City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, G.R. No.

14355, [October 31,

1919], 40 PHIL 349-385

Issue: Whether or not the Courts can inquire into the necessity of expropriation of
delegate, such as the City of Manila?

Held: The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal

corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the
power upon it. The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not
be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the
legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the
State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be
questioned by courts, but the general authority of municipalities or entities must
not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must
comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for
conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or
not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case
under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the
courts have the right to inquire into. When the courts come to determine the
question, they must only find In the present case there are two conditions imposed
upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private;
and, second, the purpose must be public. The authority of the city of Manila to
expropriate private lands for public purposes, is not denied as provided in its
Charter. However, if the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions
exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right
is being exercised in accordance with law. In the instant case, the record does not
show conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely decided that there exists a
necessity for expropriation. The decision of the lower court is affirmed.

[G.R. No. L-12172. August 29, 1958.] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Higinio V. Catalan for
appellee. Prila, Pardalis & Pejo for appellants.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: NO. Where an ordinance of a Municipality fails to state any policy or to set up
any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action; expresses no purpose to be
attained by requiring a permit; enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal;
and entirely lacks standards thus confering upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such
ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow
or prevent an activity, per se lawful. (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Primicias vs.
Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71; Schloss Poster Adv. Co., Inc. vs. City of Rock Hill, et al., 2 SE [2d],
pp. 394-395)

A Municipal Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive if it operates to permanently

deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; it then oversteps the
bounds of police power without just compensation. We do not overlook that the
modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to
the comfort and happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the
interest of the general welfare and, in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures
offensive to sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil., 580), the State may not,
under guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community. To legally achieve that result, the
landowner should be given just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as

Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
defendants-appellees. [G.R. No. L-26400. February 29, 1972.]

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can file a suit against the government by
reason of the unjust taking of her property without just compensation

Held: In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu , the SC held: ". . . If
the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for
public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not
be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the
government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a
complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation
fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the
amount fixed, may it have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to
appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment.' If there were an
observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they
are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by
what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as
important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of
officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that
when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon
the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest
that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the
doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked."

Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of

her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any
portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole
lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the
portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the
government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has
been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make
due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the
due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the
time of the taking.

As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal
interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that
payment is made by the government. 3 In addition, the government should pay for
attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded
to the court a quo for the determination of compensation, including attorney's fees,
to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

LORENZO SUMULONG and EMILIA VIDANES-BALAOING, petitioners, vs. HON.

BUENAVENTURA GUERRERO and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,
respondents. [G.R. No. L-48685. September 30, 1987.]

Issue: Whether the taking of private property for ―socialized housing which would
benefit a few and not all citizens, constitutes taking for ―public use. Whether or not
there was a proper assessment of the payment for just compensation.

Held: Yes. The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain
limitations imposed by the constitution (1973), i.e. that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation (Art. IV, sec. 9); and that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. IV, sec. 1).

The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal
import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added
the broader notion of indirect public bene t or advantage. As discussed in the above
cited case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona:

“The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which
circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and which
possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take
private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the
Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which
impel the exertion of sovereign power are an too often found in areas of scarce
public land or limited government resources. (p. 231) “

Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost

housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept
of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 1973
Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and ensure
adequate social services including housing [Art. II, sec. 7]. In the case at bar, the use
to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the requisites of
"public use". The lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the
expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-
salaried government employees.

Petitioners further contend that Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, would allow the
taking of "any private land" regardless of the size and no matter how small the area
of the land to be expropriated. Petitioners claim that "there are vast areas of lands in
Mayamot, Cupang, and San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal hundred of hectares of which are
owned by a few landowners only. It is surprising [therefore] why respondent
National Housing Authority [would] include [their] two small lots . . .

In J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, [G.R. No. L-21064, February
18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413 (1970, at 428] this Court earlier ruled that expropriation is
not confined to landed estates. The said case of J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. departed from
the ruling in Guido v. Rural Progress Administration [84 Phil. 847 (1949)] which
held that the test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the
area of the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefited. Since then
"there has evolved a clear pattern of adherence to the `number of people to be
benefited test'" [Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association, Inc. v. Dimayuga, G.R. No.
32049, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 30 (1984) at 39]. Thus, in Pulido v. Court of Appeals
[G.R. No. 57625, May 3, 1983, 122 SCRA 63 (1983) at 73], this Court stated that, "[i]t
is unfortunate that the petitioner would be deprived of his landholdings, but his
interest and that of his family should not stand in the way of progress and the
benefit of the greater majority of the inhabitants of the country."

Petitioners maintain that Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, would allow the taking
of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed
by government assessors. In addition, they assert that the Decree would deprive the
courts of their judicial discretion to determine what would be "just compensation".
In Export Processing Zone Authority, this Court pointed out that:
The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas
covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion.
Individual differences are never taken into account. Tax values can serve as guides
but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.

In the same case of EPZA also it was held that: Petitioners assert that Pres. Decree
1224, as amended, violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of
possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in
court. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice
and without hearing, viz:
“It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic
concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of minor bureaucrat or
clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after
expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and
considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously
evaluated. (p. 13) “

Lastly, On the matter of the issuance of a writ of possession, the ruling in the Ignacio
case is reiterated, thus:
[I]t is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in
expropriation proceedings, the following requisites must be met: (1) There must be
a Complaint for expropriation sufficient inform and in substance; (2) A provisional
determination of just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated
must be made by the trial court on the basis of judicial (not legislative or executive)
discretion; and (3) The deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be
complied with. (p. 14)

WHEREFORE, the Orders of the lower court dated January 17, 1978 and June 28,
1978 issuing the writ of possession on the basis of the market value appearing
therein are annulled for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. Let this case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the
compensation the petitioners are entitled to be paid. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HON. CEFERINO E.

DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents. [G.R. No. L-59603. April 29, 1987.]

Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have
repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court,
such that in determining the just compensation of property in an expropriation case,
the only basis should be its market value as declared by the owner or as determined
by the assessor, whichever is lower.

Held: The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render
this Court initial in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically
would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property,
following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the
lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a
necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners
under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process
clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said
that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict
application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere
formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the
owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the
two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what
is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the
determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.

The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the
factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own
judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
The doctrine we enunciated in National Housing Authority v. Reyes, supra,
therefore, must necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold this Court's role as the
guardian of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the due process and equal
protection clauses and as the final arbiter over transgressions committed against
constitutional rights.

Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It
means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities,
should be considered. In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the
petitioner as basis for just compensation were made by the Lapu-Lapu municipal,
later city assessor long before martial law, when land was not only much cheaper
but when assessed values of properties were stated in figures constituting only a
fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner
of the properties at the time. It purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg
the value of the lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and at prices
below the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory.

Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out
for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for
very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception
of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of
land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts,
or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for
generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building
materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values
can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.

To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors
since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of land
owners accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by
local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less
analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a
demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so. It is violative of
due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the
tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and
fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely
prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners
have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have
been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just
determination have been judiciously evaluated.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial

function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of
Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.

The SC held that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint
commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and
void. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the very purpose why this Court
exists in the first place.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The

temporary restraining order issued on February 16, 1982 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.