III. CREATION AND DISSOLUTION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS o Section 68 does not meet this requirement.
o Section 68 does not meet this requirement. It does not enunciate any policy
A. CREATION
Pelaez v Auditor-General
G.R. No. L-23825 | December 24, 1965 | Concepcion, J.
Digest by: YBAÑEZ
Petitioners: EMMANUEL PELAEZ, Vice President of the Philippines
Respondents: THE AUDITOR GENERAL
Doctrine: Whereas the power to fix a common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts
of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature, the
authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
Facts:
 President Diosdado Macapagal issued EOs creating 33 municipalities. The EOs were
purportedly pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.
 Section 68 provides: The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by
executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province,
municipality, municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish
the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more
subprovinces (etc)
 Petitioner Pelaez, Vice President, and acting as a taxpayer, filed a suit for prohibition
against the Auditor General in order to restrain from passing audit any expenditure of
public funds in the implementation of the said EOs.
o Pelaez asserts that such EOs were null and void because Section 68 has
been repealed by RA 2370 and constitute undue delegation of legislative
power.
o RA 2370 provides: Barrios may not be created or, their boundaries altered
nor their names changed except by: act of Congress, act of the provincial
board upon petition of a majority of voters, or recommendation of the council
of the municipalities.
o Pelaez further asserts that if, under the new law, the president cannot create
even a barrio, then he should not be allowed to create a municipality, which
is composed of several barrios.
 Respondent avers that the new municipalities can be created without the need of
creating the barrio by placing the old barrios in the jurisdiction of the new municipality.
Issue/s:
 W/N the EOs are null and void, being an undue delegation of legislative power - YES.
Ratio:
 Whereas the power to fix a common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature
(involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law
creating said municipalities) the authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature.
 Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill
in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
o be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate
o fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions
1
to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a
standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
 Court further ruled: the last clause of Section 68, which states that the president, may
change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require, only refers to the place of which the seat of government
may be transferred.
o It does not refer to the president’s power in defining boundaries of the
political subdivisions.
o Even if it were for the public welfare, the EO cannot be issued because it is
still an eminently legislative function. It can never be exercised by the
president.
 Also, the EOs in question were issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the
municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. This proved that the
issuance of said EOs was actually an exercise of pure legislative functions.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above
referred to. It is so ordered.
Asuncion v Yriarte
G.R. No. 9321 | September 24, 1914 | MORELAND, J.
Digest by: TORIO
Petitioners: Norberto Asuncion et al
Respondents: Manuel Yriarte
Doctrine:
The various barrios of the municipality have no right to own or hold property, they not being
recognized as legal entities by any law.
Facts:
1. Respondent chief of the division of archives of the Execuive Bureau Manuel Yriarte
refused to file the articles of incorporation of petitioners on the ground that the object
of the Corporation was unlawful, hence not registrable based on Act No. 1459.
2. The object of the corporation is (a) to organize and regulate the management,
disposition, administration and control which the barrio of Pulo or San Miguel or its
inhabitants or residents have over the common property of said residents or
inhabitants or property belonging to the whole barrio as such; and (b) to use the
natural products of the said property for institutions, foundations, and charitable works
of common utility and advantage to the barrio or its inhabitants."
3. Petitioner filed an action to obtain a writ of mandamus to compel Yriarte to file the
articles of incorporation.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the chief of the division of archives has authority, under the
Corporation for registration, to decide not only as to the sufficiency of the form of the
articles, but also as to the lawfulness of the purpose of the proposed corporation.—
YES
2. Was the object of the Corporation unlawful?— YES
Ratio:
FIRST ISSUE
1.Section 6 of the Corporation Law states:
“Five or more persons, not exceeding fifteen, a majority of whom are residents of the Philippine
Islands, may form a private corporation for any lawful purpose by filing with the division of
archives, patents, copyrights, and trademarks if the Executive Bureau articles of incorporation
duly executed and acknowledged before a notary public, . . . .”
Simply because the duties of an official happens to be ministerial, it does not necessarily follow
that he may not, in the administration of his office, determine questions of law. We are of the
opinion that it is the duty of the division of archives, when articles of incorporation are presented
for registration, to determine whether the objects of the corporation as expressed in the articles
are lawful.
2. We are of the opinion that he may be mandamused if he act in violation of law or if he refuses,
unduly, to comply with the law.
SECOND ISSUE
1. The municipality of Pasig is a municipal corporation organized by law. It has the control of all
property of the municipality. The various barrios of the municipality have no right to own or hold
property, they not being recognized as legal entities by any law. The residents of the barrios
participate in the advantages which accrue to the municipality from public property and receive
all the benefits incident to residence in a municipality organized by law. If there is any public
property situated in the barrio of Pulo or San Miguel not belonging to the general government or
the province, it belongs to the municipality of Pasig and the sole authority to manage and
administer the same resides in that municipality. Until the present laws upon the subject are
charged no other entity can be the owner of such property or control or administer it.
3. The object of the proposed corporation, as appears from the articles offered for registration, is
to make of the barrio of Pulo or San Miguel a corporation which will become the owner of and
have the right to control and administer any property belonging to the municipality of Pasig found
within the limits of that barrio. This clearly cannot be permitted. Otherwise municipalities as now
established by law could be deprived of the property which they now own and administer. Each
barrio of the municipality would become under the scheme proposed, a separate corporation,
would take over the ownership, administration, and control of that portion of the municipal
territory within its limits. This would disrupt, in a sense, the municipalities of the Islands by
dividing them into a series of smaller municipalities entirely independent of the original
municipality.
Dispositive: Judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Annotation, 15 SCRA 591-596
Digest by: SAN DIEGO
Annotation on the Creation of Municipalities
I. Historical Background
A. Spanish Regime
 The procedure of the creation of municipalities has been prescribed by the Leyes de
las Indias
 An Ayuntamiento corresponds to the English term municipal corporation
 The unit of local administration was the "pueblo" which ordinarily embraces an area of.
many square miles and contained numerous barrios or villages
B. American Regime
 President William McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission also
stressed the importance of the creation of municipal governments.
 The Philippine Commission enacted:
o Act No 82 - for the organization and government of municipalities
o Act No. 88 - for the organization of the provinces
II. Creation of Corporations
2
 The power of the municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature.
 In the absence of any constitutional limitations, a legislative body may create any
corporation it deems essential for the more efficient administration of the government
 The legislative power to create municipal corporations may not be delegated
 The delegation, if at all, may be made if the legislature imposes conditions on which
the municipal corporation may be created
o The Supreme Court held that a provision authorizing the President to
subdivide/divide/create/ etc. Barrios, Provinces, etc. is unconstitutional
because it is an undue delegation of power
 Congress may enact laws creating provinces, sub-provinces, cities, municipalities,
municipal districts, barrios and other local entities. It may group into one area those
which are already existing. It may subdivide them into several other local areas. It may
abolish them. There is no limitation upon Its power except the provisions of Art. VII,
Section 1 of the Constitution
 The legislative power to create an area of the local government involves two things:
o (1) the determination of whether a local area shall be created or not;
o (2) the determination of whether said decision shall have the force of
law.Tan v Comelec
G.R. No. 73155 | July 11, 1986 | ALAMPAY, J.
Digest by: RIOFLORIDO
Petitioners: PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO,
VIRGILIO GASTON, CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA,
ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ
AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY
Respondents: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER
OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
Doctrine:
The Constitution provides that no new local government unit shall be created without the
conduct of a plebiscite in the “area or areas” affected. Such phrase shall be construed to
mean that the plebiscite should be conducted in the areas where the new province will be as
well as in the province from which such new province will be carved out from. The case of
Paredes v. Executive Secretary as invoked by respondents was abandoned by the Court for
being contrary to the Constitution. Further, the Court also held that the territory requirement in
the LGC only refers to the land area and does not include the territorial waters of the
proposed province. The area of the proposed Negros del Norte failed to reach the minimum
of 3,500 square kilometers of territory as provided for in the LGC.
Facts:
 BP Blg. 885 was passed which provided for the creation of the new Province of
Negros del Norte.
o The new province was carved out of the already existing province of Negros
Occidental.
o Negros del Norte was formed out of the northern part of the province of
Negros Occidental.
o The same law provided that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the
proposed new province only.
 Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition on December 23, 1985 for the purpose of
stopping COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite.
o Petitioners allege that such law is unconstitutional and does not conform to
the provisions of the Local Government Code regarding the requisites for
creation of new provinces.
 On the one hand, the Constitution provides in Article XI, Sec. 3 (which is now Art. X,
Sec. 10) that:
 o “No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units
affected.”
 On the other hand, according to Sec. 197 of the LGC:
o “a province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand
five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred
thousand persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified
by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the
last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the
population and income of the mother province or provinces at the time of
said creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands.”
 Due to the Christmas holidays when the Court was in recess, the plebiscite pushed
through on January 3, 1986 despite the pendency of the case because no TRO was
issued.
o Petitioners thereafter supplemented their petition and still prayed that a writ
of prohibition be issued against the COMELEC to desist from issuing official
proclamation of the results of the plebiscite.
o They alleged that there was still serious issues with the plebiscite
conducted.
o For one thing, the plebiscite was only confined to the inhabitants of the
territory which would cover Negros del Norte. The other residents of Negros
Occidental were not included.
 On the part of the respondents, the Solicitor General argued that the law should be
given the presumption of legality.
o The SolGen furthermore argued that there was no irregularity with the
plebiscite held because the areas of Negros Occidental which would not
form part of Negros del Norte do not fall within the meaning and scope of
the term “unit or units affected” as provided for in the Constitution.
o It invoked the case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary. Such case held that
when a barangay is to be separated from the municipality in order to form a
new municipality, the plebiscite need not be held in the entire municipality.
The SolGen also moved that the case be dismissed because the issue was
already moot since the plebiscite already approved the creation of the new
province (164,734 in favor, 30,400 against).
Issue/s:
 W/N the creation of Negros del Norte is valid — NO
Ratio:
The phrase “unit or units affected” should be construed in its general sense.
 The boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would be substantially
altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the
proposed new province of Negros del Norte.
 The two political units of Negros del Norte and Negros Occidental would indeed be
affected by the creation of the new political units.
o They will be affected in terms of a change in the borders, change in the land
area, and a change in the economy of the province. (Seven out of 15 sugar
mills in Negros Occidental are located in the territory of Negros del Norte.)
 The alleged good intentions (of promoting autonomy of local governments) cannot
prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that what our Constitution categorically
directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed, respected and
complied with.
3
 The Constitution explicitly provides that the plebiscite should be conducted in the unit
or units affected.
o As such, the plebiscite should have been conducted in the entire province of
Negros Occidental, not just the proposed Negros del Norte.
 The law creating Negros del Norte is indeed unconstitutional insofar as it provides that
the plebiscite should be conducted only in the new territory of Negros del Norte and
not in Negros Occidental.
 The plebiscite held on January 3 is null and void. However, a new plebiscite cannot be
conducted because there is no legal basis to do so.
 The creation of the province of Negros del Norte is thus without any legal basis and
must be erased.
The case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary is not availing in this case.
 The ruling rendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court
then to exercise its discretion on the matter. It did not interpret the Constitution.
 The said case should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. The case
itself mentioned that when a municipality is to be formed out of barangays to be
separated from the mother municipality, all the voters therein are affected.
 What is applicable is the case of Lopez v. COMELEC where it was held that it was
constitutionally infirm when not all the residents of Bulacan and Rizal were included in
a referendum which asked if the people were willing to give up some towns in the said
provinces to Metro Manila.
 The case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary was explicitly abandoned by the Court for
being contrary to the Constitution.
The province of Negros del Norte failed to comply with the land area requirement in the
LGC.
 “Territory” as used in the LGC refers to land area and excludes the waters.
o There would have been no need for the legislators to use the adjective
“contiguous” if they had intended the term “territory” to embrace not only
land area but also territorial waters.
 The proposed new province of Negros del Norte would only cover a total land area of
2,765.4 square kilometers. Provinces are required to have at least 3,500 square
kilometers.
 Such measures were based on data by the National Census and Statistics Office.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation
of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are
also declared null and void.
Padilla v Comelec
G.R. No. 103328 | October 19, 1992 | ROMERO, J.
Digest by: REGADO
Petitioners: HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of
Camarines Norte
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Doctrine:
 It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted
"in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity
who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a
right to vote in said plebiscite.
 Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase "political units directly affected," is
the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.
 Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12

barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in
the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte
Facts
 Pursuant to Republic Act 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated on
November 13, 1991, Resolution No. 2312 which creates the Municipality of Tulay-
Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-
Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-
Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province.
 Under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution the creation of a municipality shall
be subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local Government Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337) said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections;
 In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only
2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of the
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa.
 The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the
independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes.
 Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines
Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991 throughout
the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken as provided by
RA 7155.In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the approval and
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, particularly Article X, Section 10, the ruling set
forth in Tan v. COMELEC relied upon by respondent COMELEC is now passe, thus
reinstating the case of Paredes v.Executive Secretary which held that where a local
unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segrated
should be included in the plebiscite
Issue/s:
 Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and, consequently, whether or not the plebiscite
conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and
the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid.
Ratio:YES
 Where a local unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to
be segregated should be included in the plebiscite.COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and that the plebiscite, which rejected the
creation of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid.
 The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution has not affected our
ruling in Tan v. COMELEC as explained by then CONCOM Commission Associate
Justice Hilario Davide
Mr. Davide. I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or"
because in the plebiscite to... be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is
the creation of a barangay, the municipality itself must participate... in the plebiscite
because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory
 It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in
the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who
would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to
vote in. said plebiscite.
 Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase "political units directly affected," is the
plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.
4
 Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the
12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those
living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that
respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Resolution No. 2312.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Sema v Comelec
G.R. No. 177597 & 178628 | July 16, 2008 | CARPIO, J.
Digest by: PEÑALOSA
Petitioners: BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN
Doctrine:
 The Constitution is clear the power to create a province or a city inherently involves
the power to create a legislative district, which belongs exclusively to Congress.
Facts:
 The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts
for the Province of Maguindanao The First District includes of Cotabato City. Although
Cotabato City is included in the First District of Maguindanao, it (Cotabato) was not
part of ARMM.
 By virtue of RA 9054 (Organic Act that created ARMM), the ARMM Regional Assembly
(ARMM’s Legislature) exercised its power to create a PROVINCE by enacting
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201). As a result, Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan with eight municipalities from Maguindanao’s first district was created.
 In 2006, voters of Maguindano ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite.
 Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Cotabato requested the Comelec to clarifiy the status
of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a
regular province. In response, Comelec issued a Resolution, maintaining the status
quo with Cotabato City as part of Kabunsuan in the first legislative district of
Maguindanao.
 Comelec then promulgated Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first
legislative district is composed of Cotabato City ONLY.
 Subsequently, Comelec again issued another resolution, Resolution No .7902,
renaming the first district of Maguindnao with Cotabato City as “Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City.”
 Petitioner Sema, who was a candidate for representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City” sought to nullify Comelec Resolution 7902 and to
exclude votes casted from Cotabato City. He said that hariff Kabunsuan should have
its own representative in Congress.
 In an answer, Comelec said Sema’s action became moot upon the proclamation of
Respondent Dilangalen as representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City.”
 For his part, Respondent Dilangalen said the resolution in question is constitutional
because it did not create or reapportion the legislative district of Maguindanao but
merely renamed Maguindanao’s first legislative district.
Issue/s:
 Is Sec 19, Art VI of RA 9054 unconstitutional insofar as it grants ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities? – YES.
 Is MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan void? – YES.
Ratio:
 ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Under
the Constitution, the creation of any of the four local government units — province,
city, municipality or barangay — must comply with three conditions: (1) the creation of
a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code;
(2) such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution; (3) there
must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
 There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power
to create local government units. Congress under its plenary legislative powers can
delegate the power to create LGUs to local legislative bodies subject to reasonable
standards and so long as it does not cause conflict with the provisions of the
Constitution. But the Constitution is clear that only an Act of Congress can create
provinces, cities or municipalities.
 Pursuant to RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power
to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM.
 It is held that there is no conflict in delegating to regional legislative bodies the power
to create Baranagays. BUT creation of Provinces and Cities is a different matter. The
Constitution clearly states that a province cannot be created without a legislative
district. Moreso, a city with a population of at least 250,000 people is still not
automatically entitled to have a representative to Congress without a Legislative
District. This is because the power to create a province or a city inherently involves the
power to create a legislative district, which belongs exclusively to Congress.
 Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an Act of Congress. Pursuant
to Sec 5 (1), Art VI of the Constitution, Congress is vested with the power to increase,
through law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, which Sec
5(4), Art VI empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts.
 In the present case, the creation of the ARMM and grant of legislative powers to its
Regional Assembly did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create
legislative districts. The Regional Assembly cannot create a national office given that
its legislative power extends to its regional territory only.
 In sum, the Constitution clearly grants Congress the exclusive power to create or
reapportion legislative districts.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Torralba v Mun. of Sibagat
G.R. No. L-59180 | January 29, 1987 | Melencio - Herrera
Digest by: NAGUIAT
Petitioners: Clemento Torralba & Resolution Rugay
Respondents: The municipality of Sibagat, Province of Algusan del Sur & Municipal Officers
Doctrine:
The power to create a municipal corporation is legislative in nature. In the absence of any
constitutional limitation, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for
the more efficient administration of government.
The absence of the Local Government Code (LGC) at the time of the enactment of BP 56 did
not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal
corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the
modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. There is
no requirement that the LGC is a condition sine qua non for the creation of a municipality.
What Art. XI, section 3 means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or
dissolution of local government units should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the
5
interregnum before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary
except that the creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the people
concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
Facts:
 Batas Pambansa Blg. 56 (BP 56) was enacted on 1 February 1980 creating the
Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur. The pertinent provisions of BP 56
read:
Sec. 1. The barangays of Ilihan, Sinai, Sibagat, El Rio, Afga, Tabontabon, Perez,
Magsaysay, Santa Cruz, Santa Maria, San Isidro, Villangit, Del Rosario, Anahauan
Mahayahay, and San Vicente, all in the Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del
Sur, are hereby separated from said municipality to form and constitute an independent
Municipality of Sibagat without affecting in any manner the legal existence of the mother
Municipality of Bayugan.
Sec. 5. After ratification by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted in
the area or areas affected within a period of ninety (90) days after the approval of this Act,
the President (Prime Minister) shall appoint the Mayor and other Officials of the new
Municipality of Sibagat.
 Petitioners are residents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitioner, Clementino
Torralba, being a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the same City. The
petitioners contends that BP 56 is violative of Section 3, Article XI of the 1973
Constitution. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution provides that:
Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
 Petitioners' argues that that under Art XI section 3, the LGC must first be enacted to
determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrio; and that since
no LGC had as yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute could
not have possibly complied with any criteria when respondent Municipality was
created, hence, it is null and void.
 LGC came into being only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP 56 was enacted, the
code was not yet in existence. The evidence likewise discloses that a plebiscite had
been conducted among the people of the unit/units affected by the creation of the new
Municipality, who expressed approval thereof; and that officials of the newly created
Municipality had been appointed and had assumed their respective positions as such
Issue/s:
 W/N BP 56 is null and void? – NO, BP 56 is valid.
Ratio:
 The absence of the Local Government Code (LGC) at the time of its enactment did
not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal
corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor
prohibit the modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of
the Local Government Code. It contains no requirement that the LGC is a condition
sine qua non for the creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the creation
of a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a Local Government Code.
 What the Constitutional provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the
creation, modification or dissolution of local government units should conform
with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum before the enactment of such
Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new
local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a
plebiscite called for the purpose.
 The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A
plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and
approved the creation of the new local government unit. In fact, the conduct of said
plebiscite is not questioned herein. The officials of the new Municipality have
effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their functions. A de jure entity
has thus been created.
 It is a long recognized principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is
essentially legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional limitations a
legislative body may Create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient
administration of government. The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat was a
valid exercise of legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim
Batasang Pambansa.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Separate Opinion:
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur on the assumption that the required plebiscite, although not questioned here,
nevertheless complied with Article XI, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, and was duly held "in
the unit or units affected," i.e. not only in the proposed municipality but also in the mother
municipality, in line with Tan v. Commission on Elections,, reversing Paredes v. Executive
Secretary and Lopez v. Metro Manila Commission insofar as these cases held that the plebiscite
could be confined only to the political unit proposed to be created.
Samson v. Aguirre
G.R. No. 118303 | January 31, 1996 | HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.
Digest by: MEDEL
Petitioners: MOISES S. SAMSON
Respondents: HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
Doctrine: The creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another
level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services: (a) income, (b) population, and (c) land area.
Under the Local Government Code, the proposed city must comply with requirements as
regards income and population or land area.
Facts:
 President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act No. 8535, creating the City of
Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City. Petitioner Samson, incumbent
councilor of the first district of Quezon City, is now before the Court challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535.
 Samson bases his petition on the following grounds:
6
o R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the Local
Government Code particularly, Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a), as to the
requirements of income, population and land area; seat of government; and
no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon City, respectively, and its
Implementing Rules as provided in Article 11(b)(1) and (2), as to furnishing a
copy of the Quezon City Council of barangay resolution; and
o The said law will in effect amend the Constitution.
 Samson asserts that certifications as to income, population, and land area were not
presented to Congress during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. No.
8535. This, he argues, is clear from the minutes of the public hearings conducted by
the Senate Committee on Local Government on the proposed charter of the City of
Novaliches. He is silent, however, on the hearings held by the appropriate Committee
in the House of Representatives.
 Likewise, Samson points out that there is no certification attesting to the fact that the
mother local government unit, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the
creation of the City of Novaliches, in terms of income, population, and land area.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 8535 is constitutional. YES.
Ratio:
 The bill that eventually became R.A. No. 8535 originated in the House of
Representatives. Note that Samson merely alleged that no certifications were
submitted to the House Committee on Local Government, as is the usual practice in
this regard. Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption
stands that the law passed by Congress had complied with all the requisites therefor.
 The Local Government Code of 1991 provides under Section 7:
SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a
local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall
be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to
provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards,
to provide for all essential government facilities and services and
special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as
expected of the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of
inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government
unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or
more islands or is separated by a local government unit
independent of the others; properly identified by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for
such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the
Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the
Land Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
 The representative from the Bureau of Local Government Finance estimated the
combined average annual income of the 13 barangay for the years 1995 and 1996 to
be around P26,952,128.26. Under the Local Government Code, a proposed city must
have an average annual income of only at least P20,000,000.00 for the immediately
preceding two years.
  The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the barangays that
would comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be around 347,310. This figure is
more than the 150,000 required by the Implementing Rules.
 There is no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since under the Local
Government Code, the proposed city must comply with requirements as regards
income and population or land area.
 Other than the income requirement, the proposed city must have the requisite number
of inhabitants or land area. Compliance with either requirement, in addition to income,
is sufficient. Judicial notice may also be taken that Novaliches is now highly urbanized.
 Samson then argues that R.A. No. 8535 failed to specify the seat of government of the
proposed City of Novaliches as required under Section 11(a) of the Local Government
Code:
SECTION 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site, Offices,
and Facilities.
(a) The law or ordinance creating or merging local government units shall
specify the seat of government from where governmental and corporate
service shall be delivered. In selecting said site, factors relating to
geographical centrality, accessibility, availability of transportation and
communication facilities, drainage and sanitation, development and
economic progress, and other relevant considerations shall be taken into
account.
 Indeed, a reading of R.A. No. 8535 will readily show that it does not provide for a seat
of government. However, this omission, to our mind, is not as fatal to the validity of
R.A. No. 8535 as Samson makes it to be. The Local Government Code also provides
that the City of Novaliches can still establish a seat of government after its creation.
 The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited
amendment of the Constitution, contrary to Samson’s contention. The ordinance
appended to the Constitution merely apportions the seats of the House of
Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere does it
provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and
municipalities as claimed by Samson. Too literal a reading of the ordinance in or
appendix of the Constitution will only result in its erroneous interpretation.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Navarro v Ermita
G.R. No. 180050 | April 12, 2011 | NACHURA, J.
Digest by: LUMBRE
Petitioners: Rodolfo Navarro, et. al
Respondents: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et. al
Doctrine:
The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of 1 or
more islands
Facts:
 Petitioners Navarro et al. filed a motion to declare RA 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands) invalid.
 On February 10, 2010, the petitioners succeeded in having RA 9355 declared
unconstitutional. The court reasoned that R.A. 9355 failed to comply with the land area
requirements (1) having an area of only 802.12 square kilometers, and failing to meet
the population requirement (2) having only 106, 951 inhabitants.
 Such ruling was sustained in the October 2010 motion for reconsideration, further
stressing that a provision in the LGC-IRR which stated that “..the land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or
7
more islands.” is null and void for having no legal basis, the same exemption not being
expressly stated in the Local Government Code.
 Hence this motion to recall entry of judgment, where movant-intervenors argued the
constitutionality of RA 9355, reiterating their contention that:
o the power to create a local government unit is vested with the Legislature
o the acts of the Legislature and Executive in enacting into law RA 9355
should be respected as petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of
validity or constitutionality
Issue/s:
 W/N the creation of Dinagat Island as a province is exempt from the land area
requirement - YES
Ratio:
DINAGAT ISLAND EXEMPT FROM THE LAND AREA REQUIREMENT
 The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit,
is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into
account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as
certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than
the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The
delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and
sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010
elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of
Dinagat's existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that
Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be
instrumental in stunting such capacity.
DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE LGC-IRR AND THE LGC
 It must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of
one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly
provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be
created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is
absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under
Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9 (2) of the
LGC-IRR.
 The court ruled that there is neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should
apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical
configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or
group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in
most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative
policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for
component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for
provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9 (2) of the
LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section
461 of the LGC — and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order
for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR.
 With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and
legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had
already been put in place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too
urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress,
recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province,
enacted RA 9355 following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with
respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the
LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress
breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR and
 transformed it into law when it enacted RA 9355 creating the Island Province of
Dinagat.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:
1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated
and filed on October 29, 2010
2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT the Motion
for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010
3. GRANT the Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12,
2010. The May 12, 2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The
provision in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR stating, "The land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is
declared VALID. Accordingly, RA 9355 is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL,
and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the
officials thereof are declared VALID
4. The petition is DISMISSED
Alvarez v Guingona
G.R. No. 118303 | January 31, 1996 | HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.
Digest by: LAUIGAN
Petitioners: SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR.
NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P. GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM,
LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S. ALIPON
Respondents: HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
HON. RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON.
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Santiago and HON.
CHARITO MANUBAY, HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON.
DANILO VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO
CALEON and HON. ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN
MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY.
ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his capacity as Municipal Administrator
Doctrine:
ANNUAL INCOME are revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities
from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and
other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-
recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds,
sales of fixed assets, and similar others.
Facts:
 The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7720 entitled, An
Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component
City to be known as the City of Santiago
 Petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average
annual income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in
order to be converted into a component city.
 Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its
average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices falls below the required annual income of Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city, petitioners having computed Santiagos
average annual income in the following manner:
8
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 P20,379,057.07
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 P21,570,106.87
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P41,949,163.94
Minus:
IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P15,730,043.00
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P26,219,120.94
Average Annual Income P13,109,960.47
 By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after
deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be
P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim that
Santiago’s income is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average annual
income requirement.
 The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the
Department of Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual income to be
P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not
excluded from the computation.
 Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or
budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or
decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing
Issue/s:
 Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the
computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its
conversion into an independent component city - YES
Ratio:
 The court holds that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal
Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.
 For a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have
an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. Such income must be duly certified
by the Department of Finance
 An LGU is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and
possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.
o It is an autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources.
o Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby
deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to
develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own
resources and assets
o Development through a decentralized local government system certainly
concerns the matter of financial resources
o Broadened powers and more responsibilities entail more expenses so it
needs adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out
its functions
 Availment of resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government
unit of
o the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue;
o the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in
the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and
o the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and
development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries
 The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds
accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its
operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the
Local Government Code and its implementing rules and regulations
  Therefore, for purposes of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the
estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the
share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This
is as it should be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all
revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of
the local government unit
 For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of
Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an average annual income
of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices. This, the Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its
computation of said average annual income.
 Department of Finance Order No. 3593 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the
above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be revenues and receipts
realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local
General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in
Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such
as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed
assets, and similar others
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs against petitioners.
League of Cities v Comelec
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente
Digest by: GUEVARRA
Petitioners: League of Cities of the Philippines
Respondents: COMELEC
Doctrine:
Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the
existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same.
Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to
all members of the same class.The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the
laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause.
Facts:
 During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.
 During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 which amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The amendment was due to "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into
cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact
that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
 The House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,
which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However,
the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
 During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval.
However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the
advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision
9
exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA
9009.
 The House of Representatives and the Senate approved the cityhood bills except that
of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law
(Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's
signature.
 The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the
voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality
into a city.
 2008 Decision the SC declared the cityhood laws unconstitutional, deviating as they
do from the uniform and non-discriminatory income criterion prescribed by the LGC of
1991. In so doing, the ponencia veritably agreed with the petitioners that the
Constitution, in clear and unambiguous language, requires that all the criteria for the
creation of a city shall be embodied and written in the LGC, and not in any other law.
Issue/s:
 W/N the Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution - NO
 W/N the Cityhood Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause – NO
Ratio:
 The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional provision. Save for
the use of the term barrio in lieu of barangay, may be instead of shall, the change of
the phrase unit or units to political unit and the addition of the modifier directly to the
word affected, the aforesaid provision is a substantial reproduction of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of
the 1973 Constitution
 Since Congress wields the vast poser of creating political subdivisions, surely it can
exercise the lesser authority of requiring a set of criteria, standards, or ascertainable
indicators of viability for their creation. Thus, the only conceivable reason why the
Constitution employs the clause in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can
impose the criteria.
Fr. Bernas: Section 10 [Art. X of the 1987 Constitution], which is a legacy from the 1973
Constitution, goes further than the doctrine in the Pelaez case. It not only makes creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of provinces, cities,
municipalities x x x subject to criteria established in the local government code, thereby
declaring these actions properly legislative, but it also makes creation, division, merger, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundaries subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
 Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a
consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said
verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local
government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as
possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification,
enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified,
just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009
upped the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100
million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no different from the
enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political
subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting
law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.
 As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal protection does
not require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred and responsibilities or
obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from
 recognizing and acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It
recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify] necessarily
implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.The Court
finds that all these requisites have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and
discriminatory under the equal protection clause.
 Due to extraneous circumstances, however, the bills for their conversion remained
unacted upon by Congress. Each of the 12 municipalities has all the requisites for
conversion into a component city based on the old requirements set forth under
Section 450 of the [LGC], prior to its amendment by RA 9009.
 The classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of
respondent LGUs/municipalities from the PhP 100 million income requirement was
meant to reduce the inequality occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA
9009.
 Respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities, which had already been
elevated to city status, were all found to be qualified under the old Sec. 450 of the
LGC of 1991 during the 11th Congress. As such, both respondent LGUs and the 33
other former municipalities are under like circumstances and conditions.
 Indeed, to deny respondent LGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges
accorded to the 33 other municipalities when, at the outset they were similarly
situated, is tantamount to denying the former the protective mantle of the equal
protection clause. In effect, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention are creating an
absurd situation in which an alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is remedied by another violation of the same clause.
 The uniform exemption clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood
bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the
LGC of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of PhP 20 million.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws,
namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408,
9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
SO ORDERED.
NOTES:
2008 Decision: Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution requires that the creation of LGUs
must follow the criteria established in the LGC and not in any other law. Thus, Congress cannot
write any criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood laws.
The intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political
units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely on the LGC. Any
derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the LGC violates Sec. 10, Art 10 of the
Constitution.
The Cityhood Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause. The exemption provision in
the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date −
the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress - as against all other
municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009
2011 Decision:
The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. “We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16
cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th
Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC
prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all
10
the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by
stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing
the certain collective wisdom of Congress.
“The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well
aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by
the Cityhood Laws. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses
ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear
legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No.
9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way
of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.
The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources
under RA 9009 was arbitrary. “While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local
government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to
insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such
amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote
autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.”
Section 450. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if
it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at
least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on
1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers,
as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
Art. X, sec 10 of the Constitution:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Malabang v Benito
G.R. No. L-28113 | March 28, 1969 | Castro, J
Digest by: GARCIA
Petitioners: THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, and AMER
MACAORAO BALINDONG
Respondents: PANGANDAPUN BENITO, HADJI NOPODIN MACAPUNUNG, HADJI
HASAN MACARAMPAD, FREDERICK V. DUJERTE MONDACO ONTAL, MARONSONG
ANDOY, MACALABA INDAR LAO

Doctrine:
To be called a de facto corporation, either requisite must concur:
 A valid law enacted by the legislature.
 An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld for a
time by the courts or (b) not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant for its
creation can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potential
existence by the general laws or constitution of the state.
Facts:
 Municipality of Balabagan was once part of the Municipality of Malabang before it was
created into a separate municipality thru an executive order.
 The Municipality Malabang filed a suit against the Municipality of Balabagan for having
been created under an invalid EO 386 and to restrain the respondent municipal
officials from performing the functions of their respective offices.
o Petitioner’s basis is the Pelaez case stating that Sec. 68 of the
Administrative Code is unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power and (b) because it offends against Section 10
(1) of Article VII of the Constitution, which limits the President's power over
local governments to mere supervision.
o and that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March
10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the
Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with
said statutory enactment.
 The Respondents argue that the Mun. of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation
for having been organized under color of a statute before this was declared
unconstitutional (the administrative code provision)
o plus, its officers has been either elected or appointed, and the municipality
itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years
preceding the institution of this action.
o It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be
collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for
quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the
petitioner Balindong.
o The method of challenging the existence of a municipal corporation is
reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct
proceeding.
o But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal
corporation is at least a de facto corporation.
o For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the
rule is that its existence may be questioned collaterally or directly in any
action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are affected
thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are
estopped by their conduct from doing so.
Issue/s:
 W/N The Municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation?- NO
Ratio:
 The Municipality of Balabagan has no statute creating it since EO 386 was also
declared unconstitutional
 To be called a de facto corporation, either requisite must concur:
o A valid law enacted by the legislature.
o An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld
for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been declared void; provided that a
warrant for its creation can be found in some other valid law or in the
11
recognition of its potential existence by the general laws or constitution of
the state.
 There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or potentially,
such a de jure corporation is authorized by some legislative fiat.
 There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the invalidity of
which is apparent on its face.
 There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing de jure
corporation, as such organization would clearly be an usurper.
 Executive Order 386 "created no office."
o however, that the acts done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise
of its corporate powers are not a nullity for the existence of Executive Order
386 is an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored.
Dispositive:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order 386 is declared void, and the
respondents are hereby permanently restrained from performing the duties and
functions of their respective offices. No pronouncement as to costs.
Camid v Office of the President
G.R. No. 161414 | January 17, 2005 | Tinga, J.
Digest by: FRANCISCO
Petitioners: SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID
Respondents: THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT
of FINANCE, DEPARTMENT of BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
and the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES AND
SENATE)
Doctrine:
Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has
claimed and exercised corporate functions with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
legislature, and without interruption/objection for period long enough to afford title by
prescription. It is presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that their
charters had been lost. Camid did not have the opportunity to make an initial factual
demonstration of these circumstances before this Court. Andong does not meet the requisites
set forth by Sec. 442(d) of the LGC. In order to receive recognition, they must have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of LGC.
Facts:
 The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor
General: E.O. No. 107 creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao, including Andong, was
nullified.
 These orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of such
municipalities failed to pass Congress. Pres. Macapagal justified the creation,
citing his powers under Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. This was
repealed by R.A. No. 2370 which constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power.
 Petitioner Camid represents himself as a current resident of Andong, suing as a
private citizen and taxpayer. He alleges that Andong has turned into a full-blown
municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services,
even though he concedes that since 1968, no person has been appointed, elected or
qualified to serve any of the elective local government positions.
 The municipality has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of
Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least 17 barangay units with their
own respective chairmen.
  From 1964-1972 (according to Camid), the public officials have been serving
through the minimal means and resources with least honorarium and recognition
from then Pres. Macapagal.
 In support of his claim, Camid presented:
1. a Certification issued by the DENR-CENRO certifying the total land area of the
municipality,
2. a Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City
concerning the population of Andong at 14,059,
3. a list of governmental agencies and private groups that allegedly recognize
Andong, and
4. notes that other municipalities have recommended to the Speaker of the
Regional Legislative Assembly for the immediate revival/re-establishment of
Andong.
 The petition assails a Certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government
Supervision of the DILG which enumerates 18 municipalities as existing, according to
records. These 18 are among the 33 (along with Andong) whose creations were
voided by this Court in Pelaez.
 He imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG in not classifying Andong
as a regular existing municipality and not including it in its records as such.
 He argues such non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of
Andong, especially in light of the current recognition given to the 18
municipalities similarly annulled by reason of Pelaez.
 As appropriate relief, Camid prays:
1. the annulment of the DILG Certification;
2. the classification of Andong as a regular existing municipality;
3. all public respondents, to extend full recognition and support to Andong;
4. the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management to
immediately release the internal revenue allotments of Andong; and
5. the DILG to recognize its Interim Local Officials
 He insists on the continuing validity of E.O. No. 107 and argues that Pelaez has
already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and
jurisprudence.
 As pointed out by the OSG, the case is not a fit subject for the special civil actions of
certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the appreciation of factual questions.
 There is no way to confirm several of Camid’s factual allegations pertaining to the
purported continuing operation of Andong.
 No trial court had the opportunity to ascertain the validity of these, which is
beyond the function of this Court since it is not a trier of facts.
Issue/s:
 W/N Andong is a de facto municipal corporation – NO RULING; Camid failed to make
a factual demonstration of the requisites
 W/N a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided by this
Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute
– NO
Ratio:
1st Issue
 Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that: 1) the
community has claimed and exercised corporate functions with the knowledge
and acquiescence of the legislature, and 2) without interruption/objection for
period long enough to afford title by prescription.
 It is presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that their
charters had been lost.
 Camid did not have the opportunity to make an initial factual
demonstration of these circumstances before this Court.
12
 His ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts, as well as the prematurity of the present petition, cannot be
countenanced.
Additional notes:
 The assailed issuance is the Certification issued by the DILG, but the annulment of
such will really do nothing to serve Camid’s ultimate cause- the recognition of Andong.
It does not expressly refute the his claim, as there is nothing in the document that
comments on the present status of Andong.
 E.O. No. 107, which established Andong, was declared null and void ab initio in
Pelaez, along with 33 other executive orders.
 Pelaez was never reversed, but was expressly affirmed in 3 subsequent cases.
 No subsequent ruling declared Pelaez as overturned/inoperative and no
subsequent legislation has been passed creating a Municipality of Andong.
 The Court clarified in Malabang that the previous acts done by the municipality in the
exercise of its corporate powers were not necessarily a nullity.
 Camid devotes several pages of his petition in citing this point, yet the relevance
of such is unclear considering that he does not assert the validity of any
corporate act of Andong prior to its judicial dissolution.
 The Court also emphasized the unconstitutionality of the President's power to create
municipal corporations by way of presidential promulgations. However, there was a
shift in this ruling in Municipality of San Narciso:
 E.O.No. 353 which created the municipality of San Andres, Quezon issued by
Pres. Garcia was not one of the 33 issuances annulled by Pelaez.
Consequently, it was not nullified.
 The Court noted a circumstance which is not present in the case at bar: San
Andres was in existence for nearly 30 years before its legality was challenged.
 SC held: San Andres attained the unique status of a de facto municipal
corporation due to peculiar circumstances.
2nd Issue
 Sec. 442(d) of the LGC states that municipal districts "organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of
elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."
 The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature.
Congress did just that when it has incorporated Sec. 442(d) in the Code.
 Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective and aimed at giving "validity to acts
done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been
complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual
qualification against impairment of vested rights.
 Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create
municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the 33 particular municipalities
challenged in actual cases before this Court.
 However, with the promulgation of the LGC in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the
municipalities similarly created by executive order, but not judicially annulled.
 The de facto status of such municipalities (San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban)
was recognized by this Court and Section 442(b) of the LGC deemed curative
whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had.
 The major difference between Andong and these municipalities: the executive
order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court.
 To affirm Andong’s de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence
despite its nullification would condone defiance of a valid court order.
 Based on Camid’s own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth
by Sec. 442(d) of the LGC. In order to receive recognition, they must have their
 respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of LGC.
 Andong has never elected its municipal officers. This incapacity ties in with the
fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965.
 The national government ceased to recognize its existence, depriving its share
of the public funds and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void
municipality.
 The certifications relied upon by Camid issued by the DENR-CENRO and the
NSO can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to Andong’s legal efficacy. Both
certifications qualify that they were issued upon the request of Camid to support
his claim, conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative.
 Sec. 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially
dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created by
presidential issuances or executive orders. It affirms the legal personalities only of
those municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have
been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have
been judicially annulled.
 The municipalities judicially dissolved remain inexistent, unless recreated through
specific legislative enactments, as done with the 18 municipalities certified by the
DILG.
 Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from the presidential
issuances/executive orders which originally created them or from Section
442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes enacted to revive them.
 The solution is through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
Mun. of San Narciso v Mendez
G.R. No.103702 | December 6, 1994| J. Vitug
Digest by: FADERGUYA
Petitioners: Municipality of San Narciso
Respondents: Hon. Antonio V. Mendez (RTC Judge)
Doctrine: The fact that in a span of 30 years, unquestioned, San Andres exercised powers
and authority of a duly created LGU leads to the conclusion that San Andres had at least
attained the status of a de facto municipal corporation.
Facts:
 In 1959, President Carlos Garcia issued EO No. 353 creating the municipal district
of San Andres, Quezon by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso
several barrios and their sitios which was under San Narciso. (Ninakaw ng San
Andres daw yung barrios ng San Narciso lol)
 The EO was issued upon the request of the municipal council of San Narciso in
its resolution.
 In 1965, Pres. Macapagal issued EO 174 which officially recognized the municipal
district of San Andres as having the status of a fifth class municipality beginning
July 1963.
 Mun. of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC against the officials
of the Municipality of San Andres.
o sought to declare the nullity of EO 353
o prayed that the local officials of San andres be permanently ordered to
refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective
offices.
13
o Invoked ruling in Pelaez case saying that the EO was a clear usurpation of
the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the principle
of separation of powers.
 Respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition arguing that:
o Petitioner is estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality
because it was at its instance that San Andres was given life with issuance
of EO 353.
o San Andres was in existence since 1959
o Petitioner is not the proper party because quo warranto cases are to be
brought by the State through the Solicitor General.
 San Andres moved for dismissal again on the ground that the petition was already
moot and academic due to the enactment of the Local Government Code
o Under Sec. 442(d), Municipalities existing as of the date of LGC’s effectivity
shall continue to exist and operate.
 Petitioner opposed the motion alleging that Section 442 pertains to legally existing
municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation is void.
 RTC dismissed the petition reasoning that LGC cured whatever defects San Andres
had.
Issue/s:
 W/N San Andres is a legally existing municipality – YES
Ratio:
 It took petitioners almost thirty years to question and challenge the legality of the
Executive Order creating San Andres.
 During the span of 30 years, San Andres exercised powers and authority of a duly
created local government unit. Public Interest demands the timely challenge against
the lawful authority of a political subdivision.
 Assuming EO 353 was null and void for being a unconstitutional delegation of
legislative powers, the circumstances in this case leads to the conclusion that San
Andres had at least attained the status of a de facto municipal corporation.
 When the Pelaez case was ruled upon, no one challenged EO 353, moreover, certain
governmental acts pointed to State’s recognition of the existence of San Andres which
is evidenced by EO 174 classifying it as a fifth class municipality after having
surpassed the income requirement.
 Municipal Circuit courts were established in San Andres, thus, legitimizing the
municipality.
 Furthermore, the ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution considered San Andres
to be one of the 12 municipalities composing 3rd district of Quezon. Sec. 442 of LGC
also states that municipal districts organized pursuant to EOs are considered as
a regular municipality.
 The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did
just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code.
 Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, 21 and aimed at giving "validity to
acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have
been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual
qualification against impairment of vested rights.
 Taking all into consideration, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality
must be dispelled.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED
Municipality of Jimenez v Baz
G.R. No. 105746 | December 2, 1996 | J. Mendoza
Digest by: DE VERA
Petitioners: Municipality of Jimenez (Jimenez)
Respondents: Vicente Baz Jr. (Presiding Judge in RTC Branch 14, Oroquieta City) and
Municipality of Sinacaban (Sinacaban)
Doctrine: Where a municipality created by an Executive Order is later impliedly recognized
and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned (de facto
municipal corporation).
Facts:
 Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of Pres. Quirino, pursuant to the 1917 Revised
Administrative Code.
 Municipal Council Resolution No. 171 (1988) - Sinacaban claimed four barrios
(Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto) and a portion of another one
(Tabo-o), all of which are under the current territory of the Jimenez. These barrios
were in Jimenez.
o The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against
Jimenez.
o Jimenez asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement fixing their
common boundary (1950 Agreement), which was approved by the
Provincial Board in its Resolution No. 77.
 The Resolution stated: “Macabayao, Sitio Adorable xxx will be a
part of the Jimenez down”
 The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban.
o Held that the previous resolution approving the agreement between
the municipalities was void because the Board had no power to alter the
boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258, that power being vested in
Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the 1983 LGC
 Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the RTC against
Sinacaban, the Provincial Board, COA, etc.
o Alleged that in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the power to create municipalities
is essentially legislative and Sinacaban, which was created by an EO, had
no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim vis a vis
Jimenez, of which it remains part.
 RTC Decision held that Resolution No. 77 was void.
o Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely organized itself
even prior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for 40 years
before its existence was questioned;
o Ordered the Commissioners are hereby ordered to conduct the relocation
survey of the boundary of Sinacaban within 60 days from the time the
decision shall have become final and executory and another 60 days within
which to submit their report from the completion of the said relocation
survey.
Issue/s:
 W/N Sinacaban legally exists and therefore has legal personality to file a claim - YES
 W/N Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC is valid - YES
 W/N the RTC correctly ordered the relocation survey - YES
Ratio:
FIRST ISSUE
 If Sinacaban legally exists, then it has standing to bring a claim.
 The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal
corporation is Pelaez v. Auditor General:
14
o That the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter
and therefore the President is without power to create one
 However, we have since held that where a municipality created by an EO is later
impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no
longer be questioned.
 In Municipality of San Narciso v. Mendez, Sr., the ff. factors validated the creation of a
municipal corporation created by an EO before Pelaez:
o (1) for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation had never been
challenged;
o (2) after Pelaez, no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the
executive order creating such municipality; and
o (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class
municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered
part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the
House of Representatives.
o Whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the
municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Sec. 442(d),
1991 LGC
 Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least
a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been
recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
o Sinacaban had been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was decided
(1965). Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been
questioned.
o Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned
and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for
its revenue.
o This fact must be underscored because a quo warranto suit against a
corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five years
from the time the act complained of was done
o The State and even Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban’s corporate
existence.
 SC AO no. 33/B.P. Blg. 129: Sinacaban is part of municipal circuit
for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
 Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban by entering into the
1950 Agreement regarding their common boundary, embodied in
Resolution no. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.
 Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which
considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental.
 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any
defect in the creation of Sinacaban.
o Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall
continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have
their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities.
SECOND ISSUE
 Jimenez: R.A. No. 7160, 442(d) is invalid, since it does not conform to the
constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation
of new municipalities.
 However, since Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987
Constitution took effect, it is not subject to the plebiscite requirement.
 o The plebiscite requirement applies only to new municipalities created
for the first time under the Constitution.
THIRD ISSUE
 Jimenez: the RTC erred in ordering a relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban
because the barangays which Sinacaban are claiming are not enumerated in EO 258
and that in any event, the parties agreed that the barangays in question were
considered part of Jimenez.
 EO 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now called
Barangays) mentioned.
o What it says is that Sinacaban contains those barrios, without saying they
are the only ones comprising it.
o The reason for this is that the technical description, containing the metes
and bounds of its territory, is controlling.
 The trial court correctly ordered a relocation and consequently the question to which
the municipality the barangays in question belong.
FOURTH ISSUE: W/N the Provincial Board had the authority to approve the 1950 Agreement -
the SC didn’t definitely answer this issue idk why
 Jimenez: regardless of its conformity to EO 258, the 1950 Agreement as embodied in
Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board, is binding on Sinacaban.
 At the time Resolution No. 77 was passed, the applicable law was the 1917 Revised
Administrative Code:
o SEC. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. How settled. Disputes as to
jurisdiction of municipal governments over places or barrios shall be
decided by the provincial boards of the provinces xxx
 As held in Pelaez, the power of provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is of an
administrative nature involving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry
into effect the law creating said municipalities.
o It is a power to fix common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities
o It is thus limited to implementing the law creating a municipality.
o It is obvious that any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with
the law creating a municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but
its amendment.
o If, therefore, Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis
Occidental is contrary to the technical description of the territory of
Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing the claim of
Sinacaban.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Cawaling v Comelec
G.R. No. 146319 and 146342| OCTOBER 26, 2001| SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Digest by: DE LA TORRE
Petitioners: BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR
Respondents: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and Rep. FRANCIS
JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO
Doctrine:
The abolition or the cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon because of the merger is not a separate and different matter from the creation of
Sorsogon City. This is merely the logical and natural consequence of the merger. The subject
title cannot exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities.
Facts:
- President Estrada signed RA 8806 (“An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor”).
o The COMELEC conducted a plebiscite on December 16th, 2000 in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, which was duly proclaimed that the
creation of Sorsogon City has been ratified and approved, by the Plebiscite
Board.
- Benjamin E. Cawaling (resident + taxpayer of Sorsogon) sought the annulment of the
plebiscite and to enjoin the further implementation of the said law on the grounds that the
creation of said city by merging the two subject municipalities violates Section 450a of the Local
Government Code:
(a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component
city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:
a. a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau;
b. or a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand
(150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
and Section 10, Article X of the Constitution (that only “a municipality/a cluster of
barangays” may be converted into a component city) and that the law has two
subjects (the creation of the city and the abolition of the subject municipalities), thus
violating the “one subject-one bill” rule in Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
- Petitioner also argued that the plebiscite was done too late.
Issue/s:
● W/N RA 8806 is unconstitutional? –NO, it is not.
● W/N the plebiscite was done too late? – NO, it was not.
Ratio:
● The petitioner’s argument regarding unconstitutionality is unmeritorious.
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 ○ “A municipality or a cluster of barangaysmay be converted into a
component city” is merely a mode of city creation and not a criterion.
■ This is highlighted by:
● The word “converted.”
● Section 10, Article X of the Constitution:
○ Allows the merger of LGUs to create a
province, city, municipality, or barangay, but
should be in accordance with the Local
Government Code.
■ Section 8:
● “Divisionand mergerof existing [LGUs] shall
comply with the same requirements…
prescribed for their creation…”
○ There is actually one subject embraced by the law’s title, which is the
creation of Sorsogon City.
■ The abolition or the cessation of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon because of the merger is
not a separate and different matter from the creation of Sorsogon
City.
● This is merely the logical and natural consequence
of the merger.
● The subject title cannot exclude the incidental effect
of abolishing the two municipalities.
■ In fact, the Congress doesn’t need to provide everything in the
title with such precision to actually display the index or the
contents of the law itself.
● There should be a liberal construction of the rule.
● The plebiscite was not late at all.
○ Section 54, RA 8806.
■ Sorsogon City shall acquire corporate existence upon the
ratification of its creation.
● This shall be done by a majority of votes in a
plebiscite in Bacon and Sorsogon within 120 days from
the approval of this Act.
○ “Approval” in this context means the completion
of its publication as per the requirements in the
Tañadacase.
■ Publication was completed on September 1st, 2000
(the law was published in a newspaper of local
circulation in Sorsogon Province).
● September 1st, 2000 was thus the
reckoning point for the 120-day period to
conduct the plebiscite.
○ As per Section 10 of the Local Government Code, a plebiscite is required
for the creation/division/merger of LGUs.
■ Generally, 120 days from the effectivity of the law.
● Except if the law fixes another date.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
Mejia v Balolong (including RESOLUTION of Motion for reconsideration)
G.R. No L-1925. | 16 September, 1948 | Feria, J.
Digest by: DA SILVA
Petitioners: (Put Petitioner/s Here)
16
Respondents: (Put Respondent/s Here)
Doctrine: A cityhood statute becomes effectively upon its approval, and the city it creates
becomes a city upon this occurrence. A city comes into existence through the law that
converts it into a city, and not through the law which organizes its city government.
Facts:
 In November 1947, the general election for provincial, municipal and city officials was
held.
o Petitioners were elected as councilors of Dagupan City
o Respondents, though defeated in said election, were appointed as
councilors by the President of the Philippines on Dec 30, 1947
 Petitioners filed an action for quo warranto against respondents on the ground that
their appointments were null and void
Issue/s:
 W/N The appointments of respondents was null and void – YES
Ratio:
 The validity of the appointments depends on whether the City of Dagupan was created
and came into existence on June 20, 1947, which is the date Act No. 17 came into
effect, or if it came into existence on January 1, 1948 when the city government was
organized by E.O. 96.
The City of Dagupan was created in, and came into existence on June 20, 1947 when
its cityhood laws became effective
A cityhood statute becomes effectively upon its approval, and the city it creates
becomes a city upon this occurrence. A city comes into existence through the law that
converts it into a city, and not through the law which organizes its city government.
As a result, the position of councilor of the city of Dagupan was an elective position at
the time of respondents’ appointments. Therefore, their appointments are null and
void.
Dispositive:
In view of all the foregoing, the four respondents shall be ousted and altogether excluded from
the position of councilor of the City of Dagupan which they are now unlawfully holding, and that
the four petitioners elected by popular vote during the general election on November 11, 1947,
be placed in possession of those offices. It is so ordered with costs against the respondents.
Motion For Reconsideration
Resolution: The Motion for Reconsideration is predicated on an erroneous premise or
confusion of the creation or existence of a municipal corporation.
If a juridical entity such as a city or municipality come into existence upon the organization of
their governments, then it would not have been necessary for the Sec. 2186 of the Admin Code
to provide a legal fiction that “Where provision is made for the creation or organization of a new
municipality, it shall come into existence as a separate corporate body upon qualification of the
president, vice-president, and a majority of the councilors, unless some other time be fixed
therefor by law.” If organization and the coming into existence cities and municipalities were
one and the same, then the law would not be able to fix some other time for its coming into
existence, at a time other the organization of their government and qualification of their officers.
In Act 170, the law converting Dagupan into a City, Congress set June 20, 1947 as the date that
Dagupan would become a city. This was done when Congress provided that the same would
occur upon the effectivity of the Act which fell on said date.
The President is not authorized to create the City of Dagupan, but only to fix, by Proclamation,
the organization of the government of the City, and appoint the officers thereof, the Mayor and
the members of the city council, if the government of the City is organized before the next
general elections for provincial and municipal officials on November 1947, in which the
councilors of the City were to be elected, or appoint only the Mayor if the organization is made
after the said elections. The government of the city could not be organized and its officers
appointed or elected before the city had been created or come into existence, for it would be
absurd to elect or appoint the officers of a public or private corporation or any other entity which
does not yet exist.
B. ALTERATION AND DISSOLUTION
Pasig v Comelec
G.R. No. 125646| September 10, 1999| YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
Digest by: CUA
Petitioners: City of Pasig
Respondents: Comelec and the municipality of Cainta
Petitioners: Municipality of Cainta
Respondents: Comelec City of Pasig
Doctrine:
A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries
Facts:
 The case involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan and the proposed Barangay
Napico
 The city of Pasig claims these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while the
Municipality of Cainta claims that these proposed barangays encroached upon areas
within its territory/jurisdiction
 Upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village, the city council of Pasig passed
and approved Ordinance No. 21 creating Barangay Karangalan. The plebiscite on the
creation of said barangay was set for June 22, 1996
 Similarly on September 9, 1996 the City of Pasig passed a similar ordinance creating
Barangay Napico. The plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997
 Upon learning of the ordinances, the municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or
cancel the plebiscites and filed petitions with the COMELEC calling the attention of the
COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC for settlement of a boundary dispute
 COMELEC ordered the plebiscite to be held in abeyance until the court has settled the
boundary dispute with regard to the creation of Barangay Karangalan.
 COMELEC, however, dismissed the other petition for being moot in view of the holding
of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the creation of Barangay
Napico was ratified and approved by the majority
 Hence the filing of GR 125646 by the City of Pasig and the filing of GR 128663 by the
Municipality of Cainta
Issue/s:
 WON the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico
should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between
the two local governments? YES
Ratio:
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 The court agrees with the position of COMELEC that the civil case involving the
boundary dispute presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before
plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held
 A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries
 If not, the court could pave the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays
 Moreover considering the expenses in the holding of plebiscites, it is more prudent to
hold in abeyance the conduct of the same
 Neither does the court agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held
in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta
has already been rendered moot and academic.
 Tan v Comelec
o Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-
compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had
been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the
case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic.
Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which
petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be
inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its
creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for
perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents urging
that, as there has been fait accompli, then this Court should passively
accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion.
Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition
fraught with mischief. Respondents submission will create a dangerous
precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of
interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might
tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to
recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter
the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily,
confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future
challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC
Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on
March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is declared null and
void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance until after the courts settle with finality
the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No.
94-300.
Kananga v Madrona
G.R. No. 141375 | April 30, 2003 | Panganiban, J.
Digest by: CRUZ
Petitioners: Municipality of Kananga
Respondents: Hon. Madrona, Presiding Judge of RTC of Ormoc (Branch 35) and the City of
Ormoc
Doctrine: the RTC has general jurisdiction on boundary disputes
Facts:
 A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc.
  An amicable settlement cannot be reached
To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City
 Ruling of the Trial Court: RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. It further ruled that Section 118 of the Local Government Code
had been substantially complied with, because both parties already had the occasion
to meet and thresh out their differences.In fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to
the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that Section 118 governed venue;
hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court.
Issue/s:
 Whether RTC may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary
dispute between a municipality and an independent component city. YEEEEEEssss
Ratio:
 Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of the Complaint is
Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC), which provides:
 Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes. Boundary
disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be
settled amicably. To this end:
 (a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or
municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned.
 (b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same
province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
 (c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces
concerned.
 (d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and
a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be
jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
 (e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60)
days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that
effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned
which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification
referred to above.
 Under this provision, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a component city
or a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other -- or
between two or more highly urbanized cities -- shall be jointly referred for settlement to
the respective sanggunians of the local government units involved.
 There is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No.
542.
 By virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC, it continued to exist and operate as such.
 However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent component, city
created under Republic Act No. 179. Section 89 thereof reads: Election of provincial
governor and members of the Provincial Board of the Province of Leyte. The qualified
voters of Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the
provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte.
 Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized.
 Ormoc is deemed an independent component city, because its charter prohibits its
voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It is a city independent of the
province.
 In fact, it is considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region
VIII by both Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus
Election Code, which apportions representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa.
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 There is neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by
the parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its Motion
to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent chartered city.
 Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a
municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an
independent component city.
 While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly
then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them.
 Nevertheless, a joint session was indeed held, but no amicable settlement was
reached.
 A resolution to that effect was issued, and the sanggunians of both local government
units mutually agreed to bring the dispute to the RTC for adjudication.
 Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant case, the
general rules governing jurisdiction should then be used.
 The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.
Section 19(6) of this law provides:
 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction: (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
 Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency
over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent
component city of the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss.
 RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly
withheld from their plenary powers. They have the power not only to take judicial
cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to
the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original,
but also exclusive.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Order AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Bgy. Mayamot v Antipolo
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente
Digest by: CORPUS
Petitioners: Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo City
Respondents: Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo City, Petitioner, v. Antipolo City, Sangguniang
Panglungsod Of Antipolo
Doctrine:
By virtue of the Local Government Code of 1991, the RTC lost its power to try, at the first
instance, cases of boundary disputes, and it is only when the intermediary steps have failed
that resort to the RTC will follow as provided in the laws.
Facts:
 In 1984, BP 787 to 794 were passed creating 8 new barangays in the then
Municipality of Antipolo. Each law creating the new barangay contained provisions
regarding the sitios comprising it, its boundaries, and mechanism for ratification of the
law.
o Antipolo became composed of 16 barangays.
 In order to integrate the territorial jurisdiction of the barangays into the map of
Antipolo, the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo passed Resolution No. 97-80,
commissioning the City Assessor to plot and delineate the territorial boundaries of the
 barangays pursuant to the Bureau of Lands Cadastral Survey and the provisions of
BP 787 to794.
 In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 97-89. It approved the
barangay boundaries specified and delineated in the plans/maps prepared by the City
Assessor.
 In 1999, Barangay Mayamot filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment
of Resolution No. 97-89 and Injunction against Antipolo City, Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Antipolo, Barangays Sta. Cruz, Bagong Nayon, Cupang, and
Mambugan, the City Assessor and the City Treasurer before the RTC of Antipolo City.
They argue that
o While BP Blg. 787 to 794 did not require Barangay Mayamot to part with any
of its territory, Resolution No. 97-89 reduced its territory to ½ of its original
area and was apportioned to other barangays.
o The preparation of the plan and the adoption of Resolution No. 97-89 were
not preceded by any consultation nor any public hearing
o Resolution No. 97-89 violated Section 82 of the LGC of 1983, the law in
force at the time, which provided that alteration, modification and definition
of barangay boundaries shall be by ordinance and confirmed by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
 · RTC dismissed the petition.
o Resolution No. 97-89 was passed pursuant to the Cadastral Survey Plan
duly approved by the Bureau of Lands and BP Blg. 787 to 794 and was not
intended to alter the territorial boundary of Barangay Mayamot. Not
intending to alter any territorial boundary, Resolution No. 97-89 is not an
ordinance contemplated under Section 82 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 as
required to hold a plebiscite.
 · CA denied petitioner’s appeal.
o The additional barangays were created by BP Blg. 787 to794 and were
approved by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on February
5, 1986. It agreed with the finding of the RTC that Resolution No. 97-89 was
passed only in consequence of BP Blg. 787 to 794 and did not alter the
territorial boundary of Barangay Mayamot. As such, the case was merely a
boundary dispute.
o Sections 118-119 of RA No. 7160 or the the LGC of 1991, the statute in
force at the time of commencement of Barangay Mayamot's action, provide
the mechanism for settlement of boundary disputes. RTC correctly
dismissed the case because it has no original jurisdiction to try and decide a
barangay boundary dispute, as the LGC of 1991 grants the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan with original jurisdiction to actually hear
and decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the
law and its implementing rules and regulations.
Issue/s:
 Whether or not the RTC has original jurisdiction over boundary disputes. - NO.
Ratio:
 Barangay Mayamot claimed that as a result of the consolidation and integration of the
boundaries of the old barangays and newly-created barangays and issuance of
Resolution No. 97-89, a portion of its territory was apportioned to other barangays.
The issues raised by Barangay Mayamot are centered on the alleged inconsistency
between its perceived actual and physical territory and its territory and boundaries, as
defined and identified after the Bureau of Lands Cadastral Survey and the provisions
of BP Blg. 787 to 794 were consolidated and integrated by respondent City Assessor
into the map of Antipolo. The issue to be resolved is the boundary dispute between
Barangay Mayamot and the other barangays.
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 There is a boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area of a
Local Government Unit (LGU) is claimed by two (2) or more LGUs.
o Here, Barangay Mayamot is claiming a portion of the territory of Barangays
Bagong Nayon, Sta. Cruz, Cupang and Mambugan. Unfortunately for
petitioner, the resolution of a boundary dispute is outside the jurisdiction of
the RTC.
 Sec. 118 of the LGC of 1991 provides that boundary disputes involving two (2) or
more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned. In the event the
sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within 60 days, it shall issue a
certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the
sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within 6) days from the date of the
certification referred to above.
 Sec. 119 of the same Code states that within the time and manner prescribed by the
Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to
the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The
Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof
 In Municipality of Sta. Fe v. Municipality of Aritao, and Municipality of Pateros v. Court
of Appeals, the Court previously held that by virtue of the Local Government Code of
1991, the RTC lost its power to try, at the first instance, cases of boundary disputes,
and it is only when the intermediary steps have failed that resort to the RTC will follow
as provided in the laws.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated January 30, 2009 and Resolution dated March 31, 2009 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.
Mariano v Comelec
G.R. No. 118577. | March 7, 1995 | Puno, J.
Digest by: CHANG
Petitioners: JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al.
Respondents: COMELEC, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI
Doctrine:
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise
powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits,
its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which
ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the
Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be
spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Facts: (Maraming possible issues but I think #1 yung most important.)
 In this case, there are 2 petitions to declare R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
 R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati.”
 The petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52
of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
o 1. Section 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in
 violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7
and 450 of the Local Government Code;
o 2. Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit
for local elective officials, in violation of Sec. 8, Art. X and Sec. 7, Art. VI of the
Constitution.
o 3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
 (a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law
(the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the
return of every census;
 (b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title
of the bill; and
 (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with Sec. 5 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
Issue/s:
1. WON Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati
violating Sec. 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds
with technical descriptions? NO.
2. WON Section 51 Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and
Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a new
corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two
executive terms as allowed by the Constitution? NO.
3. WON the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the
reapportionment cannot be made by a special law? NO.
Ratio:
1. Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 was delineated properly:
“Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall
comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area
over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City
of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros
and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the
northwest, by the City of Manila.”
 The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit
of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they
define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires.
 Any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly
conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice
the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local
Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit
must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
 The delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered
by Makati as a municipality.
 Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati.
In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall
comprise the present territory of the municipality."
 “The territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions" — was made in order to provide a
means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained.
1. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as
tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself.
20
Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably
ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring
municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative
intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.
2. Sec. 51 Art. X of R.A. No. 7854 does not collide with collides with Sec. 8, Art. X
and Sec. 7, Art. VI of the Constitution:
“Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of
Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and
functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have
already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new
corporate existence.”
“Sec. 8 Art. VI of the Consti: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.”
 Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials have a term of 3
years and are prohibited from serving for more than 3 consecutive terms.
 Petitioners argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate
existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal
elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them.
 Basically, the don’t want Jejomar Binay serving more than 2 terms as Mayor of Makati.
Since at the time of the case, Binay was already mayor for 2 terms.
 SC: Petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor
Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in
said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy.
3. The addition of another legislative district in Makati is constitutional.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised
of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded,
the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment of the law.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Province of Zambo. Del Norte v City of Zambo.
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente
Digest by: CASAMA

Petitioners: Province of Zamboanga del Norte
Respondents: City of Zamboanga, Secretary of Finance, Commission of Internal Revenue
Doctrine:
If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and
governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it.
But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and
Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due
process and payment of just compensation.
Facts:
 Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the municipality of Zamboanga Province
used to be the provincial capital of the Zamboanga province
 Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the municipality into Zamboanga City
 CA 39 provides that buildings and properties which province shall abandon upon the
transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of
Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General
 The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings
constructed thereon located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individual by
Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province
 In 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog and in 1948,
RA 286 was approved creating the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of
Zamboanga Province
 In 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General fixed the value of the
properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at
1,294,244.00
 RA 711 approved dividing the province of Zamboanga (del Norte and del Sur). The
assets and obligations of the old province were divided equitably between the two
 The Auditor General apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct province of
Zamboanga (Norte – 54,89% Sur – 45.61%) of the 1,294,244
 Zamboanga del Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39 of 1,294,244, the total value
of the lots and buildings in question, or 704, 220.05 payably by Zamboanga City
 In 1959, the Executive Secretary issued a ruling that Zamboanga del Norte had a
vested right as owner of the properties mentioned in CA 39 and is entitled to the price
threof payable by Zamboanga City
 Cabinet resolution revoked this ruling conveying all 50 lots and buildings to
Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of then
Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog
 The Secretary of Finance authorized the CIR to deduct 25% of the regular internal
revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for 3 quarters of fiscal year
 The deductions aggregating 57,373.46 was credited to the province of Zamboanga del
Norte, in partial payment of the 705,220,05 due it
 However, RA 3039 amended the CA 39 providing that all buildings, properties, and
assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of
Zamboanga are transferred, FREE OF CHARGE, in favor of the City of Zamboanga
 Secretary of finance ordered CIR to return to Zamboanga City the 57,373.46 taken
from it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte
 43,030.11 of 57,373.46 has already been returned
 Zamboanga del Norte assailed the constitutionality of 3039
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Issue/s:
 WON RA 3039 is constitutional? YES
Ratio:
 The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings
thereon in question
 DOCTRINE
 The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which
it is intended and devoted.
 Applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal
Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public
service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be
considered public, it is enough that the property be held and devoted for governmental
purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc
 Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites
and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites
— a total of 24 lots — since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its
governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress
 But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share
in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since
they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes.
 The fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are
truly private in nature
 The 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no significance
since registration cannot convert public property to private.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is
hereby entered as follows:
(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del
Norte in lump sum the amount of P43,030,11 which the former took back from the latter
out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter, and
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever
balance remains of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after
deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated
March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of
quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner originally
adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No
costs. So ordered.
Notes:
 The lower courts used the Civil code classification of properties which is a general law.
The SC used the Law of Municipal Corporation which is a special law. Under the Civil
Code:
"ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal
streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
"All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be
governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special
laws."
Teves v Comelec
G.R. No. 180363 | April 28, 2009 | Ynares-Santiago, J.
Digest by: CAPACITE

Petitioners: Edgar Y. Teves
Respondents: COMELEC and Herminio G. Teves
Doctrine:
It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is
punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be
inherently immoral.
Facts:
 Edgar was a candidate for Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros
Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections.
 Herminio filed to disqualify Edgar (then Mayor) based on the latter being convicted in
Teves v. Sandiganbayan for violating Sec 3(h), RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit.
o that such violation was a crime involving moral turpitude carrying the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification of public office
 COMELEC disqualified Edgar since:
o he turned over management of the cockpit to his wife, but did not divest of
its ownership - thus, he still maintained ownership by deceit
o even if he transferred ownership to his wife, he would still have an interest
as it would belong to the conjugal property
o his act is a betrayal of the trust reposed by the people
o the crime involves moral turpitude
 Edgar filed a MR which was denied by COMELEC en banc for being moot since Edgar
lost in the 2007 elections.
Issue/s:
 W/N violation of Sec 3(h), RA 3019 involves moral turpitude - NO
Ratio:
 Moral turpitude - everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which
a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
 Elements of Sec 3(h):
1) The accused is a public officer;
2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction;
3) he either:
a) (1st mode) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with such interest, or
b) (2nd mode) is prohibited from having such interest by the
Constitution or by law.
o In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, Edgar was convicted under the 2nd mode for
having pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, prohibited under Sec.
89(2) of the LGC of 1991.
o Conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the
same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding
circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides,
moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral
but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant
case.
 It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless
of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be
merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently
22
immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by
statute fixes the moral turpitude.
 Under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a
cockpit was not among the prohibitions enumerated.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections dated May 11, 2007 and October 9, 2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves from
running for the position of Representative of the 3rd District of Negros Oriental, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring that the crime committed by petitioner
(violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.
Notes:
 The Sangguniang Bayan has the authority to issue a license for the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of cockpits.
o Unlike in the old LGC, where the municipal mayor was the presiding officer
of the Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so
anymore and is not even a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
o Hence, Mayor Edgar could not have intervened or taken part in his official
capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license because he was not a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan.
o Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by
transferring the management thereof to his wife.
 Said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC
prohibiting possession of such interest.
 Not moot - since his disqualification affected his running in the 2010 elections despite
the 5-year disqualification period
Miranda v Aguirre
G.R. No. 133064. | September 16, 1999| Puno, J.
Digest by: BULATAO
Petitioners: JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V.
BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO
Respondents: HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON.
EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of
Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY.
BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in
his capacity as Provincial Treasurer
Doctrine:
When an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected is mandatory.
Facts:
 In 1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela,
into an independent component city.
 RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite.
 In 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically
downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a component
city.
  Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to 2. The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the
submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite. cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is
 Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been
merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a extinguished.
component city.
 It allegedly did not involve any “creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial Issue/s:
alteration of boundaries of local government units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the  Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the
people of Santiago is unnecessary. City of Manila to its creditor--NO.
 They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the
petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction. Ratio:

Issue/s: 1. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the
municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign.
1. W/N RA No. 8528 is unconstitutional. - YES 2. The new City of Manila is in a legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new
2. W/N the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case at bar. - YES city is entitled to all property and property rights of the predecessor corporation
3. W/N the petitioners have locus standi. - YES including its liabilities.
3. The court held that only the governmental functions that are not compatible with the
Ratio: present sovereignty are suspended.
4. Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city,
YES. RA No. 8528 is unconstitutional. it is still liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila.
 When an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or 5. While military occupation or territorial cession may work a suspension of the
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the governmental functions of municipal corporations, such occupation or cession does
political units directly affected is mandatory. not result in their dissolution.
6. While there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of inhabitants of ceded
YES. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over said petition because it involves a territory, and an abrogation of laws in conflict with the political character of the
justiciable issue and not a political question, and of which only the court could decide substituted sovereign, the great body of municipal law regulating private and domestic
whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional. rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler.
1. Although the United States might have extinguished every municipality in
YES. Petitioners are directly affected by the implementation of RA No. 8528. the territory ceded by Spain under the Treaty of 1898, it will not, in view of
 Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang the practice of nations to the contrary, be presumed to have done so.
Liga, and together with 3 other petitioners, all residents and voters in the City of b. The legal entity of the City of Manila survived both its military occupation by, and its
Santiago. cession to, the United States, and, as in law, the present city, as the successor of the
 It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite, to be former city, is entitled to the property rights of its predecessor, it is also subject to its
conducted by the COMELEC. liabilities.
 The denial of their right by RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the 1. The cession in the Treaty of 1898 of all the public property of Spain in
law as unconstitutional. the Philippine Islands did not include property belonging to
municipalities, and the agreement against impairment of property and
Dispositive: private property rights in that treaty applied to the property of municipalities
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and claims against municipalities.
and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from b. One supplying goods to a municipality does so, in the absence of specific provision,
implementing said law. on its general faith and credit, and not as against special funds in its possession, and
Vilas v City of Manila even if such goods are supplied for a purpose for which the special funds are held, no
220 U.S. 345 | April 3, 1911 | Lurton, J. specific lien is created thereon.
Digest by: BALAGTAS
Dispositive:
Petitioners: Vilas Our conclusion is that the decree in the Aguado case must be reversed and the case remanded,
Respondents: City of Manila with direction to render judgment and such other relief as may seem in conformity with law. The
judgments in the Trigas and Vilas cases will be reversed, and the cases remanded with direction
Doctrine: to overrule the respective demurrers, and for such other action as may be consistent with law,
The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal and consistent with this opinion.
corporation organized under the former sovereign. Umali v Comelec
G.R. No. 203974 | April 22, 2014| Velasco, Jr., J.
Digest by: AVILLON
Facts:
1. Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183, Vilas is Petitioners: Aurelio Umali
the creditor of the City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the Respondents: Commission on Elections, Julius Cesar Vergara, and the City Government of
sum of money owed to him by the city.
23

Cabanatuan
Doctrine:
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution addressed the undesirable practice in the past
whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of
the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. The changes that will result from
the conversion are too substantial that there is a necessity for the plurality of those that will
be affected to approve it.
 The province will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in territory. With the city’s
newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the province, which
reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter.
 The taxes imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself.
 The province will also be divested of jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning the
elected city officials of the new HUC, and the appeal process for administrative case
decisions against barangay officials of the city will also be modified accordingly.
 Likewise, the registered voters of the city will no longer be entitled to vote for and be
voted upon as provincial officials.

Facts: Dispositive:
 The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cabanatuan City passed a Resolution requesting the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 203974, is
President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the hereby GRANTED. COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 dated September 11, 2012 and
province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Minute Resolution No. 12-0925 dated October 16, 2012 are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
 President issued a Presidential Proclamation proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as Public respondent COMELEC is hereby enjoined from implementing the said Resolutions.
an HUC subject to ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters. Additionally, COMELEC is hereby ordered to conduct a plebiscite for the purpose of converting
 COMELEC issued a Minute Resolution declaring that for purposes of the plebiscite, Cabanatuan City into a Highly Urbanized City to be participated in by the qualified registered
only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate. COMELEC voters of Nueva Ecija within 120 days from the finality of this Decision. The Petition for
based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code. Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 204371, is hereby DISMISSED.
 Aurelio Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, opposed this and argued that:
o In, Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution:
 “No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”
o the phrase "political units directly affected" necessarily encompasses not
only Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija
o all the registered voters in the province are qualified to cast their votes in
resolving the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City.
 Julius Cesar Vergara, mayor of Cabanatuan, argued that:
o Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to conversions
o a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, allows only the qualified voters of
Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite
o Section 453. “It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly
urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum
requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper
application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters
therein.”
o the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 refers only to the
registered voters in the city being converted
Issue/s:
 W/N the registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija should vote in the
plebiscite? YES

Ratio:
 The creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units involve a common denominator - material change in the political and
economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people
therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the
people "in the political units directly affected."
 While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an
HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries.

24