EN BANC

[G.R. No. 188920. February 16, 2010.]

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR., RODOLFO G. VALENCIA,

DANILO E. SUAREZ, SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO, SALVACION ZALDIVAR-
PEREZ, HARLIN CAST-ABAYON, MELVIN G. MACUSI AND ELEASAR P.
QUINTO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON and J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA, respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J p:

This petition is an offshoot of two earlier cases already resolved by the Court involving a
leadership dispute within a political party. In this case, the petitioners question their expulsion from
that party and assail the validity of the election of new party leaders conducted by the respondents.
Statement of the Facts and the Case
For a better understanding of the controversy, a brief recall of the preceding events is in
order.
On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal
Party (LP), announced his party's withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of
party members denounced Drilon's move, claiming that he made the announcement without
consulting his party.
On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local
autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions
in the LP's ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent
Drilon immediately filed a petition 1 with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the
elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the party's electing bodies, the National
Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly
convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution, 2 party officers were
elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on November 30, 2007. aSEHDA
On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LP's NECO and
NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. The election of new officers on that occasion
could be likened to "people power," wherein the LP majority removed respondent Drilon as
president by direct action. Atienza also said that the amendments 3 to the original LP Constitution,
or the Salonga Constitution, giving LP officers a fixed three-year term, had not been properly
ratified. Consequently, the term of Drilon and the other officers already ended on July 24, 2006.
On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution, 4 partially granting respondent
Drilon's petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new election
under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of petitioner Atienza and the others with him
was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the Salonga
Constitution. But, since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been properly
ratified, Drilon's term may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in
a holdover capacity until new officers were elected.
Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On April
17, 2007 a divided Court issued a resolution, 5granting respondent Drilon's petition and denying
that of petitioner Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that the COMELEC had jurisdiction
over the intra-party leadership dispute; that the Salonga Constitution had been validly amended;
and that, as a consequence, respondent Drilon's term as LP president was to end only on
November 30, 2007.
Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent
Drilon's term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who were supposedly qualified to
vote attended. Before the election, however, several persons associated with petitioner Atienza
sought to clarify their membership status and raised issues regarding the composition of the
NECO. Eventually, that meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP
president.
On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor, Jr., Rodolfo G. Valencia,
Danilo E. Suarez, Solomon R. Chungalao, Salvacion Zaldivar-Perez, Harlin Cast-Abayon, Melvin
G. Macusi, and Eleazar P. Quinto, filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction 6 before
the COMELEC against respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary
general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP, claiming
that the NECO assembly which elected him was invalidly convened. They questioned the
existence of a quorum and claimed that the NECO composition ought to have been based on a list
appearing in the party's 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that
list as common exhibit in the earlier cases and it showed that the NECO had 103
members. EHTISC
Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was
not invited to the NECO meeting and that some members, like petitioner Defensor, were given the
status of "guests" during the meeting. Atienza's allies allegedly raised these issues but respondent
Drilon arbitrarily thumbed them down and "railroaded" the proceedings. He suspended the
meeting and moved it to another room, where Roxas was elected without notice to Atienza's allies.
On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas' election as LP president
faithfully complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution. The party's 60th
Anniversary Souvenir Program could not be used for determining the NECO members because
supervening events changed the body's number and composition. Some NECO members had
died, voluntarily resigned, or had gone on leave after accepting positions in the government.
Others had lost their re-election bid or did not run in the May 2007 elections, making them
ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP members who got elected to public office also became
part of the NECO. Certain persons of national stature also became NECO members upon
respondent Drilon's nomination, a privilege granted the LP president under the amended LP
Constitution. In other words, the NECO membership was not fixed or static; it changed due to
supervening circumstances.
Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners Atienza,
Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP officers on March 2,
2006. This was pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution that NECO subsequently
ratified. Meanwhile, certain NECO members, like petitioners Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez,
forfeited their party membership when they ran under other political parties during the May 2007
elections. They were dropped from the roster of LP members.
On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners
Atienza, et al.'s petition. It noted that the May 2007 elections necessarily changed the composition
of the NECO since the amended LP Constitution explicitly made incumbent senators, members of
the House of Representatives, governors and mayors members of that body. That some lost or
won these positions in the May 2007 elections affected the NECO membership. Petitioners failed
to prove that the NECO which elected Roxas as LP president was not properly convened.
As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.'s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC
observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political
party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to
resolve. DHESca
Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, petitioners
Atienza, et al. filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The Issues Presented
Respondents Roxas, et al. raise the following threshold issues:
1. Whether or not the LP, which was not impleaded in the case, is an indispensable
party; and
2. Whether or not petitioners Atienza, et al., as ousted LP members, have the requisite
legal standing to question Roxas' election.
Petitioners Atienza, et al., on the other hand, raise the following issues:
3. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the
NECO membership that elected respondent Roxas as LP president;
4. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the
issue concerning the validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the
issue concerning the expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party; and
5. Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.'s
constitutional right to due process by the latter's expulsion from the party.
The Court's Ruling
One. Respondents Roxas, et al. assert that the Court should dismiss the petition for failure
of petitioners Atienza, et al. to implead the LP as an indispensable party. Roxas, et al. point out
that, since the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the NECO, the
controversy could not be adjudicated with finality without making the LP a party to the case. 7
But petitioners Atienza, et al.'s causes of action in this case consist in respondents
Roxas, et al.'s disenfranchisement of Atienza, et al.from the election of party leaders and in the
illegal election of Roxas as party president. Atienza, et al. were supposedly excluded from the
elections by a series of "despotic acts" of Roxas, et al., who controlled the proceedings. Among
these acts are Atienza, et al.'s expulsion from the party, their exclusion from the NECO, and
respondent Drilon's "railroading" of election proceedings. Atienza, et al. attributed all these illegal
and prejudicial acts to Roxas, et al. CcAIDa
Since no wrong had been imputed to the LP nor had some affirmative relief been sought
from it, the LP is not an indispensable party. Petitioners Atienza, et al.'s prayer for the undoing of
respondents Roxas, et al.'s acts and the reconvening of the NECO are directed against Roxas, et
al.
Two. Respondents Roxas, et al. also claim that petitioners Atienza, et al. have no legal
standing to question the election of Roxas as LP president because they are no longer LP
members, having been validly expelled from the party or having joined other political parties. 8 As
non-members, they have no stake in the outcome of the action.
 But, as the Court held in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 9 legal standing in suits is governed
by the "real parties-in-interest" rule under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This states that
"every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest." And "real
party-in-interest" is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. In other words, the plaintiff's standing is based on his own
right to the relief sought. In raising petitioners Atienza, et al.'s lack of standing as a threshold issue,
respondents Roxas, et al. would have the Court hypothetically assume the truth of the allegations
in the petition.
Here, it is precisely petitioners Atienza, et al.'s allegations that respondents Roxas, et
al. deprived them of their rights as LP members by summarily excluding them from the LP roster
and not allowing them to take part in the election of its officers and that not all who sat in the
NECO were in the correct list of NECO members. If Atienza, et al.'s allegations were correct, they
would have been irregularly expelled from the party and the election of officers, void. Further, they
would be entitled to recognition as members of good standing and to the holding of a new election
of officers using the correct list of NECO members. To this extent, therefore, Atienza, et al. who
want to take part in another election would stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the Court's
decision in this case. Consequently, they have legal standing to pursue this petition.
Three. In assailing respondent Roxas' election as LP president, petitioners Atienza, et
al. claim that the NECO members allowed to take part in that election should have been limited to
those in the list of NECO members appearing in the party's 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program.
Atienza, et al. allege that respondent Drilon, as holdover LP president, adopted that list in the
earlier cases before the COMELEC and it should thus bind respondents Roxas, et al. The Court's
decision in the earlier cases, said Atienza, et al., anointed that list for the next party election. Thus,
Roxas, et al. in effect defied the Court's ruling when they removed Atienza as party chairman and
changed the NECO's composition. 10 DSAEIT
But the list of NECO members appearing in the party's 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program
was drawn before the May 2007 elections. After the 2007 elections, changes in the NECO
membership had to be redrawn to comply with what the amended LP Constitution required.
Respondent Drilon adopted the souvenir program as common exhibit in the earlier cases only to
prove that the NECO, which supposedly elected Atienza as new LP president on March 2, 2006,
had been improperly convened. It cannot be regarded as an immutable list, given the nature and
character of the NECO membership.
Nothing in the Court's resolution in the earlier cases implies that the NECO membership
should be pegged to the party's 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. There would have been no
basis for such a position. The amended LP Constitution did not intend the NECO membership to
be permanent. Its Section 27 11 provides that the NECO shall include all incumbent senators,
members of the House of Representatives, governors, and mayors who were LP members in
good standing for at least six months. It follows from this that with the national and local elections
taking place in May 2007, the number and composition of the NECO would have to yield to
changes brought about by the elections.
Former NECO members who lost the offices that entitled them to membership had to be
dropped. Newly elected ones who gained the privilege because of their offices had to come in.
Furthermore, former NECO members who passed away, resigned from the party, or went on
leave could not be expected to remain part of the NECO that convened and held elections on
November 26, 2007. In addition, Section 27 of the amended LP Constitution expressly authorized
the party president to nominate "persons of national stature" to the NECO. Thus, petitioners
Atienza, et al. cannot validly object to the admission of 12 NECO members nominated by
respondent Drilon when he was LP president. Even if this move could be regarded as
respondents Roxas, et al.'s way of ensuring their election as party officers, there was certainly
nothing irregular about the act under the amended LP Constitution.
 The NECO was validly convened in accordance with the amended LP Constitution.
Respondents Roxas, et al. explained in details how they arrived at the NECO composition for the
purpose of electing the party leaders. 12 The explanation is logical and consistent with party rules.
Consequently, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld the composition
of the NECO that elected Roxas as LP president. ASHICc
Petitioner Atienza claims that the Court's resolution in the earlier cases recognized his right
as party chairman with a term, like respondent Drilon, that would last up to November 30, 2007
and that, therefore, his ouster from that position violated the Court's resolution. But the Court's
resolution in the earlier cases did not preclude the party from disciplining Atienza under Sections
29 13 and 46 14 of the amended LP Constitution. The party could very well remove him or any
officer for cause as it saw fit.
Four. Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its
jurisdiction when it ruled on the composition of the NECO but refused to delve into the legality of
their expulsion from the party. The two issues, they said, weigh heavily on the leadership
controversy involved in the case. The previous rulings of the Court, they claim, categorically
upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over intra-party leadership disputes. 15
But, as respondents Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue in this case is not the validity of
the expulsion of petitioners Atienza, et al. from the party, but the legitimacy of the NECO assembly
that elected respondent Roxas as LP president. Given the COMELEC's finding as upheld by this
Court that the membership of the NECO in question complied with the LP Constitution, the
resolution of the issue of whether or not the party validly expelled petitioners cannot affect the
election of officers that the NECO held.
While petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the majority of LP members belong to their
faction, they did not specify who these members were and how their numbers could possibly
affect the composition of the NECO and the outcome of its election of party leaders. Atienza, et
al.has not bothered to assail the individual qualifications of the NECO members who voted for
Roxas. Nor did Atienza, et al. present proof that the NECO had no quorum when it then
assembled. In other words, the claims of Atienza, et al. were totally unsupported by evidence.
Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party
impacts on the party leadership issue or on the election of respondent Roxas as president so that
it was indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim. Under the circumstances, the
validity or invalidity of Atienza, et al.'s expulsion was purely a membership issue that had to be
settled within the party. It is an internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
What is more, some of petitioner Atienza's allies raised objections before the NECO
assembly regarding the status of members from their faction. Still, the NECO proceeded with the
election, implying that its membership, whose composition has been upheld, voted out those
objections. HCaDIS
The COMELEC's jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket
authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are
generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may
intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional
functions.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled
by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections 16 that the COMELEC's
powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment
of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court
also declared in another case 17that the COMELEC's power to register political parties
necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the
COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas' election as LP president is a leadership issue that the
COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing
authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It is
also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for
candidates to local elective posts. 18 In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the
official standard bearer of the party.
The law also grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges that will redound
to the benefit of its official candidates. It imposes, too, legal obligations upon registered political
parties that have to be carried out through their leaders. The resolution of the leadership issue is
thus particularly significant in ensuring the peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections. 19
Five. Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple
issue of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected
right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first
summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. According to
Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative
proceedings 20 and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. 21
But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of
political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies
created by the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An
administrative agency or instrumentality "contemplates an authority to which the state delegates
governmental power for the performance of a state function." 22 The constitutional limitations that
generally apply to the exercise of the state's powers thus, apply too, to administrative
bodies. aEDCSI
The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the state's powers are found in Article III of
the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life,
property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the state's
powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary
citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or
entities. In the latter case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts apply.
The right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the
fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private
parties. 23
Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary
between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The
discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within
the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to
be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party
members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been
freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party
members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated have recourse to
courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process issue against the
government or any of its agencies.
But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in
membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its
internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. InSinaca v.
Mula, 24 the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest by
 allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with the
state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to the free choice of the
people. 25
To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas'
election as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.'s expulsion from the
party. While the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELEC's performance of
its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue
pertaining to Atienza, et al.'s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of
party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited
scope of its power over political parties. DcITaC
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and UPHOLDS the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections dated June 18, 2009 in COMELEC Case SPP 08-001. SO ORDERED.
||| (Atienza v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188920, [February 16, 2010], 626 PHIL 654-674)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 179271. April 21, 2009.]

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND

TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ONELECTIONS (sitting as
the National Board of Canvassers), respondent.

ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, intervenor.

AANGAT TAYO, intervenor.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

(SENIOR CITIZENS), intervenor.

[G.R. No. 179295. April 21, 2009.]

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH

ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS,
INC.,and ABONO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) — in a petition for certiorariand mandamus, 1 assails the
Resolution 2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC
No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC's resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En
Banc, acting as NBC, aPetition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals
(ABS),Aangat Tayo (AT),and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.
(Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A
Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition, 3 assails NBC Resolution
No. 07-60 4 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties,
organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the
Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-
list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or
coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC 5 (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of
the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives.
The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. 6
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution,docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the
NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have
recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall
implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list
seats". 7 There were no intervenors in BANAT's petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a
memorandumon 19 July 2007. aTEACS
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-
60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-
list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY),Bayan Muna, Citizens' Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC),Gabriela's Women Party (Gabriela),Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives (APEC),A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party (AKBAYAN),Alagad, Luzon
Farmers Party (BUTIL),Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO),Anak Pawis, Alliance
of Rural Concerns (ARC),and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of
Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially
canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred
eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-
List System of Representation, in connection with the National and
Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National
Board of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot
go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one
hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections
i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/ 15,283,659
Tabulated

ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ 1,337,032

untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)

iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% 102,430

outcome) from areas not yet submitted for
canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar,
Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan,
Maguindanao)

Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in
part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each:
provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided,
finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list
votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred
thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen's Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation
Partyversus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party,
organization or coalition receiving more than the required two percent (2%) votes,
stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have been
completely canvassed;
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at
least three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes
are as follows:
RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES
COALITION RECEIVED

1 BUHAY 1,163,218
2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730
3 CIBAC 760,260
4 GABRIELA 610,451
5 APEC 538,971
6 A TEACHER 476,036
7 AKBAYAN 470,872
8 ALAGAD 423,076
9 BUTIL 405,052
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029
11 BATAS 386,361
12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
 13 ARC 338,194
14 ABONO 337,046
WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing
Sambayanan (BATAS),against which an URGENT PETITION FOR
CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been
filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties,
organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled
to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the
meantime. SATDHE
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166,
7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the
National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM,
subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations and
coalitions participating under the Party-List System:
1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY
2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA
3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC
4 Gabriela Women's Party GABRIELA
5 Association of Philippine Electric APEC
Cooperatives
6 Advocacy for Teacher A TEACHER
Empowerment Through
Action, Cooperation and
Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc.
7 Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party AKBAYAN
8 Alagad ALAGAD
9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL
10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO
11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC
13 Abono ABONO
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or
coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two percent (2%)
of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.
The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be
determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versusCOMELEC formula upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan
(BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to
render the proceedings therein moot and academic.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and
coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution
of their respective cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
 SO ORDERED. 8 (Emphasis in the original)
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We
quote from the COMELEC's interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No.
07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the
National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s]
and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes
from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were
thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the
National Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July
11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in
Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for
Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes
for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:
Party-List Projected total number of votes

1 BUHAY 1,178,747
2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476
3 CIBAC 755,964
4 GABRIELA 621,718
5 APEC 622,489
6 A TEACHER 492,369
7 AKBAYAN 462,674
8 ALAGAD 423,190
9 BUTIL 409,298
10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
12 ARC 375,846
13 ABONO 340,151
WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained
the highest number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations
and coalitions, making it the "first party" in accordance with Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC,reiterated in Citizen's Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) versus COMELEC; acITSD
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the
party-list system of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be
entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme
Court in Veterans;
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party",the correct formula
as expressed in Veterans,is:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first
————————————— = party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system party-list system
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall
entitle it to additional seats:
 Proportion of votes received Additional seats
by the first party

Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but lessthan 6% One (1) additional seat
Less than 4% No additional seat
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:
1,178,747
————— = 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed inVeterans and
reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:
No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for = —————— x seats allocated to
a concerned party No. of votes of first party
first party
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:
Party List Percentage Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1

CIBAC 1.28 1
GABRIELA 1.05 1
APEC 1.05 1
A TEACHER 0.83 0
AKBAYAN 0.78 0
ALAGAD 0.71 0
BUTIL 0.69 0
COOP-NATCO 0.69 0
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0
ARC 0.63 0
ABONO 0.57 0
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus
Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and
other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the
following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:
Party List Additional Seats

BUHAY 2
BAYAN MUNA 1
CIBAC 1
GABRIELA 1
APEC 1
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or
coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two per cent
(2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1)
 guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1)
additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and
coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution
of their respective cases.
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution,
furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED. 9
Acting on BANAT's petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August
2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head,
National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and
recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)],which reads:
COMMENTS/OBSERVATIONS:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to
wit:
1. That the full number — twenty percent (20%) — of Party-List representatives
as mandated by Section 5, Article VI of theConstitution shall be
proclaimed. CaDEAT
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold
votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and
with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the
first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first
ranking.
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding
to every 2% of the votes they received and the additional seats shall be
allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total
nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the
corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold
rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF
PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25
June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall
be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative seats and
how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].
 5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative
prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.
RECOMMENDATION:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9,
2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the
Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System
During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others
that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition
shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-
list results".
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED,
as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D.
Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being
moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED. 10
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution
No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC,
to reconsider its decision to use the Veteransformula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A.
No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the
NBC. 11
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007,
the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one
guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc.
(AGAP), 12Anak Mindanao (AMIN), 13 and An Waray. 14 Per the certification 15 by COMELEC,
the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List No. of Seat(s)

1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2
1.3 CIBAC 2
1.4 Gabriela 2
1.5 APEC 2
1.6 A Teacher 1
1.7 Akbayan 1
1.8 Alagad 1
1.9 Butil 1
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
1.11 Anak Pawis 1
1.12 ARC 1
 1.13 Abono 1
1.14 AGAP 1
1.15 AMIN 1
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan
(BATAS),against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and
Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been
filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250. SaHIEA
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? 16
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their
petition:
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party
Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional
seats for the "First Party" violates the principle of proportional
representation under RA 7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for
the "First Party" and another for the qualifying parties, violates
Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different
from those required under RA 7941;
C.Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system
as provided for under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et
al. v. COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the
First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations,
the same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations
Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues
involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation
and implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our
nation. 17
 Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases,
we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for
one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections? 18
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at
least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and
two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes". 19 ITSacC
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term
"proportional representation",this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of
additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1)The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.
(2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution,one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
 The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the
House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law".
The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list
representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of
the House of Representatives.
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list
representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available
to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not
deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats available to Number of seats available to
legislative districts x .20 = party-list representatives
————————————
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the
Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list
representatives.
220
———— x .20 = 55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-
list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under
the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list
candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are
numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional
seats" under the Party-List System. Veteransproduced the First Party Rule, 20 and Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza's dissent in Veterans presented Germany's Niemeyer formula 21 as an
alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for
party-list representatives. Congress enactedR.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11
and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — ...
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, 22 the following procedure
shall be observed:
 (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally,
That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
Section 12.Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. —
The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate
party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes
cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate
party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11 (b) on the 2%
requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941.BANAT described this procedure as
follows: ASEIDH
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total
Members of the House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups
as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA
7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220
District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List
Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum
(2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall
have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list
groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total
the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted
proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three
(3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941. 23
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT's first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is
declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide
basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. 24
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional
percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and
the other is "by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in
computing the allocation of seats". 25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded
under BANAT's second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC's
original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list
seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats
allotted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat
cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is
generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only.
The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list
seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to
using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned
party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is
conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to
lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are
filled up. 26
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11 (a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes garnered during the elections. 27
Rank Party Votes
Garnered

1 BUHAY 1,169,234
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039
3 CIBAC 755,686
4 GABRIELA 621,171
5 APEC 619,657
6 A TEACHER 490,379
7 AKBAYAN 466,112
8 ALAGAD 423,149
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883
10 BUTIL 409,160
11 BATAS 385,810
12 ARC 374,288
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261
14 ABONO 339,990
15 AMIN 338,185
16 AGAP 328,724
17 AN WARAY 321,503
18 YACAP 310,889
19 FPJPM 300,923
20 UNI-MAD 245,382
21 ABS 235,086
22 KAKUSA 228,999
23 KABATAAN 228,637
24 ABA-AKO 218,818
25 ALIF 217,822
26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058
27 AT 197,872
28 VFP 196,266
29 ANAD 188,521
30 BANAT 177,028
31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531
32 BANTAY 169,801
33 ABAKADA 166,747
34 1-UTAK 164,980
35 TUCP 162,647
36 COCOFED 155,920
37 AGHAM 146,032
38 ANAK 141,817
39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356
40 PM 119,054
41 AVE 110,769
42 SUARA 110,732
43 ASSALAM 110,440
44 DIWA 107,021
45 ANC 99,636
46 SANLAKAS 97,375
47 ABC 90,058
48 KALAHI 88,868
49 APOI 79,386
50 BP 78,541
51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
52 BIGKIS 77,327
53 PMAP 75,200
54 AKAPIN 74,686
55 PBA 71,544
56 GRECON 62,220
57 BTM 60,993
58 A SMILE 58,717
59 NELFFI 57,872
60 AKSA 57,012
61 BAGO 55,846
62 BANDILA 54,751
63 AHON 54,522
64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
65 AGBIAG! 50,837
66 SPI 50,478
67 BAHANDI 46,612
68 ADD 45,624
69 AMANG SCIAaT 43,062
70 ABAY PARAK 42,282
71 BABAE KA 36,512
72 SB 34,835
73 ASAP 34,098
74 PEP 33,938
75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903
76 VENDORS 33,691
77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
 78 ALMANA 32,255
79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO 29,130
80 AAPS 26,271
81 HAPI 25,781
82 AAWAS 22,946
83 SM 20,744
84 AG 16,916
85 AGING PINOY 16,729
86 APO 16,421
87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241
88 ATS 14,161
89 UMDJ 9,445
90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915
91 LYPAD 8,471
92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
93 KASAPI 6,221
—————
TOTAL 15,950,900
=========
The first clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to one seat each". This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2
below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
Table 2.The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes
garnered over the total votes for the party-list. 28
Rank Party Votes Votes Guaranteed
Garnered Garnered over Seat
Total Votes
for Party-List,
in %

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
11 BATAS 29 385,810 2.42% 1
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
16 AGAP IDTHcA 328,724 2.06% 1
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
 ——
Total 17
===
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from
the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or
the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are "entitled to one seat each",or the
guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes".This is where petitioners' and intervenors' problem with the formula
in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to
be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express
language of R.A. No. 7941. IATHaS
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of
the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party
list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the
two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast
for the 100 participants in the party listelections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or
one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get
one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus,
even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent
threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives". 30
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A.
No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.
 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1,
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes
until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved
under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by
each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the
second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available
seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List
System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of
the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party's share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank
until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in
the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number
of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3.Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
Votes Votes Guaranteed Additional (B) plus
Garnered Garnered Seat Seats (C),in
over whole
Total integers
Votes for
Party List,
in %
(First (Second
Round) Round)
(A) (B) (C) (D)
1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3
MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3
755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2
ELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2
619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2
her 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2
AN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2
D 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2
NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2
409,160 2.57% 1 1 2
385,810 2.42% 1 1 2
374,288 2.35% 1 1 2
AWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2
O 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2
338,185 2.12% 1 1 2
328,724 2.06% 1 1 2
RAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2
310,889 1.95% 0 1 1
300,923 1.89% 0 1 1
D 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1
235,086 1.47% 0 1 1
A 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1
AAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1
KO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1
217,822 1.37% 0 1 1
R CITIZENS 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1
197,872 1.24% 0 1 1
196,266 1.23% 0 1 1
188,521 1.18% 0 1 1
177,028 1.11% 0 1 1
ASANGGA 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1
Y 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1
DA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1
K 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1
162,647 1.02% 0 1 1
FED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1
—— ——
17 55
==== ====
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-
list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are
filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole
seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D). IcADSE

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political
parties to participate in the party-list elections.The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic
society through a multiparty system. ...We are for opening up the system,
and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one
of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives
from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party
list system. ....
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My
question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and
Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept
or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA.
In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field
candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of
Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the
20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are
allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also
participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only
sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD.
May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in thisConstitution.
MR. MONSOD.
Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he
represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD.
But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is
a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO.
Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in
the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along
sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD.
What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it
is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base
of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin
mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin
ang "reserve".Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan
natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. DAETHc
Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner
Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system,
would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone,
UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO.
The same.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE.
...In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass
organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban
and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make common
goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can
be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is
true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng
Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be
attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we
belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that
with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed
because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the
mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list
system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is
understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of
representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in
time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor
organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the
Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and
their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and
the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote
with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote
with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political
parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and
interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in
this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more
lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-
Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift,
but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being
elected representatives later on through a party list system; and even beyond
 that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political power in
the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.
xxx xxx xxx 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the
Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered
with the Commission on Elections(COMELEC).Component parties or organizations of
a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part
does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of
at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread
over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region. cDaEAS
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of
citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests
or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating
the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating
in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the
members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and
in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. 33 In defining a
"party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party", R.A.
No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the
intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-
political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-
list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state
that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations
for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party
participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its
sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk
wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees.
Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of theelections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the
day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization's nominee
"wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" 34 as there is no financial status required in the law. It
is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, 35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must
be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in theConstitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1,
Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, . . . ." The 20% allocation of party-
list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of
a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a
qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any
party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be
allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who
voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the
Court is unanimous in concurring with thisponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of
the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9
July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the
distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political
parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately
executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. ECISAD
||| (Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 179271, 179295, [April 21, 2009], 604 PHIL 131-184)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 179271. April 21, 2009.]

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND

TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ONELECTIONS (sitting as
the National Board of Canvassers), respondent.

ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, intervenor.

AANGAT TAYO, intervenor.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

(SENIOR CITIZENS), intervenor.

[G.R. No. 179295. April 21, 2009.]

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH

ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS,
INC.,and ABONO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) — in a petition for certiorariand mandamus, 1 assails the
Resolution 2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC
No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC's resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En
Banc, acting as NBC, aPetition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals
(ABS),Aangat Tayo (AT),and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.
(Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A
Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition, 3 assails NBC Resolution
No. 07-60 4 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties,
organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the
Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-
list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or
coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC 5 (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of
the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives.
The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. 6
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution,docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the
NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have
recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall
implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list
seats". 7 There were no intervenors in BANAT's petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a
memorandumon 19 July 2007. aTEACS
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-
60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-
list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY),Bayan Muna, Citizens' Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC),Gabriela's Women Party (Gabriela),Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives (APEC),A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party (AKBAYAN),Alagad, Luzon
Farmers Party (BUTIL),Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO),Anak Pawis, Alliance
of Rural Concerns (ARC),and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of
Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially
canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred
eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-
List System of Representation, in connection with the National and
Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National
Board of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot
go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one
hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/ 15,283,659

tabulated

ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ 1,337,032

untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)

iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% 102,430

outcome) from areas not yet submitted for
canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar,
Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan,
Maguindanao)
 Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in
part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each:
provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided,
finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list
votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred
thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen's Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation
Partyversus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party,
organization or coalition receiving more than the required two percent (2%) votes,
stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have been
completely canvassed;
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at
least three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes
are as follows:
RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES
COALITION RECEIVED

1 BUHAY 1,163,218
2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730
3 CIBAC 760,260
4 GABRIELA 610,451
5 APEC 538,971
6 A TEACHER 476,036
7 AKBAYAN 470,872
8 ALAGAD 423,076
9 BUTIL 405,052
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029
11 BATAS 386,361
12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
13 ARC 338,194
14 ABONO 337,046
WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing
Sambayanan (BATAS),against which an URGENT PETITION FOR
CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been
filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties,
organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled
to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the
meantime. SATDHE
 NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166,
7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the
National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM,
subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations and
coalitions participating under the Party-List System:
1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY
2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA
3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC
4 Gabriela Women's Party GABRIELA
5 Association of Philippine Electric APEC
Cooperatives
6 Advocacy for Teacher A TEACHER
Empowerment Through
Action, Cooperation and
Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc.
7 Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party AKBAYAN
8 Alagad ALAGAD
9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL
10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO
11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC
13 Abono ABONO
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or
coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two percent (2%)
of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.
The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be
determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versusCOMELEC formula upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan
(BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to
render the proceedings therein moot and academic.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and
coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution
of their respective cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED. 8 (Emphasis in the original)
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We
quote from the COMELEC's interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No.
07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the
National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s]
and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes
from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were
thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the
National Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July
11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in
Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for
Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes
for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:
Party-List Projected total number of votes

1 BUHAY 1,178,747
2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476
3 CIBAC 755,964
4 GABRIELA 621,718
5 APEC 622,489
6 A TEACHER 492,369
7 AKBAYAN 462,674
8 ALAGAD 423,190
9 BUTIL 409,298
10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
12 ARC 375,846
13 ABONO 340,151
WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained
the highest number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations
and coalitions, making it the "first party" in accordance with Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC,reiterated in Citizen's Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) versus COMELEC; acITSD
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the
party-list system of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be
entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme
Court in Veterans;
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party",the correct formula
as expressed in Veterans,is:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first
————————————— = party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system party-list system
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall
entitle it to additional seats:
Proportion of votes received Additional seats
by the first party

Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but lessthan 6% One (1) additional seat
Less than 4% No additional seat
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:
1,178,747
————— = 0.07248 or 7.2%
 16,261,369
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed inVeterans and
reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:
No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for = —————— x seats allocated to
a concerned party No. of votes of first party
first party
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:
Party List Percentage Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1

CIBAC 1.28 1
GABRIELA 1.05 1
APEC 1.05 1
A TEACHER 0.83 0
AKBAYAN 0.78 0
ALAGAD 0.71 0
BUTIL 0.69 0
COOP-NATCO 0.69 0
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0
ARC 0.63 0
ABONO 0.57 0
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus
Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and
other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the
following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:
Party List Additional Seats

BUHAY 2
BAYAN MUNA 1
CIBAC 1
GABRIELA 1
APEC 1
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or
coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two per cent
(2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1)
guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1)
additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and
coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution
of their respective cases.
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution,
furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.
 SO ORDERED. 9
Acting on BANAT's petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August
2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head,
National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and
recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)],which reads:
COMMENTS/OBSERVATIONS:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to
wit:
1. That the full number — twenty percent (20%) — of Party-List representatives
as mandated by Section 5, Article VI of theConstitution shall be
proclaimed. CaDEAT
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold
votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and
with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the
first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first
ranking.
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding
to every 2% of the votes they received and the additional seats shall be
allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total
nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the
corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold
rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF
PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25
June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall
be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative seats and
how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].
5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative
prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.
RECOMMENDATION:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9,
2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the
Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System
During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others
that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition
 shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-
list results".
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED,
as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D.
Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being
moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED. 10
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution
No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC,
to reconsider its decision to use the Veteransformula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A.
No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the
NBC. 11
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007,
the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one
guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc.
(AGAP), 12Anak Mindanao (AMIN), 13 and An Waray. 14 Per the certification 15 by COMELEC,
the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List No. of Seat(s)

1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2
1.3 CIBAC 2
1.4 Gabriela 2
1.5 APEC 2
1.6 A Teacher 1
1.7 Akbayan 1
1.8 Alagad 1
1.9 Butil 1
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
1.11 Anak Pawis 1
1.12 ARC 1
1.13 Abono 1
1.14 AGAP 1
1.15 AMIN 1
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan
(BATAS),against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and
Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been
filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250. SaHIEA
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? 16
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their
petition:
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party
Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional
seats for the "First Party" violates the principle of proportional
representation under RA 7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for
the "First Party" and another for the qualifying parties, violates
Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different
from those required under RA 7941;
C.Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system
as provided for under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et
al. v. COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the
First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations,
the same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations
Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues
involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation
and implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our
nation. 17
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases,
we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for
one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
 5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections? 18
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at
least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and
two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes". 19 ITSacC
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term
"proportional representation",this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of
additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1)The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.
(2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution,one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the
House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law".
The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list
representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of
the House of Representatives.
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list
representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available
to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not
deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats available to Number of seats available to
legislative districts x .20 = party-list representatives
————————————
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the
Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list
representatives.
220
———— x .20 = 55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-
list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under
the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list
candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are
numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional
seats" under the Party-List System. Veteransproduced the First Party Rule, 20 and Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza's dissent in Veterans presented Germany's Niemeyer formula 21 as an
alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for
party-list representatives. Congress enactedR.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11
and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — ...
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, 22 the following procedure
shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally,
That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
Section 12.Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. —
The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
 nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate
party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes
cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate
party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11 (b) on the 2%
requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941.BANAT described this procedure as
follows: ASEIDH
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total
Members of the House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups
as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA
7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220
District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List
Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum
(2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall
have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list
groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total
the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted
proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three
(3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941. 23
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT's first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is
declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide
basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. 24
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional
percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and
the other is "by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in
computing the allocation of seats". 25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded
under BANAT's second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC's
original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list
seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats
allotted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat
cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is
generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only.
The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list
seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to
using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned
party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is
conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to
lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are
filled up. 26
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11 (a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes garnered during the elections. 27
Rank Party Votes
Garnered

1 BUHAY 1,169,234
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039
3 CIBAC 755,686
4 GABRIELA 621,171
5 APEC 619,657
6 A TEACHER 490,379
7 AKBAYAN 466,112
8 ALAGAD 423,149
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883
10 BUTIL 409,160
11 BATAS 385,810
12 ARC 374,288
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261
14 ABONO 339,990
15 AMIN 338,185
16 AGAP 328,724
17 AN WARAY 321,503
18 YACAP 310,889
19 FPJPM 300,923
20 UNI-MAD 245,382
21 ABS 235,086
22 KAKUSA 228,999
23 KABATAAN 228,637
24 ABA-AKO 218,818
25 ALIF 217,822
26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058
27 AT 197,872
28 VFP 196,266
29 ANAD 188,521
30 BANAT 177,028
31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531
32 BANTAY 169,801
33 ABAKADA 166,747
34 1-UTAK 164,980
35 TUCP 162,647
36 COCOFED 155,920
37 AGHAM 146,032
38 ANAK 141,817
39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356
40 PM 119,054
41 AVE 110,769
42 SUARA 110,732
43 ASSALAM 110,440
44 DIWA 107,021
45 ANC 99,636
46 SANLAKAS 97,375
47 ABC 90,058
48 KALAHI 88,868
49 APOI 79,386
50 BP 78,541
51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
52 BIGKIS 77,327
53 PMAP 75,200
54 AKAPIN 74,686
55 PBA 71,544
56 GRECON 62,220
57 BTM 60,993
58 A SMILE 58,717
59 NELFFI 57,872
60 AKSA 57,012
61 BAGO 55,846
62 BANDILA 54,751
63 AHON 54,522
64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
65 AGBIAG! 50,837
66 SPI 50,478
67 BAHANDI 46,612
68 ADD 45,624
69 AMANG SCIAaT 43,062
70 ABAY PARAK 42,282
71 BABAE KA 36,512
72 SB 34,835
73 ASAP 34,098
74 PEP 33,938
75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903
76 VENDORS 33,691
77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
78 ALMANA 32,255
79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO 29,130
80 AAPS 26,271
81 HAPI 25,781
82 AAWAS 22,946
83 SM 20,744
84 AG 16,916
85 AGING PINOY 16,729
86 APO 16,421
87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241
88 ATS 14,161
89 UMDJ 9,445
 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915
91 LYPAD 8,471
92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
93 KASAPI 6,221
—————
TOTAL 15,950,900
=========
The first clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to one seat each". This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2
below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
Table 2.The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes
garnered over the total votes for the party-list. 28
Rank Party Votes Votes Guaranteed
Garnered Garnered over Seat
Total Votes
for Party-List,
in %

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
11 BATAS 29 385,810 2.42% 1
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
16 AGAP IDTHcA 328,724 2.06% 1
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
——
Total 17
===
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from
the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or
the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are "entitled to one seat each",or the
guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
 The second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes".This is where petitioners' and intervenors' problem with the formula
in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to
be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express
language of R.A. No. 7941. IATHaS
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of
the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party
list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the
two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast
for the 100 participants in the party listelections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or
one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get
one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus,
even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent
threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives". 30
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A.
No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1,
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes
until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved
under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by
 each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the
second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available
seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List
System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of
the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party's share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank
until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in
the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number
of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3.Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
Votes Votes Guaranteed Additional (B) plus
Garnered Garnered Seat Seats (C),in
over whole
Total integers
Votes for
Party List,
in %
(First (Second
Round) Round)
(A) (B) (C) (D)
1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3
MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3
755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2
ELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2
619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2
her 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2
AN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2
D 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2
NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2
409,160 2.57% 1 1 2
385,810 2.42% 1 1 2
374,288 2.35% 1 1 2
AWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2
O 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2
338,185 2.12% 1 1 2
328,724 2.06% 1 1 2
RAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2
310,889 1.95% 0 1 1
300,923 1.89% 0 1 1
D 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1
235,086 1.47% 0 1 1
A 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1
AAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1
KO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1
217,822 1.37% 0 1 1
R CITIZENS 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1
197,872 1.24% 0 1 1
196,266 1.23% 0 1 1
188,521 1.18% 0 1 1
177,028 1.11% 0 1 1
ASANGGA 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1
Y 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1
DA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1
K 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1
162,647 1.02% 0 1 1
FED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1
—— ——
17 55
==== ====
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-
list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are
filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole
seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D). IcADSE

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political
parties to participate in the party-list elections.The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic
society through a multiparty system. ...We are for opening up the system,
and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one
of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives
from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party
list system. ....
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My
question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and
Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept
or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA.
In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field
candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of
Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the
20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are
allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also
participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only
sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD.
May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in thisConstitution.
MR. MONSOD.
Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he
represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD.
But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is
a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO.
Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in
the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along
sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD.
What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it
is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base
of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin
mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin
ang "reserve".Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan
natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. DAETHc
Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner
Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system,
would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone,
UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO.
 The same.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE.
...In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass
organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban
and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make common
goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can
be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is
true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng
Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be
attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we
belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that
with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed
because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the
mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list
system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is
understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of
representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in
time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor
organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the
Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and
their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and
the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote
with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote
with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political
parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and
interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in
this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more
lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-
Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift,
but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being
elected representatives later on through a party list system; and even beyond
that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political power in
the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.
xxx xxx xxx 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the
Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered
with the Commission on Elections(COMELEC).Component parties or organizations of
a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part
does not participate in the party-list system.
 (b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of
at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread
over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region. cDaEAS
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of
citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests
or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating
the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating
in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the
members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and
in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. 33 In defining a
"party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party", R.A.
No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the
intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-
political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-
list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state
that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations
for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party
participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its
sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk
wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees.
Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of theelections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the
day of the election.
 In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization's nominee
"wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" 34 as there is no financial status required in the law. It
is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, 35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must
be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in theConstitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1,
Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, . . . ." The 20% allocation of party-
list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of
a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a
qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any
party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be
allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who
voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the
Court is unanimous in concurring with thisponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of
the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9
July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the
distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political
parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately
executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. ECISAD
||| (Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 179271, 179295, [April 21, 2009], 604 PHIL 131-184)

[G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013.]

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan

Igot, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. Nos. 203818-19. April 2, 2013.]

AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.
 [G.R. No. 203922. April 2, 2013.]

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC), represented

by its President Congressman Ponciano D. Payuyo, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 203936. April 2, 2013.]

AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its President

Michael Abas Kida, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 203958. April 2, 2013.]

KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC.

(KAKUSA), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 203960. April 2, 2013.]

1ST CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-

CARE), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,respondent.

[G.R. No. 203976. April 2, 2013.]

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC.

(ARARO), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.

[G.R. No. 203981. April 2, 2013.]

ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL)

PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin, the party's
Secretary General, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204002. April 2, 2013.]

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204094. April 2, 2013.]

ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

(ANAD), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204100. April 2, 2013.]

1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI) formerly
PGBI, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204122. April 2, 2013.]

1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC.,

(1GANAP/GUARDIANS), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC
composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
Commissioner, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Commissioner, ARMANDO C. VELASCO,
Commissioner, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, Commissioner, and CHRISTIAN ROBERT S.
LIM, Commissioner,respondents.

[G.R. No. 204125. April 2, 2013.]

AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA),

represented by its Secretary General, Ronald D.
Macaraig, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204126. April 2, 2013.]

KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP),

formerly known as AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO
AGILA), represented by its Secretary General, Leo R. San
Buenaventura, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204139. April 2, 2013.]

ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Cataluña

Causing, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204141. April 2, 2013.]

BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan,

President, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.

[G.R. No. 204153. April 2, 2013.]

PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY represented by its President Roberto

"Ka Obet" Martin, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204158. April 2, 2013.]

ABROAD PARTY LIST, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO,
ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM,
MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, LUCENITO TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER
PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF, respondents.

[G.R. No. 204174. April 2, 2013.]

AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T.

Silva, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204216. April 2, 2013.]

COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION,

INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204220. April 2, 2013.]

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN

BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204236. April 2, 2013.]

FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204238. April 2, 2013.]

ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204239. April 2, 2013.]

GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER

EARTH (GREENFORCE), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204240. April 2, 2013.]

AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS MOVEMENT

(AGRI), represented by its Secretary General, Michael Ryan A.
Enriquez, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204263. April 2, 2013.]

A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSED FEDERATION OF FARMERS AND

FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
 [G.R. No. 204318. April 2, 2013.]

UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTY-

LIST, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.

[G.R. No. 204321. April 2, 2013.]

ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary

General Jose C. Policarpio, Jr., petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204323. April 2, 2013.]

BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented by Homer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani, Israel de

Castro, Dante Navarro and Guiling Mamondiong, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V.
SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA GRACIA CIELO M.
PADACA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 204341. April 2, 2013.]

ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES (ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented

herein by its President Fatani S. Abdul Malik,petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204356. April 2, 2013.]

BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204358. April 2, 2013.]

ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MINING ADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL

PROGRESS (AAMA), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204359. April 2, 2013.]

SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVE REFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART),

represented by its Chairman, Carlito B. Cubelo,petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204364. April 2, 2013.]

ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY,
HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO BUHAY),petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN
ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their capacities as
Commissioners thereof, respondents.

[G.R. No. 204367. April 2, 2013.]

AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION (AKIN), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204370. April 2, 2013.]

AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by its Secretary General, Rodolfo T.

Tuazon, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.

[G.R. No. 204374. April 2, 2013.]

BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA

MAGSASAKA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,respondent.

[G.R. No. 204379. April 2, 2013.]

ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle

Lorenz, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.

[G.R. No. 204394. April 2, 2013.]

ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER, DRIVER/DOMESTIC

HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(GUARDJAN), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204402. April 2, 2013.]

KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista,

Jr., and Secretary General, Frances Q. Quimpo,petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204408. April 2, 2013.]

PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT

AND WELFARE (PACYAW), petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
 [G.R. No. 204410. April 2, 2013.]

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204421. April 2, 2013.]

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its 1st nominee and
Chairman, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204425. April 2, 2013.]

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES,

INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS
AND AGENTS, ACTING FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 204426. April 2, 2013.]

ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS,

INC. (ALA-EH), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S.
BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA
CIELO M. PADACA, in their respective capacities as COMELEC Chairperson and
Commissioners, respondents.

[G.R. No. 204428. April 2, 2013.]

ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R.

Corella, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204435. April 2, 2013.]

1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY

(1AAAP), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204436. April 2, 2013.]

ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented by its Party President, Rolex T.

Suplico, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204455. April 2, 2013.]

 MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,
INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204484. April 2, 2013.]

PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General,

Roger M. Federazo, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204485. April 2, 2013.]

ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE

PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA), petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204486. April 2, 2013.]

1ST KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1ST

KABAGIS), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.

[G.R. No. 204490. April 2, 2013.]

PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

EN BANC, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Cases
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 filed by
52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012, 2 20
November 2012, 3 27 November 2012, 4 4 December 2012, 5 11 December 2012, 6 and 19 February
2013. 7
The Facts
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire
to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
G.R. No. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial
A.Via the COMELEC En Banc's automatic review of the COMELEC Division's
resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 2012 8
1 204379 12-099 Alagad ng - The "artists" sector is not considered
(PLM) Sining (ASIN) marginalized and underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track record; and
- Failure of the nominees to qualify
under RA 7941 and Ang Bagong
Bayani.
Resolution dated 27 November 2012 9

2 204455 12-041 Manila Teachers - A non-stock savings and loan

(PLM) Savings and Loan association cannot be considered
Association, Inc. marginalized and underrepresented;
(Manila Teachers) and
- The first and second nominees are
not teachers by profession.
3 204426 12-011 Association of - Failure to show that its members
(PLM) Local Athletics belong to the marginalized; and
Entrepreneurs
and Hobbyists, - Failure of the nominees to qualify.
Inc. (ALA-EH)
Resolution dated 27 November 2012 10
4 204435 12-057 1 Alliance - Failure of the nominees to qualify:
(PLM) Advocating although registering as a regional
Autonomy Party political party, two of the nominees
(1AAAP) are not residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do not
belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 27 November 2012 11

5 204367 12-104 Akbay - Failure of the group to show that its

(PL) Kalusugan nominees belong to the urban poor
(AKIN), Inc. sector.
Resolution dated 29 November 2012 12

6 204370 12-011 Ako An Bisaya - Failure to represent a marginalized

(PP) (AAB) sector of society, despite the
formation of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region 8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
 - Lack of track record in representing
peasants and farmers; and
- Nominees are neither farmers nor
peasants.
Resolution dated 4 December 2012 13

7 204436 12-009 Abyan Ilonggo - Failure to show that the party

(PP), Party (AI) represents a marginalized and
12-165 underrepresented sector, as the
(PLM) Province of Iloilo has district
representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its five
nominees.
Resolution dated 4 December 2012 14

8 204485 12-175 Alliance of - Failure to establish that the group can

(PL) Organizations, represent 14 Networks and sectors;
Associations of
the Philippines, - The sectors of homeowners'
Inc. (ALONA) associations, entrepreneurs and
cooperatives are not marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented.
B.Via the COMELEC En Banc's review on motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC
Division's resolutions denying registration of groups and organizations
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 15

9 204139 12-127 Alab ng - Failure to prove track record as an

(PL) Mamamahayag organization;
(ALAM)
- Failure to show that the group
actually represents the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that the group
can represent all sectors it seeks to
represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 16

10 204402 12-061 Kalikasan Party- - The group reflects an advocacy for

(PP) List the environment, and is not
 (KALIKASAN) representative of the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- There is no proof that majority of
its members belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented;
- The group represents sectors with
conflicting interests; and
- The nominees do not belong to the
sector which the group claims to
represent.
Resolution dated 14 November 2012 17

11 204394 12-145
Association of - Failure to prove membership base
(PL) Guard, Utility and track record;
Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/ - Failure to present activities that
Domestic sufficiently benefited its intended
Helper, constituency; and
Janitor, Agent - The nominees do not belong to any
and Nanny of the of the sectors which the group seeks
Philippines, Inc. to represent.
(GUARDJAN)
Resolution dated 5 December 2012 18

12 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa - Failure to show that the group

(PLM) Pinoy (PPP) represents a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as Region
12 has district representatives; and
- Failure to show a track record of
undertaking programs for the welfare
of the sector the group seeks to
represent.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, 19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second
Division's resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida's (PBB) registration and accreditation as a
political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track
record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and
underrepresented." 20 SDHCac
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM,
KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this
Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, 21 and excluded the names
of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 22 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of
intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC 23 (Ang
Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
G.R. No. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial
Resolution dated 10 October 2012 24

1203818- 12-154 AKO Bicol Retained registration and accreditation

19(PLM) Political Party as a political party, but denied
12-177 (AKB) participation in the May 2013 party-list
(PLM) elections
- Failure to represent any marginalized
and underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already has
representatives in Congress; and
- The nominees are not marginalized
and underrepresented.
Resolution dated 11 October 2012 25

2 20376612-161 Atong Paglaum, Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Inc. (Atong accreditation
Paglaum) - The nominees do not belong to the
sectors which the party represents;
and
- The party failed to file its Statement
of Contributions and Expenditures
for the 2010 Elections.
Cancelled registration and
3 20398112-187 Association for
accreditation
(PLM) Righteousness - Failure to comply, and for violation
Advocacy on of election laws;
Leadership
(ARAL) - The nominees do not represent the
sectors which the party represents;
and
- There is doubt that the party is
organized for religious purposes.
4 20400212-188 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Rural Concerns accreditation
(ARC) - Failure of the nominees to qualify;
and
- Failure of the party to prove that
 majority of its members belong to
the sectors it seeks to represent.
5 20431812-220 United Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Movement accreditation
Against Drugs The sectors of drug counsellors and
Foundation lecturers, veterans and the youth,
(UNIMAD) are not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track record; and
- Failure of the nominees to qualify
as representatives of the youth and
young urban professionals.
Resolution dated 16 October 2012 26

6 20410012-196 1-Bro Philippine Cancelled registration

(PLM) Guardians - Failure to define the sector it seeks to
Brotherhood, represent; and
Inc. (1 BRO-
PGBI) - The nominees do not belong to a
marginalized and underrepresented
sector.
7 20412212-223 1 Guardians Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nationalist - The party is a military fraternity;
Philippines, Inc.
(1GANAP/ - The sector of community volunteer
GUARDIANS) workers is too broad to allow for
meaningful representation; and
- The nominees do not appear to
belong to the sector of community

volunteer workers.

8 20426312-257 Blessed Cancelled registration

(PLM) Federation of - Three of the seven and nominees do
Farmers and not belong to the sector of farmers
Fishermen and fishermen, the sector sought
International, to be represented; and
Inc. (A
BLESSED - None of the nominees are registered
Party-List) voters of Region XI, the region
sought to be represented.
Resolution dated 16 October 2012 27

9 20396012-260 1st Consumers Cancelled registration

 (PLM) Alliance for - The sector of rural energy consumers
Rural Energy, is not marginalized and
Inc. (1-CARE) underrepresented;
- The party's track record is related
to electric cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
- The nominees do not belong to the
sector of rural energy consumers.
Resolution dated 16 October 2012 28

10 20392212-201 Association of Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Philippine accreditation
Electric - Failure to represent a marginalized
Cooperatives and underrepresented sector; and
(APEC)
- The nominees do not belong to the
sector that the party claims to
represent.
Resolution dated 23 October 2012 29

11 20417412-232 Aangat Tayo Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Party-List Party accreditation
(AT) - The incumbent representative in
Congress failed to author or
sponsor bills that are beneficial to
the sectors that the party represents
(women, elderly, youth, urban poor);
and
- The nominees do not belong to the
marginalized sectors that the party
seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 23 October 2012 30

12 20397612-288 Alliance for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Rural and accreditation
Agrarian - The interests of the peasant and
Reconstruction, urban poor sectors that the party
Inc. (ARARO) represents differ;
- The nominees do not belong to the
sectors that the party seeks to
represent;
- Failure to show that three of the
nominees are bona fide party
 members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution to
participate in the party-list elections.
Resolution dated 24 October 2012 31

13 20424012-279 Agri-Agra na Cancelled registration

(PLM) Reporma Para sa - The party ceased to exist for more
Magsasaka ng than a year immediately after the
Pilipinas May 2010 elections;
Movement
(AGRI) - The nominees do not belong to the
sector of peasants and farmers that
the party seeks to represent;
- Only four nominees were submitted
to the COMELEC; and
- Failure to show meaningful activities
for its constituency.
14 20393612-248 Aksyon Cancelled registration
(PLM) Magsasaka- - Failure to show that majority of its
Partido Tinig ng members are marginalized and
Masa (AKMA- underrepresented;
PTM)
- Failure to prove that four of its nine
nominees actually belong to the
farmers sector; and
- Failure to show that five of its nine
nominees work on uplifting the lives
of the members of the sector.
15 20412612-263 Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nagkakaisang - The Manifestation of Intent and
Agilang Certificate of Nomination were not
Pilipinong signed by an appropriate officer of
Magsasaka the party;
(KAP)
- Failure to show track record for the
farmers and peasants sector; and
- Failure to show that nominees
actually belong to the sector, or
that they have undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.
16 20436412-180 Adhikain at Cancelled registration
(PLM) Kilusan ng - Failure to show that nominees
Ordinaryong actually belong to the sector, or
 Tao Para sa that they have undertaken meaningful
Lupa, Pabahay, activities for the sector.
Hanapbuhay at
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
17 20414112-229 The True Cancelled registration
(PLM) Marcos Loyalist - Failure to show that majority of
(for God, its members are marginalized
Country and and underrepresented; and
People)
Association of - Failure to prove that two of its
the Philippines, nominees actually belong to the
Inc. (BANTAY) marginalized and underrepresented.
18 20440812-217 Pilipino Cancelled registration
(PLM) Association for - Change of sector (from urban poor
Country — Urban youth to urban poor) necessitates
Poor Youth a new application;
Advancement
and Welfare - Failure to show track record for
(PACYAW) the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that majority of its
members and officers are from the
urban poor sector; and
- The nominees are not members of the
urban poor sector.
19 20415312-277 Pasang Masda Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nationwide - The party represents drivers and
Party (PASANG operators, who may have conflicting
MASDA) interests; and
- Nominees are either operators or
former operators.
20 20395812-015 Kapatiran ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) mga Nakulong - Failure to prove that majority of
na Walang Sala, its officers and members belong to the
Inc. (KAKUSA) marginalized and underrepresented;
- The incumbent representative in
Congress failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the sector
that the party represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt);
- Failure to show track record for the
 marginalized and underrepresented;
and
- The nominees did not appear to be
marginalized and underrepresented.
Resolution dated 30 October 2012 32

21 20442812-256 Ang Galing Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Pinoy (AG) accreditation
- Failure to attend the summary
hearing;
- Failure to show track record for the
marginalized and underrepresented;
and
- The nominees did not appear to be
marginalized and underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 33

22 20409412-185 Alliance for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Nationalism and accreditation
Democracy - Failure to represent an identifiable
(ANAD) marginalized and underrepresented
sector;
- Only three nominees were submitted
to the COMELEC;
- The nominees do not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented;
and
- Failure to submit its Statement of
Contribution and Expenditures for
the 2007 Elections.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 34

23 20423912-060 Green Force for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) the Environment accreditation
Sons and - The party is an advocacy group and
Daughters of does not represent the marginalized
Mother Earth and underrepresented;
(GREENFORCE)
- Failure to comply with the track
record requirement; and
- The nominees are not marginalized
citizens.
24 20423612-254 Firm 24-K Cancelled registration and
 (PLM) Association, Inc. accreditation
(FIRM 24-K) - The nominees do not belong to the
sector that the party seeks to
represent (urban poor and peasants
of the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees reside in
the National Capital Region; and
- Failure to comply with the track
record requirement.
25 20434112-269 Action League Cancelled registration and
(PLM) of Indigenous accreditation
Masses (ALIM) - Failure to establish that its nominees
are members of the indigenous people
in the Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the party's nominees
reside in the Mindanao and
Cordilleras; and
- Three of the nominees do not appear
to belong to the marginalized.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 35

26 20435812-204 Alliance of Cancelled registration

(PLM) Advocates in - The sector it represents is a
Mining specifically defined group which
Advancement may not be allowed registration
for National under the party-list system; and
Progress
(AAMA) - Failure to establish that the nominees
actually belong to the sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 36

27 20435912-272 Social Cancelled registration

(PLM) Movement for - The nominees are disqualified from
Active Reform representing the sectors that
and Transparency the party represents;
(SMART)
- Failure to comply with the track
record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether majority
of its members are marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 37

28 20423812-173 Alliance of Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Bicolnon Party accreditation
(ABP) - Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to 2010;
- Failure to represent any sector; and
- Failure to establish that the nominees
are employed in the construction
industry, the sector it claims to
represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 38

29 20432312-210 Bayani Party Cancelled registration and

(PLM) List (BAYANI) accreditation
- Failure to prove a track record of
trying to uplift the marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the sector
of professionals.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 39

30 20432112-252 Ang Agrikultura Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Natin Isulong accreditation
(AANI) - Failure to establish a track record
of enhancing the lives of the
marginalized and underrepresented
farmers which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the party's
nominees do not belong to the
farmers sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 40

31 20412512-292 Agapay ng Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Indigenous accreditation
Peoples Rights - Failure to prove that its five nominees
Alliance, Inc. are members of the indigenous
(A-IPRA) people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five nominees
actively participated in the
 undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five nominees
are bona fide members.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 41

32 20421612-202 Philippine Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Coconut accreditation
Producers - The party is affiliated with private
Federation, Inc. and government agencies and is
(COCOFED) not marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government in various projects; and
- The nominees are not members of
the marginalized sector of coconut
farmers and producers.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 42

33 20422012-238 Abang Lingkod Cancelled registration

(PLM) Party-List - Failure to establish a track record of
(ABANG continuously representing the
LINGKOD) peasant farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its members
actually belong to the peasant farmers
sector; and
- Failure to show that its nominees are
marginalized and underrepresented,
have actively participated in programs
for the advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.
Resolution dated 14 November 2012 43

34 20415812-158 Action Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Brotherhood for accreditation
Active - Failure to show that the party is
Dreamers, Inc. actually able to represent all of
(ABROAD) the sectors it claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete track
record of its activities since its
registration; and
- The nominees are not part of any of
the sectors which the party seeks to
represent.
Resolution dated 28 November 2012 44
 35 20437412-228 Binhi-Partido ng Cancelled registration and
(PLM) mga Magsasaka accreditation
Para sa mga - The party receives assistance from
Magsasaka the government through the
(BINHI) Department of Agriculture; and
- Failure to prove that the group is
marginalized and underrepresented.
Resolution dated 28 November 2012 45

36 20435612-136 Butil Farmers Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Party (BUTIL) accreditation
- Failure to establish that the
agriculture and cooperative sectors
are marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The party's nominees neither appear
to belong to the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have actively
participated in the undertakings of
the party.
Resolution dated 3 December 2012 46

37 20448612-194 1st Kabalikat ng Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Bayan accreditation
Ginhawang - Declaration of untruthful statements;
Sangkatauhan
(1st KABAGIS) - Failure to exist for at least one year;
and
- None of its nominees belong to the
labor, fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural communities
sectors which it seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 4 December 2012 47

38 20441012-198 1-United Cancelled accreditation

(PLM) Transport - The party represents drivers and
Koalisyon (1- operators, who may have conflicting
UTAK) interests; and
- The party's nominees do not belong
to any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
Resolution dated 4 December 2012 48
 39204421, 12-157 Coalition of Cancelled registration
204425(PLM), Senior Citizens - The party violated election laws
12-191 in the because its nominees had a term-
(PLM) Philippines, Inc. sharing agreement.
(SENIOR
CITIZENS)
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,
1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM,
KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE,
FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD,
ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a
mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39
petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. CSAaDE
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo AnteOrders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the
54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:
G.R. No. SPP No. Group
Resolution dated 13 November 2012
203818-19 12-154 (PLM) AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)
12-177 (PLM)
Association for Righteousness
203981 12-187 (PLM)
Advocacy
on Leadership (ARAL)
204002 12-188 (PLM) Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)
203922 12-201 (PLM) Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives (APEC)
203960 12-260 (PLM) 1st Consumers Alliance for Rural
Energy, Inc. (1-CARE)
203936 12-248 (PLM) Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng
Masa (AKMA-PTM)
Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na
203958 12-015 (PLM)
Walang
Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA)
203976 12-288 (PLM) Alliance for Rural and Agrarian
Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO)
Resolution dated 20 November 2012
Alliance for Nationalism and
204094 12-185 (PLM)
Democracy
(ANAD)
204125 12-292 (PLM) Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights
Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA)
1-Bro Philippine Guardians
204100 12-196 (PLM)
Brotherhood,
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI)
Resolution dated 27 November 2012
204141 12-229 (PLM) The True Marcos Loyalist (for God,
 Country and People) Association of
the
Philippines, Inc. (BANTAY)
Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa
204240 12-279 (PLM)
Magsasaka
ng Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)
Philippine Coconut Producers
204216 12-202 (PLM)
Federation,
Inc. (COCOFED)
Action Brotherhood for Active
204158 12-158 (PLM)
Dreamer,
Inc. (ABROAD)
Resolutions dated 4 December 2012
1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines,
204122 12-223 (PLM)
Inc.
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS)
203766 12-161 (PLM) Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)
204318 12-220 (PLM) United Movement Against Drugs
Foundation (UNIMAD)
204263 12-257 (PLM) Blessed Federation of Farmers and
Fishermen International, Inc.
(A BLESSED Party-List)
204174 12-232 (PLM) Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)
204126 12-263 (PLM) Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang
Pilipinong Magsasaka (KAP)
Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong
204364 12-180 (PLM)
Tao
Para sa Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay
at
Kaunlaran (AKO-BAHAY)
204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)
204220 12-238 (PLM) Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG
LINGKOD)
Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-
204236 12-254 (PLM)
K)
204238 12-173 (PLM) Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)
204239 12-060 (PLM) Green Force for the Environment Sons
and Daughters of Mother Earth
(GREENFORCE)
204321 12-252 (PLM) Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)
204323 12-210 (PLM) Bayani Party List (BAYANI)
204341 12-269 (PLM) Action League of Indigenous Masses
(ALIM)
204358 12-204 (PLM) Alliance of Advocates in Mining
Advancement for National Progress
(AAMA)
204359 12-272 (PLM) Social Movement for Active Reform
and Transparency (SMART)
204356 12-136 (PLM) Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
 Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)
204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper,
Aider, Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper,
Janitor, Agent and Nanny of the
Philippines, Inc. (GUARDJAN)
204408 12-217 (PLM) Pilipino Association for Country —
Urban Poor Youth Advancement
and Welfare (PACYAW)
204428 12-256 (PLM) Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)
204490 12-073 (PLM) Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)
204379 12-099 (PLM) Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)
204426 12-011 (PLM) Association of Local Athletics
Entrepreneurs and Hobbyists, Inc.
(ALA-EH)
204455 12-041 (PLM) Manila Teachers Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (Manila Teachers)
204374 12-228 (PLM) Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para
sa mga Magsasaka (BINHI)
204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)
204435 12-057 (PLM) 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy
Party (1AAAP)
204486 12-194 (PLM) 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang
Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)
1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-
204410 12-198 (PLM)
UTAK)
204421, 12-157 (PLM) Coalition of Senior Citizens in the
204425 12-191 (PLM) Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)
204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)
12-165 (PLM)
204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of Organizations, Networks
and Associations of the Philippines,
Inc.
(ALONA)
204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204153 12-277 (PLM) Pasang Masda Nationwide Party
(PASANG MASDA)
The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations;
and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong
Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections 49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
 The Court's Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions
of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of
national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in
the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all
the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list
system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters
prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the
party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in
legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. 50The voter elects
two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and
another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution
provides: cCTESa
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-
list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be
valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list
system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be
entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the
party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." 51 The
constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be read in light of the following discussion
among its framers: SEDaAH
MR. MONSOD:
....
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party
list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation.
Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors
and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the proposal on the
party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by
Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a
sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would
have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in
those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because
as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers,
fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic,
ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were
identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this
Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral representation
in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other
sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should
be included which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we
make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become because when we
make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the enumeration.
Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the
farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called
"hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a
farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so
he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral
representation in the Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes
and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a
party list system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for
sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral
organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How
do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has
two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative
of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked:
What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the
Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or
coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be
put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer
to say that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any
citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then
tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization
— one does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate
as a party — and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the
votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition. ScCIaA
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250
seats will be for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50.
That means that the maximum that any party can get out of these 50 seats is
15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They have to
submit these names because these nominees have to meet the minimum
qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day,
when the votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO
 gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women's
party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote
qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at
least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of,
say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the
justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we are saying that
any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group
that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group,
should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say,
there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If
each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are
not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really
have a common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get
five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those
are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while
at the same time making sure that those who really have a national
constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the
National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the
constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able
to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide
basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that
there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide;
have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or
fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But
this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if
they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the
mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system. EcHaAC
BISHOP BACANI:
Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list
system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list
rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD:
As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to
mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list
system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list system.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic
society through a multiparty system. . . . We are for opening up the system,
and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one
of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives
 from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party
list system. . . . . CcAHEI
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political
parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example
Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they
run under the party list concept or must they be under the district
legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA.
In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned
can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of
Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the
20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are
allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can
also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only
sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD.
May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD.
Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he
represents the farmers, would he qualify? EaSCAH
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD.
But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is
a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO.
Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in
the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along
sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD.
What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it
is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base
of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin
mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin
ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan
natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD.
Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner
Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system,
would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system? CDHaET
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone,
UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO.
The same.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines. IcESaA
MR. MONSOD:
Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor
leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO:
Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD:
Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of
sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader,
would he qualify?
MR. TADEO:
The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really
organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed,
the political party may submit a list of individuals who are actually
members of such sectors. The lists are to be published to give individuals
or organizations belonging to such sector the chance to present evidence
contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the
claims of the existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This
proceeding shall be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in
 character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this matter are final
and unappealable. 52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only
sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a
part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo
Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "[F]or as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution." 53 DTAaCE
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in
the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral
parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of
the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions — the first headed by
Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in
Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to
appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was
opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting
the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-
pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further the
sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was
apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an
electoral contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the
bigger and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941
recognized this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from participating in the
party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically
lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral
representatives made an effort towards a compromise — that the party-list system be
open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further
whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to
candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The
majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in
the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups,
was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was
an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after
the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to
gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party
electoral contest with the more veteran political groups. 54 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted.
Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three
consecutive terms. 55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and
that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to
win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same
number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list
system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-
traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections. TaDSHC
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution,
which states:
Section 5.(1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the
words "national[,]" and "regional[,]" separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had
the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time
sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely
because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5 (1), could not be any clearer:
the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only
one of the three groups. The text of Section 5 (1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and
regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National
and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National
and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not
represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again
that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons. ASETHC
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to
non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."Second, the
reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully
open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will
be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting
the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5 (1) and
(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for
sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list
system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
 coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list
system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members
as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of
at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread
over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of
the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains
to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of
citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests
or concerns. DCIEac
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3 (c) of R.A. No.
7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizensadvocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On the
other hand, Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized
group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereofwhose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides
different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from
each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under
the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude,
by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate
in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the
party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only
option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously
senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
No. 7941. aHcACT
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different
from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not
represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional
political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the
political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same
governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals." 56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and
underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and
underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize
themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective
sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not
require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941,
to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the
COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. TcEaAS
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section
2 on Declaration of Policy. 57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable
Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become members of the House of
Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be
"marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors
mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its
specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution
on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5
that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are:
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the
sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the
sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for
the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not
mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector,
is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented"
are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination
Board. 58 TAaCED
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the
elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance
to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an
opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a
multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and
ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of
Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in
poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined
political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the
national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not
belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties
under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the
opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of
parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by
RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling 'Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives.'" However, the requirement in Ang Bagong
Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party . . . must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the
COMELEC's refusal to register sectoral wings officially organized by major political
parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major political
parties from participating in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings. STECDc
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from
participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. 59 Thus, major political parties can participate
in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988
party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections only
through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a
majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined
political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those
who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list
elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies."
The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as
members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those
who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus, to
participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district
elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional,
women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector
represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major
political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which
provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in
party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list
system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision
prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election. aSTAcH
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she
seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one
must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such
sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to
participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA
7941. . . .
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Third, . . . the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system. . . . . cSCADE
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941,
which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association,
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-
list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by, the government. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees
must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:TCcIaA
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at
least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25)
but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
 sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall
be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. . . . .
Eighth, . . . the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis
supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further.
In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list
elections, 60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list
elections. TEacSA
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list
system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation
of the Constitution and the law." 61 The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only
resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear
contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying
petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave
abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose
and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats,
reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong
Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our
rule 62 that a party may appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in
the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the
following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need
to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections.
A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative
district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral
wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing
 is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition. cdtai
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members
of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national
and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fidemembers of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified. THESAD
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not
satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified
by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines
and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do
not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track
record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been
disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified
because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining
qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under
such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from
engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has
ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present
petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by
this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been
granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners
in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination
whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. The
41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in
the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections
may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 203766, 203818-19, 203922, etc.,
[April 2, 2013], 707 PHIL 454-753)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004.]

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.

[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004.]

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.

[G.R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004.]

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE
JR., respondents.

DECISION

VITUG, J p:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the
privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition," 1 that cannot be taken
lightly by anyone — either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound
importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a
presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment
of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the
main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and
reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid
of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
 Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus
Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate
of candidacy by claiming to be a natural- born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions — first, Allan F. Poe contracted a
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if
no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support
of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits — 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2)
a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her
having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after
discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit
aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by
the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no
record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines
before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant
ones being — a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the
registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original
Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of
Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the
name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported
marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City
Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office
during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or
on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06
February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of
the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G.R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary
restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality
and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G.R. No. 161824, would include G.R. No. 161434, entitled
"Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. 'Fernando Poe, Jr.'), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G.R.
No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,"
both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction
to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G.R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course
or to cancel FPJ's certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that
FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code —
"Section 78.Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false" —
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code —
"Section 52.Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall
have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" —
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested
party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance
candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per
Rule 64 2 in an action for certiorari under Rule 65 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section
7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads —
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision
or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by
this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which power "includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G.R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could
well be taken cognizance of, by this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of
their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be
elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.

In G.R. No. 161434 and G.R. No. 161634

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions
of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead
take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential
contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, 4 as "not (being) justiciable"
controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to
enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to
Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-
Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act
1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the
members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government
under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up,
nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election
contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies,
would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the
phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,"
promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise —
"Rule 12.Jurisdiction. — The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.
"Rule 13.How Initiated. — An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo
warranto shall not include an election protest.
"Rule 14.Election Protest. — Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-
President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of
votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may
be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being
an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office. 5 In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule
14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of
votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G.R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on
Elections, et al.," and G.R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept
of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384
to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in
the holding of an office. 6 Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the
"State," which he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number
to achieve a self-sufficient existence. 7 The concept grew to include one who would both govern and
be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected.
Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant
obligations, on the other. 8 In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally
willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the
concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for
individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. 9 Its meaning expanded
during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in
the exercise of political power. 10 The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social
citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social
security. 11 The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so
developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly
shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship. 12
The Local Setting — from Spanish Time to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or
"Spanish subjects." 13 In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for
the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th
century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these
citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those
explicitly extended by Royal Decrees. 14
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on
16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of
differing views among experts; 15 however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable
to Spaniards in the Philippines — the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841, 16 the Royal Decree
of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine
Islands, 17 and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. 18
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the
express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this
country was included, would be governed by special laws. 19
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which
came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. —
"(a)Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b)Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
"(c)Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d)Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any
town of the Monarchy." 20
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a
superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power,
the United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty,
while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws,
which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United
States. 21 Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of
the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress —
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain
by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such
territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property,
including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall
also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being
subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they
remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of
ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in
default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have
adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.

Thus —
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." 22
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the
subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did
not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws
and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the
protection of the United States. LibLex
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902,
also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation
of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines —
". . . that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
 Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight." 23
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken
to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and
3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. 24
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July
1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the
view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli,
otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England,
governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period. 25More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine
Bill of 1902 —
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who
do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of
the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would
become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein." 26
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first
time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General
in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the
Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually
the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 —
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become
citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United
States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the
Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring
citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting,
once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship —
 "Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines
—
"(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution
"(2)Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption
of this Constitution,had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
"(3)Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4)Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at
the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire
that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the
women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate
children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking
to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as
equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on
citizenship to reflect such concerns —
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution — The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
"(2)Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3)Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
"(4)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that —
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for
subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable
proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section 1, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
"(2)Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3)Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
"(4)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
 The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." 27
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of
the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship — naturalization, jus
soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis 28 — had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus
sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa
vs. Collector of Customs 29 (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the1935 Constitution and
the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor 30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship
would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established
direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the
father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence,
his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan,
and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father
of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou,
and a mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a
supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16
September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old,
unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an
American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to
Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-
one years old and married.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be
drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that —
1.The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2.FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3.Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4.The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5.At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born
Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ,
and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the
proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent.
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last
two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in
reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date
of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo
Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had
utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true copies of
the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that —
"Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
"(d)When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded
in a public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their
contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be
grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty
which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such
statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors
as might have occurred. 31
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of
84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime
in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo
Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there
was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner,
however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In
his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that
the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It
would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had
complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to
the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an
illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules
under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until
the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment
was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or
voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the
putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document. 32 Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry
Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that —
"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the
latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of
the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by
which such father could be identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of
filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure
of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of
recognition. 33 InMendoza vs. Mella, 34 the Court ruled —
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here
really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy
of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been
voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it.
While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the
original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all
that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the
data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth
certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a
natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but
in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent
recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was
the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to
have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained
to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja, 35 this Court defined what could constitute
such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents,
those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and
those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public
document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be
made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into
voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was
recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded
generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to
claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the
heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the
lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an
authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable
writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a
notary public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
"Art. 172.The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
"(1)The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
"(2)An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
"(1)The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
"(2)Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Art. 173.The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a
state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within
which to institute the action.

"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of
either or both the parties.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Art. 175.Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256.This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Thus, in Vda. De SyQuia vs. Court of Appeals, 36 the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be
decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that
Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place
according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of
laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment of recognition of
illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart
legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare
of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the
family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual
would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed,
provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code,such provisions must be taken in the
context or private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly —
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of
the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of
 precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and
obedience among member of a family, and those which exist among members of a
society for the protection of private interests." 37
In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster, 38 the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, . . . the laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern
Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all
questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the
matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between
them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority,
division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil
effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are
questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil
Code,stating that —
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" —
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on
citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of
the Civil Code,39 such as on successional rights and family relations. 40 In adoption, for instance,
an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same
rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil
law 41 and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be
traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional
rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate
children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth
were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by
foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and
the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our
own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law
and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be
deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes.
The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not
have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on
evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily
precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides —
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and
the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word 'pedigree' includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
 marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected
with pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable
to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the
person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has
occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in
question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe
submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the facts of Allan F. Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e., living together with Bessie Kelly and his
children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family —
"I, Ruby Kelly Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
"1.I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelly Poe.
"2.Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3.Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more
popularly known in the Philippines as 'Fernando Poe, Jr., or FPJ'.
"4.Ronald Allan Poe 'FPJ' was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital,
Magdalena Street, Manila.
"xxx xxx xxx
"7.Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were
students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to
Fernando Poe Sr., by my sister that same year.
"8.Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
"9.Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald,
Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's
house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of
Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.
"10.Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more
children after Ronald Allan Poe.
"xxx xxx xxx
"18.I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan
Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando
Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelly Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactory establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child
and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear
up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, 42 this Court has acknowledged the strong
weight of DNA testing —
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of
the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has
two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from
the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts
should apply the results of science when completely obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."

Petitioner's Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted
his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to
his marriage to Bessie Kelly, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita
Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelly bigamous and respondent FPJ an
illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less
than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of
his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to Filipino father and an American mother
who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents
would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so
followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, basing his stand on the
ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo, 43 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon 44 and Serra
vs. Republic. 45
On the above score, the disqualification made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most
convincing; he states —
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the
procurement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement
would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the
pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a
decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite
the Court to look closely into these cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivio. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino
father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese
mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the
naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinisthere. The stepson did not
have blood of the naturalized stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by
election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2)
of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
 "Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The
issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still
needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan. 46 This is more complicated case. The case was about the
citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed
that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father.
But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the
son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino.
If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only
not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum.
The Court said obiterthat even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would
not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based
on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely necessary for the case. . . . It
was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano
vs. Vivo.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation
in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause ofthe
Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between
a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of
a Filipino mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionality allowable distinctions was established long ago
by People vs. Cayat. 47 I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children
and illegitimate children rests on real differences. . . . But real differences alone do not
justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but
not for another purpose.
". . . What is the relevance of legitimacy to elective public service? What possible state
interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public
officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive
the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an
illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the
indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is
neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the
equal protection clause and must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor
Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of
petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did
so for the benefit of the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien
father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and
had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate
against him.
The fact of the matter — perhaps the most significant consideration — is that the 1935 Constitution,
the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be
more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that
among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There
utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there are clearly none
provided.
In Sum —
(1)The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in
G.R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification
of respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections
on the contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2)The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G.R.
No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latter's capacity as
the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution.
Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the
elections are held.
(3)In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the
COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when
the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence
upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
(4)But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the
ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or
not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos
vs. COMELEC, 48 must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS —

1.G.R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,)
and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G.R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of
jurisdiction.
2.G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections
and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No.
04-003.
No Costs. SO ORDERED.
||| (Tecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161434, 161634, 161824, [March 3, 2004], 468
PHIL 421-755)

[G.R. No. 83820. May 25, 1990.]

JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in

Cebu), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER
OSMEÑA, respondents.

Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.

DECISION

PARAS, J p:

Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of

the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition for the
disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña as candidate for Provincial Governor of
Cebu Province. cdll
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy
with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988
local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as
represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed
with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is
allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the
then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private
respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958,
respectively. (Annex "B-1").
The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from
tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the final
resolution of the main petition.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue
canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following exhibits
tending to show that private respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien Registration
Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979
(Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent dated
November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Exh.
"D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo).
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.;
that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25,
1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the
country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since
1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the
winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed
the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for
not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino
citizen. cdrep
Hence, the present petition.
The petition is not meritorious.
There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to
run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
"(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may
be filed at any time not later than twenty five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.
and
"(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of any
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officeron the ground
of inelligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of
the results of the election."
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987 and
that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private respondent on January 22, 1988.
Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time.
The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a petition for quo
warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably premature, considering that
private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citizenship and
qualification to hold the public office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough basis
for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from
running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by
substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing
Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of
America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of
registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing,
the respondent is an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and
sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or
not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us
here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino
remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine
citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al., (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989)
and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al. (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the
case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983
per certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but claimed
that he was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of the
Marcos government. The Court, however, found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable,
pointing out that there were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo
who did not find it necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an Australian citizen and that
he was naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976, per certification from the Australian Government
through its Consul in the Philippines. This was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number of sworn
statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia. LexLib
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore, disqualified from serving
as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the Court
considered the fact that by their own admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines since they have sworn their total allegiance to a foreign
state.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the
United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has
continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as
a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the
loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmeña
obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24
years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as having expressly renounced
Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the
fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a
Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of
analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has a
brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a person
is enrolled as student simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and University Y,
presents a Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not necessarily mean that he is
not still a student of University Y. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships.
Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no
implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied ".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And
while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the
concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under
the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future
law. Said law has not yet been enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of
the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
||| (Aznar v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 83820, [May 25, 1990], 264 PHIL 307-331)

[G.R. No. 83820. May 25, 1990.]

JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in

Cebu), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER
OSMEÑA, respondents.

Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.

DECISION

PARAS, J p:

Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of

the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition for the
disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña as candidate for Provincial Governor of
Cebu Province. cdll
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy
with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988
local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as
represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed
with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is
allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the
then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private
respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958,
respectively. (Annex "B-1").
The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from
tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the final
resolution of the main petition.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue
canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following exhibits
tending to show that private respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien Registration
Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979
(Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent dated
November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Exh.
"D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo).
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.;
that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25,
1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the
country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since
1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the
winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed
the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for
not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino
citizen. cdrep
Hence, the present petition.
The petition is not meritorious.
There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to
run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
"(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may
be filed at any time not later than twenty five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.
and
"(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of any
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officeron the ground
of inelligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of
the results of the election."
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987 and
that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private respondent on January 22, 1988.
Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time.
The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a petition for quo
warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably premature, considering that
private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citizenship and
qualification to hold the public office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough basis
for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from
running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by
substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing
Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of
America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of
registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing,
the respondent is an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and
sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or
not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us
here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino
remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine
citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al., (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989)
and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al. (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the
case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983
per certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but claimed
that he was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of the
Marcos government. The Court, however, found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable,
pointing out that there were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo
who did not find it necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an Australian citizen and that
he was naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976, per certification from the Australian Government
through its Consul in the Philippines. This was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number of sworn
statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia. LexLib
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore, disqualified from serving
as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the Court
considered the fact that by their own admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines since they have sworn their total allegiance to a foreign
state.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the
United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has
continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as
a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the
loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmeña
obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24
years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as having expressly renounced
Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the
fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a
Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of
analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has a
brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a person
is enrolled as student simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and University Y,
presents a Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not necessarily mean that he is
not still a student of University Y. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships.
Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no
implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied ".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And
while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the
concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under
the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future
law. Said law has not yet been enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of
the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Aznar v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 83820, [May 25, 1990], 264 PHIL 307-331)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-21289. October 4, 1971.]

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN
YEUNG, petitioners-appellants, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.

Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Asst. Sol. Gen. Frine C . Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang
V . Bernardo for respondent-appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; IMMIGRATION ACT; SECTION 9 (G) THEREOF, NOT

APPLICABLE TO ALIEN WHO LEGITIMATELY BECOMES FILIPINO. — Section 9 (g) of the
Immigration Act does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors,
legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality
naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may
choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor
confiscate their bonds.
2. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; EFFECTS. — The naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine
citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon himipso facto all the rights of citizenship
including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of
the Commissioner of Immigration vis-avis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express
provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the
Philippines.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHERE LANGUAGE OF STATUTE IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF TWO
CONSTRUCTIONS, THAT WHICH CARRIES OUT OBJECT PREVAILS. — A statute is to be
construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the language is susceptible of two constructions,
one which will carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it should receive the former
construction. A construction will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the court will, if
possible, place on the statute a construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance with
the decisions construing statutes, a construction will not result in oppression, hardship, or
inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a construction which will prejudice public interest, or
construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will result in absurd
consequences.
4. ID.; CONSTRUCTION AVOIDED IF INCONSISTENT WITH LEGISLATIVE INTENT. — So a
construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent inconsistency in
legislative intent, as has been determined by the judicial decisions, or which would result in futility,
redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the legislature; and the court should adopt that
construction which will be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to have been the
intention of the legislature an interpretation which would render the requirements of the statute
uncertain and vague is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to
confer an illusory right.
5. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; POLICY OF SELECTIVE ADMISSION,
EXPLAINED. — The avowed policy of "selective admission" more particularly refers to a case where
a citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the
courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who are worthy to be come
citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. But this
policy finds no application is cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases,
the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operations of law
proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the cannot do otherwise than
to declare that he is a citizens of the Philippines.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIEN WOMAN MARRYING FILIPINO IPSO FACTO BECOME CITIZEN PROVIDED
NOT DISQUALIFIED BY LAW. — We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating
otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien
woman married an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her
husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizens, provided that she does not suffer from any
of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION PROCEEDING, NOT REQUIRED. — Section 16 is a parallel
provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for naturalization a Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceeding, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should not follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied that same
privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature
intended to treat them differently.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; MODES OF. — The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who
are naturalized in accordance with law" (Section 1 [5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by
naturalization, under this provision, include not only those who are naturalized in accordance with
legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship by
"derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife
through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a citizen.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 15 OF REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW; PURPOSE. — The leading idea
or purpose of Section 15 was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes
of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are
already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the
provisions concurs with the fact of citizenship of the person to who they are related, the effect is for
said person to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not mean
that all alien wives and all minor children of the Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship,
necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do
not ipso facto become citizens; they must apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status.
What it does mean, however, is that in respect of those persons enumerated in Section 15, the
relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such
citizenship commences.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIEN WIFE DEEMED A CITIZEN IF SHE MIGHT HERSELF BE
NATURALIZED. — The legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be
deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized.
Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is
one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself
be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is
only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e.,
as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely
implies that at the time of her marriage to Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power" to
become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force.
11. ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA NOT APPLICABLE TO RULINGS THEREON. — Everytime the
citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand.
12. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; PROCEDURES FOR ALIEN WIFE TO ACQUIRE PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP. — Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration
is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not
disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. Upon the filing of the said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by
the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not
belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited Section from becoming naturalized Filipino
citizen, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or
decision granting or denying the petition.
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; ALIEN WOMAN MARRIED TO FILIPINO
MUST PROVE QUALIFICATIONS UNDER SECTION 3. — Our naturalization law separates
qualifications from disqualifications; the positive qualifications under Section 3 thereof express a
policy of restriction as to candidates for naturalization as much as the disqualifications under Section
4. And it has been shown in our decision in the second Ly Giok Ha case (Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, L-
21332 March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 416) that those not disqualified under Section 4 would not
necessarily qualify under Section 3, even if the residence qualification were disregarded. In other
words, by giving to Section 15 of our Naturalization Law the effect of excluding only those women
suffering from disqualification under Section 3 could result in admitting to citizenship woman that
Section 2 intends to exclude. In these circumstances, I do not see why American interpretation of the
words who might herself be lawfully naturalized should be considered hinding in this jurisdiction.

DECISION

BARREDO, J p:

Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705
entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is,
sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and the fundamental issues involved in this case thus:
"In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the
Commissioner of Immigration, 'restraining the latter and/or his authorized
representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and
causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure
to do so.'
"The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been denied,
the case was heard on the merits and the parties submitted their respective evidence.
"The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor General
are these:
'On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with
her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated
that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to
take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching
Ping for a period of one month (Exhibits '1,' '1-a,' and '2'). She was permitted to
come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a
period of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On the date of her
arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,
among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After
repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit '4'). On January 25, 1962, she
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an
alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to
confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with
preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years
after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write
either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either
English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino
 name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or
sisters-in-law.'
"Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds,
that the instant petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same reasons set
forth in the Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of which
read:
'First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
"'Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or
may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself
be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should be
held to mean what it plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The
clause 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized' incontestably implies that an alien
woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a
Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications specified in the law,because these are the explicit requisites provided
by law for an alien to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs.
Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855). However, from the allegation of paragraph 3
of the complaint, to wit:
"'3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be
lawfully naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to become such
by naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage on January 25,
1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under
the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines."
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to
be disqualified, does not and cannot allege that she possesses all the qualifications to
be naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted as a temporary visitor only on
March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the requisite length of
residence in the Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3,
Case No. 3).
'Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed a citizen of
the Philippines by virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen, need only be not
disqualified under the Naturalization Law, it would have been worded "and who
herself is not disqualified to become a citizen of the Philippines."
'Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose authorized
stay in the Philippines, after repeated extensions thereof, was to expire last February
28, 1962, having married her co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over
one month before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage was
effected merely for convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending compulsory
departure, not to say deportation. This cannot be permitted.
'Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:
"'5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien
visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will
enter and stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa,
cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently without first
departing from the Philippines as she had promised." (Chung Tiao Bing, et al.
 vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong
Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017, September 16, 1954;
Sec. 9, last par., Phil. Immigration Law).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed, not only by the
decided cases of the Supreme Court on the point mentioned above, but also on the
very provisions of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940 which reads:
" 'An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines
permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must
depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate
Philippine Consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the
Officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for
determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this
Act. (This paragraph is added by Republic Act 503).'" (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940).
'And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the
administration of all laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the
performance of his duties in relation to alien immigrants, the law gives the
Commissioner of Immigration a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial function in determining
cases presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner of Immigration CA-G. R. No.
23336-R, Dec 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon may not be disturbed unless he
acted with abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction.'
"It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and
insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and English, she admitted that she cannot write
either language."
The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some bearing in
the resolution of this appeal is the allegation in the brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in the
government's brief, that "in the hearing . . . , it was shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau
Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of the disqualifications for naturalization." Of course,
as an additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized by said appellants that
during the hearing in the lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged marriage of
petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb for seven months a child by her
husband."
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE 'WHO MIGHT
HERSELF BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED' (OF SECTION 15, REVISED
NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN
MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER
MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES ALL THE
QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE
LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO
DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND
WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN
 AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION
9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO
A FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE
SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE
OF HER AUTHORIZED STAY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COMMISSIONER
OF IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE
COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE
TO DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND, ARREST AND
IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS
NOW A FILIPINO CITIZEN.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS'
COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE
COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE
THE PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.

VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR
COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD
ON APPEAL).
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision upheld the two
main grounds of objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the court below, viz:
"That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on
the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay
only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her
representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she
had promised (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-
9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-
6017, Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);
"That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer
on the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the qualifications
required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the
disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No.
L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)"
It is obvious from the nature of these objections that their proper resolution would necessarily
cover all the points raised in appellants' assignments of error, hence, We will base our discussions,
more or less, on said objections.
I.
The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in appellants' second
and fourth assignments of error does not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of fact, it seems
evident that the Solicitor General's pose that an alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a
non-immigrant cannot remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first and
goes to a foreign country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and
thereafter undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry
for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption that
petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We note the same line of reasoning in the
appealed decision of the court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were the Solicitor
General and His Honor of the view that said petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of
her marriage to her Filipino husband, they would have held her as entitled to assume the status of a
permanent resident without having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9(g) of the law.
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9(g) of the Immigration
Act providing:
"An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines
permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart
voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul
the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of this Act."
does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately
become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally
bestows upon them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose,
and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate
their bonds. True it is that this Court has vehement]y expressed disapproval of convenient ruses
employed by aliens to convert their status from temporary visitors to permanent residents in
circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned, such as in
Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Immigration Commissioners,
95 Phil. 785, said:
". . . It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a
deliberate and voluntary representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and
thereby secures the benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him
subsequently to go back on his representation and stay permanently, without first
departing from the Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve him of the
departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of
'change' or 'correction', for the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is above the
law. Any other ruling would, as stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to
enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted to enter for a limited
time, might then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such claim
should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to
examining and verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up
permanent residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his
stay and evade his return to the port whence he came, contrary to what he promised
to do when he entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-evident."
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here as a
temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the
Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of
showing that he is entitled to come back, when after all, such right has become incontestible as a
necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this hag been
conferred upon him. Consider, for example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who is
naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law
that before they can be allowed permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so that they
may be processed to determine whether or not they have a right to have permanent residence here?
The difficulties and hardships which such a requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness
argue against such a rather absurd construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang,
101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:
". . . (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also
a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that,
in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence
the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c)
of Commonwealth Act 613 provides that 'in the event of the naturalization as a
Philippine citizen . . . of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond
shall be cancelled or the be deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal
representative.'" (At. pp. 462-463) In other words, the applicable statute itself more
than implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically
produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship
including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit
of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its
very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is
inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense thus discussed, therefore,
appellants' second and fourth assignments of error are well taken.
II.
Precisely, the second objection of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is that appellant
Lau Yuen Yeung's marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yaoalias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino
citizenship is not denied did not have the effect of making her a Filipino, since it has not been shown
that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in the record that she does not
possess all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by the Revised Naturalization
Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General implicitly concedes that had it been
established in the proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications
required by the law of applicants for naturalization, she would have been recognized by the
respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case, without requiring her to submit to the usual
proceedings for naturalization.
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the view of this
Court since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-11855, promulgated
December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706, 713, 1 for it was only in Zita Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-
24252 which was promulgated on January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice
Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to be deemed a
Filipina, she has to apply for naturalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
the Revised Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding not only that she has all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the law but also that she has complied
with all the formalities required thereby like any other applicant for naturalization, 2 albeit said
decision is not yet part of our jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration is still
pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us, however, in their first and second assignments
of error, not only to reconsider Burca but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact,
is the prevailing rule, having been reiterated in all subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty. 3
Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473,
underwent judicial construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha case, 4 one almost identical to the one at
bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose authority to
stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to guaranty her timely departure. On March 8,
1956, eight days before the expiration of her authority to stay, she married a Filipino by the name of
Restituto Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband notified the Commissioner of Immigration of said
marriage and, contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason of said marriage, demanded
for the cancellation of her bond, but instead of acceding to such request, the Commissioner required
her to leave, and upon her failure to do so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her
bond; a suit was filed for the recovery of the bond; the lower court sustained her contention that she
had no obligation to leave because she had become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be
returned. The Commissioner appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto
Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:
"The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to a
Filipino justified or, at least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from
the Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the affirmative view,
petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also, a
citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in
consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence,
the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c)
of Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that 'in the event of the naturalization as a
Philippine citizen . . . of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond
shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal
representative." Thus the issue boils down to whether an alien female who marries a
male citizen of the Philippines follows ipso facto his political status.
"The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which
petitioners rely, reads:
'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.'
"Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to
his foreign wife, unless she 'herself may be lawfully naturalized.' As correctly held in
an opinion of the Secretary of Justice (O.p. No. 52, series of 1950), * this limitation of
section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified
from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of
said Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:
'(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association
or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;
'(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their
ideas;
'(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
'(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
'(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
 '(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have
not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire
to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
'(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the . . . Philippines are at war,
during the period of such war;
'(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States,
whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or
subjects thereof.'
"In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok
Ha does not fall under any of the classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties
who claim that, despite her failure to depart from the Philippines within the period
specified in the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof, petitioners have
the burden of proving her alleged change of political status, from alien to citizen.
Strictly speaking, petitioners have not made out, therefore a case against the
respondents-appellants.
"Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the lower
court, had the parties seemingly felt that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha
may 'be lawfully naturalized,' and this being a case of first impression in our courts, we
are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the parties herein should be
given an opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have any, on said issue." (At pp.
462-464.).
As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the above decision
as regards the following propositions:
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, the marriage of
an alien woman to a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might be lawfully naturalized";
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the limitation of
Section 15 of the Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, only
those disqualified from being naturalized under Section 4 of the law quoted in the decision;
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the action to recover
her bond confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration;
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and
5. That in referring to the disqualifications enumerated in the law, the Court somehow left the
impression that no inquiry need be made as to qualifications, 5 specially considering that the decision
cited and footnoted several opinions of the Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior of the
Commissioner of Immigration, the most important of which are the following:
"Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section
15, Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided that 'any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.' A similar provision in the
naturalization law of the United States has been construed as not requiring the woman
to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in the case of
naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons
who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex
parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No. 168, s.
1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
 "In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause 'who might
herself be lawfully naturalized', should be construed as not requiring the woman to
have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization
by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be
naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
"Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization
Law, it results that any woman who married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after
June 17, 1939, and the marriage not having been dissolved, and on the assumption
that she possesses none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows the citizenship of her husband." (Op. No. 176,
v. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
"From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of
inquiry is as to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of
the Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen
of the Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473,
which reads in part as follows:
'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.'
"The phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized', as contained in the above
provision, means that the woman who is married to a Filipino citizen must not belong
to any of the disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law
(Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s. 1941: Nos. 79 and 168,
s. 1940). Under the facts stated in the within papers, Mrs. Machura does not appear to
be among the disqualified classes mentioned in the law.
"It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an
illegitimate of a Filipino mother, he should be considered as a citizen of the Philippines
in consonance with the well-settled rule that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship
of his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281,
s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must
necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act
No. 473.) (Op. No. 52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so appealed to this
Court that five days later, on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil.
521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the same ruling on the basis of the following facts:
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned out that her
passport was forged. On December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for her arrest for purposes of
deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953, she married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of said
marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry considered her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case, however,
the Board of Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with the deportation proceedings and
so, the husband filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court denied the petition.
Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other hand, that:

"Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok
Ha v. Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not
suffice to confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the Naturalization Law
requires that the alien woman who marries a Filipino must show, in addition, that she
 'might herself be lawfully naturalized' as a Filipino citizen. As construed in the decision
cited, this last condition requires proof that the woman who married a Filipino is herself
not disqualified under section 4 of the Naturalization Law.
"No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino citizenship
by Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The lower court,
therefore, committed no error in refusing to interfere with the deportation proceedings,
where she can anyway establish the requisites indispensable for her acquisition of
Filipino citizenship, as well as the alleged validity of her Indonesian passport."
(Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Immigration Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22,
1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.) [Emphasis supplied]
For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave the parties
concerned opportunity to prove the fact that they were not suffering from any of the disqualifications
of the law without the need of undergoing any judicial naturalization proceeding. It may be stated,
therefore, that according to the above decisions, the law in this country, on the matter of the effect of
marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven
that at the time of such marriage, she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in
Section 4 of the Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any naturalization proceedings
under said law.
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to qualifications, that is, as to
whether or not they need also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice
understood them to mean that such qualifications need not be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary
of Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a distinguished member of this Court, 6 so ruled in
opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative of which held:
"At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen
needs only to show that she 'might herself be lawfully naturalized' in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of the statute, such as those
relating to the qualifications of an applicant for naturalization through judicial
proceedings, is not necessary (See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen
[U.S.] 507; Ops Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.
"This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No. L-
10760, promulgated May 17, 1957, where the Supreme Court, construing the
abovequoted section of the Naturalization Law, held that 'marriage to a male Filipino
does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she 'herself may he
lawfully naturalized,' and that 'this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits
of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of
the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473.' In other words,
disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the
decisive factor that defeats the right of the foreign wife of a Philippine citizen to
acquire Philippine citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
"Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups ? The Commissioner of
Immigration does not say so but merely predicates his negative action on the ground
that a warrant of deportation for 'overstaying' is pending against the petitioner.
"We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for disqualification for
naturalization are expressly enumerated in the law, a warrant of deportation not based
on a finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any of those specified causes may
not be invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign wife of a
 Philippine citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. (Inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius)" (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
"Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau
of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation
of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married
to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's
citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon
the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint
affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does
not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming
naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision
granting or denying the petition." (Op. No. 38, B. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G.
Barrera.)
"This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-
10760, promulgated May 17, 1957), where the Supreme Court, construing the above-
quoted section in the Revised Naturalization Law, held that 'marriage to a male
Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she 'herself may
be lawfully naturalized,' and that 'this limitation of Section 15 excludes from the
benefits of naturalization by marriage those disqualified from being naturalized as
citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473.' In
other words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in section 4 of the Act
is the decisive factor that defeats the right of an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship." (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G.
Barrera.)
"The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a
new one. In that case, the Supreme Court held that under paragraph 1 of Section 15
of Commonwealth Act No. 473, 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine
citizenship to his foreign wife unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized"', and,
quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice, namely: No. 52, s. 1950;
No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28, s. 1950, 'this limitation of
section 15 excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified
from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of
said Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134, B. 1962 of Justice Undersec. Magno S.
Gatmaitan.)
It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above construction of the law was
importantly modified by this Court in Lee Suan Ay,supra, in which the facts were as follows:
"Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of temporary stay in
the Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration
asked the bondsman to present her to the Bureau of Immigration within 24 hours from
receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be confiscated (Annex 1). For failure of the
bondsman to comply with the foregoing order, on 1 April 1955 the Commissioner of
Immigration ordered the cash bond confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was an
order issued by the Commissioner of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash
bond. Unlike in forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings, where the Court must
enter an order forfeiting the bail bond and the bondsman must be given an opportunity
to present his principal or give a satisfactory reason for his inability to do so, before
final judgment may be entered against the bondsman, (section 15, Rule 110; U.S. v.
 Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the temporary stay of an alien in
the Philippines, no court proceeding is necessary. Once a breach of the terms and
conditions of the undertaking in the bond is committed, the Commissioner of
Immigration may, under the terms and conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of
the Government." (In the meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan,
a Filipino, were joined in marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las Piñas, Rizal.)
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices Concepcion
and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:
"The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does not
relieve the bondsman from his liability on the bond. The marriage took place on 1 April
1955, and the violation of the terms and conditions of; the undertaking in the bond —
failure to depart from the Philippines upon expiration of her authorized period of
temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure to report to the
Commissioner of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice — were committed
before the marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not
automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possesses the
qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization. ** There is
no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization."
Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon in the appealed
decision now before Us, is the fact that the footnote of the statement therein that the alien wife "must
possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes
reference to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha v.
Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice
explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940, above-
quoted, it was clearly held that "(I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the
clause 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized', should be construed as not requiring the woman to
have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial
proceedings, but merely that she is of the race by persons who may be naturalized." (Op. Na. 79, s.
1940)

Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification of the
construction of the law, it could be said that there was need for clarification of the seemingly new
posture of the Court. The occasion for such clarification should have been in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs.
The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963, penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo Cua, supra, which followed that in Ly Giok
Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the particular
point in issue now, since it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay, hence,
anything said on the said matter would at best be no more than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited
himself to holding that "Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Act, the wife is deemed a citizen of the
Philippines only if she 'might herself be lawfully naturalized,' so that the fact of marriage to a citizen,
by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha
v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there
is here no evidence of record as to the qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua
Suy", without explaining the apparent departure already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo
Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped
together Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that both qualifications and non-
disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on what seemed to be departure from the said
first two decisions.
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of rationalizing the
Court's position. In La San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638,
the facts were simply these: 10 San Tuang, a Chinese woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1,
1960 as a temporary visitor with authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She married a Filipino on
January 7, 1961, almost six months before the expiry date at her permit, and when she was refused
to leave after her authority to stay had expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had become a
Filipina by marriage, and to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit stating explicitly that she
does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth
Act 473. When the case reached the court, the trial judge held for the government that in addition to
not having any of the disqualifications referred to, there was need that Lo San Tuang should have
also possessed all the qualifications of residence, moral character, knowledge of a native principal
dialect, etc., provided by the law. Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed upon was whether
or not the possession of all the qualifications were indeed needed to be shown apart from non-
disqualification, Justice Regala held affirmatively for the Court, reasoning out thus:
"It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on the basis
of the decision laid down in the case of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where
the Circuit Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary that the woman 'should be
a person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing laws, and that in
respect of the qualifications arising out of her conduct or opinions, being the wife of a
citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a
citizen.' (In explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: 'If, whenever during the life of
the woman or afterwards, the question of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding,
the party asserting her citizenship by reason of her marriage with a citizen must not
only prove such marriage, but also that the woman then possessed all the further
qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized under existing laws, the statute
will be practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a snare. The proof of the facts may
have existed at the time of the marriage, but years after, when a controversy arises
upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult to find.')
"In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white
woman or a woman of African descent or nativity, in order to be deemed an American
citizen, because, with respect to the rest of the qualifications on residence, moral
character, etc., she was presumed to be qualified.
"Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as
amended by Act No. 3448) specified the classes of persons who alone might become
citizens of the Philippines, even as it provided who were disqualified. Thus, the
pertinent provisions of that law provided:
'Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. — Philippine citizenship may
be acquired by (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under
the Jones Law; (b) natives of the Insular possessions of the United States; (c)
citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United
States may become citizens of said country if residing therein.
'Section 2. Who are disqualified. — The following cannot be naturalized as
Philippine citizens: (a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated
with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized government; (b) persons defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the
 success and predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists or believers in the
practice of polygamy; (d) persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the
Philippines are at war, during the period of such war.
'Section 3. Qualifications. — The persons comprised in subsection (a) of
section one of this Act, in order to be able to acquire Philippine citizenship,
must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of their
petition.
'The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one shall, in
addition to being not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the
hearing of the petition, have all and each of the following qualifications:
'First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not less
than five years, except as provided in the next following section;
'Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire Period of their residence in the Philippine Islands, in
their relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in
which they are living;
'Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than one
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or have some known trade or profession;
and
'Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native tongue.
'In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare in writing
and under oath his intention of renouncing absolutely and perpetually all faith
and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a
native, citizen or subject.'
"Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant, supra, to our law as it then
stood, alien women married to citizens of the Philippines must, in order to be deemed
citizens of the Philippines, be either (1) natives of the Philippines who were not
citizens thereof under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of the
United States, or (3) citizens of the United States or foreigners who under the laws of
the United States might become citizens of that country if residing therein. With
respect to the qualifications set forth in Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed
to have the same for all intents and purposes.
"But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473)
on June 17, 1939, Congress has since discarded class or racial consideration from the
qualifications of applicants for naturalization (according to its proponent, the purpose
in eliminating this consideration was, first, to remove the features of the existing
naturalization act which discriminated in favor of the Caucasian} and against Asiatics
who are our neighbors, and are related to us by racial affinity and, second, to foster
amity with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 — 11 ed.]), even as it retained in
Section 15 the phrase in question. The result is that the phrase 'who might herself be
lawfully naturalized' must be understood in the context in which it is now found, in a
setting so different from that in which it was found by the Court in Leonard v. Grant.
"The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration is that,
as the Solicitor General points out, the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully
 naturalized' must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the
law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines.
"There is simply no support for the view that the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully
naturalized' must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must
not belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid down in Leonard v.
Grant. A person who is not disqualified is not necessarily qualified to become a citizen
of the Philippines, because the law treats 'qualifications' and 'disqualifications' in
separate sections. And then it must not be lost sight of that even under the
interpretation given to the former law, it was to be understood that the alien woman
was not disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonard v. Grant did not rule that it
was enough if the alien woman does not belong to the class of disqualified persons in
order that she may be deemed to follow the citizenship of her husband: What that
case held was that the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized, merely
means that she belongs to the class or race of persons qualified to become citizens by
naturalization — the assumption being always that she is not otherwise disqualified.

"We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law, an alien woman, who is married to a citizen of the Philippines, acquires the
citizenship of her husband only if she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law. Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner
has all the qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino
citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect that
she is not in any way disqualified to become a citizen of this country was correctly
disregarded by the trial court, the same being self-serving."
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong V. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No L-20784,
December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a previous
resolution of the preceding administration to allow Sun Peck Yong and her minor son to await the
taking of the oath of Filipino citizenship of her husband two years after the decision granting him
nationalization and required her to leave and this order was contested in court, Justice Barrera held:
"In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775,
promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua Suy vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790,
promulgated October 31, 1963), we held that the fact that the husband became a
naturalized citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen of the Philippines. It
must also be shown that she herself possesses all the qualifications, and none of the
disqualifications, to become a citizen. In this case, there is no allegation, much less
showing, that petitioner-wife is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself.
Furthermore, the fact that a decision was favorably made on the naturalization petition
of her husband is no assurance that he (the husband) would become a citizen, as to
make a basis for the extension of her temporary stay."
On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876,
Justice Barrera reiterated the same ruling and citing particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua Suy, held
that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a Filipino on November 12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and
her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before the Philippine Vice Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on
January 6, 1961 did not make her a Filipino citizen, since she came here only in 1961 and
obviously, she had not had the necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines required by the
law.
Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion when Justice
Makalintal sought a reexamination thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26,
1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's husband was granted Philippine citizenship on January 13,
1959 and took the oath on January 31 of the same year, Choy King Tee first came to the Philippines
in 1955 and kept commuting between Manila and Hongkong since then, her last visa before the case
being due to expire on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband asked the
Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as well as their child's, for
the reason that they were Filipinos, and when the request was denied as to the wife, a mandamus
was sought, which the trial court granted. Discussing anew the issue of the need for qualifications,
Justice Makalintal not on]y reiterated the arguments of Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang but added
further that the ruling is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to
Philippine citizenship. 7
No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA
336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily reversed the decision of the lower court granting the writs of
mandamus and prohibition against the Commissioner of Immigration, considering that Austria's wife,
while admitting she did not possess all the qualifications for naturalization, had submitted only an
affidavit that she had none of the disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold
eight days later in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.
Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case 8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took occasion to expand on
the reasoning of Choy King Tee by illustrating with examples "the danger of relying exclusively on the
absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the
law." 9
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966, 10 Justice Zaldivar held
for the Court that an alien woman who is widowed during the pendency of the naturalization
proceedings of her husband, in order that she may be allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must,
aside from proving compliance with the requirements of Republic Act 530, show that she possesses
all the qualifications and does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under the Naturalization Law,
citing in the process the decision to such effect discussed above, 1 1 even as he impliedly
reversed pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.
Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that the point now
under discussion is settled law.
In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue. Under Section 15 of
the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:
"SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman, who is now
or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
"Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
"A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the
naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a
foreign-born child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized,
shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to
reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will
continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
"A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be
considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of
 majority he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of
the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married to a man
who subsequently becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from not
suffering from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the law, she must also possess all the
qualifications required by said law? If nothing but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty,
as recounted above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer to the
question would be inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the present case was actually submitted
for decision on January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck
Yong, all supra, and even before Choy King Tee, supra, were decided. There are other
circumstances, however, which make it desirable, if not necessary, that the Court take up the
matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the membership of the Court since Go Im
Ty, and of those who were in the Court already when Burca was decided, two members, Justice
Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result, precisely, according to them, because they
wanted to leave the point now under discussion open in so far as they are concerned. 12 Truth to
tell, the views and arguments discussed at length with copious relevant authorities, in the motion
for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of the amici curiae 13 in the Burca case cannot
just be taken lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful manner, not
only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the imperative practical aspects thereof in
the light of the actual situation of the thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who have so long, even
decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and have always lived and acted as such, officially
or otherwise, relying on the long standing continuous recognition of their status as such by the
administrative authorities in charge of the matter, as well as by the courts. Under these
circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider the views of the five
justices who took no part in Ga Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion), the Court decided to
further reexamine the matter. After all, the ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San
Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not categorically repudiate the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha. Besides, some
points brought to light during the deliberations in this case would seem to indicate that the
premises of the later cases can still bear further consideration.
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are construing, Section
15, aforequoted, of the Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted from its
American counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the
American provision. A brief review of its history proves this beyond per adventure of doubt.
The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature under American
sovereignty was that of March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a consequence of the Treaty
of Paris, our citizenship laws were found only in the Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act
of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and later the Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No.
2927 was enacted pursuant to express authority granted by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the
Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration only after the effectivity of
the Philippine Independence Act. This made it practically impossible for our laws on said subject to
have any perspective or orientation of our own; everything was American.

The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently:

"SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein
who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-
nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto,
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled
to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve
 their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight."
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of March 23, 1912,
by adding a provision as follows:
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who
do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possessions
of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who
would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if
residing therein."
The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially:
"SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects
on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in
said islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to
be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become
citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United
States under the laws of the United States if residing therein."
For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding the effect of
marriage to a Filipino upon the nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil Code
provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which were, however, abrogated upon the change of
sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife always followed that of the husband.
Not even Act 2927 contained any provision regarding the effect of naturalization of an alien upon the
citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien woman with a native born Filipino or one
who had become a Filipino before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided thus:
"SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. — In case a
petitioner should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor
children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far
as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it
had been rendered during the life of the petitioner."
It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act 2977, that the
following provisions were added to the above Section 13:
"SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections
thirteen and fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:
'SEC. 13 (a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen
of the Philippine Islands and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands.
'SEC. 13 (b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized under this
law, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of
 their parents, shall, if dwelling in the Philippine Islands, be considered citizens
thereof.
'SEC. 13 (c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who have been
born in the Philippine Islands after the naturalization of their parents shall be
considered citizens thereof.' "
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June 17, 1939, the
above Section 13 became its Section 15 which has already been quoted earlier in this decision. As
can be seen, Section 13(a) abovequoted was re-enacted practically word for word in the first
paragraph of this Section 15 except for the change of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it could
not have been on any other basis than this legislative history of our naturalization law that each and
everyone of the decisions of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty, discussed above, were
rendered.
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it was quite clear
that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to become herself a Filipino citizen, there is no need
for any naturalization proceeding because she becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the time of such
marriage, provided she does not suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4
of Commonwealth Act 473, with no mention being made of whether or not the qualifications
enumerated in Section 2 thereof need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the
possession of qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until 1963, in Lo San Tuang, that
Justice Regala reasoned out why the possession of the qualifications provided by the law should also
be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a Filipino, for her to become a Filipina by marriage.
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as follows: That "like
the law in the United States, our Naturalization Law specified the classes of persons who alone might
become citizens, even as it provided who were disqualified," and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act
473, our Naturalization Law since 1939 did not reenact the section providing who might become
citizens, allegedly in order to remove racial discrimination in favor of Caucasians and against Asiatics,
"the only logical deduction . . . is that the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized' must now
be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of
the Philippines" and "there is simply no support for the view that the phrase 'who might herself be
lawfully naturalized' must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not
belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law." 14
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference may be quoted:
"The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number of
cases. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first prove that she has all the
qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in
Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may he deemed a Philippine citizen
(Lao Chay v. Galang, L-19977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775,
Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784, December
27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27, 1963). The writer of this
opinion has submitted the question anew to the court for a possible reexamination of
the said ruling in the light of the interpretation of a similar law in the United States after
which Section 15 of our Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2 of
the Act of February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the U.S.). The
local law, Act No. 3448, was passed on November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the
former Philippine Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on March 26,
1920. Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was limited to
three classes of persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof;
(b) natives of the other insular possessions of the United States; and (c) citizens of the
 United States, or foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may become
citizens of the latter country if residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to
foreigners who may become American Citizens is restrictive in character, for only
persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder. In other words, in so far
as racial restrictions were concerned there was at the time a similarity between the
naturalization laws of the two countries, and hence there was reason to accord here
persuasive force to the interpretation given in the United States to the statutory
provision concerning the citizenship of alien women marrying American citizens.
"This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the
enactment of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June
17, 1939. The racial restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision
found in Act No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume that when
Congress chose to retain the said provision — that to be deemed a Philippine citizen
upon marriage the alien wife must be one 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized,'
the reference is no longer to the class or race to which the woman belongs, for class
or race has become immaterial, but to the qualifications and disqualifications for
naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute. Otherwise the
requirement that the woman 'might herself be lawfully naturalized' would be
meaningless surplusage, contrary to settled norms of statutory construction.
"The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is
believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine
citizenship, which after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found worthy
thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a
man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral character, ideological
beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions.

"Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for
naturalization, even, indeed, that she has none of the disqualifications, she is not
entitled to recognition as a Philippine citizen."
In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of the same conclusion
thus:
"On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has been
residing in the Philippines for a continuous period of at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n.,
id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13. t.s.n., id.);
and (3) she can speak and write English, or any of the principal Philippine languages
(pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.)
"While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words emphasized
indicate that the present Naturalization Law requires that an alien woman who marries
a Filipino husband must possess the qualifications prescribed by section 2 in addition
to not being disqualified under any of the eight ('a' to 'h') subheadings of section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our citizenship by marriage, both the
appellee and the court below (in its second decision) sustain the view that all that the
law demands is that the woman be not disqualified under section 4.
"At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the question
at issue could be regarded as not conclusively settled, there being only the concise
pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to
the effect that:
 'The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer
Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the qualifications
required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.'
"Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly established
the rule that the requirement of section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 (the
Naturalization Act), that an alien woman married to a citizen should be one who 'might
herself be lawfully naturalized," means not only woman free from the disqualifications
enumerated in section 4 of the Act but also one who possesses the qualifications
prescribed by section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v. Galang, L-18775,
Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L-20784, Dec. 27, 1963; Tong
Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v. Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965;
Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito v. Com. of Immigration, L-
16829, June 30, 1965).
"Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section
2 of the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are
not mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino
be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be
conferred upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4
disqualifies only —
'(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and
'(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,'
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously
convicted by a competent court would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that
the law did not intend such person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the
requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship 'must be of good moral
character.'
"Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in
government by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain
'herrenvolk', and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution;
yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not 'opposed to
organized government,' nor affiliated to groups 'upholding or teaching doctrines
opposing all organized governments', nor 'defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or
predominance of their ideas.' Et sic de caeteris.
"The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying exclusively
on the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative
requirements of the law, which, in the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly
does not possess.
"As to the argument that the phrase 'might herself be lawfully naturalized' was derived
from the U.S. Revised Statutes (section 1994) and should be given the same territorial
and racial significance given to it by American courts, this Court has rejected the same
in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee v.
Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965."
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a closer study
thereof cannot but reveal certain relevant considerations which adversely affect the premises on
which they are predicated, thus rendering the conclusions arrived thereby not entirely unassailable.
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927 providing who are
eligible for Philippine citizenship, the purpose ofCommonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization
Law, was to remove the racial requirements for naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino
nationality to Asiatics instead of allowing the admission thereto of Caucasians only, suffers from lack
of exact accuracy. It is important to note, to start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the
whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads thus:
"SECTION 1. Who may become Philippines citizens. — Philippine citizenship may be
acquired by: (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones
Law; (b) natives of the other Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of
the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become
citizens of said country if residing therein."
and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any mention of
race or color of the persons who were then eligible for Philippine citizenship. What is more evident
from said provision is that it reflected the inevitable subordination of our legislation during the pre-
Commonwealth American regime to the understandable limitations flowing from our status as a
territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act 2927 was
precisely approved pursuant to express authority, without which it could not have been done,
granted by an amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the
United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of the Jones Law of
1916, the pertinent provisions of which have already been quoted earlier. In truth, therefore, it was
because of the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and in the exercise of our
legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under the Philippine Independence Act that Section 1
of Act 2927 was eliminated, 15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial discrimination contained
in our Naturalization Law. The Philippine Legislature naturally wished to free our Naturalization
Law from the impositions of American legislation. In other words, the fact that such discrimination
was removed was one of the effects rather than the intended purpose of the amendment.
2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in subdivision (c) (of Section
1 of Act 2927) to foreigners who may become American citizens is restrictive in character, for only
persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of the
said subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision was to confine the grant under it of
Philippine citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein mentioned, the third of which were
citizens of the United States and, corollarily, persons who could be American citizens under her laws.
The words used in the provision do not convey any idea of favoring aliens of any particular race or
color and of excluding others, but more accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners
for American citizenship under the laws of the United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long
before 1920, when our Act 2927 became a law, the naturalization laws of the United States already
provided for the following disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29, 1906:
"SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized
government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and
teaching such disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who advocates or
teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any
officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the
Government of the United States, or of any other organized government, because of
his or their official character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a
citizen of the United States."
and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship under
Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they happened to be Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of
fact, said American law, which was the first "Act to Establish a Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization and to Provide for a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of Aliens throughout the United
 States" contained no racial disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of May 6,
1882 not being among those expressly repealed by this law, hence it is clear that when Act 2927
was enacted, subdivision (c) of its Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial
exclusion necessarily, even if it were traced back to its origin in the Act of the United States
Congress of 1912 already mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem that the nationalization in the
quoted decisions predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927
by Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial
discrimination in our naturalization law has no clear factual basis. 17

3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason, why the construction
adopted in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of the
Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond dispute that the first paragraph of Section 15
ofCommonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448,
and that the latter is nothing but an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States as it stood before it repeal in 1922. 18 Before such repeal, the phrase
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a definite unmistakable
construction uniformly followed in all courts of the United States that had occasion to apply the same
and which, therefore, must be considered as if it were written in the statute itself. It is almost trite to
say that when our legislators enacted said section, they knew of its unvarying construction in the
United States and that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the American statute, they have in effect
incorporated into the provision, as thus enacted, the construction given to it by the American courts
as well as the Attorney General of the United States and all administrative authorities charged with
the implementation of the naturalization and immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo,
77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S.
216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [1935]; Helvering v. Windmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45
[1938]; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p.
32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]).
A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and administrative
authorities is contained in United Stats of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod,
Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 285 Fed. 523, decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as
follows:
"Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. § 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed.
p. 117) provides as follows: 'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be
deemed a citizen.'
"Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of Congress of
February 10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which in its second section provided
'that any woman, who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married,
or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to
be a citizen.'
"And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British Statute
7 & 8 Vict. chap. 66, . . . 16, 1844, which provided that 'any woman married, or who
shall be married, to a natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and
taken to be herself naturalized, and have all the rights and privileges of a natural born
subject.'
"The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411, Comp.
Stat. § 4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 255), being 'An Act Relative to the
Naturalization and Citizenship of Married Women,' in § 2, provides 'that any woman
who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage of this Act, . . . shall not
become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage . . .'
"Section 6 of the act also provides 'that . . . 1994 of the Revised Statutes . . . are
repealed.'
"Section 6 also provides that 'such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or
retained under either of such sections, . . .' meaning § § 2 and 6. So that this Act of
September 22, 1922, has no application to the facts of the present case, as the
marriage of the relator took place prior to its passage. This case, therefore, depends
upon the meaning to be attached to § 1994 of the Revised Statutes.
"In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284,
construed this provision as found in the Act of 1855 as follows: 'The term, "who might
lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limits the application of the law to
free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, only required
that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free white person," and not an
alien enemy.'
"This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged to the
class or race which might be lawfully naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other
provisions of the naturalization laws as to residence or moral character, or to any of
the provisions of the immigration laws relating to the exclusion or deportation of aliens.
"In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also construed
the Act of 1855, declaring that 'any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to
a citizen of the United States, and might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be
deemed a citizen.' He held that 'upon the authorities, and the reason, if not the
necessity, of the case,' the statute must be construed as in effect declaring that an
alien woman, who is of the class or race that may be lawfully naturalized under the
existing laws, and who marries a citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also,
and it was not necessary that it should appear affirmatively that she possessed the
other qualifications at the time of her marriage to entitle her to naturalization.
"In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit court, in
United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien woman, a subject of Prussia came to the
United States and married here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with the
concurrence of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage she became ipso facto a
citizen of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all of the provisions of
the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. He added: 'There can be no doubt of
this, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Kelly v. Owen,
7 Wall. 496, 19 L. ed. 283.' The alien 'belonged to the class of persons' who might be
lawfully naturalized.
"In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman came to
the United States from France and entered the country contrary to the immigration
laws. The immigration authorities took her into custody at the port of New York, with
the view of deporting her. She applied for her release under a writ of habeas corpus,
and pending the disposition of the matter she married a naturalized American citizen.
The circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit held, affirming the court below, that she
was entitled to be discharged from custody. The court declared: 'The rule is well
settled that her marriage to a naturalized citizen of the United States entitled her to be
discharged. The status of the wife follows that of her husband, . . . and by virtue of her
marriage her husband's domicil became her domicil.'
"In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165 Fed. 980,
had before it the application of a husband for his final decree of naturalization. It
appeared that at that time his wife was held by the immigration authorities at New
York on the ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease.
Counsel on both sides agreed that the effect of the husband's naturalization would be
to confer citizenship upon the wife. In view of that contingency District Judge Brown
declined to pass upon the husband's application for naturalization, and thought it best
to wait until it was determined whether the wife's disease was curable. He placed his
failure to act on the express ground that the effect of naturalizing the husband might
naturalize her. At the same time he expressed his opinion that the husband's
naturalization would not effect her naturalization, as she was not one who could
become lawfully naturalized. 'Her own capacity (to become naturalized),' the court
stated, 'is a prerequisite to her attaining citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity,
the married status cannot confer it upon her.' Nothing, however, was actually decided
in that case, and the views expressed therein are really nothing more than mere dicta.
But, if they can be regarded as something more than that, we find ourselves, with all
due respect for the learned judge, unable to accept them.
"In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed, 626, District Judge
Learned Hand held that an alien woman, a subject of the Turkish Empire, who married
an American citizen while visiting Turkey, and then came to the United States, could
not be excluded, although she had, at the time of her entry, a disease which under the
immigration laws would have been sufficient ground for her exclusion, if she had not
had the status of a citizen. The case was brought into this court on appeal, and in
1911 was affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. In that case, however at the
time the relators married, they might have been lawfully naturalized, and we said:
'Even if we assume the contention of the district attorney to be correct that marriage
will not make a citizen of a woman who would be excluded under our immigration laws,
it does not affect these relators.'
"We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was also
said to be inconsistent with the policy of our law that the husband should be a citizen
and the wife an alien. The distinction between that case and the one now before the
court is that, in the former case, the marriage took place before any order of exclusion
had been made, while in this the marriage was celebrated after such an order was
made. But such an order is a mere administrative provision, and has not the force of a
judgment of a court, and works no estoppel. The administrative order is based on the
circumstances that existed at the time the order of exclusion was made. If the
circumstances change prior to the order being carried into effect, it cannot be
executed. For example, if an order of exclusion should be based on the ground that
the alien was at the time afflicted with a contagious disease, and it should be made
satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual deportation, that the alien had entirely
recovered from the disease, we think it plain that the order could not be carried into
effect. So, in this case, if, after the making of the order of exclusion and while she is
permitted temporarily to remain, she in good faith marries an American citizen, we
cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that she thereby acquired, under
international law and under § 1994 of the Revised Statutes, American citizenship, and
ceased to be an alien. There upon, the immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction
over her, as that jurisdiction applies only to aliens, and not to citizens.

"In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained the
right of the officials to deport a woman under the following circumstances: She entered
this country in July, 1910, being an alien and having been born in Turkey. She was
taken into custody by the immigration authorities in the following September, and in
October a warrant for her deportation was issued. Pending hearings as to the validity
of that order, she was paroled in the custody of her counsel. The ground alleged for
her deportation was that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease at
the time of her entry. One of the reasons assigned to defeat deportation was that the
woman had married a citizen of the United States pending the proceedings for her
deportation. Judge Dodge declared himself unable to believe that a marriage under
such circumstances 'is capable of having the effect claimed, in view of the facts
shown.' He held that it was no part of the intended policy of § 1994 to annul or
override the immigration laws, so as to authorize the admission into the country of the
wife of a naturalized alien not otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien woman,
who is of a class of persons excluded by law from admission to the United States does
not come within the provisions of that section. The court relied wholly upon the dicta
contained in the Rustigian Case. No other authorities were cited.
"In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed § 1994
and held that where, pending proceedings to deport an alien native of France as an
alien prostitute, she was married to a citizen of the United States, she thereby became
a citizen, and was not subject to deportation until her citizenship was revoked by due
process of law. It was his opinion that if, as was contended, her marriage was
conceived in fraud, and was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration
laws and preventing her deportation, such fact should be established in a court of
competent jurisdiction in an action commenced for the purpose. The case was
appealed and the appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed. 1022.
"It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of the
statute by the Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty.
Gen. 402, passing upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held that residence within the
United States for the period required by the naturalization laws was not necessary in
order to constitute an alien woman a citizen, she having married a citizen of the United
States abroad, although she never resided in the United States, she and her husband
having continued to reside abroad after the marriage.
"In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an
opinion rendered by Attorney General Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman,
twenty-eight years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in New York and went at
once to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About fifteen months after
her arrival she was taken before a United States commissioner by way of instituting
proceedings under the Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat. §
4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her deportation, on the ground that she had
entered this country for the purpose of prostitution, and had been found an inmate of a
house of prostitution and practicing the same within three years after landing. It
appeared, however, that after she was taken before the United States commissioner,
but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the Department of Justice, she was lawfully
married to a native-born citizen of the United States. The woman professed at the time
of her marriage an intention to abandon her previous mode of life and to remove with
her husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life had been,
but professed to believe in her good intentions. The question was raised as to the right
to deport her, the claim being advance that by her marriage she had become an
American citizen and therefore could not be deported. The Attorney General ruled
against the right to deport her as she had become an American citizen. He held that
the words, 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized,' refer to a class or race who
 might be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions of the
naturalization laws was not required. 27 Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.
"Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our observation
that Congress, in enacting the Immigration Act of 1917, co as to provide, in § 19, 'that
the marriage to an American citizen of a female of the sexually immoral classes . . .
shall not invest such female with United States citizenship if the marriage of such alien
female shall be solemnized after her arrest or after the commission of acts which
make her liable to deportation under this act.'
"Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the law:
"(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the immoral class
avoiding deportation through the device of marrying an American citizen.
"(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen with an alien
woman of any other of the excluded classes, either before or after her detention
should not confer upon her American citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter the
country, its intention would have been expressed, and § 19 would not have been
confined solely to women of the immoral class."
Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the, subject and We have found no
warrant for the proposition that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994
of the Revised Status was meant solely as a racial bar, even if loose statements in some decisions
and other treaties and other writings on the subject would seem to give such impression. The case of
Kelly v. Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited among the first of these decisions 19 simply
held:
"As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married
to citizens of the United States, if they are of the class of persons for whose
naturalization the previous Acts of Congress provide. The terms 'married' or 'who shall
be married,' do not refer, in our judgment, to the time when the ceremony of marriage
is celebrated, but to a state of marriage. They mean that, whenever a woman, who
under previous Acts might be naturalized, is in a state of marriage to a citizen, whether
his citizenship existed at the passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the
marriage, she becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His citizenship, whenever it exists,
confers, under the Act, citizenship upon her. The construction which would restrict the
Act to women whose husbands, at the time of marriage, are citizens, would exclude
far the greater number, for whose benefit, as we think, the Act was intended. Its object,
in our opinion, was to allow her citizenship to follow that of her husband, without the
necessity of any application for naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object,
there is no reason for the restriction suggested.
"The terms, 'who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws,' only limit the
application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at
the time only required that the person applying for its benefits should be 'a free white
person,' and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.
"A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New York, in
Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is the one which gives the widest extension to its
provisions"
Note that while the court did say that "the terms, 'who might lawfully be naturalized under existing
laws' only limit the application to free white women" 20 it hastened to add that "the previous
Naturalization Act, existing at the time, . . . required that the person applying for its benefits should be
(not only) a 'free white person' (but also) . . . not an alien enemy." This is simply because under the
Naturalization Law of the United States at the time the case was decided, the disqualification of
enemy aliens had already been removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the
corresponding footnote hereof anon. In other words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the race
requirement was mentioned, the reason was that there was no other non-racial requirement or no
more alien-enemy disqualification at the time; and this is demonstrated by the fact that the court took
care to make it clear that under the previous naturalization law, there was also such requirement in
addition to race. This is important, since as stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The
expression used by Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms 'who might lawfully be naturalized
under existing laws' only limit the application of the law to free white women, must be interpreted in
the application to the special facts and to the incapacities under the then existing laws," (at p. 982)
meaning that whether or not an alien wife marrying a citizen would be a citizen was dependent, not
only on her race and nothing more necessarily, but on whether or not there were other
disqualifications under the law in force at the time of her marriage or the naturalization of her husband.
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court drew
the inference that because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by Commonwealth Act 473, it.
follows that in place of the said eliminated section, particularly its subdivision (c), being the criterion of
whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalized," what should be required is not only that
she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but that she must also possess the qualifications
enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence to the
underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or
ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local
languages, education of children in certain schools, etc., thereby implying that, in effect, said Section
2 has been purposely intended to take the place of Section 1 of Act 2927. Upon further consideration
of the proper premises, We have come to the conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently
justified.

To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already examined above of the
mentioned provisions has been shown or can be shown to indicate that such was the clear intent of
the legislature. Rather, what is definite is that Section 15 an exact copy of Section 1994 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States, which, at the time of the approval of Commonwealth Act
473 had already a settled construction by American courts and administrative authorities.
Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions quoted above, there
can be no doubt that in the construction of the identically worded provision in the Revised Statutes of
the United States, (Section 1994, which was taken from the Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities
in the United States are unanimously agreed that the qualifications of residence, good moral
character, adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be considered, and that the only
eligibility to be taken into account is that of the race or class to which the subject belongs, the
conceptual scope of which, We have just discussed. 21 In the very case of Leonard v.
Grant, supra, discussed by Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang, the explanation for such posture of the
American authorities was made thus:
"The phrase, 'shall be deemed a citizen,' in section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was in the
Act of 1855, supra, 'shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen,' while it may imply that
the person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by ordinary means or
in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application
and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that account practically any the
less a citizen. The word 'deemed' is the equivalent of 'considered' or 'judged'; and,
therefore, whatever an act of Congress requires to be 'deemed' or 'taken' as true of
any person or thing, must, in law, he considered as having been duly adjudged or
established concerning such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly.
 When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be 'deemed' an American citizen, the effect when the contingency
occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an act of Congress, or in the
usual mode thereby prescribed."
Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that in a situation
like this wherein our legislature has copied an American statute word for word, it is understood
that the construction already given to such statute before its being copied constitute part of our
own law, there seems to be no reason how We can give a different connotation or meaning to the
provision in question. At least, We have already seen that the views sustaining the contrary
conclusion appear to be based on inaccurate factual premises related to the real legislative
background of the framing of our naturalization law in its present form.
Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act
473 with the eligibility requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot bear close scrutiny from any point
of view. There is no question that Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less substantially
the same as Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-existed already with
practically the same provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the phrase
"who may be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, referred to
the so called racial requirement in Section 1 of the same Act, without regard to the provisions of
Section 3 thereof, how could the elimination of Section 1 have the effect of shifting the reference to
Section 3, when precisely, according to the American jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the
time Commonwealth Act 473 was approved, such qualifications as were embodied in said Section 3,
which had their counterpart in the corresponding American statutes, are not supposed to be taken
into account and that what should be considered only are the requirements similar to those provided
for in said Section 1 together with the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4?
Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully naturalized" in Section 15
could have been intended to convey a meaning different than that given to it by the American courts
and administrative authorities. As already stated, Act 3448 which contained said phrase and from
which it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By that time, Section 1994 of
the Revised Statutes of the United States was no longer in force because it had been repealed
expressly the Act of September 22, 1922 which did away with the automatic naturalization of alien
wives of American citizens and required, instead, that they submit to regular naturalization
proceedings, albeit under more liberal terms than those of other applicants. In other words, when our
legislature adopted the phrase in question, which, as already demonstrated, had a definite
construction in American law, the Americans had already abandoned said phraseology in favor of a
categorical compulsion for alien wives to be naturalized judicially. Simple logic would seem to dictate
that, since our lawmakers, at the time of the approval of Act 3448, had two choices, one to adopt the
phraseology of Section 1994 with its settled construction and the other to follow the new posture of
the Americans of requiring judicial naturalization, and it appears that they have opted for the first, We
have no alternative but to conclude that our law still follows the old or previous American law on the
subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473 was approved in 1939, the Philippine Legislature,
already autonomous then from the American Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the old
American law and make one of our own, or, at least, follow the trend of the Act of the U.S. Congress
of 1922, but still, our legislators chose to maintain the language of the old law. What then is
significantly important is not that the legislature maintained said phraseology after Section 1 of Act
2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after the Americans had amended
their law in order to provide for what is now contended to be the construction that should be given to
the phrase in question. Stated differently, had our legislature adopted a phrase from an American
statute before the American courts had given it a construction which was acquiesced to by those
given upon to apply the same, it would be possible for Us to adopt a construction here different from
that of the Americans, but as things stand, the fact is that our legislature borrowed the phrase when
there was already a settled construction thereof, and what is more, it appears that our legislators
even ignored the modification of the American law and persisted in maintaining the old phraseology.
Under these circumstances, it would be in defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory
construction to say that Section 15 has a nationalistic and selective orientation and that it should be
construed independently of the previous American posture because of the difference of
circumstances here and in the United States. It is always safe to say that in the construction of a
statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or perspective when the demonstrated legislative point
of view seems to indicate otherwise.
5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in reality and in effect, the
so-called racial requirements, whether under the American laws or the Philippine laws, have hardly
been considered as qualifications in the same sense as those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927
and later in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More accurately, they have always been considered
as disqualifications, in the sense that those who did not possess them were the ones who could not
"be lawfully naturalized," just as if they were suffering from any of the disqualifications under Section
2 of Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally, are
practically identical to those in the former law, except those in paragraphs (f) and (h) of the
latter. 22 Indeed, such is the clear impression anyone will surely get after going over all the American
decisions and opinions quoted and/or cited in the latest USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-
602, and the first decisions of this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing
with approval the opinions of the Secretary of Justice. 23 Such being the case, that is, that the so-
called racial requirements were always treated as disqualifications in the same light as the other
disqualifications under the law, why should their elimination not be viewed or understood as a
subtraction from or a lessening of the disqualifications? Why should such elimination have instead the
meaning that what were previously considered as irrelevant qualifications have become
disqualifications, as seems to be the import of the holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the
retention in Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 of the same language of what used to be Section
13 (a) of Act 2927 (as amended by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of the
latter, necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making the phrase in question "who may
be lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any racial disqualification but to the qualification under
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were two groups of
persons that could not be naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and those falling under
Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1, could not have
had, by any process of reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing the disqualifications
that used to be before such elimination. We cannot see by what alchemy of logic such elimination
could have converted qualifications into disqualifications, specially in the light of the fact that, after all,
these are disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law distinctly and separately from
qualifications and, as already demonstrated, in American jurisprudence, qualifications had never been
considered to be of any relevance in determining "who might be lawfully naturalized," as such phrase
is used in the statute governing the status of alien wives of American citizens, and our law on the
matter was merely copied verbatim from the American statutes.

6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and judicial opinions,
whether here or in the United States, there are practical considerations that militate towards the same
conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion for reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated
February 23, 1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra:
"Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove 'qualifications —
"There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction that
Section 15 of the law requires that an alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove
that she possesses the qualifications prescribed under Section 2, before she may be
deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an alien wife, becomes
unreasonably onerous and compliance therewith manifestly difficult. The
unreasonableness of such requirement is shown by the following:
"1. One of the qualifications required of an applicant for naturalization under
Section 2 of the law is that the applicant 'must have resided in the Philippines
for a continuous period of not less than ten years.' If this requirement is applied
to an alien wife married to a Filipino citizen, this means that for a period of ten
years at least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her husband. If the
wife happens to be a citizen of a country whose law declares that upon her
marriage to a foreigner she automatically loses her citizenship and acquires the
citizenship of her husband, this could mean that for a period of ten years at
least, she would be stateless. And even after having acquired continuous
residence in the Philippines for ten years, there is no guarantee that her petition
for naturalization will be granted, in which case she would remain stateless for
an indefinite period of time.
"2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for naturalization that
he 'must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand
pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation.' Considering the constitutional prohibition
against acquisition by an alien of real estate except in cases of hereditary
succession (Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife desiring to acquire the
citizenship of her husband must have to prove that she has a lucrative income
derived from a lawful trade, profession or occupation. The income requirement
has been interpreted to mean that the petitioner herself must be the one to
possess the said income. (Uy v. Republic, L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong
vs. Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L-20912,
November 29, 1965). In other words, the wife must prove that she has a
lucrative income derived from sources other than her husband's trade,
profession or calling. It is of common knowledge, and judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that most wives in the Philippines do not have gainful
occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the dependence
of the wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter the duty of supporting
the former. (Art. 291, Civil Code). It should be borne in mind that universally, it
is an accepted concept that when a woman marries, her primary duty is to be a
wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be remiss in this duty,
how can she hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own to qualify her for
citizenship?
"3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization 'must have
enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Office of the Private Education of the Philippines,
where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as
part of the school curriculum during the entire period of residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization
as Philippine citizen.' If an alien woman has minor children by a previous
marriage to another alien before she marries a Filipino, and such minor children
had not been enrolled in Philippine schools during her period of residence in
the country, she cannot qualify for naturalization under the interpretation of this
Court. The reason behind the requirement that children should be enrolled in
recognized educational institutions is that they follow the citizenship of their
father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-5666, March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic,
 88 Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668 [950]; Yap Chin v.
Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953; Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26,
1950). Considering that said minor children by her first husband generally
follow the citizenship of their alien father, the basis for such requirement as
applied to her does not exist. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.
"4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence prescribed by
Section 2 'shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner (who
is) married to a Filipino woman.' It is absurd that an alien male married to a
Filipino wife should be required to reside only for five years in the Philippines to
qualify for citizenship, whereas an alien woman married to a Filipino husband
must reside for ten years.
"Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien wife
related by marriage to a Filipino citizen to become such citizen, than for a foreigner
who is not so related. And yet, it seems more than clear that the general purpose of
the first paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien woman, by
reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens. It
will be recalled that prior to the enactment of Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act No.
2927 (the old Naturalization Law), there was no law granting any special privilege to
alien wives of Filipinos. They were treated as any other foreigner. It was precisely to
remedy this situation that the Philippine legislature enacted Act No. 3448. On this
point, the observation made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is enlightening:
'It is true that under Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife follows the
nationality of the husband; but the Department of State of the United States on
October 31, 1921, ruled that the alien wife of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino
citizen, pointing out that our Supreme Court in the leading case of Roa v.
Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil Code
being political have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine Islands
to the United States. Accordingly, the stand taken by the Attorney-General prior
to the enactment of Act No. 3448, was that marriage of alien women to
Philippine citizens did not make the former citizens of this country.' (Op. Atty.
Gen., March 16, 1928).
'To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 5448 was enacted in 1928
adding section 13(a) to Act No. 2997 which provides that "any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine
Islands.' (Op. No. 22, s. 1941; emphasis ours)
"If Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this Court
did, in such a way as to require that the alien wife must prove the qualifications
prescribed in Section 2, the privilege granted to alien wives would become illusory. It
is submitted that such a construction, being contrary to the manifested object of the
statute, must be rejected.
'A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the
language is susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the
other defeat such manifest object, it should receive the former construction.' (In
re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 45 A. 1051; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S.
333, 89 L. ed. 285. See also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 [1911]; U. S. v.
Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 [1910]).
 '. . . A construction which will cause objectionable results should be avoided
and the court will, if possible, place on the statute a construction which will not
result in injustice, and in accordance with the decisions construing statutes, a
construction which will result in oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will
also be avoided, as will a construction which will prejudice public interest, or
construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will
result in absurd consequences.'
'So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an
apparent inconsistency in legislative intent, as has been determined by the
judicial decisions, or which would result in futility, redundancy, or a conclusion
not contemplated by the legislature; and the court should adopt that
construction which will be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly
shown to have been the intention of the legislature, an interpretation which
would render the requirements of the statute uncertain and vague is to be
avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer an
illusory right . . .' (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp. 623-632)."
7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need for aligning the
construction of Section 15 with "the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship."
But the question may be asked, is it reasonable to suppose that in the pursuit of such policy, the
legislature contemplated to make it more difficult, if not practically impossible in some instances, for
an alien woman marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than any ordinary applicant for naturalization,
as has just been demonstrated above? It seems but natural and logical to assume that Section 15
was intended to extend special treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino irrevocably
deliver themselves, their possessions, their fate and fortunes and all that marriage implies to a citizen
of this country, "for better or for worse." Perhaps there can and will be cases wherein the personal
conveniences and benefits arising from Philippine citizenship may motivate such marriage, but must
the minority, as such cases are bound to be, serve as the criterion for the construction of law?
Moreover, it is not farfetched to believe that in joining a Filipino family, the alien woman is somehow
disposed to assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos among whom, after all, she has to
live and associate, but surely, no one should expect her to do so even before marriage. Besides, it
may be considered that in reality the extension of citizenship to her is made by the law not so much
for her sake as for the husband. Indeed, We find the following observations anent the national policy
rationalization in Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite persuasive:

"We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the question.
The avowed policy of 'selective admission' more particularly refers to a case where
citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such
a case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those
who are worthy to become citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or
rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy finds no application in cases
where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts have
no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operation of law
proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the courts
cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an
individual who is able to prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is a citizen of the
Philippines, 'irrespective of his moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification
with Filipino ideals, customs, and traditions.' A minor child of a person naturalized
under the law, who is able to prove the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is likewise a
citizen, regardless of whether he has lucrative income, or he adheres to the principles
of the Constitution. So it is with an alien wife of a Philippine citizen. She is required to
 prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the
disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her
citizenship status as a fact.
"A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in this
regard, for it explains and justifies the obviously deliberate choice of words. It is
universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien
wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of
allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N.
W. 640 [1925]; see also 'Convention on the Nationality of Married Women: Historical
Background and Commentary.' UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and
Social Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only be satisfactorily
achieved by allowing the wife to acquire citizenship derivatively through the husband.
This is particularly true in the Philippines where tradition and law has placed the
husband as head of the family, whose personal status and decisions govern the life of
the family group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the unity and solidarity
of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose preservation of State as a vital and
enduring interest. (See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by tradition in
our country, there is a theoretic identity of person and interest between husband and
wife, and from the nature of the relation, the home of one is that of the other. (See De
la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that because of the theoretic
identity of husband and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of
husband should be the nationality of the wife, and the laws upon one should be the
law upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v. Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A.,
1, 130 Fed. 839, held: 'The status of the wife follows that of the husband, . . . and by
virtue of her marriage her husband's domicile became her domicile.' And the
presumption under Philippine law being that the property relations of husband and
wife are under the regime of conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of
one is also that of the other.
"It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity
that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national
treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the
husband's interests in property and business activities reserved by law to citizens
should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she
herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire
such interests. Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be
refused recognition, and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should
only be in the instances where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law." (Motion for Reconsideration, Burca
vs. Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned
that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and
construed when the phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized," found in the American statute from
which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts and administrative
authorities. There is merit, of course, in the view that Philippine statutes should be construed in the
light of Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization laws. We should
realize the disparity in the circumstances between the United States, as the so-called "melting pot" of
peoples from all over the world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is
nationalistic almost in the extreme. Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather
passionately insisting that our jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to American
authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration and respect, should not be regarded as source of pride
and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of
law now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily
from American law when the Philippines was under the dominating influence of statutes of the United
States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's
and 1930's that given the opportunity to break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in
that direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of September
22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the United States without
undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law
of August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, which, it is
worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly understood as conferring American citizenship to
alien women marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to any naturalization
proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the special qualifications of residence,
moral character, adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided they show they
did not suffer from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law.
Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding,
that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes
his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under
said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be instances
where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by entering into
fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just
because of these possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise than as dictated
inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and practical. There can always
be means of discovering such undesirable practices and every case can be dealt with accordingly as
it arises.
III.
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of this Court in
Burca, supra, regarding the need of judicial naturalization proceedings before the alien wife of a
Filipino may herself be considered or deemed a Filipino. If this case which, as already noted, was
submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the foregoing
discussions would have been sufficient to dispose of it. The Court could have held that despite her
apparent lack of qualifications, her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her
undergoing any naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain her claim that she is not
disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as things stand now, with the Burca ruling, the question
We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina without submitting to a naturalization
proceeding?
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must necessarily be in
the affirmative. As already stated, however, the decision in Burca has not yet become final because
there is still pending with Us a motion for its reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy
of serious consideration by this Court. On this account, and for the reasons expounded earlier in this
opinion, this case is as good an occasion as any other to re-examine the issue.
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:
"We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be
a citizen of this country must apply therefore by filing a petition for citizenship reciting
that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said
 petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at
least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by
any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise — other than the
judgment of a competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien wife of
the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.

"3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a
'petition for citizenship'. This is as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will
reveal at once that efforts were made to act forth therein. and to prove afterwards,
compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization law. The trial court
itself apparently considered the petition as one for naturalization, and, in fact, declared
petitioner 'a citizen of the Philippines.'"
In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to be vested with
Filipino citizenship, it is not enough that she possesses the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of
the law and none of the disqualifications enumerated in its Section 4. Over and above all these, she
has to pass thru the whole process of judicial naturalization, apparently from declaration of intention
to oath-taking, before she can become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a Filipino is
absolutely of no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband; she remains to
be the national of the country to which she owed allegiance before her marriage, and if she desires to
be of one nationality with her husband, she has to wait for the same time that any other applicant for
naturalization needs to complete, the required period of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of
English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, make her children study in Filipino
schools, acquire real property or engage in some lawful occupation of her own independently of her
husband, file her declaration of intention and after one year her application for naturalization, with the
affidavits of two credible witnesses of her good moral character and other qualifications, etc., etc.,
until a decision is rendered in her favor, after which, she has to undergo the two years of probation,
and only then, but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will she begin to be considered and
deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines. Briefly; she can become a Filipino citizen only by judicial
declaration.
Such being the import of, the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other hand, upon a
cursory reading of the provision, in question, that the law intends by it to spell out what is the "effect of
naturalization on (the) wife and children" of an alien, as plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch as
the language of the provision itself clearly conveys the thought that some effect beneficial to the wife
is intended by it, rather than that she is not in any manner to be benefited thereby, it behooves Us to
take a second hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the Court might have overlooked
any relevant consideration warranting a conclusion different from that contained therein. It is
undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave importance, considering its consequences upon tens
of thousands of persons affected by the ruling therein made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to
avoid, whenever possible, that Our decision in any case should produce any adverse effect upon
them not contemplated either by the law or by the national policy it seeks to enforce.
AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and standing in the
Bar and well known for their reputation for intellectual integrity, legal acumen and incisive and
comprehensive resourcefulness in research, truly evident in the quality of the memorandum they
have submitted in said case, invite Our attention to the impact of the decision therein thus:
"The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present case
— that an alien woman who marries a Philippine citizen not only does not ipso
facto herself become a citizen but can acquire such citizenship only through ordinary
naturalization proceedings under the Revised Naturalization Law, and that all
 administrative actions 'certifying or declaring' such woman to be a Philippine citizen
are 'null and void' — has consequences that reach far beyond the confines of the
present case. Considerably more people are affected, and affected deeply, than
simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca. The newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand
women married to Philippine citizens are affected by this decision of the Court. These
are women of many and diverse nationalities, including Chinese, Spanish, British,
American, Columbian, Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These members of the
community, some of whom have been married to citizens for two or three decades,
have all exercised rights and privileges reserved by law to Philippine citizens. They will
have acquired, separately or in conjugal partnership with their citizen husbands, real
property, and they will have sold and transferred such property. Many of these women
may be in professions membership in which is limited to citizens. Others are doubtless
stockholders or officers or employees in companies engaged in business activities for
which a certain percentage of Filipino equity content is prescribed by law. All these
married women are now faced with possible divestment of personal status and of
rights acquired and privileges exercised in reliance, in complete good faith, upon a
reading of the law that has been accepted as correct for more than two decades by
the very agencies of government charged with the administration of that law. We must
respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which would visit such comprehensive and
far-reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of Philippine citizens deserve intensive
scrutiny and re-examination."
To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan Tsitung vs.
Republic, G.R. No L-20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401—when Chief Justice Concepcion
observed:
"The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado cases —
although referring to situations the equities of which are not identical to those
obtaining in the case at bar — may have contributed materially to the irregularities
committed therein and in other analogous cases, and induced the parties concerned
to believe, although erroneously, that the procedure followed was valid under the law.
"Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration, the
Solicitor General was required, not only, to comment thereon, but, also, to state 'how
many cases there are, like the one at bar, in which certificates of naturalization have
been issued after notice of the filing of the petition for naturalization had been
published in the Official Gazette only once, within the periods (a) from January 28,
1950' (when the decision in Delgado v. Republic was promulgated) 'to May 29, 1957'
(when the Ong Son Cui was decided) 'and (b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29,
1965' (when the decision in the present case was rendered).
"After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's
motion for reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the Government, as well as of
the data contained in the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong
Son Cui case shall apply and affect the validity of certificates of naturalization
issued after, not on or before May 29, 1957."
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to expressly enjoin the
prospective application of its construction of the law made in a previous decision 24 which had
already become final, to serve the ends of justice and equity. In the case at bar, We do not have to go
that far. As already observed, the decision in Burca is still under reconsideration, while the ruling in
Lee Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and other that followed them have at the most become
the law of the case only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds therefor, all We have to do
now is to re-examine the said rulings and clarify them.
For ready reference, We requote Section 15:
"Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children .— Any woman who is now
or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
"Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be consider citizens thereof.
"A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of naturalization of
the parents, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor
child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be
deemed a Philippines citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be
a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
"A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be
considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of
minority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate
of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance."
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Revised Naturalization
Law or Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole is to establish a complete procedure for the judicial
conferment of the of the status of citizenship upon qualified aliens. After having out such a procedure,
remarkable for its elaborate and careful inclusion of all safeguards against the possibility of any
undesirable persons becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the
consequence of the naturalization of an alien undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon members
of his immediate family, his wife and children, 25 and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it ordains that:
(a) all his minor children who have been born in the Philippines shall be "considered citizens" also; (b)
all such minor children, if born outside the Philippines but dwelling here at the time of such
naturalization "shall automatically become" Filipinos also, but those not born in the Philippines and
not in the Philippines at the time of such naturalization, are also "deemed citizens" of this country
provided that they shall lose said status if they transfer their permanent residence to a foreign country
before becoming of age; (c) all such minor children, if born outside of the Philippines after such
naturalization, shall also be "considered" Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate themselves by failing
to register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American) Consulate of the country where they reside and
take the necessary oath of allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines" if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized". 26

No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that the minor
children, failing within the conditions of place and time of birth and residence prescribed in the
provision, are vested with Philippines citizenship directly by legislative fiat or by force of the law itself
and without the need for any judicial proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192 SCRA). Indeed, the
language of the provision is not susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is claimed that the same
expression "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to the wife, does not
necessarily connote the vesting of citizenship status upon her by legislative fiat because the
antecedent phrase requiring that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" implies
that such status is intended to attach only after she has undergone the whole process of judicial
naturalization required of any person desiring to become a Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling
in Burca is that while Section 15 envisages and intends legislative naturalization as to the minor
children, the same section deliberately treats the wife differently and leaves her out for ordinary
judicial naturalization.
Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional authority of the Congress
of the Philippines to confer or vest citizenship status by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169
U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961
ed.] ) In fact, it has done so for particular individuals, like two foreign religious prelates, 27 hence
there is no reason it cannot do it for classes or groups of persons under general conditions applicable
to all of the members of such class or group, like women who marry Filipinos, whether native-born or
naturalized. The issue before Us in this case is whether or not the legislature has done so in the
disputed provisions of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the
most respected authorities on political law in the Philippines 28 observes in this connection thus: " A
special form of naturalization is often observed by some states with respect to women. Thus in the
Philippines a foreign woman married to a Filipino citizen becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she
belongs to any of the classes who may apply for naturalization under the Philippine Laws" (Sinco, Phil.
Political Law 498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is substantially reiterated in the
1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua , supra.)
More importantly, it may be stated at this juncture, that in construing the provision of the United
States statutes from which our law has been copies, 28a the American citizenship by choice but by
operation of law. "In the Revised Statutes the words 'and taken' are omitted. The effect of this statute
is that every alien woman who marries a citizen of the United States becomes perforce a citizen
herself, without the formality of naturalization, and regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p.
601 [1970 ed.], citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239
U.S. 299, 60 L ed. 297.)
We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as paragraph (a) of
Section 13, by way of an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and that , in turn,
and paragraph was copied verbatim from Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,
which by that time already had a long accepted construction among the courts and administrative
authorities in that country holding that under such provision an alien woman who married a citizen
became, upon such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and as a consequence of the
marriage itself without having to undergo any naturalization proceedings, provided that it could be
shown that at the time of such marriage, she was not disqualified to be naturalized under the laws
then in force. To repeat the discussion We already made of these undeniable facts would
unnecessarily make this decision doubly extensive. The only point which might be reiterated for
emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the United States, the American Congress, recognizing
the uniform construction of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it
desirable to avoid the effects of such construction, approved the Act of September 22, 1922 explicitly
requiring all such alien wives to submit to judicial naturalization, albeit under more liberal terms than
those for other applicants for citizenship, on the other hand, the Philippines Legislature, instead of
following suit and adopting a requirement, enacted Act 3448 on November 30, 1928 which copied
verbatim the aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its preferences
to adopts the latter law and its settled constitution rather than the reform introduced by the Act of
1992.
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel that as the United
States herself has evidently found it to be an improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis the alien
wives of her citizens to discontinue their automatic incorporation into the body of her citizenry without
passing through the judicial scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding, as it used to be before 1922, it
seems but proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a developing country, the
Philippines adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which our own legislature has enacted
our laws on the subject, as recounted above, provides no basis for Us to construe said law along the
line of the 1922 modification of the American Law. For Us to do so would be to indulge in judicial
legislation which it is not constitutionally permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this Court would be
going precisely against the grain of the implicit Legislative intent.
There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite clearly implied
that this Court is of the view that under Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow and children
of an applicant for naturalization who dies during the proceeding do not have to submit themselves to
another naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the proceedings involving the
husband. Section 16 provides:
"SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. — In case a
petitioner should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor
children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far
same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner."
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383 this Court held:
"Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1) that
under said Sec. 16, the widow and minor children are allowed to continue the same
proceedings and are not substituted for the original petitioner; (2) that the
qualifications of the original petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of the widow
and minor children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies whether the petitioner dies
before or after final decision is rendered, but before the judgment becomes executory.
"There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence of said
Section 16 contemplates the fact that the qualifications of the original petitioner
remains the subject of inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that "The decision
rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned,
produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the
petitioner.' This phraseology emphasizes the intent of the law to continue the
proceedings with the deceased as the theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it
would have been unnecessary to consider the decision rendered, as far as it effected
the widow and the minor children.
xxx xxx xxx
"The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead person can
not be bound to do things stipulated in the oath of allegiance, because an oath is a
personal matter. Therein, the widow prayed that she be allowed to take the oath of
allegiance for the deceased. IN the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin merely asked that
she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance and the proper certificate of
naturalization, once the naturalization proceedings of her deceased husband, shall
have been completed, not on behalf of the deceased, but on her own behalf and of
her children, as recipients of the benefits of his naturalization. In other words, the
herein petitioner proposed to take the oath of allegiance, as a citizen of the Philippines,
by virtue of the legal provision that 'any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons naturalized under this
law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.'
(Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473). The decision granting citizenship to Lee Pa
and the record of the case at bar, do not show that the petitioning widow could not
have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee Pa filed his petition, apart from the fact
that his 9 minor children were all born in the Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of the
P)etition of Lee Pa to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287,
CFI, Manila, Annex A; Record on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The reference for Chua case is,
therefore, premature."
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that
the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and
there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.

Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion for reconsideration
in Burca, and We see no reason to disagree with the following views of counsel:
"It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be
considered citizens of the Philippines. It is a proposition too plain to be disputed that
Congress has the power not only to prescribe the mode or manner under which
foreigners may acquire citizenship, but also the very power of conferring citizenship by
legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890 [1898]; see 1
Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippine citizens ed.]). The constitutional
itself recognizes as Philippines citizens 'Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law' (Section 1[5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under
this provision, include not only those who are naturalized in accordance with legal
proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship
by 'derivative naturalization' or by operation of law, as. for example, the 'naturalization'
of an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien
woman to a citizen. (See Tañada & Carreon, op.cit supra, at 152 172; Velayo,
Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]: 1 Paras, Civil code 186 [1967
ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 3).
"The phrase 'shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines found in Section 14 of
the Revised Naturalization Law clearly manifests an intent to confer citizenship.
Construing a similar phrase found in the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised Statutes,
1994) , American courts have uniformly taken it to mean that upon her marriage, the
alien woman becomes by operation of law a citizen of the United States as fully as if
she had complied with all the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of
naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S. Opinions of the US Attorney General
dated June 4, 1874 [14 Op. 402], July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28
Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 209] and Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398] ).
'The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen, " in Section 1994 Revised Statute (U.S.
Comp. Stat. 1091 1268) or as it was in the Act of 1855 910 Stat. at L. 604,
Chapt. 71, Sec. 2), "shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen", while it may
imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by
the ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent
court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such
person is on that account practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed"
is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged," and therefore, whatever an Act of
Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing
must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or established
concerning such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When,
therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be "deemed" an American to her being naturalized directly by
an Act of Congress or in the usual mode thereby prescribed.' (Van Dyne,
Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and
Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.] ; italics ours).
"That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted the first
paragraph of Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization provision. In its entirely, Section
15 reads:
(See supra)
The phrases 'shall be deemed,' shall be considered,' and 'shall automatically become,'
as used in the above provision , are undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or
purpose of the provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon
certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood affinity,
to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of
relationship of the persons enumerated in the provision concurs related, the effect is
for said persons to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. 'Ipso facto' as here
used does not mean that all alien wives and all minor children of Philippine citizens,
from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily become such citizens also. Those who
do not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must
apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is
that in respect of those persons numerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen
of the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the points of time at which such
citizenship commences. Thus, under the second paragraph of Section 15, a minor
child of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who was born in the Philippines, becomes
ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines from the time the fact of relationship concurs with
the fact of a citizenship of his parent, and the time when child became a citizen does
not depend upon the time that he is able to prove that he was born in the Philippines.
The child may prove some 25 years after the naturalization of his father that he was
born in the Philippines and should, therefore, be 'considered' a citizen thereof. It does
not mean that he became a Philippine citizen only at that later time. Similarly, an alien
woman who married a Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years
after her marriage (perhaps, because it was only 25 years after the marriage that her
citizenship status became in question), that she is one who 'might herself be lawfully
naturalized.' It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship
only after she had proven that she 'might herself be lawfully naturalized.'
"The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology
of the law , the legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be
deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be
lawfully naturalized' is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of
citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship
as a factum probandum i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word
'might,' as used in that phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her marriage to a
Philippine citizen, the alien woman 'had (the) power' to become such a citizen herself
under the laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen,
power long after her marriage does not alter the fact that at her marriage, she became
a citizen.
"(This Court has held) that 'an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status
of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully
naturalized' (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view, the acquisition' of citizenship by the
alien wife depends on her having proven her qualifications for citizenship, that is, she
is not a lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words of the law that the proviso does
not mean that she must first prove that deemed (by Congress, not by the courts) a
citizen. Even the 'uniform' decisions cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to support its holding
did not rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen only after she has proven her
 qualifications for citizenship. What those decisions ruled was that the alien wives in
those cases failed to prove their qualifications and therefore they failed to establish
their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [1957], the case
was remanded to the lower court for determination of whether petitioner, whose claim
to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was disputed by the Government, 'might herself
be lawfully naturalized,' for the purpose of 'proving her alleged change of political
status from alien to citizen' (at 464). In Cua v. Board, 101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien
wife who was being deported, claimed she was a Philippine citizen by marriage to a
Filipino. This Court finding that there was no proof that she was not disqualified under
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law, ruled that: 'No such evidence appearing
on record, the claim of assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon
her marriage to petitioner, is untenable.' (at 523) It will be observed that in these
decisions cited by this Court, the lack of proof that the alien wives 'might (themselves)
be lawfully naturalized' did not necessarily imply that they did not become, in truth and
in fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos. What the decisions merely held was
that these wives failed to establish their claim to that status as a proven fact.
"In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when
citizenship is conferred should not be confused with the time when citizenship status is
established as a proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
whose citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would be required to prove,
for instance, that his father is a citizen of the Philippines in order to factually establish
his claim to citizenship. ***His citizenship status commences from the time of birth,
although his claim thereto is established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise,
an alien woman who might herself be a lawfully naturalized becomes a Philippine
citizen at the time of her marriage to a Filipino husband, not at the time she is able to
establish that status as a proven fact by showing that she might herself be lawfully
naturalized. Indeed, there is no difference between a statutory declaration that a
person is deemed a citizen of the Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a
declaration that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines
provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an alien woman married to a
Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself be lawfully naturalized.
Both become citizens by operation of law; the former becomes a citizen ipso facto
upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.

"It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be lawfully
naturalized, it cannot be said that she has established her status as a proven fact. But
neither can it be said that on account, she did not become a citizen of the Philippines.
If her citizenship status is not questioned in any legal proceeding, she obviously has
no obligation to establish her status as a fact. In such a case, the presumption of law
should be what she claims to be. (U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905] : Hilado v. Assad,
51 O.G. 4527 [1955] ). There is a presumption that a representation shown to have
been made is true. (Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738 A. 369,
111 ME. 321)."
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what substitute
is there for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter
of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it
everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right
reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that as the laws of our country, both
substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure, but such is no proof that the
citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born
Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or
administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as
to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out
again and again as the occasion may demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in which Justice
Dizon referred to "appropriate proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good
sense and judgment of those subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort easier or
simpler for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent official findings, even if
these are not really binding.
It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point and so that the
most immediate relevant public records may be kept in order the following observations in Opinion No.
38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as the
most appropriate initial step by the interested parties.
"Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau
of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation
of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married
to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's
citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon
the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint
affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does
not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming
naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision
granting or denying the petition."
Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien, there will
probably be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding,
depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the opposition.
Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed upon was not touched
by the trial court, but as the point is decisive in this case, the Court prefers that the matter be settled
once and for all now.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants' petition
for injunction is hereby reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized
representative is permanently enjoined from causing the arrest and deportation and the confiscation
of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen
from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim,
a Filipino citizen of January 25, 1962. No costs.
Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ ., concur.
Makalintal J ., reserves his separate concurring opinion.
Fernando, J ., concurs except as the interpretation accorded some American decisions as to which
he is not fully persuaded.
APPENDIX
The following review of all naturalization statutes of the United States from 1790 to 1970 ravel: (1)
that aside from race, various other disqualifications have also been provided for in the said statutes
from time to time, although it was only in 1906 that the familiar and usual grounds of disqualification,
like not being anarchists, polygamists, etc. were incorporated therein, and (2) that qualifications of
applicants for naturalization also varied from time to time.
 A — DISQUALIFICATIONS
1. In the first naturalization statute of March 26, 1790, only a "free white person" could be naturalized,
provided he was not "proscribed" by any state, unless it be with the consent of such state. (Chap. V. 1
Stat. 103)
2. In the Act of January 29, 1795, to the same provisions was added the disqualification of those
"legally convicted of having joined the army of Great Britain, during the late war." (Chap. XX, 1 Stat.
414).
3. In the Act of June 18, 1798, Section 1 thereto provided:
"SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That no alien shall be admitted to become
a citizen of the United States, or of any state, unless in the manner prescribed by the
act, entitled 'An Act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization; and to repeal the act
heretofore passed on that subject, 'he shall have declared his intention to become a
citizen of the United States, five years, at least, before his admission, and shall, at the
time of his application to be admitted, declare and prove, to the satisfaction of the
court having jurisdiction in the case, that he has resided within the United States
fourteen years, at least, and within the state or territory where, or for which such court
is at the time held five years, at least, besides conforming to the other declarations,
renunciations and proofs, by the said act required, any thing therein to the contrary
hereof notwithstanding: Provided, that any alien, who was residing within the limelights,
and under the jurisdiction of the United States, before the twenty-ninth day of January,
one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five, may, within one year after the passing of
this act—and any alien who shall have made the declaration of his intention to
become a citizen of the United States, in conformity to the provisions of the act,
entitled 'An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the act
heretofore passed on that subject,' may, within four years after having made the
declaration aforesaid, be admitted to become a citizen, in the manner prescribed by
the said act, upon his making proof that he has resided five years, at least, within the
limits, and under the jurisdiction of the United States: And provided also, that no alien,
who shall be a native, citizen, denizen or subject of any nation or state with whom the
United States shall be at war, at the time of his application, shall be then admitted to
become a citizen of the United States."
There is here no mention of "white persons." (Chap. LIV, 1 Stat. 566).
4. In the Act of April 14, 1802, mentioned in Kelly v. Owen, supra, reference was made again to "free
white persons," and the same enemy alien and "state-proscribed" disqualifications in the former
statutes were carried over. (Chap. XXVIII, 2 Stat. 153.)
5. The Act of March 26, 1804 provided in its Section 1 thus:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That any alien, being a free white person, who was
residing within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States, at any time
between the eighteenth day of June, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight,
and the fourteenth day of April one thousand eight hundred and two, and who has
continued to reside within the same, may be admitted to become a citizen of the
United States, without a compliance with the first condition specified in the first section
of the act, entitled 'An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal
the acts heretofore passed on that subject.' "
In its Section 2, this Act already provided that:
 "SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That when any alien who shall have complied with
the first condition specified in ,the first section of the said original act, and who shall
have pursued the directions prescribed in the second section of the said act, may die,
before he is actually naturalized, the widow and the children of such alien shall be
considered as citizens of the United States, and shall be entitled to rights and
privileges as such, upon taking the oaths prescribed by law." (CHAP. XLVII, 2 Stat.
292)
6. In the Act of July 30, 1813, the disqualification of enemy aliens was removed as follows:
"CHAP. XXXVI. — An Act supplementary to the acts heretofore passed on
the subject of an uniform rule of naturalization. (a)
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That persons resident within the United States, or
the territories thereof, on the eighteenth day of June, in the year one thousand eight
hundred and twelve, who had before that day made declaration according to law, of
their intention to become citizens of the United States, or who by the existing laws of
the United States, were on that day entitled to become citizens, without making such
declaration, may be admitted to become citizens thereof, notwithstanding they shall be
alien enemies at the times and in the manner prescribed by the laws heretofore
passed on that subject: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be taken or
construed to interfere with or prevent the apprehension and removal, agreeably to law,
of any alien enemy at any time previous to the actual naturalization of such alien."
(Chap. XXXVI, 3 Stat. 53)

7. Neither the Act of March 22, 1816 nor those of May 26, 1824 and May 24, 1828 made any change
in the above requirements. (Chap. XXXII, 3 Stat. 258; Chap. CLXX-XVI, 4 Stat. 69; and Chap. CXVI,
4 Stat. 310).
8. Then the Act of February 10, 1855, important because it gave alien wives of citizens ,the status of
citizens, was enacted providing:
"CHAP. LXXI. — An Act to secure the Right of Citizenship to Children of Citizens of
the United States born out of the Limits thereof.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That persons heretofore born, or hereafter to be
born, out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or shall
be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, shall be deemed and
considered and are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided,
however, That the rights of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers
never resided in the United States.
"SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That any woman who might lawfully be naturalized
under the existing laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the United
States, shall loyal be deemed and taken to be a citizen." (Chap. LXXI, 10 Stat. 604.)
9. The Act of July 14, 1870 mainly provided only for penalties for certain acts related to naturalization,
as punished thereby, but added in its Section 7 "that the naturalization laws are hereby extended to
aliens of African nativity and to African descent." (Chap. CCLIV, 16 Stat. 254.)
10. The Act of February 1, 1876 contained no relevant amendment. (Chap. 5, 19 Stat. 2.)
11. When the statutes of the United States were revised on June 22, 1874, the naturalization law of
the country was embodied in Sections 2165-2174 of saddle Revised Statutes. This contained no
racial disqualification. In fact, it reenacted ;Section 2 of the Act of February 10, 1855 as its Section
1994 thereof, thus:
"SEC. 1994. Any person who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen." (18 Stat. 351.)
12. The Act of May 6, 1882 provided expressly that no State court or court of the United State shall
admit Chinese to citizenship. (Chap. 126, Sec. 14, 22 Stat. , 61.)
13. The Act of August 9, 1888 extended the benefits of American citizenship to Indian woman married
to Americans thus:
"CHAP. 818. — An Act in relation to marriage between white men and Indian women.
"Be it enacted, That no white man, not otherwise a member of any tribe of Indians,
who may hereafter marry, an Indian woman, member of any Indian tribe in the United
States, or any of its Territories except the five civilized tribes in the Indian Territory,
shall by such marriage hereafter acquire any right to any tribal property, privilege, or
interest whatever to which any member of such tribe is entitled.
"SEC. 2. That every Indian woman, member of any such tribe of Indians, who may
hereafter be married to any citizen of the United States, is hereby declared to become
by such marriage a citizen of the United States, with all the right, privileges, and
immunities of any such citizen, being a married woman:
"Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall impair or in any way affect the right
or title of such married woman to any tribal property or any interest therein.
"SEC. 2. That whenever the marriage of any white man with any Indian woman, a
member of any such tribe of Indians, is required or offered to be proved in any
judicial ,proceeding, evidence of the admission of such fact by the party against whom
the proceeding is had, or evidence of general repute, or of cohabitation as married
persons, or any other circumstantial or presumptive evidence from which the fact may
be inferred, shall be competent. (Aug. 9, 1888) " [25 Stat. 392, Suppl. 1.]
14. The Act of April 19, 1900 extended American citizenship to all citizens of the Republic of Hawaii
on August 12, 1898 as well as the laws of the United States to said Republic, including, of course,
those on naturalization. (Chap. 339, Sec. 4, 31 Stat. 141.)
15. On June 29, 1906. "An Act to establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, and to provide
a uniform rule for the naturalization of aliens throughout the United States" was approved. No
reference was made therein to "free white persons''; it merely provided in its Section 7 that:
"SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieve in or who is opposed to organized
government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and
teaching such disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who advocates or
teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any
officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally of the
Government of the United States, or of any other organized government, because of
his or their official character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a
citizen of the United States." (36 Stat. 598)
Incidentally, the 6th paragraph of its Section 4 provided:
 "Sixth. When any alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the
United States dies before he is actually naturalized the widow and minor children of
such alien may, by complying with the other provisions of this Act, be naturalized
without making any declaration of intention." (36 Stat. 598)
16. By the Act of March 2, 1907, alien women who acquired American citizenship by marriage
retained said citizenship, if she continued to reside in the United States and did not renounce it, or, if
she resided outside of the United States by registering with the U.S. Consul of her place of residence.
(CHAP. 2534, Sec. 4, 34 Stat. 1229.)
17. Since United States legislation treats naturalization and citizenship per se separately, Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes remained untouched. In the Act of February 24, 1911 it was provided:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That when any alien, who has declared his intention
to become a citizen of the United States, becomes insane before he is actually
naturalized, and his wife shall thereafter make a homestead entry under the land laws
of the United States, she and their minor children may, by complying with the other
provisions of the naturalization laws be naturalized without making any declaration of
intention." (36 Stat. 929.)
18. The Act of August 11, 1916 merely validated entries filed in certain countries. (CHAP. 316, 39
Stat. 926.)
19. In the Act of May 9, 1918, the U.S. Congress amended the naturalization laws to make possible
the admission of Filipino navy servicemen, and understandably, because of the war then, it provided:
"Seventh. Any native-born Filipino of the age of twenty-one years and upward who
has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States and who has
enlisted or may hereafter enlist in the United States Navy or Marine Corps or the
Naval Auxiliary Service, and who, after service of not less than three years, may be
honorably discharged therefrom, or who may receive an ordinary discharge with
recommendation for reenlistment; or any alien, or any Porto Rican not a citizen of the
United States, . . . ." (40 Stat. 542.)
20. On September 22, 1922, "An Act Relative to the Naturalization and citizenship of married women"
was appareled repeating Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes and otherwise adopting a different
attitude as regards the citizenship and naturalization of married women thus:
"Be it enacted by the Senate cleaned House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That the right of any woman to become a
naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of her
sex or because she is a married woman.
"Sec. 2. That any woman who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage
of this Act, or any woman whose husband is naturalized after the passage of this Act,
shall not become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage or
naturalization; but, if eligible to citizenship, she may be naturalized upon full and
complete compliance with all the requirements of the naturalization laws, with the
following exceptions:
(a) No declaration of intention shall be required;
(b) In lieu of the five-year period of residence within the United States and the one-
year period of residence within the State or Territory where the naturalization court is
held, she shall have resided continuously in the United States Hawaii, Alaska, or Porto
Rico for at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition.
 "Sec. 3. That a woman citizen of the United States shall not cease to be a citizen of
the United States by reason of her marriage after the passage of this Act, unless she
makes a formal renunciation of her citizenship before a court having jurisdiction over
naturalization of aliens; Provided, That any woman citizen who marries an alien
ineligible to citizenship shall cease to be a citizen of the United States. If at the
termination of the marital status she is a citizen of the United States she shall retain
her citizenship regardless of her residence. If during the continuance of the marital
status she resides continuously for two years in a foreign State of which her husband
is a citizen or subject, or for five years continuously outside the United States, she
shall thereafter be subject to the same presumption as is a naturalized citizen of the
United States under the second paragraph of section 2 of the Act entitled "An Act in
reference to the expatriation of citizens and their protection abroad," approved March
2 1907. Nothing herein shall be construed to repeal or amend the provisions of
Revised Statutes 1999 or of section 2 of the Expatriation Act of 1907 with reference to
expatriation.
"Sec. 4. That a woman who, before the passage of this Act, has lost her United States
citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien eligible for citizenship, may be
naturalized as provided by section 2 of this Act: Provided, That no certificate of arrival
shall be required to be filed with her petition if during the continuance of the marital
status she; shall have resided within the United States. After her naturalization she
shall have the same citizenship status as if her marriage had taken place after the
passage of this Act.

"Sec. 5. That no woman whose husband is not eligible to citizenship shall be

naturalized during the continuance of the marital status.
"Sec. 6. That section 1994 of the Revised Statutes and section 4 of the Expatriation
Act of 1907 are repealed. Such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or
retained under either of such sections nor restore citizenship lost under section 4 of
the Expatriation Act of 1907.
"Sec. 7. That section 3 of the Expatriation Act of 1901 is repealed. Such repeal shall
not restore citizenship lost under such section nor terminate citizenship resumed
under such section. A woman who has resumed under such section citizenship lost by
marriage shall, upon the passage of this Act, have for all purposes the same
citizenship status as immediately preceding her marriage." (Chap. 411, 42 Stat.
10211022.)
21. When "The Code of the Laws of to United States of America of a General and Permanent
Character in Force on December 7, 1925" was approved, the provisions, corresponding to the
disqualifications for naturalization and the citizenship and naturalization of women embodied therein
were:
"367. Naturalization of woman; sex or marriage not a bar. — The right of any woman
to become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged
because of her sex or because she is a married woman. ( Sept. 22, 1922, c.411, 1, 42
Stat. 1021.)
"368. Same; women marrying citizens or persons becoming naturalized; procedure. —
Any woman who marries a citizen of the United States after September 22, 1922, or
any woman whose husband is naturalized after that date, shall not become a citizen of
the United States by reason of such marriage or naturalization; but, if eligible to
 citizenship, she may be naturalized upon full and complete compliance with the
following exceptions:
(a) No declaration of intention shall be required;
(b) In lieu of the five-year period of residence within the United States and the one-
year period of residence within the State or Territory where the naturalization court is
held, she shall have resided continuously in the United States, Hawaii, Alaska, or
Porto Rico for at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition. (Sept.
22, 1922, c. 411, § 2, 42 Stat. 1022.)
"369. Same; women who have lost citizenship by Marrying aliens eligible to citizenship;
procedure. — A woman, who, before September 22, 1922, has lost her United States
citizenship by reason for her marriage to an alien eligible for citizenship, may be
naturalized as provided in the preceding section. No certificate of arrival shall be
required to be filed with her petition if during the continuance of the marital status she
shall have resided within the United Stators. After her naturalization she shall have the
same citizenship status as if her marriage had taken place after September 22, 1922.
(Swept. 22, 1922, c. 411, § 4, 42 Stat. 1022.)
"370. Same; Women married to persons ineligible to citizenship. — No woman whose
husband is not eligible to citizenship shall be naturalized during the continuance of the
marital status. (Swept. 22, 1922, c. 411, 5, 42 Stat. 1022.)
"371. Same, wife of alien declaring becoming insane before naturalization; minor
children. — When any alien, who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the
United States, becomes insane before he is actually naturalized, and his wife shall
thereafter make a homestead entry under the land laws of the United States, she and
their minor children may, by complying with the other provisions of the naturalization
laws be naturalized without making any declaration of intention. (Feb. 24, 1911, c. 151,
36 Stat. 929.)" (Chap. 9, 44 Stat. 156, 158.)
which, of course, must be read together with the provisions on inadmissibility of Chinese,
anarchists, polygamists, non-English speaking persons, etc. in Sections 363-365 of the same
Code.
22. The Act of May 26, 1926 extended naturalization privileges to alien veterans of World War I, thus:
"Be it enacted by the Senate anal House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That (a) as used in this Act, the term "alien veteran"
means an individual, a member of the military or naval forces of the United States at
any time after April 5, 1917, and before November 12, 1918, who is now an alien not
ineligible to citizenship; but does not include (1) any individual at anytime during such
period or thereafter separated from such forces under other than honorable conditions,
(2) any conscientious objector who performed no military duty whatever or refused to
wear the uniform, or (3) any alien at any time during such period or thereafter
discharged from the military or naval forces on account of his alienage.
(b) Terms defined in the Immigration Act of 1924 shall, when used in this Act, have the
meaning assigned to such terms in that Act.
"Sec. 2. An alien veteran shall for the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1924 be
considered as a non-quota immigrant, but shall be subject to all the other provisions of
that Act and of the immigration laws, except that —
(a) He shall not be subject to the head tax imposed by section 2 of the Immigration Act
of 1917;
 (b) He shall not be required to pay any fee under section 2 or section 7 of the
Immigration Act of 1924;
(c) If otherwise admissible, he shall not be excluded under section 3 of the
Immigration Act of 1917, unless excluded under the provisions of that section relating
to —
(1) Persons afflicted with a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease, except
tuberculosis in any form;
(2) Polygamy;
(3) Prostitutes, procurers, or other like immoral persons;
(4) Contract laborers;
(5) Persons previously deported;
(6) Persons convicted of crime.
"Sec. 3. The unmarried child under eighteen years of age, the wife, or the husband, of
an alien veteran shall, for the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1924, be considered
as a non quota immigrant when accompanying or following within six months to join
him, but shall be subject to all other provisions of that Act and of the immigration laws.
'Sec. 4. The foregoing provisions of this Act shall not apply to any alien unless the
immigration visa is issued to him before the expiration of one year after the enactment
of this Act." (Chap. 398, 44 Stat. 654-655.)
23. The Act of June 21, 1930 authorized repatriation of certain veterans of World War I. (Chap. 559,
46 Stat. 791.)
24. On March 3, 1931, the Act of September 22, 1922 as amended as follows:
"Sec. 4.(a) Section 3 of the Act entitled "An Act relative to the naturalization and
citizenship of married women," approved September 22, 1922, as amended, is
amended to read as follows:
'Sec. 3.(a) A woman citizen of the United States shall not cease to be a citizen of the
United States by reason of her marriage after this section, as amended, takes effect,
unless she makes a formal renunciation of her citizenship before a court having
jurisdiction over naturalization of aliens.
'(b) Any woman who before this section, as amended takes effect, has lost her United
States citizenship by residence abroad after marriage to an alien or by marriage to an
alien ineligible to citizenship may, if she has not acquired any other nationality by
affirmative act, be naturalized in the manner prescribed in section 4 of this Act, as
amended. Any woman who was a citizen of the United States at birth shall not be
denied naturalization under section 4 on account of her race.
'(c) No woman shall be entitled to naturalization under section 4 of this Act, as
amended, if her United States citizenship originated solely by a reason of her marriage
to a citizen of the United States or by reason of the acquisition of United States
citizenship by her husband.'
"(b) Section 5 of such Act of September 22, 1922, is repealed." (Chap. 442, 46 Stat.
1511-1512.)
25. The Act of May 25, 1932 contained the following somewhat pertinent provisions:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That
(a) an alien veteran, as defined in section 1 of the Act of May 26, 1926 (ch. 398, 44
Stat. 654; title 8, sec. 241, U.S. C. Supp. 1), if residing in the United States, be entitled
at any time within two years after the enactment of this Act to naturalization upon the
same terms, conditions, and exemptions which would have been accorded to such
alien if he had petitioned before the armistice of the World War, except that (1) such
alien shall be required to prove that immediately preceding the date of this petition he
has resided continuously within the United States for at least two years, in pursuance
of a legal admission for permanent residence, and that during all such period he has
behaved as a person of good moral character; (2) if such admission was subsequent
to March 3, 1924, such alien shall file with his petition a certificate of arrival issued by
the Commissioner of Naturalization; (3) final action shall not be had upon the petition
until at least ninety days have elapsed after filing of such petition; and (4) such alien
shall be required to appear and file his petition in person, and to take the prescribed
oath of allegiance in open court. Such residence and good moral character shall be
proved either by the affidavits of two credible witnesses who are citizens of the United
States, or by depositions by two such witnesses made before a naturalization
examiner, for each place of residence.
"(b) All petitions for citizenship made outside the United States in accordance with the
seventh subdivision of section 4 of the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, as
amended, upon which naturalization has not been heretofore granted, are hereby
declared to be invalid for all purposes.
"Sec. 2. (a) The seventh subdivision of section 4 of the Naturalization Act of June 29,
1906, as amended, is amended by striking out 'the National Guard or Naval Militia of
any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or the State Militia in Federal Service.'

"(b) This section shall not be applied in the case of any individual whose petition for
naturalization has been filed before the enactment of this Act.
"Sec. 3. The last proviso in the first paragraph of the seventh subdivision of section 4
of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, is amended by striking out the period at
the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and the following: 'except that
this proviso shall not apply in the case of service on American-owned vessels by an
alien who has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence.'
"Sec. 4. Section 32 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following new subdivisions:
'(c) If the name of any naturalized citizen has, subsequent to naturalization, been
changed by order of a court of competent jurisdiction, or by marriage, the citizen may,
upon the payment to the commissioner of a fee of $10, make application
(accompanied by two photographs of the applicant) for a new certificate of citizenship
in the new name of such citizen. If the commissioner finds the name of the applicant to
have been changed as claimed he shall issue to the applicant a new certificate with
one of such photographs of the applicant affixed thereto.
'(d) The Commissioner of Naturalization is authorized to make and issue, without fee,
certifications of any part of the naturalization records of any court, or of any certificate
of citizenship, for use in complying with any statute, State or Federal, or in any judicial
proceeding. Any such certification shall be admitted in evidence equally with the
original from which such certification was made in any case in which the original
thereof might be admissible as evidence. No such certification shall be made by any
clerk of court except upon order of the court.'
"Sec. 5. So much of subdivision (a) of section 33 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as
amended, as read 'Upon obtaining a certificate from the Secretary of Labor showing
the date, place, and manner of arrival in the United States,' is hereby repealed.
"Sec. 6. Section 4 of the Act entitled 'An Act to supplement the naturalization laws,
and for other purposes,' approved March 2, 1929, is amended by striking out the
period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and the following:
'except that no such certificate shall be required if the entry was on or before June 29,
1906.'
"Sec. 7. Despite the provisions of subdivision (a) of section 1 of the Act entitled 'An Act
making it a felony with penalty for certain aliens to enter the United States of America
under certain conditions in violation of law,' approved March 4, 1929, as amended, an
alien, if otherwise admissible, shall not be excluded from admission to the United
States under the provisions of such subdivision after the expiration of one year after
the date of deportation if, prior to his reembarkation at a place outside of the United
States, or prior to his application in foreign contiguous territory for admission to the
United States, the Secretary of Labor, in his discretion, shall have granted such alien
permission to reapply for admission.
"Sec. 8. The compilation of the statistics to show races nationalities, and other
information, authorized and directed to be prepared by the Commissioner of
Naturalization, shall be completed and published at the same time, as near as
practicable, as the Publication of the statistics of the 1930 census except that reports
covering the census of 1910 shall be completed and submitted not later than January
31, 1933, and reports covering the census of 1920 not later than December 31, 1938.
Such statistics shall show the records of registry made under the provisions of the Act
entitled 'An Act to supplement the naturalization laws, and for other purposes,'
approved March 2, 1929. Payment for the equipment used in preparing such
compilation shall be made from appropriations for miscellaneous expenses of the
Bureau of Naturalization.
"Sec. 9. The Secretary of the Treasury, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Labor, is authorized to provide quarters without payment of rent, in the building
occupied by the Naturalization Service in New York City, for a photographic studio
operated by welfare organizations without profit and solely for the benefit of aliens
seeking naturalization. Such studio shall be under the supervision of the
Commissioner of Naturalization.
"Sec. 10. The tenth subdivision of section 4 of the Act of June 29, 1906 (ch. 3592, 34
Stat. 598), as amended by the Act of May 9, 1918 (ch. 69, 40, 40 Stat. 545; U.S.C.,
title 8 sec. 377), is hereby amended to read as follows:
'Tenth. That any person not an alien enemy, who resided uninterruptedly within the
United States during the period of five years next preceding July 1, 1920, and was on
that date otherwise qualified to become a citizen of the United States, except that he
had not made a declaration of intention required by law and who during or prior to that
time, because of misinformation regarding his citizenship status erroneously exercised
the rights and performed the duties of a citizen of the United States in good faith, may
file the petition for naturalization prescribed by law without making the preliminary
declaration of intention required of other aliens, and upon satisfactory proof to the
 court that he has so acted may be admitted as a citizen of the United States upon
complying in all respects with the other requirements of the naturalization law.' (Chap.
203, 47 Stat. 165-167.)
26. By June 27, 1952, the right of a person to be naturalized could no longer be denied by reason of
race or sex or because such person was married, although various disqualifications were still
maintained, such as lack understanding, capacity to read and write English, or of the principles of the
constitution and form of government of the United States, being opposed to organized government of
law, favoring totalitarian forms of government, deserters from the armed forces, etc. (Secs. 1422 to
1426, USCA 8-9, 1953; See also Secs. 1421 et seq., USCA 8, 1970.)
B — QUALIFICATIONS
Apart from the above disqualifications, the statutes referred tea contained express requirements as to
qualifications as follows:
(1) The Act of 1790 required residence, good moral character and adherence to the principles of the
United States Constitution.
(2) That of 1795 required a declaration of intention. residence, adherence to the U.S. Constitution,
good moral character and no title of nobility.
(3) That of 1798 referred only declaration of intention and residence.
(4) That of 1802 required residence, renunciation of allegiance to former government, adherence to
U.S. Constitution, good moral character and declaration of intention.
(5) That of 1804 was practically I the same as that of 1802.
(6) So also were those of 1813, 1816 and 1824.
(7) That of 1828 mentioned only residence and declaration of intention.
(8) Those of 1855, 1870 and 1888 amended the law in other respects.
(9) That of 1906 contained the following provisions:
"SEC. 4. That an alien may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States in the
following manner and not otherwise:
"First. He A hall declare on oath before the clerk of any court authorized by this Act to
naturalize aliens, or his authorized deputy, in the district in which such alien resides,
two years at least prior to his admission, and after he has reached the age of eighteen
years, that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the united States, and to
renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or
sovereignty, and particularly, by name, to the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty
of which the alien may be at the time a citizen or subject. And such declaration shall
set forth, the name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign
residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the, name of the vessel, if any, in which
he came to the United states, and the present place of residence in the United States
of said alien: Provided, however, That no alien who, in conformity with the law in force
at the date of his declaration, has declared his intention to become a citizen of the
United States shall be required to renew such declaration.
"Second. Not less than two years nor more than seven years after he has made such
declaration of intention he shall make and file, in duplicate, a petition in writing, signed
by the applicant in his own handwriting and duly verified, in which petition such
applicant shall state his full name, his place of residence (by street and number, if
possible), his occupation, and, if possible, the date and place of his birth; the place
from which he emigrated, and the date and place of his arrival in the United States,
and, if he entered through a port, the name of the vessel on which he arrived; the time
when and the place and name of the court where he declared his intention to become
a citizen of the United States; if he is married he shall state the name of his wife and, if
possible, the country of her nativity and her place of residence at the time of filing his
petition; and if he has children, the name, date, and place of birth and place of
residence of each child living at the time of his petition: Provided, That if he has filed
his declaration before the passage of this Act he shall not be required to sign the
petition in his own handwriting.
"The petition shall set forth that he is not a disbeliever in or opposed to organized
government, or a member of or affiliated with any organization or body of persons
teaching disbelief in or opposed to organized government, a polygamist or believer in
the practice of polygamy, and that it is his intention to become a citizen of the United
States and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly by name to the prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty of which he at the time of filing of his petition may be a
citizen or subject, and that it is his intention to reside permanently within the United
States, and whether or not he has been denied admission a, a citizen of the United
States, and, if denied, the ground or grounds of such denial, the court or courts in
which such decision was rendered, and that the cause for such denial has since been
cured or removed, and every fact material to his naturalization ailed required to be
proved upon the final hearing of his application.

"The petition shall also be verified by the affidavits of at least two credible witnesses,
who are citizens of the United States, and who shall state in their affidavits that they
have personally known the applicant to be a resident of the United States for a period
of at least five years continuously, and of the State, Territory, or district in which the
application is made for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the date of
the filing of his petition, and that they each have personal knowledge that the
petitioner is a person of good moral character, and that he is in every way qualified, in
their opinion, to be admitted as a citizen of the United States.
"At the time of filing of his petition there shall be filed with the clerk of the court a
certificate from the Department of Commerce and Labor, if the petitioner arrives in the
United States after the passage of this Act, stating the date, place and manner of his
arrival in the United States, and the declaration of intention of such petitioner, which
certificate and declaration shall be attached to and made a part of said petition.
"Third. He shall, before he is admitted to citizenship, declare on oath in open court that
he will support the Constitution of the United States, and he absolutely and entirely
renounces and abjures all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince potentate, state,
or sovereignty, and particularly by name to the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty
of which he was before a citizen or subject; that he will support and defend the
Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic,
and bear true faith and allegiance to the same.
"Fourth. It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court admitting any alien
to citizenship that immediately preceding the date of his application he has resided
continuously within the United States five years at least, and within the State or
Territory where such court is at the time held one year at least, and that during that
time he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of
 the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and
happiness of the same. In addition to the oath of the applicant, the testimony of at
least two witnesses, citizens of the United States, as to the facts of residence, moral
character, and attachment to the principles of the Constitution shall be required, and
the name, ,place of residence, and occupation of each witness shall be set forth in the
record.
"Fifth. In case the alien applying to be admitted to citizenship has borne any hereditary
title, or has been of any of the orders of nobility in the kingdom or state from which he
came, he shall, in addition to the above requisites make an express renunciation of his
title or order of nobility in the court to which his application is made, and his
renunciation shall be recorded in the court.
"Sixth. When any alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the
United States dies before he is actually naturalized the widow and minor children of
such alien may, by complying with the other provisions of this Act, be naturalized
without making any declaration of intention." (34 stat. 596-98.)
10. Those of 1911 and 1916 contained amendments as to other matters.
11. That of 1918 provided for different qualifications for Filipinos, Porto Ricans, etc. for naturalization
in addition to service in the U.S. Navy or Philippine Constabulary.
12. Those of years after 1922 when Section 1994 was repealed would have no material bearing in
this case.
Amen.
||| (Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289, [October 4, 1971], 148-B
PHIL 773-877)

[A.C. No. 533 . April 29, 1968.]

IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE

Rosendo J. Tansisin for the respondent.

Hon. Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano P. Vivo for the complainant.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; MARRIAGE; PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE. — Persons living together as husband

and wife are presumed to be married to each other (Rule 131, par. bb). Every intendment of law and
fact leans towards the validity of marriage and the legitimacy of children (Art. 220, Civil Code),
2. CITIZENSHIP; EVIDENCE; PROBATIVE VALUE OF LANDING CERTIFICATE, INADEQUATE. —
A landing certificate issued under section 7 of Act 702 by the Collector of Customs is based on an
administrative ex parte determination of the evidence presented and the facts as stated by the
applicant. As such, it carries little evidentiary weight as to the citizenship of the applicant's spouse.
3. ID.; AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED BY ONE CLAIMING ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP,
SELF-SERVING. — The affidavit executed by respondent's father stating that he elected to be a
Filipino when he reached the age of majority is not a substitute for a duly recorded election of
Philippine citizenship, assuming that the affiant was qualified to so elect. It is self-serving as it was
executed for the purpose of making a change in a miscellaneous lease application where he had
previously stated that he is a citizen of China; neither can it be regarded as a re-affirmation of an
alleged election of citizenship since no such previous election was proved to have existed.
4. ID.; EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE DOES NOT ALTER CITIZENSHIP. — Registration as a voter may
indicate the person's desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but this
does not alter his real citizenship which in this jurisdiction is determinable by blood (jus sanguinis).
5. ID.; WHERE FATHER IS NOT A CITIZEN, ALL HIS CHILDREN REMAIN ALIENS, INCLUDING
THE LATTER'S MOTHER. — Where the evidence is clearly preponderant, if not overwhelming, that
the respondent's father was and remained a Chinese, the respondent's mother, admittedly a Chinese
retained her original citizenship and their offsprings, respondent included, are likewise Chinese
nationals through and through.
6. ID.; CIVIL CASE FOR RESCISSION OF SALE AND RECOVERY OF LAND ON GROUND THAT
VENDEE IS A CHINESE, NOT RES JUDICATA ON ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP. — In Civil Case No.
329-G against respondent and the latter's brothers and sisters to recover a piece of land from them
on the ground that they were Chinese the Court declared them to be natural born Filipinos and that
the sale to them was valid. Such declaration did not constitute res judicata. The pronouncement was
not within the court's competence because the declaration of citizenship was not the relief sought.
Besides, at the time, the pronouncement was beyond judicial power, there being no law authorizing
the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare the citizenship of an individual.
7. ID.; ACTIONS TO BE DECLARED FILIPINO CITIZEN OTHER THAN BY NATURALIZATION;
EFFECT. — Civil Case No. 329-G, an action to declare invalid a deed of sale of land to vendees who
were supposed to be Chinese citizens, and Special Proceeding No. 3925, an action for the correction
of records of birth, are not modes of acquiring Philippine citizenship; neither is the citizenship of the
respondent converted to Filipino because certain government agencies recognized him as such. He
remains, by jus sanguinis, a Chinese until he is naturalized.
8. ID.; APPEARANCE OF FISCAL IN A SPECIAL PROCEEDING TO CORRECT CITIZENSHIP IN A
RECORD OF BIRTH; EFFECT. — The appearance of the fiscal in a special proceeding for the
correction of respondents' records of birth does not bind the State to the order of the correction
thereof because the proceeding was not instituted as in rem and, under no law had the State given its
consent to be a party thereto.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J p:

The respondent, Florencio Mallare, was admitted to the practice of law on 5 March 1962. In his
verified petition to take the bar examinations in 1961, he alleged that he is a citizen of the Philippines
and that "his father is Esteban Mallare and his mother is Te Na, both Filipino citizens". (Personal
Record, No. 17450, Bar Division)
On 16 July 1962, the then Acting Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano P. Vivo denounced the
respondent to this Court as a Chinaman masquerading as a Filipino citizen and requested that the
matter be investigated thoroughly and if the respondent fails to show that he has legally become a
Filipino, steps be taken for striking his name from the roll of persons authorized to practice law. Acting
upon the request, this Court, on 9 August 1962, referred the matter to its Legal Officer-Investigator for
investigation and report. An investigation was thus held wherein the relator or complainant and the
respondent appeared and adduced their respective evidence.
The position of the respondent-lawyer is that he is a Filipino citizen based on the supposed
citizenship of his father, Esteban Mallare, alleged to be a Filipino citizen by choice, because he was
the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother, Ana Mallare; and that the respondent's
mother, Te Na, a Chinese, followed the citizenship of her husband upon their marriage.
The respondent's second theory is that, having been declared a Filipino citizen in a final
judgment in 1960 by the Court of First Instance of Quezon province,in its Civil Case No. 329-G
(entitled, Vitaliano Itable vs. Artemio, Florencio, Paciencia, Esperanza and Raymundo Mallare) and
his birth record, wherein he was originally registered as a Chinese, has likewise been ordered
corrected to Filipino, by final judgment in Special Proceeding No. 3925 of the same court, 1 his
Filipino citizenship is conclusive, res judicata and binding to the government and to the world.
Complainant Vivo disputed, on the facts, the respondent's first theory, and, on the second theory,
claimed that the aforestated Civil Case No. 329-G (Itablevs. Mallare) was a simulated action
calculated to obtain a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship and, after having obtained the said
declaration, the respondent, together with his brothers and sisters, utilized the declaration to change
their birth and alien registration the better to hide their true nationality, which is Chinese.
The respondent denies the charge of simulating an action, and by way of defense, points out that
Civil Case No. 329-G and Special Proceeding No. 3925 are not subject to collateral attack and, since
his birth record and alien registration (and that of his brothers and sisters) have been corrected and
cancelled, respectively, the question of their citizenship is now moot and academic.
On respondent's first claim to citizenship by blood, the earliest datum that can be stated about the
respondent's supposed ancestry is that in 1902, 2 ex-municipal president Rafael Catarroja, then eight
years old, met for the first time Ana Mallare, the supposed paternal grandmother of the
respondent, inMacalelon, Quezon. He had not seen her deliver or give birth to the baby boy,
Esteban Mallare, father of the respondent, but met the supposed Filipina mother and
Esteban Mallare years later when the boy was already (8) years old. (Annex "8", pp. 10-12, t.s.n.,
Sept. 24, 1959, Civil Case No. 329-G, CFI of Quezon Province). There is no evidence that
Ana Mallare was an "inhabitant of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who was a
Spanish subject on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine", as required by the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and she cannot, therefore, be considered a Filipina. That witness
Catarroja, the respondent, and the latter's brothers and sisters, stated that Ana Mallare was a Filipina,
as well as their testimonies inthe civil case that she had not married her Chinese husband and that
she is the true mother of Esteban Mallare, are more of opinion or conjecture than fact, utterly
insufficient to overcome the presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are
married to each other (Rule 131, par bb). "Every intendment of law and fact", says Article 220 of our
Civil Code "leans toward the validity of marriage and the legitimacy of children."
The respondent relies on three documents as indicative of the alleged Philippine citizenship of his
father, Esteban Mallare. On 7 July 1926, Te Na, respondent's Chinese mother, was described in a
landing certificate of residence issued to her, as "wife of P.I. citizen" and as "wife of Dy Esteban, P.I,
citizen". (Annex "16", being Exh. "3" in Civil Case No, 329-G). On 20 February 1939, Esteban
Dy Mallare executed an affidavit stating therein that when he reached the age of majority he had
"definitely elected to be a Filipino citizen following the citizenship of my mother." (Annex "4", being
Exh. "1" in Civil Case No. 329-G) And, in 1928, Esteban Mallare was a registered voter in Macalelon,
Quezon. (Annex "7", being Exh. "2" in Civil Case No, 329-G).
A landing certificate of residence issued under Section 7, Act 702 by the Collector of Customs is
based upon an administrative ex parte determination of the evidence presented and the facts as
stated by the applicant and, therefore, carries little evidentiary weight as to the citizenship of the
applicant's husband.In the instant case, the truth of Te Na's declarations when she applied for the
landing certificate could have been inquired into had she been presented as a witness in these
proceedings, but this was not done.
The affidavit of Esteban Mallare, besides being self-serving, is not a substitute for a duly recorded
election of Philippine citizenship, assuming that the affiant was qualified to so elect. When Esteban
executed it, he was already thirty-six (36) years old and he executed it for the purpose, stated in the
last paragraph, of making a change in a miscellaneous lease application wherein he had previously
stated that he is a citizen of China. Nor can it be regarded as a re- affirmation of an alleged election of
citizenship, since no such previous election was proven to have existed.

Esteban Mallare's registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining
exclusively to Filipino citizens but this does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is
determinable by his blood (jus sanguinis).
Against these pretensions of Philippine citizenship, all the five (5) known children of the spouses
Esteban Mallare and Te Na, Artemio, Esperanza, Florencio, Paciencia and Raymundo, were
registered at birth as children of a Chinese father and a Chinese mother and with the added detail
that their parents were born in China.
The birth certificate of Esperanza Mallare (Exh. "F") who was born on 25 October 1939, is particularly
significant in this regard, because it bears the father's own signature. If Esteban Mallare was indeed a
Filipino by choice, as stated by him in his aforementioned affidavit (Annex 4), then he should have so
statedin this birth certificate of his daughter; instead, he admits, against his own interest, that he is a
Chinese. Esteban Mallare's own death certificate (Exh. "C"), over the signature of his son,
Artemio Mallare, shows against Artemio's own interest, that Esteban was a Chinese, born in Fookiang,
China; that he died on 5 June 1945, at the age of 42 and was buried at the Chinese cemetery, having
resided in the Philippines for 28 years (Exh. "C"), i.e., only since 1917.
The affidavit of Artemio denying that the signature in the aforesaid death certificate is his, is
inadmissible and, therefore, should be rejected, as it was offered in evidence for the first time after
trial was closed, as an annex to the respondent's memorandum with the investigator. The affiant was
not examined thereon, and the affidavit is self-serving besides.
The entire family, consisting of the father, mother and their four (4) children (Raymundo was not yet
born) were registered as aliens in 1942 in the then Division of Alien Statistics, pursuant to the
proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and
Executive Order No. 25 of the then Executive Commission (See letter of Jan. 18, 1963 from the
Bureau of Immigration to the Legal Officer Investigator; see also pp. 171 and 180-181, Vol. 1, No. 4,
Official Gazette, published during Japanese occupation.)In addition, the respondent himself was
again registered as an alien in 1950, his application thereto bearing his thumbprints and stating
therein that he is a Chinese; that he belongs to the yellow race and that he had used these other
names: "Tan Jua Gae", "Enciong" and "Jua Gao" (Exh. "N"). He had been a teacher in the Candon
Chinese School (t.s.n., p. 17, Oct. 3, 1962). His explanation that it was his mother who registered him
as an alien is flimsy; and, as stated hereinbefore, he did not present his mother as a witness.
The evidence is thus clearly preponderant, if not overwhelming that the respondent's father,
Esteban Mallare or "Mallari", also known as "Esteban Dy", "Esteban Dy Mallare" and "Esteban Tan",
was and remained a Chinese until he died; consequently, the respondent's mother, admittedly a
Chinese, retained her original citizenship and their offspring, respondent, Florencio Mallare, together
with his brothers and sisters, are likewise Chinese nationals, through and through.
We now turn to respondent's second defense of res judicata. There are certain marks of simulation
that attended Civil Case No. 329-G, and indicating that it was brought to circumvent a previous
unfavorable opinion of the Secretary of Justice denying cancellation of Mallare's alien registration (Op.
No. (90, Ser. of 1955, dated March 31, 1955). The said civil case was instituted by the vendor
(Vitaliano Itable) of a certain parcel of land to rescind the sale and recover the land sold from the
vendees, who are the herein respondent and his brothers and sisters, on the ground that the said
vendees are Chinese. The vendor-plaintiff practically abandoned the case; the vendees- defendants
submitted evidence purporting to show their Filipino citizenship, and plaintiff neither cross-examined
nor presented rebuttal proof. After trial, the court, declaring the vendees as natural-born Filipino
citizens, decided for the validity of the sale of the parcel of land.
On the basis of the foregoing declaration by the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province, the
respondent and his brothers and sisters filed Special Proceeding No. 3925, in the same court, but in a
different branch, for the "correction" of their birth records. The local fiscal, representing the Solicitor
General, appeared but did not oppose the petition; wherefore, after hearing, the court granted the
petition. Based on the same judicial declaration, the then Commissioner of Immigration De la Rosa
(not the complainant) cancelled on June 8, 1960, the alien registration of the herein respondent and
that of his brothers and sisters, and issued to them identification certificates recognizing them as
Filipino citizens. Then Solicitor General Alafriz took the same position.
Civil Case No. 329-G and Special Proceeding No. 3925 are not modes of acquiring Philippine
citizenship; neither is the Chinese citizenship of the respondent converted to Filipino because certain
government agencies recognized him as such. He remains, by jus sanguinis, a Chinese until he is
naturalized.
It is noted that the declaration that the respondent and his brothers and sisters are Filipino citizens is
stated in the dispositive portion of the decision in Civil Case No. 329-G, which was an
action in personam. The pronouncement was not within the court's competence, because the
declaration of the citizenship of these defendants was not the relief that was sought. At the time, the
pronouncement was beyond judicial power, there being no law authorizing the institution of a judicial
proceeding to declare the citizenship of an individual (Danilo Channie Tan v. Republic, L-14159, April
18, 1960; Palaran v. Republic, L-15047, Jan. 30, 1962; Tan Yu Chin v. Republic, L-15775, April 29,
1961; Tan v. Republic, L-16108, October 31, 1961; Santiago vs. Commissioner, L-14653, Jan. 31,
1963; Commissioner vs. Domingo, L-21274, July 31, 1963; Lao Yap Diok, et al., v. Republic, L-
19107-09, Sept. 30, 1964).
In the basic case Channie Tan vs. Republic, ante, this Court ruled as follows:
"Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of
the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable
controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act
or omission violative of said right, and a remedy granted or sanctioned by law, for said
breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a
controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their
status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance,
no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or
petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be
made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one enjoying
said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as
naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the
institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our
citizenry." (Tan vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-14159, April 18, 1960, reiterated in G.R. No.
L-15775, April 29, 1961).
The said judicial declaration 3 was merely an incident to the adjudication of the rights of the parties to
the controversy over land ownership. Their citizenship was not the thing adjudicated in the judgment
and the declaration that they are Filipinos was but a necessary premise for the court to arrive at a
conclusion that the sale of the realty was valid as between the parties. Not being the thing directly
adjudicated, their declared citizenship is not res judicata, and cannot become conclusive.
The appearance of the fiscal, representing the Solicitor General, in Special Proceeding No. 3925
does not bind the state to the order of "correction" of the birth records because the proceeding was
not instituted as in rem and, under no law had the state given its consent to be party thereto. For this
reason, the fiscal's appearance was an unauthorized one.
It is noteworthy that in neither case relied upon by the respondent does it appear that his claim for
citizenship was given adequate publication so as to apprise all concerned and give them opportunity
to contest it or supply the corresponding public office any derogatory data that might exist against the
alleged citizenship. Hence, neither decision constitutes res judicata on the issue of respondent's
alleged Filipino nationality.
And certainly, the Supreme Court, acting pursuant to its inherent and constitutional authority, may not
be precluded from inquiring into the citizenship of persons admitted to the practice of law,
independent of any court's findings in the cases or proceedings brought or instituted therein.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the respondent Florencio Mallare is hereby declared excluded
from the practice of law; his admission to the Philippine bar is revoked and he is hereby ordered to
return immediately to this Court the lawyer's diploma previously issued to him.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished, when it becomes final, to me Secretary of Justice, for such
action as may be deemed warranted, and let another copy be sent to the Local Civil Registrar of
Macalelon, Quezon, for purposes of record in the corresponding civil registry of births. SO ORDERED.
||| (In re Mallare, A.C. No. 533, [April 29, 1968], 131 PHIL 817-827)

[G.R. No. 87193. June 23, 1989.]

JUAN
GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE
LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED
BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.

J .L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.

Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.

DECISION

CRUZ, J p:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22,
1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon
Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in
his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo's
election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in
the United States on January 20,1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he
was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that
he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His
naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the
unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned
to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued
that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should
have been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the
Omhibus Election Code. The League, moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter
and so could not sue under the said section. prLL
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the
respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the
case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated
February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that
the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the
merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents.
In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized
American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January
18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that
their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of
the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as
governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if
their petition were to be considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have been filed within ten
days from Frivaldo's proclamation because it was only in September 1988 that they received proof of
his naturalization. And assuming that the League itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who
was suing not only for the League but also in his personal capacity, could nevertheless institute the
suit by himself alone.
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was
not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American
citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure
this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local
Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's
argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the
League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election
of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as
governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an
American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In support he cited the Nottebohm Case,
[1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a German national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was
not recognized because it had been obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could not
have repatriated himself before the 1988 electionsbecause the Special Committee on Naturalization
created for the purpose by LOI No. 270 had not yet been organized then. His oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his
active participation in the 1987 congressionalelections had divested him of American citizenship
under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship. He ended by reiterating
his prayer for the rejection of the move to disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of
the Omnibus Election Code. LLpr
Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has decided to
resolve it directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will after all eventually end with
this Court, albeit only after a long delay. We cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to
the public interest and the vital principles of public office to be here applied.
It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this question as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has
already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically
claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We assume this stance was taken by him after consultation with
the public respondent and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of
the COMELEC itself that we may now review. Exercising our discretion to interpret the Rules of Court
and the Constitution, we shall consider the present petition as having been filed in accordance with
Article IX-A, Section 7, of the Constitution, to challenge the aforementioned Orders of the COMELEC.
The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the
Philippines at the time of his election on January 18,1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the
other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic question.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public
officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office
must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is
running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The
evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the
following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 23, 1988
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October 20, 1915,
was naturalized in this Court on January 20, 1983, and issued Certificate of
Naturalization No. 11690178.
Petition No. 280225.
Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.
Very truly yours,
WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
Clerk
by:
(Sgd.)
ARACELI V. BARENG
Deputy Clerk
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer.
Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from the
persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the United States. cdll
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos
dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing
American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free
and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them
subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to have been
coerced — to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to
the United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely
renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of
whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the
Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who,
unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the
Marcos regime.

The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective
nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of
the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows: prcd
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated
as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of
personal status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities
which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the
nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the
nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact
most closely connected.
Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and
acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II. Many
members of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had
declared waron Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the ground that
he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against
Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with
which he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein. cdphil
That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the
nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar;
in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question
presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own
laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own
territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to
determine under its law who are its nationals."
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the
present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the
petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the
laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him
and the United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose his
naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically
restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have
happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless
individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the Special
Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that
body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious. Such a conclusion
would open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to
claim back their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their adopted state and reaffirming
their allegiance to the Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his
certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But
that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously
disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what
that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by
legislative or judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for
tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the
time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any
of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator
were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would
she have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made
within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied, that the
evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his
title was challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while
owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of
Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot
be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a
person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country
only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. LexLib
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great
price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This
country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once
rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The
returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and
love.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not
a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected
Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary
restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED. SO ORDERED.
||| (Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, [June 23, 1989], 255 PHIL 934-947)

[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001.]

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J p:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen." 1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac,
on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution. 2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and,
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States.
As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4),
a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. — A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of
allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall
not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances
is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance
with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen
concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission,
and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in
connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any
Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of
a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b),
shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the
Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of
said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall
 be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a
Filipino citizen . . . .
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630. 3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes
over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required
under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. 4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision 5 dismissing the petition, for quo warranto and
declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in
the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000. 6
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following
grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and
renunciation of such citizenship on his part.SDEHCc
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid,
the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such
reacquisition could not legally and constitutionallyrestore his natural-born status. 7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he
lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to
reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly
states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when
he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent
and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
 (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof. 9
As defined in the same Constitution,natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." 10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic
Act No. 530. 11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications 12 and none of the disqualifications 13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The
decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not
left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. 14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation,
and (3) by direct act of Congress. 15
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is
governed byCommonwealth Act No. 63. 16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications 17and none of the
disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. 18
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; 19 (2)service in the armed forces of the allied forces in
World War II; 20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time; 21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 22 and (5) political and economic necessity. 23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angara v. Republic, 24 we held:
. . . . Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the
person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a
petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of
 his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Emphasis in the
original.] 25

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 26 This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 2630, which provides:
SECTION 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance
shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in
the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. 27 It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to
perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its
decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution as follows:
SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino
citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not
considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17,
1973, 28 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship.
Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not
Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino
mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born
because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as
natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence:
"Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-
born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those
who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not
have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-
born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who,
after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of
their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. 29 The
Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. 30 In the absence
thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of
the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not
the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision. 31 There is
no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
||| (Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 142840, [May 7, 2001], 409
PHIL 633-672)

[G.R. Nos. 92191-92. July 30, 1991.]

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES and JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 92202-03. July 30, 1991.]

SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.

Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND HOUSE OF SENATE; SOLE JUDGES OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTION,
RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MEMBERS. —
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election,
returns, andqualifications of their respective members (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution). The
authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals. The Supreme Court in the
case of Lazatin vs. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive. And that, " . . . so long as
theConstitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election,
returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the
HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power
granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority
on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same."
2. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENTS THEREOF AS A RULE BEYOND JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE;
EXCEPTION; ARBITRARY AND IMPROVIDENT USE OF POWER RESULTING TO DENIAL OF
DUE PROCESS. — In the case of Robles vs. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1980]) the Supreme Court
stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of
this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision
or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of
its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to
be a remedy for such abuse." In the leading case ofMorrero vs. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court
ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event,
upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due
process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of
independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due
process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls
for remedial action.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — In the absence of a showing that the HRET has
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET
alone to decide (See Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]). It has no power to look into what
it thinks is apparent error. As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral
Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their
functions independent organs — independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power
granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]). In
passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers,
must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has
placed it (See Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]).
4. ID.; SUPREME COURT; EXPANDED JURISDICTION UNDER 1987 CONSTITUTION. — The
Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to
review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or
not they have acted within bounds of the Constitution (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution). Yet, in
the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the government branch or agency
has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view.
5. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS; HOW CONSTRUED; SPIRIT AND INTENDMENT MUST
PREVAIL. — In construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning
of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where
adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice (Casela vs. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA
279 [1970]). A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and
suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail
over the letter thereof (Jarrolt vs. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580). In the words of the Court in the case
of J.M. Tuazon vs. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]); "To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our
Constitution, any constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically, for the prescriptions
therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence
in their form but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal . . . ."
6. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE IV OF 1987 CONSTITUTION;
CONSTRUED. — Article IV of the Constitution provides: "Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines: . . . (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and . . . Section 2. Natural-born Citizens are those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not
only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having
been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in Paragraph 3 was
intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. To make the
provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an
inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive. The provision in question was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically
granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws,
conferred the status of a natural-born. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and
those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed in equal footing. They were both
considered as natural-born citizens. Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be
made to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of
essentially the same similarly situated members. It is for this reason that the amendments were
enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those
born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the
effectivity of that Constitution.
7. ID.; ID.; SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; ELECTION OF
CITIZENSHIP; APPLIES ONLY TO THOSE BORN OF FILIPINO MOTHER AND ALIEN FATHER
BUT NOT TO ONE WHOSE FATHER HAS BEEN NATURALIZED WHEN MINOR WAS ONLY NINE
(9) YEARS OF AGE. — There is no dispute that respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at
the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or
chose to be a Filipino citizen. Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of
the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17,
1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. To expect the respondent to have
formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural
born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He
could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be
amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship in spite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years
old.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) APPLIES IN
CASE AT BAR. — In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that
the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act
of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held: "Esteban's
exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship." The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He
has established his life here in the Philippines. For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent
who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re
Mallare rule. The filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving
in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office,
and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these
persons.

9. ID.; ID.; AN ATTACK THERETO MAY ONLY BE DONE THROUGH A DIRECT ACTION. — The
petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of the oath of citizenship. The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of
stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go
after the son. The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This
can not be done. In our jurisprudence, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through
a direct action for its nullity (See Queto vs. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970]).
10. ID.; ID.; TO DECLARE THE GRANT THEREOF AS NULL AND VOID VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE WHERE PERSON INVOLVED HAS BEEN LAID TO REST. — To ask the Court
to declare that grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against
the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a
fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET: "Ong
Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not rise
beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a central
issue in this case."
11. ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 17 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN SUB-PARAGRAPH 4 THEREOF IN
RELATION TO SECTION 4 OF THE PHILIPPINE BILL OF 1902, APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. —
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
"ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards: . . . (4). Those without such papers, who may have
acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy." The domicile of a natural person is the place of his
habitual residence. This domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed
lost until a new one is established (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig vs.
Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949]). Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895.
Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of
Laoang, Samar. The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even
went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place where Ong Te set up his business
and acquired his real property. Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of
the Civil Code of Spain. Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always
returned to the Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was
of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines
and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject. If Ong Te became a
Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of Spain,
necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as
one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, Vol. II). A priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te
qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
12. ID.; ID.; "RESIDENCE"; MEANING THEREOF UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. — Under
the Constitution, the term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only
under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The term "domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return (Ong
Huan Tin vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]). The absence of a person from said permanent
residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other
words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966]).
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTABLISHMENT THEREOF; OWNERSHIP OF A HOUSE NOT NECESSARY. —
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he
cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced. The properties owned by the Ong family
are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the
private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co-heir),
notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his parents. Even assuming that the
private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los
Reyes vs. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a house
in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or
in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEMPORARY ABSENCE DOES NOT NECESSARILY CONNOTE CHANGE
THEREOF; "ANIMUS REVERTENDI" ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — It has also been settled
that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other
than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence (Faypon vs. Quirino, 96
Phil. 294 [1954]). The private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and
later to practice his profession. There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar.
On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had the
animus revertendi.
15. ID.; ID.; PROSPECTIVE JUDICIAL RECOMMENDATION; MORE HUMANE AND LESS
TECHNICAL APPROACH TO CITIZENSHIP PROBLEMS. — Our citizens no doubt constitute the
country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must forever cherish. However,
in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an
interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness. Under the
overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent
backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes
humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew
how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is
time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful
examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less
technical approach to citizenship problems is essential.
16. ID.; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE; CANDIDATES; PROPERTY OWNERSHIP; NOT A
QUALIFICATION. — To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run
for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the
candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by
the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run (see
Maquera vs. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965]).
17. REMEDIAL LAW; BEST EVIDENCE RULE; EXCEPTION; ORIGINAL HAS BEEN LOST;
REQUIREMENTS THEREOF TO BE ADMISSIBLE; PROPERLY LAID IN CASE AT BAR. — The
petitioners' sole ground in disputing that respondent was a natural-born Filipino is that the documents
presented to prove it were not in compliance with the best evidence rule. The petitioners allege that
the private respondent failed to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial
evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body upon which the resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention was predicated. On the contrary, the documents presented by the private
respondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence rule. It was established in the proceedings
before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary
session of the 1971 Constitutional Conventionheld on November 28, 1972 cannot be found. This was
affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty.
Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian
of the U.P. Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there
is no governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant
Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. The
inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty.
Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not
require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona
fide diligent search, the same cannot be found (see Government of P.I. vs. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817
[1918]). Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately
established, the contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the
recollection of witnesses.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION THEREOF; EXPANDED
UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; DECISION OF HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SUBJECT TO
JUDICIAL REVIEW. — I believe that, contrary to the respondents' contentions, the Court has the
jurisdiction and competence to review the questioned decision of the House Electoral Tribunal and to
decide the present controversy. Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitutionprovides that: "Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government." The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. But
as early as 1938, it was held in Morrero vs. Bocar (66 Phil. 429), construing Section 4, Article VI of
the 1935 Constitution which provided that " . . . The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly." that: "The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of such and
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, 'upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law'
(Barry vs. US ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
35 Off. Gaz., 23)." And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, this Court is duty-bound to determine whether or not, in an actual controversy, there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — The present controversy, involves more than
perceived irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots,
in which cases, it may be contended with great legal force and persuasion that the decision of the
electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional directive, made the sole
judge of contests relating to such matters. The present controversy, however, involves no less than a
determination of whether the qualifications for membership in the House of Representatives, as
prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss in the
performance of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-
born Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives, solely because
the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal would have acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by
this Court of its power of judicial review. Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of
private respondent for the office of Member of the House of Representatives, are here controverted
by petitioners who, at the same time, claim that they are entitled to the office illegally held by private
respondent. From this additional direction, where one asserts and earnestly perceived right that in
turn is vigorously resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for this Court to
consider and decide.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS. — The Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal, does not assert
supremacy over it in contravention of the time-honored principle of constitutional separation of powers.
The Court in this instance simply performs a function entrusted and assigned to it by
the Constitution of interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the pertinent provisions of
the Constitution with finality. "It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct
constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches
of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in
action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (the Supreme Court in
Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36)." Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest
and concern to determine whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold so important and high
a public office which is specifically reserved by the Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
4. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; NATURAL-BORN; REQUISITE; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. —
The records show that private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses Jose Ong
Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern
Samar. In other words,at birth, private respondent was a Chinese citizen (not a natural-born Filipino
citizen) because his father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under the
1935 Constitution which was enforced at the time of private respondent's birth on 19 June 1948, only
those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose
mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, in order to be considered Filipino citizens. Following the basic definition in the 1987
Constitution of a natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese citizenship of
his father at the time of his birth, although from birth, private respondent had the right to elect
Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 15 OF THE REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW (C.A. 473); DID NOT
CONFER STATUS OF NATURAL-BORN IN CASE AT BAR. — While under Section 15 of
the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor children of a naturalized citizen (father), who were
born in the Philippines prior to the naturalization of the parent automatically become Filipino
citizens, this does not alter the fact that private respondent was not born to a Filipino father, and the
operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of a natural-born citizen merely
because he did not have to perform any act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
6. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; NATURE THEREOF; PRIVILEGE NOT A RIGHT. — "Naturalization is
not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting
public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions
prescribed by law therefor."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION; GRANT THEREOF; APPEALABLE; OATH TAKEN BEFORE
EXPIRATION OF THE PERIOD OF APPEAL; IMPROPER. — It is settled that an order granting a
petition to take the requisite oath of allegiance of one who has previously obtained a decision
favorable to his application for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper and illegal to
authorize the taking of said oath upon the issuance of said order and before the expiration of the
reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said order. In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic (159 SCRA
477), this Court held that: "Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of
order granting citizenship is irregular and makes the proceedings so taken null and void (Republic vs.
Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs. Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil.
1381)."
8. ID.; ID.; NATURAL-BORN; DEFINED AND INTERPRETED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
— Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) citizens as: "Natural-
born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Article IV, Section 1,
paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines: . . . (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority." It would appear then that the intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen was to equalize the position of
Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino citizens. In
other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino
fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens.
But those born to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The election, which
is related to the attainment of the age of majority, may be made before or after 17 January 1973. This
interpretation appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of the Constitution which is
to protect and enhance the people's individual interests, and to foster equality among them.
9. ID.; ID.; ELECTION THEREOF; MUST BE MADE EXPRESSLY AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 625. — It is settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that election of Philippine
citizenship must be made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625, Sections 1 and 2 of the Act
mandate that the option to elect Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly, not impliedly.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE (ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 533,
SEPTEMBER 12, 1974, [59 SCRA 45]) NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The respondent
tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare which held that Esteban Mallare's exercise of the right of
suffrage when he came of age, constituted a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. Mallare,
cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship, is
not applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal failed to consider that Esteban Mallare
reached the age of majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625 was approved and, more
importantly, eleven (11) years before the 1935 Constitution (which granted the right of election) took
effect.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE PROVIDED FOR UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 625 NOT
COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — The respondent tribunal erred in ruling that by operation
of CA 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino
citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father, the law itself had already elected Philippine
citizenship for him. For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private respondent's father was
valid, and that there was no further need for private respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he
had automatically become a Filipino citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation of the Revised
Naturalization Law amounted to an election by him of Philippine citizenship as contemplated by
the Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship derived from one's Filipino mother, is
made upon reaching the age of majority, not during one's minority. There is no doubt in my mind,
therefore, that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority in 1969 or within a reasonable time thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he
cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under Sections 2 and 1 (3), Article IV of the 1987
Constitution.

12. ID.; ELECTION PROTEST; QUESTIONING ELIGIBILITY OF A CANDIDATE-ELECT; IN EFFECT

A QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDING; INELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE-ELECT RESULTS IN NO-
CHOICE. — Neither of the petitioners may take the place of private respondent in the House of
Representatives representing the second district of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in
Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal
(176 SCRA 1), is controlling. There we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo warranto
petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as
he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice
of the people of Baguio City for mayor of that City. A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not
qualified for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding even if it is labelled an election protest.
It is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily to install the
protestant in his place. The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are
cast for an ineligible candidate in an election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. In such a case, the electors have failed to make a choice and
the election is a nullity.
13. ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE BILL OF 1902; REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED THEREIN; NOT COMPLIED
WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — The "test," following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
is whether or not Ong Te, private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was "an inhabitant of
the Philippines who continued to reside therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he
met these requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902, then, Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise,
he was not a Filipino citizen. Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the
House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in
the "Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which show that Ong Te was not listed as an
inhabitant of Samar where he is claimed to have been a resident. Petitioners (protestants) also
submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal Exhibit V, a certification of the
Chief of the Archives Division, Records and Management and Archives Office, stating that the name
of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These
exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident
of Samar close to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not continue residing in Samar, Philippines after
11 April 1899, contrary to private respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs or evidence,
private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE.
14. ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA; NOT APPLICABLE. — The decision of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong was a decision of a political body, not a court of law. And, even
if we have to take such a decision as a decision of a quasi-judicial body (i.e., a political body
exercising quasi-judicial functions), said decision in the Emil L. Ong case can not have the category
or character of res judicata in the present judicial controversy, because between the two (2) cases,
there is no identity of parties (one involves Emil L. Ong, while the other involves private respondent)
and, more importantly, there is no, identity of causes of action because the first involves the 1935
Constitution while the second involves the 1987 Constitution. As held in Lee vs. Commissioners on
Immigration (G.R. No. L-23446, 20 December 1971, 42 SCRA 561): " . . . Everytime the citizenship of
a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as
res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand."
15. ID; SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION; MUST BE ENFORCED. — It is regrettable that one
(as private respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes for the elective
position of Representative (Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the second district of
Northern Samar, would have to cease in office by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full membership
of the Court had participated in this case, with the result that the legislative district would cease to
have, in the interim, a representative in the House of Representatives. But the fundamental
consideration in case of this nature is the Constitution and only the Constitution. It has to be assumed,
therefore, that when the electorate in the second legislative district of Northern Samar cast the
majority of their votes for private respondent, they seemed and believed that he was fully eligible and
qualified for the office because he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and
belief can not prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the Constitution.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES;
AS SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTEST RELATING TO MEMBERS THEREOF; ISSUE OF
CITIZENSHIP INCLUDED; BEYOND JUDICIAL INTERVENTION. — The question of citizenship is a
question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves facts to the tribunal that determined them. I
am quite agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the membership in the House, as follows: "Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." is the
best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute its judgment because it thinks it knows better.
2. ID.; SUPREME COURT; EXPANDED JURISDICTION THEREOF; REVIEW OF FACTS NOT
INCLUDED. — In the case of Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections (88 SCRA 251), it was held that
this Court can not review the errors of the Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all
election contests) — in the sense of reviewing facts and unearthing mistakes — and that this Court's
jurisdiction is to see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. It is true that
the new Constitution has conferred expanded powers on the Court, but as the Charter states, our
authority is "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." It is not
to review facts.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; "GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION" DEFINED. — "Grave abuse of discretion" has
been defined as whimsical exercise of power amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise, to
denial of due process of law.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making
that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET, in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however,
denied by the HRET, in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution). prLL
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the
1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:
"The use of the word 'sole' emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power
by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as
'intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the
legislature.' (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as 'full, clear and complete'. (Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the
Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968] The same may be said
with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution." (p.
401).

The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule,
not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise
restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of
power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the
judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's
so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution
was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing
Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated
ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a
remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the
Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court
does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches
of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an
abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial
action. LLjur
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to
speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine
whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1,
Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different
view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not
decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177
SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not
powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent
organs — independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by
the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers,
must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has
place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may
exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral
Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of its
composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive.
The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members
of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same — manifest grave abuse of
discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part
of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on
land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish
colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by
Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish
an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino
cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong
Chuan met a natural born-Filipina, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in
1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware
store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo,
Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an
unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Samar of application for naturalization on February 15, 1954. LibLex
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April
28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to
differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were
concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned
to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of
their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education,
went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their
second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a
16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found
a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the
hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment
given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared
Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to
be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this
subject. cdll
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his
childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar,
and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family
business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the
opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of Northern
Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in
Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by
more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:.
"SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural born citizens."

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers,
elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against
Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
"Mr. Azcuna:
With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitutionor would it also
cover those who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas:
It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision
of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or after January
l7, 1973." (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis
supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Trenas:
The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and
Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a
natural-born Citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding
that persons who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas:
yes."
 xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Nolledo:
And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book, he
said that the decision was designed merely to accommodate former delegate
Ernesto Ang and that the definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect.
Now it seems that the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention
by supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas:
As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking. (Records
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Rodrigo:
But this provision becomes very important because his election of Philippine
citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino
citizen entitling him to run for Congress . . .
Fr. Bernas:
Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the body to
approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo:
I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as unfair that the
Filipino citizen who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a
Filipino citizen or a natural born citizen." (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Rodrigo:
The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation. Between 1935
and 1973 when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino
fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of
Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino
citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens." (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from
February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be
retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal
meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially
where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35
SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter
thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
"To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is
not to be construed narrowly or pedantically, for the prescriptions therein contained, to
paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in
their form but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not
formal . . ." (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino
father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one
born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so
elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an
alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting
accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated
members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental
anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution. Cdpr
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to
correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid
which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a
Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born
status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to
ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only
was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was
only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987
the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing
citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn
statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen
since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
"Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship". (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life
here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and
no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for
naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a
sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and
getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered
himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine
customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness, no acts to show that this country is
not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are fully aware of Mr. Ong's
parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court will ever know him. They
voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since
childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate
choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public
office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and
other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these
persons. LLjur
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is
doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's
being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not
only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen
elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that
"when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized
Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was
then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected
Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)

The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of
his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after
his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be
done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action
for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970]).
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void
would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How
can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words
of the HRET: "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he
could not rise beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made
a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function
is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers.
Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the
citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the
respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both
mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other
citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality.
Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father
which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave
abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by
the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of
the Constitutiondrafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was
declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang
Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error. There
would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse
of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the
11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto
were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
"ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of
Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the
Monarchy." (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
(Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895.
Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of
Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, September 7,1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established m 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the
turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real
property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The
fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will not
change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil
Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject. LibLex
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the
Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant
has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a
place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to
educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill
of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a
natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that the documents presented to prove it were not
in compliance with the best evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to
present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the
proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the
best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report No.
12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972
cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by
Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief
Librarian of the U.P. Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect
that there is no governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35;
TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN,
December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty.
Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not
require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona
fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817
[1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the
contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of
witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the
Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he
was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent, categorically
stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the election protest
against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention,
states that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the report on the
election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present.
Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have
presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-
born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of the documents presented by
the private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural objections respecting the admissibility of
the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of
that body. The HRET, by explicit mandate of theConstitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of
Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies
over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all
relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their
conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to
keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence"
has been understood as synonymous with domicilenot only under the previous Constitutions but also
under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the
qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:

"Mr. Nolledo:
With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, 'and a
resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election'. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile." (Records of the
1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
"Mrs. Rosario Braid:
The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised
the same point that 'resident' has been interpreted at times as a matter of
intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes:
Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid:
Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?
 Mr. De los Reyes:
But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in
the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may
vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it
should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence." (Records of the
1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which
regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a
person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the
domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi. (Ujano v.
Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966]) cdphil
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at
Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile;
it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET, sufficiently established that after the fire
that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment
was built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong,
Jr., November 18, 1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he
cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon
the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession,
became the co-owner thereof (as a co-heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the
names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court
in the case of De los Reyes D. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person
should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live
in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be
tantamount to a property qualification. TheConstitution only requires that the candidate meet the age,
citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the
candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil.
412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies
and later to practice his profession. There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang,
Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had
theanimus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial evolution.
Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese,
Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is
none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese.
Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private
respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which
one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an
interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very
affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy,
sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose
lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire
citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and
meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable
and less technical approach to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the house of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. SO ORDERED.
||| (Co v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, 92202-03, [July 30, 1991],
276 PHIL 758-830)

[G.R. No. 125793. August 29, 2006.]

JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON
SOLUREN, respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J p:

Citizenship is a priceless possession. Former U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren fittingly emphasized its
crowning value when he wrote that "it is man's basic right for it is nothing less than to have
rights." 1 When a person loses citizenship, therefore, the State sees to it that its reacquisition may
only be granted if the former citizen fully satisfies all conditions and complies with the applicable law.
Without doubt, repatriation is not to be granted simply based on the vagaries of the former Filipino
citizen.
The Case
The instant petition for review 2 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contests the
denial by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the Petition forHabeas Corpus interposed by petitioner
Joevanie Arellano Tabasa from the Order of Summary Deportation issued by the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) for his return to the United States.
The Facts
The facts as culled by the CA from the records show that petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, 3 when petitioner was seven years old, 4 his father,
Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen 5 of the United States. By derivative naturalization
(citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by
virtue of naturalization 6 ), petitioner also acquired American citizenship.
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for one
year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May 23,
1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay, Aklan; subsequently, he was
brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila. 7
Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and Investigation
Division of the BID on May 28, 1996; and on the same day, Tabasa was accused of violating Section
8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a charge sheet which alleged:
1. That on 3 August 1995, respondent (petitioner herein [Tabasa]) arrived in the
Philippines and was admitted as a balikbayan;
2. That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul
General of [the] U.S. Embassy, informed the Bureau that respondent's Passport No.
053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., had been
revoked by the U.S. Department of State;
3. Hence, respondent [petitioner Tabasa] is now an undocumented and undesirable
alien and may be summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions
No. 53 issued by then Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago to effect his
deportation (Exhibit 3). 8
The pertinent portion of the Herbert letter is as follows:
The U.S. Department of State has revoked U.S. passport 053854189 issued on June
10, 1994 in San Francisco, California under the name of Joevanie Arellano Tabasa,
born on February 21, 1959 in the Philippines. Mr. Tabasa's passport has been
revoked because he is the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest issued
on January 25, 1996 by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
for violation of Section 1073, "Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution," of Title 18 of the
United States Code. He is charged with one count of a felon in possession of a firearm,
in violationof California Penal Code, Section 12021(A)(1), and one count of sexual
battery, in violation of California Penal Code, Section 243.4 (D). 9
The BID ordered petitioner's deportation to his country of origin, the United States, on May 29, 1996,
in the following summary deportation order:
Records show that on 16 April 1996, Mr. Kevin F. Herbert, Consul General of the U.S.
Embassy in Manila, filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport the
abovenamed [sic] respondent [petitioner Tabasa] on the ground that a standing
warrant for several federal charges has been issued against him, and that the
respondent's Passport No. 053854189 has been revoked. AaSTIH
 By reason thereof, and on the strength of Mission Order No. LIV-96-72, Intelligence
operatives apprehended the respondent in Aklan on 23 May 1996.
In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 81461 [sic, '81461'
should be '86461'], 30 May 1989), the Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign embassy
cancels the passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien
loses the privilege to remain in the country. Further, under Office Memorandum Order
No. 34 issued on 21 August 1989, summary deportation proceedings lie where the
passport of the alien has expired.
It is, thus, apparent that respondent has lost his privilege to remain in the country. 10
Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order 11 on May 29, 1996, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
40771. Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for deportation
may be issued by immigration authorities before a final order of deportation is made; that no
notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to
admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is married
to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940;
and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he
was seven years old due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.
At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old. 12
On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of the petitioner on
June 3, 1996 and show the cause of petitioner's detention, and restrained the Bureau from summarily
deporting him. On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before the CA; and on June 6, 1996, the
CA granted both parties ten (10) days within which to file their memoranda, after which the case
would be considered submitted for decision. 13 Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Immigration granted
the petitioner's temporary release on bail on a PhP20,000.00 cash bond. 14
However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired
Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance withRepublic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that
because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau. 15
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA, in its August 7, 1996 Decision, 16 denied Tabasa's petition on the ground that he had not
legally and successfully acquired — by repatriation — his Filipino citizenship as provided in RA 8171.
The court said that although he became an American citizen by derivative naturalization when his
father was naturalized in 1968, there is no evidence to show that he lost his Philippine citizenship "on
account of political or economic necessity," as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA 8171 — the law
governing the repatriation of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship. The affidavit does
not state that political or economic necessity was the compelling reason for petitioner's parents to
give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968. Moreover, the court a quo found that petitioner Tabasa did
not dispute the truth of the April 16, 1996 letter of the United States Consul General Kevin F. Herbert
or the various warrants issued for his arrest by the United States court. The court a quo noted that
after petitioner was ordered deported by the BID on May 29, 1996, he successively executed an
Affidavit of Repatriation on June 6, 1996 and took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on June 13, 1996 — more than ten months after his arrival in the country on August 3,
1995. The appellate court considered petitioner's "repatriation" as a last ditch effort to avoid
deportation and prosecution in the United States. The appellate court concluded that his only reason
to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is to avoid criminal prosecution in the United
States of America. The court a quo, therefore, ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now before us.
The Issue
The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship
under RA 8171. If there is no valid repatriation, then he can be summarily deported for his being an
undocumented alien.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no merit in this petition.
RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine
Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos," was enacted on October 23, 1995. It
provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons, viz:
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to
aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship,
including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section
4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or
group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases. 17 (Emphasis supplied.)

Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by
reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171?
He does not.
Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171
To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-
born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a
minor. TDAcCa
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to
natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on accountof political or economic necessity, and to
the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his
Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171,
his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation
where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign
country. The repatriationof the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and
automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship: 18 the
children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the
benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation
is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life
much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the
minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still
a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner
acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to automatic
repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic
necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time ofhis "repatriation" on June 13,
1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the
filing of the petition for repatriation.
Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic
necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or
economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political
reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent's and not his. The
privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could
prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and
extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.
In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can
possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of theCitizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant to RA 8171
Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow
the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for repatriation with
the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to process petitions for
repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) dated August 22, 1996, to wit:
SECTION 1. Composition. — The composition of the Special Committee on
Naturalization, with the Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary ofForeign
Affairs and the Director-General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as
members, shall remain as constituted.
SECTION 2. Procedure. — Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special
Committee on Naturalization which shall process the same. If their applications
are approved[,] they shall take the necessary oath ofallegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship.
The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their
certificate of registration (emphasis supplied).
SECTION 3. Implementing Rules. — The Special Committee is hereby authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required
fees for the processing of petitions.
SECTION 4. Effectivity. — This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
In the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171 issued by the SCN on August 5, 1999,
applicants for repatriation are required to submit documents in support of their petition such as their
birth certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino citizenship. 19 These requirements
were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications of the applicant particularly in light of the
reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
then, executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he registered, together with the certificate of live birth,
with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office subsequently issued him a
certificate of such registration. 20 At that time, the SCN was already in place and operational by
virtue of the June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. 21 Although A.O. No.
285 designating the SCN to process petitions filed pursuant to RA 8171 was issued only on August
22, 1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance according to the Court in Angat v. Republic. 22 Thus,
petitioner should have instead filed a petition for repatriation before the SCN.
Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171
Even if petitioner — now of legal age — can still apply for repatriation under RA 8171, he
nevertheless failed to prove that his parents relinquished their Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity as provided for in the law. Nowhere in his
affidavit of repatriation did he mention that his parents lost their Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic reasons. It is notable that under the Amended Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires a petitioner for repatriation to set forth, among others, "the
reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in case of Filipino woman,
or whether by political or economic necessity in case of [a] natural-born Filipino citizen who lost
his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such political or economic necessity should be
specified." 23
Petitioner Tabasa asserts, however, that the CA erred in ruling that the applicant for repatriation must
prove that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. He
theorizes that the reference to 'political or economic reasons' is "merely descriptive, not
restrictive, of the widely accepted reasons for naturalization in [a] foreign country." 24
Petitioner's argument has no leg to stand on. AcaEDC
A reading of Section 1 of RA 8171 shows the manifest intent of the legislature to limit the
benefit of repatriation only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity, in addition to Filipino women who lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens. The precursor of RA 8171, Presidential Decree No. 725 (P.D.
725), 25 which was enacted on June 5, 1975 amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, also gives to the
same groups of former Filipinos the opportunity to repatriate but without the limiting phrase, "on
account of political or economic necessity" in relation to natural-born Filipinos. By adding the said
phrase to RA 8171, the lawmakers clearly intended to limit the application of the law only to political
or economic migrants, aside from the Filipino women who lost their citizenship by marriage to aliens.
This intention is more evident in the following sponsorship speech of Rep. Andrea B. Domingo on
House Bill No. 1248, the origin of RA 8171, to wit:
Ms. Domingo: . . .
From my experience as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, I observed that there are only four types of Filipinos who leave the
country.
The first is what we call the "economic refugees" who go abroad to work because
there is no work to be found in the country. Then we have the "political
refugees" who leave the country for fear of their lives because they are not in
consonance with the prevailing policy of government. The third type is those who have
committed crimes and would like to escape from the punishment of said crimes. Lastly,
we have those Filipinos who feel that they are not Filipinos, thereby seeking other
citizenship elsewhere.
 Of these four types of Filipinos, Mr. Speaker, the first two have to leave the country
not of choice, but rather out of sacrifice to look for a better life, as well as for a safer
abode for themselves and their families. It is for these two types of Filipinos that
this measure is being proposed for approval by this body. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

. . . [I]f the body would recall, I mentioned in my short sponsorship speech the four
types of Filipinos who leave their country. And the two types — the economic and
political refugees — are the ones being addressed by this proposed law, and they are
not really Filipino women who lost their citizenship through marriage. We had a
lot of problems with these people who left the country because of political persecution
or because of pressing economic reasons, and after feeling that they should come
back to the country and get back their citizenship and participate as they should in the
affairs of the country, they find that it is extremely difficult to get their citizenship back
because they are treated no different from any other class of alien. 26
From these two sources, namely, P.D. 725 and the sponsorship speech on House Bill No. 1248, it is
incontrovertible that the intent of our legislators in crafting Section 1 of RA 8171, as it is precisely
worded out, is to exclude those Filipinos who have abandoned their country for reasons other than
political or economic necessity.
Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his political or economic reasons since the
act of renouncing allegiance to one's native country constitutes a "necessary and unavoidable
shifting of his political allegiance," and his father's loss of Philippine citizenship through naturalization
"cannot therefore be said to be for any reason other than political or economic necessity." 27
This argument has no merit.
While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to one's native country is necessarily a political act, it
does not follow that the act is inevitably politically or economically motivated as alleged by petitioner.
To reiterate, there are other reasons why Filipinos relinquish their Philippine citizenship. The
sponsorship speech of former Congresswoman Andrea B. Domingo illustrates that aside from
economic and political refugees, there are Filipinos who leave the country because they have
committed crimes and would like to escape from punishment, and those who really feel that they are
not Filipinos and that they deserve a better nationality, and therefore seek citizenship elsewhere.
Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove to
the satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his loss ofcitizenship was the decision of his parents to
forfeit their Philippine citizenship for political or economic exigencies. He failed to undertake this
crucial step, and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.
Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by
the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that citizenship may be lost or
reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the
qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine if an
applicant for repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to
choose who will be its citizens, and who can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like
petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in rejecting the petition
for repatriation.
Petitioner: an undocumented alien subject to summary deportation
Petitioner claims that because of his repatriation, he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship;
therefore, he is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.
This theory is incorrect.
As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not shown
that his case falls within the coverage of the law.
Office Memorandum No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 of the BID is enlightening on summary
deportation:
2. The Board of Special Inquiry and the Hearing Board IV shall observe summary
deportation proceedings in cases where the charge against the alien is overstaying, or
the expiration or cancellation by his government of his passport. In cases involving
overstaying aliens, BSI and the Hearing Board IV shall merely require the
presentation of the alien's valid passport and shall decide the case on the basis
thereof.
3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien, or does not reissue a valid
passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country, under the
Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15 (Schonemann v. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 81461
[sic, should be '86461'], 30 May 1989). The automatic loss of the privilege obviates
deportation proceedings. In such instance, the Board of Commissioners may issue
summary judgment ofdeportation which shall be immediately executory. 28
In addition, in the case of Schonemann v. Defensor Santiago, et al., this Court held:
It is elementary that if an alien wants to stay in the Philippines, he must possess the
necessary documents. One of these documents is a valid passport. There
are, of course, exceptions where in the exercise of its sovereign prerogatives the
Philippines may grant refugee status, refuse to extradite an alien, or otherwise allow
him or her to stay here even if he [the alien] has no valid passport or Philippine visa.
"Boat people" seeking residence elsewhere are examples. However, the grant of the
privilege of staying in the Philippines is discretionary on the part of the proper
authorities. There is no showing of any grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
whimsicality in the questioned summary judgment. . . . 29
Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his admission into the country, became an
undocumented alien who can be summarily deported. His subsequent "repatriation" cannot bar such
deportation especially considering that he has no legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. TAacCE
WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125793, [August 29, 2006], 531 PHIL 407-428)

[G.R. No. 221697. March 8, 2016.]

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 221698-700. March 8, 2016.]

 MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND
AMADO D. VALDEZ, respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J p:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for anex parte issuance of temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following:
(1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division;
(2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11
December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and (4) 23 December 2015
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA
No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September
1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives,
Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported
and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-
Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name
"Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted
their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were
made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption, 2 the
petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer
who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live
Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay,
petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to
the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. 4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with
the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC
Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. 5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No.
F927287 6 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19
May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos.
L881511 and DD156616. 7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the
University of the Philippines 8 but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United
States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts
Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies. 9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares),
a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan
City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back
to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16
April 1992. 12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both
born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained
U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support
her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that she
gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8
July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the
Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into
a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take
care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate. 18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her
entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of
2005. 19 The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification of their children's
schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester; 20 coordination
with property movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S.
to the Philippines; 21 and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be
followed in bringing their pet dog into the country. 22 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit
her job in the U.S. 23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 24 and without delay,
secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children
immediately followed 25 while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending
projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there. 26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her
husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in
San Juan City in the second half of 2005. 27 The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title
covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to
petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006. 28 Meanwhile, her children of school age began
attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal
of some of the family's remaining household belongings. 29 She travelled back to the Philippines
on 11 March 2006. 30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the
family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S. 31 The family home was eventually
sold on 27 April 2006. 32 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006,
arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in July
2006. 33
 In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home 34and to this day, is where the couple and
their children have been residing. 35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was
issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1 June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003. 36 Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her
three minor children on 10 July 2006. 37 As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI
acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her
Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the
Philippines. 38 Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name
and in the names of her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31
August 2006. 40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No.
XX4731999. 41 This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine
Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA. 42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of
the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). 43 Before assuming her
post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of
America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20
October 2010, 44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No.
9225. 45 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the
BI 46 and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. 47 From then on, petitioner
stopped using her American passport. 48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in
Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States." 49 On that day,
she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she
had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of
relinquishing her American citizenship. 50 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she
had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July
1991 and from May 2005 to present. 51

On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the
question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013." 53 Petitioner obtained the
highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No.
DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months counted from 24 May 2005. 57 The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit
Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in
Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
 Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of
several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a
petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and
raffled to the COMELEC Second Division. 59 She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction
over her petition. 60Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed material
misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that
she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day
before the 9 May 2016 Elections. 61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a
natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling. 62 Elamparo claimed that
international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on
foundlings. 63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition
of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin
with. 64 Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to
have lost that status when she became a naturalized American citizen. 65 According to Elamparo,
natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth. 66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by
the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had
resided in the country for only six (6) years and six (6) months as of May 2013 Elections.
Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her
natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement
of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when
she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is
qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to
reestablish her domicile in the Philippines. 67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually
a petition for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the
Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary
jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations
which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in her COC
that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that there
was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that
foundlings were considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have
been born of citizens of the place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under
the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship prior to the filing of her COC for President in the May 9,
 2016 Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and has not
been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not
possess natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished
her domicile in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired
natural-born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC
for Senator was an honest mistake, not binding and should give way to
evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign
right of the Filipino people to decide a purely political question, that is,
should she serve as the country's next leader. 68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted
for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding
that petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, contained material representations
which are false. Thefallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition
to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is herebyGRANTED.
Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED. 69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner
which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the
same. 70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad),
Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the
COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, 71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite
residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency. 72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons
of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens
since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born status. 73 Tatad invoked the rule of
statutory construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that
foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the1935 Constitution is
indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them. 74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to
prove that she is a natural-born citizen. 75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her
claim that foundlings have a nationality. 76 According to Tatad, international conventions and
treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to give effect to
treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines. 77 He also stressed that there is no standard state
practice that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings. 78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to
reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225because it only applies to former natural-born
citizens and petitioner was not as she was a foundling. 79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the
ten (10)-year residency requirement. 80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in
Quezon City only from the time she renounced her American citizenship which was sometime in
2010 or 2011. 81Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S.
domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the
U.S. 82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as
SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow
upon her the status of a natural-born citizen. 83 He advanced the view that former natural-born
citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and will
not revert to their original status as natural-born citizens. 84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only
been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May
2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly
reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10)-year residency requirement for
President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras'
petition, 85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He
claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground that she did
not possess the ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy and that she made false
entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016. 86 Contreras contended that the reckoning period for
computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her
petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI. 87 He asserted that petitioner's
physical presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition
of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen and as such, she
was governed by the Philippine immigration laws. 88

In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:

First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His
petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections
12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. 89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack
of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds for
the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office.90
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus
on establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency. 91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC. 92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the
respondents. 93 Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born
citizen of this country.
 Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and
are presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found. 94 Consequently, the petitioner
is considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated
under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status. 96 Moreover, the official acts
of the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18
July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair
and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC. 97 She believed that all these acts
reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing
her domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and
schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of
their family home in Corinthian Hills. 99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the
Philippines even before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three
determinants for a change of domicile are complied with. 100 She reasoned out that there was no
requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new
domicile of choice. 101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for
Senator was a mistake made in good faith. 102
In a Resolution 103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled
that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10)-year residency
requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared
therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division
concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May
2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First
Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions
for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of anex parte temporary restraining order/status
quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining
orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives from
implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The Court
also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January
2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to
ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No.
15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
 2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11
December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a
QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied
due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and
restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in
this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC
cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article
IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers
and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction,
or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling
places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration
of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies
and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
 platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not
be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence
or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to thisConstitution, or
which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections
constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be
an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the
Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials
shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation
or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of
Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties
or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President,
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President,
the Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear
by the Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
 The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections, 104 which was affirmatively cited in the En Bancdecision in Fermin v. COMELEC 105 is
our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so
as to provide in Rule 25 §1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. — Any candidate who does not
possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the
Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law
to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing
as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however,
cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a
cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise
of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is
noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to
decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C,
§2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility
into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not
only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for
"disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility."
"Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in
§12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government
Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or
from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is
to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress.
"Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed
in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the
proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public
office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or
continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of
dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the
qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from
any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the
respective proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision
for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice
Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there
is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an
individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election
offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a
prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very
 acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the
grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he
has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason
he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his
proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his
citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending
beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the
companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the
determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after
the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character proceedings
relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of
certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law
is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible
for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications
to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases
involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the
COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in
elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members
of Congress of the President and Vice President, as the case may be. 106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated
in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012
of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February 1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or
who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate. 107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. — Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is
declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or
Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance
Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that,
as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of
a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law orthe Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides
of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for
the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must
beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with
jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a
judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be
cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her
qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior
authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found.
The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable
veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against
which the falsity of representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that
deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and
residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since foundlings 108 are not mentioned in
the enumeration of citizens under the 1935 Constitution, 109 they then cannot be citizens. As the
COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it
all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it
cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is
certain that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the burden
to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on
Paternity and Filiation. 110 That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has
Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was
on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents
should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a
foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that
her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown,
but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sec. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters — Evidence must have such a relation
to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on
collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority
(PSA) 111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was
15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%.
For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, also from
the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of
the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners,
or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were
230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there
were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino
females versus 1,190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino
males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures.
Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner
was found in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino. 112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she
was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical
Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval
face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a person
with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99%
chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample
probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the
evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In
the words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to
the Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We
do not face a situation where the probability is such that every foundling would have
a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need
to frame our questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone
born in the Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that
the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly
average, there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as
opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample
period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357.
This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines would
be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is
15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For
this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines on that decade would be a natural
born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers
for us, but I am confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the
parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino
parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of
poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners abandoning their children
here in the Philippines thinking those infants would have better economic
opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising
abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever considered
their child excess baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just
because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these
foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright
discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the
 statistical certainty — 99.9% — that any child born in the Philippines would be a
natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial
of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an
improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class
of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of common
sense are not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would
definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with
respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 114 this Court held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic
law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols:
For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The
natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the
father.
xxx xxx xxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The
gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown
parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider
them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of
unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards,
because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a
Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown
parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no
need. . . .
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be
Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
 But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for
amendment.
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus: "Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a
Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown parentage."
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the
child, is not unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of
a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is
not unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the
latter] does not recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from
Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the
Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between,
that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle
that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this
nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision on the
subject exhaustively. 116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any
objection to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because
their number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the account, 117 cited by
petitioner, of delegate andconstitution law author Jose Aruego who said:

During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an

amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign
father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this
amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the cases,
being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to
them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the
rules of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children
followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of
 the place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the
Constitution of the proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February
2016 Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was
declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as
Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying that it was
the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need to
expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally
correct. Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions
that are imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is
basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to convince their
colleagues in the convention that there is no more need to expressly declare
foundlings as Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic
efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize
foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935
Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and1987 Constitution.
It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice
Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and
humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon
them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications of
the argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of
the 1935,1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to deny foundlings the status of
Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against
foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict
this across the board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort
the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present
charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities . . ." and
Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions
contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These
laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must
be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil
Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity
of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals
with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino.
In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic, 119 a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted
by aliens. This Court said:
 In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which
no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of
the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of
Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. OurCivil Code (Art. 15) adheres to
the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the
latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of
Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the
petitioners, who are foreigners. 120 (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to
Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other Purposes" (otherwise known
as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the
Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known
as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SCor the "Rule on
Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino
children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the
issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to
acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best.
This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally
done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child
but by the authorities. 121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not
analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such
citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which
is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling,
as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. 122 The Decree of Adoption issued
on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents,"
hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling. 123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. 124 On the other hand,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations. 125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the
combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to
law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 126"General principles of law recognized
by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based
on principles which are "basic to legal systems generally," 127 such as "general principles of
equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against
discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in
Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation." 128 These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine
Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of
Rights. 129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part
of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. 130 Article 15
thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his
nationality.

The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from
birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the
right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with
their national law and their obligations under the relevant international
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right ofevery child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures
of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family,
society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to
grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be
at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization
laws,Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the
applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are
generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a
foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the
country of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be
determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.
 A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on
the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of
parents possessing the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding.
While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15 (1) of which 131 effectively affirms Article 14 of
the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15 (1) of the UDHR. 132 In Razon v.
Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the
proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as
a "generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitisis likewise notable for
declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the convention
had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the
ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was
content with the practice of international and regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin
America, and State Practice in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v.
Rañada, 134 where only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to" 135 the 1966
"Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that nine member
countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments Convention. The Court
also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the
practices of fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was pronouncement that
recognition of foreign judgments was widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally
accepted principles of international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article
38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against
discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic
to legal systems generally," 136 support the notion that the right against enforced disappearances
and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as "generally accepted
principles of international law" under the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence 137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South
America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42)
of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to
the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also,
the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189
countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances,
including the practice ofjus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which
the foundling is found.
 Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted
principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552,R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on
Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino
children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to
foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive
department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention
on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in
our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by
the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality
of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a
misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a
country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor
General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:
. . . the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those
treaties and conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned
that the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically
ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the international instruments which
seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to accord
them second-class citizenship. 138
The COMELEC also ruled 139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The
COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not
"natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson III v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases.
They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC 141 where we described it as an
"abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship . . . ." Also included
is Parreño v. Commission on Audit, 142which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, 143 where we
said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship. Parreño v. Commission on Audit 141 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his
Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will . . . recover his natural-born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as
implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and
continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole
prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree
that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the
COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.
 More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was
already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET 145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean
at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship.
In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under
the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for
repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-
born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the
absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to
such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable
law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives. 146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And
while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be
retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., 147 where
we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws ofthe Constitution,
until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." This Court also said that
"while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule,
recognized as good law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon
should be respected." 148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a
falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A. No.
9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-
born Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were the names of her biological
parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact — petitioner was legally adopted. One of the
effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee,
except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee." 149 Under R.A. No. 8552,
petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is
the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended
issue." 150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption
cases in the files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other
agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly
confidential." 151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her
birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy
of strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an
adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in
the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is,
moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of
discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner
committed false material representation when she stated in her COC that she has before and until
9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the
Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May
2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10)
years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the
day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her pleadings in
these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from
the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the
Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence
in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old
domicile. 152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In
other words, there must basically beanimus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual. 153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their
U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former
U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she
travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight
company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to
the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog
to the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting
June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005;
titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax
declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the
U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S.
Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First American
Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up
questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a
Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of
petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium
was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly
decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish
some work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC,
particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely
changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim
conceded the presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus
manendi, but maintained there was no animus non-revertendi. 154 The COMELEC disregarded
the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the earliest
date that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her
application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied
on Coquilla v. COMELEC, 155 Japzon v. COMELEC 156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During
the oral arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC. 158 Respondents
contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until
he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry
under a balikbayanstamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any
resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May
2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her
situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC, 159 the only evidence presented was a community tax
certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the
elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted to count residence
prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is
distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after reacquisition
sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC,161 the candidate admitted that his
place of work was abroad and that he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v.
COMELEC, 162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who had not even reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was
disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month
stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such fact
alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."

It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by
the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from
acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast,
the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that
she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children
from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her
husband resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently
relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005
(securing T.I.N., enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a
residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed
here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her
family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner
returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the
Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise
known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to
treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the law is a
former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail of the
necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of
society upon their return to the country" 164 in line with the government's "reintegration
program." 165 Obviously,balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
 Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him
reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that
the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow
him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the
necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did —
she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the return
of her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is
extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of
residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of
residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC, 166 and the other cases
cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a situation
where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided particularly on the
facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the
COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9
May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six (6) years and six (6) months as "period
of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the
COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the
COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as
false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in
the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said
that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was
sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers
in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence
before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is
bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now
"period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would
not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S.
house and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year
before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the school records of her
children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and
conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was
by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of
residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC, 167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where
the required period was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC
ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she
was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen
that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and
physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC
took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A.
No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had
returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to
have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already
stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August
2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's
repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of
her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC,
petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias
Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue
immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point.
From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period of
residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were already
matters of public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition
for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she
made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six (6) years and six (6) months as she
misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the
SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC for
President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her
erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Senatorwhich was expressly mentioned in her Verified
Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide
the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on
her side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not
necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for
denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already
discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a
material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a
deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
one's qualifications to run for public office. 168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good
number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus
non revertendi to the United States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and staying
home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the
petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a
declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence
sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the
residency requirement for President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing
jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines
residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for election
as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency have
been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number,
weight and substance than that presented by petitioner. 169 It ignores, above all else, what we
consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for
Senator which declaration was not even considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility
for Senator. When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a
resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections,
she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for election as Senator which was
satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before
us that at the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any
intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never made aware by
petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has
a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence
other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts of residence have
never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:

[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. [petitioner's] husband

however stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their
family home.

Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City.
[Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in
Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning
Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of
One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit
7F until the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her
former lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating
[petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and
"Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise
the disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings. [Petitioner]
returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal
Service of the family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole n on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He
returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine
company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian
Hills, where they eventually built their family home. 170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case
fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that
mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her
candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division
and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
 1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No.
15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P.
Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA
No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May
2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated
11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and
Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, [March 8, 2016])

[G.R. No. 202202. March 19, 2013.]

SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ,respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the March
22, 2012 Decision 1 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No.
10-031 (QW) which declared the validity of private respondent Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez's
substitution as the Liberal Party's replacement candidate for the position of Leyte Representative
(Fourth Legislative District) in lieu of Richard Gomez.
 The Facts
On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy 2 (CoC) with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth
Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009,
one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, 3 alleging
that Richard, who was actually a resident of Colgate Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro
Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In
this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under
Section 6, Article VI 4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared
disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard's CoC be
denied due course and/or cancelled. 5
On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution 6 granting Juntilla's
petition without any qualification. The dispositive portion of which reads: aHESCT
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of
Qualification filed by BUENAVENTURA O. JUNTILLA against RICHARD I.
GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the
Office of Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En
Banc through a Resolution dated May 4, 2010. 7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard
accepted the said resolution with finality "in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the
necessary documents for substitution." 8
On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC 9 together with a
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance 10 from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party's
official substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In response
to various letter-requests submitted to the COMELEC's Law Department (Law Department), the
COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued Resolution No. 8890 11 on
May 8, 2010, approving, among others, the recommendation of the said department to allow the
substitution of private respondent. The recommendation reads:
STUDY AND OBSERVATION
On the same date, this Department received an Opposition from Mr. Buenaventura O.
Juntilla, thru his counsel, opposing the candidacy of Ms. Lucy Marie Torres Gomez, as
a substitute candidate for Mr. Richard I. Gomez.
The crux of the opposition stemmed from the issue that there should be no
substitution because there is no candidate to substitute for.
It must be stressed that the resolution of the First Division, this Commission, in SPA
No. 09-059 speaks for disqualification of candidate Richard I. Gomez and not of
cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy:
'Wherefore, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of
Qualification filed . . . against RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I.
GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of Congressman,
Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.'
The said resolution was affirmed by the Commission En Banc on May 04, 2010.
 The disqualification of a candidate does not automatically cancel one's certificate of
candidacy, especially when it is nominated by a political party. In effect, the political
party is still allowed to substitute the candidate whose candidacy was declared
disqualified. After all, the right to substitute is a privilege given to a political party to
exercise and not dependent totally to a candidate.
Nonetheless, in case of doubt, the same must always be resolved to the qualification
of a candidate to run in the public office.
The substitution complied with the requirements provided under Section 12 in relation
to Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678 dated October 6, 2009.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department RECOMMENDS the following:
xxx xxx xxx
2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ AS A
SUBSTITUTE CANDIDATE FOR RICHARD GOMEZ; (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The following day, or on May 9, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration 12 (May 9, 2010 Motion) of the above-mentioned COMELEC En Banc resolution.
Pending resolution of Juntilla's May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local elections were conducted
as scheduled on May 10, 2010. During the elections, Richard, whose name remained on the ballots,
garnered 101,250 votes while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner
Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively. 13 In view of the aforementioned
substitution, Richard's votes were credited in favor of private respondent and as a result, she was
proclaimed the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.
On May 11, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the pending May 9, 2010
Motion relative to Resolution No. 8890. 14 The said motion, however, remained unacted. AIDTSE
On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition 15 for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust
private respondent from her congressional seat, claiming that: (1) she failed to comply with the one (1)
year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution considering that the transfer
of her voter registration from San Rafael, Bulacan 16 to the Fourth District of Leyte was only applied
for on July 23, 2009; (2) she did not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio; and (3)
private respondent's CoC was void due to her non-compliance with the prescribed notarial
requirements i.e., she failed to present valid and competent proof of her identity before the notarizing
officer. 17
In her Verified Answer, 18 private respondent denied petitioner's allegations and claimed that she
validly substituted her husband in the electoral process. She also averred that she was personally
known to the notary public who notarized her CoC, one Atty. Edgardo Cordeno, and thus, she was
not required to have presented any competent proof of identity during the notarization of the said
document. Lastly, she asserted that despite her marriage to Richard and exercise of profession in
Metro Manila, she continued to maintain her residency in Ormoc City which was the place where she
was born and raised.
During the preliminary conference, and as shown in the Preliminary Conference Order dated
September 2, 2010, the parties agreed on the following issues for resolution:
1. Whether or not the instant petition for quo warranto is meritorious;
 2. Whether or not the substitution of respondent is valid;
3. Whether or not a petition for quo warranto can be used as a substitute for failure to
file the necessary petition for disqualification with the COMELEC;
4. Whether or not respondent's COC was duly subscribed; and
5. Whether or not respondent is ineligible for the position of Representative of the
Fourth District of Leyte for lack of residency requirement. 19
Ruling of the HRET
After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed March 22, 2012 Decision 20 which dismissed
the quo warranto petition and declared that private respondent was a qualified candidate for the
position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District). It observed that the resolution denying
Richard's candidacy i.e., the COMELEC First Division's February 17, 2010 Resolution, spoke of
disqualification and not of CoC cancellation. Hence, it held that the substitution of private respondent
in lieu of Richard was legal and valid. 21 Also, it upheld the validity of private respondent's CoC due
to petitioner's failure to controvert her claim that she was personally known to the notary public who
notarized her CoC. 22 Finally, the HRET ruled that while it had been admitted that private respondent
resides in Colgate Street, San Juan City and lived in San Rafael, Bulacan, the fact was she continued
to retain her domicile in Ormoc City given that her absence therefrom was only temporary.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues Before the Court
The crux of the present controversy is whether or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in
finding that Richard was validly substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte
Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in view of the former's failure to meet the one (1) year
residency requirement provided under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
It is petitioner's submission that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the validity of
private respondent's substitution despite contrary jurisprudence holding that substitution is
impermissible where the substituted candidate's CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled, as
in the case of Richard. On the other hand, respondents maintain that Richard's CoC was not denied
due course to and/or cancelled by the COMELEC as he was only "disqualified" and therefore, was
properly substituted by private respondent.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
A. Distinction between a petition
for disqualification and a petition to
deny due course to/cancel a
certificate of candidacy
The Omnibus Election Code 23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate's bid for
public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for
disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate
of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.
Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidate's
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; 24 or (b) his or her commission of
certain acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election
offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws. 25 In particular, these are: (1)
giving money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to enhance one's candidacy;
(3) spending in one's election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4)
soliciting, receiving or making any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of
the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80, 26 83, 27 85, 28 86 29 and 261, paragraphs
d, 30 e, 31 k, 32 v, 33 and cc, sub-paragraph 6 34 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision
(Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is a party, is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have
committed any of the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public
office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had already been elected. 35
It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have
been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions
which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate's
compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and
citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form
of penal sanction brought about by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section
78 of the OEC 36 is premised on a person's misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications
required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant
qualification; he or she must have also made a false representation of the same in the CoC. 37 The
nature of a Section 78 petition was discussed in the case of Fermin v. COMELEC, 38 where the
Court illumined: AcSIDE
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC
is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a
material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required
of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in
his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of
the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate
subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the
COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel
such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section
78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact
that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo
warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one's
intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person's
declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an
express finding that the person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in
the determination of whether one's CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. 39 What remains
material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the
basis of one's ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification. 40
Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a
candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due
course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The
reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes. 41 In Talaga v. COMELEC 42(Talaga), the Court ruled that:
. . . While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, a person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due
 course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a
CoC.
The foregoing variance gains utmost importance to the present case considering its implications on
candidate substitution.
B. Valid CoC as a condition sine
qua non for candidate substitution
Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same
political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. It states
that:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. — If
after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, anofficial candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause,
only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitution
proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a
candidate, the said section unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or
accredited party may be substituted. 43
As defined under Section 79 (a) of the OEC, the term "candidate" refers to any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an
accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties. Clearly, the law requires that one must
have validly filed a CoC in order to be considered a candidate. The requirement of having a CoC
obtains even greater importance if one considers its nature. In particular, a CoC formalizes not only a
person's public declaration to run for office but evidences as well his or her statutory eligibility to be
elected for the said post. In Sinaca v. Mula, 44 the Court has illumined:
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole
world of the candidate's political creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of
a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his
candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the
name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-
office address for all election purposes being as well stated. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
In this regard, the CoC is the document which formally accords upon a person the status of a
candidate. In other words, absent a valid CoC one is not considered a candidate under legal
contemplation. As held in Talaga: 45
. . . a person's declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation
that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the
timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid CoC that render the person
making the declaration a valid or official candidate.(Emphasis supplied)
Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place,
as well as the precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it
necessarily follows that if a person's CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she
cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is therefore a
condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted. 46
 C. Divergent effects of
disqualification and denial of due
course to and/or cancellation of COC
cases vis-à-vis candidate substitution
Proceeding from the foregoing discourse, it is evident that there lies a clear-cut distinction between a
disqualification case under Section 68 and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of COC case
under Section 78 vis-à-vis their respective effects on candidate substitution under Section 77.
As explained in the case of Miranda v. Abaya 47 (Miranda), a candidate who is disqualified under
Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until
disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section
78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate. 48 Stated differently, since there
would be no candidate to speak of under a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC case,
then there would be no candidate to be substituted; the same does not obtain, however, in a
disqualification case since there remains to be a candidate to be substituted, although his or her
candidacy is discontinued.
On this note, it is equally revelatory that Section 77 expressly enumerates the instances where
substitution is permissible, that is when an official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party "dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause." Noticeably, material misrepresentation
cases are not included in the said section and therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with
candidate substitution.
D. Application to the case at bar
In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to
his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement. 49 The confusion, however, stemmed
from the use of the word "disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private
respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In short,
a finding that Richard was merely disqualified — and not that his CoC was denied due course to
and/or cancelled — would mean that he could have been validly substituted by private respondent,
thereby legitimizing her candidacy.
Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division's February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly decree
the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard's CoC should not have obviated the
COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of private respondent's substitution. It should be
stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for Richard's "disqualification" is his failure to comply
with the residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of theConstitution which is a ground for the
denial of due course to and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, not for
disqualification. 50 As earlier mentioned, the material misrepresentation contemplated under a
Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting one's qualifications for elective office such as
age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. 51 There is
therefore no legal basis to support a finding of disqualification within the ambit of election
laws. Accordingly, given Richard's non-compliance with the one year residency requirement, it cannot
be mistaken that the COMELEC First Division's unqualified grant of Juntilla's "Verified Petition to
Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification" 52 — which prayed that the COMELEC declare
Richard "DISQUALIFIED and INELIGIBLE from seeking the office of Member of the House of
Representatives" and ". . . that [his] Certificate of Candidacy . . . be DENIED DUE COURSE
and/or CANCELLED" 53 — carried with it the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of
Richard's CoC pursuant to Section 78.
Case law dictates that if a petition prays for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC
and the same is granted by the COMELEC without any qualification, the cancellation of the
candidate's CoC is in order. This is precisely the crux of the Miranda ruling wherein the Court, in
upholding the COMELEC En Banc's nullification of the substitution in that case, decreed that the
COMELEC Division's unqualified grant of the petition necessarily included the denial of due course to
and/or cancellation of the candidate's CoC, notwithstanding the use of the term "disqualified" in the
COMELEC Division's resolution, as the foregoing was prayed for in the said petition:
The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being
disqualified by the COMELEC in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy
had likewise been denied due course and cancelled.
The Court rules that it was.
Private respondent's petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of
Candidacy filed by respondent for the position of Mayor for the City of
Santiagobe not given due course and/or cancelled.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed
for. CacTSI
In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief,
the COMELEC ruled favorably in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST
DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE "Pempe"
MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of
mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national and local
elections.
SO ORDERED.
From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the COMELEC resolution of May 5,
1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and
particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no qualification
on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the
granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in
SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda. There is likewise no question that the said
petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear,
therefore, that whether or not the COMELEC granted any further relief in SPA No.
98-019 by disqualifying the candidate,the fact remains that the said petition was
granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was
denied due course and cancelled. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The same rule was later discussed in the case of Talaga, viz.:
3. Granting without any qualification
of petition in SPA No. 09-029(DC)
manifested COMELEC's intention to
declare Ramon disqualified and to
cancel his CoC
 xxx xxx xxx
In Miranda v. Abaya, the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC
"be not given due course and/or cancelled". The COMELEC categorically granted
"the petition" and then pronounced — in apparent contradiction — that Joel Pempe
Miranda was "disqualified." The Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the
petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda and at the
same time cancelled Jose Pempe Miranda's CoC.
xxx xxx xxx
The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted
the particular relief of cancelling or denying due course to the CoC prayed for
in the petition by not subjecting that relief to any qualification. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First
Division's February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law Department's finding that Richard
was only "disqualified" and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the
way for the approval of private respondent's substitution. It overlooked the fact that the COMELEC
First Division's ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richard's CoC and in consequence,
disallowed the substitution of private respondent. It was therefore grave and serious error on the part
of the COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondent's substitution.
Consequently, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Banc's error as above-discussed, the HRET
committed a grave abuse of discretion, warranting the grant of the instant petition.
Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. 54 While it is well-recognized that the
HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House, the Court maintains jurisdiction
over it to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. 55 In other words, when the HRET utterly disregards
the law and settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits a grave abuse of discretion.
Records clearly show that: (1) Richard was held ineligible as a congressional candidate for the Fourth
District of Leyte due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement; (2) Juntilla's
petition prayed for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of his CoC; and (3) the COMELEC
First Division granted the foregoing petition without any qualification. By these undisputed and
essential facts alone, the HRET should not have adopted the COMELEC En Banc's erroneous finding
that the COMELEC First Division's February 17, 2010 Resolution "speaks [only] of "disqualification
and not of cancellation of [Richard's] CoC" 56 and thereby, sanctioned the substitution of private
respondent.
Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to
the qualifications of the Members of the House. Being the sole judge 57 of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members, the HRET cannot be tied down by
COMELEC resolutions, else its constitutional mandate 58 be circumvented and rendered nugatory.
Instructive on this point is the Court's disquisition in Fernandez v. HRET, 59 to wit:
Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to
claim that the HRET, when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of
Representatives is concerned, is "co-equal", to the COMELEC, such that the HRET
cannot disregard any ruling of COMELEC respecting the matter of eligibility and
qualification of a member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other
way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the
 dispute or contest at issue refers to the eligibility and/or qualification of a
Member of the House of Representatives. A petition for quo warranto is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum
shoppingeven if another body may have passed upon in administrative or quasi-
judicial proceedings the issue of the Member's qualification while the Member
was still a candidate. There is forum-shopping only where two cases involve the
same parties and the same cause of action. The two cases here are distinct and
dissimilar in their nature and character. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notably, the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as
referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. More particularly, the term
"qualifications" refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the
proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility, or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy. 60 As used in Section 74 of the OEC, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for
elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the
public office. 61 In this relation, private respondent's own qualification to run for public office — which
was inextricably linked to her husband's own qualifications due to her substitution — was the proper
subject of quo warranto proceedings falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET and
independent from any previous proceedings before the COMELEC, lest the jurisdictional divide
between the two be blurred. cDAISC
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the HRET's independence is not without limitation. As earlier
mentioned, the Court retains certiorari jurisdiction over the HRET if only to check whether or not it has
gravely abused its discretion. In this regard, the Court does not endeavor to denigrate nor undermine
the HRET's independence; rather, it merely fulfills its duty to ensure that the Constitution and the laws
are upheld through the exercise of its power of judicial review.
In fine, the Court observes that the HRET wantonly disregarded the law by deliberately adopting the
COMELEC En Banc's flawed findings regarding private respondent's eligibility to run for public office
which essentially stemmed from her substitution. In this light, it cannot be gainsaid that the HRET
gravely abused its discretion.
Owing to the lack of proper substitution in this case, private respondent was therefore not a bona
fide candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for
office, which means that she could not have been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there
exists no cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues respecting private respondent's own
qualification to office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision rendered by the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
||| (Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 202202, [March 19, 2013], 706
PHIL 534-578)

[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999.]

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

Balase, Tamase, Alampay Law Office for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.
 SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Mercado and private respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view
of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. The Second Division of the
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy
of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending until
after the election. The board of canvassers tabulated the votes but suspended the proclamation of the
winner. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC en banc reversed
the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of
the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This
petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare the private
respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati. cdasia
On the issue of whether the petitioner has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not
the original party in the disqualification case, the Supreme Court ruled that under Sec. 6 of R.A. No.
6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, intervention may be allowed in
proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
As regards the issue of citizenship, the Court ruled that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he
ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
American citizenship.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTORAL REFORMS LAW OF 1987 (R.A. No. 6646); INTERVENTION,
ALLOWED IN PROCEEDINGS FOR DISQUALIFICATION EVEN AFTER ELECTION IF THERE HAS
BEEN NO FINAL JUDGMENT RENDERED; CASE AT BAR. — Private respondent argues that
petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a
defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-
Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory
judgment." The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in
the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only
second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time.
Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the
time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo vs. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies
to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who
placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the
time petitioner filed a "Motion for leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent
disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under Section 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If
Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of
Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate
for vice mayor of Makati City. Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he
filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have
garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a
right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
2. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; DUAL CITIZENSHIP; DISTINGUISHED FROM DUAL ALLEGIANCE. — Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents
are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows
the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of
our Constitution,it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual
citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their fathers' country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if
by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission
they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. There may be other situations in which a
citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the
above cases are possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the
other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual's volition. With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides:
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — In including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of
the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase
"dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be
understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the
most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a
reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We
recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another
country is something completely beyond our control." By electing Philippine citizenship, such
candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens
and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign
state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
4. ID.; ID.; FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY SUFFICED TO RENOUNCE
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP; CASE AT BAR. — By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his
present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, inFrivaldo vs.
COMELEC it was held: It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American.
Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40
of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" We
answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for
governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship — long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in
the interim — when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to
his Filipino citizenship." On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19,
1995: "By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took
his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in
1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995
have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, private respondent had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar vs.
COMELEC applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar: . . . Considering the fact
that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate
stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . [T]he Certification that he is
an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there
is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to
lose Philippine citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied." To recapitulate, by
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support theConstitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private
respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his
youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in
past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.acCITS

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were

candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was
Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1
 The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELEC's Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of
Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in
the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is
an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and
misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted
that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen
because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in
the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is
considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration
as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is
both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be
elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo
Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 3 The motion remained
pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the
board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the
proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. 4 Petitioner's motion
was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the
ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the
City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. 5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United
States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
 He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age
of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as
travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce
Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,
which effectively renounced his citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law,
he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest
number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one
hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty-three (103,853) votes over his closest rival,
Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety-four
(100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty-nine (2,959) votes.
Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy-five
(54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the
popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private
international law which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs.
Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondent's certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a
candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon
proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis
Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the
evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of
Makati. cdasia
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the
COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor
of Makati City. Petitioner contends that —
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when
he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a
voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor
of the City of Makati;
 C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second
Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may
not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and
hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano —
whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an
original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion
for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot
bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
SECTION 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. — Any
person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an
action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in
such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated
as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 3. Discretion of Commission. — In allowing or disallowing a motion
for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be
fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an
interest to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City
[who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be
ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out
only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at
that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the
race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, 6 reiterated in several
cases, 7 only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the
question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the
winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on
May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was
precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position"
under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification
proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was
petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari.
As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly
deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but also with the substantive
issues respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private
respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a
candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any
elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the
Charter of the City of Makati. 8
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides
with him in this case, contends that through §40(d) ofthe Local Government Code, Congress has
"command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local
elective office."
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. 9 For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution,it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their fathers' country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
 Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was
included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its
necessity as follows: 10
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual
citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to
which a dual allegiance — and I reiterate a dual allegiance — is larger and more
threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and,
perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or
of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional
cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens
in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as
well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan.
And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the People's
Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese
wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were
represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At
that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of
allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may
be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took
close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including
Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of
thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always
been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan,
Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great
commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese
— it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we
have to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask — that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will
read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE
DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with
dual allegiance, thus: 11
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual
citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty
which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be
repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades theConstitution and to citizenship itself
which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in
 terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the
obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this,
Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of
those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of
naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still
routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew
their oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of
the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated.
And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with its
attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national
security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the
determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real
impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great
numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain
a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate
double citizenship?
Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to
"dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process
with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice
if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most
perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a
reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries.
We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of
another country is something completely beyond our control." 12

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to
the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on
§40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41,
page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local
position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a
citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the
Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the
age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging
to the country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the
moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his
citizenships.
 SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the
country of origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a
citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office
would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino
citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not
require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is
opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he
should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I
have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested
upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that
will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall
under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of which at the
time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of
the Philippines.In Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that
he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by
law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is
valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law
duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or
should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese
Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying
not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign
government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be
resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the
sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at
least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the
COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998,
private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now
he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is
not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was
made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been
made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign
state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign
territory." To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign
relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private
respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements
made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED")
NATURAL-BORN
xxx xxx xxx
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN
LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN
COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT
AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL
MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY
THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE
DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF
VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF
EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE
TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus,
in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held: 17
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American.
Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship,
which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from
running for any elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as
there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took
said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his
Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his
American citizenship-long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interim-when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government
when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of
candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."
 These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before
the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is
basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any
showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained
in private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his
American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioner's contention that, to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since
no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as
an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit
in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship.
The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality
before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said
in Aznar vs. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;
truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express,"
it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there
is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied."

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that

he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, 19 we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport
and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces
his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship. cdasia
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, [May 26, 1999], 367 PHIL 132-153)
 [G.R. No. 179848. November 27, 2008.]

NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner, vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution 1 dated 28 September 2007 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution
dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division 2 disqualifying him from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections,
on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United States (US)
citizenship. SCcHIE
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of
the US on 13 December 1989. 3
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the
administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine
Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June
2006 an Order of Approval 4 of petitioner's request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. 5 On 27
September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019
recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. 6
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. 7
On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification 8 before the
COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to
renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 9225, which
reads as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. — Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.
In his Answer 9 dated 6 May 2007 and Position Paper 10 dated 8 May 2007, petitioner
countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los
Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective
renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
 In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor. DaTEIc
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its
Resolution 11 disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,
Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. The COMELEC
Second Division explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 does not automatically bestow upon any person the privilege to run for any elective public
office. It additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot be considered as a
renunciation of foreign citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division did not consider Valles v.
COMELEC 12 and Mercado v. Manzano 13 applicable to the instant case, since Valles and
Mercado were dual citizens since birth, unlike the petitioner who lost his Filipino citizenship by
means of naturalization. The COMELEC, thus, decreed in the aforementioned Resolution that:
ACCORDINGLY, NESTOR ARES JACOT is DISQUALIFIED to run for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin for the May 14, 2007 National and
Local Elections. If proclaimed, respondent cannot thus assume the Office of Vice-
Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such disqualification. 14
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 29 June 2007 reiterating his position that
his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and his oath
in his Certificate of Candidacy sufficed as an effective renunciation of his US citizenship. Attached
to the said Motion was an "Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and
Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" dated 27 June 2007, wherein petitioner explicitly
renounced his US citizenship. 15 The COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner's Motion in a
Resolution 16 dated 28 September 2007 for lack of merit.
Petitioner sought remedy from this Court via the present Special Civil Action
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, where he presented for the first time an
"Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign
Citizenship" 17 dated 7 February 2007. He avers that he executed an act of renunciation of his US
citizenship, separate from the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines he took before
the Los Angeles PCG and his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, thereby changing his theory of
the case during the appeal. He attributes the delay in the presentation of the affidavit to his former
counsel, Atty. Marciano Aparte, who allegedly advised him that said piece of evidence was
unnecessary but who, nevertheless, made him execute an identical document entitled "Oath of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign
Citizenship" on 27 June 2007 after he had already filed his Certificate of Candidacy. 18
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution of this Court:
I
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 9225, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "CITIZENSHIP
RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003", SPECIFICALLY SECTION
5(2) AS TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THOSE SEEKING ELECTIVE PUBLIC
OFFICE;
II
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE AS REGARDS
THE PAYMENT OF THE NECESSARY MOTION FEES; AND
 III
WHETHER OR NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT WOULD RESULT IN THE FRUSTRATION OF THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE OF CATARMAN, CAMIGUIN. 19
The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is whether petitioner is
disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to make
a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.
This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not
substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines,
who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic: DcaCSE
"I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the
Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a
situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by
also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship. SEDaAH
The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in
the Certificate of Candidacy which must be executed by any person who wishes to run for
public office in Philippine elections. Such an oath reads:
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that
I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Republic of the Philippines; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I hereby certify
that the facts stated herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge.
Now, Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. — Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
 and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained
their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath
simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy. 20
Hence, Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who
have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally
execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an
authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to
qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the
benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have
presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on
Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003
(precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon.
Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of
allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship: aSCHcA
CHAIRMAN DRILON.
Okay. So, No. 2. "Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath." I think it's very good,
ha? No problem?
REP. JAVIER.
. . I think it's already covered by the oath.
CHAIRMAN DRILON.
Renouncing foreign citizenship.
REP. JAVIER.
Ah. . . but he has taken his oath already.
CHAIRMAN DRILON.
No. . .no, renouncing foreign citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
 CHAIRMAN DRILON.
Can I go back to No. 2. What's your problem, Boy? Those seeking elective office
in the Philippines.
REP. JAVIER.
They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking that ano. . .
CHAIRMAN DRILON.
His American citizenship.
REP. JAVIER.
To discourage him from running?
CHAIRMAN DRILON.
No.
REP. A.D. DEFENSOR.
No. When he runs he will only have one citizenship. When he runs for office,
he will have only one. (Emphasis ours.)
There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos
reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship underRepublic Act No. 9225 to take their oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign
citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in
Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine
citizenship. TcEaAS
By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which
is substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not
constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No.
9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those
who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship
is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special
circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
Petitioner erroneously invokes the doctrine in Valles 21 and Mercado, 22 wherein the filing
by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance,
was already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship. The ruling of this Court
in Valles and Mercado is not applicable to the present case, which is now specially governed
by Republic Act No. 9225, promulgated on 29 August 2003.
In Mercado, which was cited in Valles, the disqualification of therein private respondent
Manzano was sought under another law, Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code, which
reads:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
The Court in the aforesaid cases sought to define the term "dual citizenship" vis-Ã -vis the
concept of "dual allegiance". At the time this Court decided the cases of Valles and Mercado on
26 May 1999 and 9 August 2000, respectively, the more explicitly worded requirements of Section
5 (2) ofRepublic Act No. 9225 were not yet enacted by our legislature. 23
Lopez v. Commission on Elections 24 is the more fitting precedent for this case since they
both share the same factual milieu. In Lopez, therein petitioner Lopez was a natural-born Filipino
who lost his Philippine citizenship after he became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired
his Philippine citizenship by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his candidacy
for a local elective position, but failed to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign
citizenship. This Court unequivocally declared that despite having garnered the highest number of
votes in the election, Lopez is nonetheless disqualified as a candidate for a local elective position
due to his failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5 (2) ofRepublic Act No. 9225.
Petitioner presents before this Court for the first time, in the instant Petition
for Certiorari, an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All
Foreign Citizenship," 25 which he supposedly executed on 7 February 2007, even before he filed
his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. With the said Affidavit, petitioner puts forward in
the Petition at bar a new theory of his case — that he complied with the requirement of making a
personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship before filing his Certificate of Candidacy.
This new theory constitutes a radical change from the earlier position he took before the
COMELEC — that he complied with the requirement of renunciation by his oaths of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and in his Certificate of
Candidacy, and that there was no more need for a separate act of renunciation.
As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the
proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of
the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations
of fairness and due process impel this rule. 26 Courts have neither the time nor the resources to
accommodate parties who chose to go to trial haphazardly. 27
Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence. 28 Petitioner
should have offered the Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the
COMELEC.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "In the absence of
any applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the
Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect." Section 34 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not
formally presented:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified.
Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no
opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to due
process. 29 Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly
justice. 30 SHCaDA
The Court further notes that petitioner had already presented before the COMELEC an
identical document, "Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of
Any and All Foreign Citizenship" executed on 27 June 2007, subsequent to his filing of his
Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. Petitioner attached the said Oath of 27 June 2007 to
his Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc eventually
refused to reconsider said document for being belatedly executed. What was extremely perplexing,
not to mention suspect, was that petitioner did not submit the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 or
mention it at all in the proceedings before the COMELEC, considering that it could have easily
won his case if it was actually executed on and in existence before the filing of his Certificate of
Candidacy, in compliance with law.
The justification offered by petitioner, that his counsel had advised him against presenting
this crucial piece of evidence, is lame and unconvincing. If the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 was in
existence all along, petitioner's counsel, and even petitioner himself, could have easily adduced it
to be a crucial piece of evidence to prove compliance with the requirements of Section 5 (2)
of Republic Act No. 9225. There was no apparent danger for petitioner to submit as much
evidence as possible in support of his case, than the risk of presenting too little for which he could
lose.
And even if it were true, petitioner's excuse for the late presentation of the Affidavit of 7
February 2007 will not change the outcome of petitioner's case.
It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsel's conduct, negligence, and
mistakes in handling the case, and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might
have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently. 31 The only exceptions to the general
rule — that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel — which this Court finds acceptable
are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or
when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of one's property through a
technicality. 32 These exceptions are not attendant in this case.
The Court cannot sustain petitioner's averment that his counsel was grossly negligent in
deciding against the presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the proceedings
before the COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness; the sufficiency,
relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to
introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case — unless they prejudice the
client and prevent him from properly presenting his case — do not constitute gross incompetence
or negligence, such that clients may no longer be bound by the acts of their counsel. 33 aCSHDI
Also belying petitioner's claim that his former counsel was grossly negligent was the fact
that petitioner continuously used his former counsel's theory of the case. Even when the
COMELEC already rendered an adverse decision, he persistently argues even to this Court that
his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and in his
Certificate of Candidacy amount to the renunciation of foreign citizenship which the law requires.
Having asserted the same defense in the instant Petition, petitioner only demonstrates his
continued reliance on and complete belief in the position taken by his former counsel, despite the
former's incongruous allegations that the latter has been grossly negligent.
Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his counsel was
inept, petitioner should have promptly taken action, such as discharging his counsel earlier and/or
insisting on the submission of his Affidavit of 7 February 2007 to the COMELEC, instead of waiting
until a decision was rendered disqualifying him and a resolution issued dismissing his motion for
reconsideration; and, thereupon, he could have heaped the blame on his former counsel.
Petitioner could not be so easily allowed to escape the consequences of his former counsel's acts,
because, otherwise, it would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to
reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. 34
Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 35 where therein petitioner De Guzman
was unable to present a piece of evidence because his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to
evidence, despite the Sandiganbayan's denial of his prior leave to do so. The wrongful insistence
of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived De Guzman of any chance to
present documentary evidence in his defense. This was certainly not the case in the Petition at
bar.
 Herein, petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively defended his
suit by attending the hearings, filing the pleadings, and presenting evidence on petitioner's behalf.
Moreover, petitioner's cause was not defeated by a mere technicality, but because of a mistaken
reliance on a doctrine which is not applicable to his case. A case lost due to an untenable legal
position does not justify a deviation from the rule that clients are bound by the acts and mistakes
of their counsel. 36
Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest number of votes for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman during the 2007 local elections. The fact that a candidate, who
must comply with the election requirements applicable to dual citizens and failed to do so,
received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, or amount to
a waiver of, such requirement. 37 The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified.
The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly applied. If a person seeks to
serve the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. 38 The application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. 39 aAcHCT
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 28 September
2007 of the COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007
of the COMELEC Second Division, is AFFIRMED. Petitioner is DISQUALIFIED to run for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections,
and if proclaimed, cannot assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such
disqualification. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
||| (Jacot v. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, [November 27, 2008], 592 PHIL 661-680)

[G.R. No. 176947. February 19, 2009.]

GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In EO Case No. 05-17, Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused Gustavo S. Tambunting
(Tambunting)of an election offense for violating Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) En Banc dismissed
Cordora's complaint in a Resolution 1 dated 18 August 2006. The present petition seeks to
reverse the 18 August 2006 Resolution as well as the Resolution 2 dated 20 February 2007 of the
COMELEC En Banc which denied Cordora's motion for reconsideration. cSICHD
The Facts
In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law Department, Cordora asserted
that Tambunting made false assertions in the following items:
 That Annex A [Tambunting's Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections] and
Annex B [Tambunting's Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections] state, among
others, as follows, particularly Nos. 6, 9 and 12 thereof:
1. No. 6 — I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen
2. No. 9 — No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001. 36 in the
Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I seek to be elected;
3. No. 12 — I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected. 3 (Boldface and
capitalization in the original)
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting
lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.
To disprove Tambunting's claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented
a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting
claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon
departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates
confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu,
Hawaii on 2 December 2000. Cordora concluded:
That Councilor Gustavo S. Tambunting contrary to the provision of Sec. 74
(OEC): [sic] Re: CONTENTS OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY: which requires the
declarant/affiant to state, among others, under oath, that he is a Filipino (No. 6), No.
9- residence requirement which he lost when [he was] naturalized as an American
Citizen on December 2, 2000 at [sic] Honolulu, Hawaii, knowingly and
willfully affirmed and reiterated that he possesses the abovebasic
requirements under No. 12 — that he is indeed eligible for the office to which he
seeks to be elected, when in truth and in fact, the contraryis indubitably established
by his own statements before the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration . . . . 4 (Emphases in the original) aEcHCD
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in
his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora's claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born
Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a
Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an
American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting's
father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed
Tambunting's citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambunting's possession of an American
passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of
allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or
the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth. Tambunting
has imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has been educated in
Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his loyalty and devotion to the Philippines
was shown by his service as councilor of Parañaque.
To refute Cordora's claim that the number of years of residency stated in Tambunting's
certificates of candidacy is false because Tambunting lost his residency because of his
naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting contended that the residency requirement is
not the same as citizenship.
The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department
 The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordora's complaint
against Tambunting because Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against Tambunting.
Cordora's reliance on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration that Tambunting traveled on an
American passport is not sufficient to prove that Tambunting is an American citizen.
The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law
Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to support his accusation
against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.
The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Banc's Resolution reads as follows: TAcDHS
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause.
SO ORDERED. 5
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) wrote a separate opinion
which concurred with the findings of the En BancResolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out
that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen. Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced
his American citizenship when he filed his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for
public office.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same grounds and the same
arguments in his complaint. In its Resolution promulgated on 20 February 2007, the
COMELEC En Banc dismissed Cordora's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. SACHcD
The Issue
Cordora submits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that there is no sufficient evidence to support
probable cause that may warrant the prosecution of Tambunting for an election offense.
Cordora's petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of Tambunting's failure
to meet citizenship and residency requirements. Neither is the present petition an action to declare
Tambunting a non-Filipino and a non-resident. The present petition seeks to prosecute
Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc.
Whether there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for Trial for Having Committed an
Election Offense
There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC En Banc's ruling that there is no
sufficient and convincing evidence to support a finding of probable cause to hold Tambunting for
trial for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed. Determining probable
cause is an intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation or submission of
documentary or testimonial proofs either confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the
complaint. 6 cESDCa
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code reads as follows:
Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he
is eligible for said office; . . . the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his
 date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession
or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders
and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by
his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph,
passport size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of
government not exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand, provides that violation of Section
74, among other sections in the Code, shall constitute an election offense.
Tambunting's Dual Citizenship
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father.
Neither does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for
Relative) because of his father's citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents'
differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists
that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento's observation that Tambunting possesses dual
citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting
to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in
INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at
birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two
trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed
nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual
citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that
Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office. 7 HcSaAD

Requirements for dual citizens from birth

who desire to run for public office
We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado v. Manzano, wherein we
ruled that dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local
position.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows
the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship
clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of
the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli;
 (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their fathers' country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly
possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's
volition. HSIaAT
xxx xxx xxx
[I]n including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and inR.A. No. 7854,
§20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance". Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting
laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members
of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality
imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other
countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is
considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate
their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state
and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
That is of no moment as the following discussion on §40(d) between Senators Enrile
and Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE.
Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with
dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the
present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic.
There is no requirement that such a natural-born citizen, upon reaching the age
of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship. aETASc
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the
country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government
position?
 SENATOR PIMENTEL.
To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to
run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE.
Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country
of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can
renounce. There are such countries in the world. cECTaD
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election
for him of his desire to be considered a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE.
But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the
Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a
citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman's example, if he
does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question.
So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the
Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one
citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE.
But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always
have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also
acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this
disqualification. 8 (Emphasis supplied)
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in Mercado v.
Manzano, 9 Valles v. COMELEC, 10 and AASJS v. Datumanong. 11Mercado and Valles involve
similar operative facts as the present case. Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting, possessed dual
citizenship by the circumstances of their birth. Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the United
States which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Valles was born to an Australian mother and a Filipino
father in Australia. Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is different from
dual allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to run for public office, by effect. Dual
citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks
public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained
therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individual's active participation
in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a
naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an
implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen's foreign citizenship. aADSIc
 R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was enacted
years after the promulgation of Manzano and Valles. The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225 reads as follows:
I _______________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. 12 Section 5 (3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that
naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in
the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and
COMELEC, 13 Velasco v. COMELEC, 14 and Japzon v. COMELEC, 15 all of which involve
natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran
for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did
not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements
in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
Tambunting's residency
Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement because of
Tambunting's naturalization as an American. Cordora's reasoning fails because Tambunting is not
a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the twin
elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there
permanently, 16 and is not dependent upon citizenship.
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed
willfully made false entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting sufficiently
proved his innocence of the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for the office which he
sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Commission
on Elections En Banc dated 18 August 2006 and 20 February 2007 in EO Case No. 05-17. SO
ORDERED.
||| (Cordora v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 176947, [February 19, 2009], 599 PHIL 168-181)

[G.R. No. 209835. September 22, 2015.]

ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR., respondents.

DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
seeking to set aside the Resolution 1 dated November 6, 2013 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc which affirmed in toto the Resolution 2 dated May 3, 2013 of the COMELEC
First Division canceling the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero.
Petitioner 3 and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. 4 were both candidates
for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013
elections. Private respondent filed a Petition 5 to deny due course to or cancellation of petitioner's
certificate of candidacy alleging that the latter made a false representation when he declared in his
COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen
and a non-resident thereof.
During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he
was not properly served with a copy of the petition and the petition was served by registered mail
not in his address in Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy of the
petition during the conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a Memorandum
controverting private respondent's substantial allegations in his petition.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto,
Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant
to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5 (2)
of RA No. 9225. 6 He claimed that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes
despite becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter
future for him and his family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his vacation while working in
Nigeria, California, and finally in Canada.
On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding that petitioner
made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a resident of Barangay
Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within one year prior to the election. The decretal portion of the
resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES to GRANT the instant Petition. The Certificate of Candidacy of
respondent Caballero is hereby CANCELLED. 7
The COMELEC First Division did not discuss the procedural deficiency raised by petitioner
as he was already given a copy of the petition and also in consonance with the Commission's
constitutional duty of determining the qualifications of petitioner to run for elective office. It found
that while petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had taken his Oath
of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to
comply with the other requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking elective
office, i.e., persons who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year
residency requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Petitioner's
naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in
Uyugan, Batanes; thus, having abandoned his domicile of origin, it is incumbent upon him to prove
that he was able to reestablish his domicile in Uyugan for him to be eligible to run for elective
office in said locality which he failed to do. acEHCD
Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election returns showed that
petitioner won over private respondent. 8 Private respondent filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to
Defer Proclamation. 9
 On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.
On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En
Banc assailing the May 3, 2013 Resolution issued by the COMELEC's First Division canceling his
COC.
On May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation. 10
On November 6, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed Resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order.
In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution 11 of the May 3, 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the En Banc and prayed for the
cancellation of petitioner's COC, the appropriate correction of the certificate of canvas to reflect
that all votes in favor of petitioner are stray votes, declaration of nullity of petitioner's proclamation
and proclamation of private respondent as the duly-elected Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes in the May
13, 2013 elections.
On December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of
Execution. 12 Private respondent took his Oath of Office 13 on December 20, 2013.
In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to
wit:
THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
CLEAR IMPORT OF PROCEDURAL RULES PROVIDED FOR UNDER COMELEC
RESOLUTION NO. 9523 PROMULGATED ON 25 SEPTEMBER 2012.
THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE WORKED IN
SEVERAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR "GREENER PASTURE."
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER HAS ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE
DOMICILE WHEN HE BECAME A CANADIAN CITIZEN, HIS REACQUISITION OF
HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, TAKING OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT NINE (9) MONTHS PRIOR TO HIS ELECTION ON 13
MAY 2013, IS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW ON
RESIDENCY. 14
Petitioner contends that when private respondent filed a petition to deny due course or to
cancel his COC with the Office of the Municipal Election Officer of Uyugan, Batanes, a copy
thereof was not personally served on him; that private respondent later sent a copy of the petition
to him by registered mail without an attached affidavit stating the reason on why registered mail as
a mode of service was resorted to. Petitioner argues that private respondent violated Section 4,
paragraphs (1) 15 and (4), 16 Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended
by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, thus, his petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's
certificate of candidacy should have been denied outright.
We are not convinced.
While private respondent failed to comply with the above-mentioned requirements, the
settled rule, however, is that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction.
Moreover, the COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules as provided under
Section 4, Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure.
 Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. — In the interest of justice and in order to
obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules
or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.
Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all situations without
concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any
case without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not
substantially impaired. 17
In Hayudini v. COMELEC, 18 we sustained the COMELEC's liberal treatment of
respondent's petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's COC despite its failure to comply
with Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended
by Resolution No. 9523, i.e., pertaining to the period to file petition and to provide sufficient
explanation as to why his petition was not served personally on petitioner, respectively, and held
that:
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally
construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not
be defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep
in office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it is uncertain and under
suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the
benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved
by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an
ordinary action. This principle was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v.
Commission on Elections and De Castro v. Commission on Elections, where the
Court held that "in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate
to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by
procedural rules in resolving election disputes."
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to
liberal construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even
suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy
disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of
promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives — ensuring the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as
achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action,
an election contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the adjudication
of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of
dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the
tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command,
whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader. 19 SDHTEC
Here, we find that the issue raised, i.e., whether petitioner had been a resident of Uyugan,
Batanes at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his
COC, pertains to his qualification and eligibility to run for public office, therefore imbued with public
interest, which justified the COMELEC's suspension of its own rules. We adopt the COMELEC's
ratiocination in accepting the petition, to wit:
This Commission recognizes the failure of petitioner to comply strictly with the
procedure for filing a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy
set forth in Section 4, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as amended
by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which requires service of a copy of the petition
to respondent prior to its filing. But then, we should also consider the efforts exerted
by petitioner in serving a copy of his petition to respondent after being made aware
 that such service is necessary. We should also take note of the impossibility for
petitioner to personally serve a copy of the petition to respondent since he was in
Canada at the time of its filing as shown in respondent's travel records.
The very purpose of prior service of the petition to respondent is to afford the
latter an opportunity to answer the allegations contained in the petition even prior to
the service of summons by the Commission to him. In this case, respondent was
given a copy of the petition during the conference held on 10 December 2012 and
was ultimately accorded the occasion to rebut all the allegations against him. He
even filed a Memorandum containing his defenses to petitioner's allegations. For all
intents and purposes, therefore, respondent was never deprived of due process
which is the very essence of this Commission's Rules of Procedure.
Even the Supreme Court acknowledges the need for procedural rules to bow
to substantive considerations "through a liberal construction aimed at promoting their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application
of the rules is in order. . . . .
Unquestionably, the instant case is impressed with public interest which
warrants the relaxation of the application of the [R]ules of [P]rocedure, consistent
with the ruling of the Supreme Court in several cases. 20
Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues that he
was born and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had worked therein for a couple of years,
and had paid his community tax certificate; and, that he was a registered voter and had exercised
his right of suffrage and even built his house therein. He also contends that he usually comes
back to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacations from work abroad, thus, his domicile had not been
lost. Petitioner avers that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a
candidate running for public office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he
seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents' vital needs for
their common welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his
election is a substantial compliance with the law. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in canceling his COC. HSAcaE
We are not persuaded.
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,
declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of the law. 21 The law does not provide for residency requirement
for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned
natural-born Filipino. 22
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. 23 This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born
Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish
residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a
citizen. 24 However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public
office, residency in the Philippines becomes material. Section 5 (2) of RA No. 9225 provides:
 SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. — Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by
theConstitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provides,
among others, for the qualifications of an elective local official. Section 39 thereof states:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of
the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or,
in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of the
place where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately preceding the election day.
Respondent filed the petition for cancellation of petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter
made material misrepresentation when he declared therein that he is a resident of Uyugan,
Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
"dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, 25 that is, "the place where a
party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)." 26 A domicile
of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child's parents
reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
choice). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. 27
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it
could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in
Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC, 28 we ruled that naturalization
in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in
petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of
Canadian citizenship. 29 Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the
Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan,
Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such
abandonment.
The next question is what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship
under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?
In Japzon v. COMELEC, 30 wherein respondent Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship
under RA No. 9225 and run for Mayor of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar and whose residency
in the said place was put in issue, we had the occasion to state, thus: HESIcT
 [Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still
retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the
option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The
length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his
domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth. 31
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not
automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after
becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as
his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such.
The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that he
was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding
the May 13, 2013 elections. It found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by
virtue of RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that he re-
established his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was accompanied by physical presence
thereat, coupled with an actual intent to reestablish his domicile there. However, the period from
September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one year residency required by law.
Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of
administrative bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the instant case, are final unless grave
abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations. 32 Clearly, where there is no proof of
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned Resolutions, we
may not review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency
of evidence. 33
Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a resident of
Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of elections as required
under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.
Petitioner's argument that his nine (9) months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes, prior to
the May 13, 2013 local elections is a substantial compliance with the law, is not persuasive.
In Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 34 we held:
. . . A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican
government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their
representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government
positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for
running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a
majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would
substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself. 35 AcICHD
Petitioner had made a material misrepresentation by stating in his COC that he is a
resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election, thus, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 74,
in relation to Section 78, of the OEC governs the cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course
to COCs, to wit:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs;
 civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election
purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign
country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate
of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
— A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
We have held that in order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is
essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter for the
sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate — the right to
run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. 36 We concluded that
material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such
as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a
local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code. 37 Furthermore, aside from the
requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. 38 We, therefore,
find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for
material misrepresentation.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated May 3, 2013
of the COMELEC First Division and the Resolution dated November 6, 2013 of the COMELEC En
Banc and are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
||| (Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835, [September 22, 2015])

[G.R. No. 88831. November 8, 1990.]

MATEO CAASI, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C.
MIGUEL, respondents.

[G.R. No. 84508. November 8, 1990.]

ANECITO CASCANTE, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.

Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.

Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.

SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; SUFFRAGE AND ELECTIONS; ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATES; IMMIGRATION
TO THE UNITED STATES, CONSTITUTED AN ABANDONMENT OF DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE
IN THE PHILIPPINES. — In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the
"Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State)
which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his
departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his
"Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face,
the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and
Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold
letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United
States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he
did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there, he entered the United
States with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's
(not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S.
Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; "IMMIGRATION" AND "IMMIGRANT", DEFINED. — "Immigration is the removing into
one place from another; the act of immigrating, the entering into a country with the intention of
residing in it. "An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent
residence. As shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes give a broader meaning to the term
immigrant.'" (3 CJS 674.)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE (B.P. BLG. 881), APPLICABLE
TO THE CASE AT BAR, NOT SECTION 18, ARTICLE IX OF THE1987 CONSTITUTION. — Section
18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks
to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure
shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant
of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan. The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881), which provides: "Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRED PRIOR WAIVER OF GREEN CARD, CONSTRUED. — To be "qualified to
run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card
holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country."
Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of
itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The
waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to
filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to
run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT; REASON THEREFOR. — The reason for Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find Residence in the municipality where he intends to
run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of
the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2,
Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent
resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one
year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that
municipality on January 18, 1988. In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are
permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a
clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who
possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have
cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is
that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the
interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep
another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve
their status as permanent residents thereof.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF IMMIGRANT STATUS, SHOULD BE AS INDUBITABLE AS THE
APPLICATION FOR IT. — Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the
U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such
immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he
made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate
U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our
conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null
and void.

DECISION

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:

These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the disqualification under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel, for the position of
municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18,
1988, onthe ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States
of America, not of Bolinao. LLpr
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13, 1988 of
the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito Cascante (SPC No. 87-
551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the
disqualification of Merito C. Miguel, filed prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the decision dated
June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing the petition for quo
warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green card holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US
Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly
obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his
periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent
resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan that he voted in all previouselections, including the
plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the
congressional elections on May 18, 1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC, with the exception of Commissioner
Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:
"The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently
establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary,
inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to
continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in
said municipality. As the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and
 residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) as provided for in Section 42 of
the Local Government Code, there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan." (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508)
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
"A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign
country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card holder, it is incumbent
upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove that he 'has
waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant' to be qualified to run for
elected office. This respondent has not done." (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.)
In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito Miguel, respondents,"
the petitioner prays for a review of the decision dated June 21, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents,"
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court which denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition
for quo warranto filed by Caasi. The Court of Appeals ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and
desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case. The Court of Appeals held: cdphil

". . . it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the
qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after theCOMELEC has
ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements of citizenship and
residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) and that there is no legal
obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the Election Code are appealable
to the COMELEC." (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a
permanent resident of the United States, and (2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as
a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance
at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or
acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt
with by law."
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg.
881) provides:
"SEC. 68. Disqualifications . . . Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under
this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971, EC)."
In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public officials in the present
administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are holders of green cards in foreign countries, their
effect on the holders' right to hold elective public office in the Philippines is a question that excites
much interest in the outcome of this case. dctai
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa
and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which Miguel filled up in his
own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United
States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if
permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently."
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice
and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear
bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following
information is printed:
"Alien Registration Receipt Card
"Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United
States." (Annex A pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. 84508.)
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States
merely to visit his children or his doctor there, he entered the United States with the intention to live
there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.
Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or
authority to reside there permanently. cdrep
"Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating, the
entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.
"An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent
residence. As shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes give a broader meaning to
the term immigrant.'" (3 CJS 674.)
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the
country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to him during the
period of his residence therein.
"Aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to remain, are in general
entitled to the protection of the laws with regard to their rights of person and property
and to their civil and criminal responsibility.
"In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to remain,
are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to their rights of person
and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility. Thus resident alien friends
are entitled to the benefit of the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
constitution that no state shall deprive 'any person' of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, or deny to 'any person' the equal protection of the law, and the
protection of this amendment extends to the right to earn a livelihood by following the
ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is entitled to the protection of the provision of
the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." (3 CJS 529-530.)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who
seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an
immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor
of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which provides:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has
 waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws." cdrep
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate
for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988 localelections, waive his status as a permanent resident
or immigrant of the United States?
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is
a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did
not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States.
The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior
to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified
to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code). LLjur
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent
resident or immigrant of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that
he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January
18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find Residence in the
municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his
certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must
possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification
because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of
only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before
he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants
of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the
right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance.
The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without
mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a
foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for
with one eyeon their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of
the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.
Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the United
States, he never really intended to live there permanently, for all that he wanted was a green card to
enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this Court believe
that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this time he only had one
foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will
not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and giving him the best
of both worlds so to speak.
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of
a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S.
despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as
indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that
status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for
mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified
to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void. LLjur
WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in SPC Nos. 87-551,
87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are hereby set aside. The election of
respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled. Costs
against the said respondent. SO ORDERED.
||| (Caasi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88831, 84508, [November 8, 1990], 269 PHIL 237-247)

[G.R. No. 119976. September 18, 1995.]

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-
MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY
MONTEJO, respondents.

Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Paquito N . Ochoa, Jr. and Gracelda N . Andres for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; CONSTRUED. — Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or
the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is
their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to
mean an individual's "permanent home," "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they
disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of
residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning
there permanently.
2. ID.; ID.; RESIDENCE, CONSTRUED. — Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies
the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in
a given area, community or country.
3. ID.; ID.; DIFFERENTIATED FROM RESIDENCE. — The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for
which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as
pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly
normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can
only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in
favor of another domicile of choice.
4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; RESIDENCE USED SYNONYMOUSLY WITH
DOMICILE. — For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has
clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE FROM PERMANENT RESIDENCE WITHOUT INTENTION TO
ABANDON IT DOES NOT RESULT IN LOSS OR CHANGE OF DOMICILE. — So settled is the
concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has
stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention
to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. The deliberations of the 1987
Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt
the principle that when theConstitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means
only "domicile."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACT OF RESIDENCE, NOT STATEMENT IN CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY, DECISIVE FACTOR IN DETERMINING RESIDENCY QUALIFICATION
REQUIREMENT. — It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or
appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification. cdlex
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely
committed an honest mistake in jotting down the word "seven" in the space provided for the
residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry
obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period
of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was
"since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in
the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For
instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to
make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same,
claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in
her place of actual residence in the First District, which was Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she
subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would
reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed
immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of
stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first
requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances
surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means
more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper. cdll
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE FROM LEGAL RESIDENCE OR DOMICILE OF A TEMPORARY
OR SEMI-PERMANENT NATURE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LOSS OF RESIDENCE. — We
have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has
lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a
factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or
domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent
nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could
not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of
candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled
jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and
domicile for election law purposes.
9. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; A MINOR FOLLOWS THE DOMICILE OF HIS PARENTS;
CASE AT BENCH. — A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is
retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in
Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's
averments.
10. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES TO EFFECT CHANGE OF DOMICILE. — Domicile of origin is
not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BENCH. — In the absence of clear and positive proof
based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be
rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one
cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced
by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court
that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To
effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with
an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; MARRIAGE, NOT A CAUSE FOR LOSS OF DOMICILE. — In this
connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of
law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1954. For there is a
clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." The
presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon
marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code
because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. A survey of
jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the
female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse
automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon
marriage. Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889: La
mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin
embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su
residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero. Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de
residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish
residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a
positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further
strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision
which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of
relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be
understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed, fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes
the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband
may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual
residence. Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading:
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article
110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together. The duty to live together
can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the
situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of petitioner). If the husband has
to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in
order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to
"domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is
left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their
(various) residences.
13. ID.; ID.; TERM RESIDENCE REFERS TO "ACTUAL RESIDENCE." — The term
residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in
political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned — affecting the rights
and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean
"actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
14. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTE REQUIRING RENDITION OF JUDGMENT
WITHIN SPECIFIED TIME, MERELY DIRECTORY. — It is a settled doctrine that a statute
requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory,
"so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the
statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." The difference between a
mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity.
15. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMELEC; JURISDICTION TO DECIDE PENDING
DISQUALIFICATION CASE NOT LOST BY HOLDING OF ELECTIONS. — With the enactment of
Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the
respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification
case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
16. ID.; LEGISLATURE; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
(HRET); SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTIONS, RETURNS AND
QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS; CANDIDATE MUST HAVE BEEN
PROCLAIMED. — As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption
of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it
to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member
of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives,
it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
PUNO, J ., concurring opinion:

1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; DOMICILE OF ORIGIN AND DOMICILE OF CHOICE;

ESTABLISHED BY CANDIDATE'S CONTINUED STAY IN HER PARENT'S RESIDENCE. —
There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were
domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the
place. Petitioner went to school, and thereafter worked there. Justice Puno considers Tacloban as
her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as
it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she
continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.
2. ID.; ID.; DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW; ACQUIRED BY MARRIAGE AND
DELIBERATE CHOICE OF A DIFFERENT DOMICILE BY THE HUSBAND. — There is also no
question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By
contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it
was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code. The difficult issues start as we determine whether
petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban
domicile. Justice Puno respectfully submits that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to
lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix
the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior
domicile of his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can
also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile even if it is different. It is not, therefore, the
mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that will
change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision
made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds
the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the
husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void
not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are
contrary to law and public policy. prLL
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BENCH. — In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former
President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos
Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and throughout their
married life,petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has
been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as
Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also
affected in 1965 when her husband was elected President, when they lived in Malacañang Palace,
and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as
a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro
Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the
Civil Code, it was only her husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the
evidence shows he did not effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the common
law that "a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that
of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE THAT AFTER THE HUSBAND'S DEATH, WIFE RETAINS
LAST DOMICILE OF HER HUSBAND, SHOULD NOW BE ABANDONED. — The more difficult
task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former
President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction
and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished
colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities. He echoes the
theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of her husband until she
makes an actual change. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's
domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting
today. The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is
an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of
the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. The rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in
CJS and AM JUR 2d are American state court decisions handed down between the years 1917
and 1938, or before the time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably,
the women's liberation movement resulted in far-ranging state legislations in the United States to
eliminate gender inequality. However, it has been declared that under modern statutes changing
the status of married women and departing from the common law theory of marriage, there is no
reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law. In
publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable
American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer
held.As the result of statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same
rights and powers as her unmarried sister." In light of the Family Code which abrogated the
inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the common law, there is no
reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband.
Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been
repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are
not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the
petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead husband.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WIFE REACQUIRED DOMICILE OF ORIGIN UPON DEATH OF HUSBAND.
— Prescinding from these premises, Justice Puno respectfully submits that the better stance is to
rule that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This
is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue
after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the
universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also
restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of
the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution.
Likewise, Justice Puno cannot see the fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose
again her Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her
Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed
their domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law
disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common law
should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile.
There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden. Llibris
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DELIBERATE CHOICE BY WIFE MANIFEST IN CASE AT BAR. — But
even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire
her Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit
submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred among others that: "I was not
permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Niño Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I
wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I
transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when
PCGG permitted me to stay and live there." It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished
her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house
of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence
in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the
First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of
Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional requirement of residence ". . . for a period of
not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May 8,
1995 elections.
7. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY; AMENDMENT TO
CORRECT A BONA FIDE MISTAKE, ALLOWED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. — The amendment
of a certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a
matter of course and as a matter of right. (Alialy v. COMELEC , 2 SCRA 957, 960
[1961]; Canceran v. COMELEC , 107 Phil. 607 [1960]; Gabaldon v. COMELEC , 99 Phil. 898
[1956])
8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM FROM HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION
OF BONA FIDE CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE; RIGHT VIOLATED BY LEGAL AND
EXTRA-LEGAL OBSTACLES AGAINST CANDIDATE TO PREVENT HER FROM RUNNING. —
Section 10, Article IX-C of theConstitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public
office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." A detached reading of the
records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been
thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the people's representative in the First
District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she averred that when
respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban
City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed
her intended registration by writing a letter stating that she is not a resident of said city but of
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in
Tolosa following completion of her six-month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a
petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second
District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being
to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional
election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to
create another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to
make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the
Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with respondent (petitioner
herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest,
orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. All these attempts to misuse our laws
and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious discriminations against
petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence
to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the
harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating
light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by
a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its
interpretation, bile and bitterness.
9. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT;
RATIONALE; CANDIDATE'S LIFETIME CONTACTS WITH FIRST DISTRICT OF LEYTE
SATISFIES INTENT. — In Gallego v. Vera, we explained that the reason for this residence
requirement is "to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of
a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community. . . ."
Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim
that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can
argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
10. ID.; ID.; ELECTION CASES; DOMINANT CONSIDERATION IN RESOLUTION
THEREOF IS THE NEED TO EFFECTUATE WILL OF THE ELECTORATE. — In resolving
election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate. The
election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-One
(70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three
(36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District
of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly
arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will give
life to the people's political judgment.
FRANCISCO, J ., concurring opinion:

1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; DEFINED. — Domicile has been defined as that place in which
a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention of removing therefrom, and that place
is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not
for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent
home (28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or
pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in
the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
2. ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATIONS. — Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile
of choice. The law attributes to every individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his
parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time
of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it
maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the
person has elected and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true
basis or foundation the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. 6). A third classification is domicile by
operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual
residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from
marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. 7).
3. ID.; ID.; CHANGE OF DOMICILE; REQUISITES. — In order to hold that a person has
abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the following requisites
must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain
there oranimus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non
revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC , Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415).
4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; RESIDENCE SYNONYMOUS WITH DOMICILE. — In
election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile
(Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray,
52 Phil. 645, 651).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT ABANDONED OR LOST BY REGISTRATION OF VOTER IN A
PLACE OTHER THAN HIS PLACE OF ORIGIN. — In several decisions, though, the Court has
laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not
sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294,
300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from this rule except to
surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; MARITAL DOMICILE; LOST UPON DEATH OF HUSBAND; WIFE
REVERTED TO HER ORIGINAL DOMICILE; CASE AT BAR. — Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's
domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon
her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of
her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform
their marital duties and obligations to one another. The question of domicile, however, is not
affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place
(28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists,
she automatically loses it upon the latter's termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases.
Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed
in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to
hold onto one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose. It is my view therefore that
petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's death without
even signifying her intention to that effect.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY CLAIMING THAT A PERSON HAS ABANDONED OR LOST HIS
RESIDENCE OF ORIGIN MUST SHOW AND PROVE SUCH LOSS OR ABANDONMENT. — It is
for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively
abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The clear rule is
that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his
residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss
(Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. 16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an
original or former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16). Private respondent
unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that
petitioner has acquired, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile
of origin.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONE-YEAR RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT; REQUIREMENT MET IN CASE
AT BENCH. — The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the
constitutional one-year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the
Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good
Government which sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade her
necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila. In 1992, she ran for the position of
president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After her
loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate and resided with
her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she
was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. It was in the same month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her
previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to
use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for
the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private
respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992
presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein
until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It appearing that both Tacloban
City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands
that she had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected.
Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by the
1987 Constitution.
PADILLA, J ., dissenting opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; COMELEC DID NOT

COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING CANDIDATE FOR FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCE QUALIFICATION. — The one year residence
period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be synonymous with
"domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must
in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of
a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a
district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be
the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility. Petitioner's certificate of candidacy
filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her disqualification. It is
contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the
constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." It follows from all
the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is
disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in
the elections of 8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the
constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election (8 May 1995)."
2. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; DISQUALIFICATION; CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED
THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES CAN NOT BE DECLARED WINNER OF
ELECTIVE OFFICE WHERE CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF
VOTES IS DECLARED DISQUALIFIED OR NOT ELIGIBLE FOR OFFICE. — The fact that the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The
votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into
office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary
political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray,void or meaningless.
(Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1)
3. ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646 (AN ACT INTRODUCING REFORMS IN THE
ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES); VOTES CAST FOR A CANDIDATE
DECLARED DISQUALIFIED BY FINAL JUDGMENT SHALL NOT BE COUNTED; CANDIDATE
WHO OBTAINED THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES WHERE THE WINNING
CANDIDATE IS DECLARED DISQUALIFIED DEEMED THE WINNER. — Under Sec. 6 of RA
6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes) (84
O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that: . . . — Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL
NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court
or Commissionon Elections to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a candidate
is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified. What happens then when after the elections are
over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal
contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes. It stands to reason that Section
6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a "winning candidate is
disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest
number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or
considered. As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason
why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo
case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by
the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution. ACCORDINGLY,
I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to
proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified
candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
REGALADO, J ., dissenting opinion:

1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; DOMICILE OF ORIGIN; CONSTRUED. — The domicile of the

parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an
infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place.
2. ID.; ID.; KINDS. — Domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth,
domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of
birth or domicilium originis; the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party
or domicilium proprio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,
is sometimes called domicilium necesarium.
3. ID.; ID.; DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW; ACQUIRED BY MARRIAGE. — When
petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only
international or American but of our own enactment, she acquired her husband's domicile of origin
in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
4. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR CHANGE OF DOMICILE. — To successfully effect a change
of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b)
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and
(c) acts which correspond with the purpose.
5. ID.; ID.; ONCE LOST CAN BE RECOVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW; NO
AUTOMATIC REVERSION OR REACQUISITION OF DOMICILE. — Domicile once lost in
accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law. However, we are
here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of
origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that
since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also
terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves
that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting
either the logic or the validity of this argument.
6. ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY ABANDONMENT OF DOMICILE DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY
RESTORE DOMICILE OF ORIGIN. — If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new
domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter,
he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile unless, by
subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to establish the same
as his new domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of
her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do. One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of
choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not only because there is no legal
authority therefor but because it would be absurd. Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory
of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well have obtained
another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin.
Significantly and obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably
invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge on one's freedom of
choice.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily
abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume that she entered into the marital state
against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed through her
acquisition of a new domicile byoperation of law. In fact, this is even a case of
both voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore,
should we reject the proposition that with the termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had
supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she lost in 1954.
Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was
simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of
suspended animation. LexLibris
8. ID.; ID.; DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW; AFTER THE HUSBAND'S DEATH, THE
WIFE HAS THE RIGHT TO ELECT HER OWN DOMICILE. — The American rule is likewise to the
effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the right to elect her own domicile, she
nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual change.
In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile or
legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death.
9. ID.; FAMILY CODE; RIGHT AND POWER TO FIX FAMILY HOME CAN NOT AFFECT
DOMICILE FIXED BY LAW. — I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the
majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance
therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family domicile is now shared by
the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was never exercised by
the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband,
long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine
the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing on this case. With the death of her
husband, and each of her children having gotten married and established their own respective
domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer called for or material in the present
factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of
her having acquired or not her own domicile of choice.
10. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT; NOT MET
BY CANDIDATE'S RESIDENCY FOR SEVEN (7) MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING
ELECTION; PREVIOUS RESIDENCY AT DOMICILE OF ORIGIN NOT COUNTED WHERE THE
SAME WAS LOST DUE TO MARRIAGE AND NOT REACQUIRED AFTER HUSBAND'S DEATH.
— In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having
automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the
political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present.
Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her
amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original
certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the
election.
DAVIDE, JR., J ., dissenting opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; PROPER REMEDY FROM

A DECISION, ORDER OR RULING OF THE COMELEC. — Under Section 7, Subdivision A,
Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may be brought to this
Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WRIT OF CERTIORARI; MAY BE GRANTED ONLY IN ABSENCE OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — A writ
of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BENCH, NOT A CASE FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT.
— Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the
only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner. My
careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of
the COMELEC Second Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total
absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second
Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute details the facts which established
beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of
residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or
misunderstood facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; DOMICILE; LOSS OR ABANDONMENT THEREOF IN
CASE AT BAR. — I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC,
either by admission or by documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment
of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided
to live again in her domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where her stay,
unfortunately, was for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then disqualified
to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A
holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOMICILE OF CHOICE LOST BY OPERATION OF LAW BY MARRIAGE.
— It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or
Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her
marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by
operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own
intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising
from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil
Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was
Batac, Ilocos Norte. Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and,
by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what
she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his,
and subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d
Domicile 48, 37).
6. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; FAMILY DOMICILE; FIXING THEREOF, A JOINT
DECISION OF SPOUSES. — It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family
Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now
a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The said
article uses the term "family domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses may have
multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may
destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V.
SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).
7. ID.; DOMICILE, DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW; DEATH OF HUSBAND REVIVES
POWER OF WIFE TO ACQUIRE HER OWN DOMICILE; NO AUTOMATIC RESTORATION OF
WOMAN'S DOMICILE OF ORIGIN. — The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile
of origin upon the death of her husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal
effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence.
The settled doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile,
but she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S.
Domicile 12, 27). Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own
domicile is revived, but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at
the time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 62, 45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile
of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.
8. ID.; ID.; LOSS OF DOMICILE; MARRIAGE, NOT A GROUND. — I find to be misplaced
the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino(96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the
subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile
of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in other states does
not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. So is the reliance onSection 117 of the Omnibus
Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one's
"occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational activities; work in
military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national
police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is not
deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage of
a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the
intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance
which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases
and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.
9. ID.; ID.; ABANDONMENT THEREOF IN CASE AT BENCH. — This Court should not
accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit that her "domicile or
residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or
residence of origin to which [she] always intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of
intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and
circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954 conclusively
establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new
one animo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934],
214, 326). aisadc
10. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; SELF-SERVING
STATEMENT, WITHOUT PROBATIVE VALUE. — Neither should this Court place complete
trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest mistake" in writing down the
word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the certificate of
candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all
sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise;
what she stated was the truth.
11. ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF; ONE WHO ASSERTS A FACT HAS THE BURDEN OF
PROVING IT. — The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts
a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it Imperial Victory Shipping
Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T . Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19
[1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny
the legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority
opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal
domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is
consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased
husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden
is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably
failed to discharge that burden. cdlex
ROMERO, J ., separate opinion:
 POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; RESIDENCE; DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW;
WIDOW NO LONGER BOUND BY THE DOMICILE OF THE DEPARTED HUSBAND; WIDOW
MAY CHOOSE DOMICILE; ONE YEAR RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT, MET IN CASE AT BAR.
— Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for
election purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District
of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is
her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth.
Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married
Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death
certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his
lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to
"domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by operation of law," which subject we shall
not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other separate opinions.
A widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile
of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her
domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In
returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in
the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of
choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set
up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, GENERALLY

MANDATORY IN CHARACTER. — Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in
character unless, either by express statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).
2. ID.; COMELEC; WITH JURISDICTION OVER PRE-PROCLAMATION
CONTROVERSIES. — The Commission on Elections (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound
to enforce and administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX,
C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority
to pass upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law of candidatesto an elective
office. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's
jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF ONE-
YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF THE COMELEC, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL.
— The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year
residency requirement. This issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is
basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and
judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a
number of exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable
by this Court. Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with
having committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
4. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; PLACE OF HABITUAL RESIDENCE. — For civil law
purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code).
5. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; DOMICILE SYNONYMOUS WITH RESIDENCE. — In
election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: '(t)he term
'residence' as used in the election law is synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.' 'Domicile' denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent
for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . (Romualdez vs. Regional
Trial Court, Branch 7,Tacloban City [226 SCRA 408, 409])
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS FOR CHANGE OF DOMICILE. — Residence thus acquired,
however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new
domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in
or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must
be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMELEC; ITS JURISDICTION ENDS WHEN
JURISDICTION OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL BEGINS. — The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the
case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned
begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since
become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. LexLibris
8. ID.; ID.; PROCLAMATION OF CANDIDATE, NOT A MINISTERIAL FUNCTION. — The
question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial
function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election
exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being
adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its
particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions
such as may be required by law before a proclamation is properly done.
9. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE SECOND
HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES NOT NECESSARILY ENTITLED TO BE DECLARED WINNER
OF ELECTIVE OFFICE WHERE CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF
VOTES IS LATER DECLARED DISQUALIFIED OR NOT ELIGIBLE. — I should like to next touch
base on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section
72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be
preferable to look for not so much the specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the
principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say
that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should
not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The
argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first
enunciated in the case of Topacio vs.Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later
abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA
740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435
[1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297
[1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a
unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa,
Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave).
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMELEC; WITHOUT POWER TO DISQUALIFY

CANDIDATE FOR LACK OF ELIGIBILITY. — In my view the issue in this case is whether
the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack
eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the
qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a
petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in
the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the
parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such
proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit their
dispute to that body. To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they
are not concerned with a declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are
concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a
person either to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for public office. There is also a
provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases
involving false representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the
certificates. cdll
2. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; ABSENCE OF PROVISION FOR PRE-
PROCLAMATION CONTEST BASED ON INELIGIBILITY. — The various election laws will be
searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's qualifications for an
office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for
synchronized elections(R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-
proclamation contests but only election protests or quo warranto proceedings against winning
candidates.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONS. — Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a candidate. First is the
fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining
his eligibility for the office. Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g.,
his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond
the beginning of the term of the office. Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-
proclamation cases inelections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House
of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under
the Constitution of the election, returnsand qualifications of members of Congress or of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be. By providing in § 253 for the remedy of quo
warranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after the results of elections are
proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same
ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not
authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.
4. ID.; ID.; PETITION TO DISQUALIFY CANDIDATE FOR INELIGIBILITY FALLS WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL. — Montejo's petition before
the COMELEC was not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under § 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is
important to note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under § 78 have for
their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings
have for their purpose to disqualify a person from holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo
warranto proceedings involving members of the House of Representatives is vested in the
Electoral Tribunal of that body.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; QUO WARRANTO; QUALIFICATION OF
CANDIDATE PASSED UPON ONLY AFTER PROCLAMATION OF CANDIDATE. — In the only
cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy, the
allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in their
certificates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship, age, or residence. But in the generality of
cases in which this Court passed upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did
so in the context of election protests orquo warranto proceedings filed after the proclamation of
the respondents or protestees as winners.
 6. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; ABSENCE OF PROVISION FOR PRE-
PROCLAMATION CONTESTS BASED ON INELIGIBILITY; CANNOT BE SUPPLIED BY A MERE
RULE OF THE COMELEC. — The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause
of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking
power under Art. IX, A, § 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that
the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right
to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX-C, § 2[3])
7. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS DIFFERENTIATED FROM
DECLARATION OF INELIGIBILITY. — The assimilation in Rule 25 of theCOMELEC rules of
grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the
law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for
"disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in Sections 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of
barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office.
In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its
progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in
the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for
declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
8. ID.; ID.; POSSESSION OF QUALIFICATIONS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE DOES NOT
IMPLY THAT CANDIDATE IS NOT DISQUALIFIED. — That an individual possesses the
qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a
candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of
dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed
in § 2 of the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in § 4.
9. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS BASED ON INELIGIBILITY; ELECTION
PROTEST OR ACTION FOR QUO WARRANTO, PROPER REMEDY. — To summarize, the
declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or action for quo
warranto filed pursuant to § 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his
proclamation. With respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either with the COMELEC, the
Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX-C, § 2(2) of the Constitution.
In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must be filed with the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, § 4, last paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. (Art. VI, § 17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the filing of
disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for President,
Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the same
policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases against such candidates.
10. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; COMELEC WITHOUT
JURISDICTION TO ASSUME DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATE BASED ON INELIGIBILITY.
— For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-
009; that its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the
eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First
District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the HRET. Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition
and to annul the proceedings of the Commission onElections in SPA No. 95-009, including its
questioned orders dated April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring
petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as Representative
of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the ground of
ineligibility for the office, it should be considered void. LLjur

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J p:

A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress

the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to
the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
election." 2 The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973
Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with
the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office
to serve that community." 3
Petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative
of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation
and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that
Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates to the House
of representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-
No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring
(petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the
same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate
of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with
the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private
respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day.
In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of
Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding
the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has
always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence." 11 Impugning respondent's
motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein,) announced that she was intending to register as
a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner
 immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is
not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence
therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa
from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the
Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in
the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other
Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the
town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did
not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant
petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte
in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a
vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original
Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and
petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
"Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word
"Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed.
She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical"
presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative
District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying
affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has
never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's
theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of
the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a
resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the
Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can
be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner
wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident
of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly
acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of 'honest misinterpretation or honest mistake.'
Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of
her Answer, she was quite aware of 'residence of origin' which she interprets to be
Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of
Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and
physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the
question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of
Candidacy speaks clearly of 'Residencyin the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be
elected immediately preceding the election.' Thus, the explanation of respondent fails
to be persuasive. prLL
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation,
therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she
cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the
case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the 'inconsequential deviations
which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended
primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections.' The Supreme Court in that
case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the
amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation.
The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks
to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy,
specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original
certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to
condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, to the
detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency
in order to prolong it by claiming it was 'since childhood' is to allow an untruthfulness
to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months
residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from
her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which
reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of
the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her
letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994,
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters
thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent
conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro
Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994
which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore,
cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be
admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of
the Constitution.
In election cases, the term 'residence' has always been considered as synonymous
with 'domicile' which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo
Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's
case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not
Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro
Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District
since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is
otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts
admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and
worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San
Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel,
Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later onserved as
the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had
not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of
candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San
Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter
with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of
her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not
have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including
Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she
was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her
domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on a several occasions
declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in
Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay
and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA
408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must
concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain
there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must
basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to
stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by
registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place,
she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and
school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct
indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always
intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that
intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented
any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention
to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District
of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First
District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out
that on January 28, 1995; respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she
resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be
inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of
Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she
had been a resident of the district for six months only." 15
 In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring
her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to
DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-
examination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation
should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however,
the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held
May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14,
1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes
compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of
Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition. LLcd
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional
seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her
proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal
issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The Issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 8, 1995elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive
jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8,
1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling
confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law.
While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes
of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to
substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for
the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
 Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment
of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs.
Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a
place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to
leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a
place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it
becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons,
he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs.
Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. 'Residence' is used to indicate
a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; 'domicile' denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man
may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time,
but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally
his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile."
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence . . . is synonymous with
domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated
the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to post of
Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence
from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in
the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept
(of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated
that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to
abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective
positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence"
in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
 Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, 'and a
resident thereof,' that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding
the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a
provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad
may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should
be by domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term
residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda
Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy
stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to
be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly
make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting
down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte
instead of her period of residence in the First District, which was "since childhood" in the space
provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second
Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein
petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in
the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a
resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in
the First District, which was Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her
Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the
confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence
in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
 8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in
Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period
of stay in her actual residence in a space which required her period of stay in her legal residence
or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence
and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's
registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which
she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact
of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a
mere entry on a piece of paper. dctai
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First
District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24, 1995
maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites
certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she
lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner,
in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965,
following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila
where she registered as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had
not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even
if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating,
implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-
permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by
the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to
the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places"
flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between
(actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we
stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house
wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention
of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in another
municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a
candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a
resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 we explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying
goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of
his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who
left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his
ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not
absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he registers
himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or
lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in
 national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his
domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why
the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been
deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds
justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of
birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome
by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual)
residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in
election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from theCOMELEC's Second Division's assailed
Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy
in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued
her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban,
where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte
Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her
cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he
was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her
husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her
husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in
Malacañang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992,
respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of
Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is
that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the past four decades. None
of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed
the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually
established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her
husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties
to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and
other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for
the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her
siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment,
always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are
part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were
entirely ignored in the COMELEC's Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know
what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
 Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of
origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the
place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-
establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do
not agree.
First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained
until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,
Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established
only when she reached the age of eight years old, when her father brought his family back to
Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements
can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same
time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of
origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former
domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1954. For
there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and
"residence." 39The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by
operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article
110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both
terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is
one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of
physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the
service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence
as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the
female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of
residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which
states: LexLib
 La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los
Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando
el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article,
which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly
contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or
residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido
translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his
residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of
actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to
another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a
circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the
law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring
into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity,
be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading:
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article
110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
ARTICLE 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together.
This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that
Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in
one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile. — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to
particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and
the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent
with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times
they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a
person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country
residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other
hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for
domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during
the marriage is not an iron-clad principle. In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the
spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to
maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert
to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs.
Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate
from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause
for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a
new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, under the Civil Code, to
live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of
origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of
contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province
of the courts at this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with,
and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of
the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we
are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of
contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of
consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of those countries
where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married
people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in
England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of
conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to
warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of
contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other
and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the
judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52),
decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty
Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the
subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of
adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England,
could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment.
Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the
Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a
decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the
periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can
discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the
spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to
follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New
Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn vs. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a
provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to Article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code.
It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even
in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing
cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148)
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have
affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to
the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a
particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to
deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents,
and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the
marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return
 of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the
consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her
property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily
have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,
petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual
place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several
places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no
showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that
Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. aisadc
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have
been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code
of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the
Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term
domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that
found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's
rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law
(or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar
as the Civil Code is concerned — affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the
term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion
derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the
former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not
a domicilium necesarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose
her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice"
was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought
the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot,
Leyte . . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban,
Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in
San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes"
and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as
temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion
pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or
chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to
assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a
positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage
itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court
up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor
of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of
Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
 Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that
the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in
violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction
over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have
clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often
made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this
court in Marcelino v. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often
determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the
general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a
limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent
of counsel, it was held that 'the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from
with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those
which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and
purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act.' Thus, in said case,
the statute under examination was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from
rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked
jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to
render judgments merelyon the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or
prescribed period. cdll
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78
of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondentCommission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and
decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections. cdlex
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to
say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is
obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to
either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a
petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many
established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power
during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit
of EDSA by ourselves bending established principles of law to deny an individual what he or she
justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistake of the
past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte,
the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. RespondentCOMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
 Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED. LLjur
||| (Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976, [September 18, 1995], 318
PHIL 329-466)

[G.R. No. 120265. September 18, 1995.]

AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE

MAKATI, MATEO BEDON, and JUANITO ICARO, respondents.

Haydee B. Yorac, R.A.V . Saguisag and Clarence D. Guerrero for petitioner.

Felix D. Carao, Jr., collaborating counsel for petitioner.
Pete Quirino Quadra for private respondents Move Makati and Mateo B. Bedon.

SYLLABUS

1. ELECTION LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; JURISDICTION OVER QUALIFICATION

CASES OF CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERS OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; CONTINUES
EVEN AFTER THE ELECTION. — Petitioner vigorously contends that after the May 8, 1995 elections,
the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications to run for member of
the House of Representatives. He claims that jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification is
exclusively lodged with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Given the yet —
unresolved question of jurisdiction, petitioner avers that the COMELEC committed serious error and
grave abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his proclamation as the winning candidate in
the Second Congressional District of Makati City. We disagree. Petitioner conveniently confuses the
distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of Representatives and a member of the
same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in
the winning candidate. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the Senate and the
House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members. The electoral
tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications
of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become members of either the
Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not
taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to
Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an
election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of
proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the
conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from
the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the
question of qualification" finds no basis in law, because even after the elections the COMELEC is
empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide
questions relating to qualifications of candidates.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES;
QUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERS; RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT; CANDIDATE
MUST PROVE THAT HE HAS ESTABLISHED NOT JUST RESIDENCE BUT DOMICILE OF
CHOICE. — Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,"
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of
residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera, (73 Phil. 453 [1941]) is "to exclude strangers or
newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community" from taking advantage of
favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong
with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this
nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters
those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the
period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by
individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been
domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this
Court to inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for
a period of one year in the area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District of Makati at the
time of his election or whether or not he was domiciled in the same.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESIDENCE SYNONYMOUS WITH DOMICILE FOR ELECTION
PURPOSES. — We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has
established not just residence but domicile of choice." The Constitution requires that a person seeking
election to the House of Representatives should be a resident of thedistrict in which he seeks election
for a period of not less than one (1) year prior to the elections. Residence, for election law purposes,
has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction. In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives (199 SCRA 692 [1991]) this Court held that the term "residence" has always been
understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the previous Constitutions but also
under the 1987 Constitution.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CLEAR AND POSITIVE PROOF SHOWING A SUCCESSFUL
ABANDONMENT OF DOMICILE MUST BE ESTABLISHED; CASE AT BAR. — While property
ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that
petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of
time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile
in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence" is not to
acquire a new residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the
Second District of Makati City." The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful
abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification — sentimental,
actual or otherwise — with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease
agreement was effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by
the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati. As the COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed out:
[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as a
qualification for a candidate of Representative, by establishing a commencement date of his
residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this
particular lease agreement cannot do better. Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his
domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at
bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must
prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. These requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's
claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear
and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
5. ID.; ELECTORAL REFORM LAW OF 1987 (R.A. 6646); EFFECT OF DISQUALIFICATION;
OBTAINING THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES WILL NOT RESULT IN THE SUSPENSION OR
TERMINATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS WHEN THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG. — Under
Section 6 of R.A. 6646, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to continue
after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest
number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the proceedings against him when
the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to
suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the
provisions of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78
of B.P. 881.
6. ID.; INELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE; DOES NOT ENTITLE THE ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE
RECEIVING THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES TO BE DECLARED ELECTED. — In the
more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989]); Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253
[1991]); and Benito v. Comelec, (235 SCRA 436 [1994]), this Court reiterated and upheld the ruling
in Topacio v. Paredes, and Geronimo v. Ramos to the effect that the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving the majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next higher number of
votes to be declared elected, and that a minority or defeated candidate cannot be declared elected to
the office. In these cases, we put emphasis on our pronouncement in Geronimo v. Ramos that: The
fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or
not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The
votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may be valid to vote the winner into office or
maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in sincere belief that that candidate was alive,
qualified, or eligible; they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
PADILLA, J ., separate concurring opinion:
1. ELECTION LAW; QUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES; RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT;
CANDIDATE MUST PROVE THAT HE HAD ACTUALLY AND PHYSICALLY RESIDED IN THE
PLACE TO BE VOTED UPON. — In G.R. No. 119976, Marcos vs. Comelec, J . Padilla have
maintained that the phrase "a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year"
means actual and physical presence in the legislative district of the congressional candidate, and that
said period of one year must be satisfied regardless of whether or not a person's residence or
domicile coincides. To my mind, petitioner should be declared disqualified to run as representative in
the 2nd district of Makati City in the 8 May 1995 elections not because he failed to prove his
residence therein as his domicile of choice, but because he failed altogether to prove that he
had actually and physically resided therein for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the 8 May 1995 elections. Petitioner evidently wants to impress the Court that his other
residences in Metro Manila could never have become his domicile of choice because it never entered
his mind and suddenly, seemingly not contented with these residences, he rents a condominium unit
in Makati, and calls it his domicile of choice — all these without adding clear and convincing evidence
that he did actually live and reside in Makati for at least one year prior to 8 May 1995 — and that he
no longer lived and resided in his other residences during said one year period. It follows, likewise,
that the lease contract relied upon by petitioner, standing alone, established only the alleged date
(April 25, 1994) of its due execution. Stated otherwise, the lease contract tells us that petitioner had
been leasing a condominium unit in Makati City for more than a year prior to 8 May 1995, but it does
not prove that petitioner actually and physically resided therein for the same period, in the light of his
admission that he maintained other residences in Metro Manila.
2. ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES; VOTES CAST IN FAVOR OF SAID CANDIDATE
SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. — J . Padilla agrees with the proposition advanced by the Solicitor
General that Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 clearly provides that votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not
be counted. There can be no dispute that if a final judgment is rendered before the election, declaring
a particular candidate as disqualified, such disqualified candidate shall not be voted for and votes
cast for him shall not be counted, thus posing no problem in proclaiming the candidate who receives
the highest number of votes among the qualified candidates. But what about after the election? Sec.
6 appears categorical enough in stating: "if for any reason" no final judgment of disqualification is
rendered before the elections, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes, the Comelec or the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction to hear and try the
case up to final judgment, hence, the power to even suspend the proclamation of the erstwhile
winning candidate when evidence of guilt is strong. It thus appear clear that the law does not
dichotomize the effect of a final judgment of disqualification in terms of time considerations. There is
only one natural and logical effect: the disqualified candidate shall not be voted and, if voted, the
votes case for him shall not be counted. Ubi lex non ditinguit nec nos distinguere debemus (where the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANDIDATE WHO RECEIVED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES SHOULD BE
PROCLAIMED. — At this point, what J . Padilla said in Marcos, supra, follows: "What happens then
when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be
counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes. It stands to
reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a
"winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained
the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being
counted or considered. As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no
reason why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo
case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution." Therefore the
candidate who received the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates, should be
proclaimed. cdasia
FRANCISCO, J ., concurring and dissenting opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; PROCLAMATION OF WINNER IN THE CONTESTED ELECTION AN
ESSENTIAL REQUISITE TO VEST JURISDICTION THEREON. — Section 17 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous that HRET jurisdiction applies only to the members of the
House of Representatives. The operative acts necessary for an electoral candidate's rightful
assumption of the office for which he ran are his proclamation and his taking an oath of office.
Petitioner cannot in anyway be considered as a member of the House of Representatives for the
purpose of divesting the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction to declare his disqualification and
invoking instead HRET's jurisdiction, it indubitably appearing that he has yet to be proclaimed, much
less has he taken an oath of office. That the jurisdiction conferred upon HRET extends only to
Congressional members is further established by judicial notice of HRET Rules of Procedure, and
HRET decisions consistently holding that the proclamation of a winner in the contested election is the
essential requisite vesting jurisdiction on the HRET.
2. ID.; ID.; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES QUALIFICATION OF MEMBERS; RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT; DECISION TO TRANSFER LEGAL RESIDENCE MUST BEBONA FIDE AND
UNEQUIVOCAL. — Petitioner insists that domicile is a matter of personal intention. Thus, petitioner
asserts that if he decides to transfer his legal residence so he can qualify for public office then he is
entirely free to do so. This argument to hold water, must be supported by clear and convincing proofs
that petitioner has effectively abandoned his former domicile and that his intention is not doubtful.
Indeed, domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new
one is established (Co. v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 711
[1991]). Petitioner from childhood until his last election as senator has consistently maintained
Conception, Tarlac, as his domicile. He moved to Amapola Street, Palm Village, Makati, and
thereafter claimed the same to be his new domicile. This claim, however, is dismally unsupported by
the records. The lease contract entered into by petitioner for a period of two years on the third floor
condominium unit in Palm Village, Makati, in my view, does not prove his intent to abandon his
domicile of origin. The intention to establish domicile must be an intention to remain indefinitely or
permanently in the new place. This element is lacking in this instance. Worse, public respondent
Commission even found that "respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only
one (1) year because he has other 'residences' in Manila or in Quezon City (citing TSN, May 2, 1995,
p. 92)." Noting that petitioner is already barred from running for senator due to the constitutional
consecutive two-term limit, his search for a place where he could further and continue his political
career and sudden transfer thereto make his intent suspect. The best test of intention to establish
legal residence comes from one's acts and not by mere declarations alone. To acquire, to effect a
change of domicile, the intention must be bona fide and unequivocal (28 C.J.S. 11). Petitioner, in my
view, miserably failed to show a bona fide and unequivocal intention to effect the change of his
domicile.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES PROVIDED BY THE CONSTITUTION NOT BRUSHED ASIDE BY THE
ENACTMENT OF R.A. No. 7854. — The theory of legal impossibility is advanced to justify non-
compliance with the constitutional qualification on residency. Petitioner explains his theory in this wise:
". . . THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE LEGAL
IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE
ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND BARELY
FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI." Apparently, this theory is
an offshoot of Republic Act No. 7854, an act converting the municipality of Makati into a highly
urbanized city. This law enacted on January 2, 1995, established a Second Congressional district in
Makati in which petitioner ran as a Congressional candidate. Since the second district, according to
petitioner, is barely four (4) months old then the one (1) year residence qualification provided by
the Constitution is inapplicable. Petitioner's acts, however, as borne by the records, belie his own
theory. Originally, he placed in his certificate of candidacy an entry of ten (10) months residence in
Makati. Petitioner then had it amended to one (1) year and thirteen (13) days to correct what he
claims as a mere inadvertent mistake. I doubt the sincerity of this representation. If petitioner is
indeed persuaded by his own theory, the ten months residence he initially wrote would have more
than sufficiently qualified him to run in the barely four-month old Makati district. The amendment only
reveals the true intent of petitioner to comply with the one year constitutional requirement for
residence, adding an extra thirteen (13) days for full measure. Petitioner apparently wanted to argue
one way (theory of legal impossibility), but at the same time played it safe in the other (the
constitutional one year residence requirement). And that is not all. If we were to adhere to petitioner's
theory of legal impossibility, then residents in that district shorn of the constitutional six months
residence requirement for prospective voters (Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) would
have certainly qualified to vote. That would have legitimized the entry and electoral exercise of flying
voters — one of the historic nemeses of a clean and honest election. Furthermore, to subscribe to
petitioner's contention that the constitutional qualification of candidates should be brushed aside in
view of the enactment of R.A. No. 7854 will indubitably violate the manner and procedure for the
amendment or revision of the constitution outlined under Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. A
legislative enactment, it has to be emphasized, cannot render nugatory the constitution.
The constitution is superior to a statute. It is the fundamental and organic law of the land to which
every state must conform and harmonize.

4. ELECTION LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; JURISDICTION THEREOF CANNOT BE

QUESTIONED IF THE PARTY ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE PROCEEDINGS THEREIN. — It
is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape an adverse decision.
Perforce, petitioner's asseveration that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to rule on his qualification
must fail.
5. ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATE; VOTES CAST IN HIS FAVOR SHALL NOT BE
COUNTED. — It has been contended that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed a
substitute winner. Justice Francisco finds the proposition quite unacceptable. A disqualified
"candidate" is not a candidate and the votes which may have been cast in his favor are nothing but
stray votes of no legal consequence. A disqualified person like the petitioner receives no vote or zero
vote. In short, no-candidate-no vote. Petitioner had therefore no right, in fact and in law, to claim first
place for he has nothing to base his right. The legislative intent is clear as provided by R.A. 6646,
Section 6, in that votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted as they are
considered stray(Section 211, Rule 24, Omnibus Election Code). It is only from the ranks of qualified
candidates can one be chosen as first placer and not from without. Necessarily, petitioner, a
disqualified candidate, cannot be a first placer as he claims himself to be. To count the votes for a
disqualified candidate would, in my view, disenfranchise voters who voted for a qualified candidate.
Legitimate votes cast for a qualified candidate should not be penalized alongside a disqualified
candidate. With this in mind, the other qualified candidate who garnered the highest number of votes
should be proclaimed the duly elected representative of the district. Justice Francisco feels that
the Labo doctrine ought to be abandoned.
DAVIDE, JR., J ., dissenting opinion:
1. ELECTION LAWS; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE (BATAS PAMBANSA 881); PETITION TO DENY
DUE COURSE TO OR CANCEL A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY; RULE PROVIDED UNDER
SECTION 78 THEREOF NOT SUPERSEDED BY RULE 25 OF THE COMELEC RULES OF
PROCEDURE. — The petition to disqualify the petitioner in SPA No. 95-113 is not a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Nowhere in the petition in SPA
No. 95-113 is it alleged by the private respondents that a material representation contained in the
petitioner's certificate of candidacy is false. What is being attacked therein is the petitioner's lack of
the one-year residence qualification in the new Second Legislative District of Makati City where he
sought to be elected for the office of Congressman. The rule governing disqualification cases on the
ground of ineligibility, which is also invoked by the private respondents, is Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, as amended on 15 February 1993. The amendment allows the filing of a petition
to disqualify a candidate on the ground that he does not possess all the qualifications provided for by
the Constitution or by existing laws. In its original form, the rule only applied to petitions for
disqualification based on the commission of any act declared by law to be a ground for
disqualification. The rule as thus amended now reads as follows: Rule 25 — Disqualification of
Candidates SECTION 1. Grounds for Disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any
act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate. The italicized portion is the amendment to Rule 25, which the COMELEC must have
deemed necessary to fill up a procedural hiatus in cases of disqualifications based on other grounds
in the light of this Court's interpretation in Loong vs.Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760 [1992])
that Rule 25 refers only to disqualifications under Section 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
This Court explicitly stated therein as follows: We do not agree with private respondent Ututalum's
contention that the petition for disqualification, as in the case at bar, may be filed at any time after the
last day for filing a certificate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, applying
Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure
refers to Disqualification of Candidates; and Section 1 of said rule provides that any candidate who
commits any act declared by law to be ground for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing
as a candidate. The grounds for disqualification is expressed in Sections 12 and 68 of the Code. The
petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent Comelec to disqualify petitioner
Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to
his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is
expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel
certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at any
time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which, although a
constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code which is a legislative enactment. cdtai
2. ID.; ELECTORAL REFORMS LAW OF 1987 (R.A. 6646); PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE TO
OR CANCEL A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDATES; "PROCEDURE HEREINABOVE PROVIDED"
MENTIONED UNDER SECTION 7 REFERS TO THE EFFECT OF DISQUALIFICATION CASES. —
Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the petition in SPA No. 95-113 fall under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, still Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 cannot be applied by virtue of Section
7 thereof. The "procedure hereinabove provided" mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer
to Section 6 which does not provide for a procedure but for the EFFECTS of disqualification cases. It
can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates and
which is the only procedure that precedes Section 7 of the said Act. Heretofore, no law provided for
the procedure to govern cases under Section 78. Applying to such cases, through Section 7 of R.A.
6646, the procedure applicable to cases of nuisance candidates is prudent and wise, for both cases
necessarily require that they be decided before the day of the election; hence, only summary
proceedings thereon can adequately respond to the urgency of the matter.
3. ID.; ID.; EFFECTS OF DISQUALIFICATION; RULE PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 6 MERELY
SUPPLEMENTS SECTION 72 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE. — Section 6 merely
supplements Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code by granting the COMELEC or the Court the
authority to continue hearing the case and to suspend the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is
strong. As observed by this Court in its majority opinion "the phrase 'when the evidence of guilt is
strong' seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to
disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC NOT AUTHORIZED TO CONTINUE HEARING THE CASE AFTER THE
ELECTION EVEN WITH THE AMENDMENT OF RULE 25 OF THE COMELEC RULES OF
PROCEDURE. — The amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which is the only rule
governing petitions filed before election or proclamation for the disqualification of a candidate on the
ground that he lacks the qualifications provided for by the Constitution or by law, does not, as can be
gathered from Section 5 thereof, authorize the COMELEC to continue hearing the case after the
election.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE CANNOT BE APPLIED TO A CASE WHICH DOES NOT INVOLVE REGIONAL,
PROVINCIAL AND CITY OFFICIALS AND WHERE SUSPENSION OF PROCLAMATION IS NOT
WARRANTED BECAUSE OF ABSENCE OF STRONG EVIDENCE OF GUILT OR INELIGIBILITY. —
Even assuming that the second sentence of Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 is applicable to
disqualification cases based on the ground of lack of qualification, it cannot be applied to a case
which does not involve elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and where suspension of
proclamation is not warranted because of the absence of strong evidence of guilt or ineligibility. In
such a case, the candidate sought to be disqualified but who obtains the highest number of votes has
to be proclaimed. Once he is proclaimed, the COMELEC cannot continue with the case, and the
remedy of the opponent is to contest the winning candidate's eligibility within ten days from
proclamation in a quo warranto proceeding which is within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or
municipal trial courts, in the case of barangay officials; the regional trial courts, in the case of
municipal officials (Section 2[2], Article IX-C, Constitution; Section 253, paragraph 2, B.P. Blg. 881);
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, in the case of Congressmen; the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, in the case of Senators (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution); and the Supreme Court en
banc, in the case of the President or Vice-President (Section 4, Article VII, Constitution). If what is
involved is an elective regional, provincial, or city official, and the case cannot be decided before the
election, the COMELEC can, even after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified,
proceed with the case by treating it as a petition for quo warranto, since such a case properly pertains
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC (Section 2[2], Article IX-C, Constitution; Section
253, B.P. Blg. 881). But even granting for the sake of argument that Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. No.
6646, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and the amended Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, are applicable, the order of suspension of the petitioner's
proclamation issued on 15 May 1995 is null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. What was before the COMELEC en banc at that stage was the decision of the Second
Division of 6 May 1995 dismissing the petition to disqualify the petitioner and declaring him
qualified for the position. That decision is a direct and positive rejection of any claim that the evidence
of the petitioner's guilt is strong. Note that it was only on 2 June 1995, when the COMELEC en
banc reversed the decision of the Second Division, that it was found that the evidence of the
petitioner's ineligibility is strong. It would have been otherwise if the Second Division had disqualified
the petitioner.
VITUG, J ., separate opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; SCOPE OF POWER TO ENFORCE
AND ADMINISTER ALL LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO THE CONDUCT OF ELECTION.
— The Commission on Elections (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and
administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2,
Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should include to its authority pass upon
the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-
proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and
resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
2. ID.; ID.; FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT THEREOF NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT EXCEPT
IN CASE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — The matter before us specifically calls for the
observance of the constitutional one-year residency requirement. This issue (whether or not there is
here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked to
such determination. The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the long
established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse
of discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.
3. ELECTION LAWS; QUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES; RESIDENCE; SYNONYMOUS WITH
DOMICILE. — Justice Vitug does not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to him
to be a plain matter. Generally. the term "residence" has a broader connotation that may
mean permanent(domicile), official (place where one's official duties may require him to stay)
or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time.) For civil law
purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile
of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases,
the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial
Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus: "In election cases, the Court treats
domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: (t)he term 'residence' as used in the election law
is synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. 'Domicile' denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one
intends to return. . . . Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of
domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon
the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual."
4. ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; PROCLAMATION OF CANDIDATE, NOT MERELY A
MINISTERIAL FUNCTION. — The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections,
ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee
must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the
House of Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a
candidate is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number
of votes cast in an election exercise. He believes, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the
performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or
discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining
all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a proclamation is properly done.
5. ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATE; DOES NOT ENTITLE THE CANDIDATE WHO
OBTAINED THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES TO BE DECLARED WINNER. — There
the Court held in Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435): ". . . it would be extremely repugnant to the
basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired
the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him. 'Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received
the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
(20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.) The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the
winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be
valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray,
void or meaningless.'
MENDOZA, J ., separate opinion:
1. ELECTION LAW; ELECTORAL REFORM LAW OF 1987 (R.A. 6646) EFFECT OF
DISQUALIFICATION CASES; SUSPENSION OF PROCLAMATION APPLIES TO THOSE WHO ARE
GUILTY OF USING "GUNS, GOONS OR GOLD" TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF ELECTIONS.
— The May 15, 1995 resolution of the COMELEC en banc, suspending the proclamation of petitioner
should he obtain the highest number of votes for Representative of the Second District of Makati,
Metro Manila, purports to have been issued pursuant to 6 of R.A. No. 6646. This provision authorizes
the COMELEC to order the suspension of the proclamation "whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong." As explained in my separate opinion in G.R. No. 119976, however, this provision refers to
proceedings under § 68 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides for the disqualification of
candidates found guilty of using what in political parlance have been referred to as "guns, goons or
gold" to influence the outcome of elections. Since the disqualification of petitioner in this case was not
sought on this ground, the application of 6 of R.A. No. 6646 is clearly a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANDIDATE OBTAINING THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES, ENTITLED
TO BE DECLARED THE WINNER. — In the event the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is declared ineligible, the one who received the next highest number of votes is entitled to be
declared the winner.
3. ID.; OMNIBUS ELECTION LAW (BP 881); PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE TO OR CANCEL
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY; MAY BE FILED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE GROUND THAT A
MATERIAL REPRESENTATION CONTAINED IN THE CERTIFICATE IS FALSE. — The petition to
disqualify petitioner in the COMELEC may not be justified under 78 of the OEC which authorizes the
filing of a petition for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy since such a petition may be filed
"exclusively on the ground that a material representation contained [in the certificate] as required
under Section 74 is false." There was no allegation that in stating in his certificate of candidacy that
he is a resident of Ampola St., Palm Village, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati, Metro Manila, petitioner made
any false representation. cdll

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J p:

The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be
preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through
the ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will
of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a winning candidate's
qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to
the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our
democratic institutions.
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. Among others, Aquino provided
the following information in his certificate of candidacy, viz.:
(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS., PALM
VILLAGE, MAKATI.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: _____ Years and 10 Months.
xxx xxx xxx
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That
I will obey the law, rules and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities;
That the obligation imposed to such is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion, and that the facts therein are true to the best of my
knowledge. 1
On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,
Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to
disqualify Agapito A. Aquino 2 on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be
for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The
petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another
certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in
Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one
(1) year and thirteen (13) days. 3
On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the dismissal of the
disqualification case. 4
On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner
testified and presented in evidence, among others, his Affidavit dated May 2, 1995, 5 lease contract
between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano dated April 1, 1994, 6 Affidavit of Leonor Feliciano dated
April 28, 19957 and Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April 28, 1995. 8
After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated a
Resolution dated May 6, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission (Second Division)
RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant petition for Disqualification against respondent
AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative
in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
SO ORDERED. 9
On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
May 6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3) candidates
vied for the congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered thirty eight thousand five
hundred forty seven (38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained
thirty five thousand nine hundred ten (35,910) votes. 10
On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad
Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd
Urgent MotionAd Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's
proclamation. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the
Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati is hereby directed to complete the
canvassing of election returns of the Second District of Makati, but to suspend the
proclamation of respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he obtain the winning number of
votes for the position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati,
until the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners on May 7, 1995, shall have
been resolved by the Commission.
The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to cause the immediate
implementation of this Order. The Clerk of Court of the Commission is likewise
directed to inform the parties by the fastest means available of this Order, and to
calendar the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration on May 17, 1995, at 10:00 in
the morning, PICC Press Center, Pasay City.
SO ORDERED. 11
On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with urgent motion to lift order of
suspension of proclamation.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve
Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his
intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the determination of the qualifications of
petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en banc issued an
Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof reading:
Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances of the
case, the Commission RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but to suspend
its rules, to accept the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the parties to be
heard thereon because the issue of jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be
studied with more reflection and judiciousness. 12
On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the
resolution of the Second Division dated May 6, 1995. Thefallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of the Second Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTED.
Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a
candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati
City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of
residence. Consequently, the order of suspension of proclamation of the respondent
should he obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this Commission on May 15,
1995 is now made permanent. LLcd
Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati shall
immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of election returns,
determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates, who shall be
immediately be proclaimed.
SO ORDERED. 13
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari 14 assailing the orders dated May 15, 1995 and
June 2, 1995, as well as the resolution dated June 2, 1995 issued by the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner raises the following errors for consideration, to wit:
A
THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDGE THE
DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AFTER
THE MAY 8, 1995 ELECTIONS, SUCH DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO
AND LODGE EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
B
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, SAID
JURISDICTION CEASED IN THE INSTANT CASE AFTER THE ELECTIONS, AND
THE REMEDY/IES AVAILABLE TO THE ADVERSE PARTIES LIE/S IN ANOTHER
FORUM WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS THE HRET CONSISTENT WITH SECTION
17, ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
C
THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
PROCEEDED TO PROMULGATE ITS QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX "C",
PETITION) DESPITE IT OWN RECOGNITION THAT A THRESHOLD ISSUE OF
 JURISDICTION HAS TO BE JUDICIOUSLY REVIEWED AGAIN,
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, THE
COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS ERROR
IN DIRECTING WITHOUT NOTICE THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION
OF THE PETITIONER AS THE WINNING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE AND
DESPITE THE MINISTERIAL NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO PROCLAIM (PENDING
THE FINALITY OF THE DISQUALIFICATION CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER) IF
ONLY NOT TO THWART THE PEOPLE'S WILL
D
THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT OF ONE YEAR AGAINST THE PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO
EVIDENCE AND TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE
E
IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY
CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS
THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN
THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI
F
THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS TO
"DETERMINE AND PROCLAIM THE WINNER OUT OF THE REMAINING
QUALIFIED CANDIDATES" AFTER THE ERRONEOUS DISQUALIFICATION OF
YOUR PETITIONER IN THAT SUCH DIRECTIVE IS IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE
WELL SETTLED DOCTRINE THAT A SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE OR A PERSON
WHO WAS REPUDIATED BY THE ELECTORATE IS A LOSER AND CANNOT BE
PROCLAIMED AS SUBSTITUTE WINNER. 15
I

In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after the May 8, 1995
elections, the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications to run for
member of the House of Representative. He claims that jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification is exclusively lodged with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
Given the yet — unresolved question of jurisdiction, petitioner avers that the COMELEC committed
serious error and grave abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his proclamation as the
winning candidate in the Second Congressional District of Makati City. We disagree.
Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of
Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election
does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution reads:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of their respective Members.
Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all
contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or
the House only when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of
Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed 16 and who has not taken his oath of
 office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section 17 of
Article VI of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is
ministerial, B.P. 881in conjunction with Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation
under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the
election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the
moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the
question of qualification" finds no basis in law, because even after the elections the COMELEC is
empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide
questions relating to qualifications of candidates. Section 6 states:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to
continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the
highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the proceedings against
him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong"
seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the
provisions of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78
of B.P. 881. Section 7 states:
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa
881.
II
We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established not
just residence but domicile of choice." 17
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be
a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (1) year prior to
the elections. 18 Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 19 this Court held that the term
"residence" has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court there held: 20
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of
residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain
the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there
was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence for the legislature?
Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, 'and a resident thereof,' that is, in
the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile (emphasis ours) (Records
of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87).
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has
raised the same point that 'resident' has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than
actual residence.
Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that the provision in
the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law.
So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual
residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110).
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," 21 where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as
explained in Gallego vs. Vera 22 is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions
and needs of the community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence
in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to
the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law
for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual
residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin
or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to inquire into the threshold question as
to whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in the area now
encompassed by the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not
he was domiciled in the same. Llibris
As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May
11, 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was aresident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in
1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that
election. 23 At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same
district. 24 His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents
Benigno and Aurora. 25 Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at
various times during his political career, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that
his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for
the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease
agreement of a condominium unit in the area. As the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his
leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe
 indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the
kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile
especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent
Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (1) year because he
has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City. 26
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be
voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila
coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati
(and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in
transferring his physical residence" 27 is not to acquire a new residence or domicile "but only to
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City." 28 The absence of
clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions
stated above, the lack of identification — sentimental, actual or otherwise — with the area, and the
suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner's
claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati. As
the COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed out:
[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of Representative, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by
itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot do
better. 29
Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not
easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or
an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. 30 These
requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change
of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof,
the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year
residency requirement in a newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A
new political district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing
geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived or were
domiciled in the area encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day
carpetbaggers cannot be allowed take advantage of the creation of new political districts by
suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the
process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC
did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running in the Senate because of
the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where he could run for public
office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove with reasonable certainty that he has
effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. This he
has not effectively done.

III
The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing its Order instructing
the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as winner the candidate receiving the next
higher number of votes. The answer must be in the negative.
 To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first" among the
qualified candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic
electoral process and the sociological and psychological underpinnings behind voters' preferences.
The result suggested by private respondent would lead not only to our reversing the doctrines
firmly entrenched in the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec 31 but also to a massive
disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who cast their vote in favor of a candidate they
believed could be validly voted for during the elections. Had petitioner been disqualified before the
elections, the choice, moreover, would have been different. The votes for Aquino given the
acrimony which attended the campaign, would not have automatically gone to second placer
Syjuco. The nature of the playing field would have substantially changed. To simplistically assume
that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment
for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He
was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first
among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results
under such circumstances.
In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has swung from one end to
the other. In the early case of Topacio v. Paredes 32 we declared as valid, votes cast in favor of a
disqualified, ineligible or dead candidate provided the people who voted for such candidate
believed in good faith that at the time of the elections said candidate was either qualified, eligible
or alive. The votes cast in favor of a disqualified, ineligible or dead candidate cannot be
considered stray votes, consequently, the candidate who obtained the next higher number of
votes cannot be proclaimed as winner. According to this Court in the said case, "there is not,
strictly speaking, a contest, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving the
plurality of the legally cast ballots."
Then in Ticson v. Comelec, 33 this Court held that votes cast in favor of a non-candidate in
view of his unlawful change of party affiliation (which was then a ground for disqualification)
cannot be considered in the canvassing of election returns and the votes fall into the category of
invalid and nonexistent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all and is not a
candidate in the eyes of the law. As a result, this Court upheld the proclamation of the only
candidate left in the disputed position.
In Geronimo v. Ramos 34 we reiterated our ruling in Topacio v. Paredes that the candidate
who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event the candidate who ran for the
position is ineligible. We held in Geronimo:
[I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received
the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental
idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the elections. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
However, in Santos v. Comelec 35 we made a turnabout from our previous ruling
in Geronimo v. Ramos and pronounced that "votes cast for a disqualified candidate fall within the
category of invalid or non-existent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in
the eyes of the law," reverting to our earlier ruling in Ticson v. Comelec.
 In the more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec; 36 Abella v. Comelec; 37 and Benito v.
Comelec, 38 this Court reiterated and upheld the ruling inTopacio v. Paredes and Geronimo v.
Ramos to the effect that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving the majority votes does not entitle
the eligible candidate receiving the next higher number of votes to be declared elected, and that a
minority or defeated candidate cannot be declared elected to the office. In these cases, we put
emphasis on our pronouncement in Geronimo v. Ramos that:
The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared
to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to
be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or
non-eligible person may be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there.
However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in sincere belief that that
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
Synthesizing these rulings we declared in the latest case of Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC that: 39
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of
city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner
Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief
that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent
disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import
of the recent case ofAbella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny
due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed
before Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains that the local
elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with
Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the
province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified
candidate for the position of governor. Her votes was counted and she
obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that petitioner
lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. . . . What
matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is
voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified
for not possessing the eligibility, requirements at the time of the
election as provided by law,the candidate who obtains the second
highest number of votes for the same position cannot assume the
vacated position (Emphasis supplied).
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no compelling
reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio
City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case
with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to
petitioner's (Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from
voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be
voted upon, the resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain the degree of
finality (Sec. 78, Omnibus Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec (supra), We held:
 Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent,
who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor.
He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second
highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on
Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes
for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered
a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second
placer won by default. That decisions was supported by eight members
of the Court then (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr.,
Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay, and Aquino, JJ., concurring)
with three dissenting (Teehankee, acting C.J., Abad Santos and
Melencio-Herrera) and another two reserving their votes (Plana and
Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on official leave (Fernando, C.J.).
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in
favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents the
more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten
members of the Court. . . .
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
office. LexLibris
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel. Dunning
v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes
intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void.
This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom, sovereignty resides. At
the risk of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner
Labo bona fide without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest
belief that Labo was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the
exercise of the powers of the government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to
be disqualified and cannot assume the office.

Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed,
under no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to
the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number
than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of
Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; G.R No. 105111).
This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We cannot, in
another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in an election in
which the winner has been disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining qualified
candidates because this clearly represents a minority view supported only by a scattered number
of obscure American state and English court decisions. 40 These decisions neglect the possibility
that the runner-up, though obviously qualified, could receive votes so measly and insignificant in
 number that the votes they receive would be tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the "second
placer" could receive just one vote. In such a case, it is absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated
candidate as the voters' "choice." Moreover, even in instances where the votes received by the
second placer may not be considered numerically insignificant, voters' preferences are
nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the result among qualified candidates, should the
equation change because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate, would not be self-
evident. Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a
shifting of votes to candidates other than the second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the
runner-up in an election cannot be construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast
where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.
In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein
petitioner ineligible for the elective position of Representative of Makati City's Second District on
the basis of respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence in the
district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a government
of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through
their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions.
And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the
House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second
District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Our Order
restraining respondent COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest
number of votes in the congressional elections for the Second District of Makati City is made
PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED. CDta
||| (Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120265, [September 18, 1995], 318 PHIL 467-539)

[G.R. No. 186006. October 16, 2009.]

NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

MALIK "BOBBY" T. ALINGAN, respondents.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J p:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, assailing
the Resolution 1 dated November 23, 2007 of the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) and the Resolution 2 of the Comelec En Banc dated January 14, 2009 in
SPA No. 07-621.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Prior to the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona and her husband,
Mohammad "Exchan" Limbona, each filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pantar, Lanao
del Norte. On April 2, 2007, private respondent Malik "Bobby" Alingan filed a disqualification case
against Mohammad before the Provincial Election Supervisor of Lanao del Norte. On April 12,
2007, Alingan also filed a petition for disqualification against petitioner. 3 Both disqualification
cases were premised on the ground that petitioner and her husband lacked the one-year
residency requirement and both were not registered voters of Pantar. 4
 On April 17, 2007, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of her certificate of
candidacy, 5 which was subsequently approved by the Comelec. 6 Petitioner also filed a Motion to
Dismiss the disqualification case against her for being moot and academic. 7
On election day, May 14, 2007, the Comelec resolved to postpone the elections in Pantar
because there was no final list of voters yet. A special election was scheduled for July 23,
2007. 8 IDEScC
On May 24, 2007, the Comelec First Division promulgated a Resolution disqualifying
Mohammad as candidate for mayor for failure to comply with the one-year residency
requirement. 9 Petitioner then filed her Certificate of Candidacy as substitute candidate on July 21,
2007. On July 23, 2007, Alingan filed a petition for disqualification against petitioner for, among
others, lacking the one-year residency requirement (SPA No. 07-621). 10
In a Resolution in SPA No. 07-621 11 dated November 23, 2007, the Comelec Second
Division ruled that petitioner was disqualified from running for Mayor of Pantar. The Comelec held
that petitioner only became a resident of Pantar in November 2006. It explained that petitioner's
domicile of origin was Maguing, Lanao del Norte, her birthplace. When she got married, she
became a resident of Barangay Rapasun, Marawi City, where her husband
wasBarangay Chairman until November 2006. Barangay Rapasun, the Comelec said, was
petitioner's domicile by operation of law under the Family Code. The Comelec found that the
evidence petitioner adduced to prove that she has abandoned her domicile of origin or her
domicile in Marawi City two years prior to the elections consisted mainly of self-serving affidavits
and were not corroborated by independent and competent evidence. The Comelec also took note
of its resolution in another case where it was found that petitioner was not even a registered voter
in Pantar. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 12
The Comelec resolved the motion in an En Banc Resolution dated January 14,
2009, 13 affirming the Second Division's Resolution disqualifying petitioner. The Comelec said
that the issue of whether petitioner has complied with the one-year residency rule has been
decided by the Supreme Court in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and
Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan promulgated on June 25, 2008. The Comelec noted that, in said case,
the Supreme Court upheld the Comelec First Division's Decision in SPA No. 07-611 disqualifying
petitioner from running for mayor of Pantar for failure to comply with the residency requirement.
Petitioner is now before this Court assailing the Comelec's November 23, 2007 and
January 14, 2009 Resolutions. She posits that the Comelec erred in disqualifying her for failure to
comply with the one-year residency requirement. She alleges that in a disqualification case
against her husband filed by Nasser Macauyag, another mayoralty candidate, the Comelec
considered her husband as a resident of Pantar and qualified to run for any elective office there.
Petitioner avers that since her husband was qualified to run in Pantar, she is likewise qualified to
run. 14 CEaDAc
Petitioner also stresses that she was actually residing and was physically present in that
municipality for almost two years prior to the May 2007 elections. During the time she had been
residing in Pantar, she associated and mingled with residents there, giving her ample time to know
the needs, difficulties, aspirations, and economic potential of the municipality. This, she said, is
proof of her intention to establish permanent residency there and her intent to abandon her
domicile in Marawi City.
She next argues that, even as her husband was Punong Barangay of Rapasun, Marawi
City, he never abandoned Pantar as his hometown and domicile of origin. She avers that the
performance of her husband's duty in Rapasun did not prevent the latter from having his domicile
elsewhere. Hence, it was incorrect for the Comelec to have concluded that her husband changed
his domicile only on November 11, 2006. 15 At the very least, petitioner says, the Comelec's
conflicting resolutions on the issue of her husband's residence should create a doubt that should
be resolved in her and her husband's favor. 16
She further contends that to disqualify her would disenfranchise the voters of Pantar, the
overwhelming majority of whom elected her as mayor during the July 23, 2007 special
elections. 17
The Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Comment,
insisting that the Comelec correctly disqualified petitioner from running as mayor for lack of the
one-year residency requirement. 18 The OSG argues that there is no evidence that petitioner has
abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City. 19 Moreover, the OSG said that
this Court has ruled on the issue of petitioner's residency in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v.
Commission on Elections and Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan. 20 Lastly, the OSG contends that the
Comelec's ruling in Nasser A. Macauyag v. Mohammad Limbona is not binding on petitioner
because she was not a party to the case. 21
We dismiss the Petition.
The issue of petitioner's disqualification for failure to comply with the one-year residency
requirement has been resolved by this Court in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on
Elections and Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan. 22 This case stemmed from the first disqualification case
filed by herein respondent against petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 07-611. Although the petitioner
had withdrawn the Certificate of Candidacy subject of the disqualification case, the Comelec
resolved the petition and found that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency
requirement, and was, therefore, disqualified from running as mayor of Pantar.
A unanimous Court upheld the findings of the Comelec, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The September 4, 2007
Resolution of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 07-611 disqualifying
petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona from running for office of the Mayor of Pantar,
Lanao del Norte, and the January 9, 2008 Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the
Mayor, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shallSUCCEED as Mayor. The temporary
restraining order issued on January 29, 2008 is ordered LIFTED.
SO ORDERED. 23
The Court found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. It held:
The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency
requirement. The term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
"domicile", which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The manifest
intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or
newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community. DCaEAS
For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of intention.
There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a person actually resides.
Three rules are, however, well established: first, that a man must have a residence or
domicile somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a new one
is acquired; and third, a man can have but one domicile at a time.
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. A person's "domicile" once established is considered to
continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal
or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. In other words, there must basically beanimus manendi coupled with animus
non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence
at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Petitioner's claim that she has been physically present and actually residing in Pantar
for almost 20 months prior to the elections, is self-serving and unsubstantiated. As
correctly observed by the Comelec:
In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which consists
merely of self-serving affidavits cannot persuade Us that she has abandoned
her domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City. It is alleged that
respondent "has been staying, sleeping and doing business in her house for
more than 20 months" in Lower Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent
and competent evidence that would corroborate such statement.
Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondent's intention to stay
in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of her Certificate of
Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that she has
chosen Pantar as her new residence. We also take notice of the fact that in
SPA No. 07-611, this Commission has even found that she is not a registered
voter in the said municipality warranting her disqualification as a
candidate. DHcSIT
We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioner's domicile of origin is Maguing,
Lanao del Norte, which is also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of
law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec found that
Mohammad, petitioner's husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor of
Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the
husband and wife live together in one legal residence, then it follows that petitioner
effected the change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of
the Family Code provide:
Art. 68.The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69.The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse
from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other
valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption
shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
(Emphasis ours)
Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence
from her husband, and as there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these
provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance with human experience.
Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is disqualified to
run for the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. . . . . 24
 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision was denied with
finality on March 3, 2009. 25 Petitioner filed another Motion for Reconsideration, 26 which the
Court treated as a Second Motion for Reconsideration and, consequently, denied in a Resolution
dated June 2, 2009. 27Of late, petitioner has filed a "Manifestation" that raises yet again the
issues already resolved in the petition and which the Court has, accordingly, merely noted without
action. 28 Thus, our ruling therein has now attained finality.
Consequently, the issue of petitioner's compliance with the one-year residency requirement
is now settled. We are bound by this Court's ruling in the earlier Limbona case where the issue
was squarely raised and categorically resolved. We cannot now rule anew on the merits of this
case, especially since the present Petition merely restates issues already passed upon by the
Comelec and affirmed by this Court. IcaHCS
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED and the
Resolution dated November 23, 2007 of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections and
the Resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc dated January 14, 2009 in SPA No. 07-
621 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
||| (Limbona v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 186006 (Resolution), [October 16, 2009], 619
PHIL 226-234)

[G.R. No. 86564. August 1, 1989.]

RAMON L. LABO,
JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC
AND LUIS LARDIZABAL, respondents.

Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.

Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; QUO WARRANTO; PETITION FILED TIMELY. — The Court has
considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time.
We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the
pendency of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding
which did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the
assumption that the requirement for the payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was
already effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No.
1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in the February 25, 1988
issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.
2. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF FILING FEES NECESSARY FOR CONFERMENT OF JURISDICTION;
COURT MAY ALLOW PAYMENT WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME. — It is true that in the Manchester
Case, we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness of the filing
of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, however, this Court, taking into account
the special circumstances of that case, reiterated the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over
a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, this court may allow the payment
of the said fee within a reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance therewith, the case shall be
dismissed. The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELECRules of Procedure
adopted on June 20, 1988.
3. CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTION; RESOLUTION ON THE MERITS INSTEAD OF REMANDING THE
CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS; AS DEMANDED BY THE
DICTATES OF JUSTICE. — Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence
is not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before
it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice,
has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings,
such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when public
interest demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court had already received all the
evidence of the parties.
4. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA NOT APPLICABLE TO QUESTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP;
DEFENSE TO BE SEASONABLY INVOKED. — There is also the claim that the decision can no
longer be reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This
doctrine does not apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. Moreover,
it does not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, having been invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply to the private respondent's
comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this
case.
5. POLITICAL LAW; NATURALIZATION; ACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATION.
— The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically
divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically
ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was
naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was
married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of
Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance.
6. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; MODES OF LOSING PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. — CA No. 63 enumerates
the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a
foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is
also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution,
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
7. ID.; ID.; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE TO A FOREIGNER NOT AN AUTOMATIC RESTORATION
OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. — Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his
naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen
was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His
divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his
adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine
citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility
that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has
been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
8. ID.; ID.; MEANS OF REACQUIRING PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. — Under CA No. 63 as
amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that
he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.
9. ID.; ID.; LACK OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE DAY OF LOCAL ELECTIONS; GROUND
FOR DISQUALIFICATION AS A CANDIDATE FOR MAYOR. — The petitioner is not now, nor was
he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was
not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. He was therefore
ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City under Section 42 of the Local Government Code.
10. ID.; ELECTION; QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATE FOR PUBLIC OFFICE, CONTENDING
REQUIREMENTS. — The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done
so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election
cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited.
In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not
possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from
running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
11. ID.; ELECTION; CANDIDATE OBTAINING THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES; NOT
QUALIFIED TO REPLACE THE DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATE;SANTOS RULING REVERSED. —
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of
the people of Baguio City. Re-examining Santos v. Commission on Election, 137 SCRA 740 the Court
finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos,
which represents the more logical and democratic rule. There the Court held it would be extremely
repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who
has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him.

DECISION

CRUZ, J p:

The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the
question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation
that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent
has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo
warranto against him was not filed on time. cdphil
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the petition itself
but of the payment of the filing fee, which the petitioner contends was an indispensable
requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00 only. This brings to mind the popular
verse that for want of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was indeed
filed beyond the reglementary' period, there is no question that this petition must be granted and
the challenge abated.
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio
City on January 20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed by the private
respondent on January 26,1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally
paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself
alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was paid.
This was done beyond the reglementary period provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of a Member
of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer onthe ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall files sworn petition
for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the
result of the election.
 The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36, Section 5,
of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing that —
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the payment of
a filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research
fee as required by law.
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of the filing fee is
essential to the timeliness of the filing of the petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court to
this effect, specifically Manchester v. Court of Appeals. 1
For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact,
he says, it was filed ahead of time. His point is that when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto
with Prayer for Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or
Injunction" on January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation controversy and
docketed it as SPC Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected although it was offered. It was
only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo
warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He
immediately paid the filing fee on that date.
The private respondent argues further that during the period when the COMELEC regarded
his petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo
warranto proceeding was deemed suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election
Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by
the petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after publication of the
said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could not
retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petition with the COMELEC.
In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not require it,
the payment of filing fees was still necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450
of the respondent COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980,
respectively. To this, the private respondent counters that the latter resolution was intended for the
local elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988 local elections, which were
supposed to be governed by the first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect
only on March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days after its publication as required by RA
No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became
effective on January 5,1988. Its Section 30 provides in part:
Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission. — The rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after
their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo
warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-
day period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as
a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach
this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the payment of the fees in quo
warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even
published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its
publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, or after the petition was filed. cdasia
The petitioner forgets Tañada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that the resolutions became
effective "immediately upon approval" simply because it was so provided therein. We held in that
case that publication was still necessary under the due process clause despite such effectivity
clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may
have been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in the
Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the
timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however, this
Court, taking into account the special circumstances of that case, declared:
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only
upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the
payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance
therewith, the case shall be dismissed.
The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:
Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. — If the fees above prescribed are not paid,
the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss
the action or the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo
warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee ontime, the petitioner would at the
same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a futile technicality." It is regrettable, to say
the least, that the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so
demeaned. what is worse is that it is regarded as an even less important consideration than the
reglementary period the petitioner insists upon.
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is
the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is the
subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more
important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it
now in this same action.
The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:
From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it would appear
that our sole function in this proceeding should be to resolve the single issue of
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the motion for new trial of the
GSIS in question should indeed be deemed pro forma. But going over the extended
pleadings of both parties, the Court is immediately impressed that substantial justice
may not be timely achieved, if we should decide this case upon such a technical
ground alone. We have carefully read all the allegations and arguments of the parties,
very ably and comprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and unusually
competent counsel, and we feel we can better serve the interests of justice by
broadening the scope of our inquiry, for as the record before us stands, we see that
there is enough basis for us to end the basic controversy between the parties here
and now, dispensing, however, with procedural steps which would not anyway affect
substantially the merits of their respective claims. 6
xxx xxx xxx
While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and thereby
allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more correct procedure was for the
respondent court to forward the case to the proper court which was the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action. Considering, however, the length of time that this case
has been pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112
 SCRA 629) and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states:
". . . it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to
settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to
bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case
is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the
Intermediate Appellate Court and from there to this Court." (p. 43)
Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No.
50141, January 29,1988), we stated that:
". . . But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those
facts dictate the rendition of a verdict in the petitioner's favor. There is therefore
no point in referring the case back to the Court of Appeals. The facts and the
legal propositions involved will not change, nor should the ultimate judgment.
Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is
time that the controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA
733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber
Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco v.
City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162). 'Sound
practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort
and expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in
the disposal of the case (of: Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked
characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so
demand . . . the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.' (Li Siu Liat v.
Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v.
Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this
Court act, and act with finality." 7
xxx xxx xxx
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based onthe records
before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding
them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would
not be subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an early
disposition of the case or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of
the parties. 8

This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where, to repeat for
stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:
In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted
as "its own" private respondent's repeated assertion that petitioner is no longer a
Filipino citizen. In so doing, has not respondent COMELEC effectively disqualified
itself, by reason of prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto filed by
private respondent still pending before it? 9
This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on the merits of this
case.
 Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions on the question
of the petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12,
1982, and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The second was rendered by
the Commissionon Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the
petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines. 11
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chairman Vicente Santiago, Jr., with
Commissioners Pabalate, Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan
concurring in the dismissal of the petition "without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's
citizenship being raised a new in a proper case. "Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote,
while Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall have been made
with the Australian Embassy for official verification of the petitioner's alleged naturalization as an
Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago
and Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of theCommission on Immigration and Deportation. prLL
It is important to observe that in the proceeding before the COMELEC, there was no direct
proof that the herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This
conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact that he had married
an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as en alien with the CID
upon his return to this country in 1980.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the
Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the
petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976. That
statement 12 is reproduced in full as follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a
certificate of appointment signed and sealed by the Australian Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and recognized as such by Letter of Patent
signed and sealed by the Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23
November 1983, do hereby provide the following statement in response to the
Subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the Petition for
disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73). and do
hereby certify that the statement is true and correct.
STATEMENT
A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was married in
the Philippines to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he was
not required to meet normal requirements for the grant of citizenship and was granted
Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28 July 1976.
B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship must
take an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance. The wording of the
oath of affirmation is: "I. . . ., renouncing all other allegiance . . . .," etc. This need not
necessarily have any effect on his former nationality as this would depend on the
citizenship laws of his former country.
C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27
June 1980 on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous.
D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.
E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in respect of Section 50
of Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to the giving of false or misleading
information of a material nature in respect of an application for Australian citizenship. If
 such a prosecution was successful, he could be deprived of Australian citizenship
under Section 21 of the Act.
F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of Australian
citizenship:
(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian citizenship
under Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship Act, or
(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a formal
end voluntary act other than marriage, then he would automatically lose his
Australian citizenship under Section 17 of the Act.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF THE
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12TH DAY OF APRIL 1984.
DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.
(Signed)
GRAHAM C. WEST
Consul
This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed to the private
respondent by the Department of Foreign Affairs reading as follows: 13
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform you that inquiry
made with the Australian Government through the Embassy of the Philippines in
Canberra has elicited the following information:
1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on 28
July 1976.
2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had
to either swear an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance which
carries a renunciation of "all other allegiance."
Very truly yours,
For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs:
(SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR
Assistant Secretary
The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized Australian
reading as follows:
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and
bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and
successors according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Australia and fulfill my
duties as an Australian citizen. 14
and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
 I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely promise and declare
that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second,
Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully
observe the Laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 15
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. Neither does he
deny that he obtained Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the
Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an alien and
registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He later asked for the
change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was granted
Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17 He also categorically declared that he was a
citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to
avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner. 18
The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as "mistakes" that
did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the member joined
in this finding. We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person
who was not aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted by
counsel when he performed these acts.
The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time and
stresses Labo's political affiliation with the party in power then, but we need not go into that now.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the doctrine
of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of
citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that it was
properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked
only when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private respondent's comment. Besides, one of
the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not
automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he
automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia
because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case
because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he
formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above.
Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty
Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia. . . . , and to fulfill his duties as an Australian
citizen." cdll
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual
national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot
stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also
worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution,
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was
annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that
circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of
Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted
country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine
citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The
possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not
mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor
does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.
He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring
Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725,
providing that:
. . . (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire
Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special
Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their
applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel
their certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.)
That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for the
cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his
present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988,
a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself
because of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City
under Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. — (1) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter
registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes
to be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English, Pilipino, or any other local
language or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should
not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City who elected him by a "resonant and
thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead over the second-
placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not have, even
unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. The
electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia,
or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside
over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their
countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the
belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot
nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost
but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was
disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as
such. LLpr
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice
of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is
Santos v. Commission on Elections, 22 decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed
second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a
turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second
placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, 23 with
three dissenting 24 and another two reserving their vote.25 One was on official leave. 26
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in
favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, 27 which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs.
Paredes, 28 was supported by ten members of the Court, 29 without any dissent, although one
reserved his vote, 30 another took no part, 31 and two others were an leave.32 There the Court
held:
". . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received
the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental
idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared
to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to
be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or
non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him
there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political
and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such
and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit
to grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting
it for another land that may offer him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own
country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his
allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect to be
welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself
disowned by it as an undesirable alien.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its
renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-
dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and
exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to
public office.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is
 ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City once this
decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is
LIFTED.
||| (Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86564, [August 1, 1989], 257 PHIL 1-23)

[G.R. No. 195649. April 16, 2013.]

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

ROMMEL ARNADO n y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA,respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J p:

THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution 1 in
SPA No. 10-109(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 2010 is being assailed for
applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution 2 of the COMELEC En
Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y
Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office
despite his continued use of a U.S. passport. AIDcTE
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. 3 However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. 4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. 5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. 6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually
renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I
am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America.
 I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief. 7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen/naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country. ITcCaS
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. 8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national
elections. 9Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." 10
To further bolster his claim of Arnado's US citizenship, Balua presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated travel record 11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that
Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines.
The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June
2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010,
certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent
travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700 12

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order 13 requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt
thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to
present evidence ex-parte. cSIADa
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where
Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning
candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
 It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the
following documents as evidence: 14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela,
Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that
Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been
conspicuously and continuously residing in his family's ancestral house in
Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of
his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and
returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations
Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of
Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15
April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that
Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy
based on misrepresentation, 15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for
disqualification. Balua's contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed
upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his contention," 16 whereas
the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency
requirement under the Local Government Code." 17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado's
claim that he is a Filipino citizen. 18 AHCETa
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado's act of consistently using his US passport
after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.
xxx xxx xxx
Arnado's continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado
had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye
to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado's unexplained use of a US passport six
times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his
US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "[a] passport is
defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person
intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested
himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for
US nationals. 19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC First Division reads:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or
to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is herebyGRANTED.
Rommel C. Arnado's proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession
under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect. 20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the
ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is
contrary to law." 21 He raised the following contentions: 22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence
consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which
show that he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
9225; cCSTHA
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American
citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he
did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the
Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his
Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained
it;
4. Balua's petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of
time, and the First Division's treatment of the petition as one for disqualification
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction; 23
5. He is undoubtedly the people's choice as indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction
over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo
warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections,
intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration
together with an Opposition to Arnado's Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued
that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44
of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado's candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as
the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his
Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that
intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer,
Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by
the final adjudication of the case. EaTCSA
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
 In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6
of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is
questioned."
As to Maquiling's intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final
judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer,
would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the
Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as
one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by
law, 24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of
proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division
and granted Arnado's Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the
respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen
of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a
pure Philippine Citizen again.
xxx xxx xxx
The use of a US passport [. . .] does not operate to revert back his status as a
dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly,
the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on
renounced. The First Division's reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the
said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino,
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the
conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice,
thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct
of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case, respondent
is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by
working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of
Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the
mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar. HEacAS
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US
passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only
issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later.
Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent
already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the
respondent's submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he
used the same for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16,
2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then
shows that the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine
 passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be
undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control during that time. 25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the
use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"[T]he application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is
more appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen,
either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a
citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates
himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine
citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his
American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of
expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of
citizenship." 26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus: cDACST
[R]espondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned
his allegiance to the United States. The latter's continued use of his US passport and
enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of
the afore-mention[ed] citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to
retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent's submission with the twin
requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements
for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated
National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself
is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he
lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such.
Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty
post cure the latter's failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding
his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his
having received the highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has
been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election against a
candidate but was adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained
the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office
does not violate the principle ofvox populi suprema est lex because the application
of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who
expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their
representatives who enacted the law. 27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to
run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. cHECAS
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC
En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport,
Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to
run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First
Division's disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section
44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in
ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
ISSUES
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be
addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one's qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government
Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As
the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has
an interest in the disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter
is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections. ITaESD
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and/or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division
and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt
is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano 28 clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that
case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any
 candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be
allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been
no final judgment rendered. 29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC
En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to
the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC 30 are present and therefore would not
be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the
matter before this Court. CIETDc
Arnado's claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and
respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be
sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only
after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification
case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after
renouncing one's foreign citizenship
is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one's nationality
and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one
to run for an elective position.
Section 5 (2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. . . . 31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the
Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after
performing these twin requirements required under Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225 or
the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public
office. HCEcaT
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July
2008 when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of
Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had
therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for
public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. 32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when,
after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship. 33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his
foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before
filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is
whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November
2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to
the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado
positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights
and privileges granted by the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at
any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign
country which granted the citizenship. cSIHCA
Mercado v. Manzano 34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the
country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen,
he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial
documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction
can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his
foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated
in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, 35 it is
nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino
citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he
renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation 36 that he "absolutely
and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA" 37 and that he "divest(s) [him]self of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America." 38
 We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not
divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado
represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign citizenship is fatal to
Arnado's bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an
elective local position. HcSCED
Arnado's category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through
a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship. 39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign
citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual
citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to
vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40 (d) of the Local Government
Code, 40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven
days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport
after renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. . . . . 41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any
act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado's act of
consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation." 42 This does
not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact
did. It was aftercomplying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant toSection 40 (d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for
any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier
renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to
hold any public office. CIScaA
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not
notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was
only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later. 43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who
sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his
use of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a
positive act of representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent
travels abroad." 44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September.
If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not
have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnado's subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that
after he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used
his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of
Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his
US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with
attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the
concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one's flag and country. While those who acquire dual
citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to
public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust.
Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40 (d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office
but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue. CDHaET
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes 45 which is the
jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in
an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the
test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate
cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite,
to fill the office of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the
respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio
received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole
ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the
office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required
by Act No. 2045 having intervened. 46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of Topacio on the basis of a statutory prohibition for
seeking a second re-election absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots." 47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was
comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections . . . [with] that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such
an office."
 The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast
between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced
by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court,
after an examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the
candidate declared to have received a plura[l]ity by the board of canvassers actually
received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues
its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it
may find that the manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with
fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a [plurality] of the legally
cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the
manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and
generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have
a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving
for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of
canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate
was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case,
there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally
cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and
circumstances of a single individual. 48 (Emphasis supplied) CSDAIa
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not,
strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest
in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory
cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First
Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person
who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to
determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction
when he "declared that no one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at
the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was
whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer
cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the
respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedingsthat no
one was elect[ed] municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general
election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null
and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents'
answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and
additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So
ordered. 49
 On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a
legal basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with
another and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement: TcCDIS
". . . the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any
other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another
candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court
from adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the
winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By
express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of
the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have
been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold
himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However,
notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged.
Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his
right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure
to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office. AcIaST
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed
or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public
officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person
who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will
of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the
voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy
elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC 50 when we
pronounced: DCIEac
. . . . The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse
this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment
only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective
office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must
owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state. 51(Emphasis supplied)
 This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC 52 where the
Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest
"Election victory . . . becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements." 53
[W]e have ruled in the past that a candidate's victory in the election may be
considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified
if the main issue involves defects in the candidate's certificate of candidacy. We said
that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is
an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory
provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after
the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v.
COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-
tune our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified
reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for
the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified
reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election
requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an
informed choice about a candidate's eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is
Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government
officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of
the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be
emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due
course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false
COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC
qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their
COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC,
concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case
filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will
guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates? DCHaTc
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by
ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through
the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are
disregarded and only the electorate's voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end,
it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
Maquiling is not a second- placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado's disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he
obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC 54 and Jalosjos v.
COMELEC 55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of
the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
 Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate
is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not
constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible
and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants
who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank
who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the
rules to be eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC 56 that when the voters are
well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate's disqualification and still cast their votes in
favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be
deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting
qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones. CHDAaS
The electorate's awareness of the candidate's disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance
makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate's disqualification is not
necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among
the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of
no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to
the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion
of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt
is strong.
There was no chance for Arnado's proclamation to be suspended under this rule because
Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his
Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the
winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado's candidacy involves his citizenship. It
does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed,
Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He
was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40 (d) of the Local
Government Code.
 Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall
under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election. TcHCDI
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is
thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except
that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he
filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already
proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the
disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The
affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to
the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May
2010 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted.
This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is herebyANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective
position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on
Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
||| (Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, [April 16, 2013], 709 PHIL 408-477)

[G.R. No. 150605. December 10, 2002.]

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA,

ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker and Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives, respectively, and MA. VICTORIA L.
LOCSIN, respondents.

Ramon R. Teleron and Rex Reynaldo C. Sandoval for petitioner.

Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. for respondent Hon. Ma. V.A. Locsin.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
Artemio A. Adasa Jr. and Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr. for petitioner Hon. De Venecia.
Leonardo B. Palicte for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., filed the present Petition for Mandamus and Quo
Warranto directed against respondents Speaker Jose De Venecia and Secretary-General Roberto P.
Nazareno of the House of Representatives to compel them to implement the decision of the
Commission on Elections en bancby (a) administering the oath of office to petitioner as the duly-
elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, and against respondent Ma.
Victoria L. Locsin for usurping, intruding into, and unlawfully holding and exercising the said public
office on the basis of a void proclamation.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Commission on Elections Second Division gravely
abused its power when it suspended petitioner's proclamation. Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the
COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when evidence of the winning candidate's guilt is strong.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division did not make any specific finding that evidence of
petitioner's guilt is strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is the
"seriousness of the allegations" in the petition for disqualification. More brazen is the proclamation of
respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second
highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.
In every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must at
all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him
the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his
place. The Court also ruled that the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is
no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and
beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447
votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the
proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside
the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the
COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before the Court by respondent Locsin and said
Decision has become final and executory. AECcTS

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; DISQUALIFICATION

PROCEEDINGS; PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS DURING THE ENTIRE
PROCEEDINGS LEADING TO THE PROCLAMATION OF RESPONDENT. — Resolution No. 3402
clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional Election Director, to issue summons to the
respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any, within three (3)
days from the filing of the petition for disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent
candidate the opportunity to answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side. To ensure
compliance with this requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return of the
summons together with the proof of service to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when service has
been completed. Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10) days from the filing of the
Answer, must be conducted. The hearing officer is required to submit to the Clerk of the Commission
his findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and
reception of evidence together with the complete records of the case. The records of the case do not
show that summons was served on the petitioner. They do not contain a copy of the summons
allegedly served on the petitioner and its corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private
respondent never rebutted petitioner's repeated assertion that he was not properly notified of the
petition for his disqualification because he never received summons. Petitioner claims that prior to
receiving a telegraphed Order from the COMELEC Second Division on May 22, 2001, directing the
District Board of Canvassers to suspend his proclamation, he was never summoned nor furnished a
copy of the petition for his disqualification. He was able to obtain a copy of the petition and the May
22 Order of the COMELEC Second Division by personally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on
May 23, 2001. Thus, he was able to file his Answer to the disqualification case only on May 24,
2001. DcaECT
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS RULES OF PROCEDURE REQUIRING NOTICE
AND SERVICE OF MOTIONS TO ALL PARTIES; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — In
the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by final judgment when the elections were
conducted on May 14, 2001. The Regional Election Director has yet to conduct hearing on the
petition for his disqualification. After the elections, petitioner was voted in office by a wide margin of
17,903. On May 16, 2001, however, respondent Locsin filed a Most Urgent Motion for the suspension
of petitioner's proclamation. The Most Urgent Motion contained a statement to the effect that a copy
was served to the petitioner through registered mail. The records reveal that no registry receipt was
attached to prove such service. This violates COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring notice and
service of the motion to all parties.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS POWER WHEN IT
SUSPENDED PETITIONER'S PROCLAMATION ABSENT ANY FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF
HIS GUILT IS STRONG. — Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend
proclamation only when evidence of the winning candidate's guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the
COMELEC Second Division did not make any specific finding that evidence of petitioner's guilt is
strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is the "seriousness of the
allegations" in the petition for disqualification. Pertinent portion of the Order reads: "Without giving
due course to the petition . . . the Commission (2nd Division), pursuant to Section 72 of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 . . . and considering the serious
allegations in the petition, hereby directs the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the
proclamation of respondent, if winning, until further orders." We hold that absent any finding that the
evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is strong, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its
power when it suspended his proclamation.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESOLUTION DISQUALIFYING PETITIONER IS NOT BASED ON
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; THE COMMISSION GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DECIDING THE
DISQUALIFICATION CASE BASED ON SECTION 261 (a) AND (o), AND NOT ON SECTION 68 OF
THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE. — The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be
considered to be based on substantial evidence. It relied merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to
the petition for disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC Second Division gave credence to the
affidavits without hearing the affiants. In reversing said Resolution, the COMELEC en banc correctly
observed: "Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division) made its decisions based
mainly on the allegation of the petitioner and the supporting affidavits. With this lopsided evidence at
hand, the result was predictable. The Commission (Second Division) had no choice. Codilla was
disqualified." Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the evidence
coming from the petitioner, failed to prove the gravamen of the offense for which he was charged.
Petitioner allegedly violated Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. To be disqualified under
the above-quoted provision, the following elements must be proved: (a) the candidate, personally or
through his instructions, must have given money or other material consideration; and (b) the act of
giving money or other material consideration must be for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or
corrupting the voters or public officials performing electoral functions. In the case at bar, the petition
for disqualification alleged that (a) petitioner ordered the extraction, hauling and distribution of gravel
and sand, and (b) his purpose was to induce and influence the voters of Kananga and Matag-ob,
Leyte to vote for him. These allegations are extraneous to the charge in the petition for
disqualification. More importantly, these allegations do not constitute a ground to disqualify the
petitioner based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to
disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All
other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. Pursuant to Sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power
of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election
offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice. The
COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it decided the disqualification case based on
Section 261 (a) and (o), and not on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. EDISTc

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VOTES CAST IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER CANNOT BE CONSIDERED
"STRAY" CONSIDERING THAT HE HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED DISQUALIFIED BY FINAL
JUDGMENT. — Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require
a final judgment before the electionfor the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray."
Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the election day and
was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. For in voting for a candidate who has
not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for himbonafide,
without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then
qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government. This
principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that the petitioner has not been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified not only before but even after the elections. The
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and
hence, could not be executed, because of the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. Section 13,
Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions and Resolutions. cIHDaE
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCLAMATION OF RESPONDENT VIOLATES THE SETTLED DOCTRINE
THAT THE SECOND PLACER COULD NOT TAKE THE PLACE OF THE DISQUALIFIED WINNER.
— More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine that the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the people's choice is the paramount
consideration and their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and
elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the
office, no one can be declared elected in his place. Respondent Locsin proffers a distinction between
a disqualification based on personal circumstances such as age, residence or citizenship and
disqualification based on election offenses. She contends that the election of candidates later
disqualified based on election offenses like those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Codeshould be invalidated because they violate the very essence of suffrage and as such, the votes
cast in his favor should not be considered. This contention is without merit. In the recent case
of Trinidad v. COMELEC, this Court ruled that the effect of a judgment disqualifying a candidate, after
winning the election, based on personal circumstances or Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is
the same: the second placer could not take the place of the disqualified winner.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ORDER SUSPENDING PETITIONER'S PROCLAMATION IS
UNENFORCEABLE AS IT HAS NOT ATTAINED FINALITY AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE USED
AS THE BASIS FOR RESPONDENT'S ASSUMPTION IN OFFICE. — Since the petitioner
seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending his
proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to
review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division
was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration
suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. — A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of
ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of
the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no
issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office. A petition for quo warranto in the
HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained the
highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is
evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She
lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her
premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from
the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr.,
the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; MANDAMUS; THE ADMINISTRATION OF OATH
AND REGISTRATION OF PETITIONER IN THE ROLL OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES IS NO LONGER A MATTER OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS. — Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may
file a verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law." For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject
of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the
board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant
the grant thereof. The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise
of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon
a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty
is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. In the case at bar, the administration of
oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives
representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the
public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as
against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC
Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for
Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the
proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged
before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory. In sum,
the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally
settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of
law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule
of law except the reign of chaos and confusion. EcDATH

DECISION

PUNO, J p:

In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he who has been rejected by the people cannot
represent the people. Respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. by
17,903 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
The most sophisticated legal alchemy cannot justify her insistence that she should continue
governing the people of Leyte against their will. The enforcement of the sovereign will of the people is
not subject to the discretion of any official of the land. HcTDSA
This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto directed against respondents Speaker Jose De
Venecia and Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of Representatives to compel
them to implement the decision of the Commission on Elections en banc by (a) administering the oath
of office to petitioner as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b)
registering the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, and
against respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin for usurping, intruding into, and unlawfully holding and
exercising the said public office on the basis of a void proclamation.
The facts are uncontroverted. Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position of
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001 elections. At that time,
petitioner was the Mayor of Ormoc City while respondent Locsin was the sitting Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of
Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with the COMELEC main office a Petition for Disqualification 1 against
the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte,
in violation of Section 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that the petitioner used the
equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute
gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing,
influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. Attached to the petition are the (a) Affidavits of Basilio
Bates, 2 Danilo D. Maglasang, 3 Cesar A. Laurente; 4 (b) Joint Affidavit of Agripino C. Alferez and
Rogelio T. Salvera; 5 (c) Extract Records from the Police Blotter executed by Police Superintendent
Elson G. Pecho; 6 and (d) Photographs showing government dump trucks, haulers and surfacers and
portions of public roads allegedly filled-in and surfaced through the intercession of the
respondent. 7The case was docketed as SPA No. 01-208 and assigned to the COMELEC's Second
Division.

On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order delegating the hearing and
reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director of Region
VIII. 8 On May 11, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division sent a telegram informing the petitioner that
a disqualification case was filed against him and that the petition was remanded to the Regional
Election Director for investigation. 9
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the
disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of candidates for district
representative and was voted for. The initial results showed that petitioner was the winning
candidate. cHDaEI
On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished, respondent Locsin joined as intervenor in
SPA No. 128 and filed a "Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent [herein
petitioner]" with the COMELEC Second Division. 10 Respondent Locsin alleged that "the evidence on
record against respondent is very strong and unless rebutted remains." She urged the Commission to
set the hearing of the disqualification case and prayed for the suspension of the proclamation of the
respondent "so as not to render the present disqualification case moot and academic." A copy of the
Motion was allegedly served on petitioner by registered mail but no registry receipt was attached
thereto. 11
On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a "Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
Respondent" stating "there is clear and convincing evidence showing that the respondent is
undoubtedly guilty of the charges against him and this remains unrebutted by the respondent." A copy
of the Motion was sent to the petitioner and the corresponding registry receipt was attached to the
pleading. 12 The records, however, do not show the date the petitioner received the motion. SIDTCa
On the same day, May 18, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte
Order 13 directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of
petitioner in case he obtains the highest number of votes by reason of "the seriousness of the
allegations in the petition for disqualification." 14 It also directed the Regional Election Director to
speed up the reception of evidence and to forward immediately the complete records together with its
recommendation to the Office of the Clerk of the Commission. 15 As a result, petitioner was not
proclaimed as winner even though the final election results showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as
against respondent Locsin's 53,447 votes. 16
At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its Order suspending his proclamation, the
petitioner has yet to be summoned to answer the petition for disqualification. Neither has said petition
been set for hearing. It was only on May 24, 2001 that petitioner was able to file an Answer to the
petition for his disqualification with the Regional Election Director, alleging that: (a) he has not
received the summons together with the copy of the petition; (b) he became aware of the matter only
by virtue of the telegram sent by the COMELEC Second Division informing him that a petition was
filed against him and that the Regional Election Director was directed to investigate and receive
evidence therewith; and (c) he obtained a copy of the petition from the COMELEC Regional Office No.
8 at his own instance. 17 Petitioner further alleged that the maintenance, repair and rehabilitation
of barangay roads in the municipalities of Matag-ob and Kananga were undertaken without his
authority, participation or directive as City Mayor of Ormoc. He attached in his Answer the following:
(a) Affidavit of Alex B. Borinaga; 18 (b) Copy of the Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular Session
of Barangay Monterico; 19 (c) Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel; 20 (d) Supplemental Affidavit of Wilfredo A.
Fiel; 21 and (e) Affidavit of Arnel Y. Padayao. 22
On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, 23 alleging that (a) he did not
receive a copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation and hence, was denied the right to rebut
and refute the allegations in the Motion; (b) that he did not receive a copy of the summons on the
petition for disqualification and after personally obtaining a copy of the petition, filed the requisite
answer only on May 24, 2001; and (c) that he received the telegraph Order of the COMELEC Second
Division suspending his proclamation only on May 22, 2001. He attached documentary evidence in
support of his Motion to Lift the Suspension of his proclamation, and requested the setting of a
hearing on his Motion. 24
On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on the petitioner's Motion and the parties were
ordered to submit their respective memoranda. 25 On June 4, 2001, petitioner submitted his
Memorandum 26 in support of his Motion assailing the suspension of his proclamation on the grounds
that: (a) he was not afforded due process; (b) the order has no legal and factual basis; and (c)
evidence of his guilt is patently inexistent for the purpose of suspending his proclamation. He prayed
that his proclamation as winning congressional candidate be expediently made, even while the
disqualification case against him continue upon due notice and hearing. He attached the following
additional evidence in his Memorandum: (a) Copy of certification issued by PNP Senior Inspector
Benjamin T. Gorre; 27 (b) Certification issued by Elena S. Aviles, City Budget Officer; 28 (c) Copy of
certification issued by Wilfredo A. Fiel, City Engineer of Ormoc; 29 (d) Joint Affidavit of Antonio
Patenio and Pepito Restituto; 30 and (e) Affidavits of Demetrio Brion, 31 Igmedio Rita 32 and
Gerardo Monteza. 33 Respondent Locsin's memorandum also contained additional affidavits of his
witnesses. 34
Petitioner's Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, however, was not resolved. Instead, on June 14,
2001, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution 35 in SPA No. 01-208 which found
the petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. It directed
the "immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes . . . ." A copy
of said Resolution was sent by fax to the counsel of petitioner in Cebu City in the afternoon of the
following day. 36
By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were declared stray
even before said Resolution could gain finality. On June 15, 2001, respondent Locsin was proclaimed
as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte. It issued a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning
Candidates for Member of the House of Representatives stating that "MA. VICTORIA LARRAZABAL
LOCSIN obtained a total of FIFTY THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN (53,447)
votes representing the highest number of votes legally cast in the legislative district for said
office." 37 Respondent Locsin took her oath of office on June 18, 2001 and assumed office on June
30, 2001.
On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for
Reconsideration 38 from the June 14, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division which
ordered his disqualification, as well as an Addendum to the Motion for Reconsideration. 39 Petitioner
alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration that the COMELEC Second Division erred: (1) in
disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the witnesses for respondent
Locsin; (2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and (3) in
promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing therein the
immediate proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter.' Respondent Locsin and her co-petitioner
in SPA No. 01-208 filed a joint Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration. 40
On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Proclamation, 41 docketed as SPC No. 01-324, assailing the validity of the proclamation of
respondent Locsin who garnered only the second highest number of votes. Respondent Locsin filed
her Answer alleging that: (1) the Commission lost jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of
the proclamation of Locsin and that any question on the "election, returns, and qualification" of Locsin
can only be taken cognizance of by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); (2) the
case should be filed and heard in the first instance by a Division of the Commission and not directly
by the Commission en banc; and (3) the proclamation of Locsin was valid because she received the
highest number of valid votes cast, the votes of Codilla being stray.
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation 42 stating that he was deprived of a fair
hearing on the disqualification case because while the documentary evidence adduced in his
Memorandum was in support of his Motion for the lifting of the suspension of his proclamation, the
COMELEC Second Division instead ruled on the main disqualification case. In consonance with his
prayer that a full-dress hearing be conducted on the disqualification case, he submitted Affidavits of
additional witnesses 43 which he claims would refute and substantially belie the allegations of
petitioner's/intervenor's witnesses. A Reply, 44 Rejoinder 45 and Sur-Rejoinder 46 were respectively
filed by the parties. Consequently, the motion for reconsideration in SPA No. 01-208 and the petition
for declaration of nullity in SPC No. 01-324 were submitted for resolution. cCaSHA

From the records, it appears that initially, a "Resolution" penned by Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier,
dated July 24, 2001, was submitted to the Office of the Chairman, dismissing the petition for
declaration of nullity for lack of jurisdiction and denying the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Codilla. 47Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Resurreccion Z. Borra submitted
their respective dissenting opinions 48 to the Javier resolution. It bears emphasis that Commissioner
Tuason, Jr. was the ponente of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division which ordered the
disqualification of petitioner but after considering the additional evidence presented by the latter, he
concluded that the totality of the evidence was clearly in petitioner's favor. Equally worth mentioning is
the fact that Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, who was the Presiding Commissioner of the Second
Division, also dissented and voted to grant Codilla's motion for reconsideration on the ground that
"[T]he people of Leyte have spoken and I respect the electorate's will. . . ." 49
On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a "Vote and Opinion and
Summary of Votes" reversing the resolution of the Second Division and declaring the proclamation of
respondent Locsin as null and void. The dispositive portion reads:
"JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, I concur with Commissioner
Resurreccion Z. Borra, Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Commissioner
Ralph C. Lantion, in SPA No. 01-208, to GRANT the motion for reconsideration and to
REVERSE the resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 1,
2001, disqualifying Codilla; and subsequently, in SPC No. 01-324, to GRANT the
petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the proclamation of
losing candidate Locsin.
Accordingly:
1. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the disqualification resolution against Codilla,
promulgated by the Commission (Second Division) on June 14, 2001 (SPA No. 01-
208), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent-movant Eufrocino
M. Codilla, Sr., and to REVERSE the Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, for insufficiency of
evidence;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by
the Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, having been issued
without hearing and without any finding that the evidence of guilt of
petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, for "(t)he immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes,
to the exclusion of respondent" and the concurrent order for "the
Provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene
and thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes counting out the Respondent" the same being violative
of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the
Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, that the votes of respondent
Codilla are "considered stray and invalid" said ruling being issued on the
basis of an inapplicable decision, and contrary to established
jurisprudence;
(e) to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this
resolution, to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the winning
candidate for Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte to
comply with its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes in the elections for that position;
and
(f) to order intervenor-oppositor Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to
vacate the office of Representative of the House of Representatives
representing the Fourth legislative district of Leyte and, for this purpose,
 to inform the House of Representatives through the Honorable Speaker
of this resolution for its attention and guidance; and
2. On the petition for Declaration of Nullity of proclamation of respondent Ma. Victoria
L. Locsin (SPC No. 01-324), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and
void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin, the proclamation being
violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of
the Commission on Elections;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by
the Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208,
having been issued without hearing and without any finding that the
evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, for "(t)he
immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest
number of votes, to the exclusion of respondent" and the concurrent
order for "the provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately
reconvene and thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes counting out the Respondent" the same
being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and
resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, that the
votes of respondent Codilla are "considered stray and invalid" said ruling
being issued on the basis of an inapplicable decision, and contrary to
established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this
resolution, to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the winning
candidate for Representative of the Fourth legislative district of Leyte
he (sic) having garnered the highest number of votes in the elections for
the position; and
(f) to order respondent Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate the
office of Representative of the House of Representatives representing
the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte and, for this purpose, to inform the
House of Representatives through the Honorable Speaker of this
resolution for its attention and guidance. CAacTH
Summary of Votes
Considering the FOUR (4) VOTES of the Chairman and Commissioners Resurreccion
Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., and Ralph C. Lantion, to grant the Motion for
Reconsideration of Codilla and reverse the disqualification Resolution of the
Commission (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-208, promulgated on June 14, 2001,
and as an inevitable consequence, in voting to grant the petition for declaration of
nullity of the proclamation of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin in SPC No. 01-324, the
verdict/opinion of the Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners taken together now
stands, as it is, the MAJORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both cases;
and the "Resolution" submitted by three (3) Commissioners, namely, Commissioner
Rufino S.B. Javier, Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Commissioner
 Mehol K. Sadain, is considered, as it is, the MINORITY DECISION of the
Commission En Banc in both cases.
The MAJORITY DECISION was arrived at after proper consultation with those who
joined the majority. The Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners comprising the
majority decided that no one will be assigned to write a Majority Decision. Instead,
each one will write his own separate opinion. Commissioners Borra, Tuason, Jr. and
the undersigned Chairman submitted separate opinions. Commissioner Lantion wrote
an explanation on his vote."50
The aforequoted judgment was adopted in a "Vote of Adoption" signed by Commissioners Ralph C.
Lantion, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. 51
Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision annulling her proclamation. Instead, she filed a
"Comment and Manifestation" 52 with the COMELEC en banc questioning the procedure and the
manner by which the decision was issued. In addition, respondent Locsin requested and was issued
an opinion by House of Representatives Executive Director and Chief Legal Counsel Leonardo B.
Palicte III declaring that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of respondent
Locsin after she had taken her oath and assumed office since it is the HRET which is the sole judge
of election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House. 53 Relying on this opinion,
respondent Locsin submitted a written privileged speech to the House during its regular session on
September 4, 2001, where she declared that she will not only disregard but will openly defy and
disobey the COMELEC en banc resolution ordering her to vacate her position. 54
On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order 55 constituting the members of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to implement the aforesaid decision. It likewise ordered the
Board to reconvene and "proclaim the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the
district, as the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte, and accordingly
issue a Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for Member of the House of
Representatives . . . , based on the city/municipal certificates of canvass submitted beforehand to the
previous Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte . . . ."
On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as
the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, having obtained a total of
71,350 votes representing the highest number of votes cast in the district. 56 On the same day,
petitioner took his oath of office before Executive Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of the Regional Trial
Court of Ormoc City. 57

On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru respondent Speaker De
Venecia, informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en banc resolution annulling the
proclamation of respondent Locsin, and proclaiming him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte. 58 Petitioner also served notice that "I am assuming the duties and
responsibilities as Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte to which position I have
been lawfully elected and proclaimed. On behalf of my constituents, I therefore expect that all rights
and privileges intended for the position of Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte be
accorded to me, including all physical facilities and staff support." On the basis of this letter, a
Memorandum 59 dated October 8, 2001 was issued by Legal Affairs Deputy Secretary-General
Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr., for Speaker De Venecia, stating that "there is no legal obstacle to
complying with the duly promulgated — and now final and executory — COMELEC Decision of
August 29, 2001 . . . ."
These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House of Representatives of a copy of the
COMELEC en banc resolution on September 20, 2001, 60 no action was taken by the House on the
letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence, petitioner sought the assistance of his party, LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP,
which sent a letter 61 addressed to respondent Speaker De Venecia, dated October 25, 2001, and
signed by Party President Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Secretary-General Heherson T. Alvarez, and
Region VIII Party Chairman Sergio Antonio F. Apostol, requesting the House of Representatives to
act decisively on the matter in order that petitioner "can avail of whatever remedy is available should
their action remain unfavorable or otherwise undecisive."
In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter 62 dated October 30, 2001, stating that:
"We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we are inclined to sustain it.
However, Rep. Locsin has officially notified the HOUSE in her privilege speech,
inserted in the HOUSE Journal dated September 4, 2001, that she shall 'openly defy
and disobey' the COMELEC ruling. This ultimately means that implementing the
decision would result in the spectacle of having two (2) legislators occupying the same
congressional seat, a legal situation, the only consideration, that effectively deters the
HOUSE's liberty to take action.
In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the implementation of the COMELEC
decision is a matter that can be best, and with finality, adjudicated by the Supreme
Court, which, hopefully, shall act on it most expeditiously." (italics supplied)
Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo warranto.
Petitioner submits that by virtue of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc which has become final
and executory for failure of respondent Locsin to appeal therefrom, it has become the ministerial duty:
(1) of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as its Administrative Head and Presiding Officer,
to implement the said resolution of the COMELEC en banc by installing him as the duly-elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte; and (2) of the Secretary-General, as official
custodian of the records of the House, to formally register his name in the Roll of Members of the
House and delete the name of respondent Locsin therefrom. Petitioner further contends that
respondent Locsin has been usurping and unlawfully holding the public office of Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte considering that her premature proclamation has been declared null
and void by the COMELEC en banc. He alleges that the action or inaction of public respondents has
deprived him of his lawful right to assume the office of Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte.
In his Comment, 63 public respondent Speaker De Venecia alleged that mandamus will not lie to
compel the implementation of the COMELEC decision which is not merely a ministerial duty but one
which requires the exercise of discretion by the Speaker of the House considering that: (1) it affects
the membership of the House; and (2) there is nothing in the Rules of the House of Representatives
which imposes a duty on the House Speaker to implement a COMELEC decision that unseats an
incumbent House member.
In his Comment, 64 public respondent Secretary-General Nazareno alleged that in reading the name
of respondent Locsin during the roll call, and in allowing her to take her oath before the Speaker-elect
and sit as Member of the House during the Joint Session of Congress, he was merely performing
official acts in compliance with the opinions 65 rendered by House of Representatives Chief Counsel
and Executive Director Leonardo C. Palicte III stating that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
declare the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void since it is the HRET which is the sole
judge of all election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House. He also contends that the
determination of who will sit as Member of the House of Representatives is not a ministerial function
and cannot, thus, be compelled by mandamus.
Respondent Locsin, in her Comment, 66 alleged that the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction
over an action for quo warranto involving a member of the House of Representatives for under
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. She likewise
asserts that this Court cannot issue the writ of mandamus against a co-equal legislative department
without grossly violating the principle of separation of powers. She contends that the act of
recognizing who should be seated as a bona fide member of the House of Representatives is not a
ministerial function but a legislative prerogative, the performance of which cannot be compelled
by mandamus. Moreover, the prayer for a writ of mandamus cannot be directed against the Speaker
and Secretary-General because they do not have the authority to enforce and implement the
resolution of the COMELEC.
Additionally, respondent Locsin urges that the resolution of the COMELEC en banc is null and void
for lack of jurisdiction. First, it should have dismissed the case pending before it after her
proclamation and after she had taken her oath of office. Jurisdiction then was vested in the HRET to
unseat and remove a Member of the House of Representatives. Second, the petition for declaration
of nullity is clearly a pre-proclamation controversy and the COMELEC en banchas no original
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pre-proclamation controversy. It must first be heard by a COMELEC
Division. Third, the questioned decision is actually a "hodge-podge" decision because of the peculiar
manner in which the COMELEC disposed of the case.
Finally, respondent Locsin asserts that the matter of her qualification and eligibility has been
categorically affirmed by the HRET when it dismissed the quo warranto case filed against her,
docketed as HRET Case No. 01-043, entitled "Paciano Travero vs. Ma. Victoria Locsin," on the
ground that "the allegations stated therein are not proper grounds for a petition for quo
warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives under Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, and that the petition was filed late." 67
In his Reply, 68 petitioner asserts that the remedy of respondent Locsin from the COMELEC decision
was to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, not to seek an opinion from the Chief Legal
Counsel of the House of Representatives; that the HRET has no jurisdiction over a petition for
declaration of nullity of proclamation which is based not on ineligibility or disloyalty, but by reason that
the candidate proclaimed as winner did not obtain the highest number of votes; that the petition for
annulment of proclamation is a pre-proclamation controversy and, hence, falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to Section 242 of B.P. Blg. 881 69 and Section 3, Article IX (C)
of the Constitution; that respondent Speaker De Venecia himself recognizes the finality of the
COMELEC decision but has decided to refer the matter to the Supreme Court for adjudication; that
the enforcement and implementation of a final decision of the COMELEC involves a ministerial act
and does not encroach on the legislative power of Congress; and that the power to determine who
will sit as Member of the House does not involve an exercise of legislative power but is vested in the
sovereign will of the electorate.
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by the
COMELEC Second Division is valid; (b) whether said proclamation divested the COMELEC en
banc of jurisdiction to review its validity; and (c) assuming the invalidity of said proclamation, whether
it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally
elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
I
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.
After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we find that the proclamation of respondent Locsin
is null and void for the following reasons:
First. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the
proclamation of respondent Locsin.
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 3402 70 sets the procedure for disqualification cases pursuant to Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
"C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF
THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR
LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SAME GROUNDS FOR
DISQUALIFICATION
(1) The verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code and the verified petition to disqualify a
candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing same grounds for
disqualification, may be filed any day after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.

(2) The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus

Election Code shall be filed in ten (10) legible copies by any citizen of
voting age, or duly registered political party, organization or coalition of
political parties against any candidate who in an action or protest in
which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of.
2.a having given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions;
2.b having committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; EHTSCD
2.c having spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by the Omnibus Election Code;
2.d having solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the Omnibus Election Code;
2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d,
e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus Election Code,
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Upon payment of the filing fee of P1,000.00 and legal research fee of
P20.00, the offices concerned shall docket the petition and assign to it a
docket number which must be consecutive, according to the order of
receipt and must bear the year and prefixed as SPA with the
corresponding initial of the name of the office, i.e. SPA (RED) No. C01-
001; SPA (PES) No. C01-001;
(5) Within three (3) days from filing of the petitions, the offices concerned shall
issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the
petition and its enclosures, if any;
(6) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of summons
within which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the
petition in ten (10) legible copies, serving a copy thereof upon the
 petitioner. Grounds for Motion to Dismiss may be raised as an
affirmative defense;
(7) The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the testimonies, the
parties shall submit their affidavits or counter-affidavits and other
documentary evidences including their position paper;
(8) The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of the
filing of the answer. The hearing officer concerned shall submit to the
Clerk of the Commission through the fastest means of communication,
his findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the
completion of the hearing and reception of evidence together with the
complete records of the case;
(9) Upon receipt of the records of the case of the findings, reports and
recommendation of the hearing officer concerned, the Clerk of the
Commission shall immediately docket the case consecutively and
calendar the same for raffle to a division;
(10) The division to whom the case is raffled, shall after consultation, assign the
same to a member who shall pen the decision, within five (5) days from
the date of consultation."
Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional Election Director, to issue
summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any,
within three (3) days from the filing of the petition for disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the
respondent candidate the opportunity to answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side. To
ensure compliance with this requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return of
the summons together with the proof of service to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when service
has been completed, viz:
"Rule 14. Summons
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. Return. — When the service has been completed by personal service, the
server shall give notice thereof, by registered mail, to the protestant or his counsel and
shall return the summons to the Clerk of Court concerned who issued it, accompanied
with the proof of service.
Section 6. Proof of Service. — Proof of service of summons shall be made in the
manner provided for in the Rules of Court in the Philippines."
Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer, must be
conducted. The hearing officer is required to submit to the Clerk of the Commission his findings,
reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and reception of
evidence together with the complete records of the case.
(a) Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the service
of summons nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation.TaDSCA
The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the petitioner. They do not contain
a copy of the summons allegedly served on the petitioner and its corresponding proof of service.
Furthermore, private respondent never rebutted petitioner's repeated assertion that he was not
properly notified of the petition for his disqualification because he never received
summons. 71 Petitioner claims that prior to receiving a telegraphed Order from the COMELEC
Second Division on May 22, 2001, directing the District Board of Canvassers to suspend his
proclamation, he was never summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition for his disqualification. He
was able to obtain a copy of the petition and the May 22 Order of the COMELEC Second Division by
personally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23, 2001. Thus, he was able to file his
Answer to the disqualification case only on May 24, 2001.
More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in gross violation of Section 72 of
the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
"Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and the
courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to
the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office." (italics supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by final judgment when the elections were
conducted on May 14, 2001. The Regional Election Director has yet to conduct hearing on the
petition for his disqualification. After the elections, petitioner was voted in office by a wide margin of
17,903. On May 16, 2001, however, respondent Locsin filed a Most Urgent Motion for the suspension
of petitioner's proclamation. The Most Urgent Motion contained a statement to the effect that a copy
was served to the petitioner through registered mail. The records reveal that no registry receipt was
attached to prove such service. 72 This violates COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring notice and
service of the motion to all parties, viz:
"Section 4. Notice. — Notice of a motion shall be served by the movant to all parties
concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of
the motion. For good cause shown, the motion may be heard on shorter notice,
especially on matters which the Commission or the Division may dispose of on its own
motion.
The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and
place of the hearing of the motion.
Section 5. Proof of Service. — No motion shall be acted upon by the Commission
without proof of service of notice thereof, except when the Commission or a Division is
satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected."
Respondent's Most Urgent Motion does not fall under the exceptions to notice and service of motions.
First, the suspension of proclamation of a winning candidate is not a matter which the COMELEC
Second Division can dispose of motu proprio. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 73 requires that the
suspension must be "upon motion by the complainant or any intervenor," viz:
"Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue
with the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension
of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong." (italics supplied)
Second, the right of an adverse party, in this case, the petitioner, is clearly affected. Given the lack of
service of the Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner, said Motion is a mere scrap of paper. 74 It cannot
be acted upon by the COMELEC Second Division.
On May 18, 2001 at exactly 5:00 p.m., 75 respondent Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent Motion for
the suspension of petitioner's proclamation. Petitioner was served a copy of the Second Motion again
by registered mail. A registry receipt 76 was attached evidencing service of the Second Most Urgent
Motion to the petitioner but it does not appear when the petitioner received a copy thereof. That same
day, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order suspending the proclamation of petitioner.
Clearly, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to contest the allegations contained in the
petition for disqualification. The Order was issued on the very same day the Second Most Urgent
Motion was filed. The petitioner could not have received the Second Most Urgent Motion, let alone
answer the same on time as he was served a copy thereof by registered mail.

Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when evidence of
the winning candidate's guilt is strong. In the case at bar,the COMELEC Second Division did not
make any specific finding that evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong. Its only basis in suspending the
proclamation of the petitioner is the "seriousness of the allegations" in the petition for disqualification.
Pertinent portion of the Order reads:
"Without giving due course to the petition . . . the Commission (2nd Division), pursuant
to Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6,Republic Act No.
6646 . . . and considering the serious allegations in the petition, hereby directs the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of respondent, if
winning, until further orders." 77 (italics supplied)
We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is strong, the
COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its power when it suspended his proclamation.
(b) The COMELEC Second Division did not give ample opportunity to the petitioner to
adduce evidence in support of his defense in the petition for his disqualification.
All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted on the petition for disqualification in gross
violation of Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to "continue with the
trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest." This is also in violation of COMELEC Resolution No.
3402 requiring the Regional Election Director to complete the hearing and reception of
evidence within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer, and to submit his findings, reports, and
recommendations within the five (5) days from completion of the hearing and the reception of
evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension of his proclamation on May 25, 2001.
Although an oral argument on this Motion was held, and the parties were allowed to file their
respective memoranda, the Motion was not acted upon. Instead, the COMELEC Second Division
issued a Resolution on the petition for disqualification against the petitioner. It was based on the
following evidence: (a) the affidavits attached to the Petition for Disqualification; (b) the affidavits
attached to the Answer; and (c) the respective memoranda of the parties.
On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension cannot be
substituted for the hearing in the disqualification case. Although intrinsically linked, it is not to be
supposed that the evidence of the parties in the main disqualification case are the same as those in
the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. The parties may have other evidence which they may
deem proper to present only on the hearing for the disqualification case. Also, there may be evidence
which are unavailable during the hearing for the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension but which may
be available during the hearing for the disqualification case.
In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that he submitted his Memorandum merely to support his Motion
to Lift the Order of Suspension. It was not intended to answer and refute the disqualification case
against him. This submission was sustained by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, the members of the
COMELECen banc concluded, upon consideration of the additional affidavits attached in his Urgent
Manifestation, that the evidence to disqualify the petitioner was insufficient. More specifically,
the ponente of the challenged Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division held: IcaHTA
"Indeed, I find from the records that the May 30, 2001 hearing of the COMELEC
(Second Division) concerns only the incident relating to the Motion to Lift Order of
Suspension of Proclamation. It also appears that the order for the submission of the
parties' respective memoranda was in lieu of the parties' oral argument on the motion.
This would explain the fact that Codilla's Memorandum refers mainly to the validity of
the issuance of the order of suspension of proclamation. There is, however, no record
of any hearing on the urgent motion for the suspension of proclamation. Indeed, it was
only upon the filing of the Urgent Manifestation by Codilla that the Members of the
Commission (Second Division) and other Members of the Commission en banc had
the opportunity to consider Codilla's affidavits. This time, Codilla was able to present
his side, thus, completing the presentation of evidentiary documents from both
sides." 78 (italics supplied)
Indeed, careful reading of the petitioner's Memorandum shows that he confined his arguments in
support of his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. In said Memorandum, petitioner raised the
following issues: (a) he was utterly deprived of procedural due process, and consequently, the order
suspending his proclamation is null and void; (b) the said order of suspension of proclamation has no
legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of guilt on his part is patently inexistent for the purpose of
directing the suspension of his proclamation. 79 He urged the COMELEC Second Division to conduct
a full dress hearing on the main disqualification case should the suspension be lifted. 80
(c) the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner is not
based on substantial evidence.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be considered to be based on substantial
evidence. It relied merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for disqualification. As
stressed, the COMELEC Second Division gave credence to the affidavits without hearing the affiants.
In reversing said Resolution, the COMELEC en banc correctly observed:
"Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division) made its decisions
based mainly on the allegation of the petitioner and the supporting affidavits. With this
lopsided evidence at hand, the result was predictable. The Commission (Second
Division) had no choice. Codilla was disqualified." 81
Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the evidence coming from the
petitioner, failed to prove the gravamen of the offense for which he was charged. 82
Petitioner allegedly violated Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:
"Section 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is
a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing official functions, . . . shall be
disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding
office"
To be disqualified under the above-quoted provision, the following elements must be proved: (a) the
candidate, personally or through his instructions, must have given money or other material
consideration; and (b) the act of giving money or other material consideration must be for the purpose
of influencing, inducing, or corrupting the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions. AIDcTE
In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged that (a) petitioner ordered the extraction,
hauling and distribution of gravel and sand, and (b) his purpose was to induce and influence the
voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to vote for him. Pertinent portion of the petition reads:
"[T]he respondent [herein petitioner], within the election period, took advantage of his
current elective position as City Mayor of Ormoc City by illegally and unlawfully using
during the prohibited period, public equipments and vehicles belonging to and owned
by the City Government of Ormoc City in extracting, hauling and distributing gravel
and sand to the residents and voters of the Municipalities of Kananga and Matag-ob
Leyte, well within the territorial limits of the 4th Congressional District of Leyte, which
acts were executed without period, and clearly for the illicit purpose of unduly inducing
or directly corrupting various voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, within the 4th
legislative district of Leyte, for the precise purpose of inducing and influencing the
voters/beneficiaries of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to cast their votes for said
respondent." 83
The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second Division failed to prove these allegations. For
instance, Cesar A. Laurente merely stated that he saw three (3) ten-wheeler dump trucks and a
Hyundai Payloader with the markings "Ormoc City Government" extracting and hauling sand and
gravel from the riverbed adjacent to the property owned by the Codilla family. 84
Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Sulvera in their Joint Affidavit merely stated that they saw white
trucks owned by the City Government of Ormoc dumping gravel and sand on the road of Purok 6,
San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte. A payloader then scattered the sand and gravel unloaded by the white
trucks. 85
On the other hand, Danilo D. Maglasang, a temporary employee of the City Government of Ormoc
assigned to check and record the delivery of sand and gravel for the different barangays in Ormoc,
stated as follows:
"3. That on April 20, 2001, I was ordered by Engr. Arnel Padayo, an employee of the
City Engineering Office, Ormoc City to go to Tagaytay, Kangga (sic), Leyte as that will
be the source of the sand and gravel. I inquired why we had to go to Kananga but
Engr. Padayao said that it's not a problem as it was Mayor Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr.
who ordered this and the property is owned by the family of Mayor Codilla. We were to
deliver sand and gravel to whoever requests from Mayor Codilla." 86
Similarly, the Affidavit of Basilio Bates cannot prove the offense charged against the petitioner. He
alleged that on April 18, 2001, a white truck with the marking "City Government of Ormoc" came to
his lot at Montebello, Kananga, Leyte and unloaded mixed sand and that the driver of the truck told
him to "vote for Codilla as a (sic) congressman during election." 87 His statement is hearsay. He has
no personal knowledge of the supposed order of the petitioner to distribute gravel and sand for the
purpose of inducing the voters to vote for him. The same could be said about the affidavits of Randy
T. Merin, 88Alfredo C. De la Peña, 89 Miguel P. Pandac, 90 Paquito Bregeldo, Cristeta Alferez,
Glicerio Rios, 91 Romulo Alkuino, Sr., 92 Abner Casas, 93 Rita Trangia, 94 and Judith
Erispe 95 attached to respondent Locsin's Memorandum on the Motion to Lift the Suspension of
Proclamation.

Also valueless are the affidavits of other witnesses 96 of respondent Locsin, all similarly worded,
which alleged that the petitioner ordered the repair of the road in Purok 6, Barangay San Vicente,
Matag-ob, Leyte and the flattening of the area where the cockfights were to be held. These
allegations are extraneous to the charge in the petition for disqualification. More importantly, these
allegations do not constitute a ground to disqualify the petitioner based on Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed other election offenses against the petitioner,
particularly Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
"Section 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. — (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises
money or anything of value, gives or promises any office or employment,
franchise or grant, public or private, or make or offers to make an expenditure,
directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person,
association, corporation, entity or community in order to induce anyone or the
public in general, to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the
election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a
candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political
party. caIACE
xxx xxx xxx
(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or
controlled by the government for an election campaign. — Any person who
uses under any guise whatsoever directly or indirectly, . . . (3) any equipment,
vehicle, facility, apparatus, or paraphernalia owned by the government or by its
political subdivisions, agencies including government-owned or controlled
corporations, or by the Armed Forces of the Philippines for any election
campaign or for any partisan political activity . . . ."
However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of
COMELEC jurisdiction. 97 They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to Sections
265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of
preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged
offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz:
"Section 265. Prosecution. — The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission
may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within
four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the
fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if
warranted.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 268. Jurisdiction. — The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of this
Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which
shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the
decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."
The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it decided the disqualification case based on
Section 261(a) and (o), and not on Section 68 of theOmnibus Election Code.
 (d) Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of respondent
Locsin was done with undue haste.
The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of the petitioner, and
the proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner the opportunity to
challenge the same. In the morning of June 15, 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers convened,
and on the strength of the said Resolution excluding the votes received by the petitioner, certified that
respondent Locsin received the highest number of votes. On this basis, respondent Locsin was
proclaimed.
Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
only through his counsel via a facsimile message in the afternoon of June 15, 2001 98 when
everything was already fait accompli. Undoubtedly, he was not able to contest the issuance of the
Certificate of Canvass and the proclamation of respondent Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of
due process.
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived of that basic
fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.
Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray" and respondent cannot
be validly proclaimed on that basis.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 01-208 contains two dispositions: (1) it
ruled that the petitioner was disqualified as a candidate for the position of Congressman of the Fourth
District of Leyte; and (2) it ordered the immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes, to the exclusion of the respondent [herein petitioner].
As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being violative of due
process and for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming, however, that the petitioner was
validly disqualified, it is still improper for the COMELEC Second Division to order the immediate
exclusion of votes cast for the petitioner as stray, and on this basis, proclaim the respondent as
having garnered the next highest number of votes.
(a) The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of the
petitioner cannot be considered "stray."
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment
before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray." Hence, when a
candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was voted for,
the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the
electorate in whom sovereignty resides. 99 For in voting for a candidate who has not been
disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any
intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to
be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government. 100
This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that the petitioner has not been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified not only before but even after the elections. The
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and
hence, could not be executed, because of the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. Section 13,
Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions and Resolutions reads:
"Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. — (a) In ordinary actions, special
proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the
Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its
promulgation.
 (b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the
Commission en banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days in
Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other
proceedings, following their promulgation.
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of
a Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in
Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other
actions or proceedings, following its promulgation." (italics supplied)
In this wise, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, 101 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or
decisions in disqualification cases, provides:
"This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or
division, particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).
Special Action cases refer to the following:
(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of
decisions or resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the
Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on
disqualification cases shall become final and executory after five (5)
days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court;
(2) the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall
become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a
motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed;
(3) where the ground for disqualification case is by reason of non-residence,
citizenship, violation of election laws and other analogous cases and on
the day of the election the resolution has not become final and executory
the BEI shall tally and count the votes for such disqualified candidate;
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates,
particularly whether the nuisance candidate has the same name as
thebona fide candidate shall be immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly
where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona
fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5)
days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which
case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted
and tallied for the bona fide candidate.

All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or
repealed."
Considering the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division gravely
abused its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the
exclusion of the votes cast in his favor. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is
very clear that a timely Motion for Reconsideration shall suspend the execution or implementation of
the resolution, viz:
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration. — A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from
the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or
implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling." (italics supplied)
(b) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed.
More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine that the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified. 102 In every election, the people's choice is the paramount
consideration and their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and
elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the
office, no one can be declared elected in his place. 103 In Domino v. COMELEC, 104 this Court
ruled, viz:
"It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have
received that (sic) other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the
voters. He could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates because in
a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially
changed.
xxx xxx xxx
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the
election fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the
disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only
authorizes a declaration in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes,
and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the
election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the
elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the
electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and
meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice." 105
Respondent Locsin proffers a distinction between a disqualification based on personal circumstances
such as age, residence or citizenship and disqualification based on election offenses. She contends
that the election of candidates later disqualified based on election offenses like those enumerated in
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code should be invalidated because they violate the very
essence of suffrage and as such, the votes cast in his favor should not be considered. 106
This contention is without merit. In the recent case of Trinidad v. COMELEC, 107 this Court ruled that
the effect of a judgment disqualifying a candidate, after winning the election, based on personal
circumstances or Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is the same: the second placer could not
take the place of the disqualified winner.
II
 Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested the COMELEC en banc of
jurisdiction to review its validity.
Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to annul her proclamation.
She maintains that the COMELEC en banc has been divested of jurisdiction to review the validity of
her proclamation because she has become a member of the House of Representatives. Thus, she
contends that the proper forum to question her membership to the House of Representatives is the
House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
We find no merit in these contentions.
First. The validity of the respondent's proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration
seasonably filed by the petitioner.
In his timely Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc, petitioner argued that the
COMELEC Second Division erred thus:
"(1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the
witnesses for respondent Locsin;
(2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and
(3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in
directing therein the immediate proclamation of the second highest 'vote
getter."' (italics supplied)
In support of his third assignment of error, petitioner argued that "the Second Division's directive for
the immediate proclamation of the second highest vote-getter is premature considering that the
Resolution has yet to become final and executory." 108 Clearly, the validity of respondent Locsin's
proclamation was made a central issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the
petitioner. Without doubt, the COMELEC en banc has the jurisdiction to rule on the issue.
The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the COMELEC en banc is
of no moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELECen banc could still rule on the nullity of
respondent's proclamation because it was properly raised in the Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to review, on
motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division, viz:
"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be
decided by the Commission en banc."
Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
"Rule 19. Motions for Reconsideration. —
Section 1. Grounds for Motion for Reconsideration. — A motion for reconsideration
may be filed on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision,
order or ruling, or that the said decision, order or ruling is contrary to law.
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration. — A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from
the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or
implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling."
 Section 3. Form and Contents of Motion for Reconsideration. — The motion shall be
verified and shall point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the decision,
resolution, order or ruling which are not supported by the evidence or which are
contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence
or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or resolutions.
Section 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal. — A motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling when not pro forma, suspends the
running of the period to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
Section 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of. — Upon the filing of a motion
to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court
concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the
Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case
to the Commission en banc.
Section 6. Duty of the Clerk of Court of the Commission to set Motion for Hearing. —
The Clerk of Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the
resolution of the Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification
thereof." (italics supplied)
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division
suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its
jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the
Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in
office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the
instant case.
Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and having taken oath as representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte, any question relative to her election and eligibility should be brought
before the HRET pursuant to Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. 109
We reject respondent's contention.
(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has
not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of
the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for
Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to
resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter. IEaCDH

In Puzon vs. Cua, 110 even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has
been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an
election contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been
immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements
themselves." This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the
COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.
(b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent
Locsin.
Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a petition for quo
warranto with the HRET.
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines. 111 In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor
her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to
run, and if she won, to assume office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and
proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the
time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo
warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her
proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent,
as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
III
Whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize petitioner
Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte
vice respondent Locsin.
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition
for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." 112 For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition
formandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer
or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant
thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act
or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and
not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion or judgment." 113
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no
longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond
dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in
the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of
respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its
Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en
banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become
final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been
finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The
rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to
the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly-
elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General
shall likewise register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately
executory. ESO ORDERED.
||| (Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, [December 10, 2002], 442 PHIL 139-190)

[G.R. No. 189034. January 12, 2010.]

CELESTINO A. MARTINEZ III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND BENHUR L. SALIMBANGON,respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J p:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeks to nullify the Decision 1 dated May 28, 2009
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 07-035 dismissing the
election protest and declaring private respondent as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth
Legislative District of Cebu, and the Resolution 2 dated July 30, 2009 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration thereof.
The Facts
In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon
were among the candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province.
On March 29, 2007, Edilito C. Martinez, a resident of Barangay Tambongon, Daan-Bantayan,
Cebu, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position.
On April 3, 2007, Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance
candidate. 3 However, the Commission on Elections Second Division issued its Resolution
declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate only on June 12, 2007 or almost one (1) month
after the elections.
On July 9, 2007, Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections for the
Fourth Legislative District of Cebu on the basis of official results showing that he garnered sixty-
seven thousand two hundred seventy-seven (67,277) votes as against Martinez who garnered
sixty-seven thousand one hundred seventy-three (67,173) votes, or a difference of one hundred
four (104) votes.
Martinez filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam on July 18, 2007 and on July 26, 2007, the
HRET granted his motion to convert the same into a Regular Protest of all one thousand one
hundred twenty-nine (1,129) precincts of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu. cCSTHA
The election protest is based on three hundred (300) ballots more or less with only
"MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative which the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI) did not count for Martinez on the ground that there was another congressional
candidate (Edilito C. Martinez) who had the same surname. Martinez further alleged that he lost
several thousand votes as a result of incorrect appreciation of ballots not counted in his favor
while clearly marked ballots, groups of ballots which appeared to have been prepared by one (1)
person, individual ballots which appeared to have been prepared by two (2) or more persons, and
fake and unofficial ballots were read and counted in favor of Salimbangon. He also claimed that
the votes reflected in the election returns were unlawfully increased in favor of Salimbangon while
votes in his favor were unlawfully decreased. 4
Salimbangon filed his Answer with Counter-Protest stating that the Minutes of Voting (MOV)
inside the ballot boxes in all the protested precincts contain no recorded objections regarding
straying of votes claimed by Martinez, and that it was very seldom, if at all, that there were ballots
with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative. He counter-
protested 954 precincts on grounds of coercion/intimidation and duress; massive vote-
buying; "lansadera"; misreading/miscounting/misappreciation of votes; and other electoral
anomalies and irregularities.
During the revision, ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for
Representative were not counted and temporarily classified as stray. These comprise majority of
the 9,831 stray ballots claimed by Martinez. 5
HRET Ruling
In its Decision dated May 28, 2009, the HRET resolved each of the claims and objections
respectively raised by protestant and protestee applying the rules for appreciation of ballots. The
Tribunal recognized as most crucial the issue of whether or not ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or
"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative should be counted in favor of Martinez.
Thus, the election protest "will rise or fall on how the Tribunal [appreciates said] ballots." 6
Ruling on the issue, the HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as stray in
accordance with Sec. 211 (1) of the Omnibus Election Codewhich provides:
"Where only the first name of a candidate or only his surname is written, the vote for
such candidate is valid, if there is no other candidate with the same first name or
surname for the same office." 7 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.] cHCSDa
Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still included in the official list of candidates on
election day (May 14, 2007), the HRET held that five thousand four hundred one (5,401) ballots
with "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" only written on the line for Representative were properly
denied on the ground that there was no way of determining the real intention of the voter. These
ballots were included in the 7,544 ballots denied as votes for Martinez in 961 precincts. 8
Commiserating with Martinez on the delayed resolution of SPA Case No. 07-133 (PES), the
HRET stated:
"We sympathize to (sic) the protestant that he is the victim of the inaction of the
Comelec in failing to decide the petition to disqualify Edilito C. Martinez as nuisance
candidate on or before the May 14, 2007 elections. After all, it appears that the latter
did not even lift a finger to oppose the petition for his declaration as nuisance
candidate and that per its decision rendered only twenty-nine (29) days after the May
14, 2007 elections, Edilito C. Martinez was indeed a nuisance candidate.
"As it is, the delay committed by the Comelec in deciding the petition to disqualify
Edilito C. Martinez as nuisance candidate on or before May 14, 2007 election did not
only cause injustice to herein protestant but worst, had resulted to (sic) the
disenfranchisement of five thousand four hundred one (5,401) electorates whose
votes could have changed the number of votes garnered by the parties herein if not
changed altogether the outcome of the election itself." 9
The final overall results of recount and appreciation of ballots, election documents and
other evidence in the entire 1,129 precincts as determined by the HRET are as follows : 10
Overall Fourth District of Cebu Votes
 PROTESTANT PROTESTEE
1] Votes per physical count * in 961 57,758 57,132
precincts where there was ballot appreciation

2] Votes in 12 precincts ** without ballots 998 660

found during revision (based on election
returns)

3] Votes per election returns in 156 9,937 7,815

precincts in which several spurious ballots
were placed after elections, counting
and/or canvassing of votes
68,693 65,607
Less: Objected ballots rejected *** 4,333 860
Add: Claimed ballots admitted *** 2,287 2,348
Unclaimed ballots admitted *** 8 11
Restored Ballots 2

Total Votes in the Contested 66,655 67,108

Precincts After Appreciation of
Evidence

PLURALITY OF PROTESTEE'S 453

VOTES
On the basis of the foregoing, the HRET dismissed the election protest, affirmed the
proclamation of Salimbangon and declared him to be the duly elected Representative of the
Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, having won by a plurality margin of 453 votes.
Martinez moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the HRET denied it by Resolution
dated July 30, 2009. 11
The Petition
Petitioner alleges that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it failed to credit the
"MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" votes in his favor despite the finality of the COMELEC resolution
declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate. Petitioner argues that the Decision
disenfranchised 5,401 voters when it ruled that said votes cannot be counted as votes for him
since "there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter", in utter disregard of the
mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution. He maintains that there is no clear and good
reason to justify the rejection of those 5,401 ballots, and points out that at the time private
respondent was proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers, only 104 votes separated private
respondent from him (private respondent was credited with 67,277 votes as against 67,173 votes
of petitioner, while nuisance candidate Edilito C. Martinez got a measly 363 votes.) 12
Petitioner further alleges that the HRET invalidated ballots for him without stating the legal
and factual bases therefor, and on grounds other than the objections raised by private respondent.
He contends that the HRET erred in concluding that the ruling in Bautista v. Commission on
Elections 13cannot be applied in view of circumstances which supposedly distinguish the present
case from Bautista. Finally, petitioner cites the dissenting opinion of the Honorable Associate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura who disagreed with the majority ruling and posited that the
final declaration by COMELEC that Edilito C. Martinez was a nuisance candidate and the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy should be deemed effective as of the day of the
election. 14
In his Comment, private respondent assails the apparent desire of petitioner for this Court
to review the physical appreciation of ballots conducted by the HRET when he assigned as issues
the alleged erroneous invalidation by the HRET of petitioner's ballots which were ruled as written
by two (2) persons, and when he even appreciated ballots that were declared by the HRET as
marked ballots. Private respondent details the mostly post-election anomalies and irregularities,
particularly in Bogo City, perpetrated by the petitioner as found by the HRET such as tampering of
election returns and statement of votes and vote padding/tampering.
As to the "MARTINEZ" and "C. MARTINEZ" ballots, private respondent asserts that the
HRET correctly refused to credit petitioner with these votes, stressing that there were admittedly
three (3) candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu
as of May 14, 2007. Not a single voter in the district knew of any nuisance congressional
candidate on election day. Private respondent argues that it would be illogical and most unfair to
count the said ballots in favor of petitioner as it is erroneous to base the voter's intent on the
supervening circumstance which was inexistent on the date the ballot was accomplished and cast.
The HRET likewise did not err in holding that the Bautista ruling is inapplicable, there being no
announced declaration yet of one (1) of the candidates as nuisance candidate when the voters
cast their ballots on election day. EcHaAC
The Issues
What then is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final
judgment after the elections? Should ballots containing only the similar surname of two (2)
candidates be considered as stray votes or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?
Our Ruling
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
"Section 69. Nuisance candidates. — The Commission may motu proprio or upon a
verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the
election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by
the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or
acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for
the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a
faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."
Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as "The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987" provides
in Section 5 thereof:
"SEC. 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance Candidates. —
(a) A verified petition to declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate
under Section 69 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be filed personally or through duly
authorized representative with the Commission by any registered candidate for the
same office within five (5) days from the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy. Filing by mail shall not be allowed.
"(b) Within three (3) days from the filing of the petition, the Commission shall issue
summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its
enclosures, if any.
 "(c) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of the summons within
which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition, serving copy
thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be raised as
affirmative defenses.
"(d) The Commission may designate any of its officials who are lawyers to hear the
case and receive evidence. The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of oral
testimonies, the parties may be required to submit position papers together with
affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence. The hearing officer
shall immediately submit to the Commission his findings, reports, and
recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of such submission of
evidence. The Commission shall render its decision within five (5) days from receipt
thereof. acITSD
"(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the
Supreme Court.
"(f) The Commission shall within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available
means, disseminate its decision or the decision of the Supreme Court to the city or
municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors and the general public in
the political subdivision concerned." [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
By their very nature, proceedings in cases of nuisance candidates require prompt
disposition. The declaration of a duly registered candidate as nuisance candidate results in the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. The law mandates the Commission and the courts to
give priority to cases of disqualification to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later
than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought. 15In many instances,
however, proceedings against nuisance candidates remained pending and undecided until
election day and even after canvassing of votes had been completed.
Here, petitioner sought to declare Edilito C. Martinez as a nuisance candidate immediately
after the latter filed his certificate of candidacy as an independent candidate and long before the
May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner averred that Edilito C. Martinez who was a driver of a
motorcycle for hire, locally known as "habal-habal", did not own any real property in his
municipality, had not filed his income tax return for the past years, and being an independent
candidate did not have any political machinery to propel his candidacy nor did he have political
supporters to help him in his campaign. Petitioner claimed that Edilito C. Martinez after the filing of
his certificate of candidacy, was never heard of again and neither did he start an electoral
campaign. Given such lack of bona fide intention of Edilito C. Martinez to run for the office for
which he filed a certificate of candidacy, petitioner contended that his candidacy would just cause
confusion among the voters by the similarity of their surnames, considering that petitioner was
undeniably the frontrunner in the congressional district in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu as
his mother, Rep. Clavel A. Martinez, was the incumbent Representative of the district. 16
The COMELEC's Second Division granted the petition and declared Edilito C. Martinez as
a nuisance candidate. It noted that the failure of said candidate to answer and deny the
accusations against him clearly disclosed the fact that he had no bona fide intention to run for
public office. Thus, it concluded that his only purpose for filing his certificate of candidacy was to
put the election process into mockery and cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of
his surname with that of petitioner. 17
No motion for reconsideration was filed by Edilito C. Martinez and neither did he appeal
before this Court the resolution declaring him a nuisance candidate. Said decision had thus
become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation in accordance with the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 18 But having come too late, the decision was an empty victory
for petitioner who lost to private respondent by a slim margin of 104 votes. In his election protest,
petitioner sought to have ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for
Representative counted in his favor. The HRET, however, considered such ballots numbering
5,401 as stray and rejected petitioner's argument that the ruling in Bautista v. Comelec (supra) is
applicable in this case.
Bautista involves a mayoralty candidate (Cipriano "Efren" Bautista) during the May 11,
1998 elections who filed a petition to declare as nuisance candidate Edwin "Efren" Bautista, who
filed a certificate of candidacy for the same position at the last minute. The COMELEC granted the
petition, declared Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate and ordered the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy. Consequently, Edwin Bautista's name was not included in the official list
of candidates for the position of mayor of Navotas City and copies of the list were distributed to
the boards of election inspectors (BEI). On May 8, 1998, Edwin filed a motion for reconsideration
and as a result, the Election Officer of Navotas issued a directive to the BEI to include the name of
Edwin Bautista in the certified list of candidates, only to recall said order in the afternoon. In view
of the conflicting directives, counsel for petitioner requested the COMELEC that instructions be
given to the BEI to tally separately the votes for "EFREN BAUTISTA", "EFREN", "E. BAUTISTA"
and "BAUTISTA." HDCAaS
On May 13, 1998, the COMELEC denied Edwin Bautista's motion for reconsideration.
When the canvass of the election returns was commenced, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
refused to canvass as part of the valid votes of petitioner the separate tallies of ballots on which
were written "EFREN BAUTISTA," "EFREN," "E. BAUTISTA" and "BAUTISTA." Petitioner then
filed with the COMELEC a petition to declare illegal the proceedings of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers. Meanwhile Edwin Bautista filed a petition for certiorari with this Court assailing the
actions of COMELEC declaring him a nuisance candidate and ordering the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy. The Court dismissed said petition finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the COMELEC and subsequently also denied with finality the motion for
reconsideration filed by Edwin Bautista.
As to the petition to declare as illegal the proceedings of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers for its refusal to include the stray votes in the separate tally sheet, the COMELEC
dismissed the same, citing Sec. 211 (4) 19 of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner Bautista
elevated the case to the Supreme Court which ruled in his favor, thus:
"At the outset and initially setting aside all the ramifications of the substantive issue of
the instant petition, the primordial concern of the Court is to verify whether or not on
the day of the election, there was only one 'Efren Bautista' as a validly registered
candidate as far as the electorate was concerned.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Edwin Bautista moved for reconsideration on May 8, 1998. Unfortunately, said motion
was not resolved as of election day. Technically, the April 30, 1998 decision was not
yet final as of May 11, 1998, and this technicality created serious problems on election
day.
"xxx xxx xxx
"An analysis of the foregoing incidents shows that the separate tallies were made to
remedy any prejudice that may be caused by the inclusion of a potential nuisance
candidate in the Navotas mayoralty race. Such inclusion was brought about by
technicality, specifically Edwin Bautista's filing of a motion for reconsideration, which
prevented the April 30, 1998 resolution disqualifying him from becoming final at that
time.
"Ideally, the matter should have been finally resolved prior to election day. Its
pendency on election day exposed petitioner to the evils brought about by the
inclusion of a then potential, later shown in reality to be nuisance candidate. We
have ruled that a nuisance candidate is one whose certificate of candidacy is
presented and filed to cause confusion among the electorate by the similarity of the
names of the registered candidate or by other names which demonstrate that the
candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of
candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of
the electorate (Fernandez vs. Fernandez, 36 SCRA 1 [1970]). TAIaHE
"It must be emphasized that the instant case involves a ground for disqualification
which clearly affects the voters' will and causes confusion that frustrates the same.
This is precisely what election laws are trying to protect. They give effect to, rather
than frustrate, the will of the voter. Thus, extreme caution should be observed before
any ballot is invalidated. Further, in the appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in
favor of their validity. (Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA 521 [1967]).
"xxx xxx xxx
"As discussed in the COMELEC's April 30, 1998 decision, in accordance with Section
69, Edwin Bautista was found to be a nuisance candidate. First and foremost, he was
running under the name of Edwin 'Efren' Bautista, when it had been established that
he was really known as 'Boboy' or 'Boboy Tarugo.' Second, the following
circumstances saliently demonstrate that he had no bona fide intention of running for
the office for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: He is said to be engaged in a
'buy and sell' business, but he has no license therefor. He declared that he had a
monthly income of P10,000.00 but with expenses totalling P9,000.00. He does not
own any real property. He did not file his income tax return for the years 1995 and
1996 and when asked why, he said he did not have any net income and that he was
only earning enough to defray household expenses. He even violated COMELEC
rules since he failed to submit the names of individuals who paid for his campaign
materials as well as the printing press he dealt with. He did not have a political line-up
and had no funds to support his campaign expenses. He merely depended on friends
whose names he did not submit to the COMELEC. And as straightforwardly found by
the COMELEC, he 'has not demonstrated any accomplishment/achievement in his
twenty-six (26) years of existence as a person that would surely attract the electorate
to choose him as their representative in government.'
"In contrast, it was shown that petitioner had previously held under his name Cipriano
and appellation, 'Efren' Bautista, various elective positions, namely: Barangay Captain
of Navotas in 1962, Municipal Councilor of Navotas in 1970, and Vice-Mayor of
Navotas in 1980. He is a duly registered Naval Architect and Marine Engineer, and a
member of various civic organizations such as the Rotary Club of Navotas and the
Philippine Jaycees.
"It seems obvious to us that the votes separately tallied are not really stray
votes. Then COMELEC Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo himself, now a respected
member of the Court, in his May 14, 1998 Memorandum, allowed the segregation of
the votes for "Bautista," "Efren," and "Efren Bautista," and "E. Bautista" into a separate
improvised tally, for the purpose of later counting the votes. In fine, the COMELEC
itself validated the separate tallies since they were meant to be used in the
canvassing later on to the actual number of votes cast. These separate tallies
actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent
confusion caused by a potential nuisance candidate. What remained unsaid by
 the COMELEC Chairman was the fact that as early as May 13, 1998, the COMELEC
had already spoken and stated its final position on the issue of whether or not Edwin
Bautista is a nuisance candidate. It had already denied Edwin's motion for
reconsideration in its May 13, 1998 Order . . .
"xxx xxx xxx
"This important detail only shows that as of May 14, 1998, when Chairman Pardo
issued the aforestated Memorandum, Edwin Bautista had already been finally
declared as a nuisance candidate by the COMELEC. And when Edwin Bautista
elevated the matter to this Court, we upheld such declaration. How then can we
consider valid the votes for Edwin Bautista whom we finally ruled as disqualified from
the 1998 Navotas mayoralty race? That is like saying one thing and doing another.
These are two incompatible acts the contrariety and inconsistency of which are all too
obvious." 20[EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.] caADSE
Petitioner now invokes this Court's pronouncement in Bautista to the effect that votes
indicating only the surname of two (2) candidates should not be considered as stray but counted
in favor of the bona fide candidate after the other candidate with a similar surname was declared a
nuisance candidate. In refusing to apply the ruling in Bautista, the HRET said that the factual
circumstances in said case are different, thus:
"Protestant strongly asserts that the 'MARTINEZ' or 'C. MARTINEZ' only votes be
counted in his favor invoking the ruling in the case of Bautista vs. Comelec,G.R. No.
133840, November 13, 1998 (298 SCRA 480) where the Supreme Court held that the
final and conclusive ruling on the declaration of a nuisance candidate retroacts on the
day of the election.
"We disagree.
"While the Bautista vs. Comelec case also involves a candidate declared as nuisance
by the Comelec, the case herein is not on all fours with it. . . .
"xxx xxx xxx
"It is clear from the foregoing facts of the Bautista case that the nuisance candidate,
Edwin Bautista, was declared as such on April 30, 1998, eleven (11) days before the
May 11, 1998 elections. Although the decision was not yet final on Election Day
because of a Motion for Reconsideration that Edwin Bautista had filed on May 8, 1998,
nevertheless, his name was not included in the list of candidates for the position of
Mayor for Navotas. This is not the situation in the present case for Edilito C.
Martinez was not yet declared disqualified during the May 14, 2007
elections. There were, therefore, two (2) congressional candidates on the day of the
election with "MARTINEZ" as surname, Celestino A. Martinez and Edilito C. Martinez.
"More importantly, in the Bautista case, while the Comelec's decision declaring Edwin
Bautista a nuisance candidate had not yet attained finality on election day, May 11,
1998, the voters of Navotas were informed of such disqualification by virtue of
newspaper releases and other forms of notification.The voters in said case had
constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the Comelec delisting
Edwin Bautista as a candidate for mayor. This is not so in the present case for
Edilito C. Martinez was not yet disqualified as nuisance candidate during the
May 14, 2007 elections. There were no newspaper releases and other forms of
notification to the voters of the Fourth District of Cebu on or before May 14,
2007 elections that Edilito C. Martinez was disqualified as a nuisance
candidate." 21 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
 It is clear that Bautista is anchored on the factual determination that the COMELEC
resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was already final since his motion for
reconsideration was already denied by the Commission when canvassing of the votes started.
Hence, the segregated and separately tallied votes containing only the similar first
names/nicknames and surnames of the two (2) candidates were considered as not really stray
votes. We held that the separate tallies validated by the COMELEC actually made the will of the
electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a nuisance candidate. DSIaAE
In the case at bar, there was no segregation or separate tally of votes for petitioner. Unlike
in Bautista, there was simply no opportunity for petitioner to request the segregation and separate
tally of expected ballots containing only the surname "MARTINEZ" as the resolution granting his
petition was promulgated only a month later. The HRET, while not closing its eyes to the prejudice
caused to petitioner by COMELEC's inaction and delay, as well as the disenfranchisement of the
5,401 voters, refused to credit him with those votes on the ground that there was no way of
determining the real intention of the voter.
We disagree.
The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the
board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction of the
canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. Election contests,
therefore, involve the adjudication not only of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates,
but also of paramount public interest considering the need to dispel uncertainty over the real
choice of the electorate. 22
In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the law
contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates
may generate. A nuisance candidate is thus defined as one who, based on the attendant
circumstances, has no bona fideintention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy
has been filed, his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the
expectation that ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and not
counted for either of them.
In elections for national positions such as President, Vice-President and Senator, the sheer
logistical challenge posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission to
exercise its authority to eliminate nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or
serious intention to mount a nationwide campaign. Thus we explained in Pamatong v.
Commission on Elections: 23
"The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for
office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.Towards this end, the State
takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the
greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion,
not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the
election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the
conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should
be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper.
Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a
rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme
Court held:
[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary
showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a
political organization and its candidates on the ballot — the interest, if no
 other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the
democratic [process]. TcEaAS
"xxx xxx xxx
"There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of
candidates for national positions because the election process becomes a
mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are
allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of
Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would
entail additional costs to the government. . . .
"The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of
"nuisance candidates" to run in the elections. Our election laws provide various
entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers in every polling place,
watchers in the board of canvassers, or even the receipt of electoral contributions.
Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are
dependent on the number of candidates in a given election.
"Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy
becomes even more galling. The organization of an election with bona fidecandidates
standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions
or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. . . .
"xxx xxx xxx" 24 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED]
Given the realities of elections in our country and particularly contests involving local
positions, what emerges as the paramount concern in barring nuisance candidates from
participating in the electoral exercise is the avoidance of confusion and frustration of the
democratic process by preventing a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate, more
than the practical considerations mentioned in Pamatong. A report published by the Philippine
Center for Investigative Journalism in connection with the May 11, 1998 elections indicated that
the tactic of fielding nuisance candidates with the same surnames as leading contenders had
become one (1) "dirty trick" practiced in at least 18 parts of the country. The success of this clever
scheme by political rivals or operators has been attributed to the last-minute disqualification of
nuisance candidates by the Commission, notably its "slow-moving" decision-making. 25
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on
election day inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of
names that affects the voter's will and frustrates the same. It may be that the factual scenario
in Bautista is not exactly the same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec resolution
declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with
the electorate having been informed thereof through newspaper releases and other forms of
notification on the day of election. Undeniably, however, the adverse effect on the voter's will was
similarly present in this case, if not worse, considering the substantial number of ballots with only
"MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative — over five thousand —
which have been declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to
overcome private respondent's lead of only 453 votes after the recount. TcHDIA
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect
to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the
electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the
prospect of having a significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the
mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the
COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. While political campaigners try to
minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the
ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be
implemented in the May 2010 elections will lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of
candidates. What needs to be stressed at this point is the apparent failure of the HRET to give
weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of the electorate determinable, following the
precedent in Bautista. These can be gleaned from the findings of the Commission on the personal
circumstances of Edilito C. Martinez clearly indicating lack of serious intent to run for the position
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy, foremost of which is his sudden absence after such
filing. In contrast to petitioner who is a well-known politician, a former municipal mayor for three (3)
terms and a strong contender for the position of Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of
Cebu (then occupied by his mother), it seems too obvious that Edilito C. Martinez was far from the
voters' consciousness as he did not even campaign nor formally launch his candidacy. The HRET
likewise failed to mention the total number of votes actually cast for Edilito C. Martinez, which can
support petitioner's contention that the "MARTINEZ" and "C. MARTINEZ" votes could not have
been intended as votes for Edilito C. Martinez.
Petitioner should not be prejudiced by COMELEC's inefficiency and lethargy. Nor should
the absence of objection over straying of votes during the actual counting bar petitioner from
raising the issue in his election protest. The evidence clearly shows that Edilito C. Martinez, who
did not even bother to file an answer and simply disappeared after filing his certificate of
candidacy, was an unknown in politics within the district, a "habal-habal" driver who had neither
the financial resources nor political support to sustain his candidacy. The similarity of his surname
with that of petitioner was meant to cause confusion among the voters and spoil petitioner's
chances of winning the congressional race for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu. As it turned
out, there were thousands of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line
for Representative, votes considered stray by the BEI and not counted in favor of petitioner, and
which the HRET affirmed to be invalid votes. Had the Commission timely resolved the petition to
declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate, all such ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C.
MARTINEZ" would have been counted in favor of petitioner and not considered stray, pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, 26 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in
disqualification cases, which provides:
"This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or
division, particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification Cases). EcIDaA
Special Action cases refer to the following:
(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of
decisions or resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the
Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification
cases shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court;
xxx xxx xxx
 (4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly
whether the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall
be immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly
where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate
shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be
considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or
repealed." [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
We held in several cases that the judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond judicial
interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. 27 The power of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear
denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly
constituting such grave abuse of direction that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. 28 Grave
abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility.
The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law.29 Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming
the proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth
Legislative District of Cebu despite the final outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only
"MARTINEZ" or "C. "MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative, votes which should have
been properly counted in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes, after considering all
relevant circumstances clearly establishing that such votes could not have been intended for
"Edilito C. Martinez" who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment. IHTaCE
Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing
election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the
will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.
An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties
which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. 30 The prohibition against nuisance
candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will
of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a
nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate
as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral
process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution
of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes
counted and canvassed.
We therefore hold that ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for
the same position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and
not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final
judgment after the elections. Accordingly, the 5,401 votes for "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ"
should be credited to petitioner giving him a total of 72,056 votes as against 67,108 total votes of
private respondent. Petitioner thus garnered more votes than private respondent with a winning
margin of 4,948 votes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 28, 2009 and
Resolution dated July 30, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case
No. 07-035 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Celestino A. Martinez III is hereby
 declared the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu in the May 14,
2007 elections. This decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of the decision be served personally upon the parties and their counsels. No
pronouncement as to costs.
||| (Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 189034, [January 12, 2010],
624 PHIL 50-76)

[G.R. No. 154512. November 12, 2002.]

VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, petitioner, vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY
(PRA) of Puerto Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK
DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA,
PRA Chairman and Presiding Officer Punong Bgy. EARL S. BUENVIAJE and
PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA, JR., respondents.

[G.R. No. 154683. November 12, 2002.]

VICENTE S. SANDOVAL, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. Nos. 155083-84. November 12, 2002.]

MA. FLORES P. ADOVO, MERCY E. GILO and BIENVENIDO OLLAVE,

SR., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and EDWARD S.
HAGEDORN, respondents.

Stephen V. Jaromay for petitioners.

George Erwin M. Garcia, Dela Cruz Albano & Associates and M.M. Lazaro & Associates for E.S.
Hagedorn.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Edwin B. Gastanes for petitioner in G.R. No. 154512.
Aristotle Q. Sarmiento for petitioner in G.R. No. 154683.

SYNOPSIS

Out of the 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of Puerto Princesa, 312 convened
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) to initiate the recall of then Puerto Princesa
Mayor Victorino Dennis Socrates. The PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02, which declared their loss of
confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. Thereafter, the COMELEC scheduled the campaign
period and the recall election. Mr. Edward M. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy and
eventually won the recall election. The issues involved in these consolidated petitions are: (1)
whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the recall
resolution and in scheduling the recall election for mayor in Puerto Princesa; and (2) whether
Hagedorn was qualified to run for mayor despite serving three consecutive full terms immediately
prior to recall election.
The Supreme Court ruled that it is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within its
competence and expertise unless the findings were patently erroneous, which was not present in the
case at bar. Therefore, there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in
upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall election. The Court lifted
the temporary restraining order enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for mayor in the
recall election in Puerto Princesa. According to the Court, what the Constitution prohibits is an
immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. A recall election mid-way in
a term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election
after the third term.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS; THREE-TERM

LIMIT; CONSTRUED. — The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160,
otherwise known asthe Local Government Code. These constitutional and statutory provisions have
two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term
limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not
interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption
from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive
terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. Clearly, what theConstitution prohibits is
an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution,
however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following
the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third
term. Neither does the Constitutionprohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in
any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitutionprohibits is
a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the
prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the
third term, not any other subsequent election. DHTECc
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF SERVICE MUST BE INVOLUNTARY;
APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — In Lonzanida v. Comelec, the Court had occasion to explain
interruption of continuity of service in this manner: ". . . The second sentence of the constitutional
provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected."
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit
by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their
elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does
not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. . . . ." In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out
of office, although short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his
service as mayor. TheConstitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three
years. The clear intent is that interruption "for any length of time," as long as the cause is involuntary,
is sufficient to break an elective local official's continuity of service.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RECALL ELECTION; WINNER THEREOF COULD NOT BE CREDITED WITH
FULL TERM FOR THE PURPOSE OF COUNTING CONSECUTIVENESS OF THE ELECTIVE
OFFICIAL'S TERM OF OFFICE. — We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local official is out
of office interrupts the continuity of his service and prevents his recall term from being stitched
together as a seamless continuation of his previous two consecutive terms. In the instant case, we
likewise hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of office interrupted his continuity of
service and prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his
previous three consecutive terms. The only difference between Adormeo and the instant case is the
time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after the first two consecutive terms. In
the instant case, the interruption happened after the first three consecutive terms. In both cases, the
respondents were seeking election for a fourth term. In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began
only from the date he assumed office after winning the recall election. Talaga's recall term did not
retroact to include the tenure in office of his predecessor. If Talaga's recall term was made to so
retroact, then he would have been disqualified to run in the 2001 elections because he would already
have served three consecutive terms prior to the 2001 elections. One who wins and serves a recall
term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time
prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in
continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election
cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the
consecutiveness of an elective official's terms in office.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE UNEXPIRED TERM IS IN ITSELF ONE TERM FOR PURPOSE OF
THREE-TERM LIMIT. — The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the people
to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest
possible effect to the sovereign will of the people. As this Court aptly stated in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec:
"Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of theConstitution reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of
choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they
rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three
consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative
officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such
officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the
expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned against 'prescreening candidates [from]
whom the people will choose' as a result of the proposed, absolute disqualification, considering that
the draft constitution contained provisions 'recognizing people's power.'" A necessary consequence of
the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the interruption. An official
elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in
itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit.

PUNO, J., concurring opinion:

1. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS; THREE-TERM
LIMIT; CONDITIONS FOR DISQUALIFICATIONS AS A RESULT THEREOF. — In the recent case
of Adormeo vs. COMELEC, et al., we ruled that a mayor who assumed office via a recall election and
served the unexpired portion of the mayoralty term is not considered to have served a full term for
purposes of applying the three-term limit. . . . Citing the Borja and Lonzanidarulings, we ruled that
Talaga, Jr. was not disqualified as the two conditions for disqualifications, namely (1) the elective
official concerned was elected for three consecutive terms in the same post and (2) he has fully
served three consecutive terms, were not met. We did not consider Talaga Jr.'s service of the
unexpired portion of Tagarao's term as service of a full term for purposes of the three term limit. We
also ruled that he did not serve for three consecutiveterms as there was a break in his service when
he lost to Tagarao in the 1998 elections. EHTISC
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR THE ENACTMENT THEREOF, CONSTRUED. —
The deliberations of the ConCom and the ruling case law ofBorja, Lonzanida and Adormeo show that
there are two principal reasons for the three term limit for elective local officials: (1) to prevent political
dynasties perpetuated by the undue advantage of the incumbent and (2) to broaden the choice of the
people by allowing candidates other than the incumbent to serve the people. Likewise evident in the
deliberations is the effort to balance between two interests, namely, the prevention of political
dynasties and broadening the choice of the people on the one hand, and respecting the freedom of
choice and voice of the people, on the other; thus, the calibration between perpetual disqualification
after three consecutive terms as proposed by Commissioner Garcia, and setting a limit on immediate
reelection and providing for a hibernation period. In all three cases —
Borja, Lonzanida and Adormeo — we ruled that the "term" referred to in the three term limit is service
of a full term of three years for elective local officials. This ruling furthers the intent of the ConCom to
prevent political dynasties as it is the service of consecutive full terms that makes
service continuous and which opens the gates to political dynasties limiting the people's choice of
leaders. In the words of Commissioner Ople, ". . . we want to prevent future situations where, as a
result of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the President down to the
municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate those
powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members
of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on the
continuity or unbroken service of all of these officials." Thus, ConCom set the limit on consecutive full
terms to no more than three. Otherwise stated, it is a fourth consecutive full term that is prohibited.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHAT IS PROHIBITED IS THE SERVICE OF A FOURTH CONSECUTIVE FULL
TERM AS CONTEMPLATED BY LAW. — Even a textual analysis of Art. X, Sec. 8 will yield the
interpretation that what is prohibited is the service of a fourth consecutive full term. Petitioners are
correct in foisting the view that "term" is a fixed and definite period of time prescribed by law or
the Constitution during which the public officer may claim to hold office as a right. It is a fixed and
definite period of time to hold office, perform its functions, and enjoy its privileges and emoluments
until the expiration of the period. In ascertaining what "term" means for elective local officials,
the Constitution itself provides in Art. X, Sec. 8 that it means a fixed, definite, and full period of three,
years, viz: "Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years. . . " Although one or more persons may discharge the
duties of the office during this fixed three-year period, the term is not divided into smaller terms by the
number of incumbents who may fill the office. It is one and indivisible, and term follows term in
successive cycles of three years each. If the incumbent or the one elected to the office fills a higher
vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntary resigns
or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office, thereby creating a
permanent vacancy, the term would remain unbroken until the recurring election for the office. The
provisions on voluntary renunciation under Art. X, Sec. 8 and other articles of the Constitution bolster
the interpretation that for purposes of applying the three term limit, service of a full term of three years
is contemplated. Likewise, because "term" is understood to be a fixed, definite, and full-period,
the Constitution, in Art. VI, Sec. 9, uses the qualifier "unexpired term" to refer to only a portion of a
term. Similarly, Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 uses the phrase "unexpired term" to
mean the remainder of the term. Thus, when Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution states that ". . . no such
(local elective) official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms," it consistently means that it
allows service of a maximum of three consecutive full terms and prohibits service of a minimum fourth
consecutive full term.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE THROUGH A RECALL ELECTION IS NOT IN
REALITY A SERVICE OF FULL TERM; RATIONALE. — It is my respectful submission that
the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 proscribe a local official who has been
thrice consecutively elected in regular elections and has served three full terms in the same position,
from running in the regular election succeeding his third consecutive term. It is this situation that is
prohibited because it makes possible service of more than three consecutive and continuous full
terms, i.e., service of a fourth consecutive full term. We cannot overstress that it is this
continuousness that the ConCom feared would open the gates to the two evils sought to be avoided:
the incumbent's use of his undue advantage to put up a political dynasty and limiting the people's
choice of leaders. It is in this context of regular elections that our obiter dictum in the Lonzanida case,
which petitioners harp on, should be understood. In that case, we opined that "[a]s finally voted upon,
it was agreed that an elective local government official should be barred from running for the same
post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same
office." Indeed, insofar as regular local elections are concerned, which were the elections involved in
that case, there should be a hiatus of at least one full term of three years. On the other hand, in the
case of a local official who assumes office through a recall election — whether after his first, second,
or third consecutive term — there is a break in his service caused by the election of the incumbent
who was recalled. Even in the case of a local official who initially assumes office via recall election,
then wins the two succeeding regular elections and serves two full terms in the same post, he is not
prohibited from seeking another reelection and serving another full term. This is so because his
service of the remainder of the incumbent's term via recall election is not, in reality and in law, a full
term continuing on to his three succeeding full terms. Local officials who assume officevia recall
election serve only the unexpired portion of the incumbent's term and this service is not counted as a
full term, despite the Constitutional mandate that the term of office of elective local officials is three
years. Such is the design because Art. XVIII, Secs. 2 and 5 of the Constitution also prescribe
synchronization of regular national and local elections beginning on the second Monday of May 1992,
which is accomplished if the local official who assumes office through recall election serves only the
incumbent's unexpired term. As we ruled in the Adormeo case, service of an unexpired term is
considered service of a full term only with respect to Representatives (and Senators) because unlike
local government officials, Representatives cannot be recalled. It is continuous prolonged stay in
office that breeds political dynasties. Understandable therefore, insofar as Representatives who
cannot be recalled are concerned, service of an unexpired term is strictly counted as service of a full
term because the purpose of the ConCom was to limit the right to run and be elected in Congress.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS; THREE-TERM
LIMIT; TERM DURING WHICH A RECALL ELECTION WAS HELD SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED IN
THE COMPUTATION THEREOF; RATIONALE. — I submit with respect that the term during which a
recall election is held should not be counted in computing the three-term limit not only when the recall
election occurs within three consecutive terms, as this Court has already held, but also when such
election is held during the fourth term immediately following three consecutive terms. The reason for
this is that the elective local official cannot be said to have served "for more than three consecutive
terms" because of the break in his service. What prevents the fourth term from being counted in
determining the three-term limit is the lack of continuity, or the break, in the "service of the full term." I
must stress that the Constitutiondoes not say "service for more than three terms" but "service for
more than three consecutive terms." acCTIS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE THEREOF. — As the discussion of the Constitutional Commission on
Art. X. Sec. 8 shows, the three-term limit is aimed at preventing the monopolization or
aggrandizement of political power and the perpetration of the incumbent in office. This abuse is likely
to arise from a prolonged stay in power. It is not likely to arise if the service is broken, albeit it is for
more than three terms.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS; CONSTRUED. — Hence, the application of the constitutional
ban on the holding of elective local office for three consecutive terms requires in my view (1) election
in a regular election for three consecutive terms and (2) service for the full terms, each consisting of
three years, for which the official is elected. The first requirement is intended to give the electorate the
freedom to reelect a candidate for a local elective position as part of their sovereign right (the right of
suffrage) to choose those whom they believe can best serve them. This is the reason the framers of
ourConstitution rejected Scheme No. 1, which was to ban reelection after three successive terms,
and adopted Scheme No. 2, which is about "no immediate reelection after three successive terms."
On the other hand, the second requirement is intended to prevent the accumulation of power resulting
from too long a stay in office.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J., concurring and dissenting opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS; THREE-TERM
LIMIT; FOURTH TERM PROHIBITION COVERS THE PERIOD PERTAINING TO IT; CASE AT BAR.
— The ponencia is then correct when it holds that the three-term limit bars an immediate reelection
for a fourth term. But I disagree when it rules that in the case of Hagedorn he did not seek an
immediate reelection for a fourth term because he was not a candidate for reelection in the May 2001
election. It forgets that what would have been his fourth term by virtue of the May 2001 election was
for the period from 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2004.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INVOLUNTARY SEVERANCE FROM OFFICE; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT
BAR. — The flaw in the ruling results from an apparent confusion between term and election, the root
cause of which is the attempt to distinguish "voluntary renunciation" of office from "involuntary
severance" from office and the term to which it relates. . . . The dichotomy made in
the ponencia between "voluntary renunciation of the office" as used in Section 8 of Article V of
the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 and "involuntary severance from office" is
unnecessary, if not misplaced. From the discussion in the ponencia, the latter is made to apply to the
banned term, i.e., the fourth term immediately following three consecutive terms. Speaking now of
Hagedorn, he cannot have suffered "involuntary severance from office" because there was nothing to
be severed; he was not a holder of an office either in a de jure or de facto capacity. He knew he was
disqualified from seeking a third reelection to office. Disqualification is, definitely, not synonymous
withinvoluntary severance. Even if we concede that involuntary severance is an act which interrupts
the continuity of a term for purposes of applying the three-term principle the rule laid down
in Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (311 SCRA 609 [1999]), cited in the ponencia, page 17, is not applicable
in the case of Hagedorn. The involuntary severance referred to in that case was one that took place
during any of the three terms; hence, the term during which it occurred should be excluded in the
computation. In the case of Hagedorn, no such involuntary severance took place during any of his
three terms brought about by his election in 1992 and reelections in 1995 and 1998. ITcCaS
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION, NOT CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN
THE CONTINUITY OF SERVICE; PURPOSE THEREOF. — More importantly, the voluntary
renunciation referred to in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No.
7160 its one that takes place at any time during either the first, second, or third term of the three
consecutive terms. This is very clear from the last clause of Section 8, Article X of theConstitution,
which reads: "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected." The purpose of the provision is to prevent an elective local official from
voluntary resigning from office for the purpose of circumventing the rule on the belief that the term
during which he resigned would be excluded in the counting of the three-term rule. In short, the
provision excluded is intended to impose a penalty on one who flouts the rule or make a mockery of it
by the simple act of resigning.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THREE-TERM LIMIT CANNOT BE SUBVERTED IN A RECALL ELECTION;
CASE AT BAR. — A declaration that Hagedorn is qualified to seek reelection in a recall election to
remove the Mayor who was elected for a term for which Hagedorn was constitutionally and statutorily
disqualified to be reelected to or to hold is to subvert the rationale of the three-consecutive-term rule
and make a mockery of it. Worse, it abets destructive endless partisan politics and unsound
governance. An elective local official who is disqualified to seek a fourth term because of the three-
term limit but obsessed to hold on to power would spend the first year of the fourth term campaigning
for the recall of the incumbent in the second year of said term. This would not be a problem if the
disqualified official has a solid following and a strong political machinery. Interestingly, in this case, as
stated on page 3 of the ponencia, the President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Puerto
Princesa City is one Mark David M. Hagedorn and he was designated by the Preparatory Recall
Assembly as Interim Chairman.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case
Before us are consolidated petitions for certiorari 1 seeking the reversal of the resolutions issued by
the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC" for brevity) in relation to the recall election for mayor of
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
The Antecedents
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto
Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly ("PRA" for brevity) at the
Gymnasium of Barangay San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The PRA was convened to initiate
the recall 2 of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates ("Socrates" for brevity) who assumed office as Puerto
Princesa's mayor on June 30, 2001. The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn,
president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 ("Recall Resolution" for brevity) which
declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the
COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall
Resolution.
On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to
nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution.
On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC en banc 3 promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of merit
Socrates' petition. The COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall
election on September 7, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing the
calendar of activities and periods of certain prohibited acts in connection with the recall election. The
COMELEC fixed the campaign period from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10
days.
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn ("Hagedorn" for brevity) filed his certificate of candidacy
for mayor in the recall election.
On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo ("Adovo" for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo ("Gilo" for brevity)
filed a petition before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 02-492, to disqualify Hagedorn from
running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain
Bienvenido Ollave, Sr. ("Ollave" for brevity) filed a petition-in-intervention in SPA No. 02-492 also
seeking to disqualify Hagedorn. On the same date, a certain Genaro V. Manaay filed another petition,
docketed as SPA No. 02-539, against Hagedorn alleging substantially the same facts and involving
the same issues. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that "Hagedorn is disqualified from
running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for
three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post."
Subsequently, SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 were consolidated.
In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELEC's First Division 4 dismissed for
lack of merit SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539. The COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the
recall election. The COMELEC also reset the recall election from September 7, 2002 to September
24, 2002.
On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of Adovo and Gilo. The COMELEC affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn
qualified to run in the recall election.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
G.R. No. 154512
Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution dated August 14, 2002 in E.M.
No. 02-010 (RC) which gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on
September 7, 2002.
Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution.
Socrates cites the following circumstances as legal infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and
its issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1) not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to
adopt the resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was palpably and legally deficient; (3) the
members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from their respective
constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5)
the PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated his and the public's constitutional
right to information.
G.R. No. 154683
Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673 dated August 21,
2002 insofar as it fixed the recall election on September 7, 2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day
campaign period. He prayed that the COMELEC be enjoined from holding the recall election on
September 7, 2002 and that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least an additional 15 days
to campaign. AEDcIH

In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court en banc enjoined the COMELEC from
implementing Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the date of the recall election on September 7,
2002. The Court directed the COMELEC to give the candidates an additional fifteen 15 days from
September 7, 2002 within which to campaign.
Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5708 giving the
candidates an additional 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign. Thus, the
COMELEC reset the recall election to September 24, 2002.
G.R. Nos. 155083-84
Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELEC's resolutions dated September 20, 2002 and
September 23, 2002 in SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in
the recall election. They likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin
the proclamation of the winning candidate in the recall election.
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding Hagedorn's
qualification to run for mayor in the recall election despite the constitutional and statutory prohibitions
against a fourth consecutive term for elective local officials.
In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered the COMELEC to desist from
proclaiming any winning candidate in the recall election until further orders from the Court. Petitioners
were required to post a P20,000 bond.
On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for leave to file an attached petition for intervention
seeking the same reliefs as those sought by Adovo, Gilo and Ollave.
In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election with 20,238
votes. Rival candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241 votes.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming the winning
candidate and to allow him to assume office to give effect to the will of the electorate.
On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates' motion for leave to file a petition for intervention.
The Issues
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
giving due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall election for
mayor of Puerto Princesa.
2. In G.R. Nos. 155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall
election of Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002.
In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
fixing a campaign period of only 10 days has become moot. Our Resolution of September 3, 2002
and COMELEC Resolution No. 5708 granted an additional 15 days for the campaign period as
prayed for by petitioner.
First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.
Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective service of
notice to other PRA members. The COMELEC, however, found that —
"On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents for the Recall of
incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the convening of
the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the Local Government
Code. Copies of the said notice are in Volumes I and II entitled Notices to PRA.
Likewise, Proof of Service for each of the said notices were attached to the Petition
and marked as Annex "G" of Volumes II and III of the Petition.
Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay Hall.
Photos establishing the same were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "H".
The proponents likewise utilized the broadcast mass media in the dissemination of the
convening of the PRA.
Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the following:
[a list of 25 names of provincial elective officials, print and broadcast media
 practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional and national officials, and DILG
officials].
xxx xxx xxx
The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certification dated 10 July
2002 certified that upon a 'thorough and careful verification of the signatures
appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, . . . the majority of all members of the PRA
concerned approved said resolution.' She likewise certified 'that not a single
member/signatory of the PRA complained or objected as to the veracity and
authenticity of their signatures.'
The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan, Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his
Indorsement dated 10 July 2002, stated, 'upon proper review, all documents submitted
are found in order.'
The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study dated 30 July 2002 submitted the
following recommendations:
'This Office, after evaluating the documents filed, finds the instant Petition
sufficient in form and substance. That the PRA was validly constituted and that
the majority of all members thereof approved Resolution No. 01-02 calling for
the recall of Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates.'
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the competence and
expertise of the COMELEC, unless the findings are patently erroneous. In Malonzo v.
COMELEC, 5 which also dealt with alleged defective service of notice to PRA members, we ruled that
—
"Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is
factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a function of the
COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings,
the Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based
on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive
upon the court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the
same."
In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELEC's findings of fact
are patently erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2,
2002 because a majority of PRA members were seeking a new electoral mandate in
the barangay elections scheduled on July 15, 2002. This argument deserves scant consideration
considering that when the PRA members adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of office had not
yet expired. They were all de jure sangguniang barangay members with no legal disqualification to
participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local Government Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA proceedings violated his
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving
notice of the PRA meeting and of even sending his representative and counsel who were present
during the entire PRA proceedings. Proponents of the recall election submitted to the COMELEC the
Recall Resolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA assembly, attendance
sheets, notices sent to PRA members, and authenticated master list of barangay officials in Puerto
Princesa. Socrates had the right to examine and copy all these public records in the official custody of
the COMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim that the COMELEC denied him this right. There is
no legal basis in Socrates' claim that respondents violated his constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of
the Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.
Second Issue: Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor
in the recall election of September 24, 2002.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution,
which states: EHaCTA
"Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected."
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which provides:
"Section 43. Term of Office. — (a) . . .
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official was elected."
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective
local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that
only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The
clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of
service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a
continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth
term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of
the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question
asked was whether there would be no further election after three terms, or whether there would be
"no immediate reelection" after three terms. This is clear from the following deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission:
"THE PRESIDENT:
The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO: 6
We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as indicated on the blackboard, and
these are Alternative No. 1 where there is no further election after a total of
three terms and Alternative No. 2 where there is no immediate reelection after
three successive terms." 7
The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports the following manifestation on the term of
elective local officials:
"MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to
the consideration of two issues on the term of Representatives andlocal officials,
namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms), and 2)
Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms)." 8
The framers of the Constitution used the same "no immediate reelection" question in voting for the
term limits of Senators 9 and Representatives of the House. 10
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three
consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth
term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall
election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any
other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is
a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the
prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the
third term, not any other subsequent election.
If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within the three-year full term
following the three-term limit, then Senators should also be prohibited from running in any election
within the six-year full term following their two-term limit. The constitutional provision on the term limit
of Senators is worded exactly like the term limit of elective local officials, thus:
"No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." 11
In the debates on the term limit of Senators, the following exchange in the Constitutional Convention
is instructive:
"GASCON: 12
I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will
allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he can run again?
DAVIDE: 13
That is correct.
GASCON:
And the question that we left behind before — if the Gentleman will remember — was:
How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years
or one term which is six years?
DAVIDE:
If the Gentleman will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that
during the election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such
election will be on the third or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular
member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of hibernation for six
years. That was the Committee's stand.
 GASCON:
So, effectively, the period of rest would be three years at the least." 14 (Emphasis
supplied)
The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only three
years 15 following his completion of two terms. The framers expressly acknowledged that the
prohibited election refers only to the immediate reelection, and not to any subsequent election,
during the six-year period following the two term limit. The framers of the Constitution did not
intend "the period of rest" of an elective official who has reached his term limit to be the full extent
of the succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an
immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate
reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in
2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served
in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections.
The Constitution and theLocal Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the
maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did
not run for mayor in the 2001 elections. 16 Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the
2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen
until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent,
Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa
was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly
an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn's service as mayor, not because of his voluntary
renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive terms ended on June
30, 2001. Hagedorn's new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless
continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch together
Hagedorn's previous three-terms with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive
term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September
24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn's service as mayor.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec, 17 the Court had occasion to explain interruption of continuity of service in
this manner:
". . . The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
"Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected." The
clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the
people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. . . " (Emphasis supplied)
In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term
of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor.
The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The
clear intent is that interruption "for any length of time," as long as the cause is involuntary, is
sufficient to break an elective local official's continuity of service.
In the recent case of Adormeo v. Comelec and Talaga, 18 a unanimous Court reiterated the rule that
an interruption consisting of a portion of a term of office breaks the continuity of service of an elective
local official. In Adormeo, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. had served two consecutive full terms as mayor of
Lucena City. In his third bid for election as mayor in 1998, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao.
However, in the recall election of May 12, 2000, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of
Tagarao from May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001. When Talaga ran again for mayor in the 2001 elections,
Raymundo Adormeo, the other candidate for mayor, petitioned for Talaga's disqualification on the
ground that Talaga had already served three consecutive terms as mayor. TAaEIc
Thus, the issue in Adormeo was whether Talaga's recall term was a continuation of his previous two
terms so that he was deemed to have already served three consecutive terms as mayor. The Court
ruled that Talaga was qualified to run in the 2001 elections, stating that the period from June 30, 1998
to May 12, 2000 when Talaga was out of office interrupted the continuity of his service as mayor.
Talaga's recall term as mayor was not consecutive to his previous two terms because of this
interruption, there having been a break of almost two years during which time Tagarao was the mayor.
We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local official is out of office interrupts the continuity of
his service and prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his
previous two consecutive terms. In the instant case, we likewise hold that the nearly 15 months
Hagedorn was out of office interrupted his continuity of service and prevents his recall term from
being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms. The only
difference between Adormeo and the instant case is the time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the
interruption occurred after the first two consecutive terms. In the instant case, the interruption
happened after the first three consecutive terms. In both cases, the respondents were seeking
election for a fourth term.
In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed office after winning the
recall election. Talaga's recall term did not retroact to include the tenure in office of his predecessor. If
Talaga's recall term was made to so retroact, then he would have been disqualified to run in the 2001
elections because he would already have served three consecutive terms prior to the 2001 elections.
One who wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but only the
unexpired term. The period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds office,
constitutes an interruption in continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the
winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for
purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official's terms in office.
In the same manner, Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of
Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election if the
recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for only then can the recall term constitute a fourth
consecutive term. But to consider Hagedorn's recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting to
June 30, 2001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore
reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or successive terms of office which historically and
factually are not.
Worse, to make Hagedorn's recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly
curtails the freedom of the people to choose their leaders through popular elections. The concept of
term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their own
choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will
of the people. As this Court aptly stated in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec:
"Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of
the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as
much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were
with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal
 put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive
terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative
officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian
Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the
succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod
warned against 'prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose' as a
result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the
draft constitutioncontained provisions 'recognizing people's power.''' 19 (Emphasis
supplied)
A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term
following the interruption. An official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the
recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit.
This is clear from the following discussion in the Constitutional Commission:
"SUAREZ: 20
For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected
would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that
serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So,
half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would
disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this
provision on disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE:
Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there is a special election, he will serve only
for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the
Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House." 21
Although the discussion referred to special elections for Senators and Representatives of the House,
the same principle applies to a recall election of local officials. Otherwise, an elective local official who
serves a recall term can serve for more than nine consecutive years comprising of the recall term plus
the regular three full terms. A local official who serves a recall term should know that the recall term is
in itself one term although less than three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running
and winning in the recall election.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election for
mayor of Puerto Princesa because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive
terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001; HCITDc
2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June
30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made
to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because
factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right
of the electorate to choose their leaders.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are DISMISSED. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on September 24, 2002 enjoining the proclamation of
the winning candidate for mayor of Puerto Princesa in the recall election of September 24, 2002 is
lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Socrates v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 154512, 154683, 155083-84, [November 12,
2002], 440 PHIL 106-180)

[G.R. No. 184836. December 23, 2009.]

SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR.,DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N.

TALABONG, petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F.
ASILO, respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J p:

Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of

office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and
Section 43 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is
an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide
complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the
three-term limit rule.
The present petition 1 seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
THE ANTECEDENTS
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three
consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In
September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively
suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however,
subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan's suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the
functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The
petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr.,Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the
petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilo's certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the
ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term
therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of theConstitution and Section
43 (b) of RA 7160. EAHDac
The COMELEC's Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo's favour in its
Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as
Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the
Sandiganbayan had ordered.
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Division's ruling in its October 7,
2008 Resolution; hence, the PRESENT PETITION raising the following ISSUES:
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption
of the three-term limit rule; and
 2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Section 43 (b) of RA 7160
Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilo's preventive suspension
constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.
THE COURT'S RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
General Considerations
The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit provision of
the Constitution, but is the first on the effect of preventive suspension on the continuity of an
elective official's term. To be sure, preventive suspension, as an interruption in the term of an
elective public official, has been mentioned as an example in Borja v. Commission on
Elections. 2 Doctrinally, however, Borja is not a controlling ruling; it did not deal with preventive
suspension, but with the application of the three-term rule on the term that an elective official
acquired by succession.
a. The Three-term Limit Rule:
The Constitutional Provision Analyzed
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any
difference in wording does not assume any significance in this case.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an
elective official's stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of
the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time — three years — during
which an official has title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals, 3 a Resolution
promulgated on November 28, 2007, succinctly discusses what a "term" connotes, as
follows: TcCEDS
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time
which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem,
the term of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of
the officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and
authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the
most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the
expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed. [Emphasis supplied].
A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, 4 reiterated that "[T]he term means the time
during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the
several incumbents shall succeed one another."
The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative — "no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms." This formulation — no more than
three consecutive terms — is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule.
While it gives no exact indication of what to "serve. ..three consecutive terms" exactly connotes,
the meaning is clear — reference is to the term, not to the service that a public official may render.
In other words, the limitation refers to the term.
The second branch relates to the provision's express initiative to prevent any
circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it
expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office "shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." This declaration
complements the term limitation mandated by the first branch.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary
renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect "continuity of service for a
full term" for purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of what does
not serve as an interruption of service for a full term, but the phrase "voluntary renunciation," by
itself, is not without significance in determining constitutional intent.
The word "renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is
to give up, abandon, decline, or resign. 5 It is an act that emanates from its author, as contrasted
to an act that operates from the outside. Read with the definition of a "term" in mind, renunciation,
as mentioned under the second branch of the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that
results in cutting short the term, i.e.,the loss of title to office. The descriptive word "voluntary"
linked together with "renunciation" signifies an act of surrender based on the surenderee's own
freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to office by conscious choice. In the context of
the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed
to be purposely sought to avoid the application of the term limitation.
The following exchanges in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the term
"voluntary renunciation" shed further light on the extent of the term "voluntary
renunciation": DHAcET
MR. MAAMBONG.
Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? This term "voluntary
renunciation" does not appear in Section 3 [of Article VI];it also appears in
Section 6 [of Article VI].
MR DAVIDE.
Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG.
It is also a recurring phrase all over the Constitution. Could the Committee please
enlighten us exactly what "voluntary renunciation" mean? Is this akin to
abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE.
Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by
merely resigning at any given time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG.
Is the Committee saying that the term "voluntary renunciation" is more general than
abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE.
It is more general, more embracing. 6
From this exchange and Commissioner Davide's expansive interpretation of the term "voluntary
renunciation," the framers' intent apparently was to close all gaps that an elective official may
seize to defeat the three-term limit rule, in the way that voluntary renunciation has been rendered
unavailable as a mode of defeating the three-term limit rule. Harking back to the text of the
constitutional provision, we note further that Commissioner Davide's view is consistent with the
negative formulation of the first branch of the provision and the inflexible interpretation that it
suggests.
This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances
surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high
priority constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be
defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional worth. We view preventive
suspension vis-à-vis term limitation with this firm mindset.
b. Relevant Jurisprudence on the
Three-term Limit Rule
Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the concepts
within the provision's contemplation, particularly on the "interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term" that it speaks of.
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections 7 presented the question of whether the
disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be
strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had
been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the
application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three
consecutive terms) were not present. In so ruling, we said: DHIaTS
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the
people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months
before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with
the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such
involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus,
the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. [Emphasis supplied]
Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be exact, loss of
title, that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.
Ong v. Alegre 8 and Rivera v. COMELEC, 9 like Lonzanida, also involved the issue of
whether there had been a completed term for purposes of the three-term limit disqualification.
These cases, however, presented an interesting twist, as their final judgments in the electoral
contest came after the term of the contested office had expired so that the elective officials in
these cases were never effectively unseated.
Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was never validly
elected),the Court concluded that there was nevertheless an election and service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule based on the following premises: (1) the final decision that
the third-termer lost the election was without practical and legal use and value, having been
promulgated after the term of the contested office had expired; and (2) the official assumed and
continuously exercised the functions of the office from the start to the end of the term. The Court
noted in Ong the absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view — that the official
(referring to the winner in the election protest) would, under the three-term rule, be considered to
have served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another
actually served the term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. This
factual variation led the Court to rule differently from Lonzanida.
In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who finally lost the
election contest was merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer." The Court
obeserved that Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when
an official fully served in the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as "caretaker"
or "de facto" officer, he exercised the powers and enjoyed the perquisites of the office that
enabled him "to stay on indefinitely." ITEcAD
Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation because of
what they directly imply. Although the election requisite was not actually present, the Court still
gave full effect to the three-term limitation because of the constitutional intent to strictly limit
elective officials to service for three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it
guards the three-term limit rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term
limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.
Adormeo v. Commission on Elections 10 dealt with the effect of recall on the three-term
limit disqualification. The case presented the question of whether the disqualification applies if the
official lost in the regular election for the supposed third term, but was elected in a recall election
covering that term. The Court upheld the COMELEC's ruling that the official was not elected for
three (3) consecutive terms. The Court reasoned out that for nearly two years, the official was a
private citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the election
for the third term.
Socrates v. Commission on Elections 11 also tackled recall vis-à-vis the three-term limit
disqualification. Edward Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor. As he was disqualified to run
for a fourth term, he did not participate in the election that immediately followed his third term. In
this election, the petitioner Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor. Less than 1 1/2
years after Mayor Socrates assumed the functions of the office, recall proceedings were initiated
against him, leading to the call for a recall election. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for
mayor in the recall election, but Socrates sought his disqualification on the ground that he
(Hagedorn) had fully served three terms prior to the recall election and was therefore disqualified
to run because of the three-term limit rule. We decided in Hagedorn's favor, ruling that:
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election
for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election,like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening
period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local
officials, the question asked was whether there would be no further election after three
terms, or whether there would be "no immediate reelection" after three terms.
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term
following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a
subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately
after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term
 following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate
reelection after the third term. DcaCSE
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to
run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What
the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. 12
Latasa v. Commission on Elections 13 presented the novel question of whether a municipal
mayor who had fully served for three consecutive terms could run as city mayor in light of the
intervening conversion of the municipality into a city. During the third term, the municipality was
converted into a city; the cityhood charter provided that the elective officials of the municipality
shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to exercise their powers and functions until elections were
held for the new city officials. The Court ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city did
not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office
of the city mayor — the territorial jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the municipality;
the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3 consecutive
terms; and they were the same inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor held power and
authority as their chief executive for nine years. The Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included
an exception to the people's freedom to choose those who will govern them in
order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same
office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having
served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the
very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed
another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then
be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and
inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought
to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it. 14 aSEDHC
Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates, that no
three-term limit violation results if a rest period or break in the service between terms or tenure in
a given elective post intervened. In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a private citizen with no title to
any elective office for a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly,
in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents lived as private citizens for two years and
fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these cases establish that the law contemplates a complete
break from office during which the local elective official steps down and ceases to exercise power
or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on
Elections, 15 where the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the position of vice-
mayor by operation of law. The question posed when he subsequently ran for councilor was
whether his assumption as vice-mayor was an interruption of his term as councilor that would
place him outside the operation of the three-term limit rule. We ruled that an interruption had
intervened so that he could again run as councilor. This result seemingly deviates from the results
in the cases heretofore discussed since the elective official continued to hold public office and did
not become a private citizen during the interim. The common thread that identifiesMontebon with
the rest, however, is that the elective official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the
higher post of vice-mayor by operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor — an
interruption that effectively placed him outside the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
c. Conclusion Based on Law
and Jurisprudence
 From all the above, we conclude that the "interruption" of a term exempting an elective
official from the three-term limit rule is one that involvesno less than the involuntary loss of title to
office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short,
for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X
and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official's continuous stay in
office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and
standard of what does not constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an
effective interruption of service within a term, as we held inMontebon. On the other hand,
temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if
involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not
involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder,
while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason
provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to
hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs
during an office holder's term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions
for reasons established by law. Of course, the term "failure to serve" cannot be used once the
right to office is lost; without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so
that none is really lost. cHDEaC
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X — both by structure
and substance — fixes an elective official's term of office and limits his stay in office to three
consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as
an example of a circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of interruption of
term, not in the context of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the
elective position. The "voluntary renunciation" it speaks of refers only to the elective official's
voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary
"cessation of the exercise of power or authority" that may occur for various reasons, with
preventive suspension being only one of them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec: 16
Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official
steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants
of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. [Emphasis supplied].
Preventive Suspension and
the Three-Term Limit Rule
a. Nature of Preventive Suspension
Preventive suspension — whether under the Local Government Code, 17 the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, 18 or the Ombudsman Act 19 — is an interim remedial measure to
address the situation of an official who have been charged administratively or criminally, where
the evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code "when the evidence
of guilt is strong and given the gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that the continuance in
office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity
of the records and other evidence." Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed
after a valid information (that requires a finding of probable cause) has been filed in court, while
under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the judgment of the Ombudsman, the evidence
of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
 Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from
performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not
vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an
eventual finding of guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled
conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the
individual office holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary
prohibition on theexercise of the functions of the official's office; the official is reinstated to
the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary
incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is
preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo. HTCSDE
That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that is true in the
exercise of all powers and prerogative under theConstitution and the laws. The imposition of
preventive suspension, however, is not an unlimited power; there are limitations built into the
laws 20themselves that the courts can enforce when these limitations are transgressed,
particularly when grave abuse of discretion is present. In light of this well-defined parameters in
the imposition of preventive suspension, we should not view preventive suspension from the
extreme situation — that it can totally deprive an elective office holder of the prerogative to serve
and is thus an effective interruption of an election official's term.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective
officials' service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive
suspension involves protection of the service and of the people being served, and prevents the
office holder from temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand,
is triggered after an elective official has served his three terms in office without any break. Its
companion concept — interruption of a term — on the other hand, requires loss of title to office. If
preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption have any commonality at all, this
common point may be with respect to the discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even
on this point, they merely run parallel to each other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by
its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term;in the context of
term limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the term.
b. Preventive Suspension and
the Intent of the Three-Term
Limit Rule
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive
suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official's stay in office
beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the
suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions
and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended
official's continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is
to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating
the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term that the
constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary —
some of them personal and some of them by operation of law — that may temporarily prevent an
elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that preventive
suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement
of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder
from exercising the functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive
 suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term.
Adopting such interruption of actual service as the standard to determine effective interruption of
term under the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule,
given the many modes and occasions when actual service may be interrupted in the course of
serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a
case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption is. ASHECD
c. Preventive Suspension and
Voluntary Renunciation
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a
voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have
voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this
perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary
renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to office
as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective office
demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is — by its very nature — the exact opposite of
voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of
service, not the title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature,
different and non-comparable.
But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more important
consideration of how they affect the three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render
service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not
allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term
and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat,
however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it be
noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does
not require relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an easily
fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has
been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a
term can serve as a circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that
the Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, Asilo's 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed
preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official's
term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of
theConstitution when it granted due course to Asilo's certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth
term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by no less
than the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of law. 21 CIaDTE
WHEREFORE,premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly NULLIFY the
assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is
declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a
prohibited fourth term. Costs against private respondent Asilo. SO ORDERED.
||| (Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 184836, [December 23, 2009], 623 PHIL 876-
938)

[G.R. No. 147927. February 4, 2002.]

 RAYMUNDO M. ADORMEO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., respondents.

Silvestre L. Tagarao, Ignacio E. Camba and Romeo A. Dato for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Dante H. Diamante for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy for
mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Private respondent was elected mayor in May
1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998 he lost
to Bernard Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired
term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
Petitioner filed a petition to disqualify Talaga from running for Mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections
on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecutive
terms.
The Supreme Court held that respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms. For nearly
two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the
1998 elections. Neither can respondent's victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as "voluntary renunciation" for clearly it was not. Hence,
private respondent was not disqualified to run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; DISQUALIFICATION; THREE-TERM RULE; CONDITIONS

FOR THE APPLICATION. — The issue before us was already addressed in Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC,
295 SCRA 157, 169 (1998), where we held, To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials
must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the disqualification can apply. . . . Likewise, in the case of Lonzanida vs.
COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), we said, This Court held that the two conditions for the
application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS; VOLUNTARY
RENUNCIATION OF OFFICE DOES NOT CANCEL THE RENOUNCED TERM IN THE
COMPUTATION OF THE THREE-TERM LIMIT; CASE AT BAR. — Neither can respondent's victory
in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as "voluntary
renunciation" for clearly it is not. In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said: . . . The second sentence of
the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he
was elected." The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice
and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation
of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts
to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the
next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ
of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term. aTcESI

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J p:

Before us is a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, to nullify and set aside the resolution dated May 9, 2001 of public respondent
Commission on Elections in Comelec SPA No. 01-055, which granted the motion for reconsideration
and declared private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., qualified to run for Mayor in Lucena City for
the May 14, 2001 election. Petitioner prays that votes cast in private respondent's favor should not be
counted; and should it happen that private respondent had been already proclaimed the winner, his
proclamation should be declared null and void.
The uncontroverted facts are as follows:
Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy for
mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Private respondent was then the incumbent
mayor.
Private respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he
was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall
election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30,
2001.
On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City a
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y.
Talaga, Jr., on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3)
consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, where he served the full term; (2) in the
election of May 1995, where he again served the full term; and, (3) in the recall election of May 12,
2000, where he served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998
election. Petitioner contended that Talaga's candidacy as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Sec. 8. — The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
On March 9, 2001, private respondent responded that he was not elected City Mayor for three (3)
consecutive terms but only for two (2) consecutive terms. He pointed to his defeat in the 1998
election by Tagarao. Because of his defeat the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was
interrupted, and thus his mayorship was not for three consecutive terms of three years each.
Respondent added that his service from May 12, 2001 until June 30, 2001 for 13 months and
eighteen (18) days was not a full term, in the contemplation of the law and the Constitution. He
cites Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), as authority to the
effect that to apply disqualification under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, two (2) conditions
must concur, to wit: (a) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post, and (b) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
On April 20, 2001, the COMELEC, through the First Division, found private respondent Ramon Y.
Talaga, Jr. disqualified for the position of city mayor on the ground that he had already served three
(3) consecutive terms, and his Certificate of Candidacy was ordered withdrawn and/or cancelled.
On April 27, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that "three (3)
consecutive terms" means continuous service for nine (9) years and that the two (2) years service
from 1998 to 2000 by Tagarao who defeated him in the election of 1998 prevented him from having
three consecutive years of service. He added that Tagarao's tenure from 1998 to 2000 could not be
considered as a continuation of his mayorship. He further alleged that the recall election was not a
regular election, but a separate special election specifically to remove incompetent local officials.
On May 3, 2001, petitioner filed his Opposition to private respondent's Motion for Reconsideration
stating therein that serving the unexpired term of office is considered as one (1) term. 1 Petitioner
further contended that Article 8 of the Constitution speaks of "term" and does not mention "tenure":
The fact that private respondent was not elected in the May 1998 election to start a term that began
on June 30, 1998 was of no moment, according to petitioner, and what matters is that respondent
was elected to an unexpired term in the recall election which should be considered one full term from
June 30, 1998 to June 30, 2001. IDEScC
On May 9, 2001, the COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. It
reversed the First Division's ruling and held that 1) respondent was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms because he did not win in the May 11, 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed only
as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in the recall elections was
not considered a term of office and is not included in the 3-term disqualification rule, and 4) that he
did not fully serve the three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is
considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City.
On May 19, 2001, after canvassing, private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of
Lucena City.
Petitioner is now before this Court, raising the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT ISSUED ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 9, 2001, DECLARING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., QUALIFIED TO RUN FOR MAYOR IN
LUCENA CITY FOR THE MAY 14, 2001 ELECTIONS. 2

Stated differently, was private respondent disqualified to run for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14,
2001 elections? 3 This issue hinges on whether, as provided by the Constitution, he had already
served three consecutive terms in that office.
Petitioner contends that private respondent was disqualified to run for city mayor by reason of the
three-term rule because the unexpired portion of the term of office he served after winning a recall
election, covering the period May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001 is considered a full term. He posits that
to interpret otherwise, private respondent would be serving four (4) consecutive terms of 10 years, in
violation of Section 8, Article X of 1987 Constitution 4 andSection 43 (b) of R.A. 7160, known as the
Local Government Code.
Section 43. Term of Office. —
 xxx xxx xxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official concerned was elected.
Private respondent, in turn, maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not consecutive. He
lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and between June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000, during
Tagarao's incumbency, he was a private citizen, thus he had not been mayor for 3 consecutive terms.
In its comment, the COMELEC restated its position that private respondent was not elected for three
(3) consecutive terms having lost his third bid in the May 11, 1998 elections, said defeat is an
interruption in the continuity of service as city mayor of Lucena.
The issue before us was already addressed in Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157, 169 (1998),
where we held,
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms
in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can be made
clearer by considering the following case or situation:
xxx xxx xxx
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice
suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can
he run for one more term in the next election?
Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.
xxx xxx xxx
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of
the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils
that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their
freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
Likewise, in the case of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), we said,
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must
concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.
Accordingly, COMELEC's ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive
terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his
mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. AEDHST
Patently untenable is petitioner's contention that COMELEC in allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run
in the May 1998 election violates Article X, Section 8 of1987 Constitution. 5 To bolster his case,
respondent adverts to the comment of Fr: Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member,
stating that in interpreting said provision that "if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired
term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of
computing the number of successive terms allowed." 6
As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas' comment is pertinent only to members of the
House of Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is no recall election provided for
members of Congress. 7
Neither can respondent's victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution as "voluntary renunciation" for clearly it is not. In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we
said:
. . .The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
"Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected." The
clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the
people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. 8
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The resolution of public respondent
Commission on Elections dated May 9, 2001, in Comelec SPA No. 01-055 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
||| (Adormeo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147927, [February 4, 2002], 426 PHIL 472-480)

[G.R. No. 120140. August 21, 1996.]

BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

PATEROS MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS and JOSE T. CAPCO,
JR., respondents.

Romulo C. Felizmeña for petitioner.

Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAW; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; FAILURE OF

ELECTION; GROUNDS CITED IN CASE AT BAR ARE NOT PROPER IN A PETITION TO
DECLARE A FAILURE OF ELECTION. — A petition to declare a failure of election is neither a
pre-proclamation controversy as classified under Section 5(h), Rule 1 of the
Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure, not an election case. It must be remembered that Capco
was duly elected and proclaimed as Mayor of Pateros. "Such proclamation enjoys the
presumption of regularity and validity." To destroy the presumption, Borja must convincingly show
that his opponent's victory was procured through extra-legal means. This he tried to do by alleging
matters in his petition which he thought constituted failure of election, such as lack of notice of the
date and time of canvass; fraud, violence, terrorism and analogous causes; disenfranchisement of
voters; presence of flying voters; and unqualified members of the Board of Election Inspectors.
These grounds, however, as correctly pointed out by the COMELEC, are proper only in an
election contest but not in a petition to declare a failure of election and to nullify a proclamation.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHEN A FAILURE OF ELECTION MAY BE DECLARED;
NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code is reiterated in
Section 2, Rule 26 of the Revised COMELEC Rules. In other words, the COMELEC can call for
the holding or continuation of election by reason of failure of election only when the election is not
held, is suspended or results in a failure to elect. The latter phrase, in turn, must be understood in
its literal sense, which is "nobody was elected." None of these circumstances is present in the
case at bar. At best, the "grounds" cited byBorja are simply events which give rise to the three
consequences just mentioned.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; A CASE OF. — In reality, Borja's petition was nothing
but a simple election protest involving an elective municipal position which, under Section 251 of
the Election Code, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the appropriate Regional Trial
Court.

DECISION

ROMERO, J p:

Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr. questions the authority of

respondent Commission on Elections en banc to hear and decide at the first instance a petition
seeking to declare a failure of election without the benefit of prior notice and hearing.
During the May 8, 1995 elections, Borja and private respondent Jose T. Capco vied for the
position of Mayor of the Municipality of Pateros which was won by Capco by a margin of 6,330
votes. Capco was consequently proclaimed and has since been serving as Mayor of Pateros.
Alleging lack of notice of the date and time of canvass, fraud, violence, terrorism and
analogous causes, such as disenfranchisement of voters, presence of flying voters, and
unqualified members of the Board of Election Inspectors, Borja filed before the COMELEC a
petition to declare a failure of election and to nullify the canvass and proclamation made by the
Pateros Board of Canvassers.
Concluding that the grounds relied upon by Borja were warranted only in an election
contest, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition in its resolution dated May 25, 1995. It
declared that "forced majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud and other analogous causes. . . . are
merely the causes which may give rise to the grounds to declare failure of elections." These
grounds, which include (a) no election held on the designated election date; (b) suspension of
election before the hour fixed by law for the closing of voting; and (c) election in any polling place
resulted in a failure to elect, were not present in Borja's petition.
Aggrieved by said resolution, petitioner elevated the matter to this Court, arguing the same
matters while claiming that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned resolution of May 25, 1995. He avers that the COMELEC en banc does not have the
power to hear and decide the merits of the petition he filed below because under Article IX-C,
Section 3 of the Constitution, all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, "shall
be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be
decided by the Commission en banc."
After a careful scrutiny of petitioner's arguments, this Court finds the same to be untenable.
The petition must inevitably be dismissed.
 In order to resolve the threshold issue formulated at the outset, there must first be a
determination as to whether a petition to declare a failure of election qualifies as an election case
or a pre-proclamation controversy. If it does, the Constitution mandates that it be heard and
adjudged by theCOMELEC through any of its Divisions. The COMELEC en banc is only
empowered to resolve motions for reconsideration of cases decided by a Division for Article IX-C,
Section 3 of the Constitution expressly provides:
"SEC 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration shall be decided by
the Commission en banc."
In the case at bar, no one, much less the COMELEC, is disputing the mandate of the
aforequoted Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution. As Borjahimself maintained, the soundness
of this provision has already been affirmed by the Supreme Court in a number of cases, albeit with
some dissent. 1 InOng, the Court declared that if a case raises "pre-proclamation issues,
the COMELEC, sitting en banc, has no original jurisdiction" over the same. Accordingly, said case
should be remanded to the COMELEC which, in turn, will refer the same to any of its Divisions for
proper disposition.
A petition to declare a failure of election is neither a pre-proclamation controversy as
classified under Section 5(h), Rule 1 of the Revised COMELECRules of Procedure, nor an
election case.
It must be remembered that Capco was duly elected and proclaimed as Mayor of Pateros.
"Such proclamation enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity." 2 To destroy the
presumption, Borja must convincingly show that his opponent's victory was procured through
extra-legal means. This he tried to do by alleging matters in his petition which he thought
constituted failure of election, such as lack of notice of the date and time of canvass; fraud,
violence, terrorism and analogous causes; disenfranchisement of voters; presence of flying voters;
and unqualified members of the Board of Election Inspectors. These grounds, however, as
correctly pointed out by the COMELEC, are proper only in an election contest but not in a petition
to declare a failure of election and to nullify a proclamation. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code lays down the instances when a failure of election may be declared. It states thus:
"SEC. 6. Failure of Election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of
election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a
verified petition by any interested party and after due notice, and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure
to elect."
The same provisions are reiterated under Section 2, Rule 26 of the Revised COMELEC Rules. In
other words, the COMELEC can call for the holding or continuation of election by reason of failure
of election only when the election is not held, is suspended or results in a failure to elect. The
latter phrase, in turn, must be understood in its literal sense, which is "nobody was elected." None
 of these circumstances is present in the case at bar. At best, the "grounds" cited by Borja are
simply events which give rise to the three consequences just mentioned.
In reality, Borja's petition was nothing but a simple election protest involving an elective
municipal position which, under Section 251 of the Election Code, falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the appropriate Regional Trial Court. Section 251 states:
"Section 251. Election contests for municipal offices. — A sworn petition contesting
the election of a municipal officer shall be filed with the properregional trial court by
any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the
same office, within ten days after proclamation of the results of the election."
(Emphasis supplied)
The COMELEC in turn exercises appellate jurisdiction over the trial court's decision
pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution which states:
"Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable."
The COMELEC, therefore, had no choice but to dismiss Borja’s petition, not only for being
deficient in form but also for having been filed before the wrong tribunal. This reason need not
even be stated in the body of the decision as the same is patent on the face of the pleading itself.
Nor can Borjaclaim that he was denied due process because when the COMELEC en
banc reviewed and evaluated his petition, the same was tantamount to a fair "hearing" of his case.
The fact that Capco was not even ordered to rebut the allegations therein certainly did not deprive
him of his day in court. If anybody here was aggrieved by the alleged lack of notice and hearing, it
was Capco whose arguments were never ventilated. If he remained complacent, it was because
the COMELEC's actuation was favorable to him.
Certainly, the COMELEC cannot be said to have committed abuse of discretion, let alone
grave abuse thereof, in dismissing Borja's petition. For having applied the clear provisions of the
law, it deserves, not condemnation, but commendation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution of
the Commission on Elections dated May 25, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
cost. SO ORDERED.
||| (Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120140, [August 21, 1996], 329 PHIL 409-416)

[G.R. No. 154829. December 10, 2003.]

ARSENIO A. LATASA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO

SUNGA, respondents.

Jose Ventura Aspiras and Antonio N. Navidad for petitioner.

Jerahmeel Libre and Clifford Equila for private respondent R. Sunga.
Romualdo C. Garcia for Internor Atty. J. Penas.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the
elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioner's third term, the Municipality of Digos was
declared a component city, to be known as the City of Digos. On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed
his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is
eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos, and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.
Private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy and/or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged that
petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos
City since he had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992
to 2001. The COMELEC's First Division issued a Resolution canceling petitioner's certificate of
candidacy for being in violation of the three (3)-term rule proscribed by the 1987 Constitution and the
Local Government Code of 1991. Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration which remained
unacted upon until the day of the elections. Petitioner was proclaimed winner on May 17, 2001,
having garnered the most number of votes. Subsequently, the COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. According to the Court, the fact that the new city acquired
a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality does not mean that for
the purpose of applying Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution, the office of the municipal mayor
would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor.
The territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently,
the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. The inhabitants are the same
group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms.
They are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive
for nine years. The Court also stressed that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the people's freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a
single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a
prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after
having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very
intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive
terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief
executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive
years which is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; THE FACT THAT THE NEW CITY ACQUIRED A NEW
CORPORATE EXISTENCE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THAT OF A MUNICIPALITY DOES
NOT MEAN THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF APPLYING ARTICLE. X, SECTION 8 OF THE
CONSTITUTION, THE OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR WOULD NOW BE CONSTRUED AS
A DIFFERENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT POST AS THAT OF THE CITY MAYOR. — The Court notes
that the delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the
land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos. This Court also notes that the elective
officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions until elections
were held for the new city officials. True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate
and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of
applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be
construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier,
the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same
group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms.
These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive
for nine years.
2. ID.; ID.; ALTHOUGH THERE WERE CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS
OF THE CITY OF DIGOS, NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OCCURRED AS TO PETITIONER'S
AUTHORITY AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OVER THE INHABITANTS THEREOF. — In Borja, the private
respondent therein, before he assumed the position of mayor, first served as the vice-mayor of his
local government unit. The nature of the responsibilities and duties of the vice-mayor is wholly
different from that of the mayor. The vice-mayor does not hold office as chief executive over his local
government unit. In the present case, petitioner, upon ratification of the law converting the
municipality to a city, continued to hold office as chief executive of the same territorial jurisdiction.
There were changes in the political and economic rights of Digos as local government unit, but no
substantial change occurred as to petitioner's authority as chief executive over the inhabitants of
Digos. caIETS
3. ID.; ID.; PETITIONER NEVER CEASED FROM ACTING AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNIT AND FROM DISCHARGING HIS DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. — In the
present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected as mayor in the May 1998 elections.
Can he then be construed as having involuntarily relinquished his office by reason of the conversion
of Digos from municipality to city? This Court believes that he did involuntarily relinquish his office as
municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However,
the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor.
Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped down from
office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He
never ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos. HCEaDI
4. ID.; ID.; THE LAW CONTEMPLATES A REST PERIOD DURING WHICH THE LOCAL ELECTIVE
OFFICIAL STEPS DOWN FROM OFFICE AND CEASES TO EXERCISE POWER OR AUTHORITY
OVER THE INHABITANTS OF THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF A PARTICULAR LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNIT. — It is evident that in the above mentioned cases, there exists a rest period or
a break in the service of the local elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner therein was a private citizen
a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private
respondents therein lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months respectively. Indeed,
the law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and
ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular
local government unit. This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included
an exception to the people's freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil
of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of
a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor
after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very
intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive
terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief
executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of
eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not
abhorred by it. TCIHSa
5. ID.; ELECTION LAWS; THE FACT THAT A PLURALITY OR A MAJORITY OF THE VOTES ARE
CAST FOR AN INELIGIBLE CANDIDATE AT A POPULAR ELECTION, OR THAT A CANDIDATE IS
LATER DECLARED TO BE DISQUALIFIED TO HOLD OFFICE, DOES NOT ENTITLE THE
CANDIDATE WHO GARNERED THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES TO BE DECLARED
ELECTED. — Respondent Sunga claims that applying the principle in Labo v. COMELEC, he should
be deemed the mayoralty candidate with the highest number of votes. On the contrary, this Court
held in Labo that the disqualification of a winning candidate does not necessarily entitle the candidate
with the highest number of votes to proclamation as the winner of the elections. As an obiter, the
Court merely mentioned that the rule would have been different if the electorate, fully aware in fact
and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety,
would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate
may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher
number of votes may be deemed elected. The same, however, cannot be said of the present case.
This Court has consistently ruled that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an
ineligible candidate at a popular election, or that a candidate is later declared to be disqualified to
hold office, does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be
declared elected. The same merely results in making the winning candidate's election a nullity. In the
present case, moreover, 13,650 votes were cast for private respondent Sunga as against the 25,335
votes cast for petitioner Latasa. The second placer is obviously not the choice of the people in that
particular election. In any event, a permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby created
which should be filled by succession.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J p:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to challenge the
resolution issued by the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated April 27,
2001 in SPA Case No. 01-059 entitled, Romeo M. Sunga, petitioner, versus Arsenio A. Latasa,
respondent, and the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc denying herein petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. The assailed Resolution denied due course to the certificate of candidacy of
petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, declaring him disqualified to run for mayor of Digos City, Davao del Sur
Province in the May 14, 2001 elections, ordering that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted,
and if he has been proclaimed winner, declaring said proclamation null and void.
The facts are fairly simple.
Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the
elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioner's third term, the Municipality of Digos was
declared a component city, to be known as the City of Digos. A plebiscite conducted on September 8,
2000 ratifiedRepublic Act No. 8798 entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Digos, Davao del
Sur Province into a Component City to be known as the City of Digos" or the Charter of the City of
Digos. This event also marked the end of petitioner's tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos.
However, under Section 53, Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over
capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath as the city mayor.
On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14, 2001
elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already
served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the
first time for the position of city mayor.
On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said
elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
and/or For Disqualification 1 against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged therein that
petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos
City since petitioner had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor from
1992 to 2001.
On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his Answer, 2 arguing that he did not make any false
representation in his certificate of candidacy since he fully disclosed therein that he had served as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. Moreover, he argued that this fact
does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 2001 elections since this will be
the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
Both parties submitted their position papers on March 19, 2001. 3
On April 27, 2001, respondent COMELEC's First Division issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion
of which reads, as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the respondent's certificate of candidacy should be
cancelled for being a violation of the three (3)-term rule proscribed by the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. 4
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated May 4, 2001, 5 which remained unacted upon
until the day of the elections, May 14, 2001. On May 16, 2001, private respondent Sunga filed an Ex
Parte Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining the City Board of Canvassers
From Canvassing or Tabulating Respondent's Votes, and From Proclaiming Him as the Duly Elected
Mayor if He Wins the Elections. 6 Despite this, however, petitioner Latasa was still proclaimed winner
on May 17, 2001, having garnered the most number of votes. Consequently, private respondent
Sunga filed, on May 27, 2001, a Supplemental Motion 7 which essentially sought the annulment of
petitioner's proclamation and the suspension of its effects.
On July 1, 2001, petitioner was sworn into and assumed his office as the newly elected mayor of
Digos City. It was only on August 27, 2002 that the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC 8 that after an
elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
pass upon his qualifications. An opposing party's remedies after proclamation would be to file a
petition forquo warranto within ten days after the proclamation. IDTSaC
On the other hand, certain peculiarities in the present case reveal the fact that its very heart is
something which this Court considers of paramount interest. This Court notes from the very beginning
that petitioner himself was already entertaining some doubt as to whether or not he is indeed eligible
to run for city mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. In his certificate of candidacy, after the phrase "I
am eligible," petitioner inserted a footnote and indicated:
*Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and now running for the first time
as city mayor. 9
Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set
aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just. 10
The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision must not be attenuated by a rigid application of
procedural rules.
The present case raises a novel issue with respect to an explicit Constitutional mandate: whether or
not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City
of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of
Digos.
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who
will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitutionis an exception to this rule, in that it limits the
range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
An examination of the historical background of the subject Constitutional provision reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of
choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In fact, they
rejected a proposal set forth by Commissioner Edmundo Garcia that after serving three consecutive
terms or nine years, there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. 11 The
members, instead, adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such
officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the
expiration of the third consecutive term:
MR. MONSOD: Madam President, I was reflecting on this issue earlier and I asked to
speak because in this draft Constitution,we are recognizing people's power. We have
said that now there is a new awareness, a new kind of voter, a new kind of Filipino.
And yet at the same time, we are prescreening candidates among whom they will
choose. We are saying that this 48-member Constitutional Commission has decreed
that those who have served for a period of nine years are barred from running for the
same position.
The argument is that there may be other positions. But there are some people who are
very skilled and good at legislation, and yet are not of a national stature to be
Senators. They may be perfectly honest, perfectly competent and with integrity. They
get voted into office at the age of 25, which is the age we provide for Congressmen.
And at 34 years old we put them into pasture.
Second, we say that we want to broaden the choices of the people. We are talking
here only of congressional or senatorial seats. We want to broaden the people's
choice but we are making prejudgment today because we exclude a certain number of
people. We are, in effect, putting an additional qualification for office — that the
officials must have not have served a total of more than a number of years in their
lifetime.
Third, we are saying that by putting people to pasture, we are creating a reserve of
statesmen, but the future participation of these statesmen is limited. Their skills may
be only in some areas, but we are saying that they are going to be barred from
running for the same position.
Madam President, the ability and capacity of a statesman depend as well on the day-
to-day honing of his skills and competence, in intellectual combat, in concern and
 contact with the people, and here we are saying that he is going to be barred from the
same kind of public service.
I do not think it is in our place today to make such a very important and momentous
decision with respect to many of our countrymen in the future who may have a lot
more years ahead of them in the service of their country.
If we agree that we will make sure that these people do not set up structures that will
perpetuate them, then let us give them this rest period of three years or whatever it is.
Maybe during that time, we would even agree that their fathers or mothers or relatives
of the second degree should not run. But let us not bar them for life after serving the
public for number of years. 12

The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards
against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. As Commissioner Blas
Ople stated during the deliberations:
. . . I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service
and frequent re-elections, officials from the President down to the municipal mayor
tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate these
powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these
posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. . . . 13
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post,
unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. 14
In the present case, petitioner states that a city and a municipality have separate and distinct
personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single entity and must be accorded different treatment
consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code. He does not deny the fact that he
has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor. However, he asserts that when
Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality. Therefore,
when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same
local government post.
For a municipality to be converted into a city, the Local Government Code provides:
SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A municipality or a cluster
of barangays may be converted into a component city it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prizes,
and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as
certified by the Land Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein. AECDHS
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds. The requirement on land are shall not apply where the city
 proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more island. The territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.15
Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For one, there is a material change
in the political and economic rights of the local government unit when it is converted from a
municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these changes affect the people as well. 16 It is precisely for
this reason why Section 10, Article X of the Constitution mandates that no province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
without the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
As may be gleaned from the Local Government Code, the creation or conversion of a local
government unit is done mainly to help assure its economic viability. Such creation or conversion is
based on verified indicators:
Section 7. Creation and Conversion. — As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based on
verifiable indicators or viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. — It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide
for all essential government facilities and services and special functions
commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local
government unit concerned;
(b) Population. — It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants
within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. — It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others;
properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and
sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of
Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management
Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 17
On the other hand, Section 2 of the Charter of the City of Digos provides:
Section 2. The City of Digos. — The Municipality of Digos shall be converted into a
component city to be known as the City of Digos, hereinafter referred to as the City,
which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur
Province. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and
bounds of the Municipality of Digos. . . .
Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further states:
Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. — The present elective officials of the
Municipality of Digos shall continue to exercise their powers and functions until such a
time that a new election is held and the duly-elected officials shall have already
qualified and assumed their offices. . . . .
As seen in the aforementioned provisions, this Court notes that the delineation of the metes and
bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the
Municipality of Digos. This Court also notes that the elective officials of the Municipality of Digos
continued to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional
provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government
post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of
Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the
same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner
Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants
over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
This Court must distinguish the present case from previous cases ruled upon this Court involving the
same Constitutional provision.
In Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 18 the issue therein was whether a vice-mayor who became the mayor by
operation of law and who served the remainder of the mayor's term should be considered to have
served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit under the Constitution. Private
respondent in that case was first elected as vice-mayor, but upon the death of the incumbent mayor,
he occupied the latter's post for the unexpired term. He was, thereafter, elected for two more terms.
This Court therein held that when private respondent occupied the post of the mayor upon the
incumbent's death and served for the remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having
served a full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional provision. The term served must
be one "for which [the official concerned] was elected."
It must also be noted that in Borja, the private respondent therein, before he assumed the position of
mayor, first served as the vice-mayor of his local government unit. The nature of the responsibilities
and duties of the vice-mayor is wholly different from that of the mayor. The vice-mayor does not hold
office as chief executive over his local government unit. In the present case, petitioner, upon
ratification of the law converting the municipality to a city, continued to hold office as chief executive
of the same territorial jurisdiction. There were changes in the political and economic rights of Digos as
local government unit, but no substantial change occurred as to petitioner's authority as chief
executive over the inhabitants of Digos.
In Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 19 petitioner was elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor
from 1988 to 1995. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and
discharged his duties as mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an
election protest before the Regional Trial Court, which ruled that there was a failure of elections and
declared the position of mayor vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner acceded to
the order to vacate the post. During the May 1998 elections, petitioner therein again filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor. A petition to disqualify him was filed on the ground that he had
already served three consecutive terms. This Court ruled, however, that petitioner therein cannot be
considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and that said petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.
In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected as mayor in the May 1998
elections. Can he then be construed as having involuntarily relinquished his office by reason of the
conversion of Digos from municipality to city? This Court believes that he did involuntarily relinquish
his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion.
However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city
mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped
down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local
government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive
of Digos.
In Adormeo v. COMELEC, 20 this Court was confronted with the issue of whether or not an
assumption to office through a recall election should be considered as one term in applying the three-
term limit rule. Private respondent, in that case, was elected and served for two consecutive terms as
mayor. He then ran for his third term in the May 1998 elections, but lost to his opponent. In June 1998,
his opponent faced recall proceedings and in the recall elections of May 2000, private respondent
won and served for the unexpired term. For the May 2001 elections, private respondent filed his
certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor. This was questioned on the ground that he had
already served as mayor for three consecutive terms. This Court held therein that private respondent
cannot be construed as having been elected and served for three consecutive terms. His loss in the
May 1998 elections was considered by this Court as an interruption in the continuity of his service as
mayor. For nearly two years, private respondent therein lived as a private citizen. The same, however,
cannot be said of petitioner Latasa in the present case. IAETSC
Finally, in Socrates v. COMELEC, 21 the principal issue was whether or not private respondent
Edward M. Hagedorn was qualified to run during the recall elections. Therein respondent Hagedorn
had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 until 2001 and did not run in the
immediately following regular elections. On July 2, 2002, the barangay officials of Puerto Princesa
convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of the incumbent mayor,
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates. On August 23, 2002, respondent Hagedorn filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor in the recall election. A petition for his disqualification was filed on the ground
that he cannot run for the said post during the recall elections for he was disqualified from running for
a fourth consecutive term. This Court, however, ruled in favor of respondent Hagedorn, holding that
the principle behind the three-term limit rule is to prevent consecutiveness of the service of terms, and
that there was in his case a break in such consecutiveness after the end of his third term and before
the recall election.
It is evident that in the abovementioned cases, there exists a rest period or a break in the service of
the local elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner therein was a private citizen a few months before
the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents therein lived
as private citizens for two years and fifteen months respectively. Indeed, the law contemplates a rest
period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or
authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the
people's freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in
the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for
three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers
when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of
the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutiveyears. This is the very scenario
sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
Finally, respondent Sunga claims that applying the principle in Labo v. COMELEC, 22 he should be
deemed the mayoralty candidate with the highest number of votes. On the contrary, this Court held
in Labo that the disqualification of a winning candidate does not necessarily entitle the candidate with
the highest number of votes to proclamation as the winner of the elections. As an obiter, the Court
merely mentioned that the rule would have been different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in
law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety,
would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate
may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher
number of votes may be deemed elected. The same, however, cannot be said of the present case.
This Court has consistently ruled that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an
ineligible candidate at a popular election, or that a candidate is later declared to be disqualified to
hold office, does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be
declared elected. The same merely results in making the winning candidate's election a nullity. 23 In
the present case, moreover, 13,650 votes were cast for private respondent Sunga as against the
25,335 votes cast for petitioner Latasa. 24 The second placer is obviously not the choice of the
people in that particular election. In any event, a permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby
created which should be filled by succession. 25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Latasa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 154829, [December 10, 2003], 463 PHIL 296-314)

[G.R. No. 163295. January 23, 2006.]

FRANCIS G. ONG, petitioner, vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

[G.R. No. 163354. January 23, 2006.]

ROMMEL G. ONG, petitioner, vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

Emilio C. Pormento for petitioners for G.R. Nos. 163295 and 163354.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Jaime R. Alegre for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1.POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; TERM OF OFFICE; THREE-TERM

LIMIT RULE; PETITIONER'S PROCLAMATION AS THE DULY ELECTED MAYOR IN THE 1998
MAYORALTY ELECTION COUPLED BY HIS ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE AND HIS CONTINUOUS
EXERCISE OF THE FUNCTIONS THEREOF FROM START TO FINISH OF THE TERM, SHOULD
BE LEGALLY BE TAKEN AS SERVICE FOR A FULL TERM IN CONTEMPLATION OF THE THREE-
TERM RULE. — The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution. Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same rule. For the
three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must
concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the
same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. With the
view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring
petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004
elections. There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of
that municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995-
June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy revolves
around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor
of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term
by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The
question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Francis's assumption of office as
Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as
one full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule. We hold that such
assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, "service for the full term," and should be counted as a
full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory
provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three
consecutive term for the same position. It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in
Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis' opponent (Alegre) who "won" in the 1998
mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that
disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been
promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis' contention that he
was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest
did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the
term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule. The
absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view
would mean that Alegre would — under the three-term rule — be considered as having served a term
by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term
pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A CANDIDATE WHOSE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY HAS BEEN
CANCELLED OR NOT GIVEN DUE COURSE CANNOT BE SUBSTITUTED BY ANOTHER
BELONGING TO THE SAME POLITICAL PARTY AS THAT OF THE FORMER. — Just as
unmeritorious as Francis' petition in G.R. No. 163295 is Rommel's petition in G.R. No. 163354 in
which he (Rommel) challenges the COMELEC's act of not including his name as a substitute
candidate in the official list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections. As it were, existing
COMELEC policy provides for the non-inclusion of the name of substitute candidates in the certified
list of candidates pending approval of the substitution. Not to be overlooked is the Court's holding
in Miranda vs. Abaya, that a candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not
given due course cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same political party as that of the
former, thus: While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited
political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any
cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be
substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly
substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification
but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can
be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose
certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of
the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons
whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions
of Section 78 of the Code. . . . A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered
a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all
can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all. . . . After having considered the
importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily understood why in Bautista [Bautista vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998] we ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is
no candidate at all. Applying this principle to the case at bar and considering that Section 77 of the
Code is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may
be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be any possible substitution of a person whose certificate
of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course. In any event, with the hard reality that the
May 10, 2004 elections were already passé, Rommel Ong's petition in G.R. No. 163354 is already
moot and academic.

DECISION

GARCIA, J p:

Before the Court are these two separate petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify and
set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc.
The first, docketed as G.R. No. 163295, is a petition for certiorari with petitioner Francis G. Ong
impugning the COMELEC en banc resolution 1 dated May 7, 2004 in SPA Case No. 04-048, granting
private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre's motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated March
31, 2004 2 of the COMELEC's First Division.
The second, G.R. No. 163354, is for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for
injunctive relief, filed by petitioner Rommel Ong, brother of Francis, seeking, among other things, to
stop the COMELEC from enforcing and implementing its aforesaid May 7, 2004 en banc resolution in
SPA Case No. 04-048 pending the outcome of the petition in G.R. No. 163295.
Per its en banc Resolution of June 1, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of these petitions.
The recourse stemmed from the following essential and undisputed factual backdrop:
Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were
candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May
10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny
Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy 3 of Francis. Docketed as SPA Case No. 04-048,
the petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis having, according
to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed
office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding
to those elections.
To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the
office of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by
COMELEC winner in that contest. Alegre subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as Election
Case No. 6850 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC
declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, 4albeit the decision came
out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact
already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San
Vicente. TaSEHC
Acting on Alegre's petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis' certificate of candidacy for the May 10,
2004 elections, the First Division of the COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a
resolution 5 dismissing the said petition of Alegre, rationalizing as follows:
We see the circumstances in the case now before us analogous to those obtaining in
the sample situations addressed by the Highest Court in the Borja case. Herein, one
 of the requisites for the application of the three term rule is not present. Francis Ong
might have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998; 1998 to 2001 and
2001 to 2004. The mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001 cannot be considered
his because he was not duly elected thereto. The [RTC] of Daet, Camarines Norte,
Branch 41 has voided his election for the 1998 term when it held, in its decision that
Stanley Alegre was the "legally elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election in
San Vicente, Camarines Norte." This disposition had become final after the
[COMELEC] dismissed the appeal filed by Ong, the case having become moot and
academic.
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of the words of the Highest Court pronounced in the Lonzanida case and
applicable in the case at bench, Ong could not be considered as having served as
mayor from 1998 to 2001 because "he was not duly elected to the post; he merely
assumed office as a presumptive winner; which presumption was later overturned . . .
when [the RTC] decided with finality that [he] lost in the May 1998 elections." (Words
in bracket and emphasis in the original).
Undaunted, Alegre filed a timely motion for reconsideration, contending, in the main, that there was a
misapplication of the three-term rule, as applied in the cited cases of Borja vs.
Comelec and Lonzanida vs. Comelec, infra.
On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued, in SPA No. 04-048, a resolution 6 reversing the
March 31, 2004 resolution of the COMELEC's First Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis "as
disqualified to run for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the . . . May 10, 2004"; (b) ordering
the deletion of Francis' name from the official list of candidates; and (c) directing the concerned board
of election inspectors not to count the votes cast in his favor.
The following day, May 8, Francis received a fax machine copy of the aforecited May 7, 2004
resolution, sending him posthaste to seek the assistance of his political party, the Nationalist People's
Coalition, which immediately nominated his older brother, Rommel Ong (Rommel), as substitute
candidate. At about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day — which is past the deadline for filing a certificate
of candidacy, Rommel filed his own certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute
candidate for his brother Francis.
The following undisputed events then transpired:
1.On May 9, 2004, or a day before the May 10 elections, Alegre filed a Petition to Deny Due Course
to or Cancel Certificate of Rommel Ong.
2.Atty. Evillo C. Pormento, counsel for the Ong brothers, addressed a letter 7 to Provincial Election
Supervisor (PES) of Camarines Norte Liza Z. Cariño and Acting Election Officer Emily G. Basilonia in
which he appealed that, owing to the COMELEC's inaction on Alegre's petition to cancel Rommel's
certificate of candidacy, the name "Rommel Ong" be included in the official certified list of candidates
for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte. The desired listing was granted by the PES
Carino. SEcADa
3.On May 10, 2004, Alegre wrote 8 to then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano,
Commissioner-in-Charge for Regions IV and V, seeking clarification on the legality of the action thus
taken by the PES Cariño. Responding, Commissioner Garcillano issued a Memorandum under date
May 10, 2004 9 addressed to PES Liza D. Zabala-Cariño, ordering her to implement the resolution of
the COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May 7, 2004. 10 Said Memorandum
partly stated:
 The undersigned ADOPTS the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig [Director IV,
Law Department], which he quote your stand, "that substitution is not proper if the
certificate of the substituted candidacy is denied due course. In the Resolution of the
Commission En banc, the Certificate of candidacy of Francis Ong was denied due
course," and elaborated further that:
". . . there is an existing policy of the Commission not to include the name of a
substitute candidate in the certified list of candidates unless the substitution is
approved by the Commission.
In view, thereof, it is recommended that 1) the substitute certificate of
candidacy of Rommel Ong Gan Ong, should be denied due course; and 2) the
election officer be directed to delete his name from the list of candidates."
The above position of the Commission was in line with the pronouncement
of Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Abaya (311 SCRA 617) which states:
"There can no valid substitution where a candidate is excluded not only by
disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy."
In view thereof, you are hereby directed to faithfully implement the said Resolution of
the Commission En Banc in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May 7, 2004. (Emphasis
in the original; words in bracket added].
4.Owing to the aforementioned Garcillano Memorandum, it would seem that the Chairman of the
Municipal Board of Canvasser of San Vicente issued an order enjoining all concerned not to canvass
the votes cast for Rommel, prompting the latter to file a protest with that Board. 11
5.On May 11, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Alegre as the winning candidate
for the mayoralty post in San Vicente, Camarines Norte.12
On May 12, 2004, Francis filed before the Court a petition for certiorari, presently docketed as G.R.
No. 163295. His brother Rommel's petition in G.R. No. 163354 followed barely a week after.
In our en banc resolution dated June 1, 2004, G.R. No. 163295 and G.R. No. 163354 were
consolidated. 13
Meanwhile, on June 4, 2004, the COMELEC issued an order dismissing private respondent
Alegre's Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Rommel Ong, for being
moot and academic. 14
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
In G.R. No. 163295, whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its en bancresolution dated May 7, 2004 declaring
petitioner Francis as disqualified to run for Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10,
2004 elections and consequently ordering the deletion of his name from the official list of candidates
so that any vote cast in his favor shall be considered stray.
In G.R. No. 163354, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due
course to Rommel's certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his
brother Francis. cISAHT
A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges on the question of whether or not petitioner
Francis's assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998
to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. Petitioner Francis, on the other hand,
disagrees. He argues that, while he indeed assumed office and discharged the duties as Mayor of
San Vicente for three consecutive terms, his proclamation as mayor-elect in the May 1998 election
was contested and eventually nullified per the decision of the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte dated
July 4, 2001. Pressing the point, petitioner argues, citingLonzanida vs. Comelec 15 , that a
proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and one assuming office on the
strength of a protested proclamation does so as a presumptive winner and subject to the final
outcome of the election protest.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8.The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same rule as follows:
Sec. 43.Term of Office.
xxx xxx xxx
(b)No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive years in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites
must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in
the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. 16
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively
barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10,
2004 elections. There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected
mayor of that municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July
1, 1995-June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy
revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran
for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001
mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San
Vicente. The question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Francis's
assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30,
2001, may be considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term
limit rule.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, "service for the full term", and should
be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the
constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, 17 that it was
Francis' opponent (Alegre) who "won" in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally
elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical
and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired.
Petitioner Francis' contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as
his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His
proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the
1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the
functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule. EcAISC
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view
would mean that Alegre would — under the three-term rule — be considered as having served a term
by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term
pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.
Petitioner cites, but, to our mind, cannot seek refuge from the Court's ruling in, Lonzanida vs.
Comelec, 18 citing Borja vs. Comelec 19 . In Lonzanida, petitioner Lonzanida was elected and served
for two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. He
then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as
Mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election protest before the
RTC of Zambales, which, in a decision dated January 9, 1997, ruled that there was a failure of
elections and declared the position vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner
Lonzanida acceded to the order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed the office and performed his
duties up to March 1998 only. Now, during the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again ran for mayor of
the same town. A petition to disqualify, under the three-term rule, was filed and was eventually
granted. There, the Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to
the post in the May 1995 election, and that he did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by
reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. As the Court pointedly observed, Lonzanida "cannot be
deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate [and in fact
vacated] his post before the expiration of the term."
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida,
the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election",
and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed
by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-
1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In
fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service.
On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present case. But more
importantly, here, there was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis' service
respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the term in
question; he never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.
The ascription, therefore, of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it
disqualified Francis from running in the May 10, 2004 elections for the mayoralty post of San Vicente
and denying due course to his certificate of candidacy by force of the constitutional and statutory
provisions regarding the three-term limit rule for any local elective official cannot be sustained. What
the COMELEC en banc said in its May 7, 2004 assailed Resolution commends itself for concurrence:
As correctly pointed out by Petitioner-Movant [Alegre]in applying the ruling in
the Borja and Lonzanidacases in the instant petition will be erroneous because the
factual milieu in those cases is different from the one obtaining here. Explicitly, the
three-term limit was not made applicable in the cases
ofBorja and Lonzanida because there was an interruption in the continuity of service
of the three consecutive terms. Here, Respondent Ong would have served
continuously for three consecutive terms, from 1995 to 2004. His full term from 1998
to 2001 could not be simply discounted on the basis that he was not duly elected
 thereto on account of void proclamation because it would have iniquitous effects
producing outright injustice and inequality as it rewards a legally disqualified and
repudiated loser with a crown of victory. (Word in bracket added; emphasis in the
original)
Given the foregoing consideration, the question of whether or not then Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano overstepped his discretion when he issued the May 10, 2004 Memorandum, ordering the
implementation of aforesaid May 7, 2004 COMELEC en banc resolution even before its finality 20 is
now of little moment and need not detain us any longer. HCTDIS
Just as unmeritorious as Francis' petition in G.R. No. 163295 is Rommel's petition in G.R. No. 163354
in which he (Rommel) challenges the COMELEC's act of not including his name as a substitute
candidate in the official list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections. As it were, existing
COMELEC policy 21provides for the non-inclusion of the name of substitute candidates in the
certified list of candidates pending approval of the substitution.
Not to be overlooked is the Court's holding in Miranda vs. Abaya, 22 that a candidate whose
certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not given due course cannot be substituted by another
belonging to the same political party as that of the former, thus:
While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited
political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been
disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of
candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled
under Section 78 of the Code.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where
a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a
candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of
his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution
for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate
of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the
intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently
included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course
and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.
xxx xxx xxx
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in
much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all
can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.
xxx xxx xxx
After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily
understood why in Bautista [Bautista vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13,
1998] we ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all.
Applying this principle to the case at bar and considering that Section 77 of the Code
is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited
party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be any possible substitution of a
person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course.
In any event, with the hard reality that the May 10, 2004 elections were already passé, Rommel Ong's
petition in G.R. No. 163354 is already moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the assailed en banc Resolution dated May
7, 2004 of the COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-048 AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
||| (Ong v. Alegre, G.R. No. 163295, 163354, [January 23, 2006], 515 PHIL 442-457)