumulation might give us in terms of generalizable
basic knowledge. Such a state of affairs — exponential growth of the empirical
evidence in parallel with little or no innovation in theories — would be detrimental
to any science. It is therefore not surprising that psychology has been the target of
conquistadors from different armies of occupation — behaviourism in the first half
of the twentieth century, cognitivism in the second half, and in our twenty-first
century, psychology faces the increasing infiltration of the glorious well-equipped
hordes of neuroscience. For some reason the domain of the psyche — object for
investigation in the aspiring science of psychology since eighteenth century — has
become an important strategic area for capture. The battlefield for psychology has
been left with many casualties by the advancing brigades under the banners of
‘empirical science’ — lacking in-depth focus on phenomena and absence of
theoretical innovation are the most important of the kind.
The birth of various versions of cultural psychologies in the 1990s indicates
a collective multitude of new efforts to build a new kind of psychology that
would not deny the centrality of the human psyche and would allow for con-
struction of theoretical systems that could explain the unity of higher and lower
psychological functions. The vehicle for this effort was the catalytic condition of
the notion of interdisciplinarity in conducting scientific inquiries. But how can
this notion function within a field that has appropriated the canons of ‘empirical
science’ as the social norm for the discipline of psychology? The answer is
simple — it made it possible to create new opportunities for new kinds of
empirical work (e.g., qualitative methods slowly became accepted alongside
quantitative ones, ending up in the cacophony of ‘mixed methods’). Cultural
psychologies — most of the areas that identify themselves as such — are
normatively prioritizing the qualitative methods over their quantitative siblings.
But science is not made by turning tools into theories (Gigerenzer, 1991). Rather,
methods are the very end of epistemological adventure around the ‘methodology
cycle’ (Figure 1) that we had introduced already two decades ago (Branco &
Valsiner, 1997). Our aim was modest — to restore the basic epistemological
scheme of any basic science — where theoretical breakthroughs lead empirical
research and speak to basic knowledge in terms of appreciating human values.
Cultural psychology as a theoretical project / La psicología cultural como proyecto teórico 3
Now — two decades later — it is still important to remind the busy data-
collecting psychologists that general knowledge remains the goal of our very
particular research enterprises.
Our Methodology Cycle is a classic view of how the scientific enterprise
works. It is almost trivial — except for two features. First, it emphasizes the
dynamic relationships within the phenomena-axioms-theories-methods-
phenomena cycle. In such a cycle the coordination of all parts in the whole is
necessary. Simple data accumulation without the work of the cycle would make
a science blind, while a pure theory construction without moving through the
phenomena would make a science futile. Thus, the empirical data by themselves
would not matter for a science (see Hentschel, 1992 on how Einstein dismissed
the ‘blind empiricism’ of the experimental physics of his time), but in the context
of the Methodology Cycle the theoretically crucial data matter very much.
Science operates not through inductive inference (from data to generalization)
but through abductive ways of innovating the theoretical generalizations
(Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010)
4 J. Valsiner
(1) Independent theories. These are theories we currently list under the
cultural psychology label but which have been developed by their authors
without any need to conceptualize the common sense notion of culture.
Yet in their actual ways of making sense of phenomena these theories
capture different features of cultural phenomena. Hubert Hermans’
Dialogical Self Theory and Serge Moscovici’s Theory of Social
Representation belong to this category. Both were developed before
and in parallel with the cultural psychology discourses that gained
prominence in the 1990s. Both could incorporate the notion of culture
if it were of productive relevance, but neither of them needs it. Yet by
their functions in making sense of the human psyche they draw upon the
cultural backgrounds of the selves (Hermans) and on the set of main-
tained social representations (Moscovici).
(2) ‘Struggling’ theories. All theoretical efforts in the field of cross-cultural
psychology can be viewed as being in an eternal fight with the notion of
culture. Their problem is the fusion of the common language use of the
term with its possible theoretical applications. Attempting to belong to
psychology as it is considered to be pan-human, researchers in that field
try to prove empirically that the notion of culture is not theoretically
relevant. But since they encode that term into their empirical base as
a ‘variable’ and proceed to look for differences (the only use that the
statistical mindset affords) they end up in the conundrum of the necessity
of discourse about culture in various elaborations (acculturation, cultural
differences, etc.) where the use of the term remains relevant. They dis-
cover ‘cultural differences’ (since this is the only outcome statistical
group comparisons afford) but lack explanation of what the conglomer-
ates are (‘cultures’ supposed to be hidden behind the collective anonym-
ity of ‘samples’ of mostly university students from different countries).
Their empirical struggle has no end because the problem is meta-
theoretical, rather than empirical.
(3) Theories where elaborate definition of the notion of culture is irrelevant.
Here my own Cultural Psychology of Semiotic Dynamics (CPSD) is
a good example. I do not need to define the concept of culture and
keep up using it in theorizing. Instead, I translate it into the notion of
processes of semiotic mediation and proceed to analyse those in various
social settings. Likewise, Ernst Boesch’s Symbolic Action Theory, which
was developed in the second half of the twentieth century, and its sequel
in Lutz Eckensberger’s action theory, do not need the concept of culture
as a theoretical term. It is usable — and used — as a general label of
address of the framework among others (e.g., in contrast to cognitive or
ecological frameworks), but their theoretical focus is immune to the
6 J. Valsiner
the here-and-now setting by making it meaningful to the actor and to others, and to
provide orientation for future handling of similar possible situations. The latter
function is encoded by the symbolic remove of the sign S from the current setting
into a hyper-generalized form of a sign field. When — in the future — a similar
setting is encountered, the reversal of the symbolic remove — preversal (with
focus on anticipatory acting) — creates the catalytic support (Cabell & Valsiner,
2014) for the next creation of signs to handle the similar but new setting
This is the mechanism for the emergence of value orientations (Branco &
Valsiner, 2012) as well as that for making sense of the ways in which values
operate in human lives. We feel forward towards the future through creating
hyper-generalized sign fields that guide us in life to encounter all kinds of
turbulent realities.
Figure 2 can be a good starting point for demonstrating loci of translatability
between different theoretical systems that exist within the family of cultural
psychologies. Given its axiomatic base rooted in the meta-code of irreversible
time, the CPSD is unique within this family of theories. Yet when it comes to the
hyper-generalized components of ‘sign field reservoir’ and ‘anticipatory sign’, the
interchange with Hubert Hermans’ Dialogical Self Theory (DST) is apparent. The
notion of ‘promoter position’ in DST is a functional analogue for these hyper-
generalized sign fields. DST entails directionality of I-positions — the ‘promoter
position’ is a meta-level, future-oriented directing functional component within the
map of I-positions. Yet it does not share with CPSD the embeddedness of that
directionality within the life course depicted in irreversible time.
The second translatable system demonstrable in Figure 2 is the theory of
social representation (SRT — Sammut, Andreouli, Gaskell, & Valsiner, 2015). In
terms of SRT, the hyper-generalized sign fields of CPSD are depicted as social
Cultural psychology as a theoretical project / La psicología cultural como proyecto teórico 9
their craft in their immediate life settings — yet the meanings of the paintings
entered into a different macro-social political frame. They were both household
decorations and public statements. They were created — and existed — in the
societal environments challenged by wars, epidemics of fatal diseases and the
vanities of the potential owners of the paintings who simultaneously were
political and religious actors in society. The society of the Netherlands went
through a Protestant iconoclastic fury against Catholic churches in 1566
(Beeldestorm). It was not only the devastation of Catholic images in the churches
but also the market for paintings that, under Protestant dominance, began to
introduce compromises into the ways to produce Biblical figures in paintings.
Pictures of saints became drawn in ways (e.g., with dirty nails in depicted feet)
that would make them human rather than godly. The border between the states of
the sacred and the profane was renegotiated in the ways in which compositions
of paintings were carefully planned.
In the case of Mary Magdalene in Figure 4, the painter accomplished it:
In accordance with the Protestant dominant ideal, the painter depicted the
Biblical figure not as a sacred (saint) but as a profane person (a whore). Yet it
is still a public depiction of a figure of religious background which entailed the
story of becoming the former as transferred from the latter. The penitential act
was the core value promoter for the viewers — so both Protestants and Catholics
in Antwerpen could accept the complex compromise in the 1570s as it continued
as a complex sign in service of the same value goal.
The painting — surviving and reaching us in the twenty-first century —
carries with it a complex set of sense-making suggestions (Salvatore, 2018) that
differ largely from the local social context of the 1570s. The importance of
disappeared landscape — important four centuries ago — is no longer of
relevance. The open ointment jar — important for the Biblical narrative —
would be of no relevance. Rather, the dominant visual nudity of the body
becomes the sensual context for the weeping and upward head orientation. The
complex sign involves presentation at all levels — from the sensual (body) to the
counter-sensual (concealing part of the body by cloth, hands, hair) and (implied)
penitential (weeping, etc.) — the whole painting is a multi-level field-like sign
where the lower-level (sensual) moments guide the introduction of higher-level
(moral) feeling directions.
Cultural psychology as a theoretical project / La psicología cultural como proyecto teórico 13
may see (but not touch), may see only in some body position (kneeling down), or
not see at all (iconoclastic efforts to eliminate visual images from churches or not
letting them exist in mosques). The encounter — whichever way it is orga-
nized — is meant to create a wholistic affective state that starts the meaning
construction by the experiencer. A viewer of a painting (Figure 4) is expected to
feel it before trying to explain it.
The sensual basis is expected to lead to the schematization process of
explaining, involving categorization (‘this is a half-naked woman’ or ‘this is
Mary Magdalene’ — in the case of Figure 4). The categorization would lead to
narrative evocation — reconstructive recall can be at work to bring out of
memory the story of Mary Magdalene from the Bible, or — in the case of
another categorization (‘half-naked woman’) — to let the imagination free in
creating a story about the erotic pleasures that the painting would evoke. Both
trajectories of meaning construction — of the divine and of the pornographic —
are in the eyes of the beholder.
Finally, the work on the sign may reach the highest level of the subjective
meaning construction that goes beyond the ‘what is in the sign’ into the con-
structive internalization of ‘how is the sign present in me?’ The Biblical history
of Mary Magdalen’s penitentiary conduct becomes (or continues to be) a hyper-
generalized internal sign field of the psyche that gives affective meaning to the
whole relationship of myself with the world (including the next encounter with
a new version of the sign).
The analytic strategy suggested in Figure 5 is a direct application of the
tenets of CPSD to the complex sign — a painting (Figure 4), or any other
object of a similar kind (a monument — Figure 6). Its basic assumption is the
unity of schematization and pleromatization (Valsiner, 2017b/2006) that leads
to the non-speakable wholistic feeling into the world as the highest level of
human subjective experience. This highest — deeply felt but not expressible
in words — can be the basis for the invention of ritualistic acts of minimal
duration.
In Figure 6 a monument to a border guard and his dog that is located in
Moscow underground station Ploshchad Revolyutsii is depicted. This sculpture
has been part of the profoundly decorated subway station since its construction in
the mid-1930s. In around 2005, the local students — followed by others —
developed an urban legend that touching this dog’s nose (there is a second
identical sculpture on the other side of the station) would bring luck in examina-
tions, and beyond. The social practice rapidly developed — people exit the
underground train for a second or less, touch the nose of this dog and move on
in their daily pursuits with the instantly emerging hope that their luck will be
with them.
In terms of the analysis of complex signs (Figure 5), we here can note (a) the
sensual component of minimal touch together with (b) the story that such
touching brings luck, all that subsumed under the hyper-generalized feeling
that performing this ritual feels important to the self — whether the luck
materializes or not. The person feels the need for action to bring luck and is
Cultural psychology as a theoretical project / La psicología cultural como proyecto teórico 15
ready for a new second-long ritual performance. This brings us to the crucial
question of what kinds of phenomena are relevant in cultural psychologies.
Everything that I put my finger on is ugly and dirty, flowers become faded as soon
as I look upon them. If I come to love a woman she becomes ugly and unclean,
monstrous, and I am crushed by the very weight of this impression … A man
whom I care for becomes an untidy janitor reeking with alcohol. I cannot wish for
anything but that it becomes repugnant to me at the same time. (Janet, 1921,
p. 154)
The depth of the reported phenomena calls for systemic analysis of meaning
construction in action — the generation of an act is simultaneously signified, and
the signification regulates the act. Acting towards A evokes affectively irradiat-
ing sign B that inhibits A — sometimes even in the phase of action intention. As
a result, the intended action is not carried out. The presence of such aborted
actions makes it possible for psychologists to claim that the ‘study of behavior’
is their goal that guarantees objectivity in science. Most of the psychological
phenomena are generated in abundance and aborted also in abundance. This
reality leads to the need to restore the method of introspection to its deserving
central role in psychological methodology (Valsiner, 2017a).
The sign hierarchy involved in the case of Janet’s patient goes beyond the
evocation of negative feelings:
In this case the affective sign fields the person links with concrete actions not
only inhibit the actions themselves, but operate to link the value of such actions
to the meaning of the Self itself.
Pierre Janet is one of the few thinkers of the past who insisted on the
centrality of affective processes while developing the notion of sign hierarchies
(Zittoun, 2008). The notable feature of the example above is the use of vocabu-
lary that reflects the presence of overwhelming hyper-generalized sign fields
(‘offending’, ‘forbidden’, ‘stealing’). The phenomena of direct relevance for
research in cultural psychologies are the ones that link the most obvious acts
of everyday life with the highest-level hyper-generalized affective fields.
(1) The full use of the Methodology Cycle. No single part can be separated
from the whole of the cycle. The beginning move here is between the
phenomena and the meta-codes (axioms), from which the construction of
theories follows. This movement direction (counter-clockwise) renders
the methods to be the last part of the researcher’s constructive effort —
always to be checked further in relation to the phenomena. The data —
which in the social practices of contemporary psychology are held in
symbolic reverence — are derivates of the methodological constructivity.
(2) The goal is the creation of generalized knowledge. The post-modern
idealization of ‘local knowledge’ is rejected, and cultural psychology
joins the ranks of the basic sciences in their search for universal knowl-
edge. Only in the case of cultural psychology does such universal knowl-
edge include the generalized contexts of the abstracted features of
cultural constructions. Cultural psychology makes theoretical tools for
generalized processes relevant for science.
(3) Cultural psychology is an idiographic science. Its generalization of
knowledge ranges from analyses of systemic single cases to generalized
abstract context-inclusive materials (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010,
Valsiner, 2016).
innovative. Human lives are excruciatingly interesting — yet our efforts to make
sense of them are limited by our own invention of what ‘real science’ should be
like.
Note
1. All the sixteenth-century creators of complex paintings whom we now consider to
be artists were actually craftsmen — belonging to the same professional guild as
others (usually goldsmiths and jewellers), and their customers were affluent families
who furnished their houses from ceiling to floor with paintings. Most of the
paintings were requested by the buyers, who indicated their preferred topics and
at times insisted that their and their family members’ portraits appeared in the
paintings in a peripheral location (‘donors’). The notion of ‘art’ in our contemporary
sense was not yet differentiated.
Cultural psychology as a theoretical project / La psicología cultural como proyecto teórico 19
Supuestos
básicos
(Meta-código)
EXPERIENCIA
INTUITIVA
DEL
Teoría INVESTIGADOR Fe-
construida - RELACIÓN nómenos
SUBJETIVA
CON
EL MUNDO
MÉTODOS
CONSTRUIDOS
“DATOS” DERIVADOS
Nuevo signo
Reservorio
MOMENTO anticipatorio
de signos
híper-
generalizados PRESENTE
generalizado
PREVIOS
ELIMINACIÓN
SIMBÓLICA
PREVERSO
S SIMBÓLICO
EL SIGNO S ES CREADO
EN EL FLUJO DE LA SOPORTE
CATALÍTICO
EXPERIENCIA
EL ACTO
PASADO FUTURO
TIEMPO IRREVERSIBLE
HÍPER-GENERALIZACIÓN PLEROMÁTICA
El signo en toda su unidad de la reflexibilidad afectiva INMEDIATA
(experiencia sensual), EMERGENTE (categorización, evocación de historias)
y DISTANCIADA, y ALCANZA LA SÍNTESIS AFECTIVA que ofrece un significado
abrumador para la ocasión Y PUEDE REGULAR LA ACCIÓN
EVOCACIÓN NARRATIVA
El signo produce un acto de recuerdo que NUEVO
reconstruye la historia con la que está relacionado, MODO
o se desencadena a través de la imaginación DE
SENTIR
EN
CATEGORIZACIÓN PARA LA ESQUEMATIZACIÓN LA
Se otorga al signo una etiqueta generalizada o VIDA -
reconocida por una categoría existente MUNDO
BASADO
EXPOSICIÓN EN
A UN SIGNO EL SENTIMIENTO
COMPLEJO PROVOCADO
BASE SENSUAL: experiencia afectiva POR EL
sensorial del signo (percepción visual, ENCUENTRO
experiencia táctil y háptica, gusto, CON
TAMBIÉN el contexto del signo: EL
iluminación, olfato (incienso), etc. SIGNO
Todo lo que toco es feo y sucio, las flores pierden el color en cuanto las miro. Si
me enamoro de una mujer, ella se convierte en una persona fea, sucia, monstruosa,
y yo me siento aplastado por el peso de esta impresión … Un hombre al que estimo
se convierte en un conserje desaseado que apesta a alcohol … Cualquier cosa que
deseo se convierte simultáneamente en algo repugnante para mí. (Janet, 1921,
p. 154)
Parece ser que cuando preparo la sopa estoy atentando contra la ética … Soy
moralmente ostentoso cuando me visto … Siempre hago cosas prohibidas … Este
libro debe ser realmente muy inmoral, ya que cuando lo leo siempre tengo la
sensación de estar leyendo subrepticiamente uno de esos libros que estaban
prohibidos en el internado. ¿Acaso no he pagado mi desayuno? El caso es que
mientras lo tomaba tenía la impresión de estar robando algo a los pobres (Janet,
1921, las cursivas son añadidas).
En este caso, los campos de signos afectivos que el individuo vincula con
acciones concretas no solamente inhiben las mismas acciones sino que operan
para vincular el valor de dichas acciones con el significado del propio Self.
Pierre Janet es uno de los pocos pensadores del pasado que insistió en el
carácter central de los procesos afectivos al desarrollar la noción de jerarquía de
signos (Zittoun, 2008). La característica destacable del ejemplo mencionado es el
uso del vocabulario que refleja la presencia de campos de signos híper-
generalizados contundentes (‘atentar’, ‘prohibir’, ‘robar’). Los fenómenos de
relevancia directa para la investigación en las psicologías culturales son aquellos
que vinculan los actos más obvios de la vida cotidiana con los campos afectivos
híper-generalizados de nivel superior.
(1) El uso completo del Ciclo Metodológico. Ninguna parte puede ser
separada de la totalidad del ciclo. El paso inicial aquí se produce entre
los fenómenos y los meta-códigos (axiomas), desde donde se desarrolla
la construcción de teorías. Esta dirección de movimiento (contraria a las
agujas del reloj) hace que los métodos sean la última parte del esfuerzo
constructivo del investigador, métodos que deben ser siempre verificados
a posteriori en relación con los fenómenos. Los datos — que en las
prácticas sociales de la psicología contemporánea se mantienen con una
reverencia simbólica — son derivados de la constructividad
metodológica.
36 J. Valsiner
Nota
1. Todos los creadores de pinturas elaboradas del siglo XVI a los que ahora conside-
ramos artistas, en realidad eran artesanos y pertenecían al mismo gremio profesional
que otro tipo de artesanos (generalmente joyeros y orfebres) y sus clientes eran
familias que adornaban con cuadros las paredes de sus casas, desde el cielo raso
hasta el suelo. La mayoría de las pinturas eran solicitadas por compradores que
indicaban a los pintores sus temas preferidos y, en ocasiones, insistían en que los
cuadros incluyeran los retratos de los miembros de su familia en una ubicación
periférica (‘donantes’). La noción de ‘arte’ en el sentido contemporáneo aún no
estaba diferenciada.
Acknowledgements / Agradecimientos
The reviewers of the earlier version of this paper made good suggestions for its
improvement. The ideas expressed here germinated during the period of my Niels
Bohr Professorship at Aalborg University supported by Danske Grundforskningsfond. /
Los revisores de la primera versión de este artículo nos ofrecieron sugerencias adecua-
das para mejorarlo. Las ideas expresadas aquí germinaron durante el período de mi
cátedra Niels Bohr en la Universidad de Aalborg, y el trabajo fue financiado por el
Danske Grundforskningsfond.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author / Los autores no han referido
ningún potencial conflicto de interés en relación con este artículo.
Cultural psychology as a theoretical project / La psicología cultural como proyecto teórico 37
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