ToDOJ Na 2017 DOJ FREE LECTURE NOTES IN POLITICAL LAW (SIGNIFICANT CASES, PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINES) ‘THE STATE POWERS (GR No. 207132 and 6.R No. 207205, December 06, 2016 AMCOW v. GAMCA, J Brion) PROCEDURAL ISSUE; WRIT OF CERTIORARI The petitions for certiorari and prohibition against the OOH DO letters fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Acts or omissions by quasi-judicial agencies, regardiess of whether the remedy involves a Rule 43 appeal or a Rule 65 petition for certiorar is cognizable by the Court of Appeals. xx Since the DOH is part of the Executive Department and has acted in its quasijudicial capacity, the petition challenging its CDO letter should have been filed before the Court of Appeals. The RTC thus aiid ‘not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petitions and erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorar‘and prohibition against the DOH CDO letters. In procedural terms, petitions for certiovariand prohibition against @ government agency are remedies available to assail its quasiudicial acts, and should thus have been filed before the CA, The petitions for certiorari and prohibition against the DOH CDO letters were premature challenges - they failed to comply with the requirement that there be ‘no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy" and with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Regional Trial Court of Pasay City unduly disregarded the requirements that there be “no other plain speedy and adequate remedy at lav? and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, when it gave due course to the certiarariand prohibition petition against the DOH's CDO. xxx Note, at this point, that Rule 65 petitions for certiorar/and prohibition are discretionary writs, and thet the handling court possesses the authority to dismiss them outright for failure to comply with the form. and substance requirements. xxx Consequently, the RTC's resulting judgment is void and carries no legal effect. The decision exempting GAMCA from the application of the referral decking system should equally have no legal effect. THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE DOH'S ASSAILED LETTERS- The prohibition against the referral decking system under Section 16, RA No. 10022, is a valid exercise of police power. xxx The State's police power is vast and plenary and the operation of a business, especially one that is imbued with public interest (such as healthcare services), falls within the scope of governmental exercise of police power through regulation. As defined, police power includes (1) the imposition of restraint on liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. The exercise of police power involves the “state authority to enact legislation ‘that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. xxx To be considered reasonable, the government's exercise of police power must satisfy the “valid object and valid means’ method of analysis: first the interest of the public generelly, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires interference; and secand the means employed are reasonably necessary to attain the objective sought and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.These two elements of reasonableness are undeniably present in Section 16 of RA No. 10022. The prohibition against the referral decking system is consistent with the State's exercise of the police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the people, Public interest demands State interference on health matters, since the welfare of migrant workers is 2 legitimate public concern. xx Based on these circumstances, while the DOH erred when it issued its CDO letters without first giving GAMCA the opportunity to prove whether the practice conducted by GAMCA is the same practice prohibited under RA No. 10022, the DOH conclusion to so act, in our view, did not constitute grave abuse of discretion that would have divested it of jurisdiction We note that the DOH had sufficient basis when it determined that the referral decking system prohibited under RA No, 10022 was the same decking system practiced by GAMCA. To reiterate, the referral decking system was not something news, it was an old system that GAMCA practiced and was known to all in its scope and operating details. That GAMCA had previously questioned the DOH prohibition and had been given ample opportunity to be heard when it filed an appeal before the OP, negate the conclusion that GAMCA had been aggrieved by precipitate and unfair DOH action. To be sure, these factual circumstances do not make the CDQ letter compliant with procedural due process. They mitigate, however, the error committed and render it less than the capricious, arbitrary, and patent refusal to comply with a positive legal duty that characterizes an act committed with grave abuse of discretion The Court furthermore, in several instances, has recognized that an administrative agency may issue an ex partecease and desist order, where vital public interests outweigh the need for procedural due process.” PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY VIS-A-VIS POLICE POWER: While the principles of sovereign independence and equality have been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence, our recognition of this principle does not extend to the exemption of States and their affiliates from compliance with Philippine regulatory laws. In Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon, we recognized the principle of sovereign independence and equality as part of the law of the land. We used this principle to justify the recognition of the principle of sovereign immunity which exempts the State - both our Government and foreign governments - from suit. Our recognition of sovereign immunity, however, hes never been unqualified. While we recognized the principles of independence and equality of States to justify a State's sovereign immunity from suit, we also restricted state immunity to acts jus ‘mperii or public acts. We said that once a State enters into commercial transactions (/us gestions), then it descends to the level of a private individual, and is thus not immune from the resulting liability and consequences of its actions. By this recognition, we acknowledge that a foreign government acting in its jus /mperiunction cannot be held liable in a Philippine court, Philippine courts, as part of the Philippine government, cannot and should not take jurisdiction over cases involving the public acts of a foreign govemment. Taking Jurisdiction would amount to authority over a foreign government, and would thus violate the principle of sovereign independence and equality, This recognition is altogether different from exempting governments whose agents are in the Philippines from complying with our domestic laws. We have yet to declare in a case that the principle of sovereign independence and equality exempts agents of foreign governments from compliance with the application of Philippine domestic law. In the present case, GAMCA has not adduced any evidence in the court below, nor has it presented any argument before us showing that the principle of sovereign equality and independence has developed into an international custom shielding state agents from compliance with another state's domestic laws. Under this situation, the Court is in no position to determine whether the practice that GAMCA allegeshas indeed crystallized into an international custom, ‘A MOTION TO DISMISS IS NOT ALLOWED IN EXPROPRIATION CASES (GR. No. 169263, City of Manila v. Melba Tan Te, September 21, 2011) Expropriation is a two-pronged proceeding: fist the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts which terminates in an order of dismissal or an order of condemnation affirming the plaintif’s lawful right to take the property for the public use or purpose described in the complaint and second, the determination by the court of ‘the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated. Expropriation proceedings are governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Under the Rules of Court of 1940 and 1964, where the defendant in an expropriation case conceded to the plaintiffs right to expropriate (or where the trial court affirms the existence of such right), the court-appointed commissioners would then proceed to determine the just compensation to be paid. Otherwise, where the defendant had objections to and defenses against the expropriation of his property, he was required to file a single motion to dismiss containing all such objections and defenses. This motion to dismiss was not covered by Rule 15 which governed ordinary motions, and was then the required responsive pleading, taking the place of an answer, where the plaintiffs right to expropriate the defendants property could be put in issue. Any relevant and material fact could be raised as a defense, such as that which would tend to show thet the exercise of the power to condemn was lunauthorized, or that there was cause for not taking defendants property for the purpose alleged in the petition, or that the purpose for the taking was not public in character. With that, the hearing of the motion and the presentation of evicence would follow. The rule is based on fundamental constitutional provisions affecting the exercise of the power of eminent domain, such as those that seek to protect the individual property owner from the agaressions of the government. However, the rule, which was derived from the practice of most American states, proved indeed ta be a source of confusion because it likewise permitted the filing of another motion to dismiss, such as that referred to in Rule 16, where the defendant could raise, in addition, the preliminary objections authorized under it. The Supreme Court, in its en bamcResolution in Bar Matter No. 803 dated April 8, 1997, has provided that the revisions made in the Rules of Court were to take effect on July 1, 1997. Thus, with said amendments, the present state of Rule 67 dispenses with the filing of an extraordinary motion to dismiss such as that required before in response to @ complaint for expropriation. The present rule requires the filing of an answer as responsive pleading to the complaint. Section 3 thereof provides: See. 3, Defenses and objections. If 0 defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking of his property, he may and serve a notice or appearance and a manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same. Ifa defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any ‘objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer of any subsequent pleading ‘A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, atthe trial of the issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share in the distribution of the award