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1. MANUEL YAP VS.

CA The Motion in question does not affect the substantive rights of private respondents
as it merely seeks to extend the period to file the Record on Appeal, which extension
Facts: On September 11, 1973, private respondents, spouses Raymond Tomassi may be granted by the Trial Court upon application made prior to the expiration of the
and Lydia Tomassi, filed a complaint for Damages against petitioner Manuel Yap, original period (Berkenkotter v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 228 [[1973]), Neither was
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XIII, docketed as Civil Case No. R- there any claim that said Motion, which was grounded on justifiable reason, was
13571. interposed to delay the appeal. As early as Moya v. Barton, 76 Phil. 831 [1946], this
Court held that a Motion requesting an extension within which to file Record on
Petitioner-defendant filed his Answer with Special Defenses and Counterclaim, after Appeal may be considered as one which may be heard ex-parte. In Que Tiac v.
which, trial ensued. On January 31, 1978, the Trial Court rendered judgment against Republic, 43 SCRA 36 (1972), it was similarly held that a telegraphic Motion for
petitioner, ordering him to pay private respondents P30,000.00, as moral and extension of time to file a Record on Appeal is addressed to the discretion of the
exemplary damages, P20,000.00, as actual damages, P5,000.00, as attorney’s fees, Court, which may act thereon ex-parte And in the more recent case of Commercial
and the costs of suit. Within the period prescribed by law, he filed a Notice of Appeal, Union Assurance Company Limited v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, 86
a Cash Appeal Bond, and a Motion for Extension of twenty days from March 13, 1978 SCRA 79, 98 (1978), this Court ruled that the Trial Court has the power and authority
(until April 2,1978) within which to file his Record on Appeal. The Motion was not so act on an ex-parte Motion for extension of time to file the Record on Appeal, which
acted upon by the Trial Court. On March 30, 1978, within the extended period prayed was filed within the original period prescribed by the Rules since the said Motion did
for, petitioner submitted his Record on Appeal, but the Trial Court disapproved the not appear to be a litigated or a contentious Motion and may be acted upon even
same for having been filed out of time, petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file without proof of service on adverse party.
it not having been acted upon for lack of notice of hearing. The Court of Appeals, on a
Petition for" Certiorari and Mandamus," ruled that the Trial Court committed no grave
abuse of discretion in disapproving petitioner’s Record on Appeal because it was filed
out of time. Hence, this Petition for Review. 2. AZAJAR VS. CA

FACTS:
Issue: Whether or not a motion for extension of time to file record on appeal, is a
litigated and contentious motion which requires a notice of hearing before it may be 1. Azajar purchased thru the agent of Cham Samco 100 kegs of nails of
acted upon by the trial court or is it one that may be heard ex-parte and therefore various sizes and paid P18,000 in full. However, Cham Samco only
does not need a notice of hearing. delivered a part of the quantity ordered. Azajar filed a complaint before the
CFI of Cam Sur.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the Trial Court has the power to act on the ex-
parte Motion for extension of time to file the Record on Appeal since the said Motion 2. Instead of submitting an answer, Samco filed a motion to dismiss on two
grounds: failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and that venue
did not appear to be a contentious Motion and may be acted upon even without proof
was improperly laid.
of service on adverse party; consequently, the Petition should be granted because
dismissal of appeals on a purely technical ground is frowned upon as the policy of the 3. The motion to dismiss contained a notice addressed to the Clerk of Court.
Court is to encourage the hearing of appeals on the merit.
4. Contending that such notice was fatally defective, Azajar filed a motion to
As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to relief declare Samco in default, which the court granted. Azajar was allowed to
sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not present evidence ex parte and the court rendered judgment against Samco.
affected without an opportunity to be heard (Amante v. Sunga, 64 SCRA 192 (1975),
5. The TC justified its order of default in this wise: that instead of filling an
citing 60 C.J.S. 15). The three-day-notice required by law is intended not for the answer to the complaint, Samco filed a motion to dismiss which is not a
benefit of the movant but to avoid surprise upon the adverse party and to give the motion at all because the “notice” is directed to the Clerk of Court instead of
latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion (J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. v. the party concerned (as required by Sec.5, Rule 15, RC) and is without the
Magdangal, 4 SCRA 84 (1962). No motion shall be acted upon by the court without requisite notice of hearing directed to the CC and not to the parties, and
proof of service of the notice, "except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the merely stating that the same be submitted for resolution. It is without the
adverse party or parties are not affected" (Section 6, Rule 15, Rules of Court). requisite notice of time and place of hearing.

6. Aggrieved, Samco went to CA for recourse, but the CA affirmed the decision
of the TC. However, on motion for reconsideration, CA reversed itself and
declared that technicalities should be brushed aside so that Samco can be to Recall Compromise Agreement since the other property owner and other trustees
given a day in court. of petitioner were not consulted prior to the signing of the agreement. Angeles
opposed the motion.Judge Calderon-Bargas issued an Order stating that Record
ISSUE: WON the failure of Cham Samco to set its motion to dismiss for hearing on a shows that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Compromise Agreement and Motion
specified date and time and for not addressing the same to the party interested is to Approve Compromise Agreement both failed to comply with Sec[s]. 4 and 5, Rule
fatal to his cause. 15 of the Civil Procedure. Both proceedings have no specific date of hearing. The
reason why the Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement up to now has not yet
been acted upon was that it has no date of hearing.Thus, these are considered mere
scrap[s] of paper. The TC approved the Compromise Agreement. Angeles then
HELD: Yes. Although the Court sided with CA that technicalities should be set aside moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. The TC required petitioner to comment
to Samco to be afforded with his day in court. on the motion within ten (10) days.TC directed the Clerk of Court to issue a writ of
execution. On the same date, the trial court received petitioner’s Motion for Extension
1. The law explicitly requires that notice of motion shall be served by the of Time to File Comment with Entry of Appearance which was denied on October 10,
appellant to all parties concerned at least 3 days before the hearing, 2002. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration of the October 3, 2002
together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers Order.Petitioner came to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. The CA
accompanying it; and that notices shall be directed to the parties concerned denied the petition and ruled that petitioner was not deprived of due process when the
stating the time and place for the hearing of the motion. Failure to comply trial court issued the October 3, 2002 and the October 10, 2002 Orders since it was
with the requirement is a fatal flaw. given sufficient time to file its comment. The appellate court did not rule on the
second and third issues after noting that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
2. Such notice is required to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and give October 3, 2002 Order had not yet been resolved by the trial court. It did not resolve
the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion as well as to the issues even after the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on
determine or make determinable the time of submission of the motion for December 12, 2003,11 ratiocinating that the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion
resolution. for reconsideration did not operate to reinstate the petition because at the time it was
filed, petitioner had no cause of action.Hence , this petition.
3. Without the notice, the occasion would not arise to determine with
reasonable certitude whether and within what time the adverse party would ISSUES: WON the trial court seriously erred: (1) in issuing the October 3, 2002 and
respond to the motion, and when the motion might already be resolved by the October 10, 2002 Orders without awaiting petitioner’s comment; (2) in granting
the Court. the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution although it lacked the requisite notice of
hearing; and (3) in issuing the writ of execution since it varied the tenor of the
4. The duty to give that notice is imposed on the movant and not on the court. decision dated June 28, 2002.

HELD:

3. KKK FOUNDATIONVS. HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS On the first issue, we note that in its September 9, 2002 Order, the trial court gave
petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment to Angeles’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution. While petitioner claims that it received the Order only on September 21,
2002, Angeles counters that petitioner received it on September 12, 2002. We are
FACTS:On March 1, 2002, petitioner, filed a complaint for Annulment of Extra-judicial more inclined to believe Angeles’s allegation since the trial court itself declared in its
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage and/or Nullification of Sheriff’s Auction Sale and Order dated October 10, 2002 that the Order dated September 9, 2002 was
Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.3 personally served upon petitioner on September 12, 2002.13 Thus, petitioner had
Petitioner alleged that: (1) the auction sale was made with fraud and/or bad faith until September 22, 2002 within which to file its comment or to request for an
since there was no public bidding; (2) the sheriff did not post the requisite Notice of extension of time. Consequently, petitioner’s motion for extension and comment were
Sheriff’s Sale; (3) the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure was fatally defective since it not seasonably filed and such procedural lapse binds petitioner.
sought to foreclose properties of two different entities; (4) the foreclosed properties
were awarded and sold to Imelda A. Angeles for an inadequate bid of only Anent the second issue, a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections
P4,181,450; and (5) the auction sale involved eight parcels of land covered by 4 and 5 of Rule 1514 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper,
individual titles but the same were sold en masse. On March 7, 2002, Judge which the Clerk of Court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to
Calderon-Bargas issued TRO preventing Angeles from consolidating her ownership act upon. Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of the time and the place
to the foreclosed properties. On even date, petitioner and Angeles executed a of hearing of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to
Compromise Agreement wherein petitioner agreed to pay Angeles the bid price of the comply with these requirements renders their motions fatally defective. However,
eight parcels of land within 20 days. The parties then filed a Motion to Approve there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These exceptions are: (1)
Compromise Agreement.On April 1, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final SC ordered that the case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Morong,
and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained Rizal, Branch 78, which is hereby ORDERED to issue another writ of execution
therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the against petitioner KKK Foundation, Inc., in conformity with the Decision dated June
resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of 28, 2002 of the trial court. This is without prejudice to filing a new motion for
the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with consolidation by respondent Angeles.
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.A
notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process to afford the Rule 12 – Motions for Bill of Particulars
adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court.
Through such notice, the adverse party is given time to study and answer the 1. SANTOS V. LIWAG (G.R. No. L-24238 November 28, 1980)
arguments in the motion. Records show that while Angeles’s Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution contained a notice of hearing, it did not particularly state the date DOCTRINE: The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of
and time of the hearing. However, scstill find that petitioner was not denied particulars rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in
procedural due process. Upon receiving the Motion for Issuance of Writ of matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court in that regard will not be
Execution, the trial court issued an Order dated September 9, 2002 giving petitioner reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous
ten (10) days to file its comment. The trial court ruled on the motion only after the order. EMERGENCY RECIT (Very short case – please refer to the facts below)
reglementary period to file comment lapsed. Clearly, petitioner was given time to
study and comment on the motion for which reason, the very purpose of a notice of FACTS: • June 8, 1964: Jose Santos filed a complaint against Lorenzo Liwag with the
hearing had been achieved.Procedural due process is not based solely on a CFI of Manila, which seeks to annul certain documents which were alleged to be
mechanical and literal application that renders any deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, done with malice, threats, false pretenses, machination, misrepresentations, and
procedural rules are liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist in other fraudulent means, with damages and costs.
obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any action and proceeding.
• July 4, 1964: Santos filed a motion asking the court to order Liwag (petitioner) to
On the last issue, SC note that the Compromise Agreement approved by the trial submit bill of particulars on certain allegations of the complaint believed to be vague
court in its Decision dated June 28, 2002 merely provided that petitioner would pay and conflicting, and that he be informed of the charges filed against him to prepare an
Angeles the bid price of P5,500,000, for the eight parcels of land subject of the intelligent and proper pleading necessary and appropriate in the premises
auction sale, within twenty (20) days. Upon payment, Angeles would execute a
Certificate of Deed of Redemption and a Deed of Cancellation of Mortgage, and • Liwag opposed the said motion and said that the allegations in the complaint filed
surrender to petitioner the titles to the eight parcels of land. Nevertheless, when the are sufficient and contains the facts needed for a cause of action to exist and Santos’
trial court issued the writ of execution, the writ gave Sheriff Bisnar the option "to allow motion is indeed evidentiary in nature Trial Court
the consolidation of the subject real properties in favor of the defendant Imelda
Angeles." • Granted the motion and directed the plaintiff to submit a bill of particulars with
respect to the paragraphs specified in defendant’s motion
Undoubtedly, the writ of execution imposed upon petitioner an alternative obligation
which was not included or contemplated in the Compromise Agreement. While the • When plaintiff failed to comply with the order of the court, the complaint was
complaint originally sought to restrain Angeles from consolidating her ownership to dismissed with costs against the plaintiff
the foreclosed properties, that has been superseded by the Compromise Agreement.
Therefore, the writ of execution which directed Sheriff Bisnar to "cause the Register of ISSUE: 1. WON the trial court erred in granting the motion for bill of particulars filed
Deeds of Morong, Rizal, to allow the consolidation of the subject real properties in by Liwag.
favor of the defendant Imelda Angeles" is clearly erroneous because the judgment
under execution failed to provide for consolidation. Because the writ of execution HELD/RATIO: 1. NO. • BILL OF PARTICULARS ARE DISCRETIONARY UPON
varied the terms of the judgment and exceeded them, it had no validity. The writ of THE COURTS o The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of
execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed, as it may not vary particulars rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in
the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Neither may it go beyond the terms of matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court in that regard will not be
the judgment sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with the reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous
judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has pro tanto no validity.20 order. o Complaint was indeed drawn and suffers from vagueness and generalization
to enable the defendant properly to prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify
issues and aid the court in an orderly and expeditious disposition in the case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated • RULES ON BILL OF PARTICULARS ON THE GROUND OF VAGUE COMPLAINT
November 28, 2003 and the Resolution dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals o If an action (like this case) is one for the annulment of documents that have been
in CA-G.R. SP No. 73965 are MODIFIED such that the writ of execution issued on allegedly executed by reason of deceit, machination, false pretenses,
October 11, 2002 by Judge Adelina Calderon-Bargas is declared NULL and VOID. misrepresentation, threats, and other fraudulent means. o Deceit, machination, false
pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats, however, are largely conclusions of law they learned that an order of default had been issued, so they immediately
and mere allegations thereof without a statement of the facts to which such terms filed a motion asking that the same be set aside that their pending motion for
have reference are not sufficient. The allegations must state the facts and a bill of particulars be resolved and that they be given a reasonable period
circumstances from which the fraud, deceit, machination, false pretenses, thereafter within which to file their answer to the complaint.
misrepresentation, and threats may be inferred as conclusions. § In his complaint, the
appellant merely averred that all the documents sought to be annulled were all 5. On December 13, 1957 the court denied the motion and rendered its
executed through the use of deceits, machination, false pretenses, decision in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants.
misrepresentations, threats, and other fraudulent means without the particular-facts
on which alleged fraud, deceit, machination, or misrepresentations are predicated. 6. On January 4, 1958 it denied defendants' motion for reconsideration of the
order of denial. On January 24, defendants filed their record on appeal (to
• FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER TO FILE OF A BILL OF this Court from the order of December 13, 1957), but as they subsequently
PARTICULARS RESULTS IN DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT o Hence, it was proper filed a petition for relief from the judgment by default, they asked that
for the trial court to grant the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars, and when the consideration and approval of their record on appeal be held in abeyance
plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the trial court correctly dismissed the until said petition had been resolved. The request was granted. Defendant's
complaint. petition for relief, which was filed on January 28, 1958, was denied on March
21, as was also, on September 20, 1958 their motion for reconsideration of
the order of denial.

2. FAUSTA AGCANAS, JUAN MIGUEL, JUANITA MIGUEL, assisted by her 7. On October 4, 1958 the court denied likewise their motion for a writ of
husband ULPIANO PASION, preliminary injunction to restrain execution of the judgment by default.
assisted by her husband JUAN PASCUAL vs. BRUNO MERCADO and ANTONIO Hence, this appeal.
DASALLA
Issue: Whether or not upon denial of a defendants' motion to dismiss the
Facts: reglementary period within which to file an answer resumes running even though the
motion for a bill of particulars of the same defendants is still pending and unresolved.
1. On November 25, 1956 plaintiffs filed this action to recover portions of a
parcel of land in Isabela, and damages. Under date of December 4, 1956 Held:
defendants filed a motion for a bill of particulars, with notice of hearing on
December 8, but since the motion was actually received in court only on Both a motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of particulars interrupt the time to file
December 12 the court set it for hearing on December 22. a responsive pleading. In the case of a motion to dismiss, the period starts running
against as soon as the movant receives a copy of the order of denial. In the case
2. On December 17, however, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the of a motion for a bill of particulars, the suspended period shall continue to run upon
complaint, with a prayer that consideration of their motion for a bill of service on the movant of the bill of particulars, if the motion is granted, or of the notice
particulars be held in abeyance pending resolution of their motion to dismiss. of its denial, but in any event he shall have not less than five days within which to file
On December 22, 1956, the date set by the court for the hearing of the his responsive pleading.
motion for a bill of particulars and by defendants for the hearing of their
motion to dismiss, the court issued an order postponing "consideration" of When appellants filed a motion to dismiss they requested that resolution of their
both motions to December 29. previous motion for a bill of particulars be held in abeyance. This was but practical
because if the court had granted the motion to dismiss, there would have been no
3. On March 7, 1957 the court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered need for a bill of particulars. Resolution of the motion for the purpose was necessary
defendants "to answer the complaint within the reglementary period provided only in the event that court should deny, as it did, the motion to dismiss, in which case
for by the Rules of Court." Hearing of the case on the merits was set for the period to file an answer remained suspended until the motion for a bill of
October 29, 1957, notice of which was duly received by defendants. particulars is denied or, if it is granted, until the bill is served on the moving party.
Defendants not having filed their answer, plaintiffs, on October 17, 1957,
moved to have them declared in default. On the same day the court issued Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
the order of default together with another order commissioning the clerk of admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
court to receive plaintiff's evidence. adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.

4. On October 21, 1957 defendants moved to cancel the hearing scheduled for No action having been taken thereon until the present, the period to answer has
October 29, on two grounds one of which was that their motion for a bill of not yet expired. The lower court, therefore, erred in declaring appellants in
particulars had not yet been resolved. The motion to cancel was set for defaults and in taking all the subsequent actions it did in the case.
hearing on October 26, 1957. When defendants arrived in court on that day
The order of default issued and the decision rendered by the trial court are set aside of evidence by which these material elements are to be established." It refers to "the
and the case is remanded for further proceedings, pursuant to the Rules. facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be
required to prove the existence of those facts." And a motion for bill of particulars
will not be granted if the complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already
3. Salita vs Magtolis states a sufficient cause of action. 11 A motion for bill of particulars may not
call for matters which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial.
Facts: Such information may be obtained by other means. 12

1. Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman Catholic We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of Particulars filed by
Church in Ermita, Manila. private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more details
from private respondent would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters.
2. They separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the Indeed, petitioner has already been adequately apprised of private respondent’s
ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity. cause of action against her thus —

3. The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional Trial Court of . . . . (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
Quezon City. Therein it is alleged that petitioner came to realize that respondent obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital demands made by his profession — that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine —
obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of
marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter."Edwin specified attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his
that at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was job.
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that petitioner can
made by his profession — that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has
petitioner’s time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of already alleged that "she (petitioner) was unable to understand and accept the
attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to demands made by his profession . . . upon his time and efforts . . . " Certainly,
lose his job. she can respond to this. To demand for more details would indeed be asking
for information on evidentiary facts — facts necessary to prove essential or
4. Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of ultimate facts. 13 For sure, the additional facts called for by petitioner regarding
particulars. She argued that the "assertion (in the Bill of Particulars) is a her particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary
statement of legal conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel and not an matters is not the function of a motion for bill of particulars. 14
averment of ‘ultimate facts,’ as required by the Rules of Court, from which such
a conclusion may properly be inferred . . . ." 4 But finding the questioned Bill of
Particulars adequate, the trial court issued an order upholding its sufficiency
and directing Joselita to file her responsive pleading.

5. She filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court but the SC referred it to
the CA. The CA denied her petition.

Issue: WON the Bill of Particulars submitted by herein respondent is of sufficient


definiteness or particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her
responsive pleading or for trial.

Held: Yes. A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff’s cause or causes of action." 9 Ultimate facts has been defined as
"those facts which the expected evidence will support." 10 As stated by private
respondent, "[t]he term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars
RULE 16 – Motion to Dismiss P. R. Roman, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that venue was improperly
laid, the complaint states no cause of action and the court has no jurisdiction over the
RAMOS VS. PERALTA subject of the action or suit. In its motion to dismiss, P. R. Roman, Inc. cited the
pendency before the then CFI of Bataan of Civil Case No 4102 instituted by P.R.
Put in issue in this petition for review on certiorari is the propriety of the dismissal by Roman, Inc. against petitioner Benedicto Ramos on August 13, 1976 to quiet its title
the then Court of First Instance of (CFI) of Manila, Branch XVII of petitioner's action over the Salgado fishpond.
for consignation of the sum of P70,000.00 representing advance rentals for the 101-
hectare Salgado fishpond located in Bo. Balut, Pilar, Bataan. On August 27, 1976, respondent CFI of Manila issued an order 4 dismissing Civil
Case No. 103647, stating in part:
Petitioner started occupying the Salgado fishpond in 1964 by virtue of a lease
contract executed in his favor by private respondents spouses Juvencio and Juliana Without discussing in detail the grounds mentioned above, the Court really sees that
Ortanez. The original lease for a term of five (5) years from January 1, 1964 to this case should be dismissed not only insofar as against P. R. Roman, Inc. but also
January 1, 1990, was renewed several times, the last renewal being on June 28, as against the other defendants mentioned above for the reason, principally, that
1974 under a "Kasunduan sa Pag-upa" for a period of three (3) years starting January there is already a case pending between the same parties and for the same cause in
1, 1975 to December 31, 1977. Civil Case No. 4102 of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, entitled P. R.
Roman, Inc. vs. Benedicto Roman, which is precisely for the ownership of the subject
Unknown to petitioner, title 1 to said property was in the name of Philippine matter of the property allegedly leased to the plaintiff herein (Exhibit "A"-Motion). In
International Surety Co., Inc., a corporation founded, organized and 99.5%-owned by the said case, the defendant therein, Benedicto Ramos, who is the plaintiff in the case
the Salgado spouses. Later renamed Mindanao Insurance Co., Inc., 2 said at bar, filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against the spouses
corporation was placed under receivership and liquidation on June 20, 1968 in Civil surnamed Ortanez and the Mindanao Insurance Company Inc. All the issues
Case No. Q-10664 of the then CFI of Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City, upon application respecting the fishpond, including the lease contract, are necessarily involved in the
of Insurance Commissioner Gregoria Cruz-Ansaldo who was appointed receiver. case pending now in Bataan. Aside from the above, the Court cannot decide this case
because it cannot pre-empt the Court of Bataan on whether or nor the P. R. Roman,
Thereafter on February 23, 1976, respondent P. R. Roman, Inc. purchased from Inc. is already the owner because if it finds that the said defendant P. R. Roman, Inc.
Mindanao Insurance the Salgado fishpond for P950,000.00. The deed of sale was is really the owner of the fishpond, there is no more lease for which rentals are to be
signed by the receiver and duly approved by the liquidation court. paid.

Apparently due to this development, the spouses Ortanez refused to accept from Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was unsuccessful, the court a quo, standing
petitioner the advance rentals on the fishpond due on March 15, 1976 in the amount "pat on its previous order and reiterat(ing) its dismissal of the case, without costs." 5
of P30,000.00.
Hence this petition anchored on the following ascribed errors of law: 6
On or about May 1, 1976, petitioner received a letter from Don Pablo R. Roman
informing him of the latter's acquisition of the fishpond and intention to take 1. The respondent court erred in not holding that the only issue in consignation of
possession thereof on May 16, 1976. In his letter-reply, petitioner reminded Mr. funds is whether the defendant is willing to accept the proffered payment or not.
Roman of his lease contract over the fishpond and refused to consent to the intended
take over. Notwithstanding petitioner's objection, P. R. Roman, Inc. took over 2. The respondent court erred in not holding that the prerogative of choosing the
possession of the fishpond. proper venue belongs to the plaintiff.

On August 2, 1976, petitioner filed before the CFI of Manila the aforesaid complaint, 3. The respondent court erred in holding that the subsequent filing of Civil Case No.
docketed as Civil Case No. 103647, 3 against private respondents Juvencio and 4102 before the Court of First Instance of Bataan is a bar to the prosecution of Civil
Juliana Ortanez, Mindanao Insurance and P. R. Roman, Inc. for consignation of the Case No. 103647 before it.
sum of P70,000.00 representing advance rentals on the fishpond in the amounts of
P30,000.00 and P40,000.00 respectively due on March 15, 1976 and June 15, 1976, Petitioner contends that the Bataan quieting-of-title Civil Case No. 4102 cannot serve
which he had previously tendered to, but refused by the spouses Ortanez and Pablo as a bar to his Manila consignation Civil Case No. 103647 because they involve
Roman. different issues. Civil Case No. 4102 deals with the question of ownership while the
only issue involved in his consignation case is whether or not the defendant is willing
to accept the proffered payment. In fact, petitioner posits, the action to quiet title is a consignation case is to compel therein defendants to accept his advance rentals, the
useless futile exercise as he does not question P. R. Roman Inc.'s ownership of the ultimate purpose of such action is to compel the new owner of the fishpond to
fishpond under consideration, but merely wishes to assert his leasehold and recognize his leasehold rights and right of occupation. In the last analysis, therefore,
possessory rights over said property under the "Kasunduan sa Pag-upa." He further the issue involved in Civil Case No. 103647 is the right of possession over the
contends that compelling him to litigate before the Bataan court would render fishpond intertwined with the validity and effectivity of the lease contract.
nugatory his right as a plaintiff to choose the venue of his action. Besides, Civil Case
No. 103647 was filed on August 2, 1976, ahead of Civil Case No. 4102 which was This is the same issue involved in Civil Case No. 4102. Although an action for
filed on a much later date, August 13, 1976, after the Manila CFI had already quieting of title refers to ownership, P. R. Roman, Inc. in its
acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 103647. complaint 9 in Civil Case No. 4102 alleged:

Private respondents counter that the view taken by petitioner of the Manila 5. There is a cloud on the aforesaid titles of plaintiff on the said agricultural land,
consignation case is quite limited and bookish, because while it may be true that marked Annexes "A", "B" and "C" hereof, as well as on its right of possession over
theoretically, the main issue involved in a consignation case is whether or not the that real property by reason of a certain "Kasunduan sa Pagupa" (Contract of Lease)
defendant is willing to accept the proffered payment, in the consignation case brought dated June 28, 1974 executed by and between the spouses Jovencio Ortanez and
by petitioner, other issues were pleaded by petitioner himself, such as the validity and Juliana S. Ortanez purportedly as "may-ari/Nagpapaupa" (owner/lessor) and the
binding effect of the lease contract and the existence of the supposed obligor-obligee defendant as lessee, which instrument is apparently valid or effective but in truth and
relationship. They further contend that a plaintiffs right of choice of venue is not in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and is prejudicial to the said
absolute, but must invariably how to the dismissal of the case because of litis titles of plaintiff as well as to its right of possession over the same
pendentia which, in refutation of petitioner's argument, does not require that there is fishpond/agricultural land in Barrio Balut, Pilar, Bataan.
a prior pending action, merely that there is a pending action.
Thus, while the respondent court in the assailed order of dismissal dated August 27,
We find for respondents. 1976 described Civil Case No. 4102 as "precisely for the ownership of the subject
matter of the property allegedly leased to the plaintiff herein," 10 its order dated
Under the rules and jurisprudence, for litis pendentia to be invoked as a ground for October 22, 1976 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, more perceptively
the dismissal of an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: stated: 11
(a) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;
(b) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the In Civil Case No. 4102 of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, entitled P. R. Roman,
same facts; and (c) The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment Inc. vs. Benedicto Ramos one of the principal issues is the possession of the fishpond
that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount subject matter of the lease supposed rents of which are supposed to be consignated
to res judicata in the other. 7 in the instant case, plaintiff P. R. Roman, Inc. there, claiming to be entitled to the
possession of said property as owner under a certificate of title and defendant
These requisites are present in the case at bar. It is worthwhile mentioning that in his Benedicto Ramos, plaintiff here, anchoring his claim of possession upon his lease
basic petition for review, one of the assigned errors of petitioner is that the with the Ortanez spouses against whom, on his motion, he filed a third party
respondent court erred in not holding that the parties in Civil Case No. 4102 are not complaint in which he prayed in the alternative, that should he lose possession of the
the same as the parties in Civil Case No. 103647. 8 However, in his brief, no further fishpond in favor of P. R. Roman, Inc., the Ortanezes should be condemned to
mention of this assigned error was made; a clear indication of petitioner's admission reimburse him the rentals he has already paid for the unexpired portion of the lease.
of the identity of parties in Civil Case No. 4102 and Civil Case No. 103647, The issue of whether or not the lease subsists even as regards P. R. Roman, Inc., for
particularly as he filed a third party complaint in Civil Case No. 4102 against the it is the view of Ramos that it bought the property with knowledge of the lease, is
spouses Ortanez and Mindanao Insurance. squarely planted in the case before the Court of First Instance of Bataan, and,
consequently, the more appropriate court with which rents are to be consignated. . . .
Anent the second element, we agree with private respondents' observation that
petitioner's approach to his consignation case is quite constricted. His contention that That whatever decision may be handed down in Civil Case No. 4102 would
the only issue in a consignation case is whether or not the defendant is willing to constitute res judicata in Civil Case No. 103647 is beyond cavil. Should the Bataan
accept the proffered payment is true only where there is no controversy with respect court rule that the lease contract is valid and effective against P. R. Roman, Inc., the
to the obligation sought to be discharged by such payment. His consignation case, petitioner can compel it to accept his proffered payment of rentals; otherwise, he may
however, is not as simple. While ostensibly, the immediate relief sought for in his not do so.
Petitioner next contends that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 103647 deprived him of constitutional prohibition they are proscribed from assailing the sale made between
his right to choose the venue of his action. Verily, the rules on the venue of personal them and herein private respondents.
actions are laid down generally for the convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses.
But, as observed by private respondents, this right given to the plaintiff is not 12 years after the above mentioned case was promulgated, the present case for the
immutable. It must yield to the greater interest of the orderly administration of justice, recovery of the lot was instituted with the same contention of the respondents
which as in this case, may call for the dismissal of an action on the basis of litis Dinglasan that the sale should be null and void on account of the constitutional
pendentia to obviate the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by two prohibition.
different courts. 12
A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioners in this case on the ground of res judicata.
As private respondents would put it, "(T)he Rules of Court are not perfect. It does not An opposition thereto was filed by plaintiffs, with the averment that the decision in the
pretend to be able to make everyone happy simultaneously or consecutively or all the prior case "cannot be pleaded in bar of the instant action because of new or additional
time. Even the Rules of Court has hierarchy of values; thus, the choice of venue may facts or grounds of recovery and because of change of law or jurisprudence.
bow to dismissal of the case because of litis pendentia. 13 At any rate, petitioner
cannot complain of any inconvenience arising from the dismissal of Civil Case No. The Court of Appeals denied the motion to dismiss.
103647. Being the defendant in Civil Case No. 4102, he cannot but litigate before the
Issue: Whether or not the motion to dismiss should be granted
Bataan court, and bringing his consignation case before the same court would
actually save him time, effort and litigation expenses. Held: Affirmative. The decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-5996, "Rafael Dinglasan,
et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al." constitutes a bar to Civil Case No. V-3064 before the
Finally, the rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should yield to
respondent court. Said Civil case, therefore, should have been dismissed because it
the earlier case. What is required merely is that there be another pending action, not
is a mere relitigation of the same issues previously adjudged with finality, way back in
a prior pending action. Considering the broader scope of inquiry involved in Civil Case
1956, between the same parties or their privies and concerning the same subject
No. 4102 and the location of the property involved, no error was committed by the
matter. We have consistently held that the doctrine of res judicata applies where,
lower court in deferring to the Bataan court's jurisdiction.
between a pending action and one which has been finally and definitely settled, there
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated August 27, 1976 of the then Court of First is Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, is AFFIRMED in toto. This decision is immediately
We find that in the ultimate analysis, Civil Case No. V-3064 is but an attempt to
executory, with costs against petitioner.
reopen the issues which were resolved in the previous case. Contrary to the
SO ORDERED. contentions of private respondents, there has been no change in the facts or in the
conditions of the parties. Posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court cannot
retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding where the
2. Lee Bun Ting and Ang Chia vs. Hon. Jose Aliagen, Rafael Dinglasan prior adjudication was had, whether the case should be civil or criminal in nature. The
et. al. determination of the questions of fact and of law by this Court on June 27, 1956 in
case No. L-5996 has become the law of the case, and may not now be disputed or
Facts: In a previous cases [G. R. No. L-5996, "Rafael Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun relitigated by a reopening of the same questions in a subsequent litigation between
Ting, et al.] decided by the SC with the same set of private parties, it was found that the same parties and their privies the same subject matter.
private respondents sold to herein petitioner a parcel of land located in Roxas City,
Capiz through a conditional sale. Lee, the buyer, on the other hand avers that it was
an absolute sale. Both trial court and CA ruled in favor of buyer Lee. The SC found 3. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, vs. HERMOGENES HIPOLITO and
that Lee is normally not allowed to purchase the property on the count of the LEONOR JUNSAY,
constitutional prohibition (Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, FACTS: June 18, 1959 – a complaint was filed alleging that defendant Hermogenes
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in Hipolito and Leonor Junsay obtained various sugar crop loans from plaintiff PNB
the Philippines.- Article 13, 1935 Consitution) But since it was also found out that the through its Victorias Branch, evidenced by promissory notes.
buyers (private respondents) are in pari delicto for selling the property in spite of the
The amount of the notes was a total of P9,692.00. Defendants only paid P3,905.61, An examination of the complaint herein does not indicate clearly that prescription has
leaving a balance of P6,786.39, which, added to accrued interest of P5,213.34, set in. On the contrary, it is belied by the allegation concerning defendant’s offer of
summed up to P11,999.73 as of January 17, 1957. payment made on May 7, 1957. Such offer hypothetically admitted in the motion,
worked as a renewal of the obligation. An offer of payment works as a renewal of the
Despite repeated demands, defendants failed and refused to pay said amount. May obligation and prevents prescription from setting in.
7, 1957 - defendants went to Atty. Francis I. Medel of the legal department of
plaintiff's Victorias branch and offered a plan of payment of the account It is true that defendants attached to the motion a joint affidavit of merit wherein they
deny having made an offer of a plan of payment. The denial, being a contrary
For reasons unknown to plaintiff and probably due to the transfer of defendant averment of fact, would be proper in the answer to the complaint but not in a motion
Hipolito as supervising teacher to some other province, his proposed plan of payment for dismissal, for the contradictory allegations would require presentation of evidence.
did not materialize. Said offer of plan of payment was an acknowledgment of Denial of allegations in a complaint is not proper in a motion to dismiss.
defendants' just and valid obligation. The prayer is for the court to order defendants to
pay to plaintiff the said amount of P11,999.73, with accrued annual interest thereon ( ** A denial of an allegation of a complaint, as for example the denial of an offer of
rate of 5% from January 17, 1957 up to the date of payment, plus attorney's fees payment which would prevent prescription from setting in, would be proper in the
equivalent to 10%.) answer to the complaint but not in a motion for dismissal, for the contradictory
allegations would require presentation of evidence
Defendants moved for a bill of particulars – denied. Defendants moved to dismiss on
the ground that plaintiff's cause of action already prescribed. attached to the motion: a The same is true of the other allegations in the complaint concerning, the demands
joint affidavit and defendants averred that they never made any acknowledgment of for payment sent by plaintiff upon defendants and the partial payments made by
indebtedness nor offered a plan of payment, but on the contrary had always them, all or some of which may have a material bearing on the question of
maintained that plaintiff's action had prescribed. prescription. In other words, the ground for dismissal not being indubitable, the lower
court should have deferred determination of the issue until after trial of the
Plaintiff’s opposition - contending that the prescriptive period had been suspended case on the merits.
by "EO No. 32, known as the Moratorium Law," and interrupted, pursuant to Article
1973 of the old Civil Code, by plaintiff’s written extra-judicial demands as well as by The order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for
defendants’ acknowledgment of the indebtedness. further proceedings.

Defendants reply to plaintiff's opposition - citing Bachrach Motors Co., Inc. v.


Chua Tia Hian, stated that EO. No. 32, if at all, suspended the prescriptive period 4. GAUDENCIO GUERRERO vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS
"only for 2yrs, 4 months and 16 days, from March 10, 1945, or only up to July 26, NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, and PEDRO
1948," - that the alleged written extrajudicial demands constitute self-serving G. HERNANDO, respondents.
evidence; and that defendant Hipolito’s letter of February 16, 1959 cannot be
considered as an acknowledgment of indebtedness. FACTS:
1. Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did
Lower court – dismissed the complaint: ruled that the 7 promissory notes constituted not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his
1 single obligation, that the last promissory note dated June 23, 1941, should be answer.
considered as the true date of the written contract, from which the 10-year 2. @ PRE-TRIAL: Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr.: NOTED THAT: GUERRERO and
prescriptive period and such period has been suspended for 2 years, 4 months and HERNANDO were related as brothers-in-law then JUDGE gave petitioner
sixteen 16 days (by reason of EO No. 32) until said Order was declared five (5) days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the
unconstitutional. parties were very close relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and
that the complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest efforts
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant’s denial of the allegations constitute as towards a compromise were exerted but failed and considered this
grounds for the dismissal of the complaint deficiency a JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT.
3. MR was filed by GUERRERO: brothers by affinity are not members of the
RULING: NO. The dismissal is erroneous. In a motion to dismiss defendant
same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a compromise –
hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations of fact contained in the complaint.
DENIED: "[f]ailure to allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise is
jurisdictional such that for failure to allege same the court would be deprived 1. On February 1, 1985, the Municipality of Norzagaray filed a complaint for
of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case." recovery of taxes against the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of
4. Case was dismissed without prejudice: No amended complaint filed Malolos, Bulacan.
2. Before the expiration of the 15-day reglementary period to answer, the
5. ISSUE: ON APPEAL: GUERRERO: petitioner filed two successive motions for extension of time to file
a. whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same responsive pleadings, which were both granted. The last day of the second
family contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New extension was May 28, 1985.
Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of 3. On May 25, 1985, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
Court requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit the ground of the plaintiffs lack of capacity to sue and lack of a cause of
between them may be instituted and maintained; action. The motion was denied "both for lack of merit and for having been
b. whether the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest improperly filed."
efforts towards a compromise were exerted, which efforts failed, is
a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 4. On July 25, 1985, the plaintiff moved to declare the petitioner in default for
having filed only the motion to dismiss and not a responsive pleading during
HELD: the extension granted. This declaration was made on August 2, 1985, and
1. The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to evidence for the plaintiff was thereafter received ex parte resulting in a
strengthen it as a basic autonomous social institution. This is also embodied judgment in its favor on February 4, 1986. The judgment was affirmed by the
in Art. 149, and given flesh in Art. 151, of the Family Code, which provides: respondent court in its decision dated April 7, 1989, which is the subject of
2. Considering that Art. 151 starts with the negative word "No", the requirement the present petition.
is mandatory 4 that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should
allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that
the same failed, so that "[i]f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact ISSUE: WON the Motion to Dismiss was seasonably filed.
made, the case must be dismissed."
3. BUT the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the above-
quoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon Ruling:
v. Gayon 6 that the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the There is no question that the motion to dismiss was filed seasonably, within
same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law". the period of the second extension granted by the trial court. It is true that
4. The requirement that the complaint or petition should allege that earnest such a motion could not be considered a responsive pleading as SC have
efforts toward a compromise have been made but that the same failed is held in many cases. Nevertheless, it is also true that in Section 1 of Rule 16
mandatory of the Rules of Court, it is provided that "within the time for pleading,a motion
5. The enumeration of “brothers and sisters” as members of the same family to dismiss the action may be made" on the grounds therein enumerated,
does not comprehend “sister-in-law”/ “brothers-in-law” are not listed in Art including the grounds invoked by the petitioner.
217 of the NCC as members of the same family and since Art 150 repeats Moreover, it is clearly provided in Section 4 of the same Rule that:
the same “members of the family” court finds no reason to alter the existing Sec. 4. Time to plead. — If the motion to dismiss is denied or if
jurisprudence determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the
6. 2nd ISSUE: The attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of
a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period.
family, absent such allegation in the complaint being assailable at any stage The motion to dismiss was filed on May 25, 1985, three days before the
of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action. expiration of the second extension. Notice of its denial was served on the
petitioner on July 29, 1985. From that date, the petitioner had 15 days within
5. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION, vs. COURT OF APPEALS which to file its answer, or until August 13, 1985. It was unable to do so,
and MUNICIPALITY OF NORZAGARAY, however, because of the default order issued by the trial court on August 2,
1985. On that date, the petitioner still had eleven days before the expiration
FACTS: of the 15-day reglementary period during which the petitioner was supposed
to file his answer.
The Court recapitulates the rules as to the filing of a Motion to dismiss by the 3. The dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a denial of
defendant as follows: due process, if from a consideration of the pleading it appears that there are
1. The trial court may in its discretion and on proper motion extend the 15- issues of fact which cannot be decided w/out the trial of the case on the
day reglementary period for the filing of responsive pleadings. merits.
2. During the original reglementary 15-day period, or any extension of such
period, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss the complaint. xxx Summary or outright dismissals of actions are not proper where there
3. If the motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant is allowed another fifteen are factual matters in dispute which need presentation and appreciation of
days from notice of the denial to file the responsive pleading. The full 15-day evidence. … Short cuts in judicial processes are to be avoided when they
reglementary period starts all over again. impede rather than promote a judicious dispensation of justice xxx

6. Borje vs. CFI of Misamis Occidental Br. II 7. DANFOSS, INC., Petitioners, vs. CONTINENTAL CEMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
Facts:
1. Borje is the counsel of the water consuming public of Ozamis City, he FACTS:
allegedly received a blank water bill, with no indication of the meter readings, 1. Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI) is an agent of Danfoss,
no. of cubic meters consumed and the amount to be paid, hence he refused Inc.’s products here in the Philippines. On September 1997, CCC ordered
to pay said bill which lead to the disconnection of his services; two unit 132 KW Danfoss Brand Frequency Converter/Inverter from MINCI
2. He brought an action for damages w/ preliminary injunction against MOWD to be used in the Finish Mill of its Cement Plant in Bulacan. In the terms of
in the respondent Court; conditions of the original purchase order, the two unit Frequency Converter
3. The Court then issued an order enjoining MOWD to disconnect the water shall be delivered by Danfoss within 8 to 10 weeks from the opening of the
service and subsequently to reconnect the service; letter of credit. The letter of credit opened by CCC in favour of Danfoss on
4. MOWD then filed a motion to dismiss based on 2 grounds: 1) lack of September 9, 1997.
jurisdiction of respondent Court and 2) another action pending between the 2. On September 17, 1997, MINCI informed CCC that its order are already
same parties for the same causes; ready for shipment and MINCI requested to amend the letter of credit
5. Respond Court dismissed the case but not based on the grounds above changing the port of origin/loading from Singapore to Denmark (Singapore is
mentioned but because there was no malice or bad faith in the severance of the Asian Regional Office of Danfoss, the Head Office of the company is
the water connection of petitioner and that MOWD had already reconnected Denmark). CCC complied and the port of origin in the letter of credit was
the same. changed.
3. On November 6, 1997, MINCI relayed to CCC that Danfoss Inc. was still
Issue: WON, respondent court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing checking the status of their order. CCC replied that every delay in the
the case based on the ground which is not alleged in the motion to dismiss delivery of the order will cause loss to their company, so CCC requested for
of MOWD early work out and immediate shipment to avoid further loss.
4. But, on November 9, 1997, Danfoss Inc. informed MINCI through fax, that
Held: YES. the reason for the delivery problems was that some of the supplied
1. The dismissal of an actions on grounds not alleged in the motion to dismiss components for the new VLT 5000 series (this may be a part of the
is improper for in so doing, a court in effect dismiss an action motu propio converter which is the subject thing in this case or a machine to create the
w/out giving Borje a chance to argue ithe point w/out receiving any converter) did not meet the agreed quality standard. So, Danfoss was
arguments or evidence in question. canvassing for another supplier for the said VLT 5000 series. In the fax,
2. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 8, it enumerates the grounds upon which an action there was no clear message as to when normal production will resume.
may be dismissed and it specifically ordains that a motion to this end be 5. Upon receiving the relayed information, CCC surmised that Danfoss would
filed. The only instance in which the court may dismiss upon a court’s own not be able to deliver their order. There was also no definite commitment of
motion on action is, when the “plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial the delivery from Danfoss and MINCI, so CCC informed MINCI that they
or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or to comply w/ intend to cancel its order. The order was cancelled on November 13, 1997.
the Rules or any order of the Court.
6. Hence the complaint for damages filed by CCC with the RTC of Quezon City After a careful perusal of the allegations in respondent’s complaint for
against Danfoss and MINCI on November 5, 1998. In reply, Danfoss filed a damages against petitioner, we rule that the same failed to state a cause of
motion to dismiss the complaint. action. When respondent sued petitioner for damages, petitioner had not
CCC’s contention : Due to the “impending” delay in the delivery of its order, it violated any right of respondent from which a cause of action had arisen.
suffered more than P8 million and was compelled to look for another Respondent only surmised that petitioner would not be able to deliver the
supplier. two units frequency converter/inverter on the date agreed upon by them.
Danfoss’s contention: The case should be dismissed on the ground that it Based on this apprehension, it cancelled its order six days prior to the
did not state a cause of action. agreed date of delivery. How could respondent hold petitioner liable for
1) The letter of credit was opened on September 9, 1997, so, since the damages (1) when petitioner had not yet breached its obligation to deliver
agreed delivery period is 8 to 10 weeks from the opening of the letter of the goods and (2) after respondent made it impossible for petitioner to
credit, the due date is until November 19, 1997. deliver them by cancelling its order even before the agreed delivery date?
2) Although Danfoss was having a problem with its supplier prior to
CCC’s cancellation of its order, CCC only surmised that Danfoss could not The trial court erred in ruling that the issue of whether or not the defendants
deliver within the due date agreed upon. incurred delay in the delivery of the equipment within the period stipulated
3) Neither Danfoss nor CCC agreed to change the date of delivery. Only was a debatable question. It said that trial on the merits was necessary and
the port of origin was changed in the letter of credit. Danfoss has until the parties had to adduce evidence in support of their respective positions.8
November 19, 1997 to deliver the order, CCC cancelled the order on But what was there to argue about when, based on the allegations of the
November 13, 1997. complaint, petitioner was not yet due to deliver the two units frequency
4) CCC never made an extrajudicial demand for the delivery of its order converter/inverter when respondent cancelled its order? It still had six days
on its due date as it cancelled the order before the due date. within which to comply with its obligation. The court a quo should not have
5) Damages sought for by CCC could not have accrued yet since the denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint (for its failure to state a
order was cancelled before the delivery was actually delayed. cause of action) when, on its face, it was clear that petitioner had not yet
reneged on its obligation to deliver the frequency converter/inverter on the
7. RTC ruled in favor of CCC. According to the RTC: “...the issue of whether or date mutually agreed upon by the parties. Moreover, the obligation itself was
not the defendants incur delay in the delivery of the equipment in question negated by no less than respondent’s own act of cancelling its order even
within the period stipulated is a debatable question which necessitates before the prestation became due and demandable. Where therefore was
actual trial on the merits where the parties have to adduce evidence in the breach? Where was the damage caused by petitioner? There was none.
support of their respective stance. Consequently, it was wrong for the CA to affirm the order of the trial court
8. CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC and denied the Motion for denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint for its failure to state a
Reconsideration of Danfoss. cause of action.

ISSUE: WON there was a cause of action in the complaint filed by CCC 8. Lu vs. Nabua (eto lang talaga facts ng case, please read rule 16 sec 2
against Danfoss and 3)

HELD: No, there was no cause of action in the complaint for damages filed Facts:
by CCC.  The petition stemmed from an amended complaint filed by the "PR" against
SC ruled that “In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause "P", for accounting w/ TRO and Injunction;
of action, the insufficiency must appear on the face of the complaint. And  "P" filed an Omnibus MD the Amended Complaint based on the ff. grounds:
the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a o Plaintiff's claims are barred by a prior judgement or by statute of
cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can limitations (R16 S1f)
render a valid judgment thereon in accordance with the prayer of the o Plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and/or do not have a cause
complaint. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit of action(R16 S1g)
the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.” o Fraud and Equity
o Docket Fees are not paid
 "PR" filed their opposition of the Omnibus MD Amended Complaint alleging part of the aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and likewise on the
the ff.: higher court called upon to resolve the same, usually on certiorari.
o Plaintiffs not barred by prior judgment nor by statute of limitations The questioned order of the trial court denying the motion to dismiss with a
o Plaintiffs have the legal capacity to sue and have a valid cause of mere statement that there are justiciable questions which require a full blown
action trial falls short of the requirement of Rule 16 set forth above. Owing to the
o DF have been paid terseness of its expressed justification, the challenged order ironically suffers
 After the filing of "P" reply to the Opposition to MD Amended Complaint, the from undefined breadth which is a hallmark of imprecision. With its
same was submitted for resolution; unspecific and amorphous thrust, the issuance is inappropriate to the
 In resolving the OMD, lower court denied the OMD thenafter "P" filed an MR grounds detailed in the motion to dismiss.
regarding the dismissal of the OMD however it was also denied. Hence While the requirement to state clearly and distinctly the reasons for the trial
appeal. court’s resolutory order under Sec. 3,Rule 16 of the Rules does call for a
Issues: liberal interpretation, especially since jurisprudence dictates that it is
1. WoN the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari in holding that decisions on cases submitted for decision that are subject to the stringent
the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying "P" MD requirement of specificity of rulings under Sec. 1, Rule 3624 of the Rules,
2. WoN the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss on the ground the trial court’s order in this case leaves too much to the imagination.
that “[T]here are justiciable questions raised in the pleadings of the herein
parties which are proper subject of a full blown trial” contravenes Sec. 3, AQUINO VS AURE
Rule 16 of the Rules and constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court. FACTS: Aure Lending filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino. In
Held: their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending alleged that they acquired the
1. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which subject property from a Deed of Sale.
neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case,as it leaves something to be
done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, Aquino countered that the Complaint lacks cause of action for Aure and Aure
the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be Lending do not have any legal right over the subject property.
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed
to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a MeTC rendered in favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint for
denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for non-compliance with the barangay
final judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify the grant of the conciliation process, among other grounds. Te MeTC observed that Aure
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must and Aquino are residents of the same barangay but there is no showing that
have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or any attempt has been made to settle the case amicably at the barangay
excess of jurisdiction. level.
2. Under R16 S3, provides that Under this provision, there are three (3)
courses of action which the trial court may take in resolving a motion to RTC affirmed
dismiss, i.e., to grant, to deny, or to allow amendment of the pleading.
Deferment of the resolution of a motion to dismiss if the ground relied upon CA reversed the MeTC and RTC Decisions and remanding the case to the
is not indubitable is now disallowed in view of the provision requiring MeTC for further proceedings and final determination of the substantive
presentation of all available arguments and evidence. Thus, there is no rights of the parties.
longer any need to defer action until the trial as the evidence presented, and
such additional evidence as the trial court may require, would already enable ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE BARANGAY
the trial court to rule upon the dubitability of the ground alleged. CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT
Further, it is now specifically required that the resolution on the motion shall WARRANTS THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT.
clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor. This proscribes the common
practice of perfunctorily dismissing the motion for “lack of merit.” Such HELD: NO. There is no dispute herein that the present case was never
cavalier dispositions can often pose difficulty and misunderstanding on the referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation before Aure and Aure
Lending instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no allegation of such
barangay conciliation proceedings was made in Aure and Aure Lending’s possession. On its face, the new Rule on Summary Procedure was
Complaint before the MeTC. extended to include within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment
cases which likewise involve the issue of ownership. This does not mean,
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the however, that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue of ownership in
requirement of Section 412 of the Local Government Code on barangay ejectment suits has been thus conferred on the inferior courts.
conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No.
1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies -- the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The
and the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 October 2001 and its Resolution dated 8
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.[22] Nevertheless, the May 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non- the petitioner.
compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has
otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the
defendant.[23] HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR. v. JUANA GONZALES

As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v. Intermediate Appellate FACTS: Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar
Court[24]: (Capitolina) with whom he had seven children. When Capitolina died in
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. March 1994. Dr. Favis married Juana Gonzalez (Juana), his common-law
1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano), he executed
his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children.
prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction Mariano is married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four
from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the children.
defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in
their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo. Dr. Favis died intestate on July 29, 1995. On October 16, 1994, prior his
death, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana. Claiming the said
jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with Capitolina,
instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation,
affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the inventory, liquidation, liquidation and partition of property before the RTC
case by cross-examining respondent Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners against Juana, Sps. Mariano and Larcelita and their grandchildren as
cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by respondents.
attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves
voluntarily. x x x (Emphasis supplied.) RTC nullified the Deed of Donation. The trial court found that Dr. Favis, at
the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of
Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation.
the complaint. As long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action
either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners nullification
over the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved during case. The CA motu proprioproprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for
the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a
the court -- after acquiring jurisdiction -- may resolve to dismiss the action for compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family
insufficiency of evidence. Court.

x x x. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when the question of ISSUE: May the appellate court dismiss the order of dismissal of the
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of compromise have been made?
statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the
complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed
HELD: The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that
complaint. respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or
The appellate courts decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code, objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-
Art.151.No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioners
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not
shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. have any authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioners
complaint.
The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: Section 1. Grounds. - The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The
Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading respondents opted to rely only on what the appellate court considered,
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following erroneously though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial court's factual
grounds:(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents did not provide us
complied with. with any argument to have it reversed.
The appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats
of the grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the
from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals Judgment of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED. GRANTED.
with dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four
instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) Rule 17 – Dismissal of Actions
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata;
and (d) prescription of action.
1. GO v CRUZ
It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas cited in P.L. Uy Realty
Corporation v. ALS Management and Development Corporation where we FACTS:
noted that the second sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 does not only supply
On October 26, 1981, California Manufacturing Co., Inc. brought an action in the CFI
exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
of Manila against Dante Go, accusing him of unfair competition. California alleged
or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases
that Dante Go is doing business under the name and style of "Sugarland International
motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds. The tenor of the second
Products," and engaged like California in the manufacture of spaghetti, macaroni, and
sentence of the Rule is that the allowance of a motu propio dismissal can
other pasta was selling his products in the open market under the brand name, "Great
proceed only from the exemption from the rule on waiver; which is but logical
Italian," in packages which were in colorable and deceitful limitation of California's
because there can be no ruling on a waived ground.
containers bearing its own brand, "Royal." Its complaint contained an application for
preliminary injunction commanding Dante Go to immediately cease and desist from
A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint
the further manufacture, sale and distribution of said products, and to retrieve those
among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely
already being offered for sale.
a defect in the statement of a cause of action.
In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. About two weeks later, however, or on November 12, 1981, California filed a notice of
The complaint of petitioners was answered by respondents without a prior dismissal.
motion to dismiss having been filed. The decision in favor of the petitioners
was appealed by respondents on the basis of the alleged error in the ruling
on the merits, no mention having been made about any defect in the
Four days afterwards, or on November 16, 1981, California received by registered might have had for bringing it about, and was, as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points
mail a copy of Dante Go's answer with counterclaim dated November 6, 1981, which out, "without prejudice," the contrary not being otherwise "stated in the notice" and it
had been filed with the Court on November 9, 1981. being the first time the action was being so dismissed.

On November 19, 1981 a fire broke out at the Manila City Hall destroying among There was therefore no legal obstacle to the institution of the second action in the
others the sala of Judge Tengco and the records of cases therein kept, including that Caloocan Court of First Instance based on the same claim. The filing of the complaint
filed by California against Dante Go. invested it with jurisdiction of the subject matter or nature of the action. In truth, and
contrary to what petitioner Dante Go obviously believes, even if the first action were
On December 1, 1981, California filed another complaint asserting the same cause of still pending in the Manila Court, this circumstance would not affect the jurisdiction of
action against Dante Go, this time with the CFI at Caloocan City. This second suit the Caloocan Court over the second suit. The pendency of the first action would
was docketed as Civil Case No. C-9702 and was assigned to the branch presided merely give the defendant the right to move to dismiss the second action on the
over by Judge Fernando A. Cruz. ground of auter action pendant or litis pendentia.

On December 3, 1981, Judge Cruz issued an ex parte restraining order against Go.

On the day following the rendition of the restraining order, Dante Go filed the present Dante Go vs. Hon. Cruz, City Sheriff and California Manufacturing (1989)
petition for certiorari, etc. with this Court praying for its nullification and perpetual
inhibition. On December 11, 1981, this Court, in turn issued a writ of preliminary [Facts]
injunction restraining California, Judge Cruz and the City Sheriff from enforcing or
implementing the restraining order of December 3, 1981, and from continuing with the - California Manufacturing filed a case against Dante Go for unfair competition
hearing on the application for preliminary injunction in said Civil Case No. C-9702. alleging that the latter’s pasta products (Great Italian) such as spaghetti and
The scope of the injunction was subsequently enlarged by this Court's Resolution of macaroni are packed with confusing similarity and colourable imitation with
April 14,1982 to include the City Fiscal of Manila, who was thereby restrained from the former’s Royal Pasta products.
proceeding with the case of unfair competition filed in his office by California against
Dante Go. - 2 weeks later, California filed a Notice of Dismissal without prejudice

ISSUE: WON Sec. 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court applies in the present case. - 4 days after it received Go’s answer with counterclaim

HELD: No.What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to cause dismissal of the - Fire broke out at the Manila City Hall and burned the records therein
action by mere notice is not the filing of the defendant's answer with the Court (either including the case filed by California
personally or by mail) but the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a motion for
- California filed another complaint based on the same cause of action against
summary judgment. This is the plain and explicit message of the Rules. "The filing of
Go in the CFI Caloocan.
pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders and other papers with the court,
"according to Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, means the delivery thereof to - Caloocan judge issued a restraining order directing Go to cease and desist
the clerk of the court either personally or by registered mail. Service, on the other from manufacturing and selling his products.
hand, signifies delivery of the pleading or other paper to the parties affected thereby
through their counsel of record, unless delivery to the party himself is ordered by the - Go claims that the case in Manila is still pending and that the dismissal
court, by any of the modes set forth in the Rules, i.e., by personal service, service by sought by California is no longer a matter of right. He further accused
mail, or substituted service. California of forum shopping at Caloocan judge’s sala.

Here, California filed its notice of dismissal of its action in the Manila Court after the [issue] Whether or not the dismissal of California is in accordance with the Rules of
filing of Dante Go's answer butbefore service thereof. Thus having acted well within Court thus allowing it to file a subsequent case
the letter and contemplation of the afore-quoted Section 1 of Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court, its notice ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the action then pending in [ruling] Yes, it is in accord with RC. Section 1 Rule 17 mandates that notice of
the Manila Court, without need of any order or other action by the Presiding Judge. dismissal must be filed any time before service of answer.
The dismissal was effected without regard to whatever reasons or motives California
-California filed its notice of dismissal in CFI manila after Go’s filing of answer but order of dismissal on February 5, 1970, and, therefore, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 38
before service thereof. Thus, its notice ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for relief should have been filed within 60
action pending in Manila court, without need of any order or action by the presiding days from February 5, 1970, and within 6 months from January 26, 1970, when the
judge therein. order was issued; hence, the filing of the petition was beyond the reglementary
period.The petition for relief was given due course,setting aside the orders dated
-No legal obstacle to the institution of the second action in the Caloocan CFI based January 26, 1970 and June 23, 1972, and setting the continuation of the trial for
on the same claim. September 15, 1972. Hence, the present recourse by petitioner.

ISSUE: WON the prior case was validly dismissed for failure to prosecute

2. G.R. No. L-35989 October 28, 1977 HELD: NO

JALOVER vs. YTORIAGA It will be noted that, as found by respondent Judge, private respondents, as plaintiffs,
adduced their evidence and rested their case on September 4, 1963, or more than six
FACTS: This involves a land dispute filed by Ytoriaga and Lopez against Hedriana years before the dismissal of the case on January 26, 1970. It was, therefore, the turn
and Jalover in the CFI of Iloilo. They claim that they the owners of the lot, covered by of petitioner, as defendant, to present his evidence. In the premises, private
TCT by virtue of the effects of the current of the river based on the principle of respondents court not possibly have failed to prosecute they were already past the
continuous possession and alluvion. They alleged that Jalover , without their consent stage where they could still be charged with such failure. As correctly held by
had the portion of the land surveyed and even placed concrete monuments thereof respondent Judge, private respondents' absence at the hearing scheduled on
and even took possession of the land. Jalover , alleged, inter alia, that he is the January 6, 1970 "can only be construed as a waiver on their part to cross-examine
owner of the land as sole heir of his mother, who owned the land pursuant to Article the witnesses that defendants might present at the continuation of trial and to object
461 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Ytoriaga and Lopez offered documentary to the admissibility of the latter's evidence." The right to cross-examine petitioner's
evidence and upon admission thereof, rested their case. Jalover prayed the court to witnesses and/or object to his evidence is a right that belongs to private respondents
dismiss the complaint with costs against Ytoriaga and Lopez Issues having been which they can certainly waive. Such waiver could be nothing more than the
joined, the case was set for trial. Trial was postponed many times stretching to a "intentional relinquishment of a known right," and. as such, should not have been
period of more than 6 years, until January 26, 1970, when the case was called for taken against private respondents.
trial, and then Presiding Judge Ramon Blanco dismissed the case, for failure of
private respondents to appear in court, since the Plaintiff did not take the necessary To dismiss the case after private respondents had submitted their evidence and
steps to engage the service of another lawyer in lieu of Atty. Atol, who since several rested their case, would not only be to hold said respondents accountable for waiving
years ago has been appointed Chief of the Secret Service of the Iloilo City Police a right, but also to deny them one of the cardinal primary rights of a litigant, which is,
Department. Two years later, private respondents' lawyer, Atty. Amado B. Atol, filed a corollary to the right to adduce evidence, the right to have the said evidence
motion for reconsideration alleging that the said respondents did not fail to prosecute considered by the court. The dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute, when in
because, during the times that the case was set for hearing, at least one of said truth private respondents had already presented their evidence and rested their case,
respondents was always present, and the record would show that the transfers of and, therefore, had duly ,prosecuted their case, would in effect mean a total disregard
hearing were all made at the instance of petitioner or his counsel; and, moreover, by the court of evidence presented by a party in the regular course of trial and now
private respondents had already finished presenting their evidence. respondent forming part of the record. The ends of justice would be better served if, in its
Judge Venicio Escolin, who succeeded Judge Blanco in Branch V, issued an order deliberative function. the court would consider the said evidence together with the
denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order of dismissal had evidence to be adduced by petitioner.However,relief from judgment under Rule 38 of
become final long ago and was beyond the court's power to amend or change. the Revised Rules of Court is not the appropriate remedy. A petition for relief is
Private respondents then filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment dated July 10, available only if the judgment or order complained of has already become final and
1972, claiming that the order of dismissal dated January 26, 1970 was void because executory; but here, as earlier noted, the order of January 26, 1970 never attained
of lack of due process and for having been obtained thru fraud, for the petitioner had finality for the reason that notice thereof was not served upon private respondents'
misrepresented to the court the status of the case by making Judge Blanco - who was counsel of record. The petition for relief may nevertheless be considered as a second
not the Presiding Judge when private respondents presented their evidence and motion for reconsideration or a motion for new trial based on fraud and lack of
rested their case in 1963 - believe that trial had not even begun. Petitioner opposed procedural due process.
the petition for relief contending that private respondents were served a copy of the
Fermin Jalover vs Porferio Ytoriaga, Consolacion Lopez (1977)

[facts] Ligaya, Jaime, Silvina, Fausta, Pablo all surnamed Mina vs. Antonia Pacson,
Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina (1963)
- This involves a land dispute filed by Ytoriaga and Lopez vs. Jalover in CFI
Iloilo. [facts]

- Ytoriaga and Lopez claims that a land which was once under water - Case 1: The Minas are claiming to be the illegitimate children of Joaquin
automatically belongs to them based on the principle of continuous Mina while married to Pacson. They are claiming that the DOS allegedly
possession and alluvion. They alleged that Jalover, without their consent, signed by Joaquin when he was ill was fraudulently obtained. They pray for
had that portion of land surveyed and even placed concrete monuments the annulment of the DOS and their recognition as illegitimate children.
thereon and took possession thereof.
- Court in Case 1 ordered that Pacson be impleaded. The Minas failed to
- Jalover, in his answer, alleged that his mother and Hedriana are co-owners comply with said order, thus, it was dismissed.
of said land; that he, as heir, is entitled to that portion.
- Case 2: The Minas filed another case, this time impleading Pacson but with
- Ytoriaga and Lopez offered documentary evidence and upon admission the same cause of action and including Medina and Cresencia.
thereof, rested their case.
- Defendants filed a MTD on the ground of res judicata.
- Continuation of trial was ordered transferred until further assignment, thus,
causing the postponement of said case for a period of more than 6 years. [issue] Whether or not CC 3015 (case 1) effectively bars the present case

- When the case was re-called for trial, Ytoriaga and Lopez failed to appear. [ruling] Partially. Failure to comply with a court order has the effect of adjudication
Judge Blanco dismissed the case for their failure to prosecute. upon the merits (Sec 3 Rule 17). Thus, failure to comply with the court order in CC
3015 justifies the dismissal on the issue of annulment of DOS.
- 2 years after, Ytoriaga’s counsel filed an MR but denied. Counsel filed a
petition for relief of judgement. It was given due course. However, present case is not deemed dismissed as to the issue of filiation and
Pacson, as she is not impleaded in the prior case.
[issue] Whether or not the prior case is validly dismissed for failure to prosecute.

4. G.R. No. L-18707 February 28, 1967


[ruling] No. Private respondents (Y and L) could not have possibly failed to prosecute
as they were already past the stage of presenting their evidence. Their absence CASEÑAS vs. ROSALES
during the time the case was re-called for trial was a mere waiver of their right to
cross-examine the witnesses. FACTS: Arañas and Caseñas filed with the CFI of Agusan, a complaint for specific
performance and enforcement of their alleged right under a certain deed of sale, and
The dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute when in truth they have already damages against the spousesRosales. They alleged that sometime in 1939, Agustin
presented their evidence and rested their case would, in effect, mean a total O. Caseñas acquired from Rodolfo Arañas under a deed of assignment, the latter's
disregard of the court of the evidence presented by them in the regular course of trial. rights and interest over a parcel of land , that Rodolfo Arañas in turn, acquired the
said property from the spouses Jose A. Rosales and Concepcion Sanchez under a
Further, said dismissal never attained finality as the notice thereof was not served deed of sale ,under the terms of which, however, the actual transfer of the aforesaid
upon their counsel of record. land unto the vendee would be made only on or before February 18, 1941; and that
despite the above documented transactions, and despite the arrival of the stipulated
period for the execution of the final deed of transfer, the vendors spouses refused to
fulfill their obligation to effect such transfer of the said lot to the vendee, Rodolfo to comply therewith, the said court dismissed the complaint for such non-compliance.
Arañas or his assignee, the herein appellant, Agustin O. Caseñas. After the We must hold, therefore, as We did in Barrameda that inasmuch as there was no
defendants-spouses had filed their answer to the above complaint, but before trial, obligation on the part of the plaintiff-appellant herein to amend his complaint in Civil
the counsel for the plaintiffs gave notice to the trial court that plaintiff Rodolfo Arañas Case No. 261, any such imposition being void, his failure to comply with such an
and defendant Jose A. Rosales had both died. In view of the said manifestation, the order did not justify the dismissal of his complaint. Grounded as it was upon a void
lower court,directed, the surviving plaintiff, Agustin O. Caseñas, to amend the order, the dismissal was itself void.Consequently, as the dismissal of Civil Case No.
complaint to effect the necessary substitution of parties thereon. The said surviving 261 was void, it clearly may not be asserted to bar the subsequent prosecution of the
plaintiff, however, failed altogether to comply with the aforementioned order. LC same or identical claim.
dismissed the case for failure on the part of the counsel for the plaintiffs to comply
with the order of this Court which shows abandonment and lack of interest on the part A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or
of the plaintiffs. Casenas, filed with the same CFI of Agusan, another complaint rights of the other (Ma-ao Sugar Central vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666) and both these
against the widow and heirs of the late Jose A. Rosales "to quiet, and for elements were clearly alleged in the aforesaid complaint.
reconveyance of, title to real property, with damages. This suit referred itself to the
very same property litigated under Civil Case No. 261 and asserted exactly the same The resolution of the issue of prescription may be deferred until after the case is tried
.The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds, namely: res judicata, on the merits where the defense pleaded against said issue is the existence of a trust
prescription, lack of cause of action, failure to include indispensable parties, and that over the property in dispute.
the contract subject of the complaint was void ab initio. After the plaintiff had filed his
opposition to the above motion, the lcissued the order under appeal dismissing the
complaint. Of the above grounds, though, the lower court relied alone on the
defendants' plea of res judicata, lack of cause of action and prescription.

ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the lower court was proper.

HELD: No, the SC remanded the case to the court of origin.

When certain of the parties to Civil Case No. 261 died and due notice thereof was
given to the trial court, it devolved on the said court to order, not the amendment of Agustin Casenas vs. Concepcion Sanchez de Rosales, Romeo Rosales, et. Al.
the complaint, but the appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased in (1967)
accordance with the procedure and manner outlined in Rule 3, Section 17 of the
Rules of Court. In the case of Barrameda vs. Barbara, 90 Phil. 718, the SC held that [facts]
an order to amend the complaint, before the proper substitution of parties as directed
by the aforequoted rule has been effected, is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no - Case 1 prays for the execution of DOS in favour of Casenas: filed by
duty to comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing the said complaint, for Rodolfo Aranas(assignor) and Casenas(assignee) vs. Jose Rosales and
such non-compliance, would similarly be void. In a subsequent case, Ferriera et al. Sanchez.
vs. Gonzalez, et al., G.R. No. L-11567, July 17, 1958, this court affirmed a similar
conclusion on the determination that the continuance of a proceedings during the - Rosales and Sanchez filed an answer before trial. Counsel for Aranas and
pendency of which a party thereto dies, without such party having been validly Casenas manifested the death of Jose Rosales and Aranas. The court
substituted in accordance with the rules, amounts to a "lack of jurisdiction." ordered Casenas to amend the complaint. Casenas failed to comply, thus, it
was dismissed.
The facts of this case fit four squares into the Barrameda case abovecited, save for
the minor variance that in the former two of the litigants died while only one - Case 2 (present case) prays for quieting and reconveyance of title in favour
predeceased the case in Barrameda. Here, as in Barrameda, during the pendency of of Casenas. Sanchez claims res judicata.
civil case, notice was given to the trial court of the deaths of one of the plaintiffs and
[issue] Whether or not dismissal in the prior case effectively bars the present case
one of the defendants in it. Instead of ordering the substitution of the deceased's legal
representatives in accordance with Rule 3, section 17 of the Rules of Court, the trial
court directed the surviving plaintiff to amend the complaint and when the latter failed
[ruling] No. The order to amend the complaint is not in accordance with the procedure any binding decision, favorable or adverse to them, or dismiss the case with prejudice
of the RC. The court should have ordered the counsel to make a substitution of the which, in effect, is an adjudication on the merits. The controverted orders in Civil
deceased by the legal representatives of the deceased. Casenas’ failure to comply Case No. 116028 disregarded the fundamental principles of remedial law and the
with the order of the court did not validly justify the dismissal of the said case. meaning and the effect of jurisdiction. A judgment, to be considered res judicata, must
be binding, and must be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
judgment is a nullity. The order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 116028 does not have
the effect of an adjudication on the merits of the case because the court that rendered
REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK V MOLINA the same did not have the requisite jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants
therein. This being so, it cannot be the basis of res judicata and it cannot be a bar to a
Facts: Both complaints in Civil Case No. 116028 and in Civil Case No. 129829 were
lawful claim. If at all, such a dismissal may be considered as one without prejudice.
filed by petitioner Republic Planters Bank against private respondent, for the
collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note dated January 26, 1970, in
the amount of P100,000.00. Judge Alfredo C. Florendo dismissed Civil Case No.
116028 for failure of the petitioner "to prosecute its case within a reasonable length of PAREDES VS. VERANO
time. 1 A motion for reconsideration of that order was denied. When Civil Case No.
129829 was filed by petitioner, a motion to dismiss was submitted by private Facts:
respondents on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment (res
judicata) in Civil Case No. 116028. Private respondents opined that said order was an 1. The legal battle between the parties began with a complaint for the
adjudication upon the merits. Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that establishment of a right of way filed by the petitioners against respondents. The
res judicata does not apply because the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. complaint culminated in a judgment by compromise.
116028 were never served upon private respondents and, as such, the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over private respondents and, consequently, over the 2. In the Compromise Agreement, respondent Cosme Hinunangan granted a 2 meter-
case. Petitioner maintains that the order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 11 6028 never wide right of way in favor of petitioners in consideration of the amount of Php
became final as against private respondents. But the same was dismissed, on the 6,000.00 which petitioners agreed to pay.
ground that judgment on the previous complaint had become final. Therefore,
3. Alleging that petitioners had blocked the passage way in violation of the
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals both questioned orders of respondent
Compromise Agreement, respondents filed a complaint for specific performance with
court in Civil Case No. 129829. 6 But then, petitioner sought a more speedy remedy
damages against petitioners.
in questioning said orders by filing this petition for certiorari before this Court.
4. In their answer, petitioners denied having violated the Compromise
Issue: Whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ordered
Agreement, and alleged that like them, respondents were not actual residents of
Civil Case No. 129829 dismissed on the ground of resjudicata it appearing that Civil
Barangay Tagnipa where the ―road right of way‖ was established and that
Case No. 116028 was dismissed on May 21, 1979, for failure of petitioner to
respondent Cosme had already sold his only remaining lot in the vicinity to petitioner
prosecute within a reasonable length of time, although in the said case, the trial court
Paredes.
never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of private respondents
5. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of action. TC-DENIED.
Held: The questioned orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 129829 supporting
private respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata are without 6. Pre-trial was initially set for 24 April 2003, but this was reset to 3 June 2003. But
cogent basis. We sustain petitioner's claim that respondent trial judge acted without or the pre-trial set on 3 June 2003 did not push through either because none of the
in excess of jurisdiction when he issued said orders because he thereby traversed the parties appeared. So, pre-trial was reset to 11 November 2003.However, petitioner
constitutional precept that "no person shall be deprived of property without due Baybay was present in court along with other defendants was called. RTC was
process of law" and that jurisdiction is vitally essential for any order or adjudication to informed then of a proposed settlement between the parties, although Baybay
be binding. Justice cannot be sacrificed for technicality. It is a cardinal rule that no qualified his reaction by telling the court that he would first have to inform his lawyer
one must be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another without just cause. of the said proposal.
For the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. If it did not acquire jurisdiction 7. RTC reset the pre-trial for 23 January 2004.
over the private respondents as parties to Civil Case No. 116028, it cannot render
8. Before the new pre-trial date, counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation Section 4 imposes the duty on litigating parties and their respective counsel during
of Willingness to Settle With Request for Cancellation dated 5 January 2004. pre-trial. The provision also provides for the instances where the non-appearance of a
party may be excused. Nothing, however, in Sec 4 provides for a sanction should the
9. The hearing did push through on 23 January 2004. The private respondents and parties or their respective counsel be absent during pre-trial. The penalty is provided
their counsel were present. So were petitioners Baybay and Paredes, and co- for in Sec 5 which penalizes the failure to appear of either the plaintiff or the
defendant Alago, but not their counsel. defendant, and not their respective counsel.

10.RTC allowed respondents to present their evidence ex parte, ―for failure of the The absence of counsel for defendants at pre trial does not ipso facto authorize the
defendants’ counsel to appear before the RTC.11. Motion for reconsideration – judge to declare the defendant as in default and order the presentation of evidence ex
DENIED. parte. Nothing in the rules of court sanctions the presentation of evidence ex parte
upon instances when counsel for defendant is absent during pre-trial. The Rules do
12. Petition for certiorari – CA– dismissed for failure to attach duplicate orig copies of not countenance stringent construction at the expense of justice and equity.
annexes to petition as well as other pleadings relevant and pertinent to the petition.

13. Motion for recon with motion to admit additional exhibits – DENIED. CA ruled that
even with the submission by petitioners of the required pleadings and documents, the RULE 18: PRE-TRIAL
instant petition must nevertheless failed. It conceded that under Sec 5 Rule 18 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the failure of the defendant, and not defendant’s Filoil Marketing Corporation vs Dy Pac & Co. (1988)
counsel, to appear at the pre-trial that would serve cause to allow plaintiff to present FACTS:
evidence ex parte.
Filoil commenced an action for collection of sum of money with interest against Dy
Issue: Whether the absence of the counsel for defendants at the pre-trial, with all Pac on the ground that the latter fails to pay, notwithstanding repeated demands, the
defendants themselves present, is aground to declare defendants in default and to amount due to it for petroleum products bought on credit.
authorize plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte.
At the hearing set, neither Dy Pac nor its counsel appeared. Filoil was allowed by the
Held: No.
City Court of Manila to proceed ex parte. The said court rendered a decision on the
Section 4. same date ordering Dy Pac to pay Filoil.

Appearance of parties. Dy Pac appealed to CFI Manila which immediately set the case for pre-trial. It ruled
that:
— It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The “[…]plaintiff and defendant, who are hereby ordered to prepare a stipulation of facts
non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or based on their exhibits already marked and submit the same to the court… the parties
if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an are warned that if they cannot submit the stipulation of facts, the Court will dismiss the
amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter appeal.”
into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.
CFI Manila dismissed the case for failure of the parties to submit the required
Section 5. stipulation of facts and ordered the immediate return of the records to the City Court
for execution.
Effect of failure to appear .
ISSUE: Whether or not the case can be dismissed on the ground that the parties
— The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next
failed to submit a stipulation of facts.
preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be
with prejudice, unless other-wise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of
RULE:
the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and
No. There is no law which compulsorily requires litigants to stipulate at pre-trial on the
the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
facts and issues that may possibly crop up in a particular case, upon pain dismissal of
such case. The process of securing admissions whether of facts or evidence is
essentially voluntary, since stipulations of facts, like contracts, bind the parties thereto A judgment of default against one who failed to attend at pre-trial or even to file an
who are not allowed to controvert statements made therein. Courts cannot compel the answer implies a waiver only of their right to be heard and to present evidence to
parties to enter into an agreement upon the facts. support their allegation but not all their other rights.

Where the parties are unable to arrive at a stipulation of facts and do not reach an
amicable settlement of their controversy, the court must close the proceedings and go Paredes vs. Verano
forward the trial of the case. The CFI Manila committed serious error in dismissing Dy
Pac’s appeal from the City Court’s decision solely on the ground that the parties failed Facts:
to comply with the order. 1. The legal battle between the parties began with a complaint for the
establishment of a right of way filed by the petitioners against respondents.
The complaint culminated in a judgment by compromise.
Rodolfo Paredes, Tito Alago, Agripino Baybay vs. Ernesto Verano and 2. In the Compromise Agreement, respondent Cosme Hinunangan granted a 2
CosmeHinunangan (2006) meter-wide right of way in favor of petitioners in consideration of the amount
FACTS: of Php 6,000.00 which petitioners agreed to pay.
3. Alleging that petitioners had blocked the passage way in violation of the
In Civil Case 2767, a compromise was entered into regarding the complaint for the Compromise Agreement, respondents filed a complaint for specific
establishment of a right of way.Hinunangan granted a 2m-wide right of way in favour performance with damages against petitioners.
of Paredes, Alago and Baybay in consideration of P6,000.00. 4. In their answer, petitioners denied having violated the Compromise
Agreement, and alleged that like them, respondents were not actual
A complaint for specific performance with damages was filed by Hinunangan on the residents of Barangay Tagnipa where the “road right of way” was
ground that Petitioners had blocked the passage way in violation of the compromise established and that respondent Cosme had already sold his only remaining
agreement. lot in the vicinity to petitioner Paredes.
5. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of action. TC-
Petitioners denied the allegation contending that respondents were not actual DENIED.
residents of the barangay and that the lot covering the passage of right of way was 6. Pre-trial was initially set for 24 April 2003, but this was reset to 3 June 2003.
sold by Hinunangan to Paredes. Petitioners filed a MTD on the ground of lack of But the pre-trial set on 3 June 2003 did not push through either because
cause of action. The trial court denied the MTD. none of the parties appeared. So, pre-trial was reset to 11 November 2003.
However, petitioner Baybay was present in court along with other
Pre-trial was set on April but was reset on June. However, it did not push through defendants was called. RTC was informed then of a proposed settlement
either because none of the parties appeared. On Nov, the RTC was informed of a between the parties, although Baybay qualified his reaction by telling the
proposed settlement. The case was reset to January 2004. On January, private court that he would first have to inform his lawyer of the said propodal.
respondents and their counsel were present. Petitioners were also present but not 7. RTC reset the pre-trial for 23 January 2004.
their counsel. 8. Before the new pre-trial date, counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation of
Willingness to Settle With Request for Cancellation dated 5 January 2004.
RTC allowed respondents to present evidence ex parte for failure of the defendant’s 9. The hearing did push through on 23 January 2004. The private respondents
counsel to appear. and their counsel were present. So were petitioners Baybay and Paredes,
and co-defendant Alago, but not their counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of counsel for petitioners at the pre-trial, with all 10. RTC allowed respondents to present their evidence ex parte, “for failure of
petitioners themselves present, is a ground to declare them in default the defendants’ counsel to appear before the RTC.
11. Motion for recon – DENIED.
RULING: No. Absence of counsel at pre-trial does not ipso facto authorise the judge 12. Petition for certiorari – CA – dismissed for failure to attach duplicate orig
to declare them in default. Sec. 4, Rule 18 imposes duty on litigating parties and their copies of annexes to petition as well as other pleadings relevant and
respective counsel to appear at pre-trial. Sec. 5 penalizes the failure to appear of pertinent to the petition.
either plaintiff or defendant but not of their counsel.
13. Motion for recon with motion to admit additional exhibits – DENIED. CA ruled Arradaza boarded a jeepney owned and operated by Maidin and Lebita. Following the
that even with the submission by petitioners of the required pleadings and jeepney was a dump truck registered in the name of Guanzon. The two vehicles
documents, the instant petition must nevertheless failed. It conceded that collided. Arradaza sustained injuries. Despite several demands, Maidin and Lebita
under Sec 5 Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the failure of failed to reimburse Arradaza of the actual damages he incurred. Arradaza filed a case
the defendant, and not defendant’s counsel, to appear at the pre-trial that against Maidin and Lebita. The latter filed their answer arguing that it was the truck
would serve cause to allow plaintiff to present evidence ex parte. driver who was at fault. Therefore, Guanzon, being the employer, failed to exercise
Issue: Whether the absence of the counsel for defendants at the pre-trial, with all the diligence of a god father in selecting and hiring the driver.
defendants themselves present, is a ground to declare defendants in default and to
authorize plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte. Summons were served to Guanzon through substituted service via a certain Susan
Held: No. Ador. Guanzon failed to file an answer and was declared in default.
Section 4. Appearance of parties. — It shall be the duty of the parties and their
counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused 2 years later, Guanzon filed a MTD on the ground that the court did not acquire
only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf jurisdiction over her because of the defective service of summons.
fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative
modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and MeTCadjuged in favour of Arradaza.Guanzon appealed to the RTC Manila. RTC
of documents. affirmed the MeTC decision. Appeal to the CA was also denied.
Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so
required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the ISSUE: Whether or not there was proper service of summons on Guanzon.
action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless other-wise ordered by the court.
A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to RULING: Yes. The motor vehicle registration of the truck is under the name of
present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. Guanzon with address at Manresa, QC. The service of summons therein failed
Section 4 imposes the duty on litigating parties and their respective counsel because Guanzon was not known in the said address. Upon inquiry with the SEC, it
during pre-trial. The provision also provides for the instances where the non- was found out that Guanzon was the director of Guanzon Lime Dev’t Company with
appearance of a party may be excused. Nothing, however, in Sec 4 provides for a address at Caloocan. Service of summons was effected there through Susan Ador, of
sanction should the parties or their respective counsel be absent during pre-trial. The suitable age and working in the premises.
penalty is provided for in Sec 5 which penalizes the failure to appear of either the
plaintiff or the defendant, and not their respective counsel. The service of summons upon petitioner first attempted by personal service, and
The absence of counsel for defendants at pretrial does not ipso facto subsequently by substituted service more than meets the requirements set by the
authorize the judge to declare the defendant as in default and order the presentation Rules of Court.
of evidence ex parte. Nothing in the rules of court sanctions the presentation of
evidence ex parte upon instances when counsel for defendant is absent during pre-
trial. The Rules do not countenance stringent construction at the expense of justice
and equity.

Erlinda Guanzon vs Andrew Arradaza, Francisca Maidin, ErlindaLebita (2006)

FACTS:

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