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Complications of union in
Malaya
Published online: 15 Apr 2008.
To cite this article: (1946) Complications of union in Malaya, The Round Table:
The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 36:143, 238-246, DOI:
10.1080/00358534608451393
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COMPLICATIONS OF UNION IN
MALAYA
NEW POLICY AND OLD ENGAGEMENTS
newspapers. It was hoped, however, that the Sultans, with their proverbial
courtesy, would overlook the British Minister's gaucherie, and be ready to
accept the proposals when they had had time to consider them in detail.
In this belief the announcement met with a generally favourable reception
in the United Kingdom, and The Times in a leading article of October 12
expressed public opinion by saying: "Britain is pledged by treaty to uphold
the position of the respective Rulers, who enjoy devoted loyalty from their
Malay subjects."
Sir Harold MacMichael gave an account of his visit to Malaya in a report
published as Command Paper Colonial No. 194. He took with him an
"explanatory note" (published as an appendix to his report) of eleven short
paragraphs. The note emphasized the obligations of His Majesty's Govern-
ment to the Malay people, to the Rulers as their leaders, and to the whole
population of the country; and declared that so far from there being any fear
that the Malays would be submerged, the Malays and the whole country
would be strengthened. It referred to the "special position of the Rulers as
traditional and spiritual leaders of the Malay people". It declared that the
Malayan Union would not break with tradition, but would preserve the
traditional and spiritual dignity of the Rulers. In spite of this, there was a
paragraph which showed that each Ruler in his State would in future only
preside over a Malay Advisory Council whose functions would practically
be confined to advice on matters connected with the Muhammadan religion,
the extent to which Their Highnesses understood this paragraph appears to
be open to some doubt. The note made it clear, however, that the Malayan
Union would be a centralized body under a Governor, with Legislative and
Executive Councils, and that in each State and Settlement the principal
British official would be a Resident Commissioner who would preside over a
local Council. There was no mention of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act.
Provided with this document, Sir Harold proceeded to "invite each Ruler's
co-operation in the establishment of a fresh constitutional organization of
Malaya, which had been approved by His Majesty's Government''',* and to conclude
with each Ruler a formal Agreement by which he would cede full jurisdiction
to His Majesty in his State. The intention clearly was that the nine Rulers
should not have the opportunity of consulting one another. It was a whirl-
wind tour. All the treaties were executed in nine separate and distant States
* Italics by T H E ROUND TABLE.
242 COMPLICATIONS OF UNION IN MALAYA
between October 20 and December 21. The first visit was to Johore, where
the Sultan, without consulting his State Council, as he should have done
under the Constitution of the State, signed the treaty after a short talk. In
the other States a day or two was.all that was required. In Trengganu there
was a difficulty, since the Constitution of the State declared that it was unlaw-
ful for the Ruler to surrender the government to any other country. It was
overcome by the Chief Minister, who said that the only question was whether
the country was, or was not, prepared to trust the British Government. The
Sultan decided to trust it, and signed the Agreement.
All nine treaties were in identical words. Sir Harold had no authority to
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agree to any variation. There were two short paragraphs: "His Highness
the Sultan agrees that His Majesty shall have full power and jurisdiction
within the State and territory of . Save in so far as the subsisting
Agreements are inconsistent with this Agreement or with such future consti-
tutional arrangements for Malaya as may be approved by His Majesty, the said
Agreements shall remain of full force and effect." The words italicized above*
gave the British Crown unilateral power to nullify all subsisting Agreements
at any time. The validity of the treaties is now disputed by all nine Rulers, and
all that need be said is that the question appears to be whether His Majesty's
Government, like Shylock, will declare "I stand upon my bond", or whether
the voice of Portia may be heard.
There is, however, another aspect of the case. The people of the country
have not been consulted. In such matters the general policy of His Majesty's
Government has been declared in the clearest terms. In a speech at Bradford
on March 23 Mr. Herbert Morrison, Lord President of the Council, said:
"It is largely because we believe in democracy, and because we urge the
advantages of government by consent, government after discussion, that we
resist the Communists and their antics." This general rule does not apply to
Malaya, for no attempt was made there to consult the people of the Straits
Settlements or the people of the Malay States. The Straits Settlements were
to be torn asunder: Singapore Island alone would retain its status as a Crown
Colony, and the other Settlements were to be severed from it and become part
of a Malayan Union. Penang Island, in particular, was to lose its status as a
"free port"—a status upon which its international trade depended—and to
become subject to the import and export customs tariffs of the peninsula.
(The Colonial Office, indeed, was in such haste to impose these tariffs that it
did so on January 1, long before the debates of March 8 and 18 in the House
of Commons, and only reconsidered its decision in March.) Nowhere was
any consideration paid to the loyalties of the people to the Crown Colony.
In the Malay States the people were not consulted in the surrender by their
Rulers of all power and jurisdiction in their States. Mr. Creech Jones, when
he moved the second reading of the Straits Settlements (Repeal) Bill on
March 8, made it abundantly clear that in his opinion it was quite unnecessary
to consider the wishes of the people concerned. "His Majesty's Govern-
ment" he said, "cannot be deflected from the policy to which they have
given so much careful consideration, and of whose essential rightness they
* By T H E ROUND TABLE.
COMPLICATIONS OF UNION IN MALAYA 243
are so confident." In other words, he meant that, as His Majesty's Govern-
ment was satisfied, the people had no cause for complaint. Nevertheless, the
people of Malaya may ponder over the words of the Lord President of the
Council.
When the Sultans executed the treaties they knew nothing of the White
Paper proposals. The first White Paper (Command 6724)- was not issued
until January 22, more than three months after the execution of the Johore
Treaty of October 20. It was then for the first time that Their Highnesses
began to understand the purport of their cession of power and jurisdiction.
A second White Paper (Command 6749), issued on March 4, gave further
details. One of them was to convert all the "State Lands", hitherto vested
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in the Sultans on behalf of the people, into "Crown Lands", and another was
to transfer all the financial assets of every Malay State to the Government of
the Malayan Union. The Sultans were not consulted in regard to either
document: indeed, from beginning to end the only attention paid to them
has been in respect of their brief interviews with Sir Harold MacMichael.
should be overcome. The Sultans are well aware of the genuine desire of
His Majesty's Government to solve the present constitutional difficulties in
British India, and the Governor's letter has been written in the same spirit.
It may be confidently expected that Their Highnesses will seek the support
and co-operation of the Malays and of all the Asiatics who have their real
home in Malaya.*
Another matter yet to be settled amicably relates to the injured feelings of
a people who have never been consulted. It will be necessary to explain to
the people of Penang Island, Province Wellesley and Malacca the reasons for
the decision taken by His Majesty's Government, and the benefits which they
may expect to receive from the change. In the Malay States it will be more
difficult. As was stated in the House of Commons, the policy has "driven a
wedge" between Malay Rulers and Malay subjects. One section of the
Malays, in its loyalty and devotion to the Rulers, bitterly resents the reduction
of the Rulers to a status in which they will take no further part in the adminis-
tration of the States, but another section is indignant with the Rulers for
having signed treaties without reference to them. In both respects the
present position is most regrettable. The Malays are a sensitive and emotional
people, and their feelings may become uncontrollable. They are profoundly
alarmed by the cession of jurisdiction and by the extension of citizenship to
temporary alien immigrants. If they can be given an immediate assurance on
the second point, they may be ready to listen to explanations and assurances
on the first. It is fortunate that, in its Civil Service, Malaya has officers of
long experience in the country, with an intimate knowledge of the language
and the customs, and with really affectionate friendships with the Rulers,
with the leaders of the community and with the peasantry. Hitherto the
situation has been clumsily handled by the Colonial Office, and all the tact
of the local officials will be required to put matters right again. Though it
may be too much to say that there is no need for alarm for the future, there
is good reason for sober confidence. If the local officials are allowed by the
Colonial Office to express some regret for the diplomacy of the past, the
diplomacy of the future may open in a spirit of confidence and co-operation.
* Since this article was written eight of the Sultans have requested a passage by air to
England, in order to lay their case before H.M. Government. The ninth Sultan, His
Highness of Johore, is already in London.—Editor.