`Javellana vs. Executive Exec
Whether or not the issue of the validity of
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme
Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana
filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them
from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution.
This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a
qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for
himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly
situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had
announced the immediate implementation of the new
constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
constitution upon ground the that the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to
create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve
proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the
ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed
constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of
Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and
proclamation which have the same import and objective.
ISSUES:
1.
Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political
question, and therefore non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified
validly conforming to the applicable constitutional
and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has
been acquiesced in (with or without valid
ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for
relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the
1971 Constitutional Convention in force.
HELD:
1. To determine whether or not the new constitution
is in force depends upon whether or not the said
new constitution has been ratified in accordance
with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It
is well settled that the matter of ratification of an
amendment to the constitution should be settled
applying the provisions of the constitution in force
at the time of the alleged ratification of the old
constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed
has been ratified in accordance with the provisions
of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable
 as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom
we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.
2. The Constitution does not allow Congress or
anybody else to vest in those lacking the
qualifications and having the disqualifications
mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age
render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies
void. Proceedings held in such Citizen’s
Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that
persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in
Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were
allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since
there is no means by which the invalid votes of
those less than 21 years of age can be separated
or segregated from those of the qualified voters,
the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must
be considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the
constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935
Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast"
choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising
hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites.
This is but natural and logical, for, since the early
years of the American regime, we had adopted the
Australian Ballot System, with its major
characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots
prepared and furnished by the Government and
secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of
keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when
necessary, into the accuracy of the election
returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been
conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is
void. The point is that, such of the Barrio
Assemblies as were held took place without the
intervention of the COMELEC and without
complying with the provisions of the Election Code
of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree
No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is
such that there is no reasonable means of
checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the
officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is
another patent violation of Article X of the 1935
Constitution which form part of the fundamental
scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as
amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest"
expression of the people's will. For this, the
alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is
null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to
have ratified the revised Constitution.
3. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of
ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution
places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the
"the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections," independently
of the Executive. But there is not even a
 certification by the COMELEC in support of the
alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied
upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on January
17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the
Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the
Department of Local Governments had certified to
the President the alleged result of the citizens'
assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizen’s
assemblies did not adopt the proposed
constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial
knowledge that there have been no such citizen’s
assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs,
not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines.
4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of
the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to
DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and
Castro so voted on the strength of their view that
"(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the
final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question
posed by these cases to resolve which
considerations other than judicial, an therefore
beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant
and unavoidable."
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices
Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted
to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give
due course to the petitions.
5. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold
that it is in force by virtue of the people's
acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court,
namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and
Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise
stated in their votes on the third question that they
could not state with judicial certainty whether the
people have accepted or not accepted the
Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely,
Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention is not in force; with the result, there
are not enough votes to declare that the new
Constitution is not in force.
PBA v. COMELEC
FACTS:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the
enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national
elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the
offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines.
BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the
President to continue holding office after the calling of the
special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of
conditional “resignation” did not create the actual
vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the
Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a
special election for President and Vice President earlier
than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The
letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing)
the position of President effective only when the election
is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as
President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his
proclamation.”
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict
compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the
incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and
turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as
acting President, their standard bearers have not filed
any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor
repudiated the scheduled election. They have not
insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long
as the election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme
Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the
elections
HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the
prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining
respondents from holding the election on February 7,
1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10
votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the
Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the
issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable
issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to
the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office)
which can be truly decided only by the people in their
sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there
is no issue more political than the election. The Court
cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide
through their ballot, either to give the incumbent
president a new mandate or to elect a new president.
Lansang v. Garcia
Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9
p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was
holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the
presentation of its candidates in the general elections
scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades
were thrown at the platform where said candidates and
other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many
more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the
President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus
stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and
insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power.
Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons
(13) who have been arrested without a warrant.
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the
proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons
caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was
issued as an amendment, inserting the word “actually
staging”. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the
suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces
and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the
suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in
Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7
provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-
provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended.
Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not
declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or
rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it became
moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners
further contend that public safety did not require the
issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is no
rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the
suspension of the privilege, the Government was
functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no
untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August
Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d)
that the President's alleged apprehension, because of
said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the
Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and
weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to
require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having
tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in
order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases
for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after
conclusive decision reached by majority.
Issues:
1. W/N the proclamation of Proclamation No. 889 is
valid and effective.
2. W/N the president can suspend the writ of habeas
corpus under the said proclamation.
3. W/N the petitioners herein belong to the class of
persons as to whom privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus has been suspended
Held:
1. The President has authority however it is subject
to judicial review. Two conditions must concur for
the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the
privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger
thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the
suspension of the privilege. President has three
(3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed
forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law. He had,
already, called out the armed forces, proved
inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the
suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.
 Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no
ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20
barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there
were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents
in the Greater Manila Area in 1970. CPP has
managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine
major labor organizations; has exploited the (11)
major student or youth organizations; about thirty
(30) mass organizations actively advancing the
CPP.
2. Yes it is valid and such suspension is limited. The
President could have declared
a general suspension of the privilege. Instead,
Proclamation No. 889 limited the suspension to
persons detained "for crimes of insurrection or
rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses
committed by them in furtherance or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith." Even this was further
limited by Proclamation No. 889-A, which withdrew
from the coverage of the suspension persons
detained for other crimes and offenses committed
"on the occasion" of the insurrection or rebellion,
or "incident thereto, in or connection therewith." In
fact, the petitioners in L-33964, L-33982 and L-
34004 concede that the President had acted in
good faith.
3. If the proclamation suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is valid — and We so hold it
to be — and the detainee is covered by the
proclamation, the filing of a complaint or
information against him does not affect the
suspension of said privilege, and, consequently,
his release may not be ordered by Us
AYTONA V. CASTILLO
FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos
Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador Aytona as ad
interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the
corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon,
President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office;
and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2
recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim
appointments made by former President Garcia. There
were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments
made by the former President Garcia. On January 1,
President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad
interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a
case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he
was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment
to Castillo by the new President, should be considered
void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former
President Garcia were valid.
RULING:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President
Macapagal, previous President Garcia administration
was no more than a care-taker administration. He was
duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority the incoming President, and he should not
do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or
obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him
to use powers as incumbent President to continue the
political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of
presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The
filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so
spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and
careful consideration of the need for the appointment and
the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be
permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one
night and planned induction of almost all of them a few
hours before the inauguration of the new President may,
with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse
Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being
apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant
positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and
thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity
to make the corresponding appointments.
IN RE SATURINO BERMUDEZ
Facts:
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no
respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first
paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously
stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution,
which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and
Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election
is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-
President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom
it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer
the question of the construction and definiteness as to
who, among the present incumbent President Corazon
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the
elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-
President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the
said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986
Constitution refers to, . ...
Ruling:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their
petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of
the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of
the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made
the judgment; they have accepted the government of
President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control
of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto
government but in fact and law a de jure government.
Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven
members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to
uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her
government.
B. Republic of the Phil as a State
1. Elements of a State; Def of a State
CIR v. CAMPOS RUEDA
Maria Cerdiera is a Spanish national (Filipina married to
a Spanish citizen), lived in Morocco and died there. In the
Philippines, she left intangible properties. The person
tasked as administrator of the intangible properties is
Antonio Campos Rueda. He filed a provisional estate and
inheritance tax return on all properties left by her. The
Collector of Internal Revenue, the respondent, pending
the investigation of the tax value of the properties, issued
an assessment for estate tax worth P111,592.48 and
inheritance tax worth P187,791.48 with a total amount of
P369,383.96. These tax liabilities were paid by Antonio
Rueda.
Later, Campos Rueda filed an amended tax return
wherein the properties worth P396,308.90 are claimed as
exempted from taxes. Respondent, still pending
investigation on the same subject, issued another
assessment for estate tax worth P202,262.40 and
inheritance taxed worth P267,402.84 with a total amount
of P469,665.24.
Issues:
Respondent’s reply to the request for exemption of taxes,
etc.:
(1) There is no reciprocity as it did not meet the
requirements mentioned in Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code. Tangier is a mere principality
and not a foreign country.
(Note: As argued, section 122, in relation to the case,
grants certain exemption of taxes provided that
‘reciprocity’ be met and for reciprocity to be met, Tangier
must be a foreign country within the meaning of Section
122).
(2) Respondent denied request for exemption because
the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code.
(3) Respondent demanded the payment of the sums of
239,439.49 representing deficiency estate and
inheritance tax including ad valorem penalties,
surcharges, interests and compromise penalties.
The Court of Tax Appeals ruled:
(1) Tangier allows a similar law for the exemption of
taxes. Such exemption is sufficient to entitle Antonio
Rueda to the exemption benefits. There is no lacking of
reciprocity.
The Collector of Internal Revenue asked a question of
law:
(1) Whether the requisites of statehood is necessary
(sine qua non) for the acquisition of international
personality.
(2) Whether acquisition of international personality is
required for a ‘foreign country’ to fall within the exemption
of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
The Supreme Court referred the case back to the Court
of Tax Appeals to determine whether the alleged law of
Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax exemption required
by Section 122.
Held:
(1) Requisite of Statehood is necessary.
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is
to be identified with a state, it is required in line with
Pound’s formulation that:“it be a politically organized
sovereign community independent of outside control
bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme
within its territory, acting through a government
functioning under a regime of law.”
(2) Tangier is a state.
(3) Section 122 does not require that the “foreign country”
possess an international personality. In other words,
international personality is not a requisite.
(4) Supreme Court affirms Court of Tax Appeals ruling.
(Note: Look at the ruling of the Court of Appeals found in
the issue.)
US v. DORR
Facts
Fred L. Dorr and a number of other persons (Dorr, et al.)
were convicted of violating Section 8 of Act No. 292
which punishes the utterance of "seditious words or
speeches" and the writing, publication, or circulation of
"scurrilous libels against the Government of the United
States or the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands" or other libels against the same entities which (1)
"tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing
his office", (2) "tend to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes", (3) "suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots", or (4) "tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the
peace of the community, the safety, and order of the
Government". The same provision also punishes the
deliberate concealment of the aforementioned acts.
The charge against Dorr et al. stemmed from an article
published in the newspaper Manila Freedom criticizing
the appointment by the Civil Commission of certain
persons— including Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera— to
key government positions. The said article referred to the
aforementioned appointees as "rascals" and "corrupt"
and called certain government offices organized by the
Civil Commission as "rotten" and "corrupt".
Issue
Whether or not the publication of the subject article falls
within the purview of Section 8 of Act No. 292.
Held
No. The article in question produces none of the effects
enumerated in Section 8 of Act No. 292. In addition, the
same provision refers to libel of the government in
general, and not of specific individuals.
Ratio Decidendi
N.B.: The Court did not provide any basis for finding that
the subject article did not have the tendency to produce
the effects enumerated under Section 8 of Act No. 292,
other than all the justices agreed on the same
conclusion.
As used in Act No. 292, the term "government" is used in
the abstract sense of the existing political system, as
distinguished from the concrete organisms of the
Government, such as the Houses of Congress and the
Executive, which are also specially mentioned. Had the
framers of the said law intended to mean specific
government personnel, they would have expressly stated
so.
In this case, the article in question, attacked the Civil
Commission and some of its individual members, not the
governmental system. Hence, it falls outside the purview
of Act No. 292.
2. The Doc of State of Immunity
a. “That the State may not be sued w/o its consent.”
Art XVI s3
KAWANANAKOA V. POLYBANK
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from a decree affirming a decree of
foreclosure and sale under a mortgage executed by the
appellants to the appellee, Sister Albertina. 17 Haw. 82.
The defendants (appellants) pleaded to the jurisdiction
that after the execution of the mortgage a part of the
mortgaged land had been conveyed by them to one
Damon, and by Damon to the territory of Hawaii, and was
now part of a public street. The bill originally made the
territory a party, but the territory demurred and the
plaintiffs dismissed their bill as to it before the above plea
was argued. Then the plea was overruled, and after
answer and hearing the decree of foreclosure was made,
the appellants having saved their rights. The decree
excepted from the sale the land conveyed to the territory,
and directed a judgment for the sum remaining due in
case the proceeds of the sale were insufficient to pay the
debt. Eq. Rule 92.
The appellants contend that the owners of the equity of
redemption in all parts of the mortgage land must be
joined, and that no deficiency judgment should be
entered until all the mortgaged premises have been sold.
In aid of their contention they argue that the territory of
Hawaii is liable to suit like a municipal corporation,
irrespective of the permission given by its statutes, which
does not extend to this case. They liken the territory to
the District of Columbia (Metr- [205 U.S. 349,
353] opolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1 ,
33 L. ed. 231, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 19), and point out that it
has been a party to suits that have been before this court
(Damson v. Hawaii, 194 U.S. 154 , 48 L. ed. 916, 24 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 617; Carter v. Hawaii, 200 U.S. 255 , 50 L. ed.
470, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 248).
The territory, of course, could waive its exemption (Smith
v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 , 44 L. ed. 1140, 20 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 919), and it took no objection to the proceedings in
the cases cited if it could have done so. See act of April
30, 1900, chap. 339, 96. 31 Stat. at L. 141, 160. But in
the case at bar it did object, and the question raised is
whether the plaintiffs were bound to yield. Some doubts
have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of
a sovereign power from suit without its own permission,
but the answer has been public property since before the
days of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap. 26, 2. A sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception
or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends. 'Car on
peut bien recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par
nature de se donner loy.' Bodin, Republique, 1, chap. 8,
ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis,
chap. 3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative. Baldus,
De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed. 1496, fol. 51b, ed.
1539, fol. 61.
As the ground is thus logical and practical, the doctrine is
not confined to powers that are sovereign in the full
sense of juridical theory, but naturally is extended to
those that, in actual administration, originate and change
at their will the law of contract and property, from which
persons within the jurisdiction derive their rights. A suit
presupposes that the defendants are subject to the law
invoked. Of course it cannot be maintained unless they
are so. But that is not the case with a territory of the
United States, because the territory itself is the fountain
from which rights ordinarily flow. It is true that Congress
might intervene, just as, in the case of a state, the
Constitution does, and the power that can alter the
Constitution might. But the rights that exist are not
created by [205 U.S. 349, 354] Congress or the
Constitution, except to the extent of certain limitations of
power. The District of Columbia is different, because
there the body of private rights is created and controlled
by Congress, and not by a legislature of the District. But
for the territory of Hawaii it is enough to refer to the
organic act. Act of April 30, 1900, chap. 339, 6, 55. 31
Stat. at L. 141, 142, 150. Coffield v. Territory, 13 Haw.
478. See, further, Territory v. Doty, 1 Pinney (Wis.) 396,
405; Langford v. King, 1 Mont. 33; Fisk v. Cuthbert, 2
Mont. 593, 598.
However it might be in a different case, when the inability
to join all parties and to sell all the land is due to a
conveyance by the mortgagor directly or indirectly to the
territory, the court is not thereby deprived of ability to
proceed.
Decree affirmed.
Ruling: To Justice Holmes, however, the doctrine of non-
suability is based not on any formal conception or
obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right against the authority
which makes the law on which the right depends.
Garcia v. COS
FACTS:
The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan an action to collect a sum of money against
the above defendants. He suffered injuries while
undergoing a 10-month military training at Camp
Floridablanca, Pampanga. He filed a claim under
Commonwealth Act 400 and in April 1957 with the
Adjutant General’s Office which later disallow his claim
for disability benefit. After further demands of the plaintiff,
the same Adjutant General’s Office denied the claim,
alleging that the Commonwealth Act 400 had already
been repealed by RA 610 which took effect January 1,
1950. That by the reason of the injuries suffered by
plaintiff, he was deprived of his sight or vision rendering
him permanently disabled; and by the reason of
unjustified refusal of defendants on the claim, plaintiff
was deprived of his disability pension from July
1948 totaling no less than Php 4,000 at the rate of P20
per month and suffered moral damages and
attorney’s fees the amount of Php 2,000. The Philippine
Veterans Administration and the Chief of Staff of AFP file
separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust
all administrative remedies before coming to court; that
the complaint states no cause of action; and that the
cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.
Acting on the said Motion, the Court of First Instance, on
March 2, 1962, rendered an order dismissing the
complaint on the ground that action has prescribed.
Motion for reconsideration of the said order having been
denied, the plaintiff has interposed this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court has jurisdiction on the said
matter and dismissing the complaint on ground it being
the money claim against the government.
HELD:
The court affirmed the lower court’s decision on
dismissing the complaint for the simple reason that the
Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, it being a money claim against the
government. If there is a money claim against the
government should be filed with the Auditor General.
Plus, under the doctrine of state immunity, the state
cannot be sued without its consent. Moreover, it is in line
with the principle that the State cannot be charged
without its content as provided by the Commonwealth Act
328 Sec. 1 that in all cases involving the settlement of
accounts and claims other than those of accountable
officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the
same within sixty days.
Also, if all administrative remedies have been made and
if superior administrative officers could grant relief, it is
not necessary to entertain actions against the
administrative officers as established by the rule.
THE HOLY SEE V. ROSARIO
Petitioner in this case is the Holy See (who exercises
sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome Italy and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.
Respondent in this case is Hon. Edilberto Rosario in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge of RTC Makati, Branch
61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, a domestic
corporation engaged in the real estate business.
The petition started from a controversy over a parcel of
land. Lot 5A registered under the name of the Holy See,
is connected to Lot 5B and 5D under the name of
Philippine Realty Corporation. The land was donated by
the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio which
represented the Holy See who exercises sovereignty
over the Vatican City, Rome Italy for his residence.
The said lots were sold to Ramon Licup who assigned his
rights to respondents Starbright Sales, Inc.
When the squatters refused to vacate the lots, a dispute
arose between these two parties because both were
unsure as to whose responsibility was it to evict the
squatters from the said lots. Respondent Starbright
insists that the Holy See should clear the property while
Holy See says that Starbright should do it or the earnest
money will be returned.
Since Starbright refused to clear the property, Msgr.
Cirilios, the agent, returned P100k earnest money. The
same lots were sold to Tropicana Properties.
Starbright filed a suit for annulment of sale, specific
performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios,
Philippine Realty Corporation and Tropicana.
The Holy See moved to dismiss the petition for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity of suit. The
RTC denied the motion on the ground that the petitioner
already shed off its sovereign immunity by entering into a
business contract.
Petitioner filed for Petition for Certiorari in the SC.
On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed
before the SC by the DFA, claiming that it has a legal
interest in the outcome of the case as regards the
diplomatic immunity of petitioner.
Issue: W/N Petitioner is immune from suits.
Held: YES. The Court held that the Holy See may
properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability.
In Article 31 (A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, diplomatic envoy (a representative
government who is sent on a special diplomatic mission)
shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action
relating to private immovable property.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent
disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental
character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain.
It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the
squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for
petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The
fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying
the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the
premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its
complaint
Furthermore, the DFA certified that the Embassy of the
Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to
the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted
from local jurisdiction and is entitled to immunity rights of
a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.
US V. RUIZ
Facts:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and
restrain perpetually the proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic,
Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and
the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United
States invited the submission of bids for a couple of
repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc.
responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US
two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals
and for the name of its bonding company. The company
construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they
complied with the requests. The company received a
letter which was signed by William I. Collins of
Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of
the petitioners herein informing that the company did not
qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its
previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs,
and that the projects were awarded to third parties. For
this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by
him against the US.
Issues: W/N the US naval base in bidding for said
contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to
invoke state immunity.
Rulings: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this
case the projects are an integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both the United States
and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order, they are not utilized for
nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State
may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given
its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to
the exercise of its sovereign functions.
USA V. GUINTO
Facts:
The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The
United States of America was not impleaded in the case
at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they
are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.
The private respondents are suing several officers of the
US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the
bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber
services in the said base. Among those who submitted
their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia,
Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar.
The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection
of the private respondents who claimed that he had made
a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area
which was not included in the invitation to bid.
The private respondents filed a complaint in the court
below to compel Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and
the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to
conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and
to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary
injunction to continue operating the concessions pending
litigation.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to
the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that
the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not
waived its non-suability, but trial court denied the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against
United States of America.
2. Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit
under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them
in the performance of their official duties.
Discussions:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent,
is one of the generally accepted principles of international
law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by
the generally accepted principles of international law
under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine,
as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are
deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as
a condition and consequence of its membership in the
society of nations. Upon its admission to such society,
the state is automatically obligated to comply with these
principles in its relations with other states.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against
the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the states for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such
officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be
regarded as against the state although it has not been
formally impleaded. When the government enters into a
contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of
the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign
immunity from suit with its implied consent.
Rulings:
1. The court finds the barbershops subject to the
concessions granted by the US government to be
commercial enterprises operated by private persons.
They are not agencies of the United States Armed
Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter
of right by the American servicemen. These
establishments provide for the grooming needs of
their customers. This being the case, the petitioners
cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by
the private respondents in the court below.
2. Petitioners states they have acted in the discharge of
their official functions as officers or agents of the
United States. They are sought to be held answerable
for personal torts in which the United States itself is
not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must
satisfy the judgment.
The Court would have directly resolved the claims
against the defendants, except for the paucity of the
record in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged
irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is
not before the Court. The respondent court will have to
receive that evidence first, so it can later determine on
the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief
they seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded
to the court below for further proceedings.
TORIO V. FONTANILLA
FACTS:
On October 21, 1978, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui,
Pangasinan passed Resolution No. 156 whereby it
resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta
celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959. Resolution
No. 182 was also passed creating the town fiesta
committee with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The
amount of P100.00 was also appropriated for the
construction of two stages, one for the zarzuela and the
other for the cancionan. On January 22, while in the
midst of the zarzuela, the stage collapsed, pinning
Vicente Fontanilla who died thereafter. The heirs of
Fontanilla filed a petition for recovery of damages.
Defendant councilors contend that they are merely acting
as agents of the municipality.
1. ISSUE:
Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a
municipal council a governmental or a corporate
function of the municipality?
2. Are the councilors liable for the death of
Fontanilla?
HELD:
The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality
was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the
municipality. The provision on Section 2282 of the
Revised Administrative Code simply gives authority to the
municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not
impose upon it a duty to observe one. It follows that
under the doctrine of respondent-superior, the
municipality is held liable for damages for the death of
Fontanilla. Since it is established that the municipality
was acting a proprietary function, it follows that it stands
on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation
where officers are not held liable for the negligence of the
corporation merely because of their official relation to it.
Thus, the municipal councilors are absolved from any
criminal liability for they did not directly participate in the
defective construction of the stage.
b. waiver of immunity
Express consent; general or special law
MERRITT V. GOVT OF PH
FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre
Faura Street when he was bumped by the ambulance of
the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries
rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature
later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit
against the Government in order to fix the responsibility
for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the
amount of the damages, if any, to which he is entitled.
After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due
to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then
determined the amount of damages and ordered the
government to pay the same.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply
waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its
liability to the plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the
driver of the ambulance?
HELD:
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of
the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts
through a special agent, but not when the damage should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one
who receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official. This concept does not apply to any
executive agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility
performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally
pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and
the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the
Government is not liable.
NOTE:
■ The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains. (Art. 2180 par. 6, Civil Code)
■ The state is not responsible for the damages suffered
by private individuals in consequence of acts performed
by its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in
the organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents.
■ The State is not liable for the torts committed by its
officers or agents whom it employs, except when
expressly made so by legislative enactment. The
government does not undertake to guarantee to any
person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it
employs since that would involve it in all its operations in
endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which
would be subversive of the public interest.
REPUBLIC VS PURISIMA
Facts:
A MTD was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant
Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the
sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a
money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract,
the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight
Lines, Inc.
At that time, the leading case of Mobil
Philippines Exploration,Inc. v. Customs Arrastre
Service , where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of
jurisdiction of a court to pass on the meritsof a claim
against any office or entity acting as part of the
machinery of the national government unless consent
beshown, had been applied in 53 other decisions.
Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of
First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss
dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari
and prohibition was filed.
I s s u e : W/N the respondent’s decision is valid
R u l i n g : No.
Rationale:
The position of the Republic has been fortified with the
explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present
Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its
consent." "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in
this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the
[1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist
concept of law which, to paraphrase Holmes, negates the
assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself
the source of the law on which such a right may be
predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does
give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded
role of government enabling it to engage in business
pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not
obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that
calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby
cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek
collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory
remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them
subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final
adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did
in the cited Providence Washington Insurance decision:
"Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government
without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly
lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent
of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening
scope of state activities at present being undertaken.
Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist,
is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In
the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the
determination of what principles must prevail if
government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must
be, as it has been these so manyyears, for its continuing
recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional
law." [
Switzerland General Insurance Co.,Ltd. v. Republic of the
Philippines]
***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State
acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by
Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for
defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had
no binding force on the government
USA VS GUINTO(SUPRA)
These are cases that have been consolidated because
they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United
States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar
but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in
effect suits against it to which it has not consented.
FACTS:
1. USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)
The private respondents are suing several officers of
the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the
bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber
services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The
respondents wanted to cancel the award because they
claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not
included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a
rebidding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants were immune from
suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by
them in the performance of their official duties.
RULING:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its
consent is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that were have adopted as part of the
law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would
still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation.
Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the
states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the
law of every civilized state as a condition and
consequence of its membership in the society of nations.
All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears
to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent,
it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit
must be regarded as against the state although it has not
been formally impleaded. When the government enters
into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the
level of the other contracting party and divested of its
sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.
It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid
principle do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity for
all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither
may the other petitioners claim that they are also
insulated from suit in this country merely because they
have acted as agents of the United States in the
discharge of their official functions.
There is no question that the USA, like any other
state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-
suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary
or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is
only when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii)
that no such waiver may be implied.
In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops
subject to the concessions granted by the US
government to be commercial enterprises operated by
private persons. The Court would have directly resolved
the claims against the defendants as in USA vs
RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the
evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the
barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly,
this case was remanded to the court below for further
proceedings.
NOTE:
1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO
THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND CAN THUS BE
DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO
BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS
CONTRACTS.
2. Jure Gestionis – by right of economic or business
relations, may be sued. (US vs Guinto)
Jure Imperii – by right of sovereign power, in the
exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent. (US
v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)
FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO.
FACTS:
-Feb 3, 1951 - Plaintiff-appellee, Fernando A. Froilan
filed a complaint against the defendant-appelant, Pan
Oriental, alleging that he purchased from the Shipping
Commission the vessel FS-197 and due to non-payment
of installments of chattel mortgage, the Shipping
Commission took possession of the said vessel and
considered the contract of sale cancelled.
-The Shipping Commission delivered the said vessel to
Pan Oriental. Froilan appealed to the President of the
Philippines and in its meeting, Aug 25 1950 - the Cabinet
restored him to all his rights under his original contact
with the Shipping Commission. He demanded from Pan
Oriental possession of the vessel but the latter refused.
-Nov 10, 1951 - The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines intervened alleging that Froilan had failed to
pay to the Shipping Commission the balance due on the
purchase price of the vessel in question and that the
State was entitled to the possession of the said vessel
under the terms of the original contract. Therefore, it
prayed for Froilan to deliver the vessel to its
representative, the Board of Liquidators in accordance
with the revisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
-Nov 29, 1951 - Pan Oriental filed a counterclaim that the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines was
obligated to deliver the vessel to it by virtue of a contract
of bareboat charter with option to purchase. It alleged
that it had made the necessary and useful expenses on
the vessel and claimed the right to it. It prayed that if the
GRP was successful in obtaining the possession of the
said vessel, it should comply with its obligations of
delivering it to Pan O.
-Nov 29, 1951 - Froilan tendered to the Board of
Liquidators a check in payment of his balance/obligation
to the Shipping Commission as claimed by the intervenor
GRP.
-Feb 3, 1952 - the lower court held that the payment of
Froilan discharged his obligation to the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines therefore the complaint in
intervention has been dismissed

-May 10, 1952 - GRP filed a motion to dismiss the
counterclaim of Pan Oriental Shipping against it on the
ground that the purpose of the counterclaim was to
compel the GRP to deliver the vessel to it in the event
that the GRP recovers the vessel from Froilan however
since payment has already been made by Froilan, the
counterclaim is no longer feasible.
ISSUE: W/N the RP of the Philippines is immune from
suit.
HELD: No
The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of
the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state
as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions
open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in
an action against a private party, the state surrenders its
privileged position and comes down to the level of the
defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within
certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and
other defenses he might have against the state. The
United States Supreme Court thus explains:
"No direct suit can be maintained against the United
States. But when an action is brought by the United
States to recover money in the hands of a party who has
a legal claim against them, it would be a very rigid
principle to deny to him the right of setting up such claim
in a court of justice, and turn him around to an application
to Congress." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth Ed.,
pp. 36-37, citing U. S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed.
899.)
It is however, contended for the intervenor that, if there
was at all any waiver, it was in favor of the plaintiff
against whom the complaint in intervention was directed.
This contention is untenable. As already stated, the
complaint in intervention was in a sense in derogation of
the defendant's claim over the possession of the vessel
in question.
c. Immunity against Execution of Judgment: suability vs
liability
PNB VS PABALAN
Facts:
The case was filed by petitioner requesting for certiorari
against the writ of execution authorized by the Hon Judge
Pabalan regarding the transfer of funds amounting to
P12,724.66 belonging to Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration (PVTA).
Philippine National Bank (PNB) of La Union filed an
administrative complaint against Judge Pabalan for grave
abuse of discretion, alleging that the latter failed to
recognize that the questioned funds are of public
character and therefore may not be garnished, attached
or levied upon. The PNB La Union Branch invoked the
doctrine of non-suability, putting a bar on the notice of
garnishment.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Philippine National Bank can be sued.
2. Whether or not the notice of garnishment of funds of
Philippine Virginia Tobacco deposited with the
petitioner bank is valid.
Discussions:
The consent of the state to be sued may be given
expressly or impliedly. In this case, Consent to be sued
was given impliedly when the State enters into a
commercial contract. When the State enters into a
contract, the State is deemed to have divested itself of
the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the
level of the ordinary individual. Hence, Funds of public
corporations could properly be made the object of a
notice of garnishment.
Rulings:
1. PVTA is also a public corporation with the same
attributes, a similar outcome is attributed. The
government has entered with them into a commercial
business hence it has abandoned its sovereign
capacity and has stepped down to the level of a
corporation. Therefore, it is subject to rules governing
ordinary corporations and in effect can be sued.
Therefore, the petition of PNB La Union is denied.
2. The Supreme Court ruled that the funds held by PNB
is subject for garnishment. Funds of public
corporations which can sue and be sued are not
exempt from garnishment. Thus, the writ of execution
be imposed immediately.
d. suits against govt agencies
i. charted agencies
ARCEGA VS. CA
FACT:
The petitioner Alicia O. Arcega, doing business under
the firm name “Fairmont Ice Cream Company,” filed a
complaint before the court against the respondents
Central Bank of the Philippines and Philippine National
Bank, for the refund from allegedly unauthorized
payments made by her of the 17% special excise tax on
foreign exchange.
The Central Bank moved to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds,
among others, that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action,
because the judgment sought will constitute a financial
charge against the Government, and therefore the suit
is one against the Government, which cannot prosper
without its consent, and in this
case no such consent has been given.
The petitioner appealed, but the court dismissed the
complaint on the ground set forth in the Central Bank’s
motion to dismiss.
The petitioner Arcega filed a MR of the resolution to
which an opposition was filed by the Central Bank. This
time, the Central Bank submitted a certification that the
balance of the collected special excise tax on sales of
foreign exchange was turned over to the Treasurer of the
Philippines. Then the court denied the petitioner’s MR as
a result Arcega appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Holding that the suit is indirectly against the Republic of
the Philippines which cannot be sued without its consent,
the CA affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Finally the
petitioner filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the suit against the Central Bank for
refund is a suit against the State?
Held: It is a suit against the State but under the charter of
Central Bank of the Philippines, is an entity authorized by
to sue and be sued. The consent of the State to thus be
sued, therefore, has been given.
This doctrine was reiterated in Philippines Acetylene Co.
vs. Central Bank of the Philippines where it was pointedly
stated that "sec. 5 of Republic Act No. 601 (as amended)
directs that refund of taxes be made by the Central
Bank."
RAYO VS CFI OF BULACAN
FACTS: At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading",
the respondent opened simultaneously all the three
floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden,
precipitate and simultaneous opening of said floodgates
several towns in Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners
filed for damages against the respondent corporation.
Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents forn
dismissal of the case and contended that the respondent
corporation is merely performing a propriety functions
and that under its own organic act, it can sue and be
sued in court.
ISSUE: W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be
sued under its organic charter includes the power to be
sued for tort.
HELD: YES the power to sued for tort is included. It is
sufficient to say that the government has organized a
private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to
sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A. No.
6395, Sec. 3 (d).)
As a government owned and controlled corporation, it
has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from
that of the Government. (See National Shipyards and
Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L-17874, August 31, 1963, 8
SCRA 781.)
Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can "sue
and be sued in any court" is without qualification on the
cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim
such as the one instituted by the petitioners.
PNR VS IAC
Facts:
The case arose from a collision of a passenger express
train of Defendant Philippine National Railways, (PNR)
coming from San Fernando, La union and bound for
Manila and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc.
which was on its way to Bulacan, from Manila, but upon
reaching the railroad crossing at Calumpit, Bulacan got
stalled and was hit by defendant's express train causing
damages to Plaintiff's bus and its passengers, 18 of
whom died and 53 others suffered physical injuries.
Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision
was the negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR
and its locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in
operating its passenger train in a busy intersection
without any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or
switchman to warn the public of approaching train that
would pass through the crossing, filed the instant action
for damages against defendants. The defendants, in their
answer traversed the material allegation of the complaint
and as affirmative defense alleged that the collision was
caused by the negligence, imprudence and lack of
foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo Hughes.
Issue:
WON PNR being a governmental agency has immunity
from suit.
Held: The PNR did not become immune from suit.
The correct rule is that "not all government entities,
whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from
suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character
of the objects for which the entity was organized." (Nat.
Airports Corp. vs. Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91
Phil. 203, 206; Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 285;
Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104 Phil. 593).
Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in
which they have assumed to act in a private or
nongovernmental capacity are not suits against the State.
In the instant case, the State divested itself of its
sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR, which is
no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad
Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It
did not remove itself from the operation of Articles 1732
to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers.

ii. unchartered or unincorporated agencies
NAC VS TEODORO
Facts:
The National Airports Corporation was organized under
Republic Act No. 224, which expressly made the
provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the said
corporation. It was abolished by Executive Order No. 365
and to take its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration
was created.
Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to
the National Airports Corporation P65,245 as fees for
landing and parking for the period up to and including
July 31, 1948. These fees are said to have been due and
payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., who owned the
land used by the National Airports Corporation as airport.
The owner commenced an action in the court against the
Philippine Airlines, Inc.
The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party
complaint against the National Airports Corporation,
which by that time had been dissolved, and served
summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The
third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National
Airports Corporation the fees claimed by the Capitol
Subdivision, Inc. “on the belief and assumption that the
third party defendant was the lessee of the lands subject
of the complaint and that the third party defendant and its
predecessors in interest were the operators and
maintainers of said airport and, further, that the third
party defendant would pay to the landowners, particularly
the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable rentals for
the use of their lands.”
The Solicitor General, after answering the third party
complaint, filed a MTD on the ground that the court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain the third- party complaint,
because first, because the National Airports Corporation
“has lost its juridical personality,” and, second, because
agency of the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated
and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is
incapable of suing and being sued
Issues:
W/N Civil Aeronautics Administration is subject to suit.
Held:
Yes. Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration are, under Section 3 of EO 365, to
execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and
to grant concession rights, and under Section 4, to
charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of
aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals
for the use of any property under its management.
These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics
Administration, in our opinion, the power to sue and be
sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the
power to transact private business. And if it has the
power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration with greater reason should
have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and
against the National Airports Corporation, having
acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action
and assumed all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the
National Airports Corporation's creditors access to the
courts of justice against the Civil Aeronautics
Administration is to say that the government could impair
the obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient
of converting them into unincorporated agencies.
BOP VS BOP EMPLOYEES ASSO
Facts: BPEA (respondents) filed a complaint by an
acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against
petitioners BOP (secretary of Department of General
Services and Director of BOP). The complaint alleged
that both the secretary of DOG and the director of BOP
have been engaging in unfair labor practices. Answering
the complaint, the petitioners (BOP), denied the charges
of unfair labor practices attributed to them and alleged
that the BPEA complainants were suspended pending
result of administrative investigation against them for
breach of Civil Service rules and regulations; that the
BOP is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose
of gain but of the republic performing governmental
functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But later on January 27,
1959, the trial judge of Industrial Court sustained the
jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of
the BOP are “exclusively proprietary in nature,” since
they receives outside jobs and that many of its
employees are paid for overtime work on regular working
days and holidays, therefore consequently denied the
prayed for dismissal, which brought the petitioners (BOP)
to present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether or not the BOP can be sued.
Held: As an office of the Government, without any
corporate or juridical personality, the BOP cannot be
sued (Sec.1, Rule 33, Rules of court).
It is true that BOP receives outside jobs and that many of
its employees are paid for overtime work on regular
working days and holidays, but these facts do not justify
the conclusion that its functions are “exclusively
proprietary in nature”. Overtime work in the BOP is done
only when the interest of the service so requires. As a
matter of administrative policy, the overtime
compensation may be paid, but such payment is
discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending
upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the
basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are
wholly proprietary in character.
Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to
produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or
proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is
settled that the Government cannot be sued without its
consent, much less over its jurisdiction.
Disposition: The petition for a writ of prohibition is
granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the
complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners
is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than
the respondent court.
MOBIL INC VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE
Facts:
This case was filed by Mobil Phil Exploration Inc. against
the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of
Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case of
rotary drill parts.
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad,
consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. The
shipment was discharged to the custody of the Customs
Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then
handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs
Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the
consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil
Philippines Exploration, Inc filed suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service
and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the
undelivered case plus other damages.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that not being persons under the law, defendants
cannot be sued. Appellant contends that not all
government entities are immune from suit; that defendant
BOC as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of
Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such,
can be sued by private individuals.
Issues:
Whether or not both Customs Arrastre Service and the
BOC can invoke state immunity.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of
Customs cannot be sued for recovery of money and
damages involving arrastre services, considering that
said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary,
because it is a necessary incident of the primary and
governmental function of the Bureau of Customs. The
Court ruled that the fact that a non-corporate government
entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not
necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-
governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its
governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the
sovereign immunity from suit extended to such
government entity. The Supreme Court ruled that the
plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the General
Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under
which money claims against the Government may be
filed.
The BOC is a part of Department of Finance. It does not
have a separate juridical personality of its own apart from
that of the national government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful
revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and
customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec.
602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a
necessary incident. As stated in the law, agencies of the
government is not suable if it is performing governmental
functions and if it an unincorporated government entity
without a separate juridical personality.
e. Immunity not an instrument to perpetrate injustice
SANTIAGO VS RP
FACTS:
In January 1971, Ildefonso Santiago gratuitously donated
a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry. The
terms of the donation are; that the Bureau should
construct a building on the said lot and that the building
should be finished by December 7, 1974, that the Bureau
should install lighting facilities on the said lot. However,
come 1976 there were still no improvements on the lot.
This prompted Santiago to file a case pleading for the
revocation of such contract of donation. The trial court
dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the
government and should not prosper without the consent
of the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state has not waived its
immunity from suit.
HELD: No. The government has waived its immunity and
such waiver is implied by virtue of the terms provided in
the deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of
the terms of the donation. But the government through
the Bureau of Plant Industry has breached the terms of
the deed by not complying with such, therefore, the donor
Santiago has the right to have his day in court and be
heard. Further, to not allow the donor to be heard would
be unethical and contrary to equity which the government
so advances. Case should prosper.
AMIGABLE V. CUENCA
FACTS:
Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot
which, without prior expropriation proceedings or
negotiated sale, was used by the government.
Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines
requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had
been expropriated by the government.
Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the
Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of
ownership and possession of the said lot. She also
sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral
damages and attorney's fees.
The defendant said that the case was premature, barred
by prescription, and the government did not give its
consent to be sued.
ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the
government.
HELD: Where the government takes away property from
a private landowner for public use without going through
the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit.
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The
only relief available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years
ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the
basis should be the price or value at the time of the
taking.
A. Political Law; Definition
PP V. PERFECTO
FACTS:
This is a case relating to the loss of some documents
which constituted the records of testimony given by
witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies.
The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio
Perfecto, published an article about it to the effect that
"the author or authors of the robbery of the records from
the iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed
the example of certain Senators who secured their
election through fraud and robbery."
Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution
adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an information
alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article
256 of the Penal Code.
The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the
municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
ISSUEs:
o Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code
was abrogated with the change from Spanish to
American sovereignty
o Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel
HELD:
It is a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory the previous political relations of
the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being
used to denominate the laws regulating the relations
sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.

On American occupation of the Philippines, by
instructions of the President to the Military Commander,
and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of
the conquered territory affecting private rights of person
and property and providing for the punishment of crime
(e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued
in force in so far as they were compatible with the new
order of things.
Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to
protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of
the King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new
government, and a new theory of government, was set
up in the Philippines. No longer is there a Minister of the
Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position
that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath.
Said article is contrary to the genius and fundamental
principles of the American character and system of
government. It was crowded out by implication as soon
as the United States established its authority in the
Philippine Islands.
"From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted
that this article punishes contempts against executive
officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the
entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-
judicial officers has no place in a government based upon
American principles. Our official class is not, as in
monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the
people but it is an agent and servant of the people
themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect
and obedience when they are acting within the scope of
their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of
government is calculated to enforce respect and
obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but
never does it place around the individual who happens to
occupy an official position by mandate of the people any
official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for
contemptuous remarks."
DECISION:
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the
court are of the opinion, although for different reasons,
that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant
and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
MACARIOLA V. JUDGE ASUNCION
FACTS
Reyes siblings filed a complaint for partition against
Macariola, concerning the properties left by
their common father, Francisco Reyes. Asuncion was the
judge who rendered the decision, which became final for
lack of an appeal. A project of partition was submitted to
Judge Asuncion after the finality of the decision. This
project of partition was only signed by the counsel of the
parties, who assured the judge that they were given
authorization to do so.
One of the properties in the project of partition was Lot
1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots. One of these lots
(Lot 1184-D) was sold to Anota, a stenographer of the
court, while another (Lot 1184-E) was sold to Dr.
Galapon, who later on sold a portion of the same lot to
Judge Asuncion and his wife. A year after, spouses
Asuncion and Dr. Galapon sold their respective shares
over the lot to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries. At the time of the sale, Judge Asuncion and
his wife were both stockholders, with Judge Asuncion as
President and his wife as secretary of said company.
A year after the company’s registration with the SEC,
Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion
alleging: • that he violated Art. 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
in acquiring a portion of the lot, which was one of those
properties involved in the partition case; and • that he
violated Art14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3
(H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service
Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics by
associating himself with a private company while he was
a judge of the CFI of Leyte. This case was referred to
Justice Palma of the CA for investigation, report and
recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating
Justice recommended that Judge Asuncion should be
reprimanded or warned in connection with the complaints
filed against him.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 1491 (5)
of the Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot
1184-E, which was among those properties involved in
the partition case.
2. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 14 (1 and
5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec
12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics when he associated himself
with Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.,
as stockholder and a ranking officer
HELD
1. NO. Although Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
prohibits justices, judges among others from
acquiring by purchase the property and rights in
litigation or levied upon an execution before the
court, the SC has ruled, however, that for the
prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of
the property must take place during the pendency
of the litigation involving the property. In this case,
when Judge Asuncion purchased a portion of Lot
1184-E, the decision in the partition case was
already final because none of the parties filed an
appeal within the reglementary period. Thus, the
lot in question was no longer subject of the
litigation. Moreover, Judge Asuncion did NOT buy
the lot directly from the plaintiffs in the partition
case but from Dr. Galapon, who earlier purchased
the lot from the plaintiffs. The subsequent sale
from Dr. Galapon to Judge Asuncion is NOT a
scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical
transfer of said lot as a consideration for the
approval of the project of partition. As pointed out
by the Investigating Justice, there is no evidence
in the record showing that Dr. Galapon acted as a
mere dummy of Judge Asuncion. In fact, Dr.
Galapon appeared to be a respectable
citizen, credible and sincere, having bought the
subject lot in good faith and for valuable
consideration, without any intervention of Judge
Asuncion.
Although Judge Asuncion did NOT
violate Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, it was
IMPROPER for him to have acquired the lot in
question. Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
requires that judges’ official conduct should be
free from the appearance of impropriety. It was
unwise and indiscreet on the part of Judge
Asuncion to have purchased the property that was
or had been in litigation in his court and caused it
to be transferred to a corporation of which he and
his wife were ranking officers at the time of such
transfer. His actuations must not cause doubt and
mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of
justice.
2. NO. Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce
prohibits justices of the SC, judges and officials of
the department of public prosecution in active
service from engaging in commerce, either in
person or proxy or from holding any office or have
an direct, administrative or financial intervention in
commercial or industrial companies within the
limits of the territory in which they discharge their
duties. However, this Code is the Spanish Code of
Commerce of 1885, which was extended to the
Philippines by a Royal Decree. Upon the transfer
of sovereignty from Spain to the US to the
Philippines, Art14 of the Code of Commerce must
be deemed to have been abrogated because
where there is change of sovereignty, the political
laws of the former sovereign are automatically
abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted
by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There
appears to be no affirmative act that continued the
effectivity of saidprovision.
B. The Supremacy of the COnstitution
MUTUC V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the
Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil action
against the respondent COMELEC when the latter
informed him through a telegram that his certificate of
candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited
from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound
systems and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the
order to be violative of his constitutional right to freedom
of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the
premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided
that it is unlawful for the candidates “to purchase,
produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and
the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.”
COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or
taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a
tangible propaganda material and was, under the above
statute, subject to confiscation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner
form part of the prohibition invoked by the COMELEC.
HELD:
The Court held that “the general words following any
enumeration being applicable only to things of the same
kind or class as those specifically referred to”. The
COMELEC’s contention that a candidate’s jingle form
part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and
the like”, could not merit the court’s approval by principle
of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of
the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a
favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution.
Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe
construction of the statute which should be in
consonance to the express terms of the constitution. The
intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be
laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the
candidate’s constitutional rights.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila
Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the
eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management
expertise or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two
(2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of
Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s
check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of
the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the
Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the
national patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is
premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the respondents in refusing the
matching bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
1. It is a self-executing provision.
1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract. A
provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to
the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
 executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.
3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is
a mandatory, positive command which is complete
in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require
any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding
the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency
and puissance, and from which all legislations
must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. The Court agree.
1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term
patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers
not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts,
sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila
Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial
of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a
concourse for the elite, it has since then become
the venue of various significant events which have
shaped Philippine history.
3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our
national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51%
of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview
of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control
and management of the hotel. In this instance,
51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the
hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands.
3. It is not premature.
1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits
the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no
question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to
match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the
award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the
Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino
First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For,
while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a
perilous skirting of the basic law.
2. The Court does not discount the apprehension
that this policy may discourage foreign investors.
But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines
are understood to be always open to public
scrutiny. These are given factors which investors
must consider when venturing into business in a
foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring
to do business in the Philippines or with any of its
agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know
his rights and obligations under the Constitution
and the laws of the forum.
4. There was grave abuse of discretion.
1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners
when there is a Filipino group willing to match the
bid of the foreign group is to insist that
government be treated as any other ordinary
market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross
errors of judgement, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is
regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy
the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to
do so than let the government develop the habit of
forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic
conditions and parameters for its actions.
2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price
tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines
and procedures but with the Constitution as well.
The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as
 provided in the bidding rules after the latter has
matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid
of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION
to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to
do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for
the purpose.
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYESS ASSO ET
AL VS CA
1. In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector
Reform Agenda (HSRA). It provided for five general
areas of reform:
A. To provide fiscal autonomy to government
hospitals;
B. Secure funding for priority public health
programs;
C. Promote the development of local health
systems and ensure its effective performance;
D. Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory
agencies;
E. Expand the coverage of the National Health
Insurance Program (NHIP)
F. On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled
“Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health,” which provided for the
changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH. Under the
assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its
mandate from being the sole provider of health
services to being a provider of specific health
services and technical assistance, as a result of
the devolution of basic services to local
government units.
G. A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector
Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004
of the Department of Health (DOH); and
Executive Order No. 102, “Redirecting the
Functions and Operations of the Department of
Health,”
H. The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA
cannot be declared void for violating Sections 5,
9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of
Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and
Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987
Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to
the duty of the State to protect and promote the
 people’s right to health and well-being. It
reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of
the Constitution are not self-executing; they are
not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and
can only provide guidelines for legislation.
I. 5. The Court of Appeals held that Executive
Order No. 102 is detrimental to the health of the
people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The
question of whether the HSRA will bring about
the development or disintegration of the health
sector is within the realm of the political
department.
Issue:
Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violates the
constitution?
Held:
The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.
1. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution
are considered self-executing, and do not require
future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are
not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the
fundamental law can be easily nullified by the
inaction of Congress. However, some provisions
have already been categorically declared by this
Court as non self-executing. Some of the
constitutional provisions invoked in the present case
were taken from Article II of the Constitution —
specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 —
the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled
to be non self-executing in the aforecited case
of Tañada v. Angara, wherein the Court specifically
set apart the sections as non self-executing and
ruled that such broad principles need legislative
enactments before they can be implemented.
Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation
of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal
protection and due process clauses that are
embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. There were no allegations of
discrimination or of the lack of due process in
connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to
substantiate how these constitutional guarantees
were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in
establishing the relevance of this provision to the
petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
2. Even granting that these alleged errors were
adequately proven by the petitioners, they would still
not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious
legal errors in laying down the compensation of the
DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the
pertinent provisions of Department Circular No. 312,
Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable
appointments or transfers are properly addressed by
an appeal process provided under Administrative
Order No. 94, series of 2000; and if the appeal is
meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be
invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102
would, nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is
the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare
statutes invalid, although they may be abused or
 disabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse
in the manner of application. The validity of a statute
or ordinance is to be determined from its general
purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end
desired, not from its effects in a particular case.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
clearly states: “[T]he president shall have control of
all executive departments, bureaus and offices.”
Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order
No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of
1987. It is an exercise of the President’s
constitutional power of control over the executive
department, supported by the provisions of the
Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes,
and consistently affirmed by this Court.
The Preamble
AGLIPAY VS RUIZ
Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of
prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of
the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner
contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional
provision stating that no public funds shall be
appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system
of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of
the separation of church and state, for the purpose of
avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the
church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends
and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in
accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the
appropriation funds to respondent for the production and
issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous
to the government.
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the
freedom to religion.
Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious
freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however
not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is
not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as
a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far
as it instills into the minds the purest principles of
morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 “advantageous
to the government” does not authorize violation of the
Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not
inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or
religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit
of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps,
instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally
planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the
location of Manila, with the words “Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress.” The focus of the
stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of
Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to “to
advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists,” the
officials merely took advantage of an event considered of
international importance. Although such issuance and
sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic
Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally
resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the
Government.
Art I- national territory
Art II Declaration of principles and state policies
BACANI VS. NACOCO
During the pendency of a civil case in the said court,
Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation,
Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel
for Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies
of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them
during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by
delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript
containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him
their bills for the payment of their fees.
The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid the
amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to
Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per
page. But the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to
reimburse said amounts by virtue of a Department of
Justice circular which stated that NACOCO, being a
government entity, was exempt from the payment of the
fees in question. For reimbursement to take place, it was
further ordered that the amount of P25 per payday be
deducted from the salary of Bacani and P10 from the
salary of Matoto.
Petitioners filed an action in Court countering that
NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of
section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. On the other
hand, the defendants set up a defense that NACOCO is
a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence, it is
exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Issues:
Whether or not National Coconut Corporation
(NACOCO), which performs certain functions of
government, make them a part of the Government of the
Philippines.
Discussions:
NACOCO is not considered a government entity and is
not exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the
scope of the term “Government of the Republic of the
Philippines”. The term “Government” may be defined as
“that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an
independent society makes and carries out those rules of
action which are necessary to enable men to live in a
social state, or which are imposed upon the people
forming that society by those who possess the power or
authority of prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332).
This institution, when referring to the national
government, has reference to what our Constitution has
established composed of three great departments, the
legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the
powers and functions of government are exercised.
These functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant.
The former are those which constitute the very bonds of
society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those
that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general
interests of society, and are merely optional.
Rulings:
No. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the simple
reason that they do not come under the classification of
municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was
organized for the purpose of “adjusting the coconut
industry to a position independent of trade preferences in
the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the
better curing of copra products and the proper utilization
of coconut by-products”, a function which our government
has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry.
It was given a corporate power separate and distinct from
the government, as it was made subject to the provisions
of the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate
existence and the powers that it may exercise are
concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No.
518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any
other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity
different from our government.
ACCFA VS. CUGCO
FACTS:
ACCFA was a government agency created under RA No.
821, as amended. Its administrative machinery was
reorganized and its named changed to Agricultural Credit
Administration under the Land Reform Code or RA 3844.
ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA
Workers' Association were referred to as Union in the
ACCFA.
The Unions and ACCFA entered into a collective
bargaining agreement effective for a period of one
year. Few months have passed, however,The Unions,
together with the CUGCO, filed a complaint against the
ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of unfair
labor practices and non implementation of said
agreement. Court of Industrial Relations ordered ACCFA
to cease from committing further acts tending to
discourage the Union members in the exercise of their
right to self-organizatoin, to comply with and implement
the provisions of the CBA, and to bargain with good faith
with the complainants. ACCFA moved to reconsider but it
was turned down in a resolution. ACCFA appealed by
certiorari.
Issue: W/n ACA is a government entity
Held: yes
Ratio:
It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform
Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA
among them, established to carry out its purposes. There
can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform
program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the
capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into
reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than,
the establishment and maintenance of public schools and
public hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental
objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the
implementation of the land reform program of the State,
the law itself declares that the ACA is a government
office, with the formulation of policies, plans and
programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in
the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform
Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its
personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of
standardization with respect to positions and salaries,
any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of
its functions disappears.
The growing complexities of modern society, however,
have rendered this traditional classification of the
functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say
obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private
enterprise and initiative and which the government was
called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was
better equipped to administer for the public welfare than
is any private individual or group of individuals,"5continue
to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed
within activities that the government must undertake in its
sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else
the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater
socialization of economic forces. Here of course this
development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a
national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration
of principle concerning the promotion of social justice.
PVTA VS CIR
Facts:
This case involves the expanded role of the
government necessitated by the increased responsibility t
o provide for the general welfare.
1. In 1966 private respondents filed a petition
seeking relief for their alleged overtime services
and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said
compensation in accordance with CA No. 444.
2. Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of
a cause of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order,
directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for
certiorari on grounds that the corporation is
 exercising governmental functions and is therefore than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was
exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444. beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent
3. PVTA contended it is beyond the Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not
jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law
governmental functions and that it is exempt from persuasive.
the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.
A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic
Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the differentiation that
Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges
exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial
governmental and not proprietary functions.
burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only
itself to blame. It need not have required private
YES. But the distinction between the constituent and
respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be
ministrant functions of the government has become
surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of
obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare
personnel. That would indeed be a cause for
of its people. RA No. 2265 providing
astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an
for a distinction between constituent and the
objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice
ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of
for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be
the present time: “The growing complexities of modern
sustained.
society have rendered this traditional classification of the
functions of government obsolete.”
3. parens patriae
The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not
GOVT VS MONTE DE PIEDAD
apply to them deserve scant consideration. There is no
A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines
question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a
sometimes in 1863. Contributions amounting to $400,000
governmental agency. As such, the petitioner can
were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of
rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading
the victims of an earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00
ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with
was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable
its overtones of the distinction between constituent and
institution, in need for more working capital, petitioned
ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani
the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a
v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that
loan.
just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the
Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000. The respondent
bank declined to comply with this order upon the ground
that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands
and not the Department of Finance had the right to order
the reimbursement.
On account of various petitions of the persons, the
Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General, bring
suit against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the
$80,000, together with interest, for the benefit of those
persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was
entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000
gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with
legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of
the cause.
The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors
made by the defendant was to question the competence
of the plaintiff (government) to bring the action,
contending that the suit could be instituted only by the
intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is
competent to file a complaint against the respondent
bank.
HELD: Yes. The Philippine government is competent to
institute action against Monte de Piedad, this is in
accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The
government being the protector of the rights of the people
has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws
that will promote the public interest. No other party has
been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the
people the government has the right to take back the
money intended for the people.
CABANAS VS PILAPIL
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his
insurance plan that his child will be his beneficiary. He
also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a
minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered
by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten
years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco then
took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the
benefit of the child.
On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora
Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the
insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as
the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the
insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms
and obligations must be binding only to the parties and
intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue
of “parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy.
HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the
strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and
that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at
bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then
the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve
that case according to the best interest of that person.
The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the
mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor
child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more
care towards the child than the uncle will. The application
of parens patriae here is in consonance with this
country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the
family hence preference to the parent (mother) is
observed.
4. de jure and de facto govt
CO KIM CHAN VS VALDEZ TAN KET
Facts:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with
the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated during the
time of the Japanese occupation.
The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to
continue hearings on the case which were initiated during
the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the
proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in
the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had
the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines
during the Japanese military occupation, and that the
lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of
the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of
an enabling law granting such authority.
Respondent, additionally contends that the government
established during the Japanese occupation were no de
facto government.
Issues:
1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the
court made during the Japanese occupation were
valid and remained valid even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States
and Filipino forces.
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation
issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in
the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth
are null and void and without legal effect in areas of
the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control”
has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts.
3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing
the cases pending before them, if the said judicial
acts and proceedings were not invalidated by
MacArthur’s proclamation.

Discussions:
 Political and international law recognizes that all acts
and proceedings of a de facto government are good
and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and
the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese
occupation may be considered de facto governments,
supported by the military force and deriving their
authority from the laws of war. The doctrine upon this
subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on
International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one
belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the
enemy while in its military possession, is one of the
incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to
conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the
Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror,
for authority to establish a government for the territory
of the enemy in his possession, during its military
occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of
such government are regulated and limited. Such
authority and such rules are derived directly from the
laws war, as established by the usage of the world,
and confirmed by the writings of publicists and
decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations.
. . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the
laws which regulate private rights, continue in force
during military occupation, excepts so far as they are
suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . .
He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de
facto government, and can at his pleasure either
change the existing laws or make new ones.”
 General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other
governments in his proclamation October 23, 1944,
but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings
because such a construction would violate the law of
nations.
 If the proceedings pending in the different courts of
the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation
had been continued during the Japanese military
administration, the Philippine Executive Commission,
and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it
stands to reason that the same courts, which had
become re-established and conceived of as having in
continued existence upon the reoccupation and
liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of
postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516),
may continue the proceedings in cases then pending
in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law
conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in
speaking of said principles “a state or other
 governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign
military force, resumes its old place with its right and
duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political
resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that
which enables elastic bodies to regain their original
shape upon removal of the external force, — and
subject to the same exception in case of absolute
crushing of the whole fibre and content.”
Rulings:
1. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were
good and valid. The governments by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation
being de facto governments, it necessarily follows
that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of
justice of those governments, which are not of a
political complexion, were good and valid. Those not
only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto
government, which are not of a political complexion,
remained good and valid after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of General
Douglas MacArthur.
2. The phrase “processes of any other government” is
broad and may refer not only to the judicial
processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as
well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of
the Philippines or other governmental agencies
established in the Islands during the Japanese
occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as
above indicated, according to the well-known
principles of international law all judgments and
judicial proceedings, which are not of a political
complexion, of the de facto governments during the
Japanese military occupation were good and valid
before and remained so after the occupied territory
had come again into the power of the titular
sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and
could not have been, the intention of General Douglas
MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any
other government” in said proclamation, to refer to
judicial processes, in violation of said principles of
international law.
3. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and
judicial administration is suspended as a matter of
course as soon as military occupation takes place, in
practice the invader does not usually take the
administration of justice into his own hands, but
continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to
administer the laws of the country which he is
enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An
Executive Order of President McKinley to the
Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the
municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are
allowed to remain in force and to be administered by
the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were
before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so
far as possible, to be adhered to on the present
occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From
a theoretical point of view it may be said that the
conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his
arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government,
legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-
point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained
by the provision of the law of nations which compels
the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so
far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this
practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary
pursuits and business of society may not be
unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent
occupation is essentially provisional, and the
government established by the occupant of transient
character.
PERALTA VS DIR OF PRISONS
FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery
and was sentenced to life imprisonment as defined and
penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the
Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas
corpus is based on the contention that the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by
Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the
military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the
aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does
not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights of
the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 is
constitutional.
HELD:
Yes, it is constitutional. There is no room for doubt to the
validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction
established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law
martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a
governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise,
is good and valid since it was within the power and
competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate
Act No. 65. All judgments of political complexion of the
courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon
reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which
convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political
complexion must be considered as having ceased to be
valid.
ALCANTARA VS DIR OF PRISONS the Commonwealth Government was restored those
Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime crimes with political complexion (political crimes).
of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical Also there was no substantial change in the jurisdiction
injuries. The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to and structure of CA when the Japanese-initiated
an indeterminate penalty from arresto mayor to prison Republic abolished the pre-WW2 CA and reorganized it
correccional. Petitioner now questions the validity of the into several courts.
decision on the sole ground that said the court was only
5. sovereignty
a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines
during Japanese military occupation, thus, a petition for
a) Legal
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus from petitioner.
b) Political
ISSUE: c) Internal
Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid? d) External

HELD: “sovereign as auto-limitation”

The court held that the sentence served by Alcantara is a
criminal act that has no political complexion.
A punitive or penal sentence becomes that of political
complexion when it penalizes either a new act not
defined in the municipal law or acts already penalized by
the latter as a crime against the legitimate government,
but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new
offense committed against the belligerent occupant.
It cited the case of co kim chan, where the Japanese
republic and the Phil Executive Commission were
governments de facto and the judicial acts of the courts
were thereof good and valid and remained as such after
TANADA VS ANGARA
Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together
with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGO’s to
nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the
growth of our National Economy and against to the
“Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign
markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural
and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities
for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated
with exporting and more investment in the country. These
are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement
and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market”
espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the
provisions of our constitution, since the said Agreement
is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines
because it meant that Congress could not pass
legislation that would be good for national interest and
general welfare if such legislation would not conform to
the WTO Agreement.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable
controversy.
2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments
included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of
that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly
contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of
Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement
unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement
impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable
Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied
in the Final Act.
Discussions:
 1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
 Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy controlled
by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of
foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor
“mendicancy in the international community.” The
WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect
weak and developing economies, which comprise the
vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where
major states have permanent seats and veto powers
in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are
made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each
member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other.
Hence, poor countries can protect their common
interests more effectively through the WTO than
through one-on-one negotiations with developed
countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can
form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda
more decisively than outside the Organization. Which
is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic
principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize
the need of developing countries like the Philippines
to “share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic
development.”
 In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By
the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by
generally accepted principles of international law,
which are considered to be automatically part of our
own laws. A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary
to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and
Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may
intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedures. With regard to Infringement of a design
patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of
TRIPS within their own internal systems and
processes.
 The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise
of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the
adoption of the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and the
 adherence of the Constitution to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate,
after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and
overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the
land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and
power.
Rulings:
1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on
the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.”
2. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in
favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. In
other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue
an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development
of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution
does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign
goods, services and investments into the country, it
does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
3. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict
the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary
act, nations may surrender some aspects of their
state power in exchange for greater benefits granted
by or derived from a convention or pact. After all,
states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in
pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and
benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the
 exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. As shown
by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a
portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating
the Constitution, based on the rationale that the
Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations.”
4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does
not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it
is with due process and the concept of adversarial
dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
5. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed
concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required
from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the
Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate
was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown
by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994.
After reading the letter of President Ramos dated
August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic
minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring
in.
REAGAN VS COMM OF INTERNAL REVENUE
William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air
Base to help provide technical assistance to the US Air
Force (USAF). In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960
Cadillac car valued at $6,443.83. Two months later, he
got permission to sell the same car provided that he
would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the
USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson, Jr. for $6,600.00 as
shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place within Clark
Air Base. As a result of this transaction, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net
taxable income of Reagan to be at 17,912.34 and that his
income tax would be 2,797.00. Reagan paid the
assessed tax but at the same time he sought for a refund
because he claims that he is exempt. Reagan claims that
the sale took place in “foreign soil” since Clark Air Base,
in legal contemplation is a base outside the Philippines.
Reagan also cited that under the Military Bases
Agreement, he, by nature of his employment, is exempt
from Philippine taxation.
ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not
subject to Philippine income tax?
HELD: No. The Philippines is independent and
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire
domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its
power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its
commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms.
That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and
personal. On the other hand, there is nothing in the
Military Bases Agreement that lends support to Reagan’s
assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil or
territory. This country’s jurisdictional rights therein,
certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been
preserved, the Philippines merely consents that the US
exercise jurisdiction in certain cases – this is just a matter
of comity, courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted
that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income
is derived from US source but the income derived from
the sale is not of US source hence taxable.
PP VS GOZO
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located
inside the US Naval Reservation which is within the
territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice
of an assistant in the Mayor’s Office and some neighbors,
she demolished the house standing thereon without
acquiring the necessary permits and then later on
erected another house. She was then charged by the
City Engineer’s Office for violating a municipal
order which requires her to secure permits for any
demolition and/or construction within the City. She was
convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She
appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no
administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is
within a Naval Base of a foreign country.
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the
US Naval Base?
HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not
abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of
jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the
terms of the treaty, the United States Government has
prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such
offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded
rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons
of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases
Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the
State through the City of Olongapo does have
administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the
US Naval Base.
B. section 2, Art II
1. the incorporation clause and doc of incorporation
KURODA VS JALANDONI
. THE FACTS
Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was
charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war
crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68
that created the National War Crimes Office and
prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He
contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague
Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based
on law, national and international.
II. THE ISSUES

Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the
validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section
3, that –
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the
nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted
principle of international law of the present day including
the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and
significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nation all those person military
or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or
waging a war of aggression and of the commission of
crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto
in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity
and civilization are held accountable therefor.
Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of
Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines
has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and
policies of international law which are part of the our
Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner argues that respondent Military
Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the
Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a
signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947.
It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the
Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are
wholly based on the generally accepted principals of
international law. In facts these rules and principles were
accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State
and Japan who were signatories to the two
Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part
of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventions embodying them for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive
in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule
and principle of international law as contained in treaties
to which our government may have been or shall be a
signatory.
2. Conflict between international law and municipal law or
local law.
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and
national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180
entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The
main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the
Philippines, and against associations, among others,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by
aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other
alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a
judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of
Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting
under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without
due process of law.
 The subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof.
 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of
the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede
treaties or generally accepted principles.
Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should
be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld
because it represented an exercise of the police power
which, being inherent could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally
accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw
no conflict between the raised generally accepted
principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the
law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”;
and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.”
GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
Treaty vs Executive Agreements – Statutes Can Repeal
Executive Agreements
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he
entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and
Burma for the importation of rice without complying with
the requisite of securing a certification from the National
Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in
cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary,
Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000
tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local
planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo
Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the
executive agreements. Gonzales averred that
Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction”, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the
importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2
executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of
the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress.
The former may not interfere in the performance of the
legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of
his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments
that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited
by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and
a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall
prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova
not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts
adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be
given as regards executive agreements not authorized by
previous legislation, without completely upsetting the
principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances which are fundamental in our
constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an
international agreement may be invalidated by our courts,
suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines
has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that
the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or
writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide,
final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All
cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is
in question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes
the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with
the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an
act of Congress.
REYES VS BAGATSING
 Freedom of Speech – Primacy of the Constitution over
International Law
Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of
the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from
Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy which
is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been
denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The
mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports
that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless
elements. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to
prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of
the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his
intention to provide protection to the US embassy from
such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that
under our constitution we “adhere to generally accepted
principles of international law”.
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede
provisions of the Constitution. Whether or not the
rallyists should be granted the permit.
HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the
protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element.
And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement of
the generally accepted principles of international law. But
the same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of
the Philippine Constitution which upholds and
guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable
assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued
by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application
thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear
and present danger test. The mere assertion that
subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators
does not suffice. In this case, no less than the police
chief assured that they have taken all the necessary
steps to ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance
cannot be applied yet because there was no showing that
indeed the rallyists are within the 500 feet radius
(besides, there’s also the question of whether or not the
mayor can prohibit such rally – but, as noted by the SC,
that has not been raised an issue in this case).
Sec.4(2), sec.5(2)(a), Art.VIII
Art.13, declaration of rights and duties of states (cited in
bayan vs Zamora)
C. Section 3, Art. II (Civilian Authority)
Art. VII, Sec.18. President is Commander-in-chief
Art. XVI, Sec.5 No partisan politics. No appointment in
any capacity to a civilian position while in active service.
D. Section 4, Art. II (government to serve and protect the
pp. duty of pp to defend the state)
PP VS LAGMAN
Defense of State
In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He
is being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act
1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service.
Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to
support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to
kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the
constitutionality of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is
constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the
State cannot be performed except through an army. To
leave the organization of an army to the will of the
citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense
Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military
service, does not go against this constitutional provision
but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith.
“The defense of the State is a prime duty of government,
and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be
required by law to render personal military or civil
service.”
PP VS MANAYAO
Citizenship – Defense of State – Treason
Pedro Manayao was a member of the Makapili (a group
of Filipino traitors aiding the Japanese cause). Manayao
conspired together with his Japanese comrade soldiers
to inflict terror upon the barrio of Banaban in Bulacan
where they killed 60 to 70 residents. The residents they
killed were alleged to be supporters, wives and relatives
of guerillas fighting the Japanese forces. Manayao was
positively identified by credible witnesses and he was
later convicted with the high crime of treason with
multiple murder. He was sentenced to death and to pay
the damages. Manayao’s counsel argued that his client
cannot be tried with treason because Manayao has
already lost his Filipino citizenship due to his swearing of
allegiance to support the Japanese cause. Hence,
Manayao cannot be tried under Philippine courts for any
war crimes for only Japanese courts can do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manayao is guilty of treason.
HELD: No. Manayao’s swearing of allegiance to Japan
was not proven as a fact nor is it proven that he joined
the Japanese Naval, Army or Air Corps. What he joined
is the Makapili, a group of Filipino traitors pure and
simple. The Supreme Court also emphasized that in
times of war when the state invokes the Constitutional
provision which state
The defense of the state is a prime duty of the
government, in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may
be required to render personal, military or civil service…
no one can effectively cast off his duty to defend the state
by merely swearing allegiance to an enemy country,
leaving and joining the opposite force, or by deserting the
Philippine Armed Forces. Or even if Manayao did lose his
citizenship it is also indicated that no such person shall
take up arms against his native country; he shall be held
guilty of a felony and treason, if he does not strictly
observe this duty. 3. Petitioners who are members of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses wrote to the Secretary of Education allowing
their children to remain silent and stand at attention with
E. sec5 Art II
their arms and hands down and straight at the sides
F. sec6 Art II
and that they be exempted from executing the formal
Art III s5
salute, singing of the National Anthem and the reciting of
Art VI s28(3)
the patriotic pledge.
Art VI s29(2)
Art IX, C s2(5)
4. Petitioners’ religious beliefs, which served as bases for
Art XIV, s3(3)
this action, state that: “thou shalt not make unto thee any
graven image or any likeness of anything that is in
GERONA VS SEC OF EDUCATION
heaven above or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in
FACTS:
the water under earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to
them, nor serve them.” They consider that the flag is an
1. Republic Act No. 1265 took effect on June
“image within this command.”
11, 1955. The Secretary of Education, acting upon
Section 2 of said Act authorizing and directing him to
5. Petitioners’ children were expelled as a consequence
issue or cause to issue rules and regulations for the
and the Sec of Education denied the former’s petition to
proper conduct of the flag ceremony, issued Department
reinstate the children from the school.
Order No. 8 on July 21 of the same year.
3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and
2. Pertinent portions of the said department order include
contrary to the Bill of Rights.
the directive that pupils and teachers or students and
faculty who are in school and its premises shall assemble
in formation facing the flag. And, said assembly shall sing
ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional
the Philippine National Anthem with everyone standing
at attention and execute a salute. Moreover, immediately
DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and
following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall
it is for the courts to determine, not a religious group,
recite in unison the patriotic pledge (in English or
whether or not a certain practice is one.
vernacular version).
1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a
symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of
national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and
of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution
guarantee and protect. Considering the complete
separation of church and state in our system of
government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious
significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not
involve any religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or
is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It
cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a
follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be
confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as
many interpretations and meanings to be given to a
certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or
sects or followers.
2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the
Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form
or non-compliance with reasonable and non-
discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by
competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the
petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved,
and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations
about the flag salute they were not being persecuted.
Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under
threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag
salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public
education being maintained at the expense of their fellow
citizens, nothing more. According to a popular
expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected
not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute,
they forfeited their right to attend public schools.
3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious
veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty
and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious
ceremony but an act and profession of love and
allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which
the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the
Secretary of Education was duly authorized to
promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that
the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or
salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does
not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of
religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the
non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations
and school discipline, including observance of the flag
ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public
schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in
the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded
and dismissed from the public school they were
attending.
EBRALINAG ET AL VS THE DIVISION SUPT OF SCHL
OF CEBU
FACTS:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition were filed and consolidated raising the same
issue whether school children who are members or a
religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses may be
expelled from school (both public and private), for
refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part
in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band)
or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the
Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were
expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as
required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making
flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions)
of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules
and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All
Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions.
Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by
doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry
against their teachings. They contend that to compel
transcends constitutional limits and invades protection
against official control and religious freedom. The
respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v.
Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the
explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a
system of separation of the church and state and the flag
is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve
any religious ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s
Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the
flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such
exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will
disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the
school population which by far constitutes the great
majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by
the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption
from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-
discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by
competent authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners
violated their freedom of religion?
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners
from the school was not justified.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest
priority and the amplest protection among human
rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his
Creator. The right to religious profession and
worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first
is absolute as long as the belief is confined within
the realm of thought. The second is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare. The only limitation
to religious freedom is the existence of grave and
present danger to public safety, morals, health and
interests where State has right to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in
“external acts” or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through the observance of the flag ceremony.
They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony
to show their respect for the right of those who choose to
participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not
engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for
their expulsion.
PAMIL VS TELERON
Facts:
Petitioner/apellant is the rival candidate of Fr. Margarito
Gonzaga, a priest who won asp the mayor in
Albuquerque, Bohol, who filed a quo waranto case
against the latter. This is as per the 2175 Revised
Administrative Code (RAC) that states: “In no case there
shall be elected/appointed to a municipal office
ecclesiastes, soldiers in active service, persons receiving
salaries or compensation from provincial/national funds,
or contractors for public works of the municipality.”
Respondent-appellee is the judge of the Court of First
Instance of Bohol.
Court of First Instance ruled that the RAC was repealed
by the Election Code of 1971, which therefore allowed
the prohibitions of the RAC.
Issue:
Whether or not the RAC is not in effect or already
repealed, thereby making the appointment of Fr.
Gonzaga in mayor’s position as a priest, constitutional.
Held:
Decision is indecisive, the said law, in the deliberations of
the court, failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8)
which is needed in order for this law to be binding upon
the parties in this case. For this, the petition must be
granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and
set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the
mayoralty position. It is also pointed out that how can one
who swore to serve the Church’s interest above all be in
duty to enforce state policies which at times may conflict
with church tenets. This is in violation of the separation of
the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code
still stands because there is no implied repeal.
Dissenting Opinion:
J. Teehankee – The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active
service and persons receiving salaries or compensation
from provincial or national funds “are obviously now
allowed to run for a public elective office because under
Sec. 23 of the Election Code of 1971 ‘every person
holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the Armed Forces’ shall ipso facto
cease in their office or position on the date they file their
certificates of candidacy. This implies that they are no
longer disqualified from running for an elective office.”
The Comelec further ruled that as to the two remaining
categories formerly banned under the Revised
Administrative Code, “ecclesiastics and contractors for
public works of the municipality are allowed to run for
municipal elective offices under the maxim, ‘Inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius’, they being not included in the
enumeration of persons ineligible under the New Election
Code. The rule is that all persons possessing the
necessary qualifications, except those expressly
disqualified by the election code, are eligible to run for
public office.
GERMAN VS BARANGAN
Political Law – Religious Freedom vs Clear and Present
Danger Doctrine
One afternoon in October 1984, Reli German et al went
to JP Laurel Sreet to pray and worship at the St. Luke
Chapel. But they were barred by General Santiago
Barangan from entering the church because the same is
within the vicinity of the Malacañang. And considering
that German’s group is expressively known as the August
Twenty One Movement who were wearing yellow shirts
with clench fists, Barangan deemed that they were not
really there to worship but rather they are there to disrupt
the ongoings within the Malacañang.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to
worship and pray at St. Luke’s is a violation of their
freedom to worship and locomotion.
HELD: Petitioners' intention was not really to perform
an act of religious worship but to conduct an anti-
government demonstration since they wore yellow T-
shirts, raised their clenched fists and shouted anti-
government slogans. While every citizen has the right to
religious freedom, the exercise must be done in good
faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was
designed to protect the lives of the President and his
family, government officials and diplomatic and foreign
guests transacting business with Malacanang. The
restriction was also intended to secure the executive
offices within the Malacanang grounds from possible
external attacks and disturbances.
(Minority opinion) The sole justification for a prior restraint
or limitation on the exercise of the freedom of religion is
the existence of a grave and imminent, of a serious evil
to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest that the State has a right to
prevent. The burden to show the existence of grave and
imminent danger lies on the officials who would restrain
petitioners. Respondents were in full controland had the
capability to stop any untoward move. There was
no clearand present danger of any serious evil to public
safety or the security of Malacanang.
Dissenting Opinions
J. Fernando – It would be an unwarranted departure
then from what has been unanimously held in the J.B.L.
Reyes decision if on such a basic right as religious
freedom -clearly the most fundamental and thus entitled
to the highest priority among human rights, involving as it
does the relationship of man to his Creator -this Court will
be less vigilant in upholding any rightful claim. More than
ever, in times of stress -and much more so in times of
crisis -it is that deeply-held faith that affords solace and
comfort if not for everyone at least for the majority of
mankind. Without that faith, man’s very existence is
devoid of meaning, bereft of significance.
J. Teehankee – The right to freely exercise one’s religion
is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. 7
Freedom of worship, alongside with freedom of
expression and speech and peaceable assembly “along
with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in
our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too
strongly stressed that on the judiciary -even more so than
on the other departments -rests the grave and delicate
responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to
such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying
phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so
felicitously termed by Justice Holmes ‘as the sovereign
prerogative of judgment.’ Nonetheless, the presumption
must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on
the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence
and primacy.
J. Makasiar – With the assurances aforestated given by
both petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and
present danger to public peace and order or to the
security of persons within the premises of Malacañang
and the adjacent areas, as the respondents has adopted
measures and are prepared to insure against any public
disturbance or violence.
INK VS GIRONELLA
Facts:
1. Mr. Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., on behalf of the INC,
charged respondent Judge due to his opinion in the
course of acquitting the defendants-accused of Triple
Rape. In his opinion, Gironella said that, “it cannot,
therefore, be discarded that the filing of the charge was
resorted to as a gimmick of showing the community of La
Paz, Abra in particular and to the public in general that
the Iglesia ni Cristo unhesitatingly helps its member of
his/her problem.”
2.Respondent, in so doing, was charged with ignorance
of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the
bench.
Ruling:
1. The use of the word “gimmick” could offend the
sensibilities of the
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to
state that as understood in the popular sense, it is not
exactly complimentary. It may indicate lack of sincerity. It
is a ploy or device to persuade others to take a course of
action, which without it may not be acceptable.
2. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused of
having to resort to a “gimmick” to gain coverts would
certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of religion implies
respect for every creed. No one, much less a public
official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of its
adherents in a derogatory sense. It should not be lost
sight to either that the attendance at a trial of many
members of a religious sect finds support in the
Constitution.
ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR
Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of
Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man
who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years
and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband
died a year before she entered into the judiciary while
Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to
investigate respondent. According to complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is
permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They
allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’
under the approval of their congregation. Such a
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issue:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for
such conjugalarrangement.
Held:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is
exercising her right to freedom of religion. The
free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one
of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson
put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human
rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition
cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim.
In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any
concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or
bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus
the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic
preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a
distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction
of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres
the benevolentneutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required by
the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolentneutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a
compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate
that the state has used the least intrusive means possible
so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than
necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state.
Thus the conjugalarrangement cannot be penalized for it
constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to
freedom of religion.
IMBONG VS OCHOA
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December
21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are
questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law
on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right
to protection against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on
involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of
the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s
family protected by the Constitution
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its
power of judicial review over the controversy.
1. Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge 1. Actual Case or Controversy
4. Locus Standi 2. Facial Challenge
5. Declaratory Relief 3. Locus Standi
6. One Subject/One Title Rule 4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s: Discussions:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: PROCEDURAL

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule
(RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the: that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
1. Right to life standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised
2. Right to health at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy) Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
6. Due process clause or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory,
7. Equal protection clause lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual
and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished
PROCEDURAL: from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
review over the controversy.
ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe
for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has
then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as
a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a
First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to
assail the validity of statutes concerning not only
protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of
the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly
are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are
externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined
as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the
doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule
does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal
rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to
cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title
rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not
be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would
not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put
on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading,
either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or
in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject
or scope of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under
this view, the court in passing upon the question of
constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses
to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties
just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal
effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for
partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be
willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the
presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The
valid portion can stand independently as law.
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the
question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this
stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual Members could
express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory
construction), the traditional meaning of “conception”
according to reputable dictionaries cited by
the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical
sources also support the view that conception begins at
fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for
(a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization”
and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon
fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that
kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited.
Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly
take action before fertilization should be deemed non-
abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting
the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature
from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court
cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with
this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the
word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation but also those that induce abortion and
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s
womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to
protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their
office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient
by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as
abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the
IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section
12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the
definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)),
which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck
down.
2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA
4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court
believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that
only safe contraceptives are made available to the
public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the
RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions
of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be
from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will be done
following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law
is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices
and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved
by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective”.
3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of
contraceptives or participation in support of modern
RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint;
or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or
belief. However, the Court has the authority to
determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes
the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives
without being dictated upon the policies of any one
religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or
restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of
the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and
thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State
can enhance its population control program through the
RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which
permits RH procedures even with only the consent of
the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding
spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional
safeguards for the family as the basic social
institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the
right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or
family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect
them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of
marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a
minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-
family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the
portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of
minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian
or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority
or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical
procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical
procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed
to procedures) about family planning services. Parents
are not deprived of parental guidance and control over
their minor child in this situation and may assist her in
deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-
threatening procedures.
5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of
Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State
to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education. Although educators
might raise their objection to their participation in the
RH education program, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because
the Department of Education has not yet formulated a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more
importance on the role of parents in the development of
their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right
of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of
the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and
corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather
than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the
moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations,
school officials, and other interest groups in developing
the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that
the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.
6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause
of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms
as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider”
must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a “public health service provider”. The
“private health care institution” cited under Section 7
should be seen as synonymous to “private health care
service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad
enough to include providing of information and rendering
of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by
religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service
and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH
information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used
together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
“incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice
and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to
the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government’s RH program is not a violation of the
equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to
Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which
states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the
underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and
children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical
care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to
reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children.
In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of
children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The
RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is
valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom
of private educational institutions especially with respect
to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity
towards the teaching of reproductive health education
8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for
private and non-government health care service
providers to render 48 hours of pro
bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary
servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of
medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest
that it is both the power and a duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote
the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only
encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth
accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do
otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec.
17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to
render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual
case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe
for judicial determination. Considering that the RH
Law and its implementing rules have already taken
effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the
law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As
stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so
because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law
for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.
They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.
2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines
originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the
Court has withheld the application of facial challenges
to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to
cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but
also those involving religious freedom, and other
 fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is
mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its
duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions
have seriously alleged that the constitutional human
rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental
rights mentioned above have been violated by the
assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take
cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if
the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To
dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there
exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this
Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only
when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to
the detriment of the Filipino people.
3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be
assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still, the
Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus
standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with
material interest affected by a Government act,
provided a constitutional issue of transcendental
importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is,
after all, a procedural technicality which the Court
has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed,
thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to
sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have
been directly injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of
the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court
set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that
the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules
of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs
and so the Court would just consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it
has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-
reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs,
the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill
rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive
health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated
and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes
and guarantees the human rights of all persons including
their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these
rights, the right to sustainable human development, the
right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive
health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human
development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds
no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-
IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned
and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or
minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to
modem methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs
and services on reproductive health regardless of his or
her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not
in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive
health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails
and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health care service provider within the
same facility or one which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that
hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the
RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive
health service in so far as they affect the conscientious
objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR,
which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires
and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section
4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution.
State Policies
G. sec.7 Art II
Sec.8 Art II
H. sec.9 Art II
Sec.10 Art II
Sec.11 art II
1. what is social justice
Art XIII sec.1 and 2
CALALANG VS WILLIAMS
The National Traffic Commission recommended the
Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles
be prohibited from passing along Rosario St. extending
from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from
7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along
Rizal Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a period of one
year from the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge to
traffic. It was subsequently passed and thereafter enforce
by Manila Mayor and the acting chief of police. Maximo
Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer challenges its
constitutionality.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful
inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged
the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of
infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in
the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies
at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because
then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies
in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. The promotion of social justice is to be achieved
not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given
group.
Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic force by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-
honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest
number.”
ONDOY VS IGNACIO
Facts: The petitioner, Estrella Ondoy, is a mother of one
Jose Ondoy, an employee who worked under Virgilio
Ignacio. According to the chief engineer and oiler, Jose
Andoy was aboard the ship of the respondent’s
enterprise as part of the workforce. He was invited by
friends to a drinking spree, left the ship and thereafter
was found dead due to drowning. Thus the petitioner
asked for compensation, however, the testimonies by the
chief engineer were dismissed by the hearing officer due
to lack of merit. Afterwards, a motion for reconsideration
was also filed before the Secretary of Labor, but was
denied again due to lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the compensation for Jose’s death
is constitutional. Whether or not Social Justice has a role
in this case.
Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition, granting
Estrella Ondoy 6,000 pesos as compensation for Jose’s
death, 300 pesos for burial fees and 600 pesos as
attorney’s fee with the costs against respondent, Ignacio.
Ratio Decidendi: The principle of social justice applied in
this case is a matter of protection, and not equality. The
Supreme Court recognized the right of petitioner to claim
a compensation from the respondent, as Jose did drown
while “in the actual performance of his duty.” To fortify
this ruling, the SC cited cases wherein, with accordance
to the constitutional scheme of social justice and
protection to labor, Workmen’s Compensation Act, which
dealt with the right of workers for compensation for
personal injury, was applied. Among them is a case
where there was no direct testimony attesting that the
deceased drowned while in the performance of his duty,
however, the compensation was sustained. Lastly from
another case, the SC quoted that “as between a laborer,
usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has
resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason
to demand from the latter strict compliance. Social justice
in these cases is not equality but protection.
I. sec.12 Art II
1. Family; protection of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception.
IMBONG ET AL VS OCHOA (Supra)
 2. natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth
MEYER VS NEBRASKA
 (summary: The Court declared the Nebraska law
unconstitutional, reasoning it violated the liberty
protected by Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Liberty, the Court
explained, means more than freedom from bodily
restraint. It also includes the right of a teacher to
teach German to a student, and the right of
parents to control the upbringing of their child as
they see fit. While the state has a legitimate
interest in encouraging the growth of a population
that can engage in discussions of civic matters,
the means it chose to pursue this objective was
excessive. )
Plaintiff is a teacher in Zion Parochial School in
Nebraska. He was tried and convicted in the district court
for Hamilton country, Nebraska on the ground that he
unlawfully taught the subject of reading in German
language to Raymond Parpart, a 10-year-old child who
had not yet attained and successfully passed the 8th
grade. This conviction was based on an “act relating to
the teaching of foreign languages in the state of
Nebraska (approved April 9, 1919). The said act
prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to students
that had not yet completed the 8th grade. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska affirmed the decision of the trial court.
However, Plaintiff claimed that education was a
fundamental liberty interest that must be protected. He
further claimed that the statute infringed the liberty
guaranteed to the plaintiff by the 14th amendment.
Hence, this appeal to the US Supreme Court.
Issues
 Is control over the education of their children a
fundamental right of parents?
Holding/Rule
 Parents have the fundamental right to control the
upbringing, including the education, of their
children.
Reasoning
 Liberty denotes not only freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right…
o To contract
o To engage in any occupation of his
choosing
o To acquire useful knowledge
o To marry
o To establish a home and bring up children
 o To worship God according to the dictates of
his own conscience
 This liberty may not be interfered with under the
guise of protecting the public interest.
 It is the natural duty of the parent to give his
children education suitable to their station in life,
and nearly all states make education of children
compulsory.
o Mere knowledge of the German language
cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful.
Before the War, it was looked upon as
helpful and desirable.
 Meyer had the right to teach, and the parents of
the child had the right to engage him so to instruct
their child. These actions are within the liberty of
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
 The right is clearly infringed upon.
 The state says their interest is to foster a
homogenous people with American ideals
prepared readily to understand current discussions
of civic matters.
o The means adopted exceed the limitations
upon the power of the state.
 Proficiency is a foreign language
seldom comes to one not instructed
at an early age, and experience
shows that it is not injurious to the
health, morals, or understanding of
an ordinary child.
PIERCE VS SOCIETY OF SISTERS
In 1922 Oregon amended its compulsory attendance
statute to require that children between 8 and 16 years
old be sent to public schools in the districts where they
lived. Two organizations operating private schools in
Oregon, the Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus and Mary and the Hill Military Academy,
challenged the constitutionality of the statute under
the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that it deprived
them of property without due process of law.
Walter M. Pierce, the governor of Oregon, was named as
a respondent. A federal district court subsequently
entered judgment for the schools, enjoining the state
from enforcing the statute and finding that “the right to
conduct schools was property” and that the statute not
only had taken the schools’ property without due process
but had also deprived parents of the right to “direct the
education of children by selecting reputable teachers and
places.”
Issue: Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control?
Ruling: US SC held that the statute violated the due
process clause. The two schools, as Oregon corporations
and property owners within the state, were entitled to
“protection against arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful
interference with their patrons and the consequent
destruction of their business and property.” Furthermore,
the court ruled that the Oregon statute “unreasonably
interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children.”
According to the court, the state could not force
schoolchildren to “accept instruction from public teachers
only.” However, the court did acknowledge that states
have wide-ranging rights in regard to education:
“No question is raised concerning
the power of the State reasonably to
regulate all schools, to inspect,
supervise and examine them, their
teachers and pupils; to require that
all children of proper age attend
some school, that teachers shall be
of good moral character and
patriotic disposition, that certain
studies plainly essential to good
citizenship must be taught, and that
nothing be taught which is
manifestly inimical to the public
welfare.”
Thus, the court invalidated only state action that prevents
parents from making an educational choice for their
children; the court did not prohibit states from exercising
regulatory control over education, including nonpublic
schools. Finding that the Oregon statute was
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court upheld the decision
of the federal district court.
Sec.4(1) Art XIV Constitution
PACU VS SEC. OF EDUCATION
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities
(PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No.
180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of
private schools in the country. It is provided by these
laws that a permit should first be secured from the
Secretary of Education before a person may be granted
the right to own and operate a private school. This also
gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to
ascertain standards that must be followed by private
schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education
can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in
schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and
operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and
any law requiring previous governmental approval or
permit before such person could exercise said right,
amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice
abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU
also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of
Education is an undue delegation of legislative power;
that there is undue delegation because the law did not
specify the basis or the standard upon which the
Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to
ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to
censorship.
ISSUE: W/N Act No, 2706 as amended
unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable
controversy presented. PACU did not show that it
suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of
Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact
control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution
provides for state control of all educational institutions
even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of
all education to wit, the development of moral character,
personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational
efficiency, and instruction in the duties of
citizenship. The State control of private education was
intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or
those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part
of the power of control and regulation by the State over
all schools.
J. sec.13, Art II
PD 684
PD 935
PD 1102
PD 603
K.Sec. 14, Art II
VILLEGAS VS SUBIDO
is Then Metro Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas approved the
appointing of 91 women street sweepers in the City of
Manila. But the appointing would still have to be
approved by the Office of Civil Service Commission
under Commissioner Abelardo Subido. Subido refused to
extend approval to such appointments on the ground that
appointing women to manual labor is against
Memorandum Circular No. 18 series of 1964. Subido
pointed out that putting women workers with men
workers outside under the heat of the sun and placing
them under manual labor exposes them to contempt and
ridicule and constitutes a violation of the traditional
dignity and respect accorded Filipino womanhood.
Villegas however pointed out that the said Memo has
already been set aside by the Office of the President
hence the same is no longer in effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of said women
workers should be confirmed by the Civil Service
Commissioner.
HELD: Yes, the appointments must be confirmed. The
basis of Subido was not on any law or rule but simply on
his own concept of what policy to pursue, in this instance
in accordance with his own personal predilection. Here
he appeared to be unalterably convinced that to allow
women laborers to work outside their offices as street
sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition. A public
official must be able to point to a particular provision of
law or rule justifying the exercise of a challenged
authority.
Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public
official exercises power, not rights. The government itself
is merely an agency through which the will of the state is
expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are
likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of
discharging its functions. As such there is no
presumption that they are empowered to act. There must
be a delegation of such authority, either express or
implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid
of power. It must be conceded that departmental zeal
may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by
statute. Neither the high dignity of the office nor the
righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable
substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth.
Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid.
This trend towards greater recognition of equal rights for
both sexes under the shelter of the equal protection
clause argues most strongly against this kind of
discrimination.
L. sec.15 Art II
Sec.16 Art II
OPOSA VS FACTORAN
Facts:
The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network,
Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of
our environment and natural resources. The petitioners
alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued
approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to
numerous commercial logging companies to cut and
deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners
request the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:
 Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country;
 Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same
may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act
of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative
remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel
all logging permits in the country. Defendant, however,
fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.
Issues:
 Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring
action to the judicial power of the Court.
 Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their
complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided
by law.
 Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the
TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing violates the requirements of due process.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
 The petitioners have the right to bring action to the
judicial power of the Court.
1. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the
Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his
opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected
for the judicial review by the Court. According to
him, the subject matter of the complaint is of
common interest, making this civil case a class
suit and proving the existence of an actual
controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by
citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the
1987 Constitution.
2. The petitioners can file a class suit because they
represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of
the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of
nature.” Nature means the created world in its
 entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations.
3. Every generation has a responsibility to the next
to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
 The Court does not agree with the trial court’s
conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or
a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data.
1. The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
1. This right unites with the right to health which is
provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
A. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate
 all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact,
these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind.
 The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s
pronouncement.
1. The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he
had done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted
with utmost infidelity to the Government by
providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because
he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed
out by the petitioners, into every timber license
must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform
Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the
national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein .
2. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protested by the due process clause
of the Constitution.
Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The
petitioners amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.
Sec. 17 Art II
Sec.5 Art XIV
GUINGONA, JR. VS CARAGUE
FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic
appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and
P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise
known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of
P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS
amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is
authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand
Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign
Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967,
entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on
its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and
Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.”
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of
the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being
higher than the budget for education, therefore it is
against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which
mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to
education.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt
service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget
for education.
HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of
the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the
highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not
thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment
of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only
by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that
can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only
a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the
country. More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress
appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the
share allocated to education, the Court finds and so
holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed
as unconstitutional.
DEP.ED VS SAN DIEGO
FACTS:
Private respondent, San Diego, is a graduate of the
University of the East with a degree of B.S. in Zoology.
The petitioner claims that he took the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) three times and flunked it as
many times. When he applied to take it again, the
petitioner rejected his application on the basis of
the NMAT rule:
H) A STUDENT SHALL BE ALLOWED ONLY
THREE (3) CHANCES TO TAKE THE
NMAT. AFTER THREE (3) SUCCESSIVE
FAILURES, A STUDENT SHALL NOT BE
ALLOWED TO TAKE THE NMAT FOR THE
FOURTH TIME.
He then went to RTC Valenzuela to compel his
admission to the test. In his petition, he squarely
challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12,
Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The
additional grounds raised were due process and equal
protection.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent was deprived of his right to a
medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the
police power.
HELD:
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the
public. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations
requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take
and pass medical board examinations is a valid exercises
of governmental power.
The Court agreed that the government is entitled to
prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of
achieving its stated objective of “upgrading the selection
of applicants into medical schools” and of “improving the
quality of medical education in the country.”
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly
within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and
indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the
medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to
whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and
health. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession
from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
M. SEC.18, ART. II (LABOR as a primary social
economic force)
Art. XIII, sec. 3
VICTORNIAO VS ERWU
Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member,
has been an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory
(ERF) since 1958. He was also a member of the EPWU
(Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union). Under the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF and EPWU, a
close shop agreement is being enforced which means
that employment in the factory relies on the membership
in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in the
said factory one must be a member of the said Union. In
1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU
claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the
close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of
the INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden
from being a member of any labor union. It was only in
1974 that his resignation from the Union was acted upon
by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then moved
to terminate Victoriano due to his non-membership from
the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not
exempt from the close shop agreement because RA
3350, which provides that close shop agreements shall
not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization, is unconstitutional and that said law violates
the EPWU’s and ERF’s legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual
or legal rights. As such, an INC member may refuse to
join a labor union and despite the fact that there is a
close shop agreement in the factory where he was
employed, his employment could not be validly
terminated for his non-membership in the majority
therein. Further, the right to join a union includes the right
not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It
recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to
enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it
recognizes the workers’ right to join or not to join union.
RA 3550 recognizes as well the primacy of a
constitutional right over a contractual right.
N. Sec.19, Art. II (self-reliant and independent national
economy)
Sec.20, Art. II (role of the private sector)
1. Free enterprise vs. welfare state concept
PCD VS. PCA
The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was created by
PD No. 232 as an independent public corporation to
promote the rapid integrated development and growth of
the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects
and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct
participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development
and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law.
PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-
be coconut plant operators. In March 1993, however,
PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no
longer require those wishing to engage in coconut
processing to apply for licenses as a condition for
engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to
promote free enterprise unhampered by protective
regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But
this caused cut-throat competition among operators
specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling,
and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD)
then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA to
revoke B.R. No. 018-93.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
HELD: Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935
document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic
principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines
free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the
government the power to intervene whenever necessary
to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise
does not call for the removal of “protective regulations”
for the benefit of the general public. This is so because
under Art. 12, Secs. 6 and 9, it is very clear that the
government reserves the power to intervene whenever
necessary to promote the general welfare and when the
public interest so requires.
O. Sec. 21, Art II (rural devt and agrarian reform)
ASSO OF SMALL LANDOWNER VS HON. SEC OG
AGRIAN REFORM
These are four consolidated cases questioning the
constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land
Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social
Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption
by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State
shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted
in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide
for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for
distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987,
President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries
of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued
lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of
their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was
enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for
its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted.
Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657,
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law,
while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect
insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs
Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme
provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised
of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose
landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that
since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they
should not be forced to distribute their land to their
tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown
willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be
exempted from agrarian reform program because they
claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian
reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that
these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian
reform program and that the specific amount must be
determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in
eminent domain which provides that only courts can
determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also
violated due process for under the constitution, no
property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that
landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not
necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just
compensation has always been in the form of money and
not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal
protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian
reform program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they
belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian
reform program. Under the law, classification has been
defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from each
other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things
similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the
rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The
Association have not shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of
other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not
see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any
event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification. Its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except only where its discretion is abused to the
detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears
that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as
part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just
compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However,
there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like
the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just
compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the
landowner and the government – even without judicial
intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can
determine just compensation through appraisers and if
the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not
needed. What is contemplated by law however is that,
the just compensation determined by an administrative
body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not
agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the
determination of the latter shall be the final determination.
This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision
may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for
final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is
merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent
domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary
exercise of eminent domain. The program will require
billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be
made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the
government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds,
and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used
for just compensation.
P. SEC. 22, Art. II (right of indigenous cultural
communities)
Art. X, sec 15-21
EO No. 220
ORDILLO VS COMELEC
Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces
of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and
Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in
a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766
entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.”
The official COMELEC results of the plebiscite showed
that the creation of the Region was approved by a
majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and
was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest
of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990,
issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act
for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by
majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
The petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare
the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The
petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera
Autonomous Region in only one province as the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the
said Region be composed of more than one constituent
unit.
Issue: W/N the province of Ifugao, being the only
province which voted favorably for the creation of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and
validly constitute such Region.
Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly
constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution. The keywords — provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas connote that
“region” is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit. The term “region” used in its
ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is
supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions
into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous
provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become
part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other
units because of their common and distinctive historical
and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and
other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional
requirements are not present in this case.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766
provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be
administered by the Cordillera government consisting of
the Regional Government and local government units. It
further provides that:
“SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise
powers and functions necessary for the proper
governance and development of all provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous
Region . . .”
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress
never intended that a single province may constitute
the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be
faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of
officials, a set of provincial officials and another set
of regional officials exercising their executive and
legislative powers over exactly the same small area.
Q. Sec.23, Art. II (ngos and community based and
sectoral orgs)
R. Sec.24, Art II (role of communication and information)
PLDT CO. VS NTC
Facts: On June 22, 1958, Republic Act No. 2090, was
enacted otherwise known as “An Act Granting Felix
Alberto and Company, Incorporated, a franchise to
establish radio stations for domestic and transoceanic
telecommunications.” Felix Alberto & Co. Inc. was the
original corporate name, which was changed to ETCI
with amendment of the articles of incorporation in 1964.
Much later, “CELLCOM Inc.” was the name sought to be
adopted before the Securities and Exchange
Commission, but this was withdrawn and abandoned..
On May 13, 1987, alleging urgent public need, ETCI filed
an application with public respondent NTC for the
issuance of a certificate of public convenience and
necessity to construct, install, establish, operate, and
maintain a cellular mobile telephone system and an alpha
numeric paging system in Metro Manila and in the
Southern Luzon regions, with prayer for provisional
authority to operate phase A of its proposal within Metro
Manila. PLDT filed an opposition with MTD, however
NTC over ruled it. NTC granted ETC provisional authority
to install, operate, and maintain a cellular mobile
telephone system initially in Metro Manila subject to
terms and conditions, one of which is that ETCI and
PLDT shall enter into an interconnection agreement for
the provision of adequate interconnection facilities
between applicant’s cellular mobile telephone switch and
the public switched telephone network and shall jointly
submit such interconnection agreement to the
commission for approval ETCI admits that in 1964, the
Albertos, as original owners of more than 40% of the
outstanding capital stock sold their holdings to Orbes. In
1968, the Albertos reacquired the shares they had sold to
the Orbes. In 1987, the Albertos sold more than 40% of
their shares to Horacio Yalung. Thereafter, the present
stockholders acquired their ETCI shares. Moreover, in
1964, ETCI had increased its capital stock from
Php40,000 to Php360,000; and in 1987, from
Php360,000 to Php40,000,000.
Issue: Whether or not the transfers in 1987 of the shares
of stock to the new stockholders amount to a transfer of
ETCI’s franchise which needs congressional approval
pursuant to RA 2090.
Held: No. Section 10 of RA 2090 is directed to the
grantee of the franchise, which is the corporation itself
and refers to a sale, lease or assignment of that
franchise. It does not include the transfer or sale of
shares of stock of a corporation by the latter’s
stockholders.
The sale of shares of stock of a public utility is governed
by another law, in section 20 (h) of the Public Service Act
(CA 146). Pursuant thereto, the public service
commission (now NTC) is the government agency vested
with the authority to approve the transfer of more than
40% of the subscribed capital stock of a
telecommunications company to a single transferee.
In other words, transfer of shares of a public utility
corporation need only NTC approval, not congressional
authorization. What transpired in ETCI were a series of
transfers of shares starting in 1964 until 1987. The
approval of the NTC may be deemed to have been met
when it authorized the issuance of the provisional
authority to ETCI. There was full disclosure before the
NTC of the transfers. In fact, the NTC order of November
12,1987 required ETCI to submit its present capital and
ownership structure. Further, ETCI even filed a motion
before the NTC, dated November 8, 1987 or more than a
year prior to the grant of provisional authority, seeking
approval of the increase in its capital stock from
Php360,000 to Php40,000,000 and the stock transfers
made by its stockholders.
A distinction should be made between shares of stock,
which are owned by stockholders, the sale of which
requires only NTC approval, and the franchise itself
which is owned by the corporation as the grantee thereof,
the sale or transfer of which requires congressional
sanction. Since stockholders own the shares of stock,
they may dispose of the same as they see fit. They may
not, however, transfer or assign the property of a
corporation, like its franchise. In other words, even if the
original stockholders had transferred their shares to
another group of shareholders, the franchise granted to
the corporation subsists as long as the corporation as an
entity, continues to exist. The franchise is not thereby
invalidated by the transfer of shares. A corporation has a
personality separate and distinct from that of each
stockholder. It has the right to continuity or perpetual
succession.
S. Sec.25, Art. II (local govt autonomy)
Art. X, sec.1-14
T. Sec.26, Art. II (Equal access to opportunities for public
service)
PAMATONG VS COMELEC
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared
petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who
could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the
Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his
right to “equal access to opportunities for public service”
under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by
limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those
who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or
are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC
supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the
most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e.,
he possesses all the constitutional and legal
qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable
of waging a national campaign since he has numerous
national organizations under his leadership, he also has
the capacity to wage an international campaign since he
has practiced law in other countries, and he has a
platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public
office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision
which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation
of the sort.
The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of
Article II of the Constitution, entitled “Declaration of
Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the
Article are generally considered not self-executing, and
there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does
not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right
but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the
State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public
office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to
be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive
rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in
the absence of legislation since its effective means and
reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the
myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric
appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases
such as “equal access,” “opportunities,” and “public
service” are susceptible to countless interpretations
owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was
not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an
operative but amorphous foundation from which innately
unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public
office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective
office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code on “Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the
limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens
engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by
any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is
exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance
candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is
easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective,
and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical
confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time
and resources in preparation for the election. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates
standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to
run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral
process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are
palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke.
The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae
covering every step of the electoral process, most
probably posed at the instance of these nuisance
candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part
of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance
candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of
the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus,
the remand of this case for the reception of further
evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC
for the reception of further evidence, to determine the
question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong
is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
U. Sec.27, Art. II (honesty and integrity in the public
service)
RA 3019, as amended by PD 77 and BP 195
V. Sec. 28, Art. II (policy of full public disclosure)
Art. III, Sec.7
Art. VI, sec. 20
VALMONTE VS BELMONTE
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for
mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to
information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to
furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately
before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true
copies of the documents evidencing their respective
loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public
records for the subject information On June 20, 1986,
apparently not having yet received the reply of the
Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS)
Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote
respondent another letter, saying that for failure to
receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free
to do whatever action necessary within the premises to
pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public
interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens
and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest
loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting
the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The
judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only
declare what the law is, and not what the law should be.
Under our system of government, policy issues are within
the domain of the political branches of the government,
and of the people themselves as the repository of all
State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may
not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy,
considering the public offices they were holding at the
time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It
cannot be denied that because of the interest they
generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most
especially those holding responsible positions in
government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being
subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used
here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover
both steps leading to a contract, and already a
consummated contract, Considering the intent of the
framers of the Constitution which, though not binding
upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and
considering further that government-owned and
controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary
or governmental functions are accountable to the people,
the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by
the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created
by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's
right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy
of transparency in government dealings. Although
citizens are afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to
compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern.
LEGASPI VS CSC
FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to
information on matters of public concern is invoked in this
special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner
Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied
Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in
the Health Department of Cebu City. These government
employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had
allegedly represented themselves as civil service
eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.
ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access
government records to validate the civil service
eligibilities of the Health Department employees
HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on
matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not
open every door to any and all information. Under the
Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are
"subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The
law may therefore exempt certain types of information
from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
security It follows that, in every case, the availability of
access to a particular public record must be
circumscribed by the nature of the information sought,
i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves
public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law
from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the
information sought is of public interest or public concern.
This question is first addressed to the government
agency having custody of the desired information.
However, as already discussed, this does not give the
agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny
access. In case of denial of access, the government
agency has the burden of showing that the information
requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the same has been exempted by law from
the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will
serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed,
". . . the government is in an advantageous position to
marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87
Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]).
To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of
access by the government agency concerned is subject
to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access
may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office
being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens
to ensure that government positions requiring civil service
eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles.
Public officers are at all times accountable to the people
even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the
claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any
provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the
petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that
the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the
public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil
service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's
request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable.
And when, as in this case, the government employees
concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public,
through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed
eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil
service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern,
and in the absence of express limitations under the law
upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for
said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to
confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person
occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus,
therefore lies.
TANADA VS TUVERA
FACTS:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due
process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by Law. The government argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not
so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon approval. The court decided on April
24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of
some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents
to publish in the official gazette all unpublished
Presidential Issuances which are of general force and
effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not. The publication means complete
publication, and that publication must be made in the
official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor
general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for
an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on
the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the
new civil code meant that the publication required
therein was not always imperative, that the publication
when necessary, did not have to be made in the official
gazette.
ISSUE:
Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official
gazette.
RULING:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The
clear object of this provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there
shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word
“shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter
of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature
or of general applicability is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be
bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have
not been published have no force and effect.
LANTACO VS LLAMAS
FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and
non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who for a number
of years has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R.
Nos. and data (date & palce of issuance) in his
pleadings. If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060”
but he has been using this for at least 3 years already, as
shown by the following attached sample pleadings in
various courts in 1995, 1996 & 1997. Respondent’s last
payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has
not paid or remitted any amount to cover
his membership fees up to the present. He likewise admit
that as appearing in the pleadings submitted by
complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal
259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the
years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that
such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt
number for the years in which those pleadings were filed.
He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited"
practice and that he believes in good faith that he is
exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax,
under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.
ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent has misled the
court about his standing in the IBP by using the same
IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least 6 years and
therefore liable for his actions.
Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying
his membership duesowing to limited practice of law and
for being a senior citizen.
HELD: Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his
pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and
the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal
Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule
10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof
for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-
year, default shall be a ground for removal of the
delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not
matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in
“limited” practice of law. Moreover, While it is true that
R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption from the
payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their
annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level
as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the
exemption however does not include payment
of membershipor association dues.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his
misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merits the most severe penalty. However, in view
of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to
pay his duesand plea for a more temperate application of
the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension
from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later, is appropriate. Respondent Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later.
BALDOZA VS DIMAANO
FACTS:
Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel
Lagunzad, began the production of a movie entitled "The
Moises Padilla Story". It was based mainly on the
copyrighted but unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto
Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in Negros"
subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story".
The book narrates the events which culminated in
the murder of Moises Padilla who was then a mayoralty
candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of
Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the November,
1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of
the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried
and convicted for that murder. In the book, Moises
Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political
history."
Although the emphasis of the movie was on the
public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which
dealt with his private and family life including the
portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda.
de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one
"Auring" as his girlfriend.
On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister
of Moises Padilla, for and in behalf of her mother, private
respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes,
corrections and deletions in the movie.
On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some
bargaining, the petitioner and private respondent
executed a “Licensing Agreement” where the petitioner
agreed to pay the private respondent the sum of
P20,000.00 payable without need of further demand, as
follows: P5,000.00 on or before Oct. 10, 1961;
P10,000.00 on or before Oct. 31, 1961; and P5,000.00
on or before November 30, 1961. Also the Licensor
(private respondent) grants authority and permission to
Licensee (Petitioner) to exploit, use, and develop the life
story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the
PICTURE, and in connection with matters incidental to
said production, such as advertising and the like, as well
as authority and permission for the use of LICENSOR's
name in the PICTURE and have herself portrayed
therein, the authority and permission hereby granted, to
retroact to the date when LICENSEE first committed any1.
of the acts herein authorized.
After its premier showing on October 16, 1961,
the movie was shown in different theaters all over the 2.
country.
Because petitioner refused to pay any additional
amounts pursuant to the Agreement, on December 22,
1961, private respondent instituted the present suit
against him praying for judgment in her favor ordering
petitioner 1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with
legal interest from the filing of the Complaint; 2) to render
an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to
pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty therefrom; 3) to
pay attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the amounts
claimed; and 4) to pay the costs.
Petitioner contended in his Answer that the
episodes in the life of Moises Padilla depicted in the
movie were matters of public knowledge and was a
public figure; that private respondent has no property
right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement
was without valid cause or consideration and that he
signed the same only because of the coercion and threat
employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought
for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement as it
constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and of the press.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled
in favour of the private respondent.
ISSUES:
Whether or not private respondent have any property
right over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a
public figure.
Whether or not the Licensing Agreement infringes on the
constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.
RULING:
1. Yes. While it is true that petitioner had purchased
the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story,"
that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and
authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly
episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother
and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v.
Curtis,” a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of
a deceased person to protect his memory, but the
privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their
feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in
the character and memory of the deceased."
Being a public figure ipso facto does not
automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy.
The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate
public information does not extend to a fictional or
novelized representation of a person, no matter how
public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar,
while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a
true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that
he included a little romance in the film because without it,
it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
2. No. From the language of the specific
constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is
not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed
abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. It
would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that press
for recognition.
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and
present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion
for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the
press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media
as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-
interests test." The principle requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of
interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation."
In the case at bar, the interest observable are the
right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of -
freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into
account the interplay of those interests, we hold that
under the particular circumstances presented, and
considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing
Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such
agreement will have to be upheld particularly because
the limits of freedom of expression are reached when
expression touches upon matters of essentially private
concern.
CHAVEZ VS PCGG
FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and
the extent of the people’s constitutional right to information
on matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his
constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of
the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving
the national interest, demands that respondents make
public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining
to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten
wealth.
ISSUE: Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcoses within the scope of the
constitutional guarantee of access to information?
HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its
officers, as well as other government representatives, to
disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information, though, must pertain to definite propositions
of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-
agency recommendations or communications during the
stage when common assertions are still in the process of
being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. There is
a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on
disclosure of information in general --such as on matters
involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations,
intelligence and other classified information.
 PART II
ART. IV
SUFFRAGE
A.Sec. 1, Art. V
B. Sec.2, Art. V
MACALINTAL VS COMELEC
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer,
questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the
said act on the following grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an
immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in
absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating
his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it
dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a
resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months
immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it
affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning
candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it
is Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are
correct.
HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters
are required to physically reside in the Philippines within
the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as
understood in election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his
domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The
domicile is the place where one has the intention to
return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered
a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being
qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the
immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not
qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be
the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include
the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential
and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean
that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power.
The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and
vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and
was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of
RA 9189.
PART III
THE STRUCTURES AND POWERS OF THE NATL
GOVT
INTRODUCTORY
A. Inherent powers of the State
A. Police Power
 1. General
RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD
FACTS:
Rubi and other Manguianes residing in the Province of
Mindoro alleged that they were being illegally deprived of
their liberty by the provincial officials of that
province. Rubi and his companions were said to be held
on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one of their fellow tribe, Dabalos is
said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff
in the prison at Calapan for running away from the
reservation.
Manguianes, as Non-Christian tribe, were considered as
very low in culture, have shown no desire for community
life and have not progressed sufficiently in civilization.
That the purpose of containing them in a reservation, as
stated by the Solicitor General, is for their advancement,
education, and to introduce civilized custom among them.
The order was taken in accordance with section 2145 of
the Administrative Code of 1917, which reads as follow:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites
selected by provincial governor. — With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor
of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are
found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an
approved by the provincial board.
Hence, the validity of Sec. 2145 of the Administrative
Code is being questioned.
ISSUE:
Whether Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
HELD:
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of
freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community,
consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom
in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be
free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. In
general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity
to do those things which are ordinarily done by free men.
However, Liberty is not a license. Liberty is regulated by
law. Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of
the individual and for the greater good of the peace and
order of society and the general well-being. No man can
do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce
unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law
for the common good.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory
nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . .
one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their
own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of
law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law;
the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according
to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class.”
2. Nat’l Security
LAO ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and
national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180
entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The
main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the
Philippines, and against associations, among others,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by
aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other
alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a
judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of
Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting
under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without
due process of law.
 The subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof.
 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of
the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede
treaties or generally accepted principles.
Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should
be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld
because it represented an exercise of the police power
which, being inherent could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally
accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw
no conflict between the raised generally accepted
principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the
law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”;
and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.”
US VS POMPEYA
FACTS:
This case is regarding the complaint filed by the
prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo, charging
Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal
ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally and
without justifiable motive failing to render service on
patrol duty, required under said municipal ordinance.
Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer,
stating that the acts charged in the complaint do not
constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is
unconstitutional for being repugnant to the Organic Act of
the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the
citizens.
The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the
dismissal of the complaint.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to
show a cause of action under the said law
W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their rights therein
guaranteed
HELD:
Is the assailed municipal ordinance a violation of the
Philippine Bill?
The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the
provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of which
is to require each able-bodied male resident of the
municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as well as
each householder when so required by the president, to
assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the
community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by
giving information of the existence of such persons in the
locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those
who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse
to render the same.
The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether
there is anything in the law, organic or otherwise, in force
in the Philippine Islands, which prohibits the central
Government, or any governmental entity connected
therewith, from adopting or enacting rules and
regulations for the maintenance of peace and good
government?
In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal
relations of the primitive man, the feudal system, the
days of the "hundreds" -- all of which support the idea of
an ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the
protection of the peace and good order of his community.
The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under
the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the police
power of the state and that the state was fully authorized
and justified in conferring the same upon the
municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that,
therefore, the provisions of the said Act are constitutional
and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the
persons affected thereby.
Is there a cause of action?
The complain is unable to show (a) that the defendant
was a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an
able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of
age nor over 55; nor (d) that conditions existed which
justified the president of the municipality in calling upon
him for the services mentioned in the law.
"For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered."
4. Public Safety
AGUSTIN VS EDU
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is
assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which
requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices
particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized
triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that
this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and
unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already
equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to
provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate
to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early
warning devices is redundant and would only make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an
expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners
whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights
in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-
powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor
vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the
Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory
countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and
visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at
least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from
any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized
rectangular early warning device installed on the roads,
highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking,
that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road,
highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or
endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist
who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in
warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not
immediately get adequate advance warning because he
will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an
ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of
the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the
danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the
exercise of the police power. That is conceded by
petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is
the submission of the former, however, that while
embraced in such a category, it has offended against the
due process and equal protection safeguards of the
Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only
in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police
power which was originally identified by Chief Justice
Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847
decision, as “nothing more or less than the powers of
government inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed
in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice
Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution
came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police
power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. Persons and property could
thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in
1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as ‘the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of
the people.’ The concept was set forth in negative terms
by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as
‘that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety and welfare of society.’ In that sense it could be
hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v.
Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the
above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the
most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers,’
extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to all the
great public needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet
the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the
language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or
parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present
with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent
changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a
dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing
the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety,
good order, and welfare.”
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin,
compounded by the fact that the particular police power
measure challenged was clearly intended to promote
public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for
this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of
that character. None has been called to our attention, an
indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in
point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector
Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in
view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in
a statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe
transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets
designated as national roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the
first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with
petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by
the imperative demands of public safety.
5. Public Health
US VS GOMEZ JESUS
Ruling:
1. The state has general power to enact such laws, in
relation to persons and property within its borders, as
may promote public health, public morals, public safety,
and the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants.
2. To make reasonable provision for determining the
qualifications of those engaging in the practice of
medicine and surgery, and punishing those who attempt
to engage therein in defiance of such provisions.
This power of the state is generally denominated the
police power. It has been held that the state cannot be
deprived of its right to exercise this power. The police
power and the right to exercise its constitute the very
foundation, or at least one of the corner stones, of the
state. For the state to deprive itself or permit itself to be
deprived of the right to enact laws to promote the general
prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants, and promote
public health, public morals, and public safety, would be
to destroy the very purpose and objects of the state. No
legislature can bargain away the public health, public
safety, or the public morals. The people themselves
cannot do it, much less their servants. Governments are
organized with a view to the preservation of these things.
They cannot deprive themselves of the power to provide
for them.
It has been held that a constitutional prohibition upon
State laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not
restrict the power of the State to protect the public health,
public morals, or public safety, as the one or the other
may be involved in the execution of such contracts.
Rights and privileges arising from contracts with a State
are subject to regulations for the protection of the public
health, the public morals, and the public safety, in the
same sense and to the same extent as are all contracts
and all property, whether owned by natural persons or
corporations.
In order to enforce the police power of the state, it may,
under certain conditions, become necessary to deprive
its citizens of property and of a right providing for the
continuance of property, when the property or the
exercise of the right may tend to destroy the public
health, the public morals, the public safety, and the
general welfare and prosperity of its inhabitants. For
example, a tannery, a slaughterhouse, or a fertilizing
establishment may be located in such proximity to the
residence portion of a city as to become a menace to the
public health and the welfare of the inhabitants. In such a
case the discontinuance or the removal of such
institutions may be ordered, under the police power of the
state, even though it amounts to depriving persons of
their private property.
6. Public Morals
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL VS CITY OF MAYOR
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila
passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions
questioned for its violation of due process:
refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or
customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby
in open view;
prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o
150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);
making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24
hours; and
cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court issued preliminary injunction and
petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process
requirement of the constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is
to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only
discourages hotels/motels in doing business other than
legal but also increases the revenue of the LGU
concerned. There is no violation of constitutional due
process for being reasonable and the ordinance enjoys
the presumption of constitutionality absent any
irregularity on its face. As such a limitation cannot be
viewed as a transgression against the command of due
process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could
be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being
devoted. Taxation may be made to implement a police
power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is
dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of
lower court reversed and injunction lifted.
7. Public welfare and advancement
BUCK VS BELL
Facts:
Carrie Buck was a feeble minded woman who was
committed to a state mental institution. Her condition had
been present in her family for the last three generations.
A Virginia law allowed for the sexual sterilization of
inmates of institutions to promote the "health of the
patient and the welfare of society." Before the procedure
could be performed, however, a hearing was required to
determine whether or not the operation was a wise thing
to do.
Issue:
Did the Virginia statute which authorized sterilization
deny Buck the right to due process of the law and the
equal protection of the laws as protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Held:
The Court found that the statute did not violate the
Constitution. Justice Holmes made clear that Buck's
challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved
but on the process of the substantive law. Since
sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing had
occurred (at which the patient and a guardian could be
present) and after the Circuit Court of the County and the
Supreme Court of Appeals had reviewed the case, if so
requested by the patient. Only after "months of
observation" could the operation take place. That was
enough to satisfy the Court that there was no
Constitutional violation. Citing the best interests of the
state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law like
Virginia's in order to prevent the nation from "being
swamped with incompetence . . . Three generations of
imbeciles are enough."
8. The Nat’l economy
RUTTER VS ESTEBAN
On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of
land situated in the Manila for P9,600 of which P4,800
were paid outright, and the balance was made payable
as follows: P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and
P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at the
rate of 7 percent per annum. To secure the payment of
said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has been
constituted in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay
the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the
interest that had accrued and so Rutter instituted an
action to recover the balance due, the interest due and
the attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a prayer
for sale of the properties mortgaged in accordance with
law. Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation
contracted and that he is a war sufferer, having filed
his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission
for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the
last war; and that under section 2 of RA 342(moratorium
law), payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until
after the lapse of eight years. The complaint was
dismissed. A motion for recon was made which assails
the constitutionality of RA 342.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-
impairment clause grounds.
Held: Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment
of obligations decreed by the state through the medium
of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is
the application of police power. The economic interests of
the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference
with contracts. The question is not whether the legislative
action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or
indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a
legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable
and appropriate to that end.
However based on the President’s general SONA and
consistent with what the Court believes to be as the only
course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness,
declared that the continued operation and enforcement of
RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged should be
declared null and void and without effect. This holds true
as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with
greater force and reason considering that said Orders
contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as
regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity
of monetary obligations.
US VS TORIBIO
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to
have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied
because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He
nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the
necessary license. He was eventually sued and was
sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or
the other argued that the law mandating that one should
acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid
exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained
that it “is not a taking of the property for public use, within
the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and
legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to
regulate and restrain such particular use of the property
as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of
the publics. All property is acquired and held under the
tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the
equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights
and interests of the community.”

B. Eminent Domain
1. In general
2. What constitute taking
US VS CAUSBY
Facts. Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport
outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondents’
property contained a house and a chicken farm. The end
of one of the runways of the airport was 2,220 feet from
Respondents’ property, and the glide path passed over
the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house,
63 feet above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest
tree. The use by the United States of this airport is
pursuant to a lease beginning June 1, 1942, and ending
June 30, 1942, with provisions for renewal until June 30,
1967, or six months after the end of the national
emergency, whichever is earlier. The United States’ four
motored bombers make loud noises when flying above
the property, and have very bright lights. Respondents’
chicken farm production had to stop, because 150
chickens were killed by flying into walls from fright. In the
Court of Claims, it was found that the United States had
taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942,
and that the value of the property depreciation as the
result of the easement was $2,000.00. The United States
petitioned for certiorari, which was granted.
Issue. Has the Respondents’ property been taken within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment?
Held. Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination
of the value of the easement and whether the easement
was permanent or temporary.
The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of
land extending to the sky above the land. However, the
court notes that an act of Congress had given the United
States exclusive national sovereignty over the air space.
The court noted that common sense made the common
law doctrine inapplicable.
However, the court found that the common law doctrine
did not control the present case. The United States had
conceded in oral argument that if flights over the
Respondents’ property rendered it uninhabitable then
there would be a taking compensable under the Fifth
Amendment. The measure of the value of the property
taken is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain.
The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if
the landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he
must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of
the enveloping atmosphere. If this were not true then
landowners could not build buildings, plant trees or run
fences.
The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above
the land, is part of the public domain. The court does not
set the precise limits of the line of demarcation. Flights
over private land are not a taking, unless, like here, they
are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate
interference with the enjoyment of the land. The Court of
Claims must, upon remand, determine the value of the
easement and whether it is a temporary or permanent
easement.

Dissent. The dissent would reverse the decision of the
Court of Claims and hold that there has been no taking
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. This is
because of the modern nature of the airplane, and the
desire to avoid confusion.
US VS CALTEX
Facts:
1. Caltex, shell and standard vacuum oil owned terminal
facilities in Pandacan, Manila at the time of the Japanese
attack upon Pearl Harbor. These were used to receive,
handle and store petroleum products from incoming ships
and to release them for further distribution throughout the
PH islands.
2. The military situation in the PH grew worse and in the
face of the Japanese advance, the Pandacan oil deposits
were requisitioned by the US army.
3. The oil companies received an order to demolish the
facilities and destroy all unused petroleum products to
deprive the enemy of valuable logistic weapon.
4. After the war, respondents demanded compensation of
all of the properties, which had been used or destroyed
by the army. The US govt paid for the petroleum stocks
and transportation equipment, which were either used or
destroyed but it refused to compensate the respondents
for the destruction of the facilities.
5. Claiming a constitutional right under the 5th
amendment to just compensation for these facilities,
respondents sued in the court of claims. Recovery was
allowed.
6.The US SC granted certiorari for review of this
judgment.
Issue: W/N the private respondents are entitled for just
compensation.
Held: No. The judgment was reversed. The SC held that
the principle laid down by Justice Field in US vs. Pacific
Railroad must govern this case. In that case, it involved
bridges which had been destroyed during the war
between the states by a retreating Northern Army to
impede the advance of the Confederate Army.
It was held in that case that the destruction or injury of
private property in battle or in the bombardment of cities
and towns, and in many other ways in the war, had to be
borne by the sufferers alone as one of its consequences.
The safety of the state in such cases overrides all
considerations of private loss.
Pacific Railroad case was later made the basis for the
holding in Juragua Iron Co. vs US, where recovery was
denied to the owners of a factory which had been
destroyed by American soldiers in the field in Cuba
because it was thought that the structure housed the
germs if a contagious disease.

The destruction of respondents’ terminal in the face of
their impending seizure by the enemy was no different
than the destruction of the bridges in the Pacific Railroad
case. The deliberation behind the order was no more
than a design to prevent the enemy from realizing any
strategic value from an area, which it was soon to be
captured.
Dissent by Justice Douglas and Justice Black: I believe
that the 5th Amendment requires compensation for the
taking. It was as clearly appropriated to that end as
animals, food and supplies requisitioned for the defense
effort. As the Court says, the destruction of this property
deprived the enemy of a valuable logistics weapon. The
guiding principle should be that whenever the
government determines that one’s personal property,
whatever it may be, is essential to the war effort and
appropriated it for the common good, the public purse
rather than the individual, should bear the loss.
3. Public use
4. Eminent Domain and police power
GUIDO VS RURAL PROGRESS
Justa Guido, owner of the land being expropriated by the
Rural Progress Administration (RPA), filed a petition for
prohibition to prevent RPA and Judge Oscar Castelo
from proceeding with the expropriation. Guido alleged,
among others, that the land sought to be expropriated
is commercial and therefore excluded within the purview
of the provisions of Act 539. Commonwealth Act No. 539
authorized the President of the Philippines to acquire
private lands or any interest therein through purchaser or
farms for resale at a reasonable price. The
National Assembly approved this enactment on the
authority of section 4 of Article XIII of the
Constitution which provides that the Congress may
authorize, upon payment of just compensation,
the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots
and conveyed at cost to individuals.
Issue: W/n the expropriation of Guido’s land is in
conformity of to the principle of Social Justice.
Held: NO. Hand in hand with the principle that no one
shall be deprived of his property without due process of
law, herein invoked, and that "the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of
all the people should be the concern of the state," is a
declaration, with which the former should be reconciled,
that "the Philippines is a Republican state" created
to secure to the Filipino people "the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty
and democracy.
Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution,
embraces as its necessary components freedom of
conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the
pursuit of happiness. Along with these freedoms are
included economic freedom and freedom of enterprise
within reasonable bounds and under proper control. In
paving the way for the breaking up of existing large
estates, trust in perpetuity, feudalism, and their
concomitant evils, the Constitution did not propose to
destroy or undermine the property right or to advocate
equal distribution of wealth or to authorize of what is in
excess of one's personal needs and the giving of it to
another.
The promotion of social justice ordained by the
Constitution does not supply paramount basis for
untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural
Progress Administration or any other government
instrumentality. Social justice does not champion division
of property or equality of economic status; what it and the
Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity,
equality of political rights, equality before the law, equality
between values given and received on the basis of efforts
exerted in their production. As applied to metropolitan
centers, especially Manila, in relation to housing
problems, it is a command to devise, among other social
measures, ways and means for the elimination of slums,
shambles, shacks, and house that are dilapidated,
overcrowded, without ventilation. light and sanitation
facilities, and for the construction in their place of decent
dwellings for the poor and the destitute. As will presently
be shown, condemnation of blighted urban areas bears
direct relation to public safety health, and/or morals, and
is legal.
The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20
or 50 persons and their families does not inure to the
benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give the use
public character. The expropriation proceedings at bar
have been instituted for the economic relief of a few
families devoid of any consideration of public health,
public peace and order, or other public advantage. What
is proposed to be done is to take plaintiff's property,
which for all we know she acquired by sweat and
sacrifice for her and her family's security, and sell it at
cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the stipulated
rent or leave the premises.
5. Just Compensation
REPUBLIC VS JUAN
Facts: Sps Celestino Juan and Ana Tanseco Juan are
the registered owners of the 2 adjoining parcels of land
situated in LU. The government filed a complaint for the
expropriation of the said land to be used as the site of the
LU agricultural school. In negotiating for the price of the
property the Juans initially offered to sell the land for
P190k (P170k+ bank loan of P20k) with a down payment
of P90k. Subsequently, the lower court authorized the
government to take possession of the property after
depositing the amount of P90793.70 as provisional value.
However, the Juans increased valuation further to P300k
in his MR. the court ordered the government to deposit
P100k as provisional value until the true valuation of the
lots can be determined. Subsequently, the government
deposited the amount of P100k which the Juans
withdrew that same day. Thereafter, the government
started developing the area and constructing the
buildings needed for the school. Soon after the Juans
again complained that the provisional value fixed by the
court is still inadequate, claiming that the property is
worth P5k per hectre or a total of P1693040.
Nevertheless, the court ruled that the government should
pay the Juans the amount of P190k, which is the just and
reasonable compensation.
Issue: W/N the amount of P190k is just and reasonable
compensation.
Held: Yes. The amount of P190k is just and reasonable.
Besides, the unqualified withdrawal of the partial deposit
of value of land by the Juans constituted as recognition
on their part of the right of the government to expropriate
the lots.
In the instant case, it cant be said that the amount is
unjust to the Juans because 1) the property was bought
in 1957 for only P50k; 2) the value of their improvements
only amounted to P1712.60 as of 1963; 3) the alleged
cost for leveling surveying and titling thereof from 1957-
1959 amounts only to P40k; 4) the assessed value and
the tax declarations of theses lots amounts only to
P42120; 5) its also doubtful that the property would
increase in value over 6x in 6 yrs from 1957-1963; 6) the
property is also 6km from the poblacion of Bacnotan;
C. Taxation
1. In general
COMMISIONER VS BOTELHO CORP
F: Reparations Commish of the PH sold to Botelho the
vessel “M/S Maria Rosello” for the amount of
P6,798,888.88. the former likewise sold to General
Shipping the vessel “M/S General Lim” at the price of
P6,951,666.66. Upon arrival at the port of Manila, the
BOC placed the same under custody and refused to give
due course (to applications for registration), unless the
aforementioned sums of P483,433 and P494,824 be paid
as compensation tax. The buyers subsequently filed with
the CTA their respective petitions for review. Pending the
case, RA 3079 amended RA 1789 –the original
Reparations Act, under which the aforementioned
contracts with the Buyers had been executed- by
exempting buyers of reparations good acquired from the
Commish, from liability for the compensation tax.
Invoking s20 of RA 3079, the buyers applied for the
renovation of their utilizations contract with the Commish,
which granted the application and then filed with the Tax
court their supplemental petitions for review. The CTA
rule in favor of the buyers.
CIR appealed and argued upon the ground that a tax
exemption must be clear and explicit; that there is no
express provision for the retroactivity of the exemption,
established by Republic Act No. 3079, from the
compensating tax; that the favorable provisions, which
are referred to in section 20 thereof, cannot include the
exemption from compensating tax; and, that Congress
could not have intended any retroactive exemption,
considering that the result thereof would be prejudicial to
the Government.
I: W/N tax exemption may be applied retroactively.
H: Yes. The SC held that tax exemptions may and do
exist, such as the one prescribed in section 14 of
Republic Act No. 1789, as amended by Republic Act No.
3079, which, by the way, is "clear and explicit," thus,
meeting the first ground of appellant's contention. It may
not be amiss to add that no tax exemption — like any
other legal exemption or exception — is given without
any reason therefor. In much the same way as other
statutory commands, its avowed purpose is some public
benefit or interest, which the law-making body considers
sufficient to offset the monetary loss entitled in the grant
of the exemption. Indeed, section 20 of Republic Act No.
3079 exacts a valuable consideration for the retroactivity
of its favorable provisions, namely, the voluntary
assumption, by the end-user who bought reparations
goods prior to June 17, 1961 of "all the new obligations
provided for in" said Act.
The argument adduced in support of the third ground is
that the view adopted by the Tax Court would operate to
grant exemption to particular persons, the Buyers herein.
It should be noted, however, that there is no
constitutional injunction against granting tax exemptions
to particular persons. In fact, it is not unusual to grant
legislative franchises to specific individuals or entities,
conferring tax exemptions thereto. What the fundamental
law forbids is the denial of equal protection, such as
through unreasonable discrimination or classification.
Furthermore, Section 14 of the Law on Reparations, as
amended, exempts from the compensating tax, not
particular persons, but persons belonging to a
particular class. Indeed, appellants do not assail the
constitutionality of said section 14, insofar as it grants
exemptions to end-users who, after the approval of
Republic Act No. 3079, on June 17, 1961, purchased
reparations goods procured by the Commission. From
the viewpoint of Constitutional Law, especially the equal
protection clause, there is no difference between the
grant of exemption to said end-users, and the extension
of the grant to those whose contracts of purchase and
sale mere made before said date, under Republic Act No.
1789.
2. Taxation
LUTZ VS ARANETA
Appelant in this case Walter Lutz in his capacity as the
Judicial Administrator of the intestate of the deceased
Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the
Collector of the Internal Revenue the total sum of
fourteen thousand six hundred sixty six and forty cents (P
14, 666.40) paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3
of Commonwealth Act No. 567, also known as the Sugar
Adjustment Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-
1950. Commonwealth Act. 567 Section 2 provides for an
increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar
on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar
manufacturer; while section 3 levies on the owners or
persons in control of the land devoted tot he cultivation of
sugarcane and ceded to others for consideration, on
lease or otherwise - "a tax equivalent to the difference
between the money value of the rental or consideration
collected and the amount representing 12 per centum of
the assessed value of such land. It was alleged that such
tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid
and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in
plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax
may be constitutionally levied. The action was dismissed
by the CFI thus the plaintiff appealed directly to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/N the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act
No. 567 are unconstitutional.
Held: The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is
constitutional. The tax under said Act is levied with a
regulatory purpose, to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar
industry. Since sugar production is one of the great
industries of our nation, its promotion, protection, and
advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general
welfare. Hence, a said objective of the Act is a public
concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows that
the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds
what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its
promotion. If objectives and methods are
alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the
state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their
prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made with
the implement of the state’s police power. In addition, it is
only rational that the taxes be obtained from those that
will directly benefit from it. Therefore, the tax levied under
the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional.
RP VS BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING
FACTS:
RA 632 created the Philippine Sugar Institute, a semi-
public corporation. In 1951, the Institute acquired the
Insular Sugar Refinery for P3.07 million payable in
installments from the proceeds of the Sugar tax to be
collected under RA 632. The operation of the refinery for
1954 to 1957 was disastrous as the Institute suffered
tremendous losses. Contending that the purchase of
refinery with money from the Institute’s fund was not
authorized under RA 632, and that the continued
operation of the refinery is inimical to their interest,
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Ma-ao Sugar Central,
Talisay-Silay Milling Co. and the Central Azucarera del
Danao refused to continue with their contribution to said
fund. The trial court found them liable under RA 632.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Are the milling companies liable?
RULING:
Yes. The special assessment or levy for the Philippine
Sugar Institute Fund is not so much an exercise of the
power of taxation, nor the imposition of a special
assessment, but the exercise of police power for the
general welfare of the entire country. It is, therefore, an
exercise of a sovereign power which no private citizen
may lawfully resist. Section 2a of the charter authorizes
Philsugin to acquire the refinery in question. The financial
loss resulting from the operation thereof is no means an
index that the industry did profit therefrom, as other gains
of a different nature (such as experience) may have been
realized.
B. Doctrine of Separation of Powers
BELGICA ET AL VS EXEC SEC
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R.
No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the
Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly
known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the
members of the Congress. It underwent several legal
designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the
latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF.
The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the
annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in
the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house;
broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects”
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools,
etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship
grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to –
P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to –
P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide
for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into
their department provided that the request for
realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator
concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit
not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork
barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya
Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund
which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has
been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by
allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle
blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last
decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had
been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been
helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds
into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing
projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit
was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the
results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several
others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is
constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is
constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is
unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates
the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It
regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The
executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this
includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only
the executive may implement the law but under the pork
barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA,
itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves
dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be
allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they
enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of
powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs
Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as
CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was
constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend
where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the
PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence
of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in
Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people
legislative power but only insofar as the processes of
referendum and initiative are concerned). That being,
legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it
cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by
the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units
but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual
legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF
money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-
delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two
houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the
individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions
does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to
the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the
power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he
may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already
being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA
is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to
which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system,
how can the president veto the appropriation made by
the legislator if the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a
mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to
manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop
their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of
the members of the house of representatives, what’s
happening is that a congressman can either bypass or
duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his
own. This is an instance where the national government
(note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with
the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary
to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under
the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes
more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the
presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork
comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a
particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910,
which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869
(as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s
charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees,
among others, collected from certain energy-related
ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya
Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy
resource development and for other purposes which the
President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides
that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a
General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall
be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of
Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a
particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
1. Inherent of republicanism; purpose
Interdependence vs. independence
2. System of Checks and Balances
3. Inherent or incidental power
ARNAULT VS NAZARENO
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the
acquisition by the Philippine Government of the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949.
Among the witnesses called to be examined by the
special committee created by a Senate resolution was
Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the
purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During
the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the
identity of said representative, at the same time invoking
his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The
Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the
custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned “until he
shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the
Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in
connection therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a writ of
Habeas Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those
who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional
hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose
penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid
of legislation. But it must be herein established that a
witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee
may be detained during the term of the members
imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too
long as to violate the witness’ right to due process of law.
IN RE DICK
R. McCulloch Dick, is the editor and proprietor of the Philippines
Free Press, a periodical published weekly in the city of Manila.
There was a publication of certain articles in that paper which tends
to obstruct the Government of the Philippine Islands in policies
inaugurated for the prosecution of the ARTICLE VI
war between the United States and the German Empire, THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
and other articles which have tended to create a feeling of
unrest and uneasiness in the community. He is being detained A. Legislative Power; basic limitations
because the Governor-General of the Philippines ordered his a. no irrepealable laws
deportation but before the Governor- b. separation of powers
General gave his order, there was an investigation in the c. improper delegation of powers
manner and form prescribed in Sec. 69 of
the Administrative Code. Delegation of Powers
Petitioner, filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that i. Tariff powers, s.28(2) art. VI;’
he may be discharged from detention by the acting chief of ii. Emergency powers, s.23(2) art.
police of the city of Manila. VI;
iii. Delegation to the people 1)
I: W/N the Governor-General has the power of referendum, 2)plebescite;
deportation absent of a statutory grant of authority. s.2, art. XVII
s.32, art. VI
H: Y e s , t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l h a s
the power to institute and PEOPLE VS VERA
m a i n t a i n d e p o r t a t i o n proceedings. Facts:

The discretionary power to deport "undesirable aliens whose
continued presence in the Philippine Islands is a menace to the
peace and safety of the community," as an act of state, having
been conferred upon the Governor-General, to be exercised by
him upon his own opinion as to whether the facts disclosed by an
investigation had in accord with section 69 of the Administrative
Code justify or necessitate deportation in a particular case, he is
the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no
other tribunal is at liberty to re examine or controvert the sufficiency
of the evidence on which he acted.
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in
Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions for
new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the
appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting
new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is
innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of
the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular
Probation Office. The IPO denied the application.
However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner
allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City
Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to
place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in
violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the
act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to
provide a system of probation to convicted person.
Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to
a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that
only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is
covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1
Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of
laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to
provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may
be an encroachment of the power of the executive to
provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is
granting freedom, as in pardon.
Issues:
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the
1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue
delegation of legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal
protection of the laws
Discussions:
Rulings:
1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence
invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board
may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not,
by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose
upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in
the exercise of their discretionary power. What is
granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the
recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving
commission” which enables the provincial boards to
exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act,
the legislature does not seemingly on its own
authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to
the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for
the various provincial boards to determine.
protection of equal laws. The classification of equal
protection, to be reasonable, must be based on
substantial distinctions, which make real differences;
it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of the class.
1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a
constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of probation officer.
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for
2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the
this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set
provisions of our Bill of Rights, which prohibits the
standard provided by Congress on how provincial
denial to any person of the equal protection of the
boards must act in carrying out a system of probation.
laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow
The provincial boards are given absolute discretion
from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power,
which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine
although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in
of the non delegation of power. Further, it is a
every case. Adopting the example given by one of the
violation of equity so protected by the constitution.
counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11
argument, one province may appropriate the
which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in
necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation
those provinces in which the respective provincial
officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do
boards have provided for the salary of a probation
so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in
officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
operation in the former province but not in the latter.
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
This means that a person otherwise coming within the
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be
purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the
subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
benefits of probation in one province while another
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to person similarly situated in another province would be
determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all
applicability and application of the Probation Act are the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If
the provincial board does not wish to have the Act funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to respective provinces, in which case no inequality
would result for the obvious reason that probation
 would be in operation in each and every province by
the affirmative action of appropriation by all the
provincial boards.
iv. delegation to local governments
RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the
province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial
governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their
native habitat and to established themselves on a
reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and
to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they
escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a
reservation made to that end and for purposes of
cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a
Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very
low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from
the reservation but was later caught and was placed in
prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the
reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made
on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province,
alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial
board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been
illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity
of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which
provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the
provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such
a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation
on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by
him and approved by the provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation.
Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of
their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court
sustained the constitutionality of this section of the
Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity,
who else was in a better position to determine whether or
not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is
optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as
circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give
discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may
make decisions of executive departments of subordinate
official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian”
should not be given a literal meaning or a religious
signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees
of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers
not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area,
and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a
low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes
were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote
peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will
ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the
changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory
nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . .
one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their
own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of
law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law;
the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according
to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class.”
PP VS VERA supra
s.16, RA 7160, LGC of 1991: “The General
Welfare Clause; Police Power.”
s.19, RA 7160, LGC of 1991: Power of eminent
domain
s.5, art. X of the Constitution: power of taxation.
v. delegation to administrative
bodies. The “power of
subordinate legislation” by
administrative agencies.
PP VS VERA supra
CRUZ VS YOUNGBERG
F: Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is
asserted that "Act No. 3155 of the Philippine Legislature
was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the
introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands
from foreign countries, as shown by an explanatory note
and text of Senate Bill No. 328 as introduced in the
Philippine Legislature.
The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground
that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely,
(1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional
and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief
demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically
become effective and would prohibit the respondent from
giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155
was constitutional and, therefore, valid.
The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was
dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file
another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the
petitioner appealed to this court.
I: W/N AN 3052 is ineffective upon the declaration of
unconstitutionality of AN 3155.
H: No. The SC said aside from the provisions of Act No.
3052, Act No. 3155 is entirely valid. As shown in
paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the Legislature
passed Act No. 3155 to protect the cattle industry of the
country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases
through importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally
recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the
public welfare and the development of the resources of
the country are objects within the scope of the police
power. In this connection it is said in the case of
Punzalan vs. Ferriols and Provincial Board of Batangas
(19 Phil., 214), that the provisions of the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, did not have the effect of denying to the
Government of the Philippine Islands the right to the
exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion
of the general welfare and the public interest. The facts
recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows
that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there
was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said
that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the
Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or
vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it
assume to determine whether the measures are wise or
the best that might have been adopted.
ABAKADA VS EXEC SECRETARY
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4,
5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a
uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the
VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of
the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006,
raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%),
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds
two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP
of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1
½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it
constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section
28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further
argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of
goods and services and cannot be included within the
purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since
this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon
merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods. They also said that the
President has powers to cause, influence or create the
conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions
precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding
standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of
Finance will make the recommendation. They claim,
nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President
since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such
that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to
impose the increased tax rate or not.
Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the
provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI,
Section 26 (2) of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not there was an undue delegation of
legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1
and 2 of the Constitution.
2. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue
3. Whether or not there was a violation of the due
process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1
of the Constitution.
Discussions:
1. Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the
law, but the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of
Representatives, but Senate has the power not only
to propose amendments, but also to propose its own
version even with respect to bills which are required
by the Constitution to originate in the House. the
Constitution simply means is that the initiative for
filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an
increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of
local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they
are from the districts, the members of the House can
be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who
are elected at large, are expected to approach the
same problems from the national perspective. Both
views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of
such laws.
delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its
terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of
any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
3. The equal protection clause under the Constitution
means that “no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
same place and in like circumstances.”
Rulings:
1. R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The
revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the
House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill
No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes,
percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article
VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain
any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the
amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to
the House revenue bill.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but
only of the discretion as to the execution of a law.
This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does
not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power
when it describes what job must be done, who must
do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our
complex economy that is frequently the only way in
which the legislative process can go forward.
3. Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The
power of the State to make reasonable and natural
classifications for the purposes of taxation has long
been established. Whether it relates to the subject of
taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or
the amounts to be raised, the methods of
assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s
power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule,
the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent
a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination,
or arbitrariness.
vi. delegation of express authority
GARCIA VS EXEC SEC
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to
any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on
all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional
duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was
imposed across the board on all imported articles,
including crude oil and other oil products imported into
the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional
duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed
reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and
other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique
Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475
and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of
Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the
authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the
President may not assume such power by issuing
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the
nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are
constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution,
the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills,
like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the
Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does
not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as
revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the
President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as
follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to
fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to
Congress to authorize the President “subject to such
limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to
fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties
or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs
Code which authorized the President to issue the said
EOs.
vii. delegation to carry out defined
policy according to prescribed
standard
EDU VS ERICTA
FACTS:
Judge Ericta and Teddy C. Galo filed suit for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the
validity of enactment of the Reflector as well as Admin
Order No. 2 implementing it, as an invalid exercise of the
police power for being violative of the due process
clause. Galo followed with a manifestation that in the
event that Judge would uphold said statute constitutional,
A.O. No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner,
implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue
exercise of legislative power.
ISSUE:
Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is
constitutional and valid.
RULING:
Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in
order to promote public safety and order.
Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority
to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare.
Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." The
police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague
and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception
that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights
did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a
group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment
of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal
peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent
Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative Order No. 2
issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved
by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power. Such administrative order, which took
effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in
effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act.
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of
separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its
legislative power to the two other branches of the
government, subject to the exception that local
governments may over local affairs participate in its
exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority
under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and
repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in
all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. To determine whether or not there is an
undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions
when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it,
and what is the scope of his authority.
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed
together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act
No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt
as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is
the prime consideration in statutes of this character.
There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of
petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to
promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and
translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His
power is clear. There has been no abuse. His
Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack,
far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent
Galo.
RAFAEL VS EMBROIDERY BD
In 1961, Republic Act No. 3137 was passed. This law
created the Embroidery and Apparel Control and
Inspection Board (EACIB). Section 2 thereof also
provided that the Board shall be composed of:
(1) a representative from the Bureau of Customs to act
as Chairman, to be designated by the Secretary of
Finance;
(2) a representative from the Central Bank to be
designated by its Governor;
(3) a representative from the Department of Commerce
and Industry to be designated by the Secretary of
Commerce and Industry;
(4) a representative from the National Economic
Council to be designated by its Chairman; and
(5) a representative from the private sector coming from
the Association of Embroidery and Apparel Exporters of
the Philippines.
Later, in the performance of its duties, the EACIB made
certain assessments against Cecilio Rafael but the latter
refused to comply. Rafael sued EACIB and he averred
that RA 3137 is unconstitutional for while Congress may
create an office it cannot specify who shall be appointed
therein; that the members of the EACIB can only be
appointed by the President in accordance with Article 7,
Sec. 10 2 of the Constitution; that since the Act
prescribes that the chairman and members of the EACIB
should come from specified offices, it is equivalent to a
declaration by Congress as to who should be appointed,
thereby infringing the constitutional power of the
President to make appointments.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3137 bypassed the
appointing power of the president.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that indeed “the
appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the
President, upon which no limitations maybe imposed by
Congress, except those resulting from the need of
securing the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments and from the exercise of the limited power
to prescribe the qualifications to the given appointive
office.”
In the case at bar, the representatives in the EACIB
are not appointed by the Department Heads. They are
merely going to be designated hence whoever was
designated was merely sitting as an ex officio member. It
must also be noted that Congress took care to specify
that the representatives should come from the Bureau of
Customs, Central Bank, Department of Commerce and
Industry and the National Economic Council. The obvious
reason must be because these departments and/or
bureaus perform functions which have a direct relation to
the importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof
into embroidery and apparel products and their
subsequent exportation abroad. There is no attempt in
RA 3137 to deprive the President of his power to make
appointments. The law is not unconstitutional.
viii. promulgation of rules and
regulations
VDA. DE PINEDA VS PEÑA
The "Ped" mining claim was located by Pedro Sibayan in
January, 1932. After Sibayan's death, his heirs Miguela
and Aleja Sibayan executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement wherein they waived their rights and interest
over the "Ped" claim, among others, in favor of co-heir
Feliza Sibayan. Feliza then transferred said claims to
Sofia Reyes.
The "Ullmann" mining claim was located by Elvira
Carmelo in February, 1932, and was subsequently
transferred to Joseph Palengaoan.
In 1962, Reyes, Palengaoan and several others formed
the KM. 21 Mining Association, later converted into the
KM. 21 Exploration Corporation, to which the members
conveyed their respective mining claims, including the
"Ped" and "Ullmann" claims. Ultimately, the claims were
assigned to the Baguio Gold Mining Company for
operation.
During this time, an amended declaration of location for
the "Ullmann" claim was registered.
On November 23, 1972, petitioners instituted Civil Case
against Feliza Sibayan, Sofia Reyes, KM. 21 Mining
Exploration Corporation, et. al., with the CFI, Quezon
City. Petitioners claimed that the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement from which private respondents derived their
ownership and possession over the "Ped" claim was
maliciously falsified and prayed for annulment of all
subsequent transfers involving the mining claims.
During the pre-trial of Civil Case, the parties entered into
an amicable settlement, agreeing that: (1) private
respondents win return to petitioners the disputed mining
claims, including the "Ped" claim; (2) petitioners will
reimburse private respondents all expenses, like
assessment taxes, incurred in the preservation of the
claims; and (3) private respondents shall execute the
necessary documents to reconvey the mining claims to
petitioners.
Thus, the CFI rendered a decision ordering the parties to
comply with the above settlement.
On 1974, petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a
letter-complaint against private respondents for alleged
overlapping and encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim
over the "Ped" claim and which the Dir. of Mines
rendered a decision declaring that there was no conflict
between the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims.
Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No.
463 (Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974)
took effect, the provisions of the law were made
applicable to petitioners. Pres. Decree No. 463 mandates
compliance with certain requirements in order for
subsisting mining claims, such as the "Ped" claim, to
avail of the benefits granted under the Decree.
Otherwise, mining rights to the claim will be lost.
An appeal and MR was made to the Minister of Natural
Resources, which the latter denied such.
Hence, this petition.
I: W/N public respondents may not validly and legally
take cognizance of an issue not raised in the
complaint, i.e., the issue of the validity of the "Ped"
mining claim.
H: It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may
validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority
to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies. In order to be valid,
the administrative regulation must be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law, conform to the
standards that the law prescribes and must relate
solely to carrying into effect the general provisions
of the law.
With these guidelines, Section 128 of the implementing
rules invoked by public respondents as basis for their
jurisdiction cannot be tainted with invalidity. First, it was
issued by the Department Head pursuant to validly
delegated rule-making powers. Second, it does not
contravene the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463, nor
does it expand the coverage of the Decree. Section 128
merely prescribes a procedural rule to implement the
general provisions of the enabling law. It does not amend
or extend the provisions of the statute. Section 128,
being a valid implementing rule, has the force and effect
of law. Thus, public respondents were duly empowered
to inquire into the validity of the mining claims involved in
the protest case, even if not raised in issue.
3. test of delegation
a. the completeness test
US VS ANG TANG HO
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special
session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An
Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay
and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary
circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to
issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating
the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act,
in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53
which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO
fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other
hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to
Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said
amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO.
The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August
8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He
was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5
months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed
the sentence countering that there is an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the
Governor General.
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be
reversed because he committed the act prior to the
publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto
charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of
a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the
law when both the law and the order fail to set up an
ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly
fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard
policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a
uniform policy required to take the place of all others
without the determination of the insurance commissioner
in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and
without which the act could not possibly be put in use.
The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions
when it leaves the legislative branch of the government
and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors
or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that,
in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in
presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact
or event.
TUPAS VS OPLE
The Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) and the National Federation of Labor Unions
(NFLU) are unions representing the agricultural and
industrial sectors. They alleged they represent over a
million workers all over the country. On the other hand,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 is the implementing law of the
constitutional provision which states that 3 sectors are to
be represented (youth, agricultural labor, industrial labor).
Each sector must have four representatives, 2 from
Luzon, one each from Visayas and Mindanao
respectively. These sectors can submit their nominees to
the President for approval/appointment through the
Minister of Labor. TUPAS however questions the
constitutionality of the said BP because it allegedly lacks
duly published rules on accreditation, nomination and
appointment of industrial labor representatives. Being so,
TUPAS questioned the acts of Blas Ople, then Minister of
Labor, in accrediting certain nominations provided by
other industrial labor groups. TUPAS claims that since
there are no rules clearly stated in the BP on how the
nominations must be handled, the said law has provided
undue delegation to the Minister of Labor and has left
him with absolute discretion in carrying out the duty of
accrediting such nominations. TUPAS did not submit
their nomination within the given 20day period of
nominating their representation; they instead proceeded
to question the constitutionality of the said BP and the
legality of the acts of Ople. Because of their failure to
submit their nominees, Ople did not accredit them.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of
power to the Minister of Labor by BP 697.
HELD: No. The lack of merit of the contention that there
is an unlawful delegation of legislative power is quite
obvious. Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive
act involving the exercise of discretion. What is involved
then is not a legislative power but the exercise of
competence intrinsically executive. What is more, the
official who could make the recommendation is
the Minister of Labor, an alter ego of the President. The
argument, therefore, that there is an unlawful delegation
of legislative power is bereft of any persuasive force.
To further test the validity of the said BP, and to avoid the
taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard,
which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
The standard does not even have to be spelled out. It
could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole. Such standard is set forth with
clarity in Article III, Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
697 which provides in full the limits and scope of the
functions of the Minister of Labor in carrying out the said
provisions.
TUPAS and NFLU were free to submit their nominations
to the President by merely writing a letter coursed
through respondent, and their nominees should have
been submitted to the President. They did not do so. In
fact, as of May 30, 1984, which was still within the 20-day
period, they wrote a letter to Ople which in effect stated
that they were not submitting any nomination and
informing him that they were questioning the validity of
Sections 4, 5, and 6 of BP 697. Hence, if petitioners were
not able to submit any nominee they had no one to blame
but themselves. And the law cannot be declared
unconstitutional on such ground.
b. the sufficiency of standard test
PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive
orders creating 33 municipalities – this was purportedly
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the
boundary… of any… municipality… and may change the
seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require…
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a
taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor
general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the
said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were
unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had
been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which
provides that barrios may “not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by
Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under
this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he
create a municipality which is composed of several
barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal
and that only barrios were barred from being created by
the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and
that a municipality can be created without creating
barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the
RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create
municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the
power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec.
68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although
Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate —
and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such
standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate
such policy, which is the essence of every law; and,
without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause
“as the public welfare may require” – which would mean
that the President may exercise such power as the public
welfare may require – is present, still, such will not
replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of
power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the public
welfare may require” qualifies is the text which
immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is
“the President may change the seat of government within
any subdivision to such place therein as the public
welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may
be changed by the President when public welfare so
requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create
municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative (not executive).
c. examples of sufficient standards
“public interest”
PP VS ROSENTHAL
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders
and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company.
Later, Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty of selling
their shares to individuals without actual tangible assets.
Their shares were merely based on speculations and
future gains. This is in violation of Sections 2 and 5 of Act
No. 2581.
Section 2 provides that every person, partnership,
association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in
the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or
character whatsoever, is under obligation to file
previously with the Insular Treasurer the various
documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay
the required tax of twenty-pesos.
Section 5, on the other hand, provides that “whenever the
said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either
with or without the examination herein provided, that any
person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled
to the right to offer its securities as above defined and
provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue
to such person, partnership, association or corporation a
certificate or permit reciting that such person,
partnership, association or corporation has complied with
the provisions of this act, and that such person,
partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or
agents are entitled to order the securities named in said
certificate or permit for sale”; that “said Treasurer shall
furthermore have authority, when ever in his judgment it
is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or
permit”, and that “an appeal from the decision of the
Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty
days to the Secretary of Finance.”
Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional
because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can
guide said official in determining the cases in which a
certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making
his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance,
with the result that, legislative powers being unduly
delegated to the Insular Treasurer.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of
power to the Internal Treasurer.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act
furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to
follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or
cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or
permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the
person, partnership, association or corporation applying
therefor “has complied with the provisions of this Act”,
and this requirement, construed in relation to the other
provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit
shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the
provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with.
Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular
Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly
conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation “is in
the public interest.”
In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 — to
protect the public against “speculative schemes which
have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky” and
against the “sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns,
visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like
fraudulent exploitations”, — the SC held that “public
interest” in this case is a sufficient standard to guide
the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter
pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or
permits.
Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the
Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is
uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a
mistaken assumption that this is a mere general
reference to public welfare without any standard to guide
determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement
it imposes, and the context of the provision in question
show the contrary. . . ”
“simplicity, economy and efficiency”
CERVANTES VS AUDITOR GENERAL
 This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor
General denying petitioner’s claim for quarters allowance
as manager of the National Abaca and other Fibers Corp.
(NAFCO).
 Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of
NAFCO with annual salary of P15,000.00
 NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo.
Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650 for
1949.
 This allowance was disapproved by the Central
Committee of the government enterprise council under
Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by
NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the Auditor general
on two grounds:
o a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting
manager’s salary to P15,000/year.
o b) NAFCO is in precarious financial
condition.
I: W/N Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations
(GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null
and void.
W/N R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over
GOCCs is Constitutional.
H: As to the first ground, the rule is that so long as the
Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is
established by the statute" there is no undue delegation.
Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the
Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes
in government-controlled corporations, lays down a
standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the
exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free
and independent government of the Philippines and to
promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their
operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed.
The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by
promulgating the executive order in question which,
tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power.
“public welfare”
CALALANG VS WILLIAMS
Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution
of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending
from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street,
from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30
p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7
a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date
of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July
1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in
pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548,
which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national
roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in
his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, recommended to the latter the approval
of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission, with the modification that
the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn
vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from
the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga
Street.
On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, in his second endorsement addressed
to the Director of Public Works, approved the
recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and
Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn
vehicles, between the points and during the hours as
indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and
regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his
capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila,
brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of
prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as
Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio
Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan
Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila
Issues: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of
legislative power?
Ruling: There is no undue delegation of legislative
power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer
legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The
authority conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of
is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by acts of the National
Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all
classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road or
the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in
the public convenience and interest.”
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which
the application of said law is to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of
national roads and to determine when and how long a
national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly.
It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of
determining whether the proper occasion exists for
executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise
of such discretion is the making of the law.
“reasonableness”
PHILCOMSAT VS ALCUAZ
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT)
was granted the authority to “construct and operate such
ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications
services from the communications satellite system and
ground terminal or terminals” in the Philippines.
PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies
like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was
exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the
Public Service Commission later known as the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However,
Executive Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the
same has placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of
the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire
permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue
operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary
permit but it however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce
its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the
rates on EO 546.
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner
(Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and holds
that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it
to fix rates for public service communications, does not
provide the necessary standards which were
constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue
delegation of legislative power, particularly the
adjudicatory powers of NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that
nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the
creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor
of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction
of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any
standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory
powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said
submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction
of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but
of quasi-judicial power to NTC, the exercise of which
allegedly requires an express conferment by the
legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of
power.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of
the NTC to fix rates is limited by the requirements of
public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility
and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than
satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of
legislative power. Fundamental is the rule that
delegation of legislative power may be sustained only
upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in making the delegation
has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the
delegated power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned,
NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be
non-confiscatory and must have been established in the
manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the
absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power
becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-
fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and
just. However, it has been held that even in the absence
of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this
standard may be implied.
However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing
the rates was done without due process since no hearing
was made in ascertaining the rate imposed upon
PHILCOMSAT.
“other standards”
TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REG. BOARD
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted
which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to
minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a
need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse
effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of
videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being
acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may
be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of
the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable
to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred
that it is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on
gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the
subject matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to
the VRB, an administrative body, because the law
allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other
government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the
said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are
correct.
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general purpose
which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the
questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the
general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the
video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title.
The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to
that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is
simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms
scattered throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to
the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was
conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to
seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and
implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language
of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the
deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the
direction and control of the [VRB].”
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS MINISTRY
OF LABOR
In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the
Free Telephone Workers Union (the Union) and the
Philippine Long Distance Company. Eventually, the
Minister of Labor (Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction over
the issue pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code. The
Union assailed the provisions of Article 264 as it averred
that it is an undue delegation of power by Congress to
the Minister of Labor. They averred that by granting
discretion to the Minister of Labor to whether or not refer
a labor dispute for compulsory arbitration to the National
Labor Relations Commission, it also effectively granted
the Minister to make or unmake the law on free collective
bargaining.
ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue
delegation of power.
HELD: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for
adjudication as the Minister of Labor was yet to take on
the entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule
that there is an unconstitutional application of the law.
The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation
of legislative power. There could be, however, an
unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution
allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the
exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic
fundamental principle and state policy that the state
should afford protection to labor. But as to whether or not
there is an unconstitutional application of the law, that is
yet to be determined since the Minister of Labor has not
yet made a factual determination of the labor dispute in
issue.
There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in
issue is complete and it set a sufficient standard. The
law cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to
“strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national
interest.”
“insufficient standard”
YNOT VS IAC
Police Power – Not Validly Exercised
There had been an existing law which prohibited the
slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the
law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the
movement of carabaos from inter-provinces but as well
as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was
caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He
was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred
EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be
heard or his right to due process. He said that the
authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate
carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional.
The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a
valid exercise of police power in order to promote general
welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed
violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption
based on the judgment of the executive. The movement
of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot
should be given to defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they can be
confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure
is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
B. S1, Art. VI; congress
C. Composition, qualification and terms of ofc
 a. senate – art. VI s2-4
b. HOR – art. VI, 5-8; Ar.t IX-C, s
6-8; Art. XVIII s7
DIMAPORO VS MITRA
FACTS:
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected
Representative for the Second Legislative District of
Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC
a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional
Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
in the immediately following elections. Upon being
informed of this development by the COMELEC,
respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of
Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll
of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to
Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code
which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for
any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for President and Vice-
President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Having lost in the autonomous region elections,
petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker,
expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties
and functions as elected Member of Congress. He
maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as
congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being
contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the
present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the
term of office of members of the House of
Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the
incumbency of said members may be shortened, are
provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII
thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives and the local officials first
elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of
June 30, 1992," while Section 7, Article VI states: "The
Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election. He asserts that
under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to
these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the
shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground
not provided for in the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have
forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds
another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed.
Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to
holding another office or employment.
ISSUE:
1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881
OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR
THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY
ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER
FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM
FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS
CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
1. The officials running for office other than the ones they
are holding will be considered resigned not because of
abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities
but primarily because under our Constitution, we have
this …chapter on accountability of public officers (both in
the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI
(1987) on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.
Under this commentary on accountability of public
officers, the elective public officers must serve their
principal, the people, not their own personal ambition.
Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the
term of office of elective public officials, this statutory
provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to
ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of
office by discouraging them from running for another
public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by
making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy,
they cannot go back to their former position. This is
consonant with the constitutional edict that all public
officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and
not trifle with the mandate which they have received from
their constituents.
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official
covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for
another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary
renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he
is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his
term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective
upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another
office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered.
Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited
and nothing save a new election or appointment can
restore the ousted official. The law does not make the
forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies,
unforeseen and unforeseeable.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode
of shortening the tenure of office of members of
Congress, does not preclude its application to present
members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides
that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office, on impeachment … All other public officers
and employees may be removed from office as provided
by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional
expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds
found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure
of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive.
The expression in the constitution of the circumstances
which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the
legislature from prescribing other grounds
Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption
in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To
justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-
founded, does not suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and
House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions; It
was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll
considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article
IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated to
the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his
certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim
Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the
clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article
IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to
perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity
of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is
obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all
cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have
not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of
the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a
public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest
and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is
subject to such regulations and conditions as the law
may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions
which public policy may dictate on his office.
NOTES:
- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts
short the term of office of a Member of Congress,
petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office:
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not
be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.),
but the period during which an officer actually holds the
office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within
or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be
shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These
situations will not change the duration of the term of
office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by
which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding
any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or
subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for
disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by
resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest;
and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
QUINTO VS COMELEC
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari,
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing
Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC). They contend that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued
the assailed Resolution. They aver that the advance filing
of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the
purpose of early printing of the official ballots in order to
cope with time limitations. Such advance filing does not
automatically make the person who filed the CoC a
candidate at the moment of filing. Petitioners further posit
that the provision considering them as ipso facto
resigned from office upon the filing of their CoCs is
discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in
the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Are appointed officials considered resigned upon filing of
their certificates of candidacy? Is Section 13 of RA 9369
violative of the equal protection clause?
RULING:
No, to the first question and yes to the second. “ANY
PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE
CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF
THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS
COC.” The said proviso seems to mitigate the situation of
disadvantage afflicting appointive officials by considering
persons who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the
start of the campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit
intent that persons holding appointive positions will only
be considered as resigned at the start of the campaign
period when they are already treated by law as
candidates.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as
ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their
CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil
servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly
discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that
there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts,
does not justify such differential treatment.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court
finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective
ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. There is
thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials
differently from the elective ones. The classification
simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to
the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in
the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the
equal protection clause.
QUINTO VS COMELEC (MR OF 1ST CASE)
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the
Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question
an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the
second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution,
and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, “Any
person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” RA
9369 provides that
“For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline
for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate in the election.
Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within
this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the
start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period:
Provided, finally, That any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active
members of the armed forces, and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his/her office and must vacate the same at the
start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of
candidacy.
Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is violative of the
equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional
Held: No
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require
the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence
here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has
four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these
deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and
fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers
the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of
appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not
germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether
one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the
evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for
excluding elected officials from the operation of the
deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will,
perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of
the people. It involves the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering
that elected officials are put in office by their constituents
for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were
excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned
provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the
sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is
accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served
by such officials until the end of the term for which they
were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation
insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective
officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law.
For the law was made not merely to preserve the
integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service;
the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of
judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with
the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of
deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT
the respondent’s and the intervenors’ Motions for
Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s
December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and
ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not
UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and
(3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
i. Residency/reapportionment/gerrymande
ring
AQUINO VS COMELEC
Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner,
filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new (remember: newly created)
Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his
certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a
resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor.
Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo
Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino
on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which under
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be
for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8,
1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino
amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of
candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on
Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition
on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8
May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won
against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a MR with the Comelec, to which, on
May 15, the latter acted with an order suspending the
proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved
the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found
Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for
lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May
15 and June 2 orders.
Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy
actually connotes “domicile” to warrant
the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the
electoral district.
2. W/N it is proven that Aquino has established domicile
of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the
COC)in the district he was running in.
Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been
understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only
under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was
applied. The place “where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile,
is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers
unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral
gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of
establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election law requirements, this defeats the
essence of representation, which is to place through
assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to
the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short
of the period of residency mandated by law for him to
qualify.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in
the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that
Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of
choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in
the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the
district in which he seeks election to. Aquino’s certificate
of candidacy in a previous (May 11,
1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a
registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for
more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth
certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and
his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the
same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously,
choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in
Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati
City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit
in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent
home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length
of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact
of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other
residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole
purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to
acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify
as a candidate for Representative of the Second District
of Makati City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile
from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion, which is hardly
supported by the facts in the case at bench. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must
prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile,
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.
The Commission on Elections thus rightfully disqualified
Aquino due to his lack of one-year residence in the
district.
CENIZA VS COMELEC
Equal Protection” – Gerrymandering
**”Gerrymandering” is a “term employed to describe an
apportionment of representative districts so contrived as
to give an unfair advantage to the party in power.” **
FACTS: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec
1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which
effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless
otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized
(those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities
(whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial
elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a
component city NOT a chartered one or a highly
urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to
the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections,
Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS
(Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed)
questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the
COMELEC resolution. They said that the
regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a
curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners
claim that political and gerrymandering motives were
behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of
the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the
Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as
an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered
voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the
entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for
the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza
also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified
their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB
885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as
highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its
electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently
and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is
not based on substantial distinctions germane to the
purpose of the law which in effect provides for and
regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and
therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a
denial of equal protection.
ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of equal protection.
W/N there is gerrymandering
HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the
fullest autonomy of local government units. In the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated
“The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of
local government units to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners’
allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no
factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that
the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of
the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio
should be subject to the approval by the majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units
affected is a new requirement that came into being only
with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character
and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of
Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and
component cities on the basis of their regular annual
income is based upon substantial distinction. The
revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable
of existence and development as a relatively independent
social, economic, and political unit. It would also show
whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial
activity as to warrant its independence from the province
where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller
income need the continued support of the provincial
government thus justifying the continued participation of
the voters in the election of provincial officials in some
instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue
City are denied equal protection of the law since the
voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for
provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The
practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote
for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to
voters in another component city is a matter of legislative
discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the
voter’s right of suffrage.
Finally, the petitioners claim that political and
gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of
Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue
City. Gerrymandering” is a “term employed to describe an
apportionment of representative districts so contrived as
to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. The
questioned statutes in this particular case do not
apportion representative districts. The said representative
districts remain the same. Nor has it been shown that
there is an unfair advantage in favor of the candidates of
the party in power. As the Solicitor General pointed out, it
may even be that the majority of the city voters are
supporters of the administration candidates, so that the
enactment of the questioned statutes will work to their
disadvantage.
ii. Party-List Representatives- RA 7941
VETERANS FED PARTY VS COMELEC
Facts: May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list
representation was held simultaneously with the national
elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123)
parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On
June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed
thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12)
parties and organizations, which had obtained at least
two percent of the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives
belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent
of the votes.
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's Progressive
Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with
the COMELEC a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number
of Party-List Representatives provided by the
Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty
percent membership of party-list representatives in the
House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the
literal application of the two percent vote requirement and
the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this
constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be
declared winners, short of the 52 party-list
representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed
their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the
same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially
the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA's Petition was
joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation
they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations were
COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-
KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA,
AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP,
CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division
promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting
PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of
herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already
sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It
held that "at all times, the total number of congressional
seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list
representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded
the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three
"elements of the party-list system," which should
supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled
up”.
Issue: How to determine the winners of the subject party-
list election can be settled by addressing the following
issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In
other words, should the twenty percent allocation for
party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and
the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how
should the additional seats of a qualified party be
determined?
Held: WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially
GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC
are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of
the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives — two
for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12)
qualified parties — are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Ratio: In sum, we hold that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38)
herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions
are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly
violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent
threshold and proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these
statutory provisions, the COMELEC effectively arrogated
unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly
vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to
define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system.
The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions,
absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.
The COMELEC, which is tasked merely to enforce
and administer election-related laws, cannot simply
disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds
of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot
judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such
act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law find
lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.
In view of the party-list system elements per
COMELEC
First, "the system was conceived to enable the
marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be
represented in the House of Representatives." Second,
"the system should represent the broadest sectors of the
Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the]
multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.)
Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent
threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the
party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 . . . should have
at least one representative."
In view of to whom should the seats be given
In the suits, made respondents together with the
COMELEC were the 38 parties, organizations and
coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as
likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought
the proclamation of additional representatives from
each of their parties and organizations, all of which
had obtained at least two percent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo
Order directing the COMELEC "to CEASE and DESIST
from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers
on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming
as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations
and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions at
its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999
Resolution, until further orders from this Court."
In view of the 20% being mandatory
The COMELEC cannot be faulted for the
"incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves
are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of
suffrage, determine who and how many should represent
them.
On the contention that a strict application of the two
percent threshold may result in a "mathematical
impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to
determine whether to adjust or change this percentage
requirement rests in Congress. Our task now, as should
have been the COMELEC's, is not to find fault in the
wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of
clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical
formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within
the context of the actual election process.
In view of the 2% threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations
and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress.
In view of the 2.5% vote equivalent
"MR. MONSOD. . . . We are amenable to
modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our
proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent
of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who
cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half
percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a
constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a
seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two
percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The
average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking
about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many
sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly
because many of them have memberships of over
10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our
proposal.
Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned
according to "the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to
ensure meaningful local representation.
In view of the Three-Seat-Per-Party limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list
system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system
of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner
Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD: …but we also wanted to avoid the
problems of mechanics and operation in the
implementation of a concept that has very serious
shortcomings of classification and of double or triple
votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would
like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why
one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the
number of representatives from any single party that can
sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system.
This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral groups,
or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the
fifty. . . ."
In view of the method of allocating additional seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat
allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the
constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the
three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed
to the method of determining how many party-list seats
the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are
entitled to.
In view of the Niemeyer Formula
Under this formula, the number of additional seats to
which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by
multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated
by the total number of votes obtained by that party and
dividing the product by the total number of votes
garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion
of the resulting product will be the number of additional
seats that the party concerned is entitled to.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for
Germany, finds no application in the Philippine setting,
because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory
character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our
Congress and the Bundestag have threshold
requirements — two percent for us and five for them.
One half of the German Parliament is filled up by
party-list members. More important, there are no seat
limitations, because German law discourages the
proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as
already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to
encourage the promotion of the multiparty system.
In view of the legal and logical formula for the
Philippines
Step One. Rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they each received.
Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its
votes by the total votes cast for all the parties
participating in the system. All parties with at least two
percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each.
Only these parties shall be considered in the computation
of additional seats. The party receiving the highest
number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the
"first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number
of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution
is based on proportional representation, the number of
seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly
exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of
its obtaining the most number of votes.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v.
Gonzales that a fractional membership cannot be
converted into a whole membership of one when it would,
in effect; deprive another party's fractional membership. It
would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation. We said further that "no party
can claim more than what it is entitled to . . ."

In view of the formula for determining additional
seats for the first party
The only basis given by the law is that a party
receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be
entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were
to receive twice the number of votes of the second party,
it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats
and so on.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the
first party is not always entitled to the maximum number
of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the
allotment of more than the total number of available
seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more
parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to
three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats
to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the
maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the
House of Representatives.
However, if the first party received a significantly
higher amount of votes — say, twenty percent — to grant
it the same number of seats as the second party would
violate the statutory mandate of proportional
representation, since a party getting only six percent of
the votes will have an equal number of representatives
as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution,
therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats;
and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in
proportion to those of the first party.
In view of the formula for additional seats of other
qualified parties
Step Three: The next step is to solve for the number
of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation.
In view of the 2% threshold rationale
The rationale for the 2% threshold can thus be
synthesized as follows:
1.To avoid a situation where the candidate will just
use the party-list system as a fallback position;
2.To discourage nuisance candidates or parties,
who are not ready and whose chances are very low, from
participating in the elections;
3.To avoid the reserve seat system by opening up
the system;
4.To encourage the marginalized sectors to
organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the
system;
5.To enable sectoral representatives to rise to the
same majesty as that of the elected representatives in
the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree
their seats in the legislative body either to an outright
constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President
of the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually
proliferate political party groups and those who have not
really been given by the people sufficient basis for them
to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be
able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under
the name of the party-list system; 16 and
7. To ensure that only those with a more or less
substantial following can be represented.
The framers of the Constitution knew that the sectoral
groups suffer from major disadvantages in the
competitive election arena. They sought to remedy this
inequality through an outright constitutional gift of reserve
seats for the first three terms of the sectoral
representatives and no further. Thereafter, they have to
earn their seats through participation in the party-list
system.
In view of the 3-seat limit rationale
The rationale for the 3-seat limit is to distribute party-
list representation to as many party groups as possible.
According to Senator Tolentino, if one party will be
allowed to dominate, then the idea of giving as much as
possible to the marginalized groups may be defeated.
The purpose is to allow as many as possible of the
marginalized groups that would be entitled to
representation to have a seat in Congress, and to have
enough seats left for those who are way below the list.
The party-list system of proportional representation is
based on the Niemeyer formula, embodied in Art. 6(2) of
the German Federal Electoral Law, which provides that,
in determining the number of seats a party is entitled to
have in the Bundestag, seats should be multiplied by the
number of votes obtained by each party and then the
product should be divided by the sum total of the second
votes obtained by all the parties that have polled at least
5 percent of the votes. First, each party receives one seat
for each whole number resulting from the calculation. The
remaining seats are then allocated in the descending
sequence of the decimal fractions. The Niemeyer formula
was adopted in R.A. No. 7941, §11.
Indeed, the goal should be to fill all seats allowed for
party-list representatives, which at present are 52. The
provision thus fixes a ratio of 80 percent district
representatives to 20 percent party-list representatives. If
in fact all seats reserved for party-list representatives are
not filled, that is due to the fact that the law limits parties,
organizations, and coalitions to three (3) seats each. To
maintain this ratio, the entire number of seats for the
party-list system, after deducting the number of seats
initially distributed to the 2 percenters, must be allocated
to them.
I see no legal or logical basis for the majority's fixation
with designating the highest ranking participant as a
"first" party. This procedure, as admitted by the majority,
assumes that the seats to be allocated to the qualified
parties depend on the seats of the so-called first party.
In essence, the majority "formula" amounts simply to
the following prescription: (1) follow the "1 seat for every
2%" rule in allocating seats to the first ranking party only
and (2) with respect to the rest of the 2 percenters, give
each party one (1) seat, unless the first ranking party
gets at least six percent, in which case all 2 percenters
with at least one-half of the votes of the first ranking party
should get an extra seat..
The scheme adopted by the majority will prevent all 2
percenters, which are not the first ranking party, from
obtaining the maximum number of seats. This is so
because, with their votes being proportioned against the
votes of the first ranking party, there will never be an
instance where the additional seats of these parties will
be equivalent to 2. Again, this is contrary to R.A. No.
7941, §11 which contemplates the possibility of more
than one (1) party obtaining the maximum number of
seats allowed by law.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS
COMELEC
Facts:
Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed
before the COMELEC a Petition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.
3785 issued by the COMELEC. This resolution approved
the participation of 154 organizations and parties,
including those impleaded, in the 2001 party list
elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system
was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties,
the none-marginalized or overrepresented.
Issues:
a. Whether or not political parties may participate in the
party-list elections.
b. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to
‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and
organizations.
Held:
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should
be remanded to the COMELEC which will determine,
after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154
parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed
Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941. The resolution of this Court
directed the COMELEC “to refrain proclaiming any
winner” during the last party-list election, shall remain in
force until after the COMELEC have compiled and
reported its compliance.
a. Yes
b. No.
Rationale:
a. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate
in the party-list elections. Under the Constitution and RA
7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are
political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives
may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the
Constitution, political parties may be registered under the
party-list system. For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also
provides for "a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a
"party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties."
b. That political parties may participate in the party-list
elections does not mean, however, that any political party
-- or any organization or group for that matter – may do
so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the
party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA
7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. The
provision on the party-list-system is not self-executory. It
is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance
with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up
to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the
Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was.
BANAT VS COMELEC (APRIL 2009)
586 SCRA 210 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
Legislative Department – Party List System; Proportional
Representation; Proper Computation
Statutory Construction – Rule in Interpreting the
Constitution – Intent of the Framers vs Intent of the
People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs
COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers, made a partial
proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections
which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats,
the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for
legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come
from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List
System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the
total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled
to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2
seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3
seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or
the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans
Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats
even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the
party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being
used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid;
Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a
party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner
at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is
not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule
creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20%
party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or
is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2%
qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would
be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-
lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new
computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD”
portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list
candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of
whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said
elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the
seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat
valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule)
is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for
every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall
be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.
Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall
be not more than 250 members of the lower house.
Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative
districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives.
However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix
the number of the membership of the lower house as in
fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may
deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007
elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence
applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be
55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the
formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷
0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number
of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There
is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists
which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a
seat and those which garnered less than 2% are
disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20
apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats.
Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has
two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a
guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50
parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a
seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will
repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list
seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast
to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of
parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list
seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list
garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a
seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists
garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following
rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according
to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled
to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats
shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
“additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under
the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a
provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the
allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists
which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called
the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The
total number of seats given to these two-percenters are
then deducted from the total available seats for party-
lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2%
each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists
hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer
to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be
used in the second round, particularly, in determining,
first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and
second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did
not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the
process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party
and multiply it against the remaining number of seats.
The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the
additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but
the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest
total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes
cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote
garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so
2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means
it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or
a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got
20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the
3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3
seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their
guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the
remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the
voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to enjoining respondent Commission on Elections
disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, (COMELEC) from implementing the statute.
LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that
House Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate on 7
there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from
December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19
RA 7941 against major political parties from participating
December 2006.On 23 January 2007, less than four
in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not
months before the 14 May 2007 local elections.
qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in
their deliberations deliberately allowed major political
parties to participate in the party-list elections provided
On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-
that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the
sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition
marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his
alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of
separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices,
the Constitution.Petitioner also assails the
explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the
constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA
framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the
9369.According to petitioner, these provisions are of
people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the
questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to
will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of
comply with the provisions of the Constitution.
the country shall participate in the party-list elections.
Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the
Petitioner argues the following:
party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to 1. the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of
ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list poll automation but contains substantial provisions
system. dealing with the manual canvassing of election
BANAT VS COMELEC (JULY 2009) returns.Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38,
Facts: This is a petition for Prohibition with a prayer for and 43are neither embraced in the title nor germane to
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of the subject matter of RA 9369.
preliminary injunction filed by petitioner Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency 2. Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by
(BANAT) Party List (petitioner) assailing the impairing the powers of the Presidential Electoral
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369)and Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET).According to petitioner, under the amended
provisions, Congress as the National Board of
Canvassers for the election of President and Vice
President (Congress), and the COMELECen banc as the
National Board of Canvassers (COMELEC en banc), for
the election of Senatorsmay now entertain pre-
proclamation cases in the election of the President, Vice
President, and Senators.Petitioner concludes that in
entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the
COMELEC en banc undermine the independence and
encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.
3. Section 43 is unconstitutional because it gives the
other prosecuting arms of the government concurrent
power with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute
election offenses.
4. section 34 which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of
the dominant majority and dominant minority parties at
Pon election day.Petitioner argues that this violates the
freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix the
terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair,
equitable and just. Petitioner adds that this is a purely
private contract using private funds which cannot be
regulated by law.
Issue/s:
Whether or not RA 9369 is unconstitutional.
-Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI and
Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution;
-Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the
Constitution
-Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the
Constitution
Ruling: The petition is denied. RA 9369 is constitutional.
1. RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled An Act
Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled An Act
Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an
Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National
or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local
Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency,
Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections,
Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as
Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related
Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes. Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers
the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(BP 881),Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),and other
related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting
transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the
elections.The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by
petitioner deal with amendments to specific provisions of
RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37
and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166,
respectively; and(2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends
Section 265 of BP 881.Therefore, the assailed provisions
are germane to the subject matter ofRA 9369 which is to
amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others.
2. The COMELEC maintains that the amendments
introduced by Section 37 pertain only to the adoption and
application of the procedures on pre-proclamation
controversies in case of any discrepancy,
incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the certificates of
canvass.The COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not
provide that Congress and the COMELEC en bancmay
now entertain pre-proclamation cases for national
elective posts.
3. Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in
the COMELEC the power to investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses, and malpractices.COMELEC has the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations and
prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes the
COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government. In the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the authority of the
COMELEC was subsequently qualified and explained.
4. The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked
the non-impairment clause because this only applies to
previously perfected contracts.In this case, there is no
perfected contact and, therefore, no obligation will be
impaired. Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that
the law is a proper exercise of police power and it will
prevail over a contract.According to the COMELEC, poll
watching is not just an ordinary contract but is an
agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of
votes.The role of poll watchers is vested with public
interest which can be regulated by Congress in the
exercise of its police power.The OSG further argues that
the assurance that the poll watchers will receive fair and
equitable compensation promotes the general
welfare.The OSG also states that this was a reasonable
regulation considering that the dominant majority and
minority parties will secure a copy of the election returns
and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the
polling precincts.
ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC
94 SCRA 477 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
Legislative Department – Party-List System
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong
Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were
disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily
for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized
or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari
against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the
guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court
remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
abandoned some principles established in the two
aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC
must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list
system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties
or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate
in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that
can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party,
and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
“marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-
defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
“marginalized and underrepresented” include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or
that represent those who lack “well-defined political
constituencies,” either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at
least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are
disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s
really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory
prohibition, major political parties can now participate in
the party-list system provided that they do so through
their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit
indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them
to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to
the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those
who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they
were drafting the party-list system provision of the
Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was
their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system, which is
pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice
Puno emphasized that the will of the people should
defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the
people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the
party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized
sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-
list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined
political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. The common denominator however is
that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery –
unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor
candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire
the needed votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for
marginalized representation, then the system itself
unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from
running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list
representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be
noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes,
among others, in its provision for sectoral representation
groups of professionals, which are not per se
economically marginalized but are still qualified as
“marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-
defined political constituencies” as they are ideologically
marginalized.
iii. Vacany
LOZADA VS COMELEC
120 SCRA 337 – Political Law – Vacancy in the
Legislature
Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada together with Romeo Igot filed
a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to
hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim
Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention
on Section 5 (2), Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution which
provides:
In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa
eighteen months or more before a regular election, the
Commission on Election shall call a special election to be
held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to
elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.
COMELEC opposed the petition alleging that 1)
petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they
are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) the
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the
petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan
Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to
hold a special election to fill vacancies in the legislature.
HELD: No. The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is
only to review by certiorari the latter’s decision, orders or
rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C,
Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads:
Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a
copy thereof.
There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court
under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the
aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision
conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court
over the COMELEC.
It is obvious that the holding of special elections in
several regional districts where vacancies exist, would
entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang
Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary appropriation
for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be
subject to mandamus by the courts much less may
COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of
appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding
of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for
the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on
the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC,
even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not
IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive
prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which
may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus.
What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of
the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the
regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.
RA 6645
1. Election
a. Regular election – art. VI s8
b. Special election – art. 6 s9
 2. Salaries, privileges and disqualification
a. Salaries – art. 6 s10; art. 13 s 17
PHILCONSA VS MATHAY
Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former
Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor
of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to
permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in
audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by
RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of
Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in
salary of the Speaker and members of the House of
Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the
preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such
implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec.
10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the
term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part
in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on
December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of
the House who participated in the approval of said
Act expired on December 30, 1965.
Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution
require that not only the term of all the members of the
House but also that of all the Senators who approved the
increase must have fully expired before the increase
becomes effective?
Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting
period before the increased compensation for legislators
becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision
refers to “all members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit,
without distinction or separation between them. This
unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the
provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the
Senators and Representatives that approved the
measure, using the singular form and not the plural,
thereby rendering more evident
the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as
indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use
of the word “term” in the singular, when combined with
the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and
the House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI,
Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is
that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature
that enacted the measure must have expired before the
increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased
compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until
December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of
the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.
LIGOT VS MATHAY
Political Law – Salaries of Representatives – Retirement
Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for
three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year
span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic
Act No. 4134 “fixing the salaries of constitutional officials
and certain other officials of the national government”
was enacted into law and took effect on July 1, 1964. The
salaries of members of Congress (senators and
congressmen) were increased under said Act
from 7,200.00 to 32,000.00 per annum, but the Act
expressly provided that said increases “shall take effect
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”
Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a
claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act No. 186,
section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act No. 4968
which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or
employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least
twenty years of service, the last three years of which are
continuous on the basis therein provided “in case of
employees based on the highest rate received and in
case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided
by law.” The House of Representatives granted his
petition however, Jose Velasco, the then Congress
Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor
General then, Ismael Mathay, also disallowed the same.
The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement
gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which
was not applied to him during his incumbency which
ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held
in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would
become operative only for members of Congress elected
to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should
not have been disallowed, because at the time of his
retirement, the increased salary for members of
Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134)
was already P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement
benefit.
HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed
on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle
way of increasing his compensation during his term of
office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain
directly. Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as he
and other members of Congress similarly situated whose
term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are
concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity
or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of
the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation
and “other emoluments” to their salary as provided by
law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress
whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed
on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution
from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay
them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the
salary beyond that which they were permitted by the
Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As
stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the
similar case of Ligot’s colleague, ex-Congressman
Melanio Singson, “Such a scheme would contravene the
Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result
by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly
what cannot be done directly.”
b. Freedom from arrest- art. 6 s11; RPC
art. 145
MARTINZE VS MORFE
Political Law – The Legislative Department – Immunity
from Arrest under the 1935 Constitution
Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista,
Sr. were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional
Convention. Both were facing criminal prosecutions.
Martinez was charged for falsification of a public
document before the sala of Judge Jesus Morfe. While
Bautista was charged for violation of the Revised Election
Code. The two were later arrested, this is while the
Constitutional Convention was still in session. They now
assail the validity of their arrest. They contend that under
the 1935 Constitution, they are immune from arrest
because the charges upon which they were arrested are
within the immunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are
immune from arrest.
HELD: No. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the
necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise
delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They are
accorded the constitutional immunity of senators and
representatives from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of Congress and in going to and returning from
the same except in cases of treason, felony and
breach of the peace. In the case at bar, the crimes for
which Martinez and Bautista were arrested fall under the
category 0f “breach of peace”. Breach of the peace
covers any offense whether defined by the Revised
Penal Code or any special statute. Therefore, Martinez
and Bautista cannot invoke the privilege from arrest
provision of the Constitution.
NOTE: Under the 1987 Constitution:
A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in Congress or in
any committee thereof.
c. Speech and Debate clause – art. 6 s11
JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG
Political Law – Freedom of Speech and Debate
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang
caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the
Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been
allegedly three operational plans under serious study by
some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian
political strategists. That such strategists have had
collusions with communists and that the Secretary of
Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to
place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have
Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and
that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are
being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was
said to have been published in newspapers of general
circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against
Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against
Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is
libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be
dismissed because he said that as a member of
the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is
covered by the privileged communication rule and that
the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by
privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution
provides “The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony,
and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech
or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any
other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said
expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made,
or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is
in session as well as bills introduced in Congress,
whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or
outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
functions as such at the time of the performance of the
acts in question. Congress was not in session when the
letter was published and at the same time he, himself,
caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that,
in thus causing the communication to be so published, he
was not performing his official duty, either as a member
of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court
the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
OSMENA VS PENDATUN
Political Law – The Legislative Department –
Parliamentary Immunity
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr.
delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the
said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia
and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution
No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to
investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his
speech and that if his allegations were found to be
baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to
disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said
resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that
the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for
speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada
Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the matter and
Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been
violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the
legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before
the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of
Congress. However, it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body whenever his
words and conduct are considered disorderly or
unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s
petition is dismissed.
FLORES VS DRILON
FACTS
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at
Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which
directs the President to appoint a professional manager
as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st
year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City
(Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and
the CEO of the Subic Authority.”
ISSUES
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation
of elective officials to other government posts.
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio
to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an
excepted circumstance.
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing
an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec.
8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may
be appointed to another post.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the
appointing authority of the President.
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per
diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may
have received pursuant to his appointment.
HELD
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso
directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the
Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post
(as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what
the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation
where a local elective official will work for
his appointment in an executive position in government,
and thus neglect his constituents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA
posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor
without need of appointment. The phrase “shall
be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make
the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the
post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the
subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for
example, an elective official who may be appointed to
a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached
to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the
President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA,
he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of
Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of
discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress
clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer,
it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the
President to only one candidate. Such enactment
effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing
power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction
on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that
the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer
during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must
be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse
of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications
where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the
ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains
all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he
may however resign first from his elective post to cast off
the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he
may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as
long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains
ineligible for appointment to another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is
ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and
CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be
sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City,
and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and
void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in
accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to
such benefits.
 e. Duty to disclose – art. 6 s12 and 20; art.
11 s17
3. Internal Govt. of Congress
a. Election of Officers – art. 6 s16 (1)
SANTIAGO VS GUINGONA
During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen.
Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to
the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2,
Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate
President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with
the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other
member of the minority, he was assuming position of
minority leader. He explained that those who had voted
for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only
those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the “minority.” However, senators belonging
to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus,
also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the
minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo
warranto.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not there was an actual violation of the
Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate
minority leader
o Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in
matters of legislative procedure
RULING:
The petition fails.
The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority
The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number
of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total
or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than
half or more than half of any total.” The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause
simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the
votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by
any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the
“majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body. And
there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution
had in mind other than the usual meanings of these
terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the
President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not
vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who
could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or
regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
xxx
Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction
with the larger number of votes,” not necessarily more
than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality.
In contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction with a
smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.”
Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a
whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be
the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But
where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is
not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select
the leader representing all the minorities. In a
government with a multi-party system such as in the
Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves),
there could be several minority parties, one of which has
to be identified by the Comelec as the “dominant minority
party” for purposes of the general elections. In the
prevailing composition of the present Senate, members
either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision
prescribe which of the many minority groups or the
independents or a combination thereof has the right to
select the minority leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in
Congress other than Senate President and House
Speaker
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of
Congress the power “to determine the rules of its
proceedings.” xxx
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the
internal affairs of legislature
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the
positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there
an open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing
the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition
and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence
of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules,
this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine
the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On
grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of
the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to
direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the
words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of
the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must
be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate as well as to implement them, before the
courts may intervene.
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of
procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and
waiver by the body adopting them
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws,
do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they “are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being merely
matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern
to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a
majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power
and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may
deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and
discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of
this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere
and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to
protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the
Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming
regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings
of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a
tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and
judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would
practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for
this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
b. Quorum – id s6 (2)
AVELINO VS CUENCO
Political Law – The Legislative Department – Election of
Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked
his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate
charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino.
He requested to do so on the next session (Feb. 21,
1949). On the next session day however, Avelino
delayed the opening of the session for about two hours.
Upon insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano Cuenco,
Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was
forced to open session. He however, together with his
allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall
Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised
by Tañada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his
allies and they even ruled Tañada and Sanidad, among
others, as being out of order. Avelino’s camp then
moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder.
Sanidad however countered and they requested the said
adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged
his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was
immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas
Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record
— it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of
the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate
President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the
remaining members of the Senate to continue the
session in order not to paralyze the functions of the
Senate. Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver
his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution
(No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President.
This was unanimously approved and was even
recognized by the President of the Philippines the
following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter.
Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the
SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of
the case.
HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they
cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of
the power to elect its own president, which power should
not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.
The SC should abstain in this case because the selection
of the presiding officer affects only the Senators
themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the
petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the
Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case,
what will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under
Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning
session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al)
may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco
et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met
with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be
different had the resolution been approved only by ten or
less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto
was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a
continuation of the morning session (presided by
Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was
there a quorum constituting such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning
session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the
journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in
session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor).
Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the
Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution
declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a
quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members.
Even a majority of all the members constitute “the
House”. There is a difference between a majority of “all
the members of the House” and a majority of “the
House”, the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of
the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a
quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at
least, of the absent members; if one had been so
arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and
Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same
inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one
against and one abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on
March 14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the
SC take cognizance of the case and that they are willing
to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it
be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no
constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected
president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee
senators; one being confined and the other abroad but
this does not change the number of senators nor does it
change the majority which if mathematically construed is
½ + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12.
There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected
unanimously there was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to
assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of
subsequent events which justify its intervention. The
Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majority’s
pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that,
under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the
constitutional requirement in that regard has become a
mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any
new session with a quorum would result in Cuenco’s
election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group,
taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying
to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory
processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to
no avail, because of the Avelino’s persistent efforts to
block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this
reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done
enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution
and that the majority’s ruling is in conformity with
substantial justice and with the requirements of public
interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as
Senate President and the petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that
“the majority of all the members of the National Assembly
constitute a quorum to do business” and the fact that said
provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as
to read “a majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business,” shows the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not
on the number fixed or provided for in the
Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents,
and this must be limited to actual members who are
not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason
of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction
of the house or for other causes which make
attendance of the member concerned impossible,
even through coercive process which each house is
empowered to issue to compel its members to attend
the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the
amendment was intentional or made for some purpose,
and not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of
the words “of all the members” as unnecessary, is
evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the
original Constitution which required “concurrence of two-
thirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel
a member” was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the
present Constitution, so as to require “the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the members of each House”. Therefore,
as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent
from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of
the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were
twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.
c. Rules of proceedings – Id s16(3); Id s21
PACETE VS SEC OF COA
Facts: Feliciano Pacete was appointed by the President
as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He
assumed office on 11 September 1964. His appointment
was made during recess of Congress and was only
submitted to COA in 1965 session and was unanimously
confirmed on 20 May 1965. On 07 February 1966 the
Secretary of Justice advised him to vacate his post on
the ground that his appointment was by-passed. Pacete
clarified the matter with Commission on Appointments.
COA took no action and the Secretary of Justice still
moved to Pacete to vacate his post and withheld his
salaries.
Issue: W/N appointment of petitioner must be confirmed.
Held: Yes. The controlling principle is discussed in the
case of Altarejos vs Molo which interpreted the Rule 21
of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointment.
It held that the mere filing of MR doesn’t have the effect
of setting aside a confirmation. Instead, it only reopen the
appointment and submit it for approval or disapproval of
the majority members of the COA.
Moreover, there’s a distinction between appointments
made during recess of Congress and appointment made
while Congress is in session. When Congress is in
session, presidential nominees can only assume office
once confirmed by the COA. On the other hand, when
the Congress is in recess, the president makes an ad
interim appointment, which takes effect at once until its
disapproved by the COA or next adjournment of the
Congress.
ARROYO VS DE VENECIA
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA
8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are
members of the House of Representatives, charged that
there is violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The
Senate approved it with certain amendments. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile
the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate
versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted
its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep.
Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for
lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the
Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The
interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair
called out for objections to the motion. Then the
Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the
same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was
asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep.
Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.
Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s
motion, the approval of the conference committee report
had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both
Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into
law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because
it was passed in violation of the rules of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent
in character. They are subject to revocation, modification
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere
failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of
members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is
subject to qualification. Where the construction to be
given to a rule affects person other than members of the
legislative body, the question presented is necessarily
judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question
in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved
but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the
Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal
procedure of the House with which the Court should not
be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum
but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already
been defeated, as the roll call established the existence
of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously
present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.
OSMENA VS PENDATUM (supra)
ABAKADA VS ERMITA
Facts:
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4,
5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a
uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the
VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of
the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006,
raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%),
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds
two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP
of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1
½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it
constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section
28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further
argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of
goods and services and cannot be included within the
purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since
this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon
merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods. They also said that the
President has powers to cause, influence or create the
conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions
precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding
standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of
Finance will make the recommendation. They claim,
nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President
since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such
that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to
impose the increased tax rate or not.
Issue: W/N RA 9337 is unconstitutional
Held: No. There is no undue delegation of legislative
power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does
not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when
it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and
what is the scope of his authority; in our complex
economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.
In the same breadth, the Court reiterates its finding that
its not a property or a property right, and a VAT-
registered person’s entitlement to the creditable input tax
is a mere statutory privilege. As the Court stated in its
decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere
creation of law. More importantly, the assailed provisions
of RA 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom.
So long as there is a public end for which RA 9337 was
passed, the means thru which such end shall be
accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it
is within the constitutional bounds.
MR denied and TRO lifted.
d. Power over members and right to sit
VERA VS AVELINO
The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to
the President and the Congress a report regarding
the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by
reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence
in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija,
Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not
reflect the accurate feedback of the local electorate.
During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum
resolution was approved referring to the report ordering
that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero –
who had been included among the 16 candidates for
senator receiving the highest number of votes and as
proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall not
be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber,
pending the termination of the protest filed against their
election.
Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against
their colleagues who instituted the resolution, praying for
its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats
and to exercise their senatorial duties. Respondents
assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.
Issues of the Case:
Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the
jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the
said provinces are valid.
Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting
of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero
should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the
protests lodged against their elections.
Held:
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the
concept of separation of powers, holding that the case
was not a “contest”, and affirmed that it is the inherent
right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted
to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the
Constitution, the question raised was political in nature
and therefore not under the juridical review of the courts.
The case is therefore dismissed.
e. Discipline of members- Id s16(3)
ALEJANDRINO VS QUEZON
Facts:
On 5 January 1924, the Philippine Senate composed of
respondent Senators, including Senate President Manuel
L. Quezon, issued a resolution depriving petitioner,
Senator Jose Alejandrino Senator for the Twelfth District,
of all the prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of his
office for the period of one year from the first of January
1924, having found the petitioner guilty of disorderly
conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the
Senate for having treacherously assaulted Vince de
Vera, Senator for the Sixth District, on the occasion of
certain phrases being uttered by the latter in the course
of the debate regarding the credentials of Senator
Alejandrino.
Alejandrino contests the resolution, claiming the same to
be unconstitutional, praying to the Supreme Court (1) to
issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents
enjoining them from executing the resolution;(2) to
declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and
void; and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue
a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the
respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the
petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he
enjoy all of his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments,
and prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner from
exercising the rights of his office, and from carrying the
order of suspension into effect.
Respondents, through the Attorney General, objects,
claiming the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction therein.
Issue:
WON the Supreme Court has the power to annul the
Resolution made by the Philippine Senate against
Senator Alejandrino.
Held:
NO. Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch
thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their
legislative powers by any judicial process. The court
accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and
the demurrer must be sustained. As it is unlikely that the
petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it
must be dismissed.
Osmena vs Pendatum (supra)
SANTIAGO VS SB
Political Law – The Legislative Department – Suspension
of a Member of Congress – Violations of RA 3019
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the
then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (CID), approved the application for
legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was
said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran
counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a
violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the
legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by
Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified.
Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago.
Pursuant to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a
presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant
of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for
provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a
car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was
filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of
Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda)
to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order
suspension of a member of the Senate without violating
the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. It is true that the Constitution provides that
each “… house may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property
whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should
he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
Here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is
distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own
ranks under the Constitution. The suspension
contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a
punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by
the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may be,
upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is
not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of
the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its
coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore,
the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still
the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a
senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that
the public officer concerned must be suspended only in
the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts
with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held
that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it
applies to any office which the officer charged may be
holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime,
can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused
must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding
before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it
contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength
of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity
of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his
continuance in office could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records
another evidence before the court could have a valid
basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the
trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or
regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that
he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary
investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not
constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory
suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act
No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on
any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the
Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.
f. Journal and Congressional records- art.
6 s16(4)
1. The Enrolled Bill Theory
MABANAG VS VITO
Political Law – Journal – Adoption of the Enrolled Bill
Theory
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The
3 senators were suspended by senate due to election
irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to
take their seat in the lower House except in the election
of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators
and House Reps were not considered in determining the
required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the
Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) –
which has been considered as an enrolled bill by
then. At the same time, the votes were already entered
into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the
Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise
were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress
had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of
Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the
furtherance of the said resolution amending the
constitution. Respondents argued that the SC can’t take
cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by
the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: W/N the Court can take cognizance of the issue
at bar. W/N the said resolution was duly enacted by
Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned,
even if both the journals from each House and an
authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the
disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the
journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory,
for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be
proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313
of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals
no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did
not bother itself with considering the effects of an
authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not
do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness
advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the
enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the
latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and
the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No
discrepancy appears to have been noted between the
two documents and the court did not say or so much as
give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would
give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the
explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the
due enactment thereof.”
**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced,
finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper
officers of each, approved by the president and filed by
the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190),
as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official
documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the
proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislatives body that may be provided for in the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk
of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in
the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a
copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of
said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions
of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly
authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the
legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an
enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.
CASCO (PHIL) CHEMICAL CO. VS GIMENEZ
Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Enrolled
Bill
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was
engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used
primarily in the production of plywood. The main
components of the said glue are urea and
formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad.
Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid the
required margin fee for its imported urea and
formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest as it
maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt
transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it issued
vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted
to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied
the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and
formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components
are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea
formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining
urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of
Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant
to the provision of section one hereof shall not be
imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the
importation of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of
plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term “urea
formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be
construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. It further
contends that the bill approved in Congress contained
the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms
“urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the members of
Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde”
separately as essential elements in the manufacture of
the synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not
the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view
the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during
the consideration of the bill before said House, by
members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term “urea
formaldehyde”
ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde”
should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”.
HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution.
It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product
from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under
certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and
time of reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a
finished product, which is patently distinct and
different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, as
separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic
resin known as “urea formaldehyde”.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress
during the deliberation of the said law/bill do not
represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is
printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon
the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses the term
“urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde”
— is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of
the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress
and approved by the Executive — on which the SC
cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is
by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.
FARINAS VS EXEC SEC
Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative
Department – How a Bill Becomes a Law – Bicameral
Conference Committee – Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Equal Protection Clause – Valid Classification
Election Law – Appointive Officials vs Elective Officials
In 2001, Republic Act No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act
was signed into law. Section 14 thereof repealed Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code which states that an
elective official, except the President and the Vice-
President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Hence, under RA 9006, an elective official shall no longer
be deemed resigned if he files his certificate of candidacy
for an elective office while he is still in office.
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides
that an appointive official hall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy, was however retained by the Fair Election
Act.
Rodolfo Fariñas, then a Congressman belonging to the
minority group, questioned the constitutionality of Section
14 on the ground that it violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. He averred that the repeal of
Section 67 gave elective officials undue advantage over
appointive officials (discrimination).
The Fariñas group also questioned the validity of RA
9006 in its entirety. They contend that irregularities
attended to the creation of the said law. Fariñas
explained that RA 9006 originated as House Bill No.
9000 and Senate Bill No. 1741; that there were
contrasting provisions between the two bills hence a
Bicameral Conference Committee was created; that in
fact two subsequent BCCs were convened which is
irregular already in itself; that only the 1st BCC had its
record and the compromise bill from said 1st BCC was
never subjected to a conference with the lower house;
that in the 2nd BCC, it appeared that another
compromised bill was agreed upon even though there
was no meeting at all and that the Report as to how said
compromise bill was reached was instantly made and
made to be passed around for signing – all these
irregularities made the law unconstitutional for being
procedurally infirm.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 is
constitutional.
HELD: Yes, RA 9006 is constitutional.
On Equal Protection
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution
is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.
If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from the other.
In this case, substantial distinctions clearly exist between
elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security
of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. Further, appointive officials, as
officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly
prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity
or take part in any election except to vote; while elective
officials, or officers or employees holding political offices,
are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political
and electoral activities.
On the Enrolled Bill Doctrine
The contention that irregularities attended the creation of
RA 9006 is overridden by the enrolled bill doctrine. Under
this doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the
House and the Senate President and the certification of
the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The
Supreme Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of the internal rules of Congress, whether
House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern. Whatever irregularities there may have been in
the Bicameral Conference Committee involve internal
rules which cannot be inquired into by the Court.
2. Probative value of the journal
UNITED STATES VS PONS
Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Journals
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On
April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in
Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine.
The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso
subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the
other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said
25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to
any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the
customs officers conducted an investigation thereby
discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained
tins of opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium
is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged
for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing
such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons
appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was
approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress)
was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that
the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914
while the special session of the Commission was
adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is
the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the
recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was
indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the
date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the
recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are
conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of
the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are,
as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to
violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by
which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons’
witnesses cannot be given due weight against the
conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the
legislature. The journals say that the Legislature
adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This
settles the question, and the court did not err in declining
to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
3. Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory
ASTORGA VS VILLEGAS
Political Law – The Legislative Department – Journal;
When to be Consulted
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued
circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of
the city government as well as to the owners, operators
and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to
disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He
likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall
five members of the city police force who had been
assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga
(assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas.
He then filed a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or
Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the members of
the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA
4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied
recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers,
Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila)
because the said law was considered to have never been
enacted. When the this said “law” passed the 3 rd reading
in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to
the Senate which referred it to the Committee on
Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed
by then Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were
made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor
for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen.
Tolentino made significant amendments which were
subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then
sent back to the lower house and was thereafter
approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the President
for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found
out however that the copy signed by the Senate
President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent
to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was
in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It
was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as
validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the
Senate president and the President of the Philippines
withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed
on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding
and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does
not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that
the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House
of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not
authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting
and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this
case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text
of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the
same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under
the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC
can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and
lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note
however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such
amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that
the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become law. As done by both the President of the
Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew
their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the
bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never
made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding
such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has
become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring
about mischievous consequences not intended by the
law-making body.
MORALES VS SUBIDO
Political Law – The Legislative Department – Journals vs
Enrolled Bill
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police
department of a city for at least three years but does not
possess a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of
detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and
holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career
in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present
position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief,
Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila
and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to
the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo
Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the
designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his
appointment for “failure to meet the minimum educational
and civil service eligibility requirements for the said
position.” Instead, Subido certified other persons as
qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the
Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police
Agency. – No person may be appointed chief of a city
police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from
a recognized institution of learning and has served either
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National
Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police
with exemplary record, or has served in the police
department of any city with rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high
school graduate who has served as officer in the
Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a
person “who has served the police department of a city
…” can be qualified for said office. Morales however
argued that when the said act was being deliberated
upon, the approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency
unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served
either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
National Bureau of Investigation or police department of
any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years or any high school
graduate who has served the police department of a
city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for
at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one
which was actually approved by Congress but when the
bill emerged from the conference committee the only
change made in the provision was the insertion of the
phrase “or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record.” Morales went on to support his case
by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a
memorandum which according to him was signed by an
employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found
attached to the page proofs of the then bill being
deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the
history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to
look searchingly into the matter.
HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the
legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines
shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as
officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing.
The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover
what really happened. The respect due to the other
branches of the Government demands that the SC act
upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said
branches attest to as the official acts of their respective
departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the
unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to
determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of
lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of
the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that
in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To
be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution
expressly requires must be entered on the journal of
each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative
act may be affected by a failure to have such matters
entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can
decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the
case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the
SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly
required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill
prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
4. Congressional record art VI s. 16(4) par.2
g. Sessions- art. VI s15 and 16(5); art. VII s10-11 and 18
par. 3
4.Electoral Tribunals- art. VI s 17 & 19
a. composition
TANADA V CUENCA
ABBAS V SET
166 SCRA 651 – Political Law – The Legislative
Department – Electoral Tribunals – Inhibition in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the
SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in
the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the
COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three
(3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators.
Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6
senator members from partaking in the said election
protest on the ground that all of them are interested
parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of
public policy and the norms of fair play and due process
imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To
accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas
suggested the following amendment: Tribunal’s Rules
(Section 24) —- requiring the concurrence of five (5)
members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever
nature —- is a proviso that where more than four (4)
members are disqualified, the remaining members shall
constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including
one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority
vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the
situation created by the petition for disqualification, this
would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution
of the contest to the only three Members who would
remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is
not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given
due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal
lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself
which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its
jurisdiction and powers.
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.”
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by
both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the
Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and
“legislative” components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative
component herein cannot be totally excluded from
participation in the resolution of senatorial election
contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of
the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying
that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case
before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may,
as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in
the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his
personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is
that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally
function as such; absent its entire membership of
Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer
on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
b. nature of function
ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMM
63 Phil. 139 – Political Law – Judicial Review – Electoral
Commission
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted
for the position of member of the National Assembly for
the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7,
1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA
for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his
oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session
assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the
election of the members of the National Assembly
against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec
8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a
“Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On
Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which
fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to
Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation,
Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by
claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC
can take cognizance of the election protest and that the
EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over
such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC
emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only
constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the
conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review
in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is
the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency
of the government transcends the Constitution, which is
the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers and functions
to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
classification to the legislative than to any of the other
two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly.
c. Independence of ET
BONDOC V PINEDA
201 SCRA 792 – Political Law – HRET – Removal of a
Member
Separation of Powers
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a
Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga.
Pineda was a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the
Nacionalista Party (NP). Pineda won in that election.
However, Bondoc contested the result in the HRET
(House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc
won in the protest and he was subsequently declared as
the winner by the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman
Juanito Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP
confessed to Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that
he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member
of the NP. He confessed that he believed in his
conscience that Bondoc truly won the election. This
resulted to Camasura’s expulsion from the LDP. Pineda
then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the
HRET. They further prayed that a new election be held
and that the new LDP representative be appointed in the
HRET. This new representative will be voting for Pineda
in the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was
then removed by HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina
Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before
the Supreme Court (SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because Camasura’s
removal is an official act of Congress and by virtue of the
doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not
interfere.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire
upon the validity of the said act of the HRET without
violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the
case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the
legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue
here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is
being complained of is the act of HRET not the act of
Congress. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the
tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of
the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral
contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc
won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from
the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a
decision. They cannot hold the same election since the
issue has already become moot and academic. LDP is
merely changing their representative to change the
outcome of the election. Camasura should be reinstated
because his removal was not due to a lawful or valid
cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for
termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of
Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming
from the SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP). And
1 coming from the minority.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of their respective
members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.”
DAZA V SINGSON
Tribunal and its Composition
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was
reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the
lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the
Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat
occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new
LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set
of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the
original members except Daza who was replaced by
Singson. Daza questioned such replacement.
ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political
realignment validly changes the composition of the
Commission on Appointments.
HELD: As provided in the constitution, “there should be a
Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve
Senators and twelve members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House respectively on
the basis of proportional representation” of the political
parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of
each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement
is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial organization of the
Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the
court. Furthermore, the House is clothed with authority
to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in
the Commission on Appointments held by members
of said House belonging to the political party
adversely affected by the change and then fill said
vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.
COSETENG V MITRA
Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to
the House of Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to
Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the
Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal –
a request backed by nine congressmen.
Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced
Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA and
later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member,
representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a
party, prompting the revision of the House majority
membership in CA due to political realignments and the
replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).
Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA
filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered
as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that
the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan,
Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on
the theory that their election violated the constitutional
mandate of proportional representation because the New
Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members
must be nominated and elected by their parties. She
further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA
because of the support of 9 other congressmen from the
Minority.
The respondent contends that the issue of CA
reorganization was a political question, hence outside the
jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the
“proportional representation” clause in Art VI of the
Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the Majority
decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.
Issue:
W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of
proportional representation.
Held:
Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not
because issue raised was a political question but
because revision in House representation in
CA wasbased on proportional representation.
The composition of the House membership shows that
there are 160 LDP members in the House, comprising
79% of the House membership. This granted them a
rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two
to LP and KBL as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being
a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the
majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party,
its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the
House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a
seat in the 12 House seats in CA.
Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are
inconsequential because they are not members of her
party and they signed identical endorsements for her
rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA
members should have been nominated and elected by
their parties because of members were nominated by
their floor leaders and elected by the House.
Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled
in Daza vs Singson in that the Constitution conferred the
Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by the other government
branches.
2.Powers of Congress
a. general plenary powers- art. VI s1
ARNAULT V NAZARENO
Inquiry in Aid of Legislation
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the
acquisition by the Philippine Government of the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949.
Among the witnesses called to be examined by the
special committee created by a Senate resolution was
Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the
purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During
the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the
identity of said representative, at the same time invoking
his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The
Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the
custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned “until he
shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the
Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in
connection therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a writ of
Habeas Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those
who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional
hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose
penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid
of legislation. But it must be herein established that a
witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee
may be detained during the term of the members
imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too
long as to violate the witness’ right to due process of law.
b. limitations on the legislative power
1) substantive limitations
a) express substantive limitations;
b)implied substantive limitations
1. prohibition against delegation of legislative
power
2. prohibition against passage of irrepealable laws
2) procedural limitations
c. power of inquiry v. question hour- art. 6 s22
SENETA OF THE PHIL V ERMITA
495 SCRA 170 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
Legislative Branch – Question Hour – Constitutionality of
E.O. 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions
about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes
surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public
hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the
alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate
committee issued invitations to certain department heads
and military officials to speak before the committee as
resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of
the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due
to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP
Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon,
the senate president, excepted the said requests for they
were sent belatedly and arrangements were already
made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO
464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior
officials of executive departments who in the judgment of
the department heads are covered by the executive
privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the
executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP)
officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and
such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior
national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined
by the President, from appearing in such hearings
conducted by Congress without first securing the
president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were
invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to
except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled
hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring
military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and
were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s
constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part.
To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the
SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of
Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of
inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI
of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In
other words, the power of inquiry – with process to
enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information – which is not infrequently true – recourse
must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question
Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to
or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The
appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very,
very essential not only in the application of check and
balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22
refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would
refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under
which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if
he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A
distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was
meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21
and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered
as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that
may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to
the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to
compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their
basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
information. When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they
are department heads. Only one executive official may
be exempted from this power — the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It
is based on her being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal
branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-
standing custom. The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only
to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its
face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution,
the appearance of department heads in the question hour
is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however,
be applied to appearances of department heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in
such instances to respect the refusal of the department
head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of
privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it
has issued, its right to such information is not as
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of
their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers,
states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress
requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under
Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same
reasons stated in Arnault.
d. legislative investigations- art. 6 ss21
ARNAULT V NAZARENO, supra
ARNAULT V BALAGTAS
Topic: Legislative investigation; may Senate hold a
person in contempt as a punitive measure.
FACTS:
This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean
Arnault against the Director of Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault
was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate
finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the
name of a person with whom he transacted business in
relation to a government purchase of of the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates. The circumstances of Arnault's
incarceration are described in the companion
case Arnaultvs. Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the
Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for
defying or refusing to comply with an order in a legislative
inquiry.
Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with
one Jess D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista and
Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry, the Senate,
obviously not satisfied with Arnault's explanations,
adopted Resolution No. 114. The title of the resolution
states:
RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL,
AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO
CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS
CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION
AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA,
RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE
PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.
xxx
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation
of the said Jean L. Arnault has not materially changed
since he was committed to prison for contempt of the
Senate, and since the Supreme Court of the Philippines,
in a judgment long since become final, upheld the power
and authority of the Senate to hold the said Jean L.
Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement, said
power and authority having been held to be coercive
rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said Jean
L. Arnault should have given the information which he
had withheld and continues contumaciously to withhold;
WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful
statements made by the said Jean L. Arnault on the
occasions above referred to constitute a continuing
contempt of the Senate, and an added affront to its
dignity and authority, such that , were they to be
condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of the
Senate to conduct investigations would become futile and
ineffectual because they could be defied by any person
of sufficient stubbornness and malice;
xxx
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Petitioner
Arnault and ordered his release.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner may be released from his Senate-
imposed incarceration.
1. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the
findings of the Senate.
2. Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in
contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive rather
than as a coercive measure.
HELD:
YES. The Senate may continue to keep Petitioner
incarcerated.
3. NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the
right to review the findings of the Senate. In the
above quoted resolution, the Senate in stating that
petitioner “has failed and refused, and continues to
fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he
gave the amount of P440,000” and that the
situation of petitioner “has not materially charged
since he was committed to prison”, clearly shows
that the Senate believes that Arnault was still
 trying to deceive them. The CFI on the other hand
arrogated unto itself to review such finding and
held that Arnault satisfactorily answered the
questions of the Senate in its investigation of the
Buenavista and Tambobong deal.
There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of
action that the lower court followed. It assumed that
courts have the right to review the findings of legislative
bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or
interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what
is known as the legislative process. The Judicial
department has no right or power or authority to do this,
in the same manner that the legislative department may
not invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth
and in the application and interpretation of the law, in
what is known as the judicial process, because that
would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle
of separation of powers established by the
Constitution. The only instances when judicial
intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there
has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or
when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the
legislative discretion.
4. YES. The legislature may hold a person in
contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive
measure.
Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the
confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce
the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident
that the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in
fact partly punitive. This may be inferred from the
confining made in the resolution that petitioner’s acts
were arrogant and contumacious and constituted an
affront to the Senate’s dignity and authority.
The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses. This power is founded upon reason and
policy. Said power must be considered implied or
incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or
necessary to effectuate said power. How could a
legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on
which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and
compel the disclosure of such knowledge and
information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its
power and authority? The legislative department should
not be constrained to look to the courts whenever for
every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of
contumacy with which it is faced.
The exercise of the legislature’s authority to deal with the
defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme
and is not subject to judicial interference, except when
there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion
and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the
reach of constitutional limitations.

The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is,
reversed, and the petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing
the petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the
petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to the
custody of the respondent. With cost against the
petitioner-appellee.
BENGZON V SBRC
203 SCRA 767 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The
Legislative Department – Inquiry in Aid of Legislation – When not
Allowed
It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his
wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly
enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino
people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon
Law Office and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother in law,
among others, control over some of the biggest business
enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI
Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining
Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a
privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various
government owned corporations which is in violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the
speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The
motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After
committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the
committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil
case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his
right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile
categorically denying his allegations and that his
allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s
privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry
regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and
Bengzon’s plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is
poised to subpoena them and require their attendance
and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear
and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to
their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury,
and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer
for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief
against the SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC
be granted.
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The
speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA
No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the
inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee
was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory,
particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with
the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to
Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be,
therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the
contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of
legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within
the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of
the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5
of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of
the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the
Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died
during the pendency of this case.
Furthermore, It can’t be overlooked that when SRBC
decide to conduct its investigation of the P, the complaint
had already been filed with the SB. A perusal of that
complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action
against herein P, as defendants therein, is the alleged
sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint
had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's
respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be
investigated by the SRBC is one over which jurisdiction
had been acquired by the SB. In short, the issue had
been pre-empted by that court. To allow the SRBC to
conduct its own investigation of an issue already before
the SB would not only pose the possibility of conflicting
judgments between a legislative commitee and a judicial
tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be
reached before that of the SB, the possibility of its
influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of
the SB can not be discounted.
e. act as Board of canvassers for Pres and VP election-
art. 7 s4 p4; ra7166.
f. call special election for P and VP- art. 7 s10
g. revoke/extend suspension of privilege of HC and
declaration of ML- art. 7 s18
h. approve P amnesties- art. 7 s19
i. confirm certain appointments- art. 7 s9 (by congress;
id., s16 (by COA)
j. concur in treaties- art. 7 s21 (thru the senate)
k. declaration of war and delegation of emergency
powers- art. 6 s23
ARANETA V DINGLASAN
84 Phil. 368 – Political Law – First Emergency Powers Cases
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating
of Executive Order 62 which regulates rentals for houses
and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan
was the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed
seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from
proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was
issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671
which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no
legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-
3055 which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe
exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the
Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the
treasury from disbursing funds [from ’49-‘50] pursuant to
EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226
which was appropriating funds to hold the national
elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT
DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A
RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH
EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is
already inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to
said CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers
to the president, became inoperative ex proprio
vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25,
1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and
226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the
first regular session of Congress instead of the first
special session which preceded it as the point of
expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the
purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a
special session, the Congress may “consider general
legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may
designate.” Such acts were to be good only up to the
corresponding dates of adjournment of the following
sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or
repealed by the National Assembly.” Even if war
continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and
approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is
lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.
RODRIGUEZ V GELLA
92 Phil. 603 – Political Law – Second Emergency Powers Cases
Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive
Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first
appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and
essential public works, and the second setting aside the
sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities
visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes,
volcanic action and other calamities. They sought to have
Vicente Gella, then National Treasurer, be enjoined from
releasing funds pursuant to said EOs. These EO’s were
pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior
to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill
727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed
by the President due to the Korean War and his
perception that war is still subsisting as a fact. Note also
that CA 671 was already declared inoperative by the
Supreme Court in the same case of Araneta vs
Dinglasan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EO’s are valid.
HELD: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the
EO’s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered
ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual
emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world
war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such
invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit
for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the
war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president
vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be
given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend
otherwise. For “while Congress might delegate its power
by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them
except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be
easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take
them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to
be the law.” Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary
contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is
necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled
to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal
cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the
will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the
agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.
l. be judge of the Pres’ physical fitness- art. 7 s11 p4
m. power of impeachment
ROMULO V YNIGUEZ
Petitioners representing more than 1/5 of all members of
the Batasan, filed Resolution No. 644, calling for the
impeachment of President Marcos together with a
verified complaint by impeachment. Said resolution and
complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government
(CJHRGG). The committee found the complaint not
sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further
consideration and disapproved the Resolution and
dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint
attached. It then submitted its report which was duly
noted by the Batasan and sent to the Archives. The next
day, Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the
recall from the archives of RN 644 and the verified
complaint attached thereto. Said motion
was disapproved by the Batasan. The present petition
was then filed with the Court praying that pertinent
provisions of the Batasan Rules granting power to the
Batasan to determine whether an impeachment
complaint is sufficient and its power to approve of deny
such complaint be declared unconstitutional. They also
pray that dismissal by the CJHRGG of RN 644 and the
impeachment complaint attached thereto be declared null
and void. It is the petitioner’s contention that said
provisions of the Batasan Rules are unconstitutional
because they amend Sec. 3 of Art XIII of the 1973
Constitution, without complying with the amendatory
process provided in the Constitution. Further, the said
provisions vest with the CJHRGG the power to decide
whether to impeach or not, which should be decided by
the Batasan as a collegiate body and not by a small body
of the Batasan. They also content that the Batasan Rules
impose an unconstitutional and illegal condition
precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment
can proceed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a
majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for
the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of
Impeachment, the Rules impose at least 1/5 of all the
members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment
proceedings.
ISSUEs
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to order CJHRGG to
recall from the Archives and report out the resolution and
complaint for impeachment?
2. Can the Court, assuming that the resolution and
complaint for impeachment are recalled from
the Archives, order the Batasan to conduct a trial on the
charges of the complaint?
3. Are the assailed provisions unconstitutional?
HELD
No, to all three counts. When the Batasan denied the
motion of Mitra for the recall from the Archives of RN 644
and the complaint for impeachment, it, in effect,
confirmed the action of the CJHRGG dismissing said
complaint and resolution. The Constitution provides that
no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of
at least 2/3 votes of its members. In this case, a majority
vote of all the members of the Batasan confirming the
action of the CHRGG makes mathematically impossible
the required vote for conviction of at least 2/3 of all the
members. It would serve no purpose to proceedany
further when it is obvious that the require 2/3 vote for
conviction cannot be obtained. Dismissal of the
impeachment proceedings would then be in order. A
dismissal by the Batasan itself (as a body) of the
resolution and complaint for impeachment – as in the
dismissal of Mitra’s motion in the case – makes irrelevant
under what authority the CJHRGG had acted. The
dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan
of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan
as a body in the exercise of the powers vested upon it by
the Constitution beyond the power of the court to review.
The court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the
impeachment trial prayed for by the petitioners. To order
the CJHRGG to recall from the Archives the complaint
and resolution would produce the effect of ordering the
Batasan to proceed with the impeachments proceedings.
This, the court cannot do. The assailed provisions are
constitutional. The Batasan, pursuant to its powers
to adopt rules of its proceeding, may adopt necessary
rules of procedure to govern impeachment proceedings.
The Batasan Rules of Procedure in impeachment cases
providing for the dismissal of an impeachment complaint
which is not sufficient in form and substance, or when
sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, or
probable cause has not been established, or requiring
majority vote of all members of the Batasan for
the approval of a resolution setting forth the Articles of
Impeachment, are not inconsistent with Sec. 3 of Art. XIII
of the 1973 Consti. Injunction cannot lie to restrain the
enforcement of the particular provisions of the Rules
(aside from the fact that the question involved is a
political one), because the acts of the committee sought
to be restrained had already been consummated. They
are fait accompli.
LECAROZ V SB
Held: The information against petitioner was filed in 1980;
therefore, respondent court retains jurisdiction over the
case subject of instant petition.
The broad power of the New Constitution vests the
respondent court with jurisdiction over "public officers and
employees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations." There are exceptions, however,
like constitutional officers, particularly those declared to
be removed by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of
the 1973 Constitution provides:
"SEC. 2. The President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, and the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions shall be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or
graft and corruption."
Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office
of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other
method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be
removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally
while holding his office with an offense that carries the
penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the
clear mandate of the fundamental law.
n. power w/ regard to utilization of natural resources- art.
12 s2
o. amendment of the Consti- art. 17 s1-2.
3. legislative process
a. req. as to bills
(1) as to titles of bills- art. 6 s26(1)
DELA CRUZ V PARAS
Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title – Police Power Not Validly
Exercise
Facts:
1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit
the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that
the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the
municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful
business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same
time alleging that their rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws were violated as the licenses
previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without
judicial hearing.

2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20,
1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City
Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the
Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain
Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial
Jurisdictions.'
The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or
council of each chartered city shall have the power to
regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance
and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools,
pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard
pools, and other similar places of amusement within its
territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to
include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise
"Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is
worded exactly as RA 938.
3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was
considered, a municipal council may go as far as to
prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in
any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact
wording was followed. The power granted remains that
of regulation, not prohibition.
4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the
operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional
question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and
validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases.
Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid
NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a
measure not embraced within the regulatory power but
an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
"Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to
regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute
being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of
Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited.
There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory
power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of
the Administrative Code, such competence extending to
all "the great public needs.
2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that between two possible
interpretations by one of which it will be free from
constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such
grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction
that would save rather than one that would affix the seal
of doom certainly commends itself.
3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal
corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs.
 They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying
on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in
futility if the decision under review were sustained. All
that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more
for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant
licenses, because no such businesses could legally
open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to
comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and
continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate
regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to
close their establishments, the necessary result of an
affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary
termination of their business.
4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced
within the regulatory power but an exercise of an
assumed power to prohibit.
LIDASAN V COMELEC
21 SCRA 496 – Political Law – Effect if Title Does Not Completely
Express the Subject
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later,
Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Sur,” was passed. Lidasan however discovered that
certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in
Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA
4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato
voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law,
COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter
registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan
then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being
unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly
indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be
including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which
includes barrios located in another province – Cotabato –
to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional
mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill”?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the
defective title here presented is not so difficult to
perceive. Such title did not inform the members of
Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part
of their territory is being taken away from their towns and
province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao
del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns
and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even
a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out
later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province.
These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of RA 4790.
TIO V VRB
151 SCRA 208 – Political Law – The Embrace of Only One Subject
by a Bill
Delegation of Power – Delegation to Administrative Bodies
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted
which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to
minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a
need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse
effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of
videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being
acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may
be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of
the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable
to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred
that it is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on
gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the
subject matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to
the VRB, an administrative body, because the law
allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other
government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the
said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are
correct.
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general purpose
which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the
questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the
general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the
video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title.
The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to
that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is
simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms
scattered throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to
the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was
conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to
seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and
implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language
of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the
deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the
direction and control of the [VRB].”
INSULAR LUMBER V CTA
104 SCRA 710 – Political Law – One Subject Embraced in the Title
of a Bill
Insular Lumber Company (ILC) is an American company
engaged as a licensed forest concessionaire. The ILC
purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used
in the operation of its forest concession. In 1956,
Republic Act No. 1435 was passed. Section 5 thereof
provides that there should be a partial tax refund to those
using oil in the operation of forest and mining
concessions.
In 1964, ILC filed with the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) to have a tax refund of P19,921.37
pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) ruled that ILC is not covered by such provision
because Sec. 5, RA 1435 is only effective 5 years from
its enactment. Hence, in 1961 the provision ceased to be
effective. ILC appealed the issue to the CTA and the CTA
ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the
operation of a forest concession, hence, the refund
provision of Sec 5, RA 1435 allowing partial refund to
forest and mining concessionaires cannot be extended to
the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19,921.37
claimed, only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil
utilized in logging operations. The CTA did not allow the
refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because the
ILC’s right to claim the refund of a portion thereof,
particularly those paid during the period from January 1,
1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence,
ICL was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both
parties appealed from the decision of the CTA.
The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this
way: The title of RA 1435 is “An Act to Provide Means
for Increasing The Highway Special Fund.” The CIR
contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase
Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act
deals with another subject which is the partial exemption
of miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on
which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly
not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More
importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather than
an increase of the Highway Special Fund.
ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to
ILC.
HELD: Yes, but only in the amount as found by the
CTA. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no merit in
the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one
subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the
necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund
through the imposition of an increased specific tax on
manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 of the law is in
effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased
tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on
oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of
the law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted
constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation
the title of which might completely fail to apprise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and
consequences of the law or its operation. But that is not
so for in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of
its proceedings bear out, a full debate on precisely the
issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was
held by Congress which passed it.
(2) req. as to certain laws
i. appropriation laws- art. 7 s22; art. 6 ss-24-25, 29
GINGONA V CARAGUE
 The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in
automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic
Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the
appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service
is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled “Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand
Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign
Borrowing Act),” by P.D. No. 1177, entitled “Revising the
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society,” and by P.D. No. 1967,
entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on
Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and
Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D.
1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to
restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990
budget pursuant to said decrees.
Issue:
Is the appropriation of P86 billion in the P233
billion 1990 budget violative of Section 29(1), Article VI of
the Constitution?
Held:
No. There is no provision in our Constitution
that provides or prescribes any particular form of words
or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it
be “made by law,” such as precisely the authorization or
appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees.
In other words, in terms of time horizons, an
appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but
subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the
current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the
present Congress), just as said appropriation may be
made in general as well as in specific terms. The
Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual
laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special
provisions of laws of general or special application which
appropriate public funds for specific public purposes,
such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation
measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and
certainly appears from the language employed (In re
Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the
past or in the present.
ii. tax laws- art. 6, s28; art. 14 s4 (3-4)
TAN V DEL ROSARIO
1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or
the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"),
which amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well
as the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public
respondents pursuant to said law.
2. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it
allegedly violates the following provisions of the
Constitution:
-Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
- Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
- Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . .
. property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
3. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded
their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general
professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the
title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for
being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation
Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals
Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in
G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title actually
reads,
'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation
Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals
Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending
Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue
Code,' as amended. Petitioners also contend it violated
due process.
5. The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by
public respondents.
6. The Court has given due course to both petitions.
ISSUE: Whether RA 7496 and RR Nos. 2-93 are
unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. RA 7496 does not impose tax on single
proprietorships and professionals differently from the
manner it imposes the tax on corporations and
partnerships. Such system of income taxation has long
been the prevailing rule even prior to RA 7496. Uniformity
of taxation merely requires that all subjects or objects of
taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in
privileges and liabilities.
Also, the Court clarifies that a general professional
partnership is not itself an income taxpayer. The income
tax is imposed not on the professional partnership, which
is tax exempt, but on the partners themselves in their
individual capacity computed on their distributive shares
of partnership profits as provided in Section 23 of the Tax
Code.
There is no distinction in income tax liability between a
person who practices his profession alone or individually
and one who does it through partnership with others in
the exercise of a common profession. Under the present
income tax system all individuals deriving income from
any source whatsoever are treated in almost invariably
the same manner and under a common set of rules.
The phrase "income taxpayers" is an all embracing term
used in the Tax Code, and it practically covers all
persons who derive taxable income. Partnerships no
matter how created or organized, are subject to income
tax which, for purposes of the above categorization, are
by law assimilated to be within the context of, and so
legally contemplated as, corporations.
Section 6 of Revenue Regulation No. 2-93 did not alter,
but merely confirmed, the above standing rule as now so
modified by Republic Act No. 7496 on basically the
extent of allowable deductions applicable to all individual
income taxpayers on their non-compensation income.
There is no evident intention of the law, either before or
after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal
footing or in significant variance the income tax treatment
of professionals who practice their respective professions
individually and of those who do it through a general
professional partnership.
GARCIA V ES
211 SCRA 219 – Political Law – Congress Authorizing the President
to Tax
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to
any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on
all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional
duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was
imposed across the board on all imported articles,
including crude oil and other oil products imported into
the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional
duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed
reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and
other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique
Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475
and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of
Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the
authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the
President may not assume such power by issuing
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the
nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are
constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution,
the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills,
like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the
Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does
not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as
revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the
President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as
follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to
fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to
Congress to authorize the President “subject to such
limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to
fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties
or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs
Code which authorized the President ot issue the said
EOs.
iii. jurisdiction of the SC
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMIC V CA
1. Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129,
EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the
Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts
for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies
such as the Board of Investments (BOI).
2. BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s
application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by
changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed
floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a
motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while
oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to
reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed
in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for
review with CA.
4. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its
decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20)
days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing
any preliminary injunction.
5. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the
restraining order contending that CA does not have
jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is
exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to
Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
6. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the
Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a
Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and
 Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of
Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the
procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to
Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from
decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with
the Supreme Court.
7. While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency
there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of
E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has
already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme
Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or
four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over the case
YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded
Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method
of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI
are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which
by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with
the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court
of Appeals.
FABIAN V HON. DESIERTO
295 SCRA 470 – Political Law – Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court
Remedial Law – Civil Procedure – Appeal from Decisions of Quasi-
Judicial Bodies
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president
of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation
(PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction
business with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the
incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila
Engineering District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed
between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate
their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her
attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed
an administrative case against Agustin which eventually
led an appeal to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman,
Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later
referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the
decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed the case
to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
pertinently provides that:
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives
or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman
Act is valid.
HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section 27 of
RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates
the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate
jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument has
been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision
was intended to give the SC a measure of control over
cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise,
the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it
states that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC
contemplated therein is to be exercised over “final
judgments and orders of lower courts,” that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not
include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.
But what is the proper remedy?
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for
quasi-judicial agencies.
b. PROCEDURE FOR THE PASSAGE OF BILLS- ART.
6 S26(2)
ARROYO V DE VENECIA
HELD: No rule of the House of Representatives has been
cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this
involving approval of a conference committee report, the
Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or
nominal voting.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was
largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the
proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners
insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an
obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's...
question was not, in form or substance, a point of order
or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.[30] And
even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's
motion to adjourn would have precedence and would
have put an end to any further... consideration of the
question.[31]
To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but
only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum.
Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum
had already been defeated, as the roll call established
the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum
is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the...
business of the House.[
Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued
interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect
acknowledged the presence of a quorum.
Furthermore, the Constitution doesn’t require that the
yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a
House has to vote, except only in the following instances:
upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of
one-fifth of the Members... present, and in repassing a
bill over the veto of the President. Indeed, considering
the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of
the Members by yeas and nays had already been taken,
it would have been sheer... tedium to repeat the process.
c. the pres’ veto power
1. qualified v absolute veto
2. executive impoundment
compare 1987 consti art. 27 vs 1935 consti art. 6 s20
BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORP V VALENCIA
11 SCRA 486 – Political Law – Veto Power – Condition Attached to
an Item
Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a
co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc.
(CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They
operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations
in the Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido
Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for
operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia
claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans
license and their continuing operation had caused
damages to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for
damages.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to
show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal
of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as
the records show, the appropriation to operate the
Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by
Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of
the Republic of the Philippines does not allow
appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon.
Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then
there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures
made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in
violation of the law and they cannot claim damages
therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president
vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is
illegal because he may not legally veto a condition
attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation
bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does
not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If
the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same
produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction
imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
GONZALES V MACARAIG
Political Law – Veto Power – Inappropriate Provision in an
Appropriation Bill
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the
constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of
its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill
(Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the
President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills
is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s;
therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed
Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are
provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of
an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto
power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto
power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4)
the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of
the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and,
therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to
impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-
veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently
put, has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of
an Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a
general appropriations bill matters that should be more
properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does
that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be
treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President
in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one
step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that
“provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and
Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not
“provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are
“inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as
“items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
BENGZON V DRILON
208 SCRA 133 – Political Law – Veto Power of the President
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e.
Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the
time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old
laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired
judges, justices, and members of the constitutional
commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws
in order to standardize retirement benefits among
government officials. However, President Corazon
Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the
ground that the law should not give preferential treatment
to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a
petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to
readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797
was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said
PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were
subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the
repealing law never existed due to non publication and in
effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court
then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and soon in the
General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress
allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices.
Congress however did the allotment in the following
manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund
Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to
unavoidable obligations in different branches of the
government; among such obligations is the allotment for
the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines
which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in
the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion
of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed
H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired
judges and justices to question the constitutionality of the
veto made by the President. The President was
represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that
portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights
to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance
to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The
president has no power to set aside and override the
decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president
have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated
by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing
laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the president to
disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill
does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to
approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears
that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some
portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done.
The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or
not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its
entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not
veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund.
She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the
pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items
covering obligations to the other departments of the
government.
PHILCONSA V ENRIQUEZ
235 SCRA 506 – Political Law – Veto Power – Part of the
Legislative Process
Constitutionality of the Pork Barrel “Countrywide Development
Fund”
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question
the veto authority of the president involving the General
Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality
of the pork barrel. The Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development
fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate
funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those
funds would be applied for since that is already the
function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of
some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house of
congress took steps to override the veto. Instead,
Senators Wigberto Tañada and Alberto Romulo sought
the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus
against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et
al. Tañada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1) the
veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB
of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President
in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing
Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that
Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is
constitutional. In the Tañada petitions the SC dismissed
the other petitions and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and
compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The
president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme
in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is
already taken cared of by other legislation and may be
more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He,
however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00
appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the
president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing
the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president
herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered
“inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that such provision if
not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing
Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges
(SUC’s), the President vetoed special provisions which
authorize the use of income and the creation, operation
and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed.
The reason for the veto is that there were already funds
allotted for the same in the National expenditure
Program. Tañada et al claimed this as unconstitutional.
The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to
the “One Fund Policy” – it avoided double funding and
redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30%
(contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it
may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The
funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some
existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special
Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision
which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the
appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other
hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended –
70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987
Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special
provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill,
which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to
which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the
budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for
purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said
condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional
mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations,
and if allowed, “shall effectively alter the original intent of
the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military
equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP”.
The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an
administrative action in implementing a law or requiring
legislative approval of executive acts must be
incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.
Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP
pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and
separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriations specifically approved for the purpose
pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is
lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of
Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto
per reasons provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s
including the payment of separation benefits. The
President declared in his Veto Message that the
implementation of this Special Provision to the item on
the CAFGU’s shall be subject to prior Presidential
approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by
the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it
would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme
Court, etc
In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent
with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under
Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states
that ‘no elective or appointive public officer or employee
shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation
unless specifically authorized by law.’ I am, therefore,
confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain
fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-
established principle on compensation standardization.
Tañada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the
President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy
of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the
CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the
conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the
GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto
Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate
that additional or indirect compensation can only be given
pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements
are mere reminders that the disbursements of
appropriations must be made in accordance with law.
Such statements may, at worse, be treated as
superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The
Congressmen, being representatives of their local
districts know more about the problems in their
constituents areas than the national government or the
president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the
Congressmen are in a better position to recommend as
to where funds should be allocated.
TANDA V TUVERA supra
ART VII
THE EXECUTIVE DEPT
1. The President
a. singular executive
PLANAS V GIL
67 Phil. 62 – Political Law – Separation of Powers – Rule of Non-
Interference
In November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal
board member of Manila, published a statement
criticizing the acts of certain government officials
including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a newspaper. The
following morning, she received a letter from Jorge
Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the
president directing her to report before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). She was directed to explain and
prove her allegations.
She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the
jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter. She said that as
an elective official, she is accountable for her political
acts to her constituency alone, unless such acts
constitute offenses punishable under our penal laws, and
not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to
that to which petitioner is affiliated. Further, she contends
that her statement in the newspaper was made by her as
a private citizen and in the exercise of her right to discuss
freely political questions and cannot properly be the
subject of an administrative investigation; that the issue is
only cognizable by courts of justice in case the contents
of said statement infringe any provision of the Penal
Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil,
however took cognizance of the case hence
Planas appealed to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor
General replied for the CSC arguing that under the
separation of powers marked by the Constitution, the
court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief
Executive which are of purely administrative in character.
ISSUE:
 1. Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to
review orders issued by the President.
2. ISSUE: W/N the President has the legal
authority to order the investigation
HELD:
1. The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the
limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will
neither direct nor restrain executive action in such
cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal
premise, it does not necessarily follow that the SC is
precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or
constitutionality of his acts when these are properly
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The
classical separation of governmental powers viewed in
the light of political philosophy is a relative theory of
government. There is more truism and actuality in
interdependence than in independence and separation of
powers.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the
proceeding. He is neither compelled nor restrained to act
in a particular way. The CSC is the party respondent and
the theory is advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an
investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of
the President of the Philippines, the SC has no
jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by
Planas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a
subordinate officer of the government is acting under
orders from the Chief Executive may be an important
averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon this
court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative
immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference
is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the
subordinate official and employees of the executive
Department to the extent that at the mere invocation of
the authority that it purports the jurisdiction of this court to
inquire into the validity or legality of an executive order is
necessarily abated or suspended.
Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take
cognizance of the case. Planas was not denied the right
to voice out her opinion but since she made allegations
against the administration it is but right for her to prove
those allegations. The CSC has the right to elicit the
truth.
2. YES. Provided the investigation should be in
accordance with law.
The constitution grants to the President the powers of
control and supervision. The power to exercise general
supervision over all local governments and to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed authorizes him to
order an investigation of the act or conduct of the
petitioner herein.
Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active
power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least
implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in
order to render the power real and effective. If
supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not
automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a
knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after
careful study and investigation.
The President in the exercise of the executive power
under the Constitution may act through the heads of the
executive departments. The heads of the executive
departments are his authorized assistants and agents in
the performance of his executive duties, and their official
acts, promulgated in the regular course of business, are
presumptively his acts.
The power of removal which the President may exercise
directly and the practical necessities of efficient
government brought about by administrative
centralization easily make the President the head of the
administration.
VILLENA V SECRETARY
67 Phil. 451 – Political Law – Control Power – Supervision –
Suspension of a Local Government Official – Power to suspend
comes with the power to remove
Jose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s.
After investigation, the Secretary of Interior
recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office
of the president who approved the same. The Secretary
then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the
Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power
or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the
governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative
Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the
Interior has power of supervision over local governments,
that power, according to the constitution, must be
exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and
the provisions of law governing trials of charges against
elective municipal officials are those contained in sec
2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other
words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his
supervision over local governments, if he has that power
under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter
provisions govern the procedure to be followed in
suspending and punishing elective local officials while
sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law
which must yield to the special law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can
suspend an LGU official under investigation.
HELD: Yes.
There is no clear and express grant of power to the
secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is
under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears
lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code which provides that “The provincial
governor shall receive and investigate complaints made
under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration
of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
involving moral turpitude“.
The fact, however, that the power of suspension is
expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative
Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the
grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the
Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power.
For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument that
the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the
petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of
removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code)
to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the
President could, in the manner prescribed by law,
remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity
if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of
suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if,
possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a
provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the
President were to be without the power to suspend a
municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal
official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be
issued to give way for an impartial investigation.
Furthermore, The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
which provides that “the acts of the department
secretaries, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the President, presumptively the acts of
the President.” The power to suspend may be exercised
by the President. It follows that the heads of the
Department under her may also exercise the same,
unless the law required the President to act personally or
that situation demanded him so, because the heads of
the departments are assistants and agents of the
President.
ANG-ANGCO V CASTILLO
power of control and security of tenure
 Pepsi sent a letter to the Secretary of Commerce to
request for a special permit to withdraw pepsi
concentrates from the customs house. They were
imported without any dollar allocation or forex
remittance.
 They also wrote the Secretary of Finance, the Central
Bank Governor.
 The Import-Export Committee of the CB submitted to
the Monetary Board a memorandum of Pepsi’s letter.
The Monetary Board however failed to take up the
matter because the transaction did not involve any
dollar allocation or forex.
 Pepsi still had no authorization to withdraw the
concentrates.
 So, Pespsi approached Angangco (the Collector of
Customs) to secure the immediate release of the
concentrates.
 However, since there was no CB certificate,
Angangco told Pepsi to get one from the No-Dollar
Import Office who had jurisdiction over the case.
 Later, the said Office also said that it was not within
their jurisdiction.
 Thus, Angangco called up the Secretary of Finance
(Hernandez) and the Secretary VERBALLY
APPROVED THE RELEASE OF THE PEPSI
PRODUCTS.
 Angangco thus authorized the release.
 The Commissioner of Customs Manahan however
ordered the seizure of the goods. Manahan filed a
case against Angangco for grave neglect of duty,
prejudicial to the Bureau of Customs
 President Magsaysay wanted an investigation.
Angangco was suspended from office but was
reinstated by Secretary of Finance Hernandez.
 Magsaysay died.. But after 3 years Executive
Secretary Castillo by authority of now President
Garcia, rendered a decision finding Angangco
GUILTY and CONSIDERED RESIGNED.
 Angangco assails this decision and argues that it
deprives him of his office without due process.
 Castillo however claims that the President has the
power of control over officers and employees in the
executive department.
ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to take
direct action even if Angangco belongs to the
classified service under Civil Service Act of 1959
SC: Angangco was deprived of due process!!
Officers in the CLASSIFIED CIVIL SERVICE comes
within the EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE
COMMISSION OF CIVIL SERVICE, except as otherwise
provided for by law. So is there any other law
empowering the President to remove officers in the
classified civil service?
The only law we can recall is the RAC which grants the
power to remove officials “conformably to law”. It shows
that the President does not have blanket authority to
remove any officer or employee of the government, but
that his power must still be subject to the law that may be
passed. Here, there is such a law (Civil Service ACT)
which governs officers and employees in the classified
civil service. The President is bound to follow that law.
So, even granting for administrative purpose the
President is considered the Department Head of the
CSC, his power to remove is still subject to the Civil
Service Act. Under said law, the proper forum would be
the COMMISSIONER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, OR THE
CIVIL SERVICE APPEALS BOARD.
As to the power of control, it is defined as the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.
The President’s control over the executive department
REFERS ONLY TO MATTERS OF GENERAL POLICY.
Policy means any settled or definite course or method
adopted and followed by a government or body.
Here, the REMOVAL OF AN OFFICER (Angangco)
cannot be said to come within the meaning of CONTROL
OVER A SPECIFIC POLICY OF GOVERNMENT.
The power of control of the President may indeed extend
to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers
who belong to the executive, under the principle that the
power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint.
However this applies only if they are presidential
appointees or do not belong to the classified service.
As to those officers who belong to the classified service
that power cannot be exercised.
The action of the Executive Secretary, without submitting
the case to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary
to law. Angangco reinstated.
b. qualifications, election, term and oath- art. 7 s2,4 & 5.
PBA V COMELEC
The Court failed to have 10 votes to declare B.P. Blg.
883 unconstitutional. Whereas the original issue on B.P
Blg. 883’s constitutionality, the issue has now
transformed into a political question where only the
sovereign people can decide in a fair, clean and honest
election. As such, the Court dismissed the petitions and
denied their prayers of prohibition.
c. privilege and salary- art. 7 s6
d. succession
2. in case of vacancy at the beginning of the term
3. in case of vacancy during the term
4. in case of temporary disability
Constructive Resignation
ESTRADA V DESIERTO
Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph
Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the
beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued
by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On
October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a
longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner,
his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from
jueteng lords. The expose’ immediately ignited reactions
of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of
the House of Representatives to the Senate. On
November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001,
by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the
opening of the second envelope which allegedly
contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3
billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose
Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst
of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter,
the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to
the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the
resigned from their posts. intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The
validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It
Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the
issued a press statement that he was leaving cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write
Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to any formal letter of resignation before leaving
begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not
that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts
was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or
exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior
operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative
sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by
Pimentel on the same day. the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the
Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation
After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power.
filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the
set in motion. second round of negotiation, the resignation of the
Issues: petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President unsettled points at that time were the measures to be
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily undertaken by the parties during and after the transition
unable to act as President period. The Court held that the resignation of the
petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his
leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his
Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
he suffers from a permanent disability. the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process
of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind of inability and that he was going to
reassume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people
for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he
will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he
called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of
a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner
that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the
powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a
President on leave. The inability claim is contained in the
Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres.
Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter,
the House of Representatives passed a resolution
supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as
President. The Senate also passed a resolution
confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-
President. Both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in
that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has
clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. The Court
cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability to
discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The
question is political in nature and addressed solely to
Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which
cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the
principle of separation of powers.
e. removal ( impeachment – see prov under art. 11:
accountability of PubOff)
f. prohibitions- art. 7 s13
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Members of
the Cabinet – Singularity of Office – EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties
Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being
challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which
provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any
other office or employment in Government are those provided in
the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2),
Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member
of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in
the government, except in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts
held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity
as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of
their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called
Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on
the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be
considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding
thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to
Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions
that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government corporations, EO
284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment
in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
g. exceptions to prohibition from holding another office
1. VP as member of the cabinet
2. SOJ as member of the JBC
CLU V SECRETARY supra
DELA CRUZ V COMM ON AUDIT
Held:
"The prohibition against holding dual or multiple
offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII
of the Constitution must not, however, be
construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity
as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of said officials' office. The reason is that
these posts do not comprise 'any other office'
within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of
additional duties and functions on said officials. x x
x
xxx xxx xxx
 "To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering
positions held without additional compensation
in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the concerned
official's office. The term ex-officio means 'from
office; by virtue of office'. It refers to an 'authority
derived from official character merely, not
expressly conferred upon the individual character,
but rather annexed to the official position.' Ex-
officio likewise denotes an 'act done in an official
character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority than
that conferred by the office.' An ex-officio member
of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his
title to a certain office, and without further warrant
or appointment. To illustrate, by express provision
of law, the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the
Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the
Light Rail Transit Authority.
xxx xxx xxx
"The ex-officio position being actually and in
legal contemplation part of the principal office,
it follows that the official concerned has no
right to receive additional compensation for
his services in the said position. The reason is
that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his
principal office. It should be obvious that if,
say, the Secretary of Finance attends a
meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-
officio member thereof, he is actually and in
legal contemplation performing the primary
function of his principal office in defining
policy in monetary banking matters, which
come under the jurisdiction of his department.
For such attendance, therefore, he is not
entitled to collect any extra compensation,
whether it be in the form of a per diem or an
honorarium or an allowance, or some other
such euphemism. By whatever name it is
designated, such additional compensation is
prohibited by the Constitution."
h. powers and functions of the Pres
1. executive power- art. 7 s1 & 17
L.S. MOON AND CO. V HARRISON
Facts: The defendants, pursuant to Act No. 2868 of the
Philippine Legislature and pursuant to EO No. 56 and 67
issued by authority of said Act, have seized the said
2,3301⁄2 kilos of Siam rice of plaintiff and deprived him of
it, for the purpose of distribution to the public at large;
that said seizure was made without compensation to
plaintiff, although defendants have promised to pay there
for at the rate of P16.25, Philippine currency, a cavan
and no more, which price is below the reasonable value
of the rice and is unjust; that payment at said rate does
not constitute just compensation and a seizure under the
circumstances alleged constitutes a confiscation of
private property contrary to the fundamental and organic
law of the Philippine Islands and an invasion of those
constitutional rights that no one may be deprived of his
property except by due process of law and with just
compensation; that the just and reasonable value of the
rice seized as aforesaid in Manila at the time of said
seizure was with respect to the Siam rice mentioned
P26.32 per cavan.
The complaint is against the Honorable Francis Burton
Harrison as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.
The alleged acts of Jakosalem and Lukban were
committed by them as agents and servants of the
Governor-General.
(Hon. Dionisio Jakosalem is the duly appointed, qualified
and acting Secretary of Commerce and Communications
and the official designated by executive order of the said
Govern-General as the executive in charge of rice, its
sale and distribution in the Philippine Islands; that the
said Justo Lukban is the duly appointed, qualified and
acting Mayor of the city of Manila, and, as such,
designated by the said Governor-General and Secretary
of Commerce and Communications as their assistant in
charge for the city of Manila of rice, its sale and
distribution)
Issue:
1. Whether or Not the enforcement of Act No. 2868 is
valid.
2. May the Chief Executive refuse to enforce a law on the
ground that in his opinion it is unconstitutional?
Held: 1. Yes, it is assumed that in the commission of the
alleged acts, the Governor-General was acting in his
official capacity, and was engaged in the performance of
a duty enjoined upon him by the Legislature of the
Philippine Islands. It is now contended that the law in
question is unconstitutional and void. At the time of the
alleged acts, he was exercising the discretionary power
which was vested in him as Governor-General.
There is a legal presumption that any law enacted by the
Legislature is valid, and the Governor-General had a
legal right to assume that Act No. 2868 was valid. It was
neither his official province nor duty to say whether the
Act was or was not constitutional.
2. No. Otherwise, he will be violating the doctrine of
separation of powers because by doing so, he will be
claiming the power to interpret the law, not merely to
implement it.
By the organic law, it is the duty of the legislature to
make the law; of the executive to enforce; and of the
courts to construe the law. The courts only have the
power to declare a law unconstitutional. In the very
nature of things, it is not the duty of the Governor to say
whether a law is or is not constitutional. It is his duty to
enforce the law until such time as it has legally been
declared unconstitutional.
In the instant case, Act No. 2868 was enacted by the
Legislature. By its terms and provisions, certain duties
were thrust upon the Governor-General. He had a legal
right to assume that the law was valid, and in the
exercise of his discretion, he undertook to enforce the
law and to carry out its terms and provisions.
The acts of the defendants were official and
discretionary, and they had a legal right to assume that
the law was valid. In the commission of the alleged acts,
they were acting for, and representing, the Government
of the Philippine Islands under a law enacted by its
Legislature.
GOVT V SPRINGER
50 Phil 259 – Law on Public Officers – Power to Appoint is
Essentially Executive
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company
(NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law
created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: “The voting power
… shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting
of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate,
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard
Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting
rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the
NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be
solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of
the government (President at that time was considered
the head of state but does not manage government
affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the
Senate President and the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and
the Senate President as well as the House Speaker,
notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the
Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four
others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo
warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was
filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their
election into the Board of NCC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as
the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members
of NCC.
HELD: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with
the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the legislature creates the public office
but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill
the office. Appointing persons to a public office is
essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned
and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress.
To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through
the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint
members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive
powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed
there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature
may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual
can be found in the appointment by the legislature of
persons to fill offices within the legislative branch – this powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that
exception is allowable because it does not weaken the the President can do anything which is not forbidden in
executive branch. the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest
discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American
MARCOS V MANGLAPUS President) and that the president has to maintain peace
during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day
Ratio:
operation of the State.
Separation of power dictates that each department has
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute.
exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of
They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
However, it does not define what is meant by “executive
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode
power” although in the same article it touches on
and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the
case law which clearly never contemplated situations
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
even remotely similar to the present one. It must be
and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to
power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons…
those residual unstated powers of the President which
(art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines
are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive.
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should
Constitution which include the power to protect the
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part
general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect
the people, promote their welfare & advance national
of the President to determine whether it must be granted
or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to
determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for
the President to conclude that it was in the national
interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the
Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her
decision. The supervening events that happened before
her decision are factual. The President must take
preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the
country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the
Constitution.
OPLE V TORRES
On December 12, 1996, then President Ramos
enacted Administrative order no. 308, which laid down
the ground work for the implementation of a National ID
system. The A.O. mandated major government agencies
to pool their resources together to implement a
centralized data bank of all citizens which shall be used
to streamline day to day government transactions and
minimize rampant red taping and corruption among
government employees.
Herein petitioner Senator Blas Ople, filed the case
at bar questioning the said A.O. on 3 grounds 1)
implementation of a national ID system requires a
legislative act, as such A.O. no. 308 is usurpation of
legislative functions. 2) that said A.O. tends to infringe
the right to privacy of citizens 3) the appropriation of
funds for the implementation of said A.O. is also an
exclusive legislative function.
On the other hand, herein respondent as
Executive Secretary refutes all said arguments.
Issue:
1. Whether or not A.O. no. 308 is a valid exercise
of the Executive power.
2. Whether or not the issuance of A.O. 308 by the
President in establishing a national computerized
identification reference system is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress.
Ruling:
 1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. implemented will put our people's right
to privacy in clear and present danger.
In holding the A.O. no. 308 as an invalid exercise of
3. A.O. no. 308 failed to substantiate any
the Presidents Executive power, the Court provided the
justifiable reason to allow the would be
following:
infringement. To streamline government
1. As raised by petitioner, A.O. no. 308 does
transactions and to remove red taping was not
indeed infringe upon the legislature’s exclusive
sufficiently shown to be valid reasons to
function as it laid down a system whereby
counter act the strict protection of the
compliance therewith is a condition to transact
individual’s right to privacy.
with the government.
2. A.O. no. 308 is a potential threat to the
Constitutional right to Privacy as it allows the 2. While Congress is vested with the power to enact
government to pool various data regarding an laws, the President executes the laws.As head of the

individual without any clear concise direction Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive.Corollary to the power of control, the President
as to the manner to keeping, safeguards
has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the
against improper use, and any definite answer maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
as to what type of information may or may not granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under
be used. his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.Administrative power is concerned with the work
 But what is not arguable is the
of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by
broadness, the vagueness, the
proper governmental organs.
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
 As said administrative order redefines the respect, the authority to prescribe rules and
parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a- regulations is not an independent source of power to
vis the State as well as the line that separates the make laws."
administrative power of the President to make rules Thus, Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled
and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
evident that it deals with a subject that should be Reference System" was declared null and void for
covered by law.From these precepts, the Supreme being unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that
is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative 2.control of executive Depts- art. 7 s17
order. The dissenting opinions of the Justices unduly
HEBRON V REYES
expand the limits of administrative legislation and
consequently erode the plenary power of Congress to Issue: is whether a municipal mayor, not charged with
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be
make laws. This is contrary to the established removed or suspended directly fry the President of the
approach defining the traditional limits of Philippines, regardless of the procedure set forth in
sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative
administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . Code.
. Many regulations however, bear directly on the HELD:

public. It is here that administrative legislation must he
restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are
not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-
making that Congress enacts in the form of a public
1. At the outset, it should be noted that, referring to
local elective officers, we held, in Lacson vs.
Roque, that the President has no "inherent
power to remove or suspend" them. In said
case, we declared, also:

law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to

"* * * Removal and suspension of public officers are
always controlled by the particular law applicable
and its proper construction subject to constitutional
limitation.
*******
* * * "There is neither statutory nor constitutional
provision granting the President sweeping authority to
remove municipal officials. By article VII, section 10,
paragraph (1) of the Constitution the President 'shall * * *
exercise general supervision over all local governments',
but supervision does not contemplate control. (People vs.
Brophy, 120 P., 2nd., 946; 49 Cal. App., 2nd., 15.)
Far from implying: control or power to remove the
President's supervisory authority over municipal affairs is
qualified by the proviso 'as may be provided by law', a
clear indication of constitutional intention that the
provisions was not to be self-executing but requires
legislative implementation. And the limitation does not
stop here. It is significant to note that section 64(b) of the
Revised Administrative Code in conferring on the Chief
Executive power to remove specifically enjoins that
the said power should be exercised conformably to law,
which we assume to mean that renewals must be
accomplished only for any of the causes and in the
fashion prescribed by law and the procedure."
Indeed, it is, likewise, well settled that laws governing the
suspension or removal of public officers, especially those
chosen by the direct vote of the people, must be strictly
construed in their favor.
2. Respondent and the amici curiae invoke sections
79 (C) and 86 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which are of the following tenor:
"SEC. 79 (C). Power of direction and supervision.-
The Department Head shall have direct control, direction,
and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing law to the
contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decisions
of the chief of said bureaus or offices when advisable in
the public interest. "The Department Head may order the
investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the
service of any bureau or office under his Department and
in connection therewith may appoint a committee or
designate an official or person who shall conduct such
investigations, and such committee, official, or person,
may summon witnesses by subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum, administer oath, and take testimony
relevant to the investigation."
"SEC. 86. Bureaus and offices under the Department of
Interior.-The Department of "the Interior shall have
executive supervision over the administration of
provinces, municipalities, chartered cities, and other local
political subdivisions, except the financial affairs and
financial agencies thereof, * * *."
Referring to these provisions, we postulated in Mondano
vs. Silvosa:
"The executive departments of the Government of the
Philippines created and organized before the approval of
the Constitution continued to exist as 'authorized by law
until the Congress shall provide otherwise.' Section. 10,
paragraph 1, Article VH, of the Constitution provides:
'The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.' Under this constitutional provision the
President has been invested with the power of control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not
of all local governments over which he has been granted
only the power of general supervision as may be
provided by law. The Department head as agent of the
President has direct control and supervision over all
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction' as provided for
in section 79(C) of the Revised Administrative Code, but
he does not have the same control of local governments
as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the
investigation by any act or conduct of any person in the
service of any bureau or office under his department is
confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and
does not extend to local governments over which, as
already stated, the President exercises only general
supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions
of Section 79(C) of the Revised Administrative Code are
to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding
department head direct control, direction, and supervision
over all local governments and that for that reason he
may order the investigation of an official of a local
government for malfeasance in office; such interpretation
would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1,
section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution. If 'general
supervision over all local governments' is to be construed
as the same power granted to the Department Head in
section 79 (C) of the Revised Administrative Code, then
there would no longer be a distinction or difference
between the power of control and that of supervision. In
administrative law supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of
section "79(C) of the Revised Administrative Code and
37 of Act No. 4007. The Congress has expressly and
specifically lodged the provincial supervision over
municipal officials in the provincial governor who is
authorized to 'receive and investigate complaints made
under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration
of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
involving moral turpitude.' And if the charges are serious,
'he shall submit written charges touching the matter to
the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to
the accused either personally or by registered mail, and
he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his
opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of
the officer in question.' Section 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of
supervision to be exercised by the Department Head
over the administration of * * * municipalities * * *. If it be
construed that it does and such additional power is the
same authority as that vested in the Department Head by
section 79 (C) of the Revised Administrative Code, then
such additional power must be deemed to have been
abrogated by section 10(1), Article VII, of the
Constitution."
DRILON V LIM
ISSUE: W/N SEC. 187 OF LGC IS UNCONSTITUTION
HELD: The SC said its Constitutional.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review
only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance
and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these
grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that
enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the
Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his
own version of what the Code should be. He did not
pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a
basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his
judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it
was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were performing their
functions in accordance with law, that is, with the
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances
and the grant of powers to the city government under the
Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act
not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an
act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion,
order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he
may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent
merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have
the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are
not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but
only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has
no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the
rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary
Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this,
and so performed an act not of control but of mere
supervision.
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO. INC. V PANO
21 SCRA 895 – Political Law – Delegation of Control Power to the
Executive Secretary
Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land
used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest
zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone.
Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes
Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner.
Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the
same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paño’s
request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his
petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the
President.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño.
LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal.
He also averred that the decision of the Executive
Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The
Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any
provision whereby the presidential power of control may
be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that
it is the constitutional duty of the President to act
personally upon the matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be
delegated to the Executive Secretary.
HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must
exercise his constitutional powers in person. However,
the president may delegate certain powers to the
Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president may
delegate powers which are not required by the
Constitution for him to perform personally. The reason for
this allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected
to perform in person all the multifarious executive and
administrative functions. The office of the Executive
Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President.
The rule which has thus gained recognition is that “under
our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts
for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an
undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse
any order” that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter
ego of the President, shall remain valid until reversed,
disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case,
no reprobation was made hence the decision granting the
land to Paño cannot be reversed.
BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB V EXEC SECRETARY
360 SCRA 718 – Law on Public Officers – Security of Tenure in a
Public Office – No Vested Right to a Public Office – Power to
Create and Destroy Public Office
During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she
created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling
operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Customs. In the year 2000, President Estrada issued
an order deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered
the employees of EIIB to be separated from the service.
Thereafter, he created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling
Task Force “Aduana”, which EIIB employees claim to be
essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB,
through the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the
Supreme Court’s power of judicial review in questioning
the said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the
president has no power to abolish a public office, as that
is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the
abolition violates their constitutional right to security of
tenure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit.
HELD: No. It is a general rule that the power to abolish a
public office is lodged with the legislature. The exception
is when it comes to agencies, bureaus, and other offices
under the executive department, the president may
deactivate them pursuant to control power over such
offices, unless such office is created by the Constitution.
This is also germane to the president’s power to
reorganize the Office of the President. Basis of such
power also has its roots in two laws i.e., PD 1772 and PD
1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the
Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government, which includes the power to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials.
Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the
abolition of EIIB. EIIB allocations has always exceeded
P100 million per year. To save the government some
money, it needed to abolish it and replace it with TF
Aduana which has for its allocation just P50 million.
Further, TYF Aduana is invested more power that EIIB
never had, i.e., search and seizure and arrest.
Lastly, EEIB employees’ right to security of tenure is not
violated. Since there is no bad faith in the abolition of
EIIB, such abolition is not infirm. Valid abolition of offices
is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. If
the public office ceases to exist, there is no separation or
dismissal to speak of. Indeed, there is no such thing as
an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional
offices which provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office or its salary.
3. general supervision of local gov’t and autonomous
regions
MONDANO V SILVOSA
97 Phil. 143 – Political Law – Control Power – Revised
Administrative Code – Supervision
Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A
complaint was filed against him for rape and
concubinage. The information reached the Assistant
Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to
investigate the matter. Consequently, Governor
Fernando Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the
latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa
suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for
prohibition enjoining the governor from further
proceeding.
In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised
Administrative Code which provided that he, as part of
the executive and by virtue o the order given by the
Assistant Executive Secretary, is with “direct control,
direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices
under his jurisdiction . . .” and to that end “may order the
investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the
service of any bureau or office under his Department and
in connection therewith may appoint a committee or
designate an official or person who shall conduct such
investigations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the
Executive, can exercise the power of control over a
mayor.
HELD: No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of
the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered him to
investigate Mondano).
The Constitution provides:
“The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.”
Under this constitutional provision the President has
been invested with the power of control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all
localgovernments over which he has been granted
only the power of general supervision as may be
provided by law. The Department head as agent of the
President has direct control and supervision over all
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for
in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but
he does not have the same control of local governments
as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any
act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau
or office under his department is confined to bureaus or
offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local
governments over which, as already stated, the President
exercises only general supervision as may be provided
by law.
If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised
Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring
upon the corresponding department head direct control,
direction, and supervision over all local governments and
that for that reason he may order the investigation of an
official of a local government for malfeasance in office,
such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of
par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or
the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail
or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action
or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for PIMENTEL V AGUIRRE
that of the latter. FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition
seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the
372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local
provincial supervision over municipal officials in the
government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of
provincial governor who is authorized to “receive and
their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal
investigate complaints made under oath against
services and to enjoin respondents from implementing
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their
corruption or other form of maladministration of office,
internal revenue allotments.
and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving
moral turpitude.” And if the charges are serious, “he shall
HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal
submit written charges touching the matter to the
autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any
provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the
manner of national government intervention by way
accused either personally or by registered mail, and he
of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs,
may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his
goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued
opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of
by the President consistent with his powers of
the officer in question.” Sec 86 of the Revised
supervision over local governments. A directory order
Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of
cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of
supervision to be exercised by the Department Head
control. The AO is intended only to advise all
over the administration of municipalities.
government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake
In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic
for crimes relating to Mondano’s office. If the issue is not stability in the country. It does not contain any sanction
related to his office but involves a rime of moral turpitude in case of noncompliance.
(such as rape or concubinage as in this case), there must
first be a final conviction before a suspension may be The Local Government Code also allows the President to
issued. The point is, the governor must suspend a mayor interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that certain
not because he’s acting as an agent of the Executive but requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector
because of the power granted him by the Revised deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with
Administrative Code. the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local
leagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation of the
secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and
Local Government, and Budget and Management; and
(4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be
less than 30% of the collection of national internal
revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature
of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government
Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% of
the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and
the law.
GANZON V CA
200 SCRA 271 – Political Law – Control Power – Local Government
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10
complaints were filed against him on grounds of
misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of
Local Government issued several suspension orders
against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints
filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600
days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the
CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the
Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution
does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego
to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the
1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and
strengthens the same. What was given by the present
Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local
Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend
and or remove local officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the
Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, “supervision” is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of
the power of supervision by the President over local
government officials in contrast to the power of control
given to him over executive officials of our government
wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control
and supervision, are two different things which differ one
from the other in meaning and extent. “In administration
law supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot
be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of
the President over local government officials does not
include the power of investigation when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of
the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid
power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day
suspension.
4. power of appointment
GOT V SPRINGER
50 Phil 259 – Law on Public Officers – Power to Appoint is
Essentially Executive
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company
(NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law
created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: “The voting power
… shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting
of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate,
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard
Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting
rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the
NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be
solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of
the government (President at that time was considered
the head of state but does not manage government
affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the
Senate President and the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and
the Senate President as well as the House Speaker,
notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the
Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four
others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo
warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was
filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their
election into the Board of NCC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as
the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members
of NCC.
HELD: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with
the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the legislature creates the public office
but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill
the office. Appointing persons to a public office is
essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned
and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress.
To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through
the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint
members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive
powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed
there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature
may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception
can be found in the appointment by the legislature of
persons to fill offices within the legislative branch –
this exception is allowable because it does not
weaken the executive branch.

RAFAEL V EMBROIDERY APPAREL
21 SCRA 336 – Political Law – Appointments – When Not
Bypassed by a Law
In 1961, Republic Act No. 3137 was passed. This law
created the Embroidery and Apparel Control and
Inspection Board (EACIB). Section 2 thereof also
provided that the Board shall be composed of:
(1) a representative from the Bureau of Customs to act
as Chairman, to be designated by the Secretary of
Finance;
(2) a representative from the Central Bank to be
designated by its Governor;
(3) a representative from the Department of Commerce
and Industry to be designated by the Secretary of
Commerce and Industry;
(4) a representative from the National Economic
Council to be designated by its Chairman; and
(5) a representative from the private sector coming from
the Association of Embroidery and Apparel Exporters of
the Philippines.
Later, in the performance of its duties, the EACIB made
certain assessments against Cecilio Rafael but the latter
refused to comply. Rafael sued EACIB and he averred
that RA 3137 is unconstitutional for while Congress may
create an office it cannot specify who shall be appointed
therein; that the members of the EACIB can only be
appointed by the President in accordance with Article 7,
Sec. 10 2 of the Constitution; that since the Act
prescribes that the chairman and members of the EACIB
should come from specified offices, it is equivalent to a
declaration by Congress as to who should be appointed,
thereby infringing the constitutional power of the
President to make appointments.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3137 bypassed the
appointing power of the president.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that indeed “the
appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the
President, upon which no limitations maybe imposed by
Congress, except those resulting from the need of
securing the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments and from the exercise of the limited power
to prescribe the qualifications to the given appointive
office.”
In the case at bar, the representatives in the EACIB
are not appointed by the Department Heads. They are
merely going to be designated hence whoever was
designated was merely sitting as an ex officio member. It
must also be noted that Congress took care to specify
that the representatives should come from the Bureau of
Customs, Central Bank, Department of Commerce and
Industry and the National Economic Council. The obvious
reason must be because these departments and/or
bureaus perform functions which have a direct relation to
the importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof
into embroidery and apparel products and their
subsequent exportation abroad. There is no attempt in
RA 3137 to deprive the President of his power to make
appointments. The law is not unconstitutional.
a. with consent of COA
SARMIENTO V MISON
156 SCRA 549 – Political Law – Appointment of “Head of Bureaus”
– Officers Requiring Confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments
This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In
1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then
president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and
Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and
professors of constitutional law questioned the
appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s
appointment was not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that
uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the
confirmation of the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo
Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of
Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison
due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of
bureaus” needed confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment.
HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers
removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers
needing confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four
(4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers
appointed by the president which require confirmation by
the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not
require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison
as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to
the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed
by the COA.
BAUTISTA V SALONGA
 172 SCRA 150 – Political Law – Appointments – Commission on
Human Rights – Security of Tenure
In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino
designated Mary Concepcion-Bautista as the Acting
Chairwoman of Commission on Human Rights. In
December 1987, Cory made the designation of Bautista
permanent. Bautista then took her oath of office.
Later however, Bautista received a letter from the
Commission on Appointments (COA) requiring her to
submit certain documents for her qualification and for
confirmation by the COA. Bautista then wrote a letter to
the COA Chairman, Senate President Jovito Salonga,
and she explained that her position as chairwoman of the
CHR does not require confirmation by the COA as laid
down in the case of Sarmiento vs Mison.
Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautista’s appointment
with the COA, Cory designated Hesiquio Mallilin as the
acting chairman of the CHR.
In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of
Bautista. COA considered Bautista’s appointment as “ad
interim”.
Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned
COA’s actions. She impleaded Mallillin. Mallillin on his
part invoked Executive Order No. 163-A which provided
that the appointment of the CHR chair is at the pleasure
of the president. Hence, since Cory left the issue with the
COA and the latter decided not to confirm Bautista,
Mallillin should be allowed to take his seat as chairman of
the CHR.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject
to COA’s confirmation.
HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and
Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the
Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of
the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose
appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in
the President with the consent of the COA. The President
appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR
pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is,
without the confirmation of the COA because they are
among the officers of government “whom he (the
President) may be authorized by law to appoint.” The law
which authorizes the president to make appointments to
the CHR is Executive Order No. 163.
The act of Cory submitting Bautista’s appointment to the
COA for confirmation is merely political in nature and it
has no basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to
the CHR should be made without the participation of the
COA. Thus, Cory’s act of submitting the appointment of
Bautista to the CHR is done without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit
such appointment to the COA for the latter’s approval or
rejection, such submission is not valid because at the
time of submission, the office of the chairman
(chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant – as at that time,
Bautista already took her oath and was the incumbent
CHR chairperson.
There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautista’s
appointment as “ad interim”. Since the position of
chairman and members of the CHR are not subject to
COA confirmation, all appointments to the CHR are
always permanent and cannot be ad interim.
Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides
that the chairman and members of the CHR may be
removed at the pleasure of the president, the same is not
valid. Thus, EO 163-A is unconstitutional. Note that the
earlier EO 163 provides that the chairman and the
members of the CHR shall have a term of 7 years. The
Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be
removed at the pleasure of the president for it is
guaranteed that they must have a term of office. They
can only be removed upon cause and with the
observance of due process.
QUINTOS-DELES V COA
177 SCRA 259 – Political Law – Appointment of Sectoral
Representatives
Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by then President
Corazon Aquino as a sectoral representative for women
in 1988. Their appointment was done while Congress
was in session. They were subsequently scheduled to
take their oath of office but the Commission on
Appointments (COA) filed an opposition against Deles et
al alleging that their appointment must have the
concurrence of the COA.
Deles then questioned the objection of the COA. She
said that her appointment does not need the concurrence
of the COA. This is in pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII
of the Constitution, which does not require her
appointment to be confirmed by the COA to qualify her to
take her seat in the lower house.
ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires the
appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives should be confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments.
HELD: Yes. There are four (4) groups of officers whom
the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to
which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII (or the first group
abovementioned) are to be reviewed by the COA,
namely, ‘the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution.’ All other
appointments by the President are to be made without
the participation of the Commission on Appointments.
Sectoral representatives belong to the phrase “and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution“. The provision of the Constitution which
provides power to the president in this regard is Section
7, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution:
Until a law is passed, the President may fill by
appointment from a list of nominees by the respective
sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in
paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.
MANALO V SISTOZA
312 SCRA 239- Political Law – Law on Public Officers –
Appointments – Confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments
Civil Law – Preliminary Title – Duty of Courts in Respecting the
Constitutionality of Laws Passed By Congress – Presumption of
Constitutionality; when not enjoyed
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 was passed. This law
created the Department of Interior and Local
Government. Said law, under Sections 26 and 31 thereof,
also provided on the manner as to how officers of the
Philippine National Police are to be appointed. It was
provided that the PNP Chief as well as certain police
officers including Directors and Chief Superintendents,
after being appointed by the President, must be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments before
said officers can take their office.
In 1992, then president Corazon Aquino appointed Pedro
Sistoza et al as Directors and Chief Superintendents
within the PNP. Said appointments were not confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments hence, Jesulito
Manalo questioned the validity of the appointments
made. He insists that without the confirmation by the
Commission, Sistoza et al are acting without jurisdiction,
their appointment being contrary to the provisions of R.A.
6975.
He then went to the Supreme Court asking the court to
carry out the provisions of the said law. Manalo also
insists that the law is a valid law, as it enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality, and hence, it must be
carried out by the courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. No.
6975 are valid.
HELD: No. Said provisions are unconstitutional. It is true
that prior to this case, as with all other laws, R.A. 6975
enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. As such, laws
enacted by Congress must be respected by courts and
as much as possible, courts must avoid delving into the
constitutionality of a law.
However, it is also the duty of the courts, as guardians of
the Constitution, to see to it that every law passed by
Congress is not repugnant to the Constitution.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, there are
four groups of officers of the government to be appointed
by the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group are the only ones whose appointments
are required by the Constitution to be affirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. All others need not be
confirmed. Officers of the PNP are not included therein.
There is also no merit to the contention that PNP officers
are akin to officers of the armed forces.
Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. 6975 are void for amending
the provisions set forth in the Constitution.
Courts have the inherent authority to determine whether
a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
alienated by the fundamental law. When it does the
courts will not hesitate to strike down such
unconstitutionality.
CALDERON V CARALE
208 SCRA 254 – Political Law – Appointment – List of Appointees
Requiring COA Confirmation Cannot Be Expanded by Law
In 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was passed. This law
amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides
that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners
and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be
appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments (COA).
Pursuant to the said law, President Corazon Aquino
appointed Bartolome Carale et al as the Chairman and
the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC. The
appointments were however not submitted to the CoA for
its confirmation. Peter John Calderon questioned the
appointment saying that without the confirmation by the
CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715.
Calderon insisted that RA 6715 should be followed as he
asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the
appointing power of the executive contained in Sec. 16,
Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law,
require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
of other officers appointed by the President in addition to
those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article
7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, expand
the list of public officers required to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointment as listed in the Constitution.
HELD: No. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President
shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General:
confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the
heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public
ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution, such as the members of the various
Constitutional Commissions (first group). With respect to
the other officers (second to fourth group) whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law
and to those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments is required.
“Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand
the list of officers whose appointments must be confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution
would have said so by adding the phrase “and other
officers required by law” at the end of the first sentence,
or the phrase, “with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments” at the end of the second sentence.
Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to
provide for such additions.
This jurisprudence established the following in
interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is
required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the
first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those
officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral
representatives to Congress and members of the
constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and
Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President
appoints other government officers whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress
creates inferior offices but omits to provide for
appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional
manner for such appointments, the officers are
considered as among those whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law.
NIERA V CFI
54 SCRA 165 – Political Law – Appointments – Residual Power to
Appoint
La Carlota City (Negros Occidental) was created by
Republic Act 4585 in 1965.
In 1966, Rodulfo Niere was appointed by the mayor of La
Carlota as the City Engineer.
In 1968, Jose Quiambao was appointed by the President
as the City Engineer of the same city (La Carlota).
Quiambao’s appointment was pursuant to the
Decentralization Act (effective January 1968). Sec 4
thereof provides that the position of the city engineer
must be filled in by the appointment of the President.
Niere relinquished the office but it was in protest and so
he filed a quo warranto case before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental. Niere lost in that case
and so he filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court. Nieri asserts that the charter of La
Carlota provides that it is the City Mayor who should
appoint the City Engineer.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nieri was legally appointed as the
City Engineer.
HELD: No. It appears that the charter of La Carlota did
not have a provision which authorizes the mayor thereof
to appoint the city engineer. In fact, the deliberations in
Congress when La Carlota’s charter was being drafted
revealed that it was the intention of the lawmakers to
exclude the position of city engineer from among those
local officers whom the mayor can appoint.
Since the city mayor, under La Carlota’s charter, is
without authority to appoint the city engineer, this
prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the
Philippines, who, under Section 10(3) of Article 7 of the
[1935] Constitution, shall nominate “all other officers of
the government whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for”; because when a statute does not
specify how an officer is to be appointed, the
appointment must be made by the President (residual
power of appointment).
The appointing power is essentially the exclusive
prerogative of the President. Consequently, any
diminution in its scope must be clear and unequivocal.
b. limitations on appoint power of the president- art. 7 s13
and 15
AYTONA V CASTILLO
4 SCRA 1 – Political Law – Appointing Power – Midnight
Appointments
Dominador Aytona was one of those appointed by
outgoing president Carlos Garcia during the last day of
his term. Aytona was appointed as the ad interim
governor of the Central Bank. When the next president,
Diosdado Macapagal took his office, he issued Order No.
2 which recalled Aytona’s position and at the same time
he appointed Andres Castillo as the new governor of the
Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo
warranto proceeding claiming that he is qualified to
remain as the Central Bank governor and that he was
validly appointed by the former president. Macapagal
averred that the ex-president’s appointments were
scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done, contrary to law and
the spirit of which, and it was an attempt to subvert the
incoming presidency or administration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post.
HELD: No. Had the appointment of Aytona been done in
good faith then he would have the right to continue office.
Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in his
post as he is competent enough, his appointment can
nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcia’s
appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the
upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the
policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a
person is qualified his appointment should not be
revoked but in here it may be since his appointment
was grounded on bad faith, immorality and
impropriety. In public service, it is not only legality that is
considered but also justice, fairness and righteousness.
QUIMSING V TAJANGLANGIT
May 16, 1962- Quimsing’s, as well as other people’s
appointments were confirmed- May 17, 1962- at the
session of the Commission on Appointments, a motion
for reconsideration of all the confirmed appointments was
approved, and the Commission was adjourned with no
future date fixed for its next meeting- June 11, 1962-
President Macapagal designated Eduardo Tajanglangit
as Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo. Hence this petition for
prohibition to restrain Eduardo Tajanglangit from
occupying the position of Chief of Police to which
petitioner Quimsing had previously been appointed and
duly qualified and the functions of which he was actually
discharging.
ISSUE
WON Quimsing’s appointment was not lawfully
confirmed, because of the motion for reconsideration of
his confirmation, which has, to the present, remained
unacted upon.
RULING:
The appointment of Tajanglangit to the position of Chief
of Police of Iloilo City was null and void, because said
position was not vacant. The Revised Rules of the
Commission on Appointments provide:“SEC. 21: …Any
motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may
be laid on the table, and this shall be final disposition on
such a motion." “SEC. 22: Notice of confirmation or
disapproval of an appointment shall not be sent to the
President of the Philippines before the expiration of the
period for its reconsideration, or while a motion for
reconsideration is pending."
The Commission had not disapproved of Quimsing’s
appointment, it was merely under reconsideration. It has
been established that on July 19, 1962, Quimsing’s
appointment was delivered to Malacañang. This, as well
as the provisions above, supports the conclusion that the
laying of a motion for reconsideration on the table does
not have the effect of withholding the effectivity of the
confirmation, nor is it synonymous with disapproval of the
appointment. In fact, it is recognition that the appointment
was confirmed.
DE CASTRO V JBC
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that
has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after
the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section
15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making
appointments within two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010,
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC
“automatically considered” for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of
the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio;
Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination
through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25,
2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may
appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled
within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section
4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers
intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so
in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition
found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions
or limitations on the President’s power to appoint
members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from “political vicissitudes” and its
“insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent
qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the
JBC, the specified period within which the President shall
appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is
whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there
being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the
vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume
its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly
requires the President to appoint one from the short list to
fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief
Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint
the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to
other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department),
provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial
Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court
shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion,
in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s
or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s
or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of
the same character, in that they affect the power of the
President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15
also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that
the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to
cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was
their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary,
the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most
likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
c. Interim or recess appointment
art. 6 s19
art7 s16
JORGE V MAYOR
Nicanor Jorge attained the position of Acting Director in
the Bureau of Lands through regular and successive
promotions. He was appointed by President Carlos
Garcia ad interim Director of Lands in December 13,
1961, he took his oath of office on the 23rd, his
appointment was transmitted to the CoA in 26th. In May
1962, CoA confirmed the said ad interim appointment.
President Macapagal issued Administrative Order No. 2
revoking ad interim appointments extended and released
by former Pres. Garcia after the joint session of Congress
that ended on December 13 1961.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of
Macapagal administration, informed Jorge that pursuant
to a letter from the Asst. Executive Sec., served on Jorge
that his appointment was among those revoked by Admin
Order No. 2, and that his position of Director of Lands
was considered vacant. Jovencio Mayor had been
designated by the President to be Acting Director of
Lands. Jorge instituted a petition for mandamus and quo
warranto, claiming that he is the legally appointed
Director of Lands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 of President
Macapagal operated as valid revocation of Jorge's ad
interim appointment.
RULING:
No. Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December
13, 1961, but there is no evidence on record that it was
made and released after the joint session of Congress
that ended on the same day. It is a matter of
contemporary history, of which this Court may take
judicial cognizance, that the session ended late in the
night of December 13, 1961, and, therefore, after regular
office hours. In the absence of competent evidence to the
contrary, it is to be presumed that the appointment of
Jorge was made before the close of office hours, that
being the regular course of business. The appointment,
therefore, was not included in, nor intended to be
covered by, Administrative Order No. 2, and the same
stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly confirmed
by the CoA and thereafter, the office never became
vacant.
d. temporary designations- admin code of 1987 bk III s17
e. limitations on appointing power of the acting President
5. Executive clemencies
Art. 7 s19
Art. 9-C s5
a. pardon distinguished from probation
b. pardon distinguished from parole
c. pardon distinguished from amnesty
PP V PATRIARCA, JR
The person released under an amnesty proclamation
stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense. Par. 3, Art. 89, Revised Penal
Code, provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by amnesty; the penalty and all its
effects are thus extinguished.
Facts:
Patriarca was charged with the crime of murder for the
death of Alfredo Arevalo before RTC Sorsogon docketed
as Criminal Case No. 2773. He was also charged with
murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain
Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively. The RTC found
him guilty in Criminal Case No. 2773 and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Patriarca appealed the decision to the SC.
Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No.
724 entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents,
and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have
Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes
Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and
Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National
Amnesty Commission." In 1999, his application was
favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board
concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his
political beliefs.
Issue:
What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the
conviction of the accused-appellant?
Held:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels
for their treason or other high political offenses, or the
forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of
another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of
nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and
puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by
amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and
all its effects.
This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty
upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once
granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end
to the appeal.
Patriarca was acquitted of the crime of murder in
Criminal Case No. 2773 while Criminal Cases Nos. 2665
and 2672 were ordered dismissed.
d.effects of pardon
PP V SALLE JR
Where the judgment of conviction is still pending
appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as
in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet
be granted to the appellant.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal.
Facts:
On November 1991, Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky
Mengote were convicted of the compound crime of
murder and destructive arson before the RTC of Quezon
City. Salle and Mengote filed their Notice of Appeal which
was accepted by the Supreme Court on March 24, 1993.
In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal.
The Court required Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of
the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) to verify the
voluntariness of the motion.
Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion without
the assistance of counsel on his misimpression that the
motion was necessary for his early release from the New
Bilibid Prison following the grant of a conditional pardon
by the President on December 9, 1993. She also stated
that Mengote was also granted conditional pardon and
that he immediately left for his province without
consulting her. She prayed that the Court grant Salle's
motion to withdraw his appeal.
On March 23, 1994, the Court granted Salle's motion.
After taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of
the Constitution which provides that the President may,
except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided
in the Constitution, grant pardon after conviction by final
judgment, the Court required (1) the Solicitor General
and the counsel for accused-appellants to submit their
memoranda on the issue of the enforceability of
the conditional pardon and (2) the Presidential
Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to
inform the Court why it recommended to the President
the grant of the conditional pardon despite the pendency
of the appeal.
In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General
maintains that the conditional pardon granted
to appellant Mengote is unenforceable because the
judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the
pendency in this Court of his appeal.
On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o, submits
that the conditional pardon extended to Mengote is valid
and enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., it
argues that although Mengote did not file a motion to
withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to have abandoned
the appeal by his acceptance of the conditional pardon
which resulted in the finality of his conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during
the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction
by the trial court is enforceable.
Held:
Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows:
“Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with
the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.”
Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation
of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after
conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of
course, entirely different where the requirement is " final
conviction, " as was mandated in the original provision of
Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or
"conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed in
Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a
case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of
conviction becomes final.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no
appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused
commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to
appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the
death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d)
when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving
his right to appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is
still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained
finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may
not yet be granted to the appellant.
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under
Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution
prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional,
to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his
conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if
one is made, should not be acted upon or the process
toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is
withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities
of the Government concerned must require proof from
the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction
or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be
in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or
the appellate court, as the case may be.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of
an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of
sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal
shall render those responsible therefor administratively
liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must
not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of
the accused from confinement.
e. sanctions for violations of conditional pardons
TORRES V GONZALES
152 SCRA 272 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Pardon – Not
Subject to Judicial Review/Scrutiny
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In
1979, he was pardoned by the president with the
condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again.
In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of
estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles
Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’
pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon.
Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court
averring that the Executive Department erred in
convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon
because the estafa charges against him were not yet
final and executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final
judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be
validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the
terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve
the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: The SC affirmed the following:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms
and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a
condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of
such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not
subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a
subsequent crime is necessary, much less
conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in
order that a convict may be recommended for the
violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial
process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict
had already been accorded judicial due process in his
trial and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional
vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code;
or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the
RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional,
minimum period, upon a convict who “having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall
violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the
President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
LLAMAS V SEC. ORBOS
Pardon – Applicable to Administrative Cases
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas
together with some other complainants filed an
administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts
constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found
guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his
vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than
30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO
showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume
office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed
upon him.
ISSUE: Whether or not pardon is applicable
administrative cases.
HELD: The SC held that pardon is applicable to
Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly see any
valid and convincing reason why the President cannot
grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can
she grant executive clemency in administrative cases,
which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
g. who may avail of amnesty?
PP V PATRIARCA JR supra
6.powers as commander-in-chief- art. 7 s18; art. 3 s13;
art. 8 s1 par. 2
IBP V ZAMORA
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief
under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing
or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The
President declared that the services of the Marines in the
to anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and
for a reasonable period only, until such time when the
situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition
seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination
of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to
assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the
military and the civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the
President’s action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different
category from the power to declare martial law and power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have
simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for
their revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said
powers highlights the intent to grant the President the
widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power
to call out because it is considered as the lesser and
more benign power compared to the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power
to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights
and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating
safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President
full discretionary power to determine the necessity of
calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally
bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to
discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to
support the assertion that there exists no justification for
calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the
deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of
the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not
constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local
police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the
PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the
PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with
the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with
the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated
or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the
deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols
does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
LACSON V PEREZ
Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of
Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well
as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to
suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of
several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion”
were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition,
injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an
application for the issuance of temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners
assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless
arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners
furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the
information against them were filed, would desist
arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved.
They also contend that they are allegedly faced with
impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint
being that hold departure orders were issued against
them.
Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid,
along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure
orders allegedly effected by the same.
Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of
Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant
petition has been rendered moot and academic.
Respondents have declared that the Justice Department
and the police authorities intend to obtain regular
warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed
prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in
suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant,
thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No.
38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is
improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly
arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation,
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the
period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be
delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the
officer responsible for such may be penalized for the
delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal
ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary
detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither
assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders,
nor were they expressing any intention to leave the
country in the near future. To declare the hold departure
orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper
proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer
for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless
arrests is premature being that no complaints have been
filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of
habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to
relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not
subjected to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and
congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to,
together with their agents, representatives, and all
persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from
arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants
for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with
the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.
SANLAKAS V ANGELO REYES
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-
hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP,
acting upon instigation, command and direction of known
and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building
in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in
the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the
government, demanding the resignation of the President,
Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts
constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the
State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the
officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the
same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and
General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435,
declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was
issued.
ISSUE: Whether Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 are constitutional?
HELD:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section
18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state
or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-
in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution
executive powers. It is not disputed that the President
has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces
and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such
power. While the Court may examine whether the power
was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the
petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis.
In declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces, the President was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on
the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as
opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on
warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person
may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as
this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
DAVID V GMA
489 SCRA 160 – Political Law – The Executive Branch –
Presidential Proclamation 1017 – Take Care Clause – Take Over
Power – Calling Out Power
 Bill of Rights – Freedom of Speech – Overbreadth
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo
members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate the president, then president Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential
Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented
by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed
to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of
extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to
celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public
organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of
their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head
Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares
is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized
and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later
still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was
raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of
Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however
grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985
for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot
visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP
1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the
state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and
some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot
be validly declared by the president for such power is
reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are
those of natural calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an
overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and
unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue
has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting
of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The
Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s
calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is
constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly
constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic
by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in
fact operative because there are parties still affected due
to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can
take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP
1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some
provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in
the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its
declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no
factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of
the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting
reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of
the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. There was also
the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group
of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed,
judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to
prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of
such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an
analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’
statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases
at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also,
a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law
that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and
‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of
facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible
fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of
conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to
state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA
declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s
‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared
PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated
powers. From the most to the least benign, these are:
the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare
Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the
calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes
necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the
Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al
averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of
the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the
President. Such power is vested in Congress. They
assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws
and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted
that such provision is similar to the power that granted
former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided
in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to
promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To
be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can
only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot
create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of
private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the
other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it
also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the
president can declare the state of national emergency but
her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority
from Congress. The authority from Congress must be
based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions
as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry
out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a
Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law
declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid
exercise of the calling out power of the president by the
president.
GUDANI & BALUTAN V SENGA
Facts: Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior
officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security to shed
light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and
Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga,
per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said
Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President
Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No.
464 enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her approval. However, the two
testified before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to
issue an order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear
before the Office of the Provost Marshal General
(OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The
following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from
military service. After investigation, the OPMG
recommended that the two be charged with violation of
Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior
officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of
President Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2) the
charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga
and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and
on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from
proceeding against them, as a consequence of their
having testified before the Senate.
Issue:
1. May the President prevent a member of the armed
forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?
2. How may the members of the military be compelled to
attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires
otherwise?
3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani
considering his retirement last 4 October 2005?
Held:
1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do
so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and
that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. Our ruling that
the President could, as a general rule, require military
officers to seek presidential approval before appearing
before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a
contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the
President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds
significant control over the armed forces in matters such
as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank
promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution
vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the
prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position.
Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain
of command mandate that the Presidents ability to
control the individual members of the armed forces be
accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is
torn between obeying the President and obeying the
Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the
officer has to choose the President. After all, the
Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not
the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.
2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow
members of the military to appear before Congress is still
subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes
as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised
for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as
commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the
President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to
conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come
to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is
aware that with its pronouncement today that the
President has the right to require prior consent from
members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom
or actualize.
We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal
order sanctions a modality by which members of the
military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries
even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which
does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as
commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.
The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate
branch of government to the legislative creates a wrinkle
to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before
Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay
between the legislative and executive branches, informed
by due deference and respect as to their various
constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this
relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one
branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of
behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of
government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either
the legislative or executive branches. Whatever
weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to
originate national policies and legislation, such is
balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by
the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the
other branches of government.
3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of
officers cannot be considered to be outside the
jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice
proceedings were initiated against him before the
termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been
acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is
terminated. Military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen.
Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the
initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before
he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005.
7.emergency powers- art. 6 s23(2)
8.contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans- art. 7 s20,
art. 12 s 21, RA 4860
9. power over foreign affairs
a. recognition of foreign states
US V BELMONT
Brief Fact Summary. The U.S. (P) claim was based on
the fact that funds deposited in a U.S. bank by a Russian
corporation that had been nationalized by the Soviet
government was due to it.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The states cannot interfere in
the complete powers which the national government has
in the conduct of international affairs.
Facts. Before to the 1918 nationalization and liquidation
by the Soviet government, a Russian corporation had
deposited money in Belmont (D), a private bank in New
York City. In 1993, the Soviet Union and the United
States (P) agreed to a final settlement of claims and
counterclaims. The agreement of the Soviet Union was to
take no steps to enforce claims against American
nationals and assigned and released all such claims to
the U.S. (P). The court however held that the situs of the
bank deposit was within the state of New York and was
not an intangible property right within soviet territory and
that it would be contrary to the public policy of the State
of New York to recognize or enforce the nationality
decree when the U.S. (P) sought to recover the money.
The U.S. (P) appealed to the Supreme Court which
granted certiorari.
Issue. Does the national government have complete
power in the conduct of international affairs?
Held. (Sutherland, J.). Yes. The states cannot interfere in
the complete powers which the national government has
in the conduct of international affairs. The U.S. (P)
recognized the Soviet government coincidentally with the
assignment of all claims. The President does not need
the consent of the Senate to conduct foreign relations. In
respect of foreign relations generally, state lines
disappear. Reversed and remanded.
Discussion. The recognition of the Soviet Union and the
release of all claims were interdependent and this was
noted by the Court. Thus it was purely in the realm of
foreign policy to make this agreement. States cannot
therefore interfere in the conduct of foreign relations.
b. conduct of foreign relations
PIMENTEL V OFFICE OF EXEC SECRETARY
Facts:
1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel
the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department
of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the
Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to
Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court
which will have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes
as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and
crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The
Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The
provisions of the Statute however require that it be
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the
signatory state.
3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under
both domestic and international law, is a function of the
Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department
to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to
exercise its discretion.
Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the
DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the
Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a
member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even
without the signature of the President.
The Supreme Court held NO.
1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ
and authorized in the external relations and he is also the
country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is
the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign
affairs.
2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority
to negotiate with other states and enter into treaties but
this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3
required vote of all the members of the Senate for the
treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).
3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a
check on the executive in the field of foreign relations, to
ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and
growth.
d. executive agreements
BAYAN V EXEC SEC
FACTS:
The Philippines and the United States entered into a
Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951, To further
strengthen their defense and security relationship. Under
the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external
armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public
vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected
the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Security which, in effect, would have extended the
presence of US military bases in the Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and
discussed, among other things, the possible elements of
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).This resulted to a
series of conferences and negotiations which culminated
on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel
Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed
by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador
Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada,
through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified
the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting
through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the
Philippines,the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the
President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners – as
legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens and
taxpayers – assail the constitutionality of the VFA and
impute to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in
ratifying the agreement.
Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the
“foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be
allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions
are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be
duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a national referendum held for that
purpose if so required by congress, and c) recognized as
such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21
Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such
treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.
ISSUES AND RULING:
1. Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question
the constitutionality of the VFA?
NO. Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A
party bringing a suit challenging the Constitutionality of a
law must show not only that the law is invalid, but that he
has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. Petitioners have failed to show that they are in any
danger of direct injury as a result of the VFA.
As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA
involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending powers. A taxpayer's suit refers to a case
where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation. Before he can invoke the power of judicial
review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury
as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute
or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the
public. Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by
taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of
any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being
misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers,
have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.)
do not possess the requisite locus standi to sue. In the
absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their
person or to the institution to which they belong, they
cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
is also stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP lacks
the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a
board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing
its National President to commence the present action.
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance
and the constitutional significance of the issues raised,
the Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and
takes cognizance of the petitions.
2. Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII,
or section 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution?
Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as
the VFA involves the presence of foreign military troops
in the Philippines.
The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the
concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international
agreements.
Section 21, Article VII reads: “[n]o treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.”
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:”[a]fter the expiration in
1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning
Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.”
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international
agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of
at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate
is required to make the treaty valid and binding to the
Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on
treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter,
coverage, or particular designation or appellation,
requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and
effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special
provision that applies to treaties which involve the
presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in
the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of
the Senate is only one of the requisites to render
compliance with the constitutional requirements and to
consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Sec
25 further requires that “foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue
of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held
for that purpose if so required by Congress, and
recognized as such by the other contracting state.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines
the treatment of US troops visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of
military personnel, and further defines the rights of the
US and RP government in the matter of criminal
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, import and
export of equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically
deals with treaties involving foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a
certain extent, however, the provisions of Section 21,
Article VII will find applicability with regard to determining
the number of votes required to obtain the valid
concurrence of the Senate.
It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is
inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason
that there is no permanent placing of structure for the
establishment of a military base. The Constitution makes
no distinction between “transient” and “permanent”. We
find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires
foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed
permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is
made by law; the Court should not distinguish. We do not
subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is
not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely
foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. The
proscription covers “foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities.” Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited
to the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign
bases being established. The clause does not refer to
“foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” collectively
but treats them as separate and independent subjects,
such that three different situations are contemplated — a
military treaty the subject of which could be either (a)
foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities
— any of the three standing alone places it under the
coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.
3. Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to
make the VFA effective?
YES
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following
conditions are sufficiently met:
(a) it must be under a treaty;
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate
and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority
of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum;
and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two
requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence
handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the Constitution, as there were at least
16 Senators that concurred.
As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase
“recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting
party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a
treaty. To require the US to submit the VFA to the US
Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to
accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is
the principle that the words used in the Constitution are
to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language
should be understood in the sense they have in common
use.
The records reveal that the US Government, through
Ambassador Hubbard, has stated that the US has fully
committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as
long as the US accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a
treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its treaty
obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate
of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the
President of the VFA, and the concurrence of the Senate,
should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of
our nation's consent to be bound by said treaty, with the
concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and
responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is
generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the
head of the state, through which the formal acceptance of
the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its
domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty.
In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the
President and not, as commonly believed, in the
legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving
or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory
and incumbent on our part, under principles of
international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be bound by
the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2,
Article II declares that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations.
e. distinction between treaty and executive
agreement
COMM. OF CUSTOMS V EASTERN
3 SCRA 351 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Treaties vs
Executive Agreements
Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company
which imports from Japan onion and garlic into the
Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs
ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods
because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank
Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to
Executive Order 328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the
implementing law of the Trades and Financial
Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into
between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive
agreement states, among others, that all import
transactions between Japan and the Philippines should
be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported
by EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that
the executive agreement that the EO was
implementing was never concurred upon by the Senate.
The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and
the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner
appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is
subject to the concurrence by the Senate.
HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties
which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the
members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the
President which fall short of treaties are commonly
referred to as executive agreements and are no less
common in our scheme of government than are the more
formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They
sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at
other times that of more formal documents denominated
‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’.
The point where ordinary correspondence between this
and other governments ends and agreements — whether
denominated executive agreements or exchanges of
notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult
of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake
to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements
as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of
executive agreements, other than those entered into
under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated
with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be
sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements
under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character,
that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant
precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of
agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive
without the approval of the Senate.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels,
navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the
admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and
commercial relations generally, international claims,
postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and
copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by
specific congressional authorization but in conformity with
policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the
general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still
others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of
claims against foreign governments, were concluded
independently of any legislation.
f. deportation of undesirable aliens

GO TEK V DEPORTATION BOARD
The Court of First Instance denied the petition for writs of
habeas corpus, mandamus and certiorari by the
petitioners.
On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang
charged petitioner before the Deportation Board. The
crimes:
•Purchasing $130,000 with license from Central Bank
and remitted it to Hong Kong
•Attempted bribery of Phil and US officials.
In effect, Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest for
petitioner (E.O. No 398, series of 1951). Upon fixing of
bonds, petitioner was temporarily set free.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the President has authority to deport
aliens.
2. Whether or not the Deportation Board also has
authority to file warrants of arrest.
HELD:
1. YES
Section 69 of Act NO. 2711 of the Revised Administrative
Code – Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A
subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall
not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands
or repatriated to his own country by the President of the
Philippines EXCEPT UPON PRIOR INVESTIGATION,
conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of
the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In
such case the person concerned shall be informed of the
charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed
not less than these days for the preparation of his
defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by
himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own
behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.”
* In effect, the President (Quezon, May 29, 1936) created
the Deportation Board to conduct investigations.
2. Yes but only after investigation has resulted to the
actual order of deportation. Arrest would have been
necessary for deportation to take effect. However, in the
case at bar, investigations were still ongoing and no
order for deportation was yet made. Decision: E.O. No
398, series of 1951: declared illegal
Deportation may be effected in 2 ways:
1. by order of President, after due investigation, pursuant
to Section 69 of the RAC
2. by Commissioner of Immigration, upon
recommendation by the Board of Commissioners under
Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
10. power over legislation
11. immunity from suits
IN RE BERMUDEZ, supra
BELTRAN V MAKASIAR
Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel
against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the reasons which
necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if
criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's
filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently
have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her
under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an
indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as
by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing
herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran
also contends that he could not be held liable for libel
because of the privileged character of the publication. He
also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would
produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.
Issues:
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process
when informations for libel were filed against them
although the finding of the existence of a prima facie
case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice
and, subsequently, by the President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant
for his arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine
probable cause; and
(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under
the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-
affidavit.
Held:
(1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the
preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that
instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a
"Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving
his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-
affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the
respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-
affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed
completed. All that is required is that the respondent be
given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is
so minded.
(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive
and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure,
he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding
the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound
policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be
unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before
their courts
(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive
of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of
the office holder's time, also demands undivided
attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only
by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in
which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case
from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent
the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so
minded the President may shed the protection afforded
by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The
choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it
is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that
cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court
finds no basis at this stage to rule on the “chilling effect”
point.
NIXON V FITZGERALD
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The President of the United
States (President) is shielded by absolute immunity from
civil damages for acts done in his official capacity as
President.
In 1968, Fitzgerald, then a civilian analyst with the United
States Air Force, testified before a congressional
committee about inefficiencies and cost overruns in the
production of the C-5A transport plane. Roughly one year
later he was fired, an action for which President Nixon
took responsibility. Fitzgerald then sued Nixon for
damages after the Civil Service Commission concluded
that his dismissal was unjust.
ISSUE: Was the President immune from prosecution in a
civil suit?
HELD: Yes. The Court held that the President "is entitled
to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on
his official acts." This sweeping immunity, argued Justice
Powell, was a function of the "President's unique office,
rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of
powers and supported by our history."
Discussion. The President must be empowered with the
maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with the
duties of his office. If not, his visibility would subject him
to numerous suits for civil damages. To keep the public
safe, there is the constitutional remedy of impeachment,
vigilant oversight by Congress and the press.
CLINTON V JONES
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The United States
Constitution (Constitution) does not automatically grant
the President of the United States immunity from civil
lawsuits based upon his private conduct unrelated to his
official duties as President.
Facts. The Respondent filed a complaint against the
Petitioner alleging that the Petitioner made unwanted
sexual advances towards her when he was the Governor
of Arkansas. The Petitioner filed motions asking the
district court to dismiss the case on grounds of
presidential immunity and to prohibit the Respondent
from re-filing the suit until after the end of his presidency.
The district court rejected the presidential immunity
argument, but held that no trial would take place until the
Petitioner was no longer president. Both parties appealed
to the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court),
which granted certiorari.
Issue. Whether the President can be involved in a
lawsuit during his presidency for actions that occurred
before the tenure of his presidency and that were not
related to official duties of the presidency?
Held. Affirmed. The President of the United States can
be involved in a lawsuit during his tenure for actions not
related to his official duties as President.
It was an abuse of discretion of the District Court to order
a stay of this lawsuit until after the President’s tenure.
The District Court’s decision to order a stay was
premature and a lengthy and categorical stay takes no
account whatsoever of the Respondent’s interest in
bringing the suit to trial. Concurrence. It is important to
recognize that civil lawsuits could significantly interfere
with the public duties of an official. The concurring judge
believed that ordinary case-management principles were
likely to prove insufficient to deal with private civil
lawsuits, unless supplemented with a constitutionally
based requirement that district courts schedule
proceedings so as to avoid significant interference with
the President’s ongoing discharge of his official
responsibilities.
Discussion. A sitting President of The United States
does not have immunity from civil lawsuits based on the
President’s private actions unrelated to his public actions
as President. The doctrine of separation of powers does
not require federal courts to stay all private actions
against the President until he leaves office. The doctrine
of separation of powers is concerned with the allocation
of official power among the three co-equal branches of
government.
ESTRADA V ARROYO
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong
doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other
forms of corruption were made against Estrada before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13,
2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in
the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft
and corruption against Estrada were made and were
only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators,
sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing
damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the
impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire
prosecution panel walked out and Senate President
Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their
support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to
be held concurrently with congressional and local
elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run
in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat
of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took
her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA
as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left
Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for
prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term
as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
“confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily
unable to discharge the duties of his office.
ISSUE: (4) W/N Estrada enjoys immunity from suit
(4) The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit. The
SC rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot be
prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted
in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial
of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the
presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed
Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.” Since the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable
for petitioner to demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before he can be
prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual
bar against his prosecution. The debates in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that when
impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the
resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil
cases may already be filed against him.
The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that
“incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure” but not beyond. Considering the
peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process
against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he
lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a
condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before
the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings.
Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC
licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials
are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally
is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as
any other trespasser.
12. executive privilege
NERI V SENATE COMMITTEE
549 SCRA 77 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative
Department – Inquiry in aid of legislation – Executive Privilege
Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with
Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for
the supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
$329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of
China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to
the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued
a statement that several high executive officials and
power brokers were using their influence to push the
approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before
the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing
wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which
he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him
with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN
project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He
later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent
a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications
between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied.
The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the
SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be
facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it
is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions
are covered by the presidential communications
privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to
enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are “received” by a close
advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet.
And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need
that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
CHAVEZ V PCGG
HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its
officers, as well as other government representatives, to
disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information, though, must pertain to definite propositions
of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-
agency recommendations or communications during the
stage when common assertions are still in the process of
being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. There is
a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on
disclosure of information in general --such as on matters
involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations,
intelligence and other classified information.
2. the VP- art. 7 s3-5, s6 and s9; art. 11 s2-3
Right of succession and membership in cabinet- art. 7 s8,
11 and 3 par.2
ESTRADA V ARROYO
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure)
president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada
cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process
of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-
assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people
for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the
people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk
from any future challenge that may come ahead in the
same service of our country. Estrada’s reference is to a
future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly,
the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not
be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The
press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of
farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if
Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the
de jure President made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
VII. distribution and separation of powers
 system of checks and balances
A. legislative intrusion into executive domain
CONCEPCION V PAREDES
HELD: It is not within the power of the Philippine
Legislature to enact laws which either expressly or
impliedly diminish the authority conferred by an Act of
Congress on the Chief Executive and a branch of the
Legislature. Deliberately considered solely as a question
of constitutional law, and putting to one side all irrelevant
question of expediency and of motive, we conclude that
the power of appointment and confirmation vested by the
Organic Act in the Governor-General and the Philippine
Senate is usurped by a lottery of judicial offices every five
years. An independent and self-respecting judiciary must
continue to exist in the Philippine. The orderly course of
constitutional government must be maintained.
It is our holding that the second paragraph of section 148
of the Administrative Code, as superseded by Act No.
2941, is in violation of the provisions of the Organic Act
and, consequently, invalid.
B. Legislative intrusion into judicial domain
IN RE CUNANAN
Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its
author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved,
the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession and their supervision have been indisputably a
judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in
the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the
admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement
of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction
between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant
license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is
of permissive character, or as other authorities may say,
merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
C. Executive intrusion into legislative domain
ARANETA V DINGLASAN supra
YOUNGTOWN TUBE AND STEEL V SAWYER
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The President’s power, if any,
to issue an order must stem from an act of Congress or
the United States Constitution (Constitution).
Facts. In 1951, a labor dispute arose between the United
States steel companies and their employees. In 1952, the
employees union gave notice of a nationwide strike.
Thereupon, fearful that such a work stoppage would
jeopardize our national defense, President Truman
issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to
take possession of the nation’s steel mills. After obeying
the orders under protest, the steel companies brought
suit in District Court. The District Court issued a
temporary restraining order against the government,
which the Court of Appeals stayed.
Issue. Did President Truman have the authority to order
the seizure of the steel mills?
Held. No. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Justice Hugo Black stated that there was no statute that
expressly conferred upon President Truman the power to
seize the mills. There are no provisions of the
Constitution, or combination of provisions thereof, which
gave the President the authority to take possession of
property as he did.
D. Executive intrusion into judicial domain
ZABALLERO V NHA
Citing precedents on the matter of just compensation,
this Court held in the EPZA case that:
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may
not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its
own determination shall prevail over the court's findings.
Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into
the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
The trial court correctly applied the law on the matter of
just compensation in rendering the disputed decision of
April 7, 1982. In the words of the trial court:
Since courts must first construe acts of government
conformably with the Constitution, the proper, nay,
inexorable, meaning to be given the cited Presidential
Decrees should be that the rules therein enumerated are
intended merely to provide guidelines for the courts as
they go about their functions of determining just
compensation. The plaintiff, therefore, may not impute
upon the presidency the unconstitutional intent of direct
executive determination of just compensation in the
promulgation of the cited decrees and as a delegate of
presidential powers, the National Housing Authority
certainly cannot rise higher than its principal's
constitutional source of authority.
ARTICLE VIII
THE JUDICIAL DEPT
1. power of judicial review
s 4(2) art. VIII Consti
s5 art. 8 consti
art. 7 NCC
MARBURY V MADISON
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the
United States (Supreme Court) has constitutional
authority to review executive actions and legislative acts.
The Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction, the bounds of
which are set by the United States Constitution
(Constitution), which may not be enlarged by the
Congress.
Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson,
outgoing President Adams attempted to secure
Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new
judgeships and filling them with Federalist appointees.
Included in these efforts was the nomination by President
Adams, under the Organic Act of the District of Columbia
(the District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the
District, which were confirmed by the Senate the day
before President Jefferson’s inauguration. A few of the
commissions, including Marbury’s, were undelivered
when President Jefferson took office. The new president
instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold
delivery of the commissions. Marbury sought mandamus
in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to
deliver his commission.
Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the
Supreme Court?
Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
As the President signed Marbury’s commission after his
confirmation, the appointment has been made, and
Marbury has a right to the commission
Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the
president to deliver Marbury’s commission, that the
Supreme Court has the power to review executive
actions when the executive acts as an officer of the law
and the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct an
officer of the government “to do a particular thing therein
specified,” mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if
available to the Supreme Court.
To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to
sustain an original action, which is (in this case) outside
the constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the
Supreme Court.
Discussion. The importance of Marbury v. Madison is
both political and legal. Although the case establishes the
traditions of judicial review and a litigable constitution on
which the remainder of constitutional law rests, it also
transformed the Supreme Court from an incongruous
institution to an equipotent head of a branch of the
federal government.
2. functions of judicial review
a. legitimizing function
b. checking function
c. symbolic/educational function
SALONGA V PANO
ISSUE: Whether the above case dropped by the lower
court still deserves a decision from the Supreme Court
HELD: 2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition
due to the case’s moot and academic nature, it has on
several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar
cases where mootness was clearly apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines,
or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench
and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled
that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not
preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear
and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of
lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the
Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.”
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the
Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created
through an executive order was mooted by Presidential
Decree No. 15, the Center’s new charter pursuant to the
President’s legislative powers under martial law.
Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional
mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino
culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9,
Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59
SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot and
academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its
symbolic function from promulgating one of the most
voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
3. justiciable v. political question
JAVELLANA V EXEC SEC supra
4. req of judicial review
DAVID V ARROYO supra
a. actual case or controversy
i. prematurity
FERNANDEZ V TORRES
DUMLAO V COMELEC
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan
have a cause of action.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of
this case for this case should have never been merged.
Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot’s. They have
separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the
requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There
are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of
the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence
of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide
the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons
charged for crimes may not run for public office and that
the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them from office as
null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of
equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be
treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age,
have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to
compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are
not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal
positions, to require that candidates should not be more
than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if
applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor
General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be
to promote the emergence of younger blood in our
political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be
that persons more than 65 years old may also be good
elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be
a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials.
For one thing, there can also be retirees from
government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither
be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-
year old retiree could be a good local official just like one,
aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official
(Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or
municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from
running for the same office from which he had retired, as
provided for in the challenged provision.
ii. mootness v. ripeness
DAVID V ARROYO supra
GONZALES V NARVASA
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing
to file the case
Held: In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner
asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.
A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that
he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable action.
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or
in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to
the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Neither
does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or
are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be
subjected to any penaltiesor burdens as a result of
the issues raised.
In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to
have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have disbursed in
alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.
Thus, payer’s action is properly brought only when there
is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there
is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue
of EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The appropriations for
the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by
Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from
funds intended for the Office of the President, in the
exercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds
pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to
the creation of the positions of presidential consultants,
advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the
necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if
he possesses a taxpayer’s interest in this particular
issue.
iii. exceptions to the mootness
rule
DAVID V GMA supra
b. earliest opportunity
ARCETA V MANGROBANG
HELD: Perusal of these petitions reveals that they
are primarily anchored on Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. In a special civil action of
certiorari the only question that may be raised is whether
or not the respondent has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Yet
nowhere in these petitions is there any allegation that the
respondent judges acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A special civil
action for certiorari will prosper only if a grave abuse of
discretion is manifested.
Noteworthy, the instant petitions are conspicuously
devoid of any attachments or annexes in the form of a
copy of an order, decision, or resolution issued by the
respondent judges so as to place them understandably
within the ambit of Rule 65. What are appended to the
petitions are only copies of the Informations in the
respective cases, nothing else. Evidently, these petitions
for a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus do not
qualify as the actual and appropriate cases contemplated
by the rules as the first requisite for the exercise of this
Courts power of judicial review. For as the petitions
clearly show on their faces petitioners have not come to
us with sufficient cause of action.
Instead, it appears to us that herein petitioners have
placed the cart before the horse, figuratively
speaking. Simply put, they have ignored the hierarchy of
courts outlined in Rule 65, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Seeking judicial review at the earliest
opportunity does not mean immediately elevating the
matter to this Court. Earliest opportunity means that the
question of unconstitutionality of the act in question
should have been immediately raised in the proceedings
in the court below. Thus, the petitioners should have
moved to quash the separate indictments or moved to
dismiss the cases in the proceedings in the trial courts on
the ground of unconstitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22. But the
records show that petitioners failed to initiate such moves
in the proceedings below. Needless to emphasize, this
Court could not entertain questions on the invalidity of a
statute where that issue was not specifically raised,
insisted upon, and adequately argued. Taking into
account the early stage of the trial proceedings below,
the instant petitions are patently premature.
LAGMAY V CA
199 SCRA 501 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Judicial
Department – Judicial Review – Legitimizing Function – Proper
Raising of Questions of Law
Adela Tuason is the owner of a parcel of land. She
leased the same to Julio Lagmay and 2 others. Tuason
got sick and she needed to sell her land. She then sent
letters to each of her lessees advising them of her
intention to sell the land and that she is giving them the
option to buy what they are occupying. Lagmay et al did
not bother to reply. Tuason thereafter did not collect the
rentals from each. Lagmay et al bothered not to pay.
After 2 years, Tuason’s sisters politely advised Lagmay
et al to vacate the land so that Tuason could sell the
same. Lagmay et al did not reply not until 3 months and
this time they agreed to buy the parcel of land. Tuason
however did not reply. Lagmay et al the filed a complaint
asserting their right over the land they’ve been occupying
for quite some time as guaranteed by PD 1517 or the
Urban Land Reform Law. The lower court ruled that
Lagmay et al waived their right under the said PD when
they refused to reply to Tuason’s initial offer. Lagmay et
al appealed before the Court of Appeals. The CA upheld
the lower court. The CA additionally pointed out that the
parcel of land in question is not declared as an “urban
land” under PD 1967. Lagmay et al filed a motion for
reconsideration assailing the constitutionality of PD 1967.
The CA denied the motion ruling that Lagmay et al
cannot raise a question of law since they did not raise the
same during the trial of merits.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutionality of PD 1967 is
ripe for judicial determination in this case.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that they must
avoid the issue of constitutionality in this case because
the controversy can be decided by other means. The
issue of constitutionality of a statute, executive order or
proclamation must be the very lis mota presented in a
case. The Court does not decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless that question is properly
raised and presented in an appropriate case and is
necessary to its determination. Although the Court may
deem it best for public policy to resolve the constitutional
issue considering that numerous persons are affected by
the questioned proclamation there are other grounds by
which this case may be resolved on a non-constitutional
determination.
Furthermore, under said provision, the terms and
conditions of the sale in exercise of the lessee’s right of
first refusal to purchase shall be determined by the Urban
Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee.
Hence, the lower court rightfully ruled that certain
prerequisites must be complied with by anyone who
wishes to avail himself of the benefits of the decree.
Section 6 should not be isolated from the other provisions
of the decree. After all, the rule is that all the provisions of
a law, even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed
to stand and be given effect by reconciling them if
necessary. The intention of the lawmaker must be
ascertained not from a consideration of a single word or a
particular phrase of the law, but from the context of the
whole law or from a portion thereof, as compared with the
whole.s
c. standing of a party
DAVID V GMA
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question." In private suits,
standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule
as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-
party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put,
the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the
relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public
suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He may be a person
who is affected no differently from any other person. He
could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a
"citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient
interest in the vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen"
and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction
was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was
held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different
category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the
former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of
public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere
instrument of the public concern. As held by the New
York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In
matter of mere public right, however…the people are
the real parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty,
of every citizen to interfere and see that a public
offence be properly pursued and punished, and that
a public grievance be remedied." With respect to
taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a
citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts
to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his
injury cannot be denied."
xxx
Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening
in the Court’s attitude toward legal standing.
In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, the Court ruled that the
status of Kilosbayan as a people’s organization does not
give it the requisite personality to question the validity of
the on-line lottery contract, more so where it does not
raise any issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot
sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds
are being misused. Nor can it sue as a concerned citizen
as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered.
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec, the Court reiterated the
"direct injury" test with respect to concerned citizens’
cases involving constitutional issues. It held that "there
must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged
illegal official act."
In Lacson v. Perez, the Court ruled that one of the
petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is
not a real party-in-interest as it had not demonstrated any
injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters.
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, the Court ruled that
only the petitioners who are members of Congress have
standing to sue, as they claim that the President’s
declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the
emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their
legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido
Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the Court
declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them
with the LDP in Lacson.
Now, the application of the above principles to the
present petitions.
The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396,
particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The
same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409,
Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They
alleged "direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest" and
"unlawful search" committed by police operatives
pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General
does not question their legal standing.
In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged
there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also
raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of
Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers
incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the
interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be
represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the
attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic
rights.
In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the
liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez, Kapatiran Ng Mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v.
Tan, Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Basco v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation, and Tañada v.
Tuvera, that when the issue concerns a public right, it is
sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an
interest in the execution of the laws.
In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s assertion that PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be
deemed sufficient to give it legal
standing. Organizations may be granted standing to
assert the rights of their members. We take judicial
notice of the announcement by the Office of the
President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for
public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are
national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any
direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or
its members may suffer as a consequence of the
issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court held that the
mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule
of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too
general an interest which is shared by other groups and
the whole citizenry. However, in view of the
transcendental importance of the issue, this Court
declares that petitioner have locus standi.
In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as
a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no
allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The
fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence.
She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation
that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired
by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a
media personality will not likewise aid her because there
was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances
prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her
submission that she has pending electoral protest before
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no
relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017
will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But
considering once more the transcendental importance of
the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing
rules.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus
standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper
exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal
tenet of the "liberality doctrine" on legal standing. It
cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount
importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice
Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with
bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical
matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the
"transcendental importance" doctrine, a relaxation of
the standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP
1017 cases."
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus
standi.
PASCUAL V SECRETARY
Facts:
1. Petitioner was the governor of Rizal, filed a petition
assailing the validity of R.A. 920 which contains an item
providing for an appropriation of P85,000.00 for the
construction and repair of a feeder road in Pasig. The
said law was passed in Congress and approved by the
President.
2. The property over which the feeder road will be
constructed is however owned by Sen. Zulueta. The
property was to be donated to the local government,
though the donation was made a few months after the
appropriation was included in RA 920. The petition
alleged that the said planned feeder road would relieve
Zulueta the responsibility of improving the road which is
inside a private subdivision.
3. The lower court (RTC) ruled that the petitioner has
standing to assail the validity of RA 920, due to the public
interest involved in the appropriation. However, he does
not have a standing with respect to the donation since he
does not have an interest that will be injured by said
donation, hence it dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the standing
to file the petition
YES.
1. Petitioner has standing. He is not merely a taxpayer
but the governor of the province of Rizal which is
considered one of the most populated biggest provinces
during that time, its taxpayers bear a substantial portion
of the burden of taxation in the country.
BUGNAY CONSTRUCTION V LARON
Facts:
1. A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P &
M Agro was executed for the use of a city lot called the
Magsaysay Market Area. Subsequently, the City filed a
case to rescind the contract due to the failure of P&M to
comply with the lease contract conditions.
2. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution granting the
lease of said lot to the petitioner Bugnay COnstruction for
the establishment of a Magsaysay Market building. As a
result, respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against
the City assailing the validity of the lease contract
between the petitioner and the city. Ravanzo was the
counsel of P&M Agro in the earlier case.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is the real party in
interest
NO.
The rule is that the taxpayer-plaintiff must sufficiently
show that he would be benefited or injured by the
judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real
party in interest. Before he can invoke the power of
judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to members of the public.
The Court held that the respondent has no standing to
file the case. There was no disbursement of public funds
involved in this case since it is the petitioner, a private
party which will fund the planned construction of the
market building.
NEPA V ONGPIN
171 SCRA 657 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Judicial
Department – Judicial Review – Requisites
After the lifting of martial law in 1981, President Ferdinand
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1789 and some
other PDs. The said PD was issued in order to suspend for
one year the requirement that in order for companies to
validly operate in the country it must be composed of at
least 60% Filipino. NEPA (National Economic Protectionism
Association), an association of local businessmen, assailed
the said PD averring that as taxpayers and Filipinos they
will be greatly adversed by such PD. They sought to enjoin
Roberto Ongpin, then the Minister (Secretary) of Trade and
Industry, from enforcing the said law. The Sol-Gen
commented that NEPA et al have no personality and
standing to sue in the absence of an actual controversy
concerning the enforcement of the PD in question – that
they were not actually adversely affected by said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the requisites for judicial review are
met.
HELD: No. NEPA et al question the constitutionality of Secs
1 and 3 of PD 1892 in relation to PD 1789, the 1981
Investment Priorities Plan and EO 676, as being violative of
the due process and equal protection clauses of the 1973
Constitution as well as Secs 8 & 9 of Article 14 thereof, and
seek to prohibit Ongpin from implementing said laws. Yet,
not even one of the petitioners has been adversely
affected by the application of those provisions. No
actual conflict has been alleged wherein NEPA could validly
and possibly say that the increase in foreign equity
participation in non-pioneer areas of investment from the
period of Dec 2, 1983 to Dec 4, 1984 had any direct bearing
on them, such as considerable rise in unemployment, real
increase in foreign investment, unfair competition with
Philippine nationals, exploitation of the country’s natural
resources by foreign investors under the decrees. NEPA et
al advance an abstract, hypothetical issue which is in effect
a petition for an advisory opinion from the SC. The power of
courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when
the interests of litigants require the use of that judicial
authority for their protection against actual interference, a
hypothetical threat being insufficient.
There must be a bona fide suit. Judicial power is limited to
the decision of actual cases and controversies. The
authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to
the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under
the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as
contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in
the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real,
earnest, and vital controversy between litigants.
Standing vs. real-party-in-interest
i. types of standing
citizen/taxpayers
TATAD V GARCIA
HELD: Respondents claimed that petitioners had no
legal standing to initiate the instant action. Petitioners,
however, countered that the action was filed by them in
their capacity as Senators and as taxpayers.
The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow
taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the
national government or government-owned or controlled
corporations allegedly in contravention of the law
(Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994])
and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts
are involved (Bugnay Construction and Development
Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA. 240 [1989]).
For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is
not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and
uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to
institute the present action.
ITF V COMELEC
Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act
8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide
demonstration of a computerized election system and
allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March
1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM).
On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its
Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the
2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the
three (3) phases of its Automated Election System;
namely, Phase I — Voter Registration and Validation
System; Phase II — Automated Counting and
Canvassing System; and Phase III — Electronic
Transmission.
On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which allocated
the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10,
2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she
authorized the release of an additional P500 million.
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an
"Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid".
On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities
(including the herein Petitioners Information Technology
Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its
president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol)
wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr.
They protested the award of the Contract to Respondent
MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which
the bidding process had been conducted." Citing therein
the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and
procedural requirements (many of which have been
discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a re-
bidding.
Issue: W/N P has locus standing
HELD: On the other hand, petitioners — suing in their
capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned
citizens — respond that the issues central to this case
are "of transcendental importance and of national
interest." Allegedly, Comelec's flawed bidding and
questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified
entity would impact directly on the success or the failure
of the electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of
the ballot as the expression of the will of the people
would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic
system of government. Petitioners further argue that the
award of any contract for automation involves
disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts;
therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing
the transaction must be followed strictly.
Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are
allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal
disbursement of public funds," 22 or if public money is
being "deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or when
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from "wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law."
JUMAMIL V CAFÉ
Facts: Facts: In 1989, Vivencio V. Jumamil filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao del
Norte a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order against
Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte. He
questioned the constitutionality of Municipal Resolution 7,
Series of 1989 (Resolution 7). Resolution 7, enacting
Appropriation Ordinance 111, provided for an initial
appropriation of P765,000 for the construction of stalls
around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public
Market which was destroyed by fire. Subsequently, the
petition was amended due to the passage of Resolution
49, series of 1989 (Resolution 49), denominated as
Ordinance 10, appropriating a further amount of
P1,515,000 for the construction of additional stalls in the
same public market. Prior to the passage of these
resolutions, Mayor Cafe had already entered into
contracts with those who advanced and deposited (with
the municipal treasurer) from their personal funds the
sum of P40,000 each. Some of the parties were close
friends and/or relatives of Cafe, et al. The construction of
the stalls which Jumamil sought to stop through the
preliminary injunction in the RTC was nevertheless
finished, rendering the prayer therefor moot and
academic. The leases of the stalls were then awarded by
public raffle which, however, was limited to those who
had deposited P40,000 each. Thus, the petition was
amended anew to include the 57 awardees of the stalls
as private respondents. Jumamil alleges that Resolution
Nos. 7 and 49 were unconstitutional because they were
passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment and
benefit of private respondents, some of which were close
friends and/or relative of the mayor and the sanggunian,
who deposited the amount of P40,000.00 for each stall,
and with whom also the mayor had a prior contract to
award the would be constructed stalls to all private
respondents; that resolutions and ordinances did not
provide for any notice of publication that the special
privilege and unwarranted benefits conferred on the
private respondents may be availed of by anybody who
can deposit the amount of P40,000; and that nor there
were any prior notice or publication pertaining to
contracts entered into by public and private respondents
for the construction of stalls to be awarded to private
respondents that the same can be availed of by anybody
willing to deposit P40,000.00. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed Jumamil’s petition for declaratory relief with
prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining
order, and ordered Jumamil to pay attorney’s fees in the
amount of P1,000 to each of the 57 private respondents.
On appeal, and on 24 July 2000 (CA GR CV 35082), the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Jumamil filed the petition for review on certiorari.
Issue [1]: Whether Jumamil had the legal standing to
bring the petition for declaratory relief
Held [1]: Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s
personal and substantial interest in a case such that he
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act being challenged. It calls for more
than just a generalized grievance. The term “interest”
means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a
person’s constitutional rights are adversely affected by
the statute or ordinance, he has no legal standing.
Jumamil brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer
of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del Norte and not in
his personal capacity. He was questioning the official
acts of the mayor and the members of the Sanggunian in
passing the ordinances and entering into the lease
contracts with private respondents. A taxpayer need not
be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. Parties
suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an
officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds. The resolutions being assailed were
appropriations ordinances. Jumamil alleged that these
ordinances were “passed for the business, occupation,
enjoyment and benefit of private respondents” (that is,
allegedly for the private benefit of respondents) because
even before they were passed, Mayor Cafe and private
respondents had already entered into lease contracts for
the construction and award of the market stalls. Private
respondents admitted they deposited P40,000 each with
the municipal treasurer, which amounts were made
available to the municipality during the construction of the
stalls. The deposits, however, were needed to ensure the
speedy completion of the stalls after the public market
was gutted by a series of fires. Thus, the award of the
stalls was necessarily limited only to those who advanced
their personal funds for their construction. Jumamil did
not seasonably allege his interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of public funds or the specific injury to him as
a result of the enforcement of the questioned resolutions
and contracts. It was only in the “Remark to Comment”
he filed in the Supreme Court did he first assert that “he
(was) willing to engage in business and (was) interested
to occupy a market stall.” Such claim was obviously an
afterthought.
Issue [2]: Whether the rule on locus standi should be
relaxed.
Held [2]: Objections to a taxpayer's suit for lack of
sufficient personality, standing or interest are procedural
matters. Considering the importance to the public of a
suit assailing the constitutionality of a tax law, and in
keeping with the Court's duty, specially explicated in the
1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other
branches of the Government have kept themselves within
the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them, the
Supreme Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure and take cognizance of the suit. There being
no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the
following determinants formulated by former Supreme
Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1)
the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government;
and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest in raising the questions being raised. But,
even if the Court disregards Jumamil’s lack of legal
standing, this petition must still fail. The subject
resolutions/ordinances appropriated a total of P2,280,000
for the construction of the public market stalls. Jumamil
alleged that these ordinances were discriminatory
because, even prior to their enactment, a decision had
already been made to award the market stalls to the
private respondents who deposited P40,000 each and
who were either friends or relatives of the mayor or
members of the Sanggunian. Jumamil asserted that
“there (was) no publication or invitation to the public that
this contract (was) available to all who (were) interested
to own a stall and (were) willing to deposit P40,000.”
Respondents, however, counter that the “public
respondents’ act of entering into this agreement was
authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo per
Resolution 180 dated 10 October 1988” and that “all the
people interested were invited to participate in investing
their savings.” Jumamil failed to prove the subject
ordinances and agreements to be discriminatory.
Considering that he was asking the Court to nullify the
acts of the local political department of Panabo, Davao
del Norte, he should have clearly established that such
ordinances operated unfairly against those who were not
notified and who were thus not given the opportunity to
make their deposits. His unsubstantiated allegation that
the public was not notified did not suffice. Furthermore,
there was the time-honored presumption of regularity of
official duty, absent any showing to the contrary.
DUMLAO V COMELEC supra
Associational
IBP V ZAMORA
Voters
Legislative
PHILCONSA V ENRIQUEZ
HELD: Therefore, the question of the legal standing of
petitioners in the three cases becomes a preliminary
issue before this Court can inquire into the validity of the
presidential veto and the conditions for the
implementation of some items in the GAA of 1994.
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House
of Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing
to question the validity of a presidential veto or a
condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or
in excess of the authority vested on the President by the
Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of
the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for
overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy,
however, is available only when the presidential veto is
based on policy or political considerations but not when
the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it
becomes the duty of the Court to draw the dividing line
where the exercise of executive power ends and the
bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin.
Governmental
PP V VERA
Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through
the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a
proper party in present case.
Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented
by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of
Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It
goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the
constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose
name the present action is brought, has a substantial
interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds
is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-
settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its
own laws.
d. constitutionality is the very lis mota
of the case
SANTOS III V NORTHWEST AIRLINES
210 SCRA 256 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Judicial
Department – Judicial Review – Constitutionality of a Treaty –
Warsaw Convention
Augusto Benedicto Santos III is a minor represented by
his dad. In October 1986, he bought a round trip ticket
from Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) in San Francisco.
His flight would be from San Francisco to Manila via
Tokyo and back to San Francisco. His scheduled flight
was in December. A day before his departure he checked
with NOA and NOA said he made no reservation and that
he bought no ticket. The next year, due to the incident,
he sued NOA for damages. He sued NOA in Manila.
NOA argued that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction
over the matter pursuant to Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention, which provides that complaints against
international carriers can only be instituted in:
1. the court of the domicile of the carrier (NOA’s domicile
is in the USA);
2. the court of its principal place of business (which is
San Francisco, USA);
3. the court where it has a place of business through
which the contract had been made (ticket was purchased
in San Francisco so that’s where the contract was made);
4. the court of the place of destination (Santos bought a
round trip ticket which final destination is San Francisco).
The lower court ruled in favor of NOA. Santos III averred
that Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case and
he questioned the constitutionality of Article 28 (1) of the
Warsaw Convention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts have
jurisdiction over the matter to conduct judicial review.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that they cannot
rule over the matter for the SC is bound by the provisions
of the Warsaw Convention which was ratified by the
Senate. Until & unless there would be amendment to the
Warsaw Convention, the only remedy for Santos III is to
sue in any of the place indicated in the Convention such
as in San Francisco, USA.
The SC cannot rule upon the constitutionality of Article
28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. In the first place, it is a
treaty which was a joint act by the legislative and the
executive. The presumption is that it was first carefully
studied and determined to be constitutional before it was
adopted and given the force of law in this country. In this
case, Santos was not able to offer any compelling
argument to overcome the presumption.
The petitioner's allegations are not convincing enough to
overcome this presumption. Apparently, the Convention
considered the four places designated in Article 28 the
most convenient forums for the litigation of any claim that
may arise between the airline and its passenger, as
distinguished from all other places. At any rate, we agree
with the respondent court that this case can be decided
on other grounds without the necessity of resolving the
constitutional issue.
DUMLAO V COMELEC supra
LAGMAY V CA supra
e. effect of declaration of unconsti of a
law
NORTON V SHELBY COUNTRY
SHEPPARD V BARRON
AGBAYANI V PNB
B. Judiciary
1. judicial power- art. 8 s1
LOPEZ V ROXAS
17 SCRA 756 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Judicial
PowerDefined
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the
candidates for Vice President in the 1965 elections.
Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his loss before
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The PET was
created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that:
“There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the
Philippines.”
In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to
appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he sought to
enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the
case. Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it
was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the
PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten
members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be
validly appealed before the SC or that there may be
conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed
before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.
HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress
merely conferred a new function to the Supreme Court.
Such is within its power, the Constitution allowed
Congress to determine which body should decide
controversies relating to the election of the President or
the Vice President. RA 1793 did not create another court
within the SC for pursuant to the Constitution, “the
Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such
inferior courts as may be established by law”
The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the
fundamental law vests in the judicial branch of the
government, not merely some specified or limited judicial
power, but “the” judicial power under our political system,
and, accordingly, the entirety or “all” of said power,
except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon
some other agency, such as the power to “judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications” of members of the Senate and those of the
House of Representatives, which is vested by the
fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal
and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice
or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires
legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and
demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for
violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or
disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this
reason, the Constitution ordains that “Congress shall
have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the RULING:
jurisdiction of the various courts”, subject to the A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial
limitations set forth in the fundamental law. powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing of
something in the nature of the action of the court. In order
The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the
for an action for certiorari to exist,
constitution. RA 1793 merely added the court’s
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises
jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by
judicial functions:
Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of
functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid
persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and
because the determining of election contests is
determination.
essentially judicial.
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to
pronounce judgment and render a decision.
SANTIAGO V BAUTISTA
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the
sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the
FACTS:
not the legislative nor the executive)
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to
honor. 2 days before his graduation, Ted and his parents
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of
sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor
parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.
students. They filed a Certiorari case against the principal
and teachers who composed the committee on rating
Judicial power is defined:
honors.. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that the
• as authority to determine the rights of persons or
action was improper, and even assuming it was proper,
property.
the question has become academic (bc the graduation
• authority vested in some court, officer or persons
already proceeded. They also argue that there was no
to hear and determine when the rights of persons or
GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the
property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject
Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board,
matter of adjudication.
exercising judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a
• The power exercised by courts in hearing and
remedy against judicial function
determining cases before them.
• The construction of laws and the adjudication of
ISSUE: WoN judicial function be exercised in this case.
legal rights.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are
neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the
performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that
there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of
persons or property under which adverse claims to such
rights are made, and the controversy ensuring there from
is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with
power and authority to determine
YNOT V IAC
On the power of courts to decide on constitutional matters
– Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance
by lower courts subject to review of the Supreme Court.
“..while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not
prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted,
subject only to the review of the highest tribunal.”
– Sec. 5[2(a)] Art VIII, 1987 Constitution.
2. supreme court
a. jurisdiction art. 8 s5(2)(d)
b. congressional power over the jurisdiction of SC- art. 8
s2 par.1, art. 6 s 30
c. en banc vs division
d. composition
VARGAS V RILLORAZA
FACTS:
Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The
People's Court Act, Commonwealth Act 682, which
provided that the President could designate Judges of
First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance or
Cadastral Judges to sit as substitute Justices of the
Supreme Court in treason cases without them
necessarily having to possess the required constitutional
qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is
constitutional
RULING:
No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional.
Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not
admit any composition of the Supreme Court other than
the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein
mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the
infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a
majority of the members of the Court — as in this case —
are replaced by judges of first instance. It is distinctly
another Supreme Court in addition to this. And the
constitution provides for only one Supreme Court.
Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those already existing at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution and continued
by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but positively
violative of the organic law.
Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that
the members of the Supreme Court should be appointed
by the President with the consent of the CoA, "Unless
provided by law" in Sec 4 cannot be construed to
authorize any legislation which would alter the
composition of the Supreme Court, as determined by the
Constitution.
However temporary or brief may be the participation of a
judge designated under Sec. 14 of PCA, there is no
escaping the fact the he would be participating in the
deliberations and acts of the SC, as the appellate
tribunal, and his vote would count as much as that any
regular Justice of the Court. "A temporary member"
therefore would be a misnomer, as that position is not
contemplated by the Constitution, where Sec.4 of Art. VIII
only provides A Chief Justice and Associate Justices who
have to be thus appointed and confirmed (Sec5).
e. JBC and qualification
f. salary
g. security of tenure
DE LA LLANA V ALBA
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana
can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute
(BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover,
this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior
courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order
their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the
President who was vested with such power. Removal is,
of course, to be distinguished from termination by
virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition,
there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there
is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose
his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts
abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect,
no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of
the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He
ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it
would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent
justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a
failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this
Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of
law is involved.
h. removal
i. reqs as to decisions
OIL & GAS NATURE CORP V CA
FACTS:
This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign
judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun,
India in favor of the petitioner, against the private
respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY,
INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a foreign corporation
owned and controlled by the Government of India while
the private respondent is a private corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
The conflict between the petitioner and the private
respondent rooted from the failure of the respondent to
deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the
petitioner even it had already received payment and
despite petitioner’s several demands. The petitioner then
informed the private respondent that it was referring its
claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their
contract which stipulates that he venue for arbitration
shall be at Dehra dun.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved
the dispute in favour of the petitioner setting forth the
arbitral award. To enable the petitioner to execute the
above award, it filed a Petition before the Court of the
Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision
of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This
was objected by the respondent but foreign court refused
to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to
pay the required filing fees. Despite notice sent to the
private respondent of the foregoing order and several
demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the
private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged
by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the
enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the
foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss
the complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a
valid cause of action. The petitioner then appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate
court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator
did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the
parties, thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the
arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed this petition for
review on certiorari,
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the
dispute between the petitioner and the
private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract.

RULING:
The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein dearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based
does not preclude the validity of "memorandum
decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact
and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of
inferior tribunals.
Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign
judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the
procedure in the courts of the country in which such
judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of
the country in which the judgment is relied on. If the
procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of
the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to
pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this
jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court
simply because our rules provide otherwise.
AIR FRANCE V CARRASCOSO
Facts
Rafael Carrascoso was part of a group of pilgrims leaving
for Lourdes. Air France, through PAL, issued to
Carrascoso a first class round trip ticket. From Manila to
Bangkok, he traveled in first class but at Bangkok, the
manager of Air France forced him to vacate his seat,
because a “white man” had a “better right” to it. He
refused and even had a heated discussion with the
manager but after being pacified by fellow passengers,
he reluctantly gave up the seat.
Air France asserts that the ticket does not represent
the true and complete intent and agreement of the
parties, and that the issuance of a first class ticket did not
guarantee a first class ride (depends upon the availability
of seats). CFI and CA disposed of this contention.
Issue: WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class
seat he claims. YES
Held:
On CA’s decision
Air France charges that CA failed to make complete
findings of fact on all issues presented. SC says that so
long as CA’s decision contains the facts necessary to
warrant its conclusions, there is nothing wrong in
withholding any specific finding of facts with respect to
the evidence for the defense.
Furthermore, SC said that the judgment of affirmance of
the CA has merged the judgment of the lower
court. Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the
Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First
Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions
raised by the assignments of error and all questions that
might have been raised are to be regarded as finally
adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment
affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". We
reached this policy construction because nothing in the
decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would
suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with
those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the
Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from
those which were made the basis of the conclusions of
the trial court.
VDA DE ESPIRITU V CFI
Held: It may be mentioned, for the rest, that petitioner
contends that the order of dismissal above-quoted, being
a decision, violates the constitutional requirement, as well
as of the rules, that it should state the facts and the law
on which it is based. The contention is not well taken. As
may be seen, the said order adopts by reference the
reasons, alleged in the motion to dismiss of respondents,
which, the record reveals, includes the facts and the law
in support thereof. There is, therefore, substantial
compliance with the fundamental law and the rules,
albeit, judges are advised that mere general reference
should be avoided, since anyway it is not difficult to quote
textually the subject of the reference for a closer
adherence to the obvious spirit and reason behind the
requirements.
BUSCAYNO V ENRILE
HELD: One other issue raised by petitioner remains. It
was likewise contended that a judgment of respondent
Military Commission would be violative of Article X,
Section 9 of the Constitution. That provision requires that
a decision of a court of record "shall clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the law on which it is based." The
proceeding in a military commission terminates with a
guilty or not guilty verdict. Hence this objection. It can be
said of course that a military commission is not a
court of record within the meaning of this Articles on
the judiciary. Moreover, the procedure followed,
including the form the judgment takes, was given the seal
of approval in the above Aquino decision citing the
applicable section of the Article on Transitory
Provisions. That would remove any taint of
unconstitutionality. It may be stated further that the
record of the proceedings are available to the reviewing
authorities. Hence any imputation of arbitrariness sought
to be avoided by the above provision would not be
warranted.
MANGELEN V CA
Held: Thus, that decision faithfully complied with Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that no
decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts of the
law on which it is based. Now, if such decision had to be
completely overturned or set aside, upon the filing of a
motion for reconsideration, in a subsequent action via a
resolution or modified decision, such resolution or
decision should likewise state the factual and legal
foundation relied upon. The reason is obvious: aside from
being required by the Constitution, the court should be
able to justify such a sudden change of course; it must be
able to convincingly explain the taking back of its solemn
conclusions and pronouncements in the earlier decision. “THAT ALL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES
In the instant case, the public respondent miserably failed WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED FOR
to do so; this is reflected in the quoted resolution of 12 DECISION OR DETERMINATION FOR A
July 1989 which leaves in limbo the trial court's PERIOD OF 90 DAYS HAVE BEEN
challenged decision because it is not the latter which is DETERMINED AND DECIDED ON OR
reserved but rather the public respondent's own decision BEFORE JANUARY 31, 1998,”
of 30 January 1989. Public respondent simply restore the when in contrary, no decision had been rendered in five
parties to the status quo obtaining prior to 30 January (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases. It was also further
1989. Clearly, therefore, an amended decision on the alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his cert. of service
appeal proper or on the merits of the decision of the trial for the months of February, April to August 1989; and the
court would be in order. months of January to September 1990, or for a total of
seventeen (17) months.

j. mandatory period for deciding cases
k. PET
LOPEZ V ROXAS supra
l. admin powers
1. supervision of lower courts
MACEDA V VASQUEZ
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO) filed a criminal complaint to the Office of the
Ombudsman against the petitioner Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda, RTC Judge Branch 12 of Antique, who was
alleged to have falsified his Cert. of Service on February
1989, by certifying,
Petitioner Contention: Petitioner contends that he had
been granted by the Court an extension of ninety (90)
days to decide the aforementioned cases. He also
contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over
said case since the offense charged arose from the
judge’s performance of his official duties, which is under
the control and supervision of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman
constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court’s
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction
over the criminal complaint filed by PAO against the
RTC Judge.
RULING:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is Ombudsman cannot compel the Court, as one of the
administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious three branches of government, to submit its records, or to
misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested
the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.
under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
Petition is Granted.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against
him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, IN RE DEMETRIA
the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative This administrative charge was triggered by newspaper
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation accounts which appeared on the July 2000 issues of The
of the doctrine of separation of powers. Manila Standard, The Manila Times, Malaya, The
Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today. The national dailies
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively collectively reported that Court of Appeals Assoc. Justice
vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision Demetrio G. Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of
over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze
Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest Yuk Lai.
municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is
only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and
court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit
any violation thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of

petitioner’s certificates of service to the Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the
true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the
necessary records to make such a determination. The
THE FACTS AS EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY Yes. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected
THE PROSECUTION ARE QUITE with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is
CLEAR. YU YUK LAI, TOGETHER WITH circumscribed with the heavy responsibility. His at all
HER SUPPOSED NEPHEW, A CERTAIN times must be characterized with propriety and must be
KENNETH SY ALIAS WILLIAM SY, WAS above suspicion. His must be free of even a whiff of
ALLEGED OF “CONSPIRING, impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of
CONFEDERATING AND MUTUALLY his judicial duties, but also his behavior outside the
HELPING ONE ANOTHER, WITH courtroom and as a private individual.
DELIBERATE INTENT AND WITHOUT
AUTHORITY OF LAW . . . (TO) SELL AND Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria
DELIVER TO A POSEUR-BUYER THREE (3) failed to live up to this expectation. Through his
KILOGRAMS, MORE OR LESS, OF indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not only make a
(SHABU), WHICH IS A REGULATED mockery of his high office, but also caused incalculable
DRUG.” damage to the entire Judiciary. The mere mention of his
ON 2000, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT “THE name in the national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for
EVIDENCE IS STRONG AND SUFFICIENT a suspected drug queen and interfering with her
TO WARRANT CONVICTION OF THE TWO prosecution seriously undermined the integrity of the
ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME CHARGED”. entire Judiciary.
JUSTICE DEMETRIA
ALLEGEDLY INTERCEDE IN BEHALF OF
SUSPECTED DRUG QUEEN YU YUK LAI Although every office in the government service is a
WHEN HE CALLED AND INSTRUCTED THE public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on
PROSECUTOR TO WITHDRAW THE MOTION moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the
TO INHIBIT OF JUDGE MURO, THE JUDGE Judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of propriety
WHO HANDLE THE CASE AND WAS should be maintained, without which the faith of the
ALLEGED TO BE PARTIAL TO YU YUK LAI. people in the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society
ISSUE: cannot be preserved. There is simply no place in the
Whether Judge Demetria violated Code of Judicial Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting
Conduct. standards of judicial conduct and integrity.

RULING:
Justice Demetria is GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED
from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with
prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to any
government office, agency or instrumentality, including
any government owned or controlled corporation or
institution.
2. temporarily assign judges to other stations in public
interest
3. order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid
miscarriage of justice
MONDIGUING V ABAD
Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are accused of
double murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder
in Court of First Instance (CFI) of Ifugao Province. The
case was filed in connection with an ambuscade, that, as
a result of that incident, Governor Gualberto Lumauig of
Ifugao was wounded and his exec. assistant and his
driver were killed. Up to this time the accused in that
case have not been arraigned. .
Mondiguing and Dunuan filed a petition to transfer the
venue of the case to Baguio City or Quezon City. They
claimed that they could not expect a fair and impartial
trial in Lagawe, Ifugao because the Judge of the CFI of
that province is a protege’ of the then Governor and his
brother, former Congressman, and because their
witnesses would be afraid to testify for fear of
harassment and reprisals. The petitioners further claimed
that their lives and the lives of their witnesses and
lawyers would be in grave danger because of the
tensions and antagonisms spawned by the case and the
political rivalry between the Lumauig and Mondiguing
factions. (The accused, George Bayucca was killed on
October 28, 1970 and Alipio Mondiguing resigned as
mayor of Banaue and took refuge in Baguio City). .
Respondent presiding Judge Abad disputed the
correctness or truth of the grounds on the change of
venue and prayed that the petition be dismissed. He said
that, if there would be bias on his part, he would be
biased in favor of the People of the Philippines since
the charged was not “committed personally against” the
Governor. However, this statement is not correct since
the governor is one of the victims mentioned in the
information.
The fact also, is that, previously, the Court has
disqualified Judge Abad from trying the electoral protests
filed against the governor since allegedly the judge was a
political leader of the Governor and was recommended to
his present position by the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether Mondiguing’s plea for a change of venue is
justified.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
A change of the place of trial in criminal cases should not
be granted for whimsical or flimsy reasons. “The interests
of the public require that, to secure the best results and
effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to
prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as
near as may be, where he committed his crime.
The Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering “a
change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice” (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the Constitution). It
“possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that
the trial and disposition of a case pending in a CFI be
transferred to another CFI within the same district
whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and
there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a
trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the
case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead
to a miscarriage of justice”.
A change of venue was ordered by this Court in a case
where it was shown that the accused might be liquidated
by his enemies in the place where the trial was originally
scheduled to be held.
In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to avoid a
miscarriage of justice and considering that his life would
be in danger if he were to be tried in Lagawe, Ifugao, he
should be tried by the Circuit Criminal Court in the City of
Baguio.
Petition is granted.
PP V SOLA
In 1980, the Philippine Constabulary, armed with
a search warrant proceeded to the place of Sola for the
search and seizure of the bodies of 7 dead persons
believed to be within the hacienda of the latter at Sta.
Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. Diggings made
in his canefield yielded two common graves containing
the 7 dead bodies of Fernandez, Olimpos, Perez,
Juanica, Juanica, Callet and Emperado.
Seven (7) separate complaints for murder was filed
against the accused Pablo Sola, et.al. While the
investigation was on going, the witnesses in the said
murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that
if the trial will be held at the Court of First Instance
branch in Himamaylan which is only 10 kilometers from
Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least
two of the accused are officials with power and influence
and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of
the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been
reports made to police authorities of threats made on the
families of the witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds
is valid.

RULING:
Yes to both. The SC could order “a change of venue or
place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.” A change
of venue is imperative if the witnesses in the case are
fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed
on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the
days of trial. Because of their fear, they may either refuse
to testify or testimony falsely to save their lives. It may be
added that there may be cases where the fear,
objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less
than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect
it has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial
aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in
mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a
change of venue.
The cancellation of the bail bonds is justified. Bail was
granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal
Court without hearing the prosecution. The prosecution
was deprived of procedural due process hence, must be
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time,
all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the
criminal case, the prosecution is denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due
process, and the order of the court granting bail should
be considered void on that ground.