A.

The Lawyer and Society

SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION AND BLESILDA S.

CONCEPCION v. ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA
Facts:
This is an administrative case that stemmed from a Verified Complaint filed by complainants
Spouses Henry A. Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S. Concepcion (Blesilda); collectively
complainants) against respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa (respondent), charging him with gross
misconduct for violating, among others, Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR). Complainants alleged that from 1997 until August 2008, respondent served as their retained
lawyer and counsel. In this capacity, respondent handled many of their cases and was consulted on
various legal matters, among others, the prospect of opening a pawnshop business towards the end
of 2005. Said business, however, failed to materialize. Aware of the fact that complainants had
money intact from their failed business venture, respondent, on March 23, 2006, called Henry to
borrow money. The checks were personally encashed by respondent. Demanded the return of
payment but failed to do so. Respondent denied borrowing P2,500,000.00 from complainants,
insisting that Nault was the real debtor. He also claimed that complainants had been attempting to
collect from Nault and that he was engaged for that specific purpose.
In fine, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP concluded that respondent’s actions degraded
the integrity of the legal profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the
CPR. Respondent’s failure to appear during the mandatory conferences further showed his
disrespect to the IBP-CBD. Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be disbarred and that he be ordered to return the P2,500,000.00 to complainants, with
stipulated interest.

Issue:
Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.

Held:
The Court concurs with the IBP’s findings except as to its recommended penalty and its directive
to return the amount of P2,500,000.00, with legal interest, to complainants. The complainants and
incurring the same obligation.
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his
client unless the client’s interests are fully protected:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come
into his possession.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to
a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal
matter he is handling for the client.”

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one
imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this “trust and
confidence” is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is
intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.
The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation. A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what
respondent did, is very unethical. It comes within those acts considered as abuse of client’s
confidence. The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all
the legal maneuverings to renege on her obligation.

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As above-discussed, respondent borrowed money from complainants who were his clients and
whose interests, by the lack of any security on the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their
trust and confidence in respondent, complainants relied solely on the former’s word that he will
return the money plus interest within five (5) days.
However, respondent abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients
the runaround up to this day. Accordingly, there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule 16.04
of the CPR.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule
16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon finality of this
Decision, with a stern warning that a commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

Philippine Association of Court Employees (PACE), Represented By

Its President, Atty. Virginia Rafael v. Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz,
A.C. No. 10134, November 26, 2014
Facts:
This is a complaint for suspension/disbarment by PACE against their former national
treasurer Atty. Diaz. Served in the IBP. Diaz was entrusted with all the money matters of PACE
during the 11th Convention/Seminar in Davao. Complainant alleged that the liquidation for the
convention was submitted by Diaz only during the 12TH in Iloilo and NOT the 11TH. Diaz ran for
the national treasurer seat but failed. The outgoing Board of Directors including Diaz made a
resolution appropriating a term-end bonus for each official. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report
for the 12th Convention. Diaz was called why she failed to liquidate the finances in Davao and Iloilo.
She claims that she liquidated as audited by Agbayani. She also denies running for a re-election as
the national treasurer since she filed her candidacy for Board Member for the 1st District of Ipil.
She says that the resolution on the bonus did not rest on her alone. The case was sent to the IBP. It
recommended the dismissal of the complaint since Diaz offered proof that she submitted the
liquidation reports. IBP Commissioner Fernandez also believes that she should be sanctioned in
accordance with the by-laws of PACE instead of a disbarment case. On reconsideration, the IBP-
BOG issued the Extended Resolution, dated June 21, 2013, granting the complainant’s motion for
reconsideration. It reversed and set aside its earlier resolution and suspended Atty. Diaz from the
practice of law for one (1) year.

Issue:
WON Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) - "A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."

Ruling:
This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended Resolution. Everyone
should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege. It is definitely not a right. In order
to enjoy this privilege, one must show that he possesses, and continues to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is
the very essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are
required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of
litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the
courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the
best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients.
Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-election,
including her non-admission that she ran for said election as shown not by her certificate of
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candidacy but by the affidavits of former PACE officers; and her involvement in the approval or
passage of the questioned term-end bonus of PACE officers, including herself even though she was
no longer working in the Judiciary, were definitely not the candor the Court speaks of. There was
much to be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1, Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) months.

Atty. Alonso v. Atty. Relamida, August 3, 2010

FACTS:
In March 2001, Jennifer Ebanen filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier Philippines,
Incorporated in the NLRC. On July 5, 2002, the labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier, stating
that Ebanen voluntarily resigned. Ebanen appealed at the NLRC which only affirmed the appealed
decision. Ebanen filed for reconsideration but was denied. The case eventually reached the
Supreme Court. On February 17, 2005, the Court’s Resolution dated August 4, 2004 has already
become final and executory; thus, a corresponding Entry of Judgment has been issued dismissing
the petition and holding that there was no illegal dismissal since Ebanen voluntarily resigned.
However, despite the judgment, Ebanen through Atty. Relamida, Jr. filed a second complaint on
August 5, 2005 for illegal dismissal based on the same cause of action of constructive dismissal
against Servier. Thus, on October 13, 2005, Servier, thru counsel, filed a letter-complaint
addressed to the then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that respondents be disciplinary
sanctioned for violation of the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.
Respondents admitted the filing of the second complaint against Servier. However, they opined
that the dismissal did not amount to res judicata, since the decision was null and void for lack of
due process since the motion for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum for the production of vital
documents filed by the complainant was ignored by the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE: Is the respondent guilty of forum shopping and res judicata thus violating Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD:
During the IBP hearing, Atty. Relamida is ot a lawyer but the daughter of Atty. Aurelio the senior
partner of A.M. Sison Jr. and Partners Law Offices where he is employed as associate lawyer.
Atty. Relamida reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen, he had no choice but
to represent the latter. Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of her right to due process
due to the denial of her motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. He then argued that
the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void; thus, there was no res judicata. He
maintained that he did not violate the lawyer’s oath by serving the interest of his client. The IBP-
CBD recommended that Atty. Relamida, Jr. be suspended for 6 months for violating the rules on
forum shopping and res judicata.
The Supreme Court agrees to this finding. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but
not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions
constitutes abuse of the court’s processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and
degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state,
the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution
of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for
not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good
fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are
consistent with truth and honor.
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res
judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a
lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of
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the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate "to delay no man for money or malice."

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-286, dated June 5, 2008, of the IBP, which found
respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. guilty of violating the Rules on Res Judicata and Forum
Shopping, is AFFIRMED. Atty. Relaminda is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the
practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision

Overgaard v. Valdez, Sept. 30, 2008

Facts: The complainant, engaged the services of respondent as his legal counsel in two cases
filed by him and two cases filed against him. Despite the receipt of the full amount of legal fees,
the respondent refused to perform any of his obligations under their contract for legal services,
ignored the complainant’s request for a report of the status of the cases entrusted to his care, and
rejected the complainant’s demands for the return of the money paid to him. Complainant
Overgaard filed a complaint for disbarment against Valdez before the IBP. During the
investigation, respondent Valdez did not participate despite due notice. He was declared in default
for failure to submit an answer and attend the mandatory conference. He did not submit a position
paper or attend the hearing. The Court held that respondent Valdez committed multiple violations
of the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility and hereby DISBARRED and his name
is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Issue: whether respondent’s abandonment of his client constitutes a violation of his oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility?

Held: Yes, the court find that respondent’s disbarment should be upheld. From the facts of the
case, and based on his own admissions, it is evident that he has committed multiple violations of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. In abruptly abandoning his law office without advising
his client and without making sure that the cases he was handling for his client were properly
attended to during his absence, and without making arrangements whereby he would receive
important mail, the respondent is clearly guilty of gross negligence. A lawyer cannot simply
disappear and abandon his clients and then rely on the convenient excuse that there were threats to
his safety. Even assuming that there were serious threats to his person, this did not give him the
permission to desert his client and leave the cases entrusted to his care hanging. He should have at
least exercised reasonable and ordinary care and diligence by taking steps to ensure that the cases
he was handling were attended to and that his client’s interest was safeguarded. If it was not
possible for him to handle the cases entrusted to his care, he should have informed the
complainant of his predicament and asked that he be allowed to withdraw from the case to enable
the client to engage the services of another counsel who could properly represent him.
Deplorably, the respondent just disappeared, deserted his client and forgot about the cases
entrusted to his care, to the complainant’s damage and prejudice. The respondent’s disbarment is
not anchored on his failure to do anything in relation the cases entrusted to his care, but on his
abandonment of his client. He will not be absolved from liability on the basis alone of these
inconsequential acts which he claims to have accomplished because the glaring fact remains that
he has failed to perform his essential obligations to his client, to the courts and to society. As the
complainant’s lawyer, the respondent is expected to serve his client with competence
and diligence. This includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care and giving the
complainant sound legal advice, but also properly representing his client in court, attending
scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the cases entrusted to his
care with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for his client or the
court to prod him to do so. He should not idly sit by and leave the rights of his client in a state of
uncertainty.

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Guevarra vs. Eala A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007
Facts:
On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala
for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint,
Guevarra first met the respondent in January 2000 when his then fiancée Irene Moje introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three
children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that from January to March
2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages some which
read “I love you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you at Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene habitually
went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not
go home from work. When he asked her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parent’s
house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent together on two occasions.
On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal
house. On April 22, 2001 complainant went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he
saw her and the respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger
and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the
conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten
letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, Complainant soon saw respondent’s
car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11 Street, New Manila where as he was later
learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his
friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was
pregnant.

Issue:
Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the reason for the disbarment of Atty. Jose
Emmanuel Eala.

Held:
Lawyer’s oath stated that a lawyer should support the Constitution and obey the laws, Meaning he
shall not make use of deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or
be convicted in any crime involving moral turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was accused of
Concubinage, under ART. 334 of the Revised Penal Code, “ Any husband who shall keep a
mistress in a conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances,
with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished
by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period. Section 2 of ART. XV states that
“Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the state. Respondent’s grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the constitution and
the laws, that he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold. Hence the court declared Atty. Jose Emmanul
M. Eala DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation
of canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Donton v. Atty. Tansingco, A.C. No. 6057, June 27, 2006

Facts:
Peter Donton filed a complaint against Atty. Emmanuel Tansingco, as the notary public who
notarized the Occupancy Agreement, and against others (Duane Stier, and Emelyn Manggay) for
estafa thru falsification of public document. A disbarment complaint filed by petitioner on May
20, 2003 against respondent Atty. Emmanual O. Tansingco for serious misconduct and deliberate
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violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility arose when
respondent Atty. Tansingco filed a counter-charge of perjury against Donton. Atty. Tansingco in
his complaint stated that he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement at the request of
Mr. Stier, an owner and long-time resident of a real property located at Cubao, Quezon City.
Since Mr. Stier is a U.S. Citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his name, he
agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
Donton averred that Atty. Tansingco’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement,
despite knowledge that Stier is a foreign national, constitutes serious misconduct and is a
deliberate violation of the Code. Donton prayed that Atty. Tansingco be disbarred. Atty.
Tansingco claimed that complainant Donton filed disbarment case against him upon the
instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Aletajan, because he refused to act
witness in the criminal case against Stier and Manggay. In Resolution dated October 1, 2003, the
court referred the matter to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation and for which
the latter, through Commissioner Milagros San Juan of the IBP Commission of Discipline
recommended suspension from the practice of law for two years and cancellation of his
commission as Notary Public. The IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the
Report and recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six months. The
report was then forwarded to SC as mandated under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.

Issue:
Whether or Not Atty. Tansingco is guilty of serious misconduct?

Ruling:
Yes. Atty. Tansingco is liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code. The Court
ruled that a lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve
defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a
dishonest scheme or who connives in violating law commits an act which justifies disciplinary
action against the lawyer. Atty. Tansingco had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he
violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to
evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Atty. Tansingco used his knowledge of the law
to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be
suspended. As such, respondent is being suspended for six (6) months.

Rodic v. Lazaro, August 23, 2012

"The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindicative principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons."

Facts:
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Rodica against the respondent Atty. Lazaro on grounds of
gross and serious misconduct, deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
On May 5, 2011, William Strong was arrested and detained by the Bureau of Immigration for
allegedly being involved in an international gang and conspiracy in Brazil on fraud involving the
creation of hundreds of dollars in illegal securities. Strong requested his friend Philip Apostol to
look for a lawyer. Apostol recommended the Lazaro Law Office represented by Atty. Manuel
Lazaro and his associates who initially declined but later accepted to handle the deportation case.
Strong initiated giving the information that his deportation case may be due to the complaint filed
by his live-in partner Jasper Rodica before the RTC against the Hillview Marketing Corporation
for recovery and possession and damages involving a property they have in Boracay which is
represented by Atty. Tan. Rodica was represented by Atty. Ibutnande in this case. Apparently,
Rodica claimed that Atty. Manuel met with Atty. Tan to discuss the settlement package on the
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deportation case they filed against Strong on the condition that Rodica withdraws her complaint
from the RTC of Cebu.
On May 25, 2011 the Bureau of Immigration rendered a judgment deporting Strong to leave the
country. On June 6, 2011 Rodica filed before the RTC a motion to withdraw her complaint
against Hillview. Rodica now alleges that after Strong was deported and withdrawing the case
before the RTC, she was deceived by Atty Manuel et al for over settlement of 7 million which
was allegedly extorted from her after misrepresenting that the withdrawal of the case before the
RTC is only a part of the settlement package.
It appears on the record that Atty. Espejo, an associate of the Lazaro Law office helped in drafting
the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration after Rodica pleaded him
to prepare the motion and was requested further to indicate the name of the Lazaro Law Office
including the name of Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle to give more weight on the pleading.
Rodica promised Atty. Espejo to talk to Atty. Manuel about it. The case before the RTC was
actually dismissed on March 29, 2011 for failure to show cause of action but a motion for
reconsideration was filed by Rodica.

Issue:
Whether or not the allegations of Rodica merit the disbarment of the respondents.

Ruling
The court ruled that Rodica failed to overcome the presumption of innocence of the respondents.
As a general rule, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant to clearly prove the allegations made against them. The required quantum of
proof is preponderance of evidence which is an evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
On Rodica's claim with regards to the settlement package, the court find it without merit because
she withdrew her complaint only after the deportation of Strong. It was also evident on record that
the said case was already dismissed even before the deportation case was filed only she filed a
motion for reconsideration. Therefore, it cannot be said that her withdrawal of the complaint is a
settlement consideration regarding the deportation case of Strong. Moreover, Strong is not a party
to the case she filed before the RTC therefore there is no connection between these 2 cases.
There was sufficient preponderance of evidence that was presented that the cause of her
withdrawal of the complaint is to facilitate the sale of her property in Boracay. According to Atty.
Espejo who helped Rodica draft the motion for withdrawal of the complaint, the said withdrawal
is for the purpose of selling her property to Apostol. Apostol further corroborated that he told
Rodica he is willing to purchase the property once it is free from any pending case. Rodica
promised him to work on the termination of the pending case attached to the property to make the
sale.
On her claim to have paid 7 million to Atty. Manuel et al, she failed to substantiate such claim
despite showing off withdrawals from her bank account certain amount of money after failing to
prove that the said amount was paid to the respondents. Moreover, the court held that Rodica is
not a client of Lazaro Law Office. They merely handled the deportation case of Strong.
As for Atty. Espejo, the court found him to have aided Rodica for misrepresenting before the
court that she was aided by the Lazaro Law Office when in fact she is not. Atty. Espejo explained
that Rodica assured him to talk to Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle about including their name on
the pleading but she did not do so. Atty. Espejo should have known better that Atty. Ibutnande
was the counsel on record on the case before the RTC and therefore it is not his duty to prepare
said pleading. He also should have known that all pleadings before the court are acted based on
merit or the lack of it and not by the name of the law firm. However, the court give due
recognition on the fact that Atty. Espejo expressed remorse on his conduct and made a sincere
apology to the RTC for wrongly employing the name of the Lazaro Law Office and that he was
newly admitted to the Bar in 2010, the court find it proper to give him a warning to become more
prudent on his actuation in the practice of his profession.

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The complaint for disbarment was dismissed.

Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco, Complainants, v. Atty. Pablo S.

Bernardo, Respondent | A.C. No. 6368, 13 June 2012
Facts:
Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Pablo S.
Bernardo for deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar, and violation of
duties and oath as a lawyer. From 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, the respondent – with the
connivance of Andres Magat – willfully and illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to
defraud against the complainants by using false pretenses and deceitful words to the effect that he
would expedite the titling of land belonging to the Miranda Family of Tagaytay City, who are the
acquaintance of the complainants.
It started when the respondent convinced the complainants to finance and deliver to him PhP
495,000.00 as advanced money to expedite the titling of the subject land. He further committed
misrepresentation by presenting himself as the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective
buyer of the land. He also led complaints to believe that he has contracts at NAMRIA, DENR,
CENRO and the Register of Deeds which representation he well knew were false, fraudulent and
were only made to induce the complainants to give and deliver the said amount. Upon receipt of
the money, he did not comply with his obligation to expedite the titling of the land but instead use
the money for personal use. The complainants demanded the return of the money to no avail.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Held:
The Supreme Court held that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He, himself,
admitted in his answer that his legal services were hired by the complainants through Magat
regarding the purported titling of land supposedly purchase. He used his position as a lawyer in
order to deceive the complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject
properties. He never denied that he did not benefit from the money given by the complainants in
the amount of PhP 495,000.00.

The Supreme Court find the respondent in violation of the Rule 2.03, Canon 2 and Rule 3.01,
Canon 3 of the CPR. The respondent was suspended from practice of law for one year and return
the amount of PhP 200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco with 10 days upon receipt of
decision. The respondent is required to submit to the Supreme Court proof of compliance.

ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR. vs. ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA A.C. No.
7360, 24 July 2012
FACTS:
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional
Trial Court, Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the
accused in the same case for which he previously appeared as prosecutor. Atty. Silvosa appeared
as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00 (Esperon Case), for the complex crime
of double frustrated murder and later on November 23, 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and
as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgement of the
Esperon Case. Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Prosecutor Toribio for 30,000.00 php and
failed. Prosecutor Toribio excuted her affidavit on June 14, 1999, a day after the failed bribery
attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon
Chapter. On May 18, 2006, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty.Silvosa in Criminal Case. 27776
for direct bribery on an NBI set-up entrapment operation, wherein, Atty. Silvosa demanded
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15,000.00 php from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for there lease of Cadinas who was
in detention for more than two years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Whether or not a delay of the filing for an administrative complaint exonerate a respondent.
Whether or not crime involving moral turpitude can be a ground for disbarment.

HELD:
Yes, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Silvosa's attempt to minimize his role in said case would be
unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of the said
case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service." The Court agree with Commissioner Funa's finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule
6.03, when he entered his appearance in the motion to Post Bail Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa
conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interest except by written consent of concern given after a full disclosure of facts." Atty. Silvosa's
representation of conflicting interests merit at least the penalty of suspension. No, delay of filing
for an administrative complaint does not exonerate a respondent. There is certain difficulty to
dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more than seven years ago. In this instance, the conflicting
allegations are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. When the
integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against
him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all
times expected of him. Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect. The Court says, mere delay in filing of
an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a
respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from
the time of the commission of the act complaint of and the time of the institution of the complaint,
erring member of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.
Atty. Silvosa's failed attempt at bribing Prosecutor Toribio also merit at least the penalty
of suspension. Yes, crime involving moral turpitude can be a ground for disbarment. Moral
turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.
There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayans' judgement in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of
public record and is already final. Rule 138, Section 27 provides, A member of the bar may be
disbarred by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The crime of direct
bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, as ruled, in Magno vs COMELEC. The practice of
Law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise his privilege. Herefore,
respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.

B. The Lawyer and the Legal Profession

Tiong v. Florendo, December 12, 2011
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics – Pardon Does Not Bar Sanction Against an Erring Lawyer –
Moral Depravity – Grossly Immoral Conduct
FACTS:
Atty. George Florendo has been serving as the lawyer of spouses Elpidio and Ma. Elena Tiong.
Elpidio, a US citizen is often times away. For two years, he suspected that his wife and Atty.
Florendo were having an affair. Finally in 1995, he was able to listen to a telephone conversation
where he heard Atty. Florendo mention amorous words to Ma. Elena. Atty. Florendo confronted
the two and both eventually admitted to their illicit relationship. Atty. Florendo and Ma. Elena
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then executed and signed an affidavit, which was later notarized, stating that they admit of their
illicit relationship; that they are seeking the forgiveness of their respective spouse. Elpidio forgave
Florendo and Ma. Elena. But nevertheless, Elpidio filed a disbarment case against Florendo.
Florendo said he can no longer be sanctioned because he was already pardoned.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Florendo is correct.

HELD:
No. A petition for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is a sui generis case. This class of cases is
meant to protect the public and the courts of undesirable members of the legal profession. As
such, pardon by the offended party of the act complained of does not operate to offset the ground
for disbarment or suspension. Florendo’s act of having an affair with his client’s wife manifested
his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It
showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. He violated the
trust reposed upon him by his client (Canon 17, Code of Professional Responsibility). His illicit
relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting
disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be
disbarred or suspended from his office for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
office, grossly immoral conduct, among others. It cannot be also said, as he claims, that their
relationship is merely a moment of indiscretion considering that their affair went on for more than
two years. Florendo was suspended for 6 months.

Antero J. Pobre vs. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago A.C. No. 7399

August 25, 2009
PETITIONER
Petitioner Antero Pobre made aware to the court the contents of Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago’s speech delivered on the senate floor. The following excerpts are the ones in question:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am

humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

According to Pobre, the words of the lady senator were disrespectful and requested that the latter
be disbarred or be subjected to disciplinary action.

RESPONDENT
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago argued that the statements she made were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. She claims to have made those
comments to expose anomalies with regard to the selection process of the Judicial Bar Council for
the next Chief Justice.
The argument of the respondent is based on Article VI Section 11 which states that:

"A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee thereof."
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ISSUE
WON Miriam Defensor-Santiago can be charged for her comments on the Judiciary

SUPREME COURT: NO.

The court ruled in favor of Defensor-Santiago in this case. The plea of Senator Santiago for the
dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her
privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of
Court.
Despite this, the court feels that the lady senator has gone beyond the limits of decency and good
conduct for the statements made which were intemperate and highly improper in substance. The
court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on her, but the factual and
legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of
remorse from her.
Petition is DISMISSED

Noe-Lacsamana v. Bustamante November 23, 2011

Petitioner’s claim:
Noe-Lacsamana alleged that she was the counsel for the plaintiff in a civil case while Busmente
was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso’s
deed of sale over the property subject of the said civil case was annulled, which resulted in the
filing of an ejectment case where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification
was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that
one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in
court, projecting herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon
verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela
Rosa was not a lawyer. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa
was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmente’scollaborating counsel which
recommended Busmente’s suspension from the practice of law for not less than five years. The
IBP Board of Governors, in its resolution, adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-
CBD

Respondent’s claim:
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few
years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was
able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb
(Macasieb), Busmente’s former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in
Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana
was forged.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal
practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law

RULING:
YES. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284
and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove that
Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We
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agree with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that
Busmente should be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came
to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its status. Busmente’s
allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit. We just presumed that she has legal
qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed her
to accompany us and attend our hearings in short, she gave us paralegal assistance

Khan Jr. v. Simbillo A.C No. 5299, August 19, 2003

FACTS:
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads:“Annulment of
Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the
number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was
an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided
the case will not involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar
advertisements were also published. An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to
the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1
year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he
admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it
was time to lift the absolute prohibition against advertisement because the interest of the public
isn’t served in any wayby the prohibition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELD:
Yes!The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public
service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service
and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary
interest. Worse, advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he erodes and
undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages
people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond. Solicitation of business is not
altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s name appears must be a reputable law list
only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor
may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure
the public or the bar.

Flora Narido vs Atty. Jaime Linsangan 157 Phil 87

FACTS:
This case arose from a labor dispute where Atty. Rufino Risma represented Flora Narido, an
indigent client against her employer Vergel De Dios, the client of Atty. Jaime Linsangan. During
the proceedings in the trial court, Atty. Risma vehemently opposed the submission of a certain
affidavit executed by De Dios because, in the belief of Risma, said affidavit is perjured. He
threatened Atty. Linsangan that if said affidavit is submitted in court, they shall file a disbarment
case against him. The affidavit was filed and so Risma and Narido filed an administrative case
against Linsangan.

Linsangan on the other hand filed a separate administrative case against Risma where he accused
Risma of instigating his client to file an administrative case against him; that said administrative
12
case is groundless; that it was only filed to spite him and is just a mere scheme to threaten him
and to ensure that Risma and Narido has an edge over the labor case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not both administrative cases should prosper.

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court adopted the findings of the Solicitor General where it was recommended
that both administrative cases are not well merited.
In the administrative case against Linsangan, it was found out that there is no sufficient evidence
to prove that De Dios’ affidavit is perjured. Or if even so, there is no showing that Linsangan was
in bad faith for it was not proven that he has the intention of misleading the court.
In the administrative case against Risma, it was not proven that he instigated Narido. It was
Risma’s zeal in protecting his client’s interest that made him to convince Narido to file an
administrative case against Linsangan. There was no bad faith on the part of Risma. He even
advanced the expenses because Narido is indigent.
HOWEVER, it was found that Risma made an arrangement with Narido that he shall collect 15%
from whatever amount they shall collect from De Dios as a result of the labor case. Risma was
admonished for this; that under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, he’s only allowed to collect a
maximum of 10%. He’s advised to keep abreast of said law.

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