LAO H.

ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents,

corporations and partnerships adversely affected by Republic Act No. 1180,
petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO
SARMIENTO, City Treasuer of Manila, respondent. [G.R. No. L-7995. May 31,
1957.]

Issue: W/N the act was approved in violation of the constitutional requirements of
due process and equal protection of the laws. If so, is this a legitimate exercise of
the police power?

Held: It must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the
constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of
determining the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge
of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in
the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the
public policy or to achieve public interest.
Police power is far-reaching in scope, and it is almost impossible to limit its sweep.
It derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, and does not need
to be expressed or defined in its scope. It is said to be co-extensive with self -
protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all
governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it
so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of
nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of
police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human
foresight. So it is that Constitutions do not de ne the scope or extent of the police
power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most
important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.

The conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and
the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence, or the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic
society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercises it, for that would be
tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and
anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty or property, provided there
is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as
always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and
means. And if distinction or classification has been made, there must be a
reasonable basis for said distinction.

A. Equal Protection of Laws vis-à-vis Police Power

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825).

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed

out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their
utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of
the people of the nation of which they are mere guests, which practices,
manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals,
show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between
an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the
retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to
prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to
fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction
can be found between one and the other.

The SC is fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that
the disputed law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination,
but the expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru
their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that
has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The
law is clearly in the interest of the public, any of the national security itself, and
indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the
State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and

classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of
the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law
can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classi cation is
without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we can
also refer to the case of Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369,
which clearly and succinctly de ned the application of equal protection clause to a
law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:

". . . '1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but
admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and
 avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and
therefore is purely arbitrary. “

The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for
classification has already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in
various courts in the United States. In the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, it was held that,
"Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification
otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a
class than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference
in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification
in the exercise of police power." (2 Am. Jur. 468-469.)

These limitations on the qualifications of aliens have been shown on many occasions
and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than
borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the
reality and significance of the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:

". . . It may be judicially known, however, that aliens coming into this country
are without the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that
our own people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are
of different psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is
natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is
first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment
and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different
regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public
weal, nor are they as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by
citizenship, are a part of the government itself. Further enlargement, is
unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed with
absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for
making the classification, and therefore appropriate discrimination against
aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . ."

The classification in the law of retail traders into nationals and aliens is actual, real
and reasonable. All persons of one class are treated alike, and it cannot be said that
the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded. Hence, it is the duty of
this Court to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and
it cannot declare that the act transcends the limits of equal protection established by
the Constitution.

B. Due process vis-à-vis Police power

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power, Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public
welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there
sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there
not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be
achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with
private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is
applied.

It has been stated by the highest authority in the United States that:
". . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only
that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the
means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject
sought to be attained. . . ."
xxx xxx xxx
"So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of
other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce
that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without
authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the
legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . ." (Nebbia vs.
New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
". . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word 'reasonable' in
considering the scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the
test used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the
legislature is to inquire whether the restrictions it imposes on rights secured
to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it
imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . ."

In Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, xes this
test of constitutionality:
"In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise
of the police power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not
constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered by the court is
whether the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in
connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and
capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health,
safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public."

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the
constitutional restrictions of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive
as freedom from economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the police
power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to the legislature full
authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the supreme happiness
of the people, their freedom and liberty. It would do well to refer to the nationalistic
tendency manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. Thus in the preamble,
a principal objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as
corollary thereto the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the
exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8
of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens
of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of
the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the
Constitution.

The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of

its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court
may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the
legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of
the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its reasonableness,
but its unreasonableness, and we nd the provisions are not unreasonable.

The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired
legislative objective, i.e., to free the national economy from alien control and
dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and
privileges (II Am. Jur., pp. 1080- 1081). The test of reasonableness of a law is the
appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry
out its purpose into effect. Judged by this test, the disputed legislation, which is not
merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed
the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant and
reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes
the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue
therein during the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue
is accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied only to persons
upon conviction of certain offenses.

C. Conclusion

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted
to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien
dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from
such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality
and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because suf cient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes
the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects
their privilege; that the wisdom and ef cacy of the law to carry out its objectives
appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within
the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are
clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled
the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said
to be void for supposed con ict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or
surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia
and Felix, JJ., concur.

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of

Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, 79310, 79744, 79777, [July 14, 1989], 256
PHIL 777-827. J. CRUZ

Issue: Whether or not the taking of property under the said laws is a valid exercise
of police power or of the power of eminent domain.

Held: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same
time on the same subject. The cases before us present no knotty complication
insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the
measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is
an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance
with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary
to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for
which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title
to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to
the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain. Recent trends, however, would
indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of
eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the
power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose
has long been accepted

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire
private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the
owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell
under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale
may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or
cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of
eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State
over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the
irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in
the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law. But
for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute
(as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional
injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the
interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of
the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.

The requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution
itself. No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, the purposes specified
in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the
constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures "to encourage
and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who
are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." The second, Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the
measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. Just compensation is defined as
the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain
but the owner's loss. It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these
petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands under
the police power. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, there is
compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator
must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary
period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the
property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property.

To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the

courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the
government.

Issue: W/N the mode of compensation under the CARP Law is unconstitutional?

The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the mode of payment and
compensation is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the
expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money,
which is the only medium of payment allowed.
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of
just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just
compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal
here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an
ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is
sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. The
expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of
whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed
their owners.

We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when
they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a
part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be
needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in
the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be no
doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had
no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the
lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume
that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by
the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid
fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with
other things of value.

Issue: W/N there is denial of equal protection clause?

Held: Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it
must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of
the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply
equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be
treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed.33 The
petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of
other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform
must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect
by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of
the Bill of Rights. It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be
sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject
and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as
distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State
and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down
by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied.
What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the
constitutional goal.

Issue: W/N the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily

transferring title before the land is fully paid.

Held: The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall
pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or
LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. Hence, the
argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring
title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.

WHEREFORE, the Court holds R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos.
228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the
herein petitions.
[G.R. No. 89572. December 21, 1989.]
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) an DIRECTOR
OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REY
C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON- CAPULONG, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172, respondents. J. Cruz

ISSUE: Whether or not the three flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: Yes. The police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference
of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is
certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The
method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of
the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three- flunk rule is intended to insulate
the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of
those not qualified to be doctors. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a
doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any
other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the
longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its
human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not
used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the
common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. A person
cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who
wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and
adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he
may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has
demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in
nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not
well-taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things
to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. There can be no
question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other
students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical
profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which,
for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for
example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the
same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly
treated. There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the
tests are admitted and others who have also quali ed are denied entrance. In other
words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals. The Court feels
that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of
the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation
and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT ve times. While his
persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless
love.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY,

petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC.,
respondents. G.R. No. L-34915. June 24, 1983.]

Issue: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of

police power.

HELD: NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. — We now come to the question
whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police
power. The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep.
Act 537. Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or
restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare.
It does not involve the taking or con scation of property with the exception of a few
cases where there is a necessity to con scate private property in order to destroy it
for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general
welfare as for instance, the con scation of an illegally possessed article, such as
opium and rearms. "It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118,
Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright con
scation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay,
even without compensation."

Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted in Political Law
by Tañada and Carreon, V-II, p. 50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate
the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property
outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the
general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government
for injury sustained in consequence thereof. There is no reasonable relation
between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of
health, morals. good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to bene t paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the
burden to private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not

covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center
of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to
the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the
Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177(g) that a
sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in
such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to
provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past. It
continues to the present.

As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on
implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as
statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and
liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking.
Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had
incorporated, received necessary licenses and permits, and commenced operating.
The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as
having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted
the permits to commence operations.