CASE DIGEST

1. Largo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177244, November 20, 2007

Facts:

December 17, 1997, petitioner Teodulo V. Largo, Section Chief,

Administrative/General Services of the National Power Corporation (NPC)
in Angat River Hydroelectric Power Plant (ARHEP), Norzagaray, Bulacan,
was administratively charged with grave misconduct. For violating NPC
Circular No. 97- 66 which prohibits personnel from carrying firearms inside
the NPC premises.

The NPC investigation revealed that on October 30, 1997, petitioner and
Olandesca attended a birthday party where petitioner claimed to have
been humiliated by the latter.

At around 5:05 in the afternoon of the same day, petitioner went to the
quarters of Olandesca at ARHEP shouting invectives and threatening to kill
Olandesca. Petitioner proceeded to the dirty kitchen at the back of the
quarters where he met Olandesca's wife.

While they were conversing, a dog suddenly appeared and barked at

petitioner. Claiming to have been frightened by the incessant barking of
the dog which was about to attack him, petitioner fired two shots. Unable
to find Olandesca Petitioner subsequently left the compound.

Meanwhile, petitioner retired from service effective January 1, 1998.

On March 19, 1998, the NPC Regional Board of Inquiry & Discipline
conducted a prehearing conference. The formal investigation was then
transferred to the Board of Inquiry and Discipline of the NPC Head Office,
which recommended that petitioner be held liable for simple misconduct.

On petitioner's motion for reconsideration, NPC President Jesus N. Alcordo

reduced the penalty to one year suspension, taking into consideration
that this was petitioner's first offense, the absence of physical harm
caused by the shots he fired, his 21 years of service, his consistent very
satisfactory performance, and Olandesca's act of humiliating him prior to
the incident.

Petitioner appealed to the CSC which on July 4, 2003, affirmed the finding
of the NPC that petitioner was guilty of grave misconduct but modified
the penalty to dismissal from service.

Issue:

1) Whether the retirement of petitioner rendered moot the resolution of

the instant administrative case; and
2) Whether petitioner was validly dismissed for serious misconduct.

Held:

On the first issue, Cessation from office by reason of resignation, death, or

retirement does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative case filed
against a public officer while he or she was still in the service, or render the
said case academic.

The jurisdiction of the disciplining authority attaches at the time of the

filing of the administrative complaint and is not lost by the mere fact that
the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the
pendency of his case.

This rule applies to all employees in the civil service, mindful of the
constitutional precept that public office is a public trust for which all
government employees and officials are accountable to the people.

The retirement of petitioner effective January 1, 1998, did not render moot
the instant case. The filing of the administrative complaint against
petitioner on December 17, 1997, prior to his retirement, effectively
conferred upon the NPC, the CSC, and this Court, the jurisdiction to
resolve the case until its conclusion. Hence, the guilt or innocence of
petitioner can be validly addressed by the Court in the instant
administrative case.

On the second issue, the Court Ruled that the complained acts of
petitioner constitute the administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, which need not be related or connected
to the public officer's official functions.
 As long as the questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of
his/her public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the
erring public officer or employee.

It found petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the

service, which under Section 52 of Rule IV of Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999, is classified as a grave
administrative offense punishable by suspension of six (6) months and 1
day to one (1) year if committed for the first time.

2. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Madriaga, G.R. No. 164316, September 27,
2006

Facts:

The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman charging GertrudesMadriaga, school principal of San
Juan Elementary School and Ana Marie Bernardo, Canteen Manager of
the same school, with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of
Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees. They were subsequently found guilty of the offense
charged. Consequently, they were meted out the penalty of six (6)
months imprisonment.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the six-month suspension
meted out by the Office of the Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo
(Gertrudes) is merely recommendatory to the Department of Education,
the Office of the Ombudsman filed the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose
administrative sanctions over public officials

Held:

Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants the Ombudsman

administrative disciplinary power to direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to the
Ombudsman of the power to ―recommend‖ the imposition of penalty on
erring public officials and employees and ensure compliance therewith.

The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee —
akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal,
without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the
Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for
disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's
"recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is actually
mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as
usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or
any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of
any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent
authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the
Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring
officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in R.A. 6770
intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the
proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.

The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in conjunction with
the phrases "ensure compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary
authority as provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770. In fine, the
Ombudsman's authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce
compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory
within the bounds of the law. The implementation of the order imposing
the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
3. Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231-32, January 28,
2014

Facts:

Sometime in 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed before
the PNP-NCR against Rolando Mendoza and four others. While said cases
were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National
Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner
Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to
said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate
administrative adjudication.

On February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio

Gonzales III, a Decision finding Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police
officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman.
They filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

On December 14, 2009, the pleadings mentioned and the records of the
case were assigned for review and recommendation to Graft
Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who released a
draft Order on April 5, 2010 for appropriate action by his immediate
superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and forwarded
said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010.

Not more than ten (10) days after, more particularly on May 6, 2010,
petitioner endorsed the Order, together with the case records, for final
approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose office it
remained pending for final review and action when Mendoza hijacked a
bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a
desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.

In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, a public outcry against

the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the
Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to
determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public
hearings and executive sessions. However, petitioner, as well as the
Ombudsman herself, refused to participate in the IIRC proceedings on the
assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent
constitutional body.

The IIRC eventually identified petitioner Gonzales to be among those in

whom culpability must lie. It recommended that its findings with respect to
petitioner Gonzales be referred to the Office of the President (OP) for
further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the
initiation of the proper administrative proceedings.

On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a Formal Charge against

petitioner. Petitioners asseverate that the President has no disciplinary
jurisdiction over them considering that the Office of the Ombudsman to
which they belong is clothed with constitutional independence and that
they, as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein, necessarily
bear the constitutional attributes of said office.

This case stems from the motion for reconsideration filed by the Office of
the President of the Court’s September 4, 2012 decision which ruled on
the petitions filed by Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III and Special
Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit. Their petitions challenged the
constitutionality of Section 8 (2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.

In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of

Section 8 (2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary
jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. The
Court, however, reversed the Office of the President’s ruling that: (i) it
found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct
constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on him the penalty of
dismissal.

In view of the Court's ruling, the OP filed the present motion for
reconsideration through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

Issue:

Whether or not, the Office of the President has constitutional or valid

statutory authority to subject the any of the deputies or staff of the
Ombudsman to an administrative investigation and to thereafter order his
removal as Deputy Ombudsman.

Held:
On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to
grant Gonzales' petition and to declare Section 8 (2) of RA No. 6770
unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all

acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public
officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers,
during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it
fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and
influence of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of external
reprisal by making it an "independent" office.

The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman

cannot be inferior — but is similar in degree and kind — to the
independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the
Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political interstices
of a republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper
functioning.

Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the

President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department
are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but
seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman
itself.

The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate,

includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in
carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the
constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8 (2) of RA No.
6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the
independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the
Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances
that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.

What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for
her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance
of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her
complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as
she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external
to her Office.
4. Hagad vs. Gozo-Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995

Facts:
Administrative complaints were filed by Mandaue City Councilors Dionson
and Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas
against Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and SangguniangPanlungsod
Member Mayol, for having conspired to falsify Ordinance 018/92 to
increase the allocated appropriation from 3.4M to 7M. The councilors
moved for the preventive suspension of the said officials. Aside from
opposing the motions, the said officials also moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the Ombudsman did not have jurisdiction to hear the
case. They averred that Section 63 of the LGC vested the power to
investigate and discipline local officials (of provinces/highly urbanized
cities/independent component cities) with the Office of the President.

The Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss and placed the officials
under preventive suspension. The officials filed for a writ of preliminary
injunction and TRO with the RTC. Respondent judge ruled in favor of the
officials, enjoining the enforcement of the preventive suspension, hence
this petition.

Issue:

Whether the Ombudsman has been divested of his authority to conduct

administrative investigations over local elective officials by virtue LGC of
1991?

Held:

SC agreed with the SolGen that there is nothing in the LGC to indicate
that it has repealed the provisions of the Ombudsman Act. Repeal of laws
by implication are not favored, unless the two laws are absolutely
incompatible.

In the old LGC of 1983, the authority to conduct administrative

investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial
or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local
Government. With the passage of the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the
Ombudsman was vested with concurrent authority. Since Sections 61 & 63
of the new LGC were adopted from the old LGC, except for the
substitution of the “Minister of Local Government” by the “Office of the
President”, no other change was effected except for such substitution.

The 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the

Ombudsman Act is not repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension
provided by Section 63 of the LGC.
The two laws govern differently. The 6-month preventive suspension under
Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act may be imposed on all public officials,
whether elective or appointive and to justify it, the evidence of guilt
should be strong, and

A. the charge against the officer or employee should involve

dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty

B. the charges should warrant removal from the service; or

C. the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the

case filed against him

On the other hand, to justify the imposition of the 60-day preventive

suspension under Section 63 of LCG of 1991 on an elective local official, it
would be enough that the issues have been joined and

a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent

has committed the act or acts complained of,

b) the evidence of culpability is strong,

c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or

d) The continuance in office of the respondent could influence

the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of
the records and other evidence.

Hearing is not a requirement before preventive suspension is imposed. In

this case, the Ombudsman imposed the preventive suspension after the
officials filed their opposition and Mayor Ouano filed his memorandum.
Being a preventive measure merely aimed to aid to the investigation and
not to serve as penalty, there is no need for a finding of guilt before it can
be imposed. The charges being of very serious nature, it was within the
Ombudsman's judgment to determine of the imposition was proper.

The RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for remedy.

Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act provides that no court shall hear any
appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

The order of the RTC ANNULLED.

5. Larin vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, October 16, 1997

Facts:

Petitioner AquilinoLarin is the Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of

Internal Revenue, and he also appears to be a co- accused in
two criminal cases for violating Section 268(4) of the National Internal
Revenue Code and Section 3 of R.A. 3019. Subsequently petitioner was
convicted and this was reported to the President, the then Senior
Deputy Executive Secretary by the authority of the president issued Memo
order 164 creating an executive committee to investigate the
administrative charges.

The committee required that petitioner filed a position paper with regard
to the charges against him, the petitioner complied, and however his
statement was that he cannot comment on the merits of the case for fear
of being cited in contempt by the court. Petitioner also alleged that the
committee doesn’t have any jurisdiction over his person, that the case
cannot be validly filed without violating res judicata, his rights against
double jeopardy and lastly to proceed with the investigation would be
redundant and oppressive against him. While all this is pending, the
president issued an order for the streamlining of BIR, in which case the
office of the petitioner was abolished by the order. His office being
abolished, the petitioner was not reinstated as an
assistant commissioner of BIR, instead another Administrative order was
issued in which it stated that he is being dismissed for being guilty of grave
misconduct in connection to the criminal cases filed against him.
Issue:

Whether the dismissal of the petitioner was valid or not.

a. Who has the power to discipline the petitioner?
b. was due process observed
c. What is the effect of the petitioners acquittal in the criminal case
d. Does the president have the power to reorganize BIR e. was the
reorganization done in bad faith.

Held:

The court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls under the category of
Career Executive Service, which is appointed by the president and being
a presidential appointee, it follows that the president have the power to
discipline the petitioner. Despite the fact that the constitution grants the
president the power to appoint and the inherent power to remove, such
power is not without limit. Under the Administrative code of 1987, career
services are characterized to have security of tenure, therefore the
petitioner is protected from being willfully removed by the president, the
only way that the petitioner can be validly removed is for a valid cause
and in accordance with the procedural due process. According to the
Court it found that, although the procedural due process was followed
and complied with the petitioner was not removed for a valid cause,
since to start with the committee was created to investigate the
administrative aspect of the criminal cases being faced by the petitioner
at that time. Now taking into consideration that the petitioner was
acquitted from the criminal cases, the court believes that there is no
ground for the administrative case to continue. It is admitted
that criminal cases and administrative cases usually progress
independently, however in this case it was proven in the criminal case
that the petitioner never committed any of the alleged acts, therefore the
case for the administrative case was also terminated, and therefore there
is no longer any valid cause for the removal of the petitioner.

As for the validity of E.O. 132 which reorganized the BIR, the court ruled
that the president has the authority to do so, as seen in the preamble of
the E.O. which stated the legal basis of its issuance. Though it is admitted
that the president had the power to reorganize the BIR, the court stated
that such power is not limitless, the reorganization to be valid must be
done in good faith. In the instant case the court found that the
reorganization was done in bad faith or at least there are indications of
bad faith, such as when the E.O. abolished the intelligence and
investigation office and at the same time creating Intelligence and
Investigation service to do the same functions of the abolished office.
Most importantly is the non-reappointment of the petitioner, the petitioner
being a holder of a career service, should have been prioritized or
preferred in appointing people to new offices created by the
reorganization, but in this case the petitioner was never reappointed
instead he was dismissed from service without any separation benefits at
all. The court ruled that the petitioner is reinstated as an
assistant commissioner and is entitled to back wages.